Written: 1937.
Source: Wang Ming, China Can Win! The New Stage in
the Aggression of Japanese Imperialism and the New Period in the Struggle of the
Chinese People, New York: Workers Library, 1937.
Online Version: Wang Ming Reference Archive, 2014.
Transcription/Markup: Juan Fajardo, 2014.
The Japanese usurpers have started a new large-scale military offensive against China. The Chinese troops offer armed resistance to Japanese aggression. China is in flames! Actually a Sino-Japanese war on a scale never seen before has already begun.
On July 7, 1937, the Japanese militarists suddenly attacked Lukouchiao and were heroically repulsed by the 37th Division of the 29th Chinese Army. In order to gain time to bring up reserves and to conceal the true plans of its new military operations from public opinion, the Japanese militarists hypocritically declared that the events at Lukouchiao were an "accidental," "local incident." However, subsequent facts have fully revealed the true purpose of the new offensive launched by the Japanese aggressor in China.
It has always been the dream of the ruling classes of imperialist Japan to establish their rule in China and completely to enslave the Chinese people. The history of the aggressive actions of the Japanese imperialists in China may be divided into the following four main stages:
First stage—from the Sino-Japanese war (1895) to the world imperialist war (1914-1918). During this time Japan grabbed the Lui-Kiu Islands, Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, the concession in Kwangtung Region and Korea—territories that were either a part of China or under Chinese rule.
The second stage—from the time of the world impe-rialist war to the events in Mukden on September 18, 1931. In this period the Japanese imperialists seized Kiaochow and Tsingtao (at the time German concessions in China), their troops advanced on the city of Tsinan and on January 18, 1915, they presented Yuan Shih-kai with the so-called Twenty-one Demands, the satisfaction of which would have meant the virtual transformation of China into a Japanese colony.
The third stage—from the Mukden events in 1931 to the events of Lukouchiao in July of the current year. During these six years the Japanese imperialists seized three northeastern provinces (i.e., Manchuria) and part of the territory of so-called Inner Mongolia (the entire province of Jehol and six counties of Northern Chahar). The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol by Japanese imperialism was a terrific economic and political blow to China.
The fourth stage begins with the Japanese attack on Lukouchiao. The immediate and primary objective of this attack is the seizure of the five northern provinces of China (Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shantung). The seizure of these five provinces would provide Japanese imperialism with rich sources of raw material and extensive markets, such as never were known in the history of the Japanese Empire. However, the military operations of the Japanese troops in the Shanghai-Nanking district show that this time the Japanese aggressor does not confine his plans to the northern provinces.
The present military operations of Japanese imperialism, after the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol, signify a
new stage in the execution of Tanaka's monstrous plan for the complete absorption of China and preparations for the seizure of India and Indo-China, the Philippine
Islands, Indonesia and Australia, as well as preparations for a "big war" against the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of securing the world supremacy of a Pan-Japanese Empire.
"To conquer the whole of China we must first seize Manchuria and Mongolia and to conquer the whole world we must seize the whole of China." This is the idea of General Tanaka which the Japanese fascist militarists are now attempting to carry out.
The open intervention of the German and Italian fascist aggressors in Spain and the consequent aggravation of the situation throughout Europe, the policy of actual toleration of fascist aggression which the British government pursues with reference to Ethiopia and Spain as well as to China, the position of waiting adopted by the government of the United States, the helplessness of the League of Nations in the face of the fascist war incendiaries, the formation of an alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy and, finally, the absence, so far, of real fighting unity of action on the part of the international proletariat, against fascism and war, as a result of the rejection by the reactionary leaders of the Socialist International of the proposals of the Comintern—these are the basic facts in the present international situation which facilitate the fulfilment of the predatory plans of the Japanese fascist militarists and encourage them to undertake new aggressive operations in China.
The rise of anti-war and anti-fascist sentiment among the working masses of Japan, the growth of conflicts between labor and capital, between the landlords and tenant peasants, the increasing financial difficulties and the rising discontent of the moderate section of the bour-geoisie with the adventurous policy of the fascist militarists, who are leading the country to complete economic and military catastrophe—these are the facts of the situation in Japan itself which prompt the Japanese militarists to hasten their aggression on the mainland. The fascist militarists are seeking by their military adventure against the Chinese people to arouse a fever of chauvinism, to divert the attention of the masses from the internal situation in Japan and to establish martial law, so that they may ruthlessly crush the revolutionary movement and all oppositionist forces.
The Japanese militarists are pushing their offensive on China for the purpose of crushing the constantly growing anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese people. They have set themselves the task of destroying the central Nanking government, of smashing the forces of the united national anti-Japanese front and destroying its main participants, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. They want to behead and disorganize the resistance of the Chinese people, in order to make China their colony.
However, we may confidently say that the brazen aggressors have miscalculated! China today is no longer what it was at the time of the Manchurian events. The Chinese people are prepared to offer determined resistance to the Japanese militarists. This is shown by the recent declarations of the head of the Nanking government and Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese army, Chiang Kai-shek.
Referring to the events at Lukouchiao, Chiang Kai-shek said in his speech at Kuling on July 17 that "the further development of the Lukouchiao events is a question of the life or death of China," and on July 30 in connection with the seizure of Peiping and Tientsin by the Japanese in an interview with the correspondent of the Central News Agency he declared: "Our whole people, seeing that the country is going through a critical period, when our very existence is at stake, will fight to the end as one man."
A portion of the Chinese troops and air force have already begun national defensive military operations in Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, Nanchang, Hopei and Chahar against the Japanese aggressors. A striking proof of the indignation of the Chinese people and its readiness for decisive struggle with the aggressor is the fact that all the organized anti-Japanese political and military forces of the country began to unite with unheard of speed. Thus at the conference of national defense in Nanking to which, for the first time, along with all the prominent military leaders of the country, the leaders of the Red Army of China, Comrades Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung and Chow En-lai were invited, considerable progress was made as regards cooperation between the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other organizations. Actually the general mobilization of military forces, including the Chinese anti-Japanese People's Red Army, for common struggle against the common national enemy has already started in China.
