Some Questions Concering the Indonesian Revolution and the Communist Party of Indonesia

Report Delivered at a Mass Rally in Peking on September 4, 1963

D.N. Aidit (1963)

Source: The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1964.

Dear Comrades

During my current visit to Peking, I have been invited by the leading comrades of the Chinese Communist Party to address this mass rally. I have chosen as my subject "Some Questions Concerning the Indonesian Revolution and the Communist Party of Indonesia". I think this is a fitting one, because the Chinese people have a deep interest in, and a warm feeling for, the Indonesian revolution and the Indonesian Communist Party. I know that the Chinese people are anxious to hear anything con­cerning the Indonesian revolution and the Indonesian Communist Party. They show interest In, cherish and hold dear our revolution and our Party just as the Indonesian working people do towards your revolution and your Party.

On this occasion, permit me first to convey to you the warmest and most sincere greetings of the Central Com­mittee of the CPI, of the more than two and a half- mil­lion, members of our Party and of the Indonesian work­ing people. This solemn and enthusiastic rally held by you Chinese people in this magnificent Great Hall of the People today is evidence of your ever increasing and vigorous support for the Indonesian people who are wag­ing a sharp struggle against imperialism headed by the United States and against reaction at home.



Indonesia is an island country comprising more than ten thousand islands of different sizes, of which over three thousand are inhabited. These islands lie scattered between Asia, and Australia connecting the two big oceans, the Pacific and Indonesian Oceans. Indonesia's land area is close on two million square kilometres. It is small compared with that of China (over 9.6 million sq. km) but the islands are spread widely. The distance between Sabang in the extreme west and Merauke in the east is approximately the same as that between the western extreme of the Tienshan Mountains and Shang­hai; the distance from north to south is about the same as that between Berlin and Algeria.

With close on a hundred million people, Indonesia ranks fifth in population after China, India, the Soviet Union and the United States. Distribution is very uneven, the density ranging from 7 to 460 persons per Square kilo­metre, the most densely populated area being the Island of Java where about two-thirds of the Indonesians live.

In Indonesia there are more than a hundred national­ities—some counted in tens of millions, some totalling only a few thousand. Each has its own language, and serious mistake, however, to think that a revolutionary movement can grow without encountering obstacles. There are still many difficulties, and every step forward in the revolutionary movement meets with new obstractions from the reactionaries.

The situation in Indonesia, which is full of contradic­tions, is indeed extremely complicated. On the one hand, as statistics show, more than 90 per cent of the Indonesian people are Islamic followers. On the other hand, communist influence has steadily grown. The domestic and foreign policies of the Indonesian govern­ment have a positive and progressive side, that is, opposition to imperialism and desire to work with the socialist countries to develop the "new emerging forces"; but they also have a negative and reactionary side, as, for example, the adoption of some financial and economic measures detrimental to the interests of the people, and compromise and collaboration with foreign capital. On the one hand, a broad, expanding national united front has already been established. A National Front-organization with a total membership of over 20 million is already in existence in Indonesia, which unites all political par­ties, mass organizations, armed forces .and individuals, and has a common programme, that is, the Political Mani­festo directed against imperialism and feudalism. The compositions of the leading body of this front, from the central to the basic levels, all reflect the three political trends, the NASAKOM. On the other hand, up to pres­ent a Gotong Royong government in which Communists share responsible positions has not yet been formed.

Indeed, the situation in Indonesia is far from simple and the course of the Indonesian revolution is no plain sailing. It is difficult for Indonesia, a country of islands with long seacoasts, to defend itself against armed attacks from without or to prevent smuggling. Moreover, its surrounding neighbours are either imperialist countries or Countries serving as bases for imperialist forces by virtue of military pacts. But the Indonesian revolutionaries' have never been disheartened by these facts. In the last few years, as a result of their hard work, they have achieved certain successes. The things I have de­scribed are stimulating the Indonesian revolutionaries to exert greater efforts and learn more effectively from the rich experience of the world revolutionary movement while blazing a trail for themselves in order to complete the Indonesian revolution.


Prior to the arrival of the first Dutch traders, Indonesia went through long periods of historical development. Many feudal kingdoms arose on this land. The best known were the Kingdom of Sriwidjajah (7th-13th cen­tury) with Palembang in South Sumatra as its centre, the Kingdom of Mataram I (8th-9th century) and the Kingdom of Madjapahit (14th-15th century). The beginning of the Christian era Saw feudal rule first estab­lished in the Island of Java. Throughout the feudal period there were continuous peasant uprisings which weakened but did not overthrow feudalism.

Another characteristic of this period was the numerous wars between the ruling feudal houses. While feudalism was disintegrating, from the 15th century onwards the merchants of such European countries as Portugal; Hol­land and Britain came to Indonesia. In bitter contests; Holland defeated all its rivals. The activities of the Dutch East India Company, the organization of the Dutch traders, were not confined to business. Shrewdly and cunningly they took direct advantage of the contradic­tions between the feudal rulers and seized colonies.

The period of the East. India Company was an impor­tant phase of Holland's primitive accumulation of capital. Resorting to ruthless methods Dutch merchants amassed fantastic fortunes. As Karl Marx said:

The history of the colonial administration of Hol­land—and Holland was the head capitalistic nation of the 17th century—“is one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness. (Karl Marx, Capital, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959, Vol. I, p.752).

At the end of the 17th century the East India Company actually controlled the whole of Indonesia which was then turned completely into a Dutch colony. Dutch exploitation was based on the feudal exploitation then existing in Indonesia. Therefore, the relations of pro­duction prevailing in the early period of Dutch colonial rule were feudal in nature. Indonesia society at that time can be affirmed as a feudal, colonial society.

Conditions began to change at the end of the 19th century, when Dutch capitalism entered the stage of imperialism. As a result of the increasing export of Dutch capital, capitalist influences penetrated deep into the In­donesian countryside. Feudal economic, relations were broken up. It was no longer a simple, natural economy. Commodity production gradually took over the dominant position. The feudal system, which could no longer exist by itself, had to rely on imperialist support for its survival. The feudal exploitation of the peasants was already intermixed with foreign capital, comprador capital and usury capital which occupied a decisive position in the economic life of Indonesian society. Feudal Indonesia was changed into semi-feudal Indonesia. This condi­tion of a colonial and semi-feudal society remained until the outbreak of the people's revolution in August 1945, During World War II the Dutch colonialists surrendered practically without putting up any fight. In March 1942 the Japanese militarists occupied Indonesia, and for three and a half years Japanese colonial rule replaced that of the Dutch; Indonesia was changed from a Dutch colony into a Japanese colony. But apart from a more ruthless form of exploitation by Japan, the character of Indonesian society remained unchanged.

During the period of colonial and semi-feudal society, however, there were changes in the class structure in In­donesia. With the establishment of imperialist enterprises at the close of the 19th century, the Indonesian working class came, into being. Entering the political arena, this class integrated the struggle for its own libera­tion with the entire Indonesian people's struggle for na­tional independence. Another class — the national bourgeoisie — arose as the feudal economy collapsed and commodity economy began to develop. The growth of na­tional industries, however, were seriously hampered by the competition of foreign monopoly capital, so much so that up to the present very few Indonesian national capi­talists are engaged in industry while by far the greater number are traders. This explains the weakness of the economic position of the national bourgeoisie in our country. In other words, the Indonesian working class was born before the national bourgeoisie, and this can be seen from the role and influence of each of the two classes in the struggle for national liberation.

With the transition of capitalism to the stage of monop­oly capitalism and imperialism at the turn of the cen­tury, the Dutch colonialists launched large-scale colonial wars. Through these wars they united the whole of Indonesia under the rule of a centralized colonial government with its own colonial economic life.

The afore-mentioned changes in political, economic and class structures also affected the character and form of the Indonesian people's struggle. The formation of a unified economy, the birth of the working class and the development national capitalist relations of production were the foundations of the development of the modern Indonesian nation. In the past the people's struggle against the Dutch colonialists mainly took the form of peasant uprisings, which were confined to certain areas and were often led by the representatives of the local feudal aristocrats who attempted to recover their lost power. Then the people's resistance was expressed in their struggles for national independence, and the partic­ipants embraced all the classes victimized by imperialism and feudalism. In the early years of the present cen­tury many mass organizations and political parties appeared, indicating the national awakening of the Indone­sian people in their resistance against the colonizers. This national movement was different from that which developed during the growth of European capitalism. From the very beginning the Indonesian working class and its political party, the Indonesian Communist Party, which was founded on May 23, 1920, integrated themselves with the national movement and became the vanguard of its Left wing. In November 1928 the first national uprising led by the CPI broke but. Although it was sup­pressed by the Dutch colonialists, the uprising taught the Indonesian people that Dutch colonial rule could not last forever. The fact that the first armed struggle on a country-wide scale was led by the Indonesian proletarian party, the CPI, was of very great significance. The In­donesian bourgeoisie never made a revolution like the 1911 Revolution in China.

The national revolution which broke out in August 1945 was an upsurge in Indonesia's national-liberation struggle. When the founding of the Republic of Indone­sia was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian people took state power into their own hands. Exercising this power they adopted various anti-imperialist measures, such as the nationalization of foreign enter­prises, the ending of the oligarchal form of government, the establishment of Indonesian National Councils in all areas and people's public security, organs down to the vil­lage level, and in some districts the distribution of farm­lands owned by foreign capital to the peasants. In other words, in the course of revolution the Indonesian people waged resolute struggles against imperialism, their principals enemy. But the feudal landlord class, another major enemy and the most important social prop of imperialist rule, had not yet been overthrown. That is to say, the peasants, the main force of the Indonesian revolution, had not been fully mobilized and won over to the side of the revolution. Therefore, the August Revolution won independence for Indonesia but the character of its society remained semi-feudal.

In September 1948 the government headed by Hatta launched an attack in an attempt to wipe out the Com­munists. This was known as the Madiun Affair, or the Provocative Madiun Affair, as a result of which, almost

all the leaders of the Communist Party were either mur­dered or arrested. After the destruction of this anti-imperialist core, in December of the same year Holland was easily able to launch its colonial war with the aim of conquering the whole of Indonesia. In November 1949 the Hatta government signed the criminal Round Table Conference Agreement with the Dutch government. Through this agreement Holland recognized the sover­eignty and Independence of Indonesia in form but Dutch imperialism completely restored. Its economic control over Indonesia. Thus, the Round Table Conference Agreement decided the status of Indonesia as a semi-colonial country.

The Indonesian people, however, did not' cease their struggle. Soon after the Round Table Conference Agree­ment was signed a bitter struggle began for its abroga­tion. In 1956 the Indonesian government unilaterally abrogated this agreement, thereby gaining a great vic­tory. In 1957, as a result of an upsurge in the struggle to literate West Irian, all Dutch enterprises were taken over and nationalized. After the Indonesian people had expressed their unanimous determination to recover West Irian by force and after the volunteers sent there had liberated certain cities and areas in co-operation with the local guerrilla forces, in 1963 West Irian returned to the domain, of the Republic of Indonesia. In this victorious struggle for the liberation of West Irian, the support of the socialist countries and progressive people throughout the world flayed an important role.

The anti-feudal struggle also made some progress. In legislation, for instance, the Decree on the Harvest Dis­tribution Contract and the Basic Decree on Land were passed. The former provided for the proportional dis­tribution of the yield between the peasants and the land­lords, while the latter provided for limited land reform. But the struggle to implement these two-comparatively progressive decrees met with numerous obstacles, primarily from the reactionaries now still entrenched in government organizations.

The anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle is still con­tinuing. Imperialism still wields quite a big influence in the state organs and in the economy. U.S. Imperialism has now replaced Dutch Imperialism and become the No. 1 enemy of the Indonesian people. Meanwhile, Dutch imperialism remains a dangerous enemy, and other imperialist countries, such as Britain, West Germany and Japan, are intensifying their penetration into Indonesia. The in­fluence of the feudal landlords still largely survives and they are one of the props of the domestic reactionary forces. On the basis of an analysis of Indonesian society and of the Indonesian revolution, the Constitution Of the CPI stresses that the Indonesian revolution is a protracted and complex one. To be able to guide the revolution, the CPI must carry the people's revolutionary struggle forward by using the tactic of advancing steadily, carefully and surely. In the course of the struggle, the CPI must consistently oppose two trends: capitulationism and adventurism.

The foregoing, is a resume of Indonesian history and the birth and development of the Indonesian national liberation movement.


The working class and its political party gained very rich experience from, the August Revolution, despite its failure. This fully confirms the saying: “A year of revolution is equivalent to decades of normal development.” Although the CPI committed some mistakes during the revolution, the working class and the Party not only took an active part in all revolutionary activities t made their utmost effort to lead this revolution. The experience gained in this revolution was most valuable to the Party, and it was because of this experience that the CPI was able to develop in the years that followed.

The August Revolution educated Indonesian Com­munists, helping them to understand: what the nature of the Indonesian revolution is; which classes support the revolution and which oppose it. It taught us: why a national united front is indispensable for the victory of the revolution; which: allies of the proletariat are reliable, and which waver and, under certain circumstances, would betray the revolution. The August Revolution also taught us that armed struggle is the most important form of struggle the revolution. One of the main lessons derived from the August Revolution is that the national-democratic revolution can be victorious in Indonesia only when the working class holds the absolute leadership of the revolution. In order to achieve this, the CPI must be able to combine the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, to "Indonesianize” Marxism-Leninism.