The Communist Party of China gave a clear and affirmative answer to this question in the first days of the Manchurian events. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese people share this standpoint. But many political and military men in China because of their "fear of Japan" and the influence of pro-Japanese elements for a long time opposed armed resistance to Japanese aggression. To be sure, the advocates of this so-called theory of non-resistance become fewer and fewer each day. However, the complete refutation of their arguments is an inseparable part of the general struggle to organize real military resistance to the constantly increasing Japanese aggression.
The advocates of the "theory of the impossibility of China winning" in an armed struggle with Japan maintain that China, which is weak from the standpoint of military technique and industry, is as yet unprepared for armed resistance to a foreign enemy. If China attempts armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor it will inevitably share the fate of Ethiopia or, at best, of Spain. While arguing in this fashion they deliberately gloss over the tremendous difference that exists between China and Ethiopia or even Spain, from the standpoint of the forces and resources the country possesses for the struggle against the usurper.
It is true that China is weak from the standpoint of military technique and industry and for this very reason all the great and even the small capitalist countries beat us. The leader of all peoples, Stalin, emphasized this weakness of China's in his report on the results of the First Five-Year Plan. Comrade Stalin said that without industrialization the situation of the U.S.S.R. would be more or less analogous to the present position of China, "which has no heavy industry, has no war industry of its own and which is pecked at by everybody who cares to do so." The Chinese Communists well realize that the level of heavy industry and the military-technical equipment of the army are of tremendous importance in modern warfare. But at the same time, as Marxist-Leninists, they recognize the truth. tested by history, that the outcome of war is decided by living people in the final analysis.
In order to offer armed resistance to Japanese impe-rialism which is armed to the teeth, China must prepare. But how? The advocates of "the impossibility of China winning" reduce this question merely to the purchase of arms abroad and the increase of armament production within the country, for in their opinion until China shall possess the same armaments as her adversary she cannot offer successful armed resistance to the aggressor.
The re-arming of China is of course necessary, but arguments that China cannot resist Japanese aggression until China's armaments correspond to those of Japan are utterly wrong and harmful. They are wrong for the very reason that China lags far behind Japan in this respect and the latter will not allow China calmly to catch up with her. The seizure by the Japanese aggressors of vast territories in Manchuria and Jehol, with their tremendous riches and resources, has already dealt a severe blow to China's defenses and now if China were to lose the five northern provinces in addition, as well as the Shanghai-Nanking area, its capacity to defend itself would be enormously reduced.
What does the loss of Manchuria, Jehol and the five northern provinces mean for China's defenses? It means the loss of over one-fourth of total population, over one-fifth the entire territory, nine-tenths of all the iron ore deposits, two-thirds of all the railways, four-fifths of all the coal mines and one-half of the total coal deposits, one-half of the entire production of salt. Obviously, if China cannot defend these rich provinces from Japanese occupation, she not only will deliver a huge portion of her population to the mercy of Japanese barbarians. She not only will lose extensive territory that will facilitate hostile military operations. She not only will surrender her rich deposits of coal, iron-ore and salt and her railways into the hands of her mortal enemy. She will at the same time be totally deprived of sources of raw material and the prerequisites for the development of her heavy and war industry.
Furthermore what would the loss of Shanghai mean to China? It would not only mean the loss of the biggest economic, industrial, political and cultural city in the land, but also surrender to the enemy of the main military strategical center. It would mean opening the gateway for the Japanese aggressor to all the rich districts on the Yangtse River. It would mean a permanent threat to Nanking, the capita! of the Chinese republic. If the Chinese people cannot defend the Shanghai-Nanking district the aggressor will strike at the very heart of China.
We must also tell the advocates of the "impossibility of China winning" that the purchase of arms and the reception of assistance from abroad largely depend on the powers of resistance and riches of China itself at the present time. It is a bitter truth of our times that no one considers the weak and those who do not defend themselves. And if alter losing jehol and Manchuria China loses its northern provinces, if it loses its important Shanghai-Nanking area, it will be weaker and poorer and then there will be less likelihood and opportunity of receiving loans, arms and other forms of assistance from abroad.
If, on the contrary, China now seriously undertakes the armed struggle in defense of its territorial integrity and national independence, in the course of the struggle it can re-arm itself both with its own resources and through the purchase of arms abroad. The clearest proof of this is the struggle of the heroic Spanish people against the fascist rebellion of Franco and the German-Italian intervention. The area of Spain is incomparably smaller than that of China; its population is twenty times smaller than the population of China.
As regards industrial development Spain is one of the most backward countries in Europe. At the outset of its military operations against the fascist rebels the republican government of Spain had only irregular detachments consisting of poorly armed working people. However, as a result of the combined efforts of all the parties and organizations of the People's Front, and first and foremost of the Communist Party of Spain, as a result of the solidarity and aid of the international proletariat and the democratic and anti-fascist forces, in the course of a year's armed struggle the Spanish Republic not only created a regular army of half a million but also succeeded in providing this army with modern military equipment. And if the comparatively small Spanish Republic managed to organize its army and acquire the necessary armaments in the course of armed struggle, why cannot the enormous Chinese Republic do likewise?
If Republican Spain offers successful armed resistance to the combined forces of fascist Italy and Germany, why cannot vast China offer successful armed resistance to the armed forces of the single Japanese aggressor? For the Japanese aggressor, save for his military technical advantage in the first period of the war, as regards the remaining prerequisites for victory is inferior to the united national forces of the Chinese people.
"l'he advocates of the "impossibility of China winning" imagine that the weaker the resistance to the foreign aggressor the fewer the sacrifices for China. The irrefutable facts of the history of Sino-Japanese relations completely disprove this conclusion of theirs. In 1895 China offered armed resistance to Japanese aggression. Although China was defeated. her territorial losses were compara-tively small.