At its Fifth National Congress convened in 1954 the CPI formulated a general programme and a programme of specific demands for the completion of the Indonesian revolution. These programmes embodied the strategical and tactical line to be folowed by the Party in the revolution. This line was a product of the integration of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of our protracted struggles. It was the outcome of the development of our understanding of the Indonesian revolution since the founding of our Party forty-three years ago and partic­ularly during the revolutionary period of August 1945. In the course of formulating and carrying out this strategjcal and tactical line, the CPI deeply appreciates the correctness of the words of Lenin:

Only an objective consideration of all the class rela­tionships in a given society, and consequently, its objective stage of development and its relations with other societies, can serve as the basis, for a correct tactic of the advanced class. And classes and countries are regarded not statically, but dynamically, i.e., not in a state of immobility, but in motion (the laws of which are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class). (Lenin, Marx, Engels, Marxism, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 6th English edition, p. 51)

Several times previously the CPI had committed "Left" mistakes of sectarianism and dogmatism, while during the August Revolution it simultaneously committed mistakes of "Left” and Right opportunism. One of the reasons why the Party had not then learned from past experience was that it had not summed up its experience. The summing-up began only in August 1948 when the Party held a conference at which the wrong line taken during that former period was corrected. The conference adopted a resolution on The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia and summed up the Party's experience con­cerning the national united front, Party building and armed struggle. This resolution marked the beginning of the maturity of the CPI. The Fifth National Congress of the Party in 1954 resolved all important and basic questions of the Indonesian revolution, demonstrating most clearly that the Party had entered upon the stage of maturity. Subsequently these important and basic questions were clearly elaborated in the work Indone­sian Society and the Indonesian Revolution, adopted by the Central Committee in July 1957. This book expounds the character of Indonesian society, the main targets of the Indonesian revolution and its tasks, as well as the driving forces, the character and the future of the rev­olution.

Since Indonesian society is still semi-colonial and semi-feudal, the main targets (enemies) of the revolution are imperialism and feudalism. The tasks of the revolution are to carry out a national revolution to drive out imperialism, and to carry out a democratic revolution to eliminate feudalism. The driving forces of the revolu­tion are the working class, the peasantry, the petty bour­geoisie and other democrats, who suffer from imperialism and resolutely oppose it. The national bourgeoisie may take part in the revolution. At the present stage, the Indonesian revolution is not a proletarian socialist rev­olution but a national-democratic revolution or a bour­geois-democratic revolution. But the future, of the rev­olution is socialism and communism , not capitalism.

In the course of leading the Indonesian people's revolu­tionary struggles, and proceeding from its knowledge of the basic questions of the Indonesian revolution, as men­tioned above the CPI has deepened its understanding of the revolution and has advanced various theories. Facts have proved that it is absolutely necessary to understand and apply these theories in order to ensure the victory of the revolution.

The CPI has advanced the theory that there are three forces existing in Indonesia, namely, the progressive force, the middle force, and the diehard force. Facts have proved this theory to be correct. The Partys line towards these three forces is to develop the progressive force, unite with the middle force and isolate the diehard force. While uniting with the middle force, the Party also con­ducts struggles against it. The Party unites with the middle force in order to oppose imperialism and feudal­ism. But the Party struggles against this middle force if it wants to weaken the independence of the Party and of the working people's movement or if it wavers in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

The Party has put forward another theory that in the armed struggle during the revolutionary period between 1945 and 1948 the Party should not have simply copied the theory of armed struggle from foreign countries but should have adopted the method of combining three forms of struggle. If the Party at that time had resolved this question on the basis combining, the three forms of struggle, guerrilla warfare during the revolution of Au­gust 1945 could have been expanded and consolidated and the demands of the August Revolution completely fulfilled. The three forms are: guerrilla warfare in the countryside (the participants being mainly hired hands and poor peasants), revolutionary struggle carried on by workers (mainly transport workers) in the enemy-held cities and the strengthening of our work among the armed forces of the enemy. This is a very important theory which can ensure the victory of guerrilla warfare in an island country like Indonesia.

Today there are no enemy armed forces in Indonesia; there are only the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia which were born shortly after World War II in the anti-fascist struggle and the national-democratic revolution. In building these forces, the working class and the CPI played an important role. They are not reactionary armed forces. It can be seen from their incep­tion that they have been anti-fascist, democratic and anti-imperialist in character. The duty of the CPI is, there­fore, to closely unite the people and the armed forces, so that in any crisis the armed forces, or their greater part, will stand firmly on the side of the people and revolution, as was demonstrated in the struggle against the counter-revolutionary PRRI-Permesta clique ("Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Charter of Total Struggle"), which not long ago was fought and defeated by the Indonesian people.

The CPI has advanced the theory that, in order to win the Indonesian revolution, all its members and the mass of the working people must be educated in the combined spirit of patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The Indonesian Communists must oppose national nihilism and bourgeois chauvinism. The Indonesian revolution is inseparable from the world proletarian, revolution which began with the Great October Socialist Revolution, of 1917 and which is now rapidly developing. The Indone­sian revolution is part of the world's progressive forces, part of the struggle of the people of the whole world for national independence, democracy, peace and social­ism.

The CPI has advanced the theory that, to be able to guide the political developments, the Party must pursue the general line which is continually to develop the work of the united front and to build the Party so as to realize thoroughly the demands of the August 1945 Revolution. In other words, the Indonesian Communists should hold high the Triple Banner of the Party — the banner of the united front, the banner of Party building and the banner of the August 1945 Revolution. The Party's general line regarding the united, front is to form an anti-imperialist united front of the working class, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie led by the working class and based on the anti-feudal worker peasant alliance. The general line with regard to Party building, is to build a Party of a nation-wide scope and a broad mass character, fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally. The Party's general line regarding the August 1945 Revolution is to use all the experience gained in struggle, mobilize the broad masses and teach them to prepare themselves for all eventualities.

The CPI has derived the foregoing theories from its experience in integrating, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution. The Party's experience accumulated over the years has produced these basic conclusions. Such experience is the result of the bloodshed and sacrifices made by thousands upon thousands of comrades and of the courageous struggle and tireless study of Marxism-Lenin­ism by Indonesian Communists. We have been applying these theories to our practice and are continuing to develop them in our actions. The slogan of the Indonesian Communists in work and study is: "Know Marxism and be aquainted with the situation!" The CPI can lead the Indonesian people to victory in the revolution only by taking the road which integrates the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the In­donesian revolution, or in other words, the road of- "Indonesianizing" Marxism-Leninism. The more Marxism-Leninism is "Indonesianized" and the better it is inte­grated with the masses of people and with the Indonesian revolution, the better will the CPI be able to avoid the danger of classical or modern revisionism and of classical or modern dogmatism — and this will ensure the further progress of the Indonesian revolution.