In 1914-19 the Chinese people offered determined opposition to Japanese aggression, as a result of which Japanese imperialism was unable to force China to agree to her enslaving Twenty-one Demands. In 1931, however, the Nanking government pursued a policy of nonresistance in connection with the Mukden events. As a result, in a short time Japan occupied the whole of Manchuria and following that, Jehol. This is the biggest terri-torial loss that China has suffered in the last hundred years.
In 1932 the Chinese 19th and 5th Armies, together with the Shanghai proletariat and the Communists, offered heroic resistance to the Japanese troops, as a result of which China saved Shanghai from Japanese occupation. In 1936 the Suiyuan and Shansi troops heroically repelled the so-called combined Japanese-Mongolian-Manchurian troops and as a result the aggressor was forced for a time to retreat from those provinces.
And now, in connection with the new big Japanese military invasion, China is faced with the crucial alternative of either seriously defending its national existence, which means life, or of not resisting Japanese aggression, which means death. The Chinese people must choose one of the two possible courses: they must either yield to the persuasions of those who maintain "the impossibility of China winning"—take the course of non-resistance, for the alleged purpose of "avoiding excessive sacrifices," and thereby sacrifice the whole of China to the Japanese usurpers, or else they must take the course of the Spanish people, and even at the cost of temporary and partial sacrifices, defend the territory and the riches that have not yet been lost, and reconquer the land and the portion of the people's wealth that has already been seized by the aggressor, save the working people of China from the barbarism of the Japanese fascist military clique, save the whole of the Chinese people from enslavement.
In other words China must either defend and reconquer everything at the cost of partial and temporary sacrifices or else on the pretext of "desiring to avoid big sacrifices" actually lose everything, including national independence, the people's freedom and the country's wealth. There is no middle course.
Departing from the false assumption of "the impossibility of China winning" the advocates of the "theory of non-resistance" Further adduce considerations of an international character. In their opinion the external position of China is as yet unfavorable for armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor.
Yes, the external position of China today is not as bril-liant as we would like it to be. from the-standpoint of our country's defense. But Japan's position is no better than China's. The new Japanese aggression is not only a threat to the national existence of the Chinese people; it also menaces the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France. By its aggression Japan violates the Covenant of the League of Nations, the obligations of the Nine Power Pact and other international agreements; she facilitates the aggression of fascist Germany and Italy in Spain and throughout Europe, she endangers the general peace.
"The situation is now deveitying in such a way that to maintain peace throughout the world means first and fore-most to bring about the defeat of the fascist invaders in Spain and China."[1]
The aggravation of the external position of Japanese imperialism facilitates the struggle of the Chinese people. More than ever before, Japan is isolated in the international arena; her allies, the signatories of the so-called anti-Comintern treaty—fascist Germany and Italy—are in no position to provide Japan with military assistance to the extent that they would if they were not involved by their intervention in. Spain. It is unlikely that they will be able to extend war credits to Japan for they themselves are in just as bad financial straits as their fond ally.
And the struggle of the Chinese people against the aggressor and war incendiary in the Orient, like the struggle of the Spanish people against German and Italian fascism, is not only the cause of defending the country's own national existence and freedom. It is an integral part of the struggle of the whole of advanced and progressive mankind against fascism and war, for democracy and peace. The solidarity and sympathy of the world proletariat and of all honest, peace-loving and democratic forces are on the side of the Chinese people.
Consequently, neither the internal nor the interna-tional position of China gives grounds for the assertion made by the advocates of the "theory of non-resistance" that China is in no position to offer successful armed resistance to Japanese aggression.
However, it by no means follows that the struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressor is an easy matter, or that China's victory is guaranteed ahead of time. The armed struggle of the Chinese people for the preservation of their national independence encounters tremendous weaknesses and difficulties, which it will require tremendous effort to overcome.
The first basic difficulty arises from the far from adequate organization and unity of the national forces of China. Although as a result of the constant struggle of the Communists and the masses, as well as of the efforts of the progressive elements within the Kuomintang, the internal war has recently ceased, and the process of the peaceful unification of all anti-Japanese national forces has begun, the extent of this unification is far from what is required for successful armed resistance to the foreign enemy. The many-millioned Chinese people who com-prise one-fifth of all humanity will become invincible only when they are united and organized into one irre-sistible national force.
The second basic difficulty in the armed struggle against the aggressor arises from China's military techni-cal backwardness. Although the Chinese troops display devotion and endurance in the battle with the foreign invaders and are greatly superior numerically to the regular infantry divisions of Japan, they are far inferior to their adversary from the standpoint of military technical equipment. The Chinese air force, despite the considerable increase in the number of airplanes and the training of new heroic and skilled fliers, is not yet adequate
The Chinese navy is weak both numerically and in quality. The strengthening of the naval forces for purposes of coastal defense is one of the urgent fighting tasks of the Chinese people and the Nanking government. The Chinese troops and the civil population are almost unprepared for chemical warfare while the cannibalistic Japanese fascists have already begun to use poison gases against the Chinese people.
Finally, in connection with the weak military technical equipment and lack of experience in modern warfare, the Chinese troops do not possess adequate military technical experts. Although the experience of the Spanish Republic has shown that similar weaknesses and difficulties may be overcome in the course of the war, they are most keenly felt in the first period of the fighting.
The third basic difficulty of the anti-Japanese struggle lies in the fact that Japanese imperialism has had great experience in espionage and diversion, experience in deception, bribery and intrigue against the oppressed peoples. In the course of decades the Japanese military political intelligence service ("Special Service Department") has succeeded in planting its numerous agents: spies, diversionists, terrorists and provocateurs in all the more or less important military, strategic and political points and organizations of China, including a section of higher political and military circles. Many of these agents deliberately refrain from activity for the time being, awaiting the opportune moment to strike a telling blow at the most vital points.
Finally, the fourth basic weakness lies in the fact that because of the country's economic backwardness, financial poverty and extremely limited means of communication, the Chinese troops will experience shortages and hitches in the flow of arms, ammunition and provisions and it will be hard to send up reinforcements and to secure the swift and timely mobility and maneuvering capacity of the troops, etc.