The CPI has reached the conclusion that one of the main reasons why the 1945 August Revolution failed to gain its objective was that the Party lacked an understanding of the necessity for a national united front and was incapable of establishing one. At that time the Communists overlooked the building of a national united front as a weapon of national revolution against imperialism. Although they later realized its importance, they did not really know how to set it up.

This summing-up stimulated the Communists to es­tablish the national united front in a more positive, unswerving and practical manner. The Fifth National Congress of the CPI set the formation of a national united front as its most urgent task. According to an analysis of the classes in Indonesian society, the united front should embrace all revolutionary, national, forces i.e., the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bour­geoisie. At the same time the Fifth National Congress of the Party stressed the worker-peasant alliance as the basis of the united front. Because the peasants were still ruthlessly exploited and oppressed by the survivals of feudalism, the worker-peasant alliance could be es­tablished and consolidated only when the Communists actively led the peasants in struggles against these survivals and satisfied first their partial and then later their fundamental demands, i.e., the abolition of feudal owner­ship and distribution of land.

Regarding the national bourgeoisie, the August Rev­olution provided the CPI with important experience concerning the wavering character of this class. Under certain circumstances, the national bourgeoisie may take part in the revolution and side with it in a clear-cut way, as in the initial period of the August Revolution. How­ever, under other circumstances, the national bourgeoisie may waver and betray the revolution, as it did during the Provocative Madiun Affair manufactured by the Hatta government. The national bourgeoisie also surrender­ed to imperialism and agreed to the treacherous Round Table Conference Agreement. Therefore, the proletariat and the CPI must perseveringly strive to win the national bourgeoisie over to the side of the revolution but at the same time must guard against its possible betrayal of the revolution.

Another section of the Indonesian bourgeoisie is the comprador- bourgeoisie which directly serves the interests of the big foreign capitalists. It is therefore not a rev­olutionary force but a target of the revolution.

Still another section of the bourgeoisie is composed of the bureaucrat-capitalists, who are also enemies and targets of the revolution. In their reactionary nature, the Indonesian bureaucrat-capitalists are like the Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists. But at present bureaucrat-capital has not developed in Indonesia, to the extent it did in old China where it was highly concentrated and mainly centred in the Four Big Families. In Indonesia the bureau­crat-capitalists developed mainly after Dutch enterprises were taken over and nationalized. Generally speaking, they have become capitalists by making use of their posi­tions in the government organizations or state enterprises, or through their relationship with influential persons in these organizations or enterprises. They make use of their official influence, as in the past they mainly used the state of emergency, to obtain and consolidate their positions as capitalists. By craft and cunning they under­mine the economy of the state, and try to place state enterprises under private ownership and so keep them under their own control. Thus they play an extremely reactionary role. They oppose democracy, the people's mass organizations and the national united front. They increasingly collude with, imperialism and work together with the landlords to oppress the peasants. They set up "trade unions" and “mass organizations” of all descriptions. Actually these are groupings or organizations under the control of the capitalists, the purpose of which is to destroy the revolutionary mass organizations, especially the All-Indonesia Central Organization of Trade Unions. Among the working masses, however, the true face of these bureaucrat-capitalist groupings or organizations has been fully exposed and strong counter attacks have been made against them.

In the process of forming the national united front in Indonesia, the working class must stand at the forefront of the straggly at the entire people. Indonesia being an economically backward country, certain weak points exist objectively in our working class. The first weak paint is that numerically it is much less than the peasants. To offset this weakness, it is necessary to establish and maintain a solid unity within the working class. As Comrade Dimitrov said:

In all countries where the number of peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie far exceeds the number of the proletariat, it is of utmost importance to make every effort to establish a Solid united front within the work­ing class so as to enable this class to occupy the leading position in the relationships among the entire work­ing people.

It may be said that a united front of the working class has now been set up in Indonesia. The Influence of social democracy and revisionism among the workers is small. An absolute majority of the organized workers have joined the progressive All-Indonesia Central Organization of Trade Unions. Furthermore, so far as organizational form or concrete action is concerned, a united front exists between the All-Indonesia Central Organization of Trade Unions and other workers’ organizations which are under the Influence of nationalism and religion. Of course, the reactionaries will continue their attempts to split the workers front. It is clear that the Indonesian Commu­nists and other progressive people must continue their efforts to strengthen and consolidate the already-formed united front.

The second weak point is that the working class of Indonesia is younger than that of the advanced capitalist countries and therefore lacks experience In the working-class movement. The workers can overcome this weak­ness only by making strenuous efforts to learn from the experience of the working-class movements of other coun­tries—particularly the movements which have been suc­cessful—and by diligently studying Marxism-Leninism. The CPI has made and will continue to make efforts to overcome this weakness. Since there is no limit to the pursuits of knowledge we have no reason to be compla­cent.

The third weak point is that the cultural level of the Indonesian working class is lower than that of the bour­geoisie This weakness must be overcome m that the workers will be better able to lead all classes in the revolution. Great and rapid progress has been made, by the working class in the fields of culture and education. In government departments and in parliament, the rep­resentatives of the proletariat have demonstrated their ability in the field of knowledge and in understanding and solving different political and economic questions. As a whole however, the working class must exert still greater efforts and reach a more advanced level. The CPI’s Four-Year Plan in the field of culture beginning from August 17 of this year will play an important role in achieving this aim.

Now the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal national united front has been in the main established in Indonesia. Cadres of the CPI are working hard among the peasants, studying agrarian relationships in the countryside and leading the peasants in struggles against the landlords. The Party already has a correct and revolutionary agra­rian programme to guide the peasants struggles.