Yes, the difficulties and weaknesses of semi-colonial China in the armed struggle with imperialist Japan are numerous and extremely serious. And it is therefore the task of the Communists and the Chinese people as a whole to find the means and the courage to overcome them. It would be a crime before the people to flinch from these difficulties and weaknesses.
Today the entire Chinese people, save for agents of the Japanese, national traitors and hopeless cowards and chatterboxes, are no longer faced with the question of whether "China must or can offer armed resistance to Japanese aggression." Now China is faced with the one question of how to organize this armed resistance and how to secure the victory of the Chinese people in this difficult but glorious struggle for national liberation.
According to the information of the foreign and the Chinese press from the moment of the Lukouchiao events to the beginning of military operations by the Japanese troops in Shanghai, that is, prior to August 14, the Kuomintang and the central Nanking government adopted the following measures in the interests of organizing resistance to the new acts of Japanese aggression:
1. Between one hundred and one hundred and fifty thousand men were mobilized in Hopei, Chahar and Shantung to strengthen defense and to help the 29th Army.
2. The first conference of national defense was called.
3. An order was published reinstating Chang Hsueh-bang (leader of the Manchurian army) as general, and readiness was expressed to reinstate General Tsai Ting-kai (Commander of the 19th Army) in his post of command.
4. Under pressure of public protest headed by Madame Sun Yat-sen the seven arrested leaders of the "All-China Association of National Salvation" were freed.
5. Work was begun on military defenses in the districts of Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan, etc.
6. Commanders for the various fronts were appointed, Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in-Chief of all the Nanking troops and Commander of the First Army, on the front along the Peiping-Hankow Railway; Feng Yu-hsiang, Commander of the Second Army, on the front along the Tientsin Pukow Railway; Yen Hsi-shan, Commander of the Third Army, on the Shansi-Suiyuan front.
It must be acknowledged that although these measures of the Kuomintang and the Nanking government do not yet meet the requirements of the situation and do not satisfy the country's defense needs, they are, nevertheless, a big step forward by comparison with the position and poliCy of the Kuomintang and the Nanking government in the recent past.
Only after the Japanese attack on the Shanghai-Nanking district did the Kuomintang and the Nanking government begin more serious armed resistance to Japanese aggression. The near future will show whether the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, with the present composition of their leadership, will be able to organize this resistance consistently to a victorious finish.. We Communists earnestly hope that the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, after fully overcoming the resistance of the pro-Japanese elements, will lead the armed struggle against the Japanese invaders to a victorious finish, together with us and together with the whole Chinese people.
The Communist Party of China for its part, deeply aware of its responsibility for the fate of the working class and of the entire Chinese people, has persistently advocated the slogan "Expel Japanese imperialism from China," which it advanced at the very beginning of Manchurian events in 193t, and, step by step, beginning with the Manifesto of August, 1935, and ending with the latest declarations regarding events in North China, it has offered concrete proposals, based on the policy of creating a single national anti-Japanese front by means of which the Chinese people will not only offer serious armed resistance to Japanese aggression but will secure the victory.
What concrete proposals and demands do the Chinese Communists advance in their declarations and appeals?
First, "the collaboration of all anti-Japanese parties and groups of China on the basis of the collaboration of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, to resist Japan and save the country." The collaboration of all parties and groups in China, based on a political agreement as regards the common struggle against the common' enemy, assumes the retention of their political and organizational independence by all the parties to the agreement: the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other political organizations.
Indeed, according to the latest reports in the foreign press the collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is making rapid progress—if this is true we must welcome it in every way. But in the interests of the Chinese people as a whole we must frankly advise certain leaders of the Kuomintang to abandon their mistaken efforts to transform collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China into the political and organizational subordination of the Communist Party to the Kuomintang. They must also abandon their mistaken policy of ignoring the other anti-Japanese political groups and organization besides the Communist Party and the Nanking Kuomintang. They must recognize the necessity of forming a united front with these groups and organizations and give up their efforts to make collaboration with these groups involve their forcible subordination to the Kuomintang and the Nanking government.
Such an attitude on the part of certain Nanking leaders to the solution of this question that is vital to the country and the people only hinders and delays the formation of a single anti-Japanese national front composed of all the truly popular forces of China. Deliberately or otherwise, these leaders hinder the work of organizing real armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor and play into the hands of the latter.
Second, "the formation of an all-China government of national defense and a single all-China democratic republic." There are now reports to the effect that the Kuomintang intends in the near future to reorganize the Nanking government in this directing. This is very well and we can only welcome it. But to hasten this work we must thoroughly expose various slanderous legends and wrong arguments. First of all the legends spread by pro-Japanese elements to the effect that the slogan for the formation of an all-China government of national defense means the overthrow of the existing central Nanking government is utterly false and unfounded. It is slander and provocation! At the present time only the Japanese aggressor and his agents are interested in the overthrow of the Nanking government.
We Chinese Communists openly declare that we support the Kuomintang and the Nanking government and that we will fight Japanese imperialism together with them shoulder to shoulder.
A wrong and scholastic assertion is made by certain incorrigible chatterboxes to the effect that the slogan for the formation of an all-China government of national defense means the formation of a government which must necessarily assume the title of all-China government of national defense and that otherwise it will not be such a government. Formalists! It is not a question of names but of essence! The assertions of those who say that the existing Nanking government has long since become an all-China government of national defense are also incorrect. No, the Nanking government has only now partially begun to carry out the tasks of national defense. But it has not yet become a truly all-China 'government of national defense such as the military situation warrants and such as all advocates of a united anti-Japanese national front demand.
The Nanking national government must become a truly all-China government of national defense and it can, provided it changes its policy in the direction of a determined struggle for national independence, for the democratization of the regime and the improvement of the material conditions of the masses, by removing pro-Japanese elements from the government and by drawing into the government the truly authoritative militant anti-Japanese leaders from the respective parties, groups and organizations, as the situation warrants and in conformity with the wishes of the latter.