Co-operation with the national bourgeoisie has also been established. Particularly after the Party had for­mulated its correct policy and overcome sectarianism in its ranks, the national bourgeoisie began to return to the side of the revolution. Just as the experience in China shows, while forming a united front with the bourgeoisie, the CPI should abide by two unshakable principles. The first is the principle of unity and struggle, which has been reflected in the attitude of the Party towards the anti-imperialist cabinets led by the national bourgeoisie. The Party supports the government's progressive policies without reservation, but criticizes its vacillating policies in order to turn them into progressive ones, and opposes the ministers who carry out policies detrimental to the people's interests. The second principle is to maintain the Party's independence in the national united front. This implies that co-operation with the bourgeoisie does not prevent the proletariat from organizing revolution and developing the organization of the Party and the revolutionary mass organizations, and that the proletariat has the right to expound its own position. The CPI has resolutely upheld this principle of independence. We have co-operated with the Indonesian bourgeoisie for more than ten years, during which the revolutionary force has steadily grown rather than diminished, while the counter-revolutionary force has met with many setbacks. Even the open anti-communist clamour of five or six years ago is now condemned as a Communist-phobia to oppose unity. President Sukarno has played an impor­tant role in the opposition to Communist-phobia and the strengthening of national unity. Of course, at present there are still anti-communist activities, and there will be as long as imperialism and feudalism remain in Indo­nesia, but having suffered blows from the revolutionary force, they have been greatly weakened.

Based on its experience in co-operating with the na­tional bourgeoisie, the CPI has reached the conclusion that it can be sure of winning over the bourgeoisie to the side of the revolution, as long as the progressive forces are strong, continue to develop and are skilled in delivering blows to the enemy, and as long as the Party's policies and tactics are correct. In developing the progressive forces, those of the workers and peasants should come first.

The CPI’s expedience in the establishment of a national united front shows that we should first understand clearly the class content of the united front, its base and its leading class. Then we should formulate concrete policies guiding the work of establishing this front and give it the specific form born of the political life of this country. For instance, in the struggle, to set up a government in which all revolutionary classes would participate, the CPI at first advocated the establishment of a national coalition government. Later, as the idea of the national united front spread far and wide and as the mass struggle developed, in February 1957 President Sukarno's formula of a Gotong Royong cabinet was pronounced. Thus, the complete content of the national coalition government was included in the demand to establish a Gotong Royong cabinet, while the content of national unity could be fully summarized in the term national Gotong Royong. Subsequently the term NASAKOM appeared which reflected the extensive co­operation among the political trends — nationalism, reli­gion and communism — with anti- imperialism as its programme. To the Communists, the national united front means nothing more than unity between the revolutionary classes. In political life, however, each class reflects its own interests through its own political party. The same is true of Indonesia, where each class, reactionary of revolutionary, clearly expresses its interests through its own political party. In the light of the tradition of the national-liberation struggles in Indonesia, there were three major political trends against Dutch colonial rule, namely, the nationalist trend, the religious (mainly Islam) trend and the communist trend. If, therefore, these three political trends form a NASAKOM, one may say that, the national unity of Indonesia has been achieved. Such an assertion Is logical and reasonable. In the pres­ent situation In Indonesia, when we raise the slogan of a national Gotong Royong with NASAKOM as the fulcrum it will not obscure the class content of the national united front, because such unity is built upon the basis of a clear-cut anti-imperialist and to a certain extent, anti-feudal programme. Two pro-imperialist and pro-feudal parties, the Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party, have disappeared from Indonesia's political life.

Another concept which also reflects national unity and NASAKOM unity is embodied in Pantjasila or the Five Principle. (The five principles are: 1) Belief In One God; 2) Humanism or Internationalism; 3) National­ism or Patriotism; 4) Democracy; and 5) Social Justice). The CPI supports and upholds Pantjasila in spite of the fact that one of the principles is "Belief in One God", because Pantjasila combines the various trends exiting in society, rather than-tries to replace the philosophy of those who support it. The Party, therefore, resolutely opposes the attempts of some people, to make one of the Five Principles the chief one. Pantjasila must be ac­cepted as a whole, and as a whole it is a means of unity. This point is frequently stressed by President Sukarno, the sponsor of Pantjasila. He also says that if Pantjasila is synthesized Into one great principle, it is Gotong Royong.  Apart from the worker-peasant alliance and NASAKOM unity, national unify in Indonesia also finds expression In the form of the National Front under the chairmanship of President Sukarno. The vice-chairmen of the National Front are representatives of the three sides of the NASAKOM. The National Front has adopted a five-point revolutionary programme as the programme of demands which guides its activities. This five-point programme accords with the three current tasks of the CPI (to consolidate the victories already won, overcome the economic difficulties and continue the struggle against neocolonialism).

The experiences described above show that if the idea of a national united front is deeply rooted in peopled minds and if the CPI persistently and unswervingly car­ries on the work of establishing this front many forms of strengthening and consolidating it will emerge. It is clear that with its understanding of the principles of the national united front the CPI will be able to find an effective form for the front which will fit the specific conditions in Indonesia.

The CPI regards the national united front, as an absolute condition through which to achieve the victory of the revolution. The progress in the national united front work will greatly facilitate the building of the Party, and vice versa.


As I have said, the situation in Indonesia is an ex­tremely complex one. This situation cannot be under­stood unless the essence of Indonesia's state power is clearly understood.

The fundamental question in every revolution is that of state power. The CPI recognizes the correctness of this formula not only in theory but also in practice as a result of bitter lessons. During the revolution of August 1945 the Party committed a serious error on the question of state power. At that time a government had teen set up with Comrade Amir Sjarifudin, a Communist, as premier and minister of defence. In the cabinet there were other Communists and there were also Rightists. Taking advantage of the error in policy committed by the CPI in the struggle against Dutch imperialism, the reac­tionaries recalled their ministers and plotted to overthrow the Amir Sjarifudin cabinet. The CPI lacked vigilance against this scheme of the Rightists. Failing to recognize the class nature of state power, the Sjarifudin cabinet dissolved itself and was succeeded, by the cabinet headed by Hatta. The reactionaries knew very well how to utilize state power to serve the interests of their own class. As soon as state power was transferred from the proletariat to the comprador-bourgeoisie as represented by Hatta, that government continued its line of conciliation with Holland while preparing counter-revolutionary activities. As I have stated before, the Hatta government finally made its counter-revolutionary move through the Provocative Madiun Affair. The error committed by the CPI on the question of state power cost us heavy sacrifices. It was an extremely bitter lesson for the Party.

What is the nature of state, power in Indonesia at pres­ent? The successive governments set up after the sign­ing of the Round Table Conference Agreement were all comprador governments which wholly represented the interests of imperialism and the feudal forces. Although there were political representatives of the national bour­geoisie in these governments, they became the captives of the reactionaries and carried out a policy of compro­mise with the enemies of the revolution — the imperialists and their lackeys. According to the Provisional Con­stitution in force since 1951, President Sukarno did not exercise direct power in the government.