Only this type of authoritative and fighting government, together with the convening of an all-China parliament based on universal suffrage and universal democratic liberties, can truly cope with the responsible, difficult and complex task of national defense, with which it is entrusted by 400,000,000 people. Only this type of all-China government of national defense can secure the universal mobilization of all the military, human and economic forces of the whole country for the sacred armed struggle of the entire Chinese people against the Japanese aggressor.
The immediate liberation of all political prisoners, the repeat of all anti-popular and anti-democratic laws, the further amendment of the laws and conditions that govern the convening of the National Assembly, the radical alteration of the draft of the Constitution of the Chinese Republic, the immediate introduction of broad democratic liberties for all citizens (with the exception of national traitors and Japanese agents). in a word the transformation of China into a truly united all-China" republic—these measures will swiftly and effectively facilitate the establishment of mutual trust between the people and the government and thereby increase China's power of national defense many times.
Third, the "universal mobilization of all military di-visions and the formation of a united all-China anti-Japanese army." A successful armed 'struggle against the Japanese aggressor requires the universal mobilization of all-China's military divisions and for this it is necessary to form an all-China united anti-Japanese army by uniting all the armed forces of China, i.e., all the central Nanking armies, all the provincial armies, the anti-Japanese people's Red Army, the Manchurian anti-Japanese people's armies, etc., with a single command, a single discipline, a single system of supplies and armaments and a single military plan for coordinating operations against the common enemy.
The Nanking government and Chiang Kai-shek have to a degree undertaken to form such an army. We naturally welcome this step. The Red Army and its commanding and political staff, led by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, has often confirmed its sincere readiness to enter the all-China united national revolutionary army as a component part, not only in words but in deeds.
But the formation of a united all-China army has long been delayed because in recent years when the mutual struggle had already virtually ceased, certain leaders of the Nanking Army and certain Nanking politicians sought to utilize the slogan of the formation of a united national army in order to weaken and reduce the fighting strength of the anti-Japanese national Red Army. For example, they demanded the resignation of the foremost, most capable leaders and organizers of the Red Army, Comrades Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, the reduction and curtailment of the size of the anti-Japanese people's Red Army, the removal of all staff leaders of all the divisions of the Red Army and the appointment of others, etc. Does this correspond to the general interests of the struggle against Japan and the cause of forming a united national army?
According to the latest information the Nanking government and the Kuomintang have already withdrawn several of their demands and the Red Army, in order to hasten the formation of the united Chinese Army and further the common struggle of the anti-Japanese front, has already officially complied with the orders of Nanking on the appointment of its commanding staff and on the redesignation of the Red Army as a part of the na-tional revolutionary army. This is a big step forward in the formation of a united all-China army.
Another serious obstacle to the formation of a united people's revolutionary army is the fact that some of the Nanking leaders have attempted, in the name of the formation of a united national revolutionary army, to weaken the strength of the local troops, while at the same time a section of the local military leaders, who have long been accustomed to regard their troops as their "personal capital," are reluctant to merge their military forces with the united all-China anti-Japanese army. We must frankly tell these military leaders in the center and in the localities that at the present time the national self-consciousness of all the fighters in the Chinese Army is constantly increasing.
They realize that their sacred duty lies not in preserving blind obedience to "their generals," but in consciously performing the glorious task of defending the country and the people. Significant in this connection is the be havior of the 38th Division of the 29th Army during the recent events, when its commander Chang Tsu-chung, a pro-Japanese agent, refused the request of his officers and soldiers that he order the division to resist the Japanese troops. Against the will of its commander the 38th Division, under the command of the best officers, voluntarily went in a body to assist the 37th Division in defending the Peiping-Tientsin district from the Japanese aggressor.
This is the ideal time to test all the military leaders of China. If under the present conditions anyone proves himself a traitor and a coward, if anyone opposes action against the Japanese, he will be despised by everyone as an unworthy military leader, as an unworthy son of his country.
Fourth, "universal mobilization of the entire Chinese people." China's military force alone is far from enough for a truly successful armed struggle against Japanese imperialism. What is needed is the universal mobilization of the entire able-bodied Chinese population, of all men and women, young and old, for a common struggle to attain a common goal.
The line of the Communist Party, which was expressed in its appeal of August 1 (1935), must become the directive of mobilization: "Let those who have much money give their money; let those who have much arms furnish their arms; let those who have bread and rice give their bread and rice; let those who have good health give their strength and energy unsparingly; let those who have special training utilize their training. Let the entire-people be mobilized in this manner!"
Fifth, "the universal arming of the whole Chinese people." The military operations of the Japanese avia tion, infantry and naval forces have already shown with full clarity that in modern warfare the rear differs little from the front. Therefore we must arm our people with all the available weapons, that they shall not only be in a position to defend themselves at any place and at any time from the surprise attacks of the Japanese and their agents but may also provide the necessary aid to our troops on the front and carry on partisan warfare and diversionist work in the enemy's rear and on his flanks, etc. Right now the Nanking government and the local authorities must first of all arm the millions of working people of Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Hangchow, Wuhan, Tsingtao and other big cities of the country as well as the peasant masses of the northern provinces, the Kiangsu-Chekiang and Fukien-Kiangsi districts. The combination of the auxiliary operations of the armed masses with the military operations of the troops on the basis of a general military plan is the only way to secure the expulsion of the Japanese invaders from China.
Sixth, "universal mobilization of the country's entire economy and the adoption of an economic policy of national defense." Anyone can see the tremendous importance of the universal mobilization of all the country's economic, financial and raw material resources in modem warfare. This task is especially urgent in China, which is backward economically and which must wage a long and drawn-out war on a vast scale with Japanese im-perialism. In this connection we Chinese Communists still have a lot of serious work to do together with our ally, the Kuomintang, in order to mobilize and organize the country's entire economy in conformity with the requirements and conditions of national defense.
Seventh, "securing and improving the material con dition of the masses." The masses of China live in pov-erty, every year millions perish from hunger, floods, drought and other calamities. The chatter about the alleged impossibility of any form of improvement in the living conditions of the masses during the war-time must be discarded as a pernicious theory. Yes, in war-time it is difficult to improve the material conditions of the masses. During the nationwide defensive struggle people must endure great sacrifices. But the provision of elementary living conditions, the improvement of the intolerable situation of the working masses during the nationwide armed struggle, is not only possible but is absolutely necessary in the interests of the struggle.
At the present time hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers and employees who were previously employed in the Japanese enterprises have left their situations in sign of protest and as a boycott of the national enemy. But unemployment means hunger. Is it impossible to provide these hundreds of thousands of vanguard fighters with a livelihood? Of course it is possible.
This year in many districts of China the peasants again stiffer from drought and crop failure. Is it impossible to give elementary aid to the starving and impoverished peasants? Of course it is possible. We must also give systematic aid to the many millions of unemployed and impoverished artisans, etc.
Eighth, "the adoption of a policy of national defense education and of aid to the unemployed and illiterate youth." China has tens of millions of illiterate workers and peasants, and the system of education is far from satisfying either the requirements of the students themselves or those of the state. Therefore in recent years China has witnessed a big, mass movement of the youth, led by the best and outstanding scientific and educational leaders, advocating a policy of national defense education and of aid to the unemployed and illiterate youth.
The main objectives of this movement are the fol-lowing:
1. The improvement of the educational system in the direction of developing the national consciousness of the youth and its determination to fight against the foreign enemy for the salvation of the country;
2. The reorganization of the educational system to conform with the requirements of national defense and the training of specialists in the various fields;
3. Freedom of conscience and of study, struggle against the compulsory training of the youth in the spirit of ideas that are hostile to the people and to the nation:
4. Military training for the youth and the students;
5. The provision of work for those who have finished their studies and aid to students, etc.
The Communist Party of China fully endorses this movement of the youth and the best section of the Chinese intellectuals, and it has included these demands in its own general program for a united national front of resistance to Japan and for the salvation of the country.
Ninth, "confiscation of all the property of the Jap-anese aggressor and his agents and the destruction of Japanese spies and national traitors." The confiscation of all the property of the Japanese aggressor and his agents will deprive our enemies of an economic foundation in China; the means thus confiscated will go to defray a part of the military expenditures and to provide aid for the anti-Japanese fighters and their families.
It is generally recognized that Japanese agents infest the state, military and party apparatus of the Kuomintang and of other organizations, centrally and locally. If the Kuomintang and the Nanking government have definitely decided to wage an armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor they must nut allow their apparatus to be infested by Japanese agents, especially in its most responsible links. And if this be true why do those open and dastardly traitors of the Chinese people. the Trotskyites. still carry on their filthy, subversive, diversionist and spying work on behalf of the Japanese secret service. with impunity. in Shanghai, Nanking, Sian and elsewhere? For it is a generally known and incontrovertible fact that the Chinese Trotskyites are employed by the Japanese secret service.
Is not the counter-revolutionary slogan to the effect that China's main enemy is not Japanese imperialism but the Communist Party of China and the All-China Association of National Salvation directly dictated by the Japanese secret service?
Is not the Trotskyite slogan of "an alliance with Japan for the struggle against the Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek" a direct appeal of the Japanese aggressor to destroy the Communist Party and the Kuomintang?
Is not the Trotskyite line "on the necessity of waging the national revolutionary war in China not only against Japanese imperialism, but at the same time, against all the imperialist powers" directed towards isolating China from Europe and America, in order to facilitate the Japanese seizure of China?
Is not the Trotskyite propaganda of the notorious anti-Leninist theory on the impossibility of national revolutionary wars in the period of imperialism, plus the furious attacks of the Japanese-Trotskyite agents on the slogan of the Chinese Communist Party for a national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism, a direct fulfilment of the Japanese instructions to preach the “theory of non-resistance" in China?
Is not the Trotskyite slogan on the "necessity of simultaneously waging a civil war against the internal enemy and a national revolutionary war against the external enemy" and the "impossibility and inadmissability of any united front between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang" a cynical application of the Japanese policy of "conquering China with the hands of the Chinese themselves," and of not letting the national forces of China unite for the common struggle against Japanese aggression under any conditions? The late national writer Lu Hsen was profoundly correct when he declared that "Japanese imperialism entirely welcomes the views of the Trotskyites in China."
During the Sian events the Japanese Trotskyite agents headed by the bandit Chang Mu-tao made every effort to stir up war between Nanking and Sian. These same agents subsequently killed General Wang l-tse. a fatuous national hero who was the first member of the high command of the Chinese army openly and honestly to establish the united anti-Japanese front with the Communist Party and the Red Army.
The Trotskyites, headed by the thrice-accursed rene-gades Huang Ping and Chang Mu-tan, receive $5o,000 a month from the Japanese secret service in North China to organize a so-called "new party" and to carry on their wrecking work. The Trotskyite representative Chang Mu-tao was included in the so-called delegation of friendship with Japan and went to Tokyo with the letter. The Trotskyites Shielt Nuon-shan, Cheng Hsiao-cha and the blood-thirsty murderer Jen Tso-hsuan (alias Yeh Ching) publish special papers and magazines, with Japanese money, which spread all kinds of slander against the Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the anti-Japanese mass organizations.
Do not all these facts prove the full correctness of our great writer Lu lisen who said that "by their conduct the Trotskyites are unworthy to be modern Chinese"? Do not all these facts show that the Trotskyites by agreement with the Japanese secret service are helping Japanese imperialism to seize China? Do not these facts prove that the Trotskyites are not only the enemies of the Communist Party, but the enemies of the whole Chinese people?
All these facts fully confirm the words of the great leader of all working humanity, Comrade Stalin, to the effect that modern "Trotskyism . . . has changed . . . into a frantic and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and intarclerm acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states."[2]
The Chinese people and international public opinion will judge the extent to which the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, as well as the local military and political authorities, are determined and prepared for armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor, by their attitude towards all Japanese agents and national traitors, including the Japanese-Trotskyite fascist agents. The government and the people of the U.S.S.R. have given us an example of how to fight against the foreign intel-ligence service and purge the state military and Party apparatus of these vermin, thereby strengthening its defenses and securing its rear in case of an attack by foreign aggressors.