As early as 1951 the CPI had put forward the demand for a national coalition government to be formed by those democratic parties and democrats without party affilia­tion who agreed to abrogate the Round Table Conference Agreement. The correct policy which was to win over the national bourgeoisie again to the side of the revolu­tion achieved initial success and resulted in 1952 in the formation of the Wilopo government (of the National Party of Indonesia). In the Wilopo cabinet there were some members of the parties of the Eight (the Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party), but the CPI supported it because its programme was comparatively democratic. Our positive attitude towards this cabinet produced re­sults, for the diehard forces began to be isolated and suffer blows while the middle and progressive forces began to consolidate their unity and develop

The governments after the Wilopo cabinet leaned basically towards the Left and were progressive while the Rightists’ role in the government became increasingly smaller. This was clearly shown in the Burhannudin Harahap cabinet formed in August 1955 (he was an im­portant figure in the Masjumi; later he became a counter­-revolutionary rebel). Obviously reactionary, this cabinet was opposed by the CPI. As the balance of forces changed in favour of the Left and as the national united front developed, this cabinet lasted less than a year. It was compelled to hold general elections which it had failed to disrupt, and had to acknowledge the defeat of the Masjumi-lndonesian Socialist Party combination. One of the important developments arising from the progress of the national united front was the sharpening of contradic­tions between the revolutionaries on the one hand and Hatta, the Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party on the other, climaxing in the resignation of Hatta as vice-president and the proclamation of the President's decree on July 5, 1959. The decree announced the restoration of the Constitution of 1945, that is, the Con­stitution adopted at the founding of the Republic of Indonesia which stipulates that the President leads Government directly.

Events moved fast. Supported by imperialism, the do­mestic reactionaries made several attempts to stage a coup d'etat and assassinate the President. Failing in their scheme, in 1958 they launched a rebellion to split the country. Urged and effectively supported by the entire people, the government resolutely suppressed' the rebellion.

In November 1960 the Provisional People's Consulta­tive Conference adopted the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia (or to be brief, the Political Mani­festo) as the Outline of State Policy. The Manifesto was issued in the form of a speech made by President Su­karno on August 17, 1959. This was an important event in the Indonesian people's revolutionary struggle for it meant that the concept of the basic questions of the Indonesian revolution had been accepted, and embodied in an official document of the state. Thus, the whole In­donesian nation had unanimously attained a correct un­derstanding of the important basic questions of the Indonesian revolution. This Outline of State Policy points out that the main targets (chief enemies) of the Indone­sian revolution are imperialism and feudalism; that In­donesia's revolutionary tasks are to set-up state power, not of one class, one stratum or one political party, but of the whole people, the Gotong Royong state power, to oppose despotism or dictatorship by military circles or by one man; that Indonesia's revolutionary forces do not consist of a single class, a single stratum or a single polit­ical party but of all the people who are resolutely opposed to imperialism and feudalism and whose basic forces are the workers and peasants; that the character of the Indonesian revolution is national-democratic; and that its future is socialism, not capitalism. The Political Manifesto has, therefore, truly become the common prog­ramme of the entire Indonesian people for the comple­tion of the revolution. Since the announcement of the Manifesto, the struggle of the revolutionaries against the counter-revolutionaries has been expressed in the struggle between the supporters and opponents of the Manifesto.

In March 1963 President Sukarno issued another important document — the Economic Declaration. Representatives of the three sides of NASAKOM played an important role in drawing up this declaration. It embraces three basic provisions. First, it provides for a basic eco­nomic strategy during the present revolutionary phase in Indonesia, i.e., the task of the phase of national-democratic revolution is fat completely liquidate, and wipe out the survivals of imperialism and feudalism. Secondly, it provides for short-term measures which must be immediately executed to overcome the present economic difficulties. Thirdly, it provides for the political conditions absolutely essential for the implementation of the declaration itself, that is, through the joint efforts of the government and the organized masses in administra­tive and executive spheres, to realize a national Gotong Royong with NASAKOM as the fulcrum, in other words, to set up a Gotong Royong government with NASAKOM as the fulcrum.

Embodied in the Political Manifesto and Economic Dec­laration, progressive political and economic plans to complete the Indonesian revolution have, in. effect, become official state policy. Why is it then that these doc­uments have not been resolutely implemented and in the course of execution things have frequently happened contrary, to the spirit of the original plans? To clarify this question, we must understand the nature of state power in the present-day Republic of Indonesia.

The CPI maintains that state power in Indonesia has two aspects: the popular aspect and the anti-popular aspect. The inception of the popular aspect is inseparable from the successes achieved by the Party in combining the three forms of straggle. This aspect has been de­veloping steadily and has impelled the Indonesian gov­ernment to adopt various revolutionary measures against imperialism. The anti-popular aspect, representing the interests of imperialism, the compradors, landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists, has been trying its test to disrupt all progressive measures. Up to the present this aspect still occupies, a dominant position. Under such circum­stances, the CPI’s struggle with regard to state power is to enable the popular aspect to grow increasingly strong and to take a dominant position and, on the other hand, to exclude from state power the forces which oppose the people. Such is the content of the people's demand for the reorganization (of the state organs), and for a Gotong Royong cabinet with NASAKOM as the fulcrum.

Because of the existence of these two aspects, Indo­nesia must carry out the revolution from top to bottom and from bottom to top. By “from top to bottom" we mean that the CPI has to urge the state to adopt various revolutionary measures and carry out reforms in per­sonnel and in state organs. By "from bottom to top” we mean that the Party has to arouse, organize and mo­bilize the people to realize these reforms. By these methods the Party is changing the balance of forces between imperialism the bureaucrat-capitalists, compradors and landlords on the one hand and the people on the other.

Some comrades have asked: Are these progressive political and economic plans not tricks used by the bour­geoisie to deceive the working people? This is not a strange question. But the point is that these progressive plans have come about through the growth of the progressive forces which have taken an active part in drawing them up. These official plans of the govern­ment greatly help the progressive people to educate, organize and mobilize the masses resolutely to demand their Implementation and to use them to expose all attempts at evasion. Therefore, all the progressive plans and meas­ures adopted by the present government are primarily the result of the struggle of Indonesia's progressive forces. The fact that, the whole nation has accepted the plan of the working class and its party reflects the working-class leadership in the revolution.