Together with the above nine slogans and the demands on internal policy, the Communist Party also advanced the slogan on the "adoption of an anti-Japanese foreign policy." The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, in their appeal of August 1, 1935, proposed a special point on foreign policy which calls for "the establishment of contact with all peoples that are hostile to Japanese imperialism (with the Japanese working people, the Koreans, Formosans, etc.), for a common struggle against the common enemy, the establishment of an alliance with all nations and states which support and sympathize with the national struggle of the Chinese people and of cordial relations with all powers and nations which maintain a friendly neutrality in the military operations between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people."
And in one of its latest declarations regarding events in Northern China the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party proposed to the Nanking government that it immediately adopt an active anti-Japanese foreign policy, that it support the international peace front and that it enter all forms of agreements with other countries which would benefit the cause of the anti-Japanese struggle.
The application of the above measures in the sphere of internal and foreign policy will not only enable the Chinese people to organize truly nationwide armed resistance, but to secure the victory over the Japanese aggressor.
The struggle of the Chinese people is entering a new period—the period of the direct organization of successful nationwide armed resistance to Japanese aggression.
If in the preceding period the main task was to end the civil war in the country on behalf of a unanimous struggle against Japanese imperialism, now, when the armed struggle with the Japanese aggressor has already begun, the main task is to organize the nationwide armed resistance to the point of the complete expulsion of the Japanese invaders from China.
If in the preceding period the Communist Party of China only succeeded in laying a certain foundation for the establishment of a united anti-Japanese front with the Kuomintang and with other organizations, it is now directly fighting for the speedy and the complete formation of this united national anti-Japanese front, through the establishment of collaboration of political parties and organizations and the creation of a united all-China democratic republic with an all-China government of national defense and a united all-China anti-Japanese army.
If previously the question of the organization of suc-cessful nationwide military resistance to Japanese ag-gression still faced the Communist Party in perspective, today it has become the immediate and urgent task. And from this it follows that if previously the Communist Party of China concentrated its attention and its work for the most part on the Red Army and the Soviet districts and relied mainly on their forces, at the present time our Communist Party must not only concern itself
with strengthening and increasing the forces of the Red Army; it must also see to it that the hest traditions and fighting qualities of the latter, a; the most advanced, disciplined, and compact component part of the all-China army, are preserved. The Communist Party of China will not only be concerned with improving work in the Soviet districts so as to make them a buttress of the anti-Japanese struggle, but, relying on the growing revolutionary strength and might of the millions of working people all over China, it will struggle to transform other districts throughout the country into strong foundations for the all-China democratic republic.
This means that in the first place the Communist Party of China must devote tremendous effort to the education and organization of the working class millions, who at the present time are again beginning to take an active and open part in the anti-imperialist struggle of national liberation as the most advanced, the most class-conscious and the most consistent detachment of the entire Chinese people.
The Chinese Communists realize that work among the workers and among the trade unions in the main centers of the country was extremely weak in the previous period. Now, however, as a result of the growing class consciousness and organization of the working class and its activity and initiative, the mass influence and the base of the Communist Party grow and strengthen and the nationwide struggle against the Japanese aggressor will become more and more powerful.
Second, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of organizing and drawing the broad peasant masses which comprise the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people into the nationwide and general democratic struggle. The Chinese Communists realize that for all their rich experience of work among peasants, save in those districts where the Red Army was or now is, they have on the whole done very little to organize the peasants. Yet the more broadly and the more effectively the peasant masses are organized and the more actively they are involved in the revolutionary struggle, the stronger will be the anti-Japanese national liberation movetnent and the more certain its successful issue.
Third, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of strengthening and extending its work among the Chinese youth in general and among the student youth in particular. The Chinese Communists realize that work among the youth is especially weak. The Chinese youth are deeply imbued with the spirit of national liberation; they take their stand heroically and devotedly on the front line of the anti-Japanese struggle and they are destined to play an important role in the struggle of the Chinese people for national liberation.
Fourth, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of organizing its menthe's and all honest revolutionary elements in all sections of the national revolutionary army in order to raise the fighting spirit of the army and strengthen revolutionary military discipline, to provide examples of heroism and self-sacrifice and to secure the mutual cooperation of the people and the army in the hard but historic struggle with the mortal enemy.
Fifth, the Communist Party of China is faced with the task of strengthening its influence and its work in Manchuria and Jehol. The Communist Party can be proud of the fact that Communists, despite great hardships and tremendous sacrifices, work and struggle in Manchuria and Jehol.
In the fulfilment of its great historical revolutionary tasks our Chinese Communist Party inevitably encounters many difficulties. These difficulties are connected with the need for carrying on—
"... the struggle against Japanese imperialism, armed as it is to the teeth—a crafty enemy which is cleverly dispersing the forces of China and making use of every internal struggle in this country for its own robber ends."[3]
These difficulties also arise from the fact that in China there exist certain representatives of the propertied classes, who like the French bourgeois leaders in the period of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, place the selfish interests of their classes above their national duty, who readily commit national treason and who, under certain conditions, will assist the foreign foe in his struggle against the Chinese working class, against the Chinese people.
"But there are also internal difficulties in the path of the Communist Party of China. It has to overcome the resistance of sectarian elements. who do not understand that in the present conditions the only way to secure the liberation of the Chinese people is that of establishing a united national front against the Japanese violators. It also has to carry on a struggle against the opportunist capitulators who are ready to sacrifice the political and organizational independence of the Party and the Red Army, and to dissolve them in other organizations."[4]
The first difficulty of an inner-party nature is connected with the fact that in recent years the Chinese Communist Party has made a sharp political turn, such as was scarcely experienced by any other section of the Comintern. Instead of the previous armed struggle with the Kuomintang, the Communist Party now fights for collaboration with the Kuomintang and the other organizations. Instead of the civil war of the Red Army with the Kuomintang and non-Kuomintang troops which lasted for nearly ten years, the Communist Party now struggles for the unification of the Red Army with all other Chinese troops in a united all-China national revolutionary army. Instead of the previous armed struggle for the overthrow of the Nanking government and the establishment of an all-China Soviet government the Communist Party now fights for the formation of a single all-China government together with the Kuomintang and the Nanking government, for the formation of a united all-China democratic republic with an all-China government of national defense.
At the same time the Communist Party openly withdraws its slogan of the Sovietization of China at the present stage at the struggle of the Chinese people. Although so far the Communist Party is making this political turn with comparative success it would be wrong to say that its ranks do not still include a considerable number of people who, because of the sharpness of the turn, are caught in the snares of ideological confusion and practical error. Now more than ever before the Communist Party must carry on a most serious ideological struggle and improve the Marxist-Leninist theoretical training of its forces.
The Chinese Communists, like true sons of their people, take their stand on the front lines, in defense of China's national existence and national independence, but this does not mean that the Chinese Communists have been transformed into bourgeois nationalists or that they have been dissolved in the ranks of the latter. There always has been and always will be an impassable barrier between the Communists and the bourgeois nationalists. While we take a most decisive stand in defense of the national interests of our people, we remain true revolutionary internationalists and consistent proletarian fighters.
While we declare ourselves, despite the differences in principle that exist between communism and Sun-Yat-sen-ism, advocates of the basic revolutionary slogans of Sun Yat-sen, of the best revolutionary traditions of the Chinese people, we Communists never for an instant under any circumstances cease to be true followers of the Marxist-Leninist teachings.
While we take our stand under specific historic condi-tions for the formation of a united national front with the Kuomintang and the other organizations on the basis of a common platform for a common struggle against a common enemy, we Chinese Communists will never, under any circumstances, even for an instant, tolerate the loss of the political and organizational independence of our own Party, or the concealment of our own Communist face and banner.
"The Communist Party of China, while loyally and honestly fulfilling its obligations according to the agreement undertaken by it regarding the struggle against the usurpers, does not in-tend to take either the path of blind faith in its allies, or the path of capitulation."[5]
While we actively favor the creation of a united all-China democratic republic and the calling of an all-China parliament, under the specific historic conditions, we Chinese Communists are never, under any circumstances. esen for an instant, transformed into bourgeois-democrats and we do not cease to be consistent advocates of Soviet power and of socialism.
The second difficulty of an inner-Party nature arises from the necessity of re-educating the old Party forces in conformity with the new tasks, of training and promoting new forces from among the activists and leaders of the mass revolutionary movement who have developed in recent years. The majority of the present forces of the Communist Party of China were trained and tempered in the civil war. Many of them are of peasant origin. The) have had experience in armed struggle against the Kuomintang and its armies, but many of them utterly lack experience in the struggle for the masses under tomtit ions where there is neither a Soviet power nor a Red Army and have not the remotest concept of the working class movement in big cities. Therefore the education of old Party forces in conformity with new conditions and methods of work is a far from easy matter.
A task of no less importance is the training and promotion of new forces, primarily from among the workers. In recent years many activists and leaders of the mass anti-Japanese movement and the strike struggle have grown up and developed. It is among them that the Communist Party can and must recruit fresh forces and new reserves, its new fighting forces, directly linked with the broad masses and possessing new experiences of struggle and work. The Party has helped them and will help them, for the Communists value every honest and capable son of the people.
In the process of the national revolutionary struggle many of the present activists and leaders of the anti-Japanese movement will become acquainted with the theory and practice of Communism; they will draw closer and. closer to our Party and will in the near future become sons and daughters of the great Communist Party. Some of them have already joined the Communist Party of China. But not all active participants in the anti-Japanese movement can be Communists. The desire and determination to take part in the anti-Japanese struggle in themselves are far from sufficient to warrant being a member of the Communist Party. Communists are not only fighters in the national revolutionary movement but consistent fighters for the liberation of the working class and of all working mankind, that is, fighters for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Soviet power and for communism.
The third difficulty of an inner-Party nature arises from the fact that under the present conditions—the cessation of the internal war and the beginning of the nationwide armed struggle of defense—the enemies of the Chinese revolution, and first and foremost the Japanese secret service, will inevitably redouble its efforts to penetrate the ranks of the Communist Party with its agents, provocateurs, diversionists, terrorists and wreckers, who are recruited primarily from among the concealed Trotskyites, the followers of Chen Tu-hsiu, Lo Tsian-lung, etc., so as to destroy from within the power and strength of the most revolutionary and the most military party, of the party which they fear the most, the Communist Party of China. This circumstance is all the more dangerous because revolutionary vigilance and systematic struggle against provocation and espionage are extremely weak and insufficient in our Party's ranks. The Party organizations, including the leading ones, do very little to verify their forces.
China is passing through the most serious and the most critical state in its history. Tremendous difficulties stand in the way of the great struggle to organize a nationwide armed resistance to the Japanese aggressor, to defend China's national existence and the cause of general peace. The entire Chinese people, every political party and group, every political, military and public leader of China, is confronted today with a crucial test. The Chinese Communists, true followers of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the great teachers of the working class and of all working mankind, and worthy sons and daughters of their people do not flinch from these difficulties and will find the way to overcome them. Together with the entire Chinese people, with the solidarity and support of the entire international proletariat and of all progressive mankind, the Chinese Communists have confidently and definitely entered the big historic battles with Japanese imperialism for a great new, independent, free and happy Chinese Republic!
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[1] Georgi Dimitrolf, Fascism is War, pp. 12-13, Workers Library Publishers, New York.
[2] Joseph Stalin. Mastering Bolshevism, p. 14. Workers Library Publishers, New York
[3] See The Communist international, October, 1936, Ceorgi Dimitroff, "The Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China," p. 1339.
[4] Ibid., p. 1340.
[5] Ibid.