Some other comrades have asked: Are not the demands of the CPI for reorganization In administrative organs and for a Gotong Royong cabinet with NASAKOM as the fulcrum the same as the theory of “structural reform"? No, absolutely not! It is true that the Party, sup­ports and urges the reorganization of the state organs so as to strengthen the position of the progressives in the state power. For instance, the Party fully endorses and supports the formation of the Supreme Advisory Council, the Gotong Royong Parliament and the Provisional Peo­ple's Consultative Conference which reflect the spirit of NASAKOM. But this represents only the partial de­mands or reform measures for achieving our strategic objective, that is, to fully realize the Political Manifesto and the CPI's general programme. As it is clearly stated in the Party's programme, the Party maintains that only a people's democratic government — a national united front government led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance — can change Indonesia from a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country into a completely independent, democratic, prosperous and advanced country. An important step in striving for the forma­tion of a people's democratic government was the demand put forward by the Party at the First Plenary Session of its Seventh Central Committee in February 1963. This government should be a Gotong Royong cabinet with NASAKOM as the fulcrum, which dares to change the country's social system, dares to sacrifice the interests of a few big exploiters in the cities and villages — the bureaucrat-capitalists, compradors and landlords — and safeguards the interests of the great majority of the people. The demand for the formation of a NASAKOM cabinet at present is therefore art important part of the straggle to achieve our strategic objective. Here the Indonesian Communists consider the question of forming a NASAKOM cabinet as one affecting the balance of forces. In the last analysis, it is a question of revolution, and not one of "structural reform". Only by exerting our whole effort and persistently developing the pro­gressive forces, uniting the middle forces and isolating the diehard forces, can the balance of forces be changed. The First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee called upon all Communists to implement this line in the spirit of "more daring, more skill, more vigilance, more resolution and more perseverance".

These are some of the questions concerning state power in the present Republic of Indonesia.



During the period of the Japanese fascist occupation, the CPI carried on all its activities underground. A large number of young Communists emerged from the struggle against the Japanese fascists, working in various mass organizations of the workers, youth, students and peasants as well as in the armed forces comprised of Indonesian youth recruited by the Japanese militarists. They were active in the struggle to prepare for the proc­lamation of independence and to oppose the Japanese and Allied armies which attempted to suppress our fight for independence. However, they did not have good central leadership because by 1942 a great many leading cadres of the Party had been arrested or killed by the Japanese. In starting the revolution of August 1945, therefore, the Party was not well prepared organiza­tionally, politically or ideologically.

Such organizational, political and ideological short­comings made it difficult to achieve political and Ideo­logical unity immediately. Three parties based on Marxism-Leninism were set up during the revolutionary period of 1945-48. That was why, in rectifying all organizational, political and ideological mistakes at a conference in August 1948, the CPI decided first of all to amalgamate all the parties based on Marxism-Leninism. According to the plan, the amalgamation should have been completed at the following national congress. That congress was not held due to the Provocative Madiun Affair which had occurred, but the good reputation of the Party was not to be impaired. In December 1948 when Holland launched its second colonial war, a number of Communists who had been imprisoned because of the Madiun Affair were released while some others escaped from jail. Immediately after they were free, they looked for arms to fight the Dutch colonial army. Their action opened the eyes of the masses, who then saw through the lie concocted by Hatta during the Provocative Madiun Affair that the Communists planned to overthrow the Republic. The Communists whose organizations had been disrupted had no way of preventing, the conclusion of the compromising Round Table Conference Agree­ment, but facts proved that everywhere the Communists stood at the forefront of the struggle against the Dutch colonialists and directly led the guerrillas. This had great significance for the progress of Party building after the Round Table Conference.

The CPI faced the task of leading the revolution in a multi-national country consisting of thousands of islands, a country with a population close on 100 million and an extremely uneven population density. To fulfil the task of leadership, it had to consider the country's special features when deciding on how to build the Party. In 1951 the total number of members and probationary members in the Party was 7,910. The organization was small and narrow in scope. The members were distributed mainly in Java and Sumatra. It would have been impossible to fulfil, the difficult task, facing the Party if it had not expanded on a large scale.

The National Conference of the Party held in early 1952 was, therefore, of great significance. It discussed the vital political questions facing the Indonesian people, such as the policy towards the Sukiman government which had arrested large numbers of Communists, and the policy towards the counter-revolutionary DI-TII gang (Darul Islam-Indonesian Islam Army). In addition, the conference seriously discussed the necessity of mapping out the path of the Indonesian revolution based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. On this question the conference drew Important conclusions concerning the method of combining the three forms of struggle, the establishment, of a national united front with the national bourgeoisie, the strengthening of the Party's ideology and the development of the Party's membership and organization. Concerning organization in particular, the conference concluded that sectarianism must be overcome, and endorsed the Political Bureau's plan to in­crease-Party membership—striving to enlarge it from 7,910 to 100,000 within six months. This was the first step the Party leadership took to build the Party into a mass party.

Some comrades doubted whether the Communist Party should become a mass party. They only stressed that the CPI should be a party of high quality, which meant that its members should be "outstanding persons" and not "just anybody". They thought that a large in­crease in membership would mean a quantitative change only. These comrades forgot that quality could not be separated from quantity, and that a mass party could at the same time be a party with select cadres.

A mass party implies two things: first, a large membership, and secondly, a broad and deep influence among the masses. Indeed, the second point is most important for the Party if it is to guide all revolutionary classes in the execution of its policies. But this would obviously be impossible if the Party did not have enough cadres to do extensive propaganda work among different social strata, let alone give leadership to the mass organizations around them. Many cadres would then have to do more than one job and perform various duties, so that people would call them, "cure-all cadres" or "cadres of all trades". Therefore, the two aspects of a mass party cannot be counterposed to each other; they must be considered as united.

Another reason advanced against the proposition of a mass party was that a large Party membership might obscure the difference between the vanguards and the masses and thus the Party could not play the role of a Leninist party, the party of a new type, that is, it could not become the advanced detachment and the highest form of workings-class organizations, etc. In the mean­time, a great number of new members of petty bourgeois origin would carry their own ideology with them into the Party and "melt" or "drown" its proletarian ideology. Of course, such a danger does exist and we can find instances of this in the parties of the Second International. But if we are aware of the danger and remain highly vigilant, it can be voided. The most im­portant thing is that while enrolling new members, and expanding Party organizations, We must continuously and persistently carry out education in Marxism-Leninism and must combine such theoretical education with educa­tion and steeling in actual struggle.

Still other comrades were worried that the building, of a mass party might open the door to the agents and spies of imperialism and reactionaries who would In­filtrate into the Party. Such worries are justified. But even though the Party were small, these agents would still attempt to infiltrate. We ought to have confidence in the masses, trust their high revolutionary spirit and their loyalty. The higher the political consciousness of the Party members, the greater their vigilance.

The plan for increasing Party membership adopted by the National Conference was actually overfulfilled. A check-up of the plan at the end of 1952 showed that the number of Party members and probationary members had reached 126,671. In other words, Party membership had increased more than sixteenfold in less than a year. What made this possible? Generally speaking, what were the objective and subjective conditions under which a mass party could be formed in Indonesia in so short a period of time?

A favourable objective condition was: people of dif­ferent strata had a buoyant revolutionary spirit, as manifested in the tradition of the popular uprising in 1926, in the August Revolution and in the subsequent anti-imperialist struggles. The Indonesian Communists always stood at the forefront of all revolutionary strug­gles and played an important role in them. The Party therefore enjoyed great prestige as the defenders of the working people.

The International condition was also favourable. The Russian October Revolution and the heroic struggles of the Soviet people during World War II had a tremendous influence, inspiring the Indonesian people to look more eagerly towards socialism. The birth of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe and particularly the brilliant victories of the Chinese people's revolution and the founding, of the People's Republic of China extended the influence of socialist ideas even more widely.

Still another favourable condition was that as a result of ruthless colonial rule there was no labour aristocracy among the workers. In the working-class movement in Indonesia, therefore, there was no reformist tradition. This fact facilitated the formation of the workers’ united front. The solid unity of the working class became the nucleus around which all other revolutionary forces united, and enabled the working class to play the role of the vanguard.

These objective conditions were favourable for the building of a mass party.

The subjective conditions, that is, the conditions obtaining in the Party at that time, were also favourable. The establishment of a new Political Bureau in 1951 ensured the unity of the Party leadership, and this is the primary and absolute condition for rebuilding the Party into a true Marxist-Leninist party. The second condition was the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist Party Constitution which provided the basis for perfecting the Party's organizational life. The third condition was the Party's correct programme. In concrete policies the Party programme prescribed the urgent tasks which the In­donesian people must immediately fulfil, such as the policies concerning the overthrow of the most reactionary Sukiman government and the liquidation of the terrorist clique of the Darul Islam-Indonesian Islam Army, and the slogan for the abrogation of the Round Table Conference Agreement. These correct policies rallied an increasing number of people around the Party. The fourth condition was struggles against sectarianism, capitulationism and adventurism in the Party. The Party was thus able to form the broadest national united front and to draw the most advanced elements of every stratum of the people into the Party.

The Sixth National Congress of the CPI held in 1959 pointed out in its summing-up that the task of building the Party set by the Fifth National Congress had been, in the main, fulfilled. The Sixth National Congress therefore decided that the new task was to consolidate the achievements already made and “to continue to build on a country-wide scale a Party which maintains close contact with the masses and which is consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally".


The Fourth Plenary Session of the Party's Fifth Central Committee held in July 1956 emphatically pointed out:

Unity within the Party can be achieved only on the, basis of unity of thought and ideology, that is, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist Ideology. Only when Com­munists have achieved ideological unity will there be true unity in the "Communist Party's policy and organization and in the action of the people led by the Communist Party.

This simple truth was particularly applicable at the time when the CPI began to build Itself into a mass party, and only by carrying out Marxist-Leninist education throughout the Party as a whole could Marxist-Leninist ideological unity be realized.

The Fifth National Congress of the CPI finally liquidated "Left" and Right opportunism in the Party, but some Party members still had no clear understanding concerning the Indonesian revolution, especially the path the Indonesian revolution must take. The situation became more complicated as the Party membership in­creased rapidly, with new members greatly outnumber­ing the old. At the time of the Fifth National Congress in 1954, probationary members constituted about seventy per cent of the total membership. These members were of different class origin, and had different family back­grounds, degrees of education and revolutionary experience. It was not surprising that they brought with them all kinds of non-proletarian ideas into the Party, giving rise to various kinds of subjectivism. The question of Marxist-Leninist education therefore became a very urgent and decisive one on which the success of Party building depended. Since 1952 the CPI has launched several large-scale campaigns to enrol new members, each time synchronized with activities to educate Party members. New members, in particular, are required to study the Party Constitution and the Party Programme, while old members must study Party documents and Marxist-Leninist theoretical works. For instance, in 1951-52 a movement to study Lenin's “Left-Wing" Com­munism, an Infantile Disorder was unfolded among the Party's leading cadres. This study movement was deci­sive in helping the Party rid itself of sectarianism. The movement to study Comrade Liu Shao-chi's On the Mass Line was of great help to the Party cadres in building a party rooted in the masses. Likewise, Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s works On Practice, On Contradiction and On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People have been of great significance to the CPI in learning to sum up its own experience and resolve the contradictions within the Party. There are many other instances.

From August 17, 1963 the Party began to-carry out its third plan, i.e., the Four-Year Plan for Cultural, Ideo­logical and Organizational Work. It was the continua­tion of the previous two Three-Year Plans. It stressed cultural work while strengthening ideological and or­ganizational work. When .this new Four-Year Plan is completed, the Party will be able to handle its tasks and work more skilfully.

Experience in building the Party leads to the conclu­sion that the Indonesian Communists have three charac­teristics: first, the Party members are, educated in the spirit of patriotism and proletarian internationalism; secondly, in Party building, they attach importance to organizational work, but lay even, greater emphasis on ideology; thirdly, they firmly adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and are flexible in applying these principles. Indonesia Communists have come to rec­ognize these three characteristics and have made them their own mainly through their practical experience in Party building.

The work of the Indonesian Communists in building and strengthening the Party cannot be separated from the development of the international communist movement, which exerts a great influence on the building of the CPI. It is unfortunate that' serious and basic differences of views exist In the International communist move­ment. The situation would have been better for the international communist movement and for the CPI if these differences and public polemics did not exist. However, since a few years ago, no Communist has been able to evade the fact that these serious and basic differences of views, in the international communist move­ment, nor has any Communist been able to take a neutral attitude towards them.

The CPI has taken a correct approach to the dif­ferences of views in the international communist move­ment, and therefore has avoided losses in Party building. This is shown in the continuous growth and consolida­tion of the Party and the steady rise in its members' theoretical level and the strengthening of their Marxist-Leninist spirit. The existence of differences in the international communist movement has helped the In­donesian Communists to understand even more clearly the correctness of taking an independent attitude. This is the only correct attitude to be taken in this period, one which is loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and loyal to the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, and which is relentless towards subjectivism, classical and modern revisionism, and classical and modern dogmatism. The differences and public polemics in the international communist movement have made the Indonesian Communists study harder and apply Marxism-Leninism more creatively. Because of their correct attitude towards the serious and basic differences in the international communist movement the ranks of the CPI have been steeled and become ever stronger. It is steadily growing into an independent party; it is therefore more mature. This may sound strange, but it is a fact.


An important experience of the CPI in building the Party is to work in a planned way. Since 1951 this method of work has been universally adopted in the Party. At the beginning the plans were all for short terms —one month, three or six months—and there were very few items. With the accumulation of experience, more and more items of Party work were includ­ed in the plans and the periods 6f the plans was extended. As I have said before, in 1956 the Party started its First Three-Year Plan for Organizational and Educational Work, which was followed by the Second Three-Year Plan for the same tasks. Now the Party is in the initial period of the Four-Year Plan for Cultural, Ideological and Organizational Work.

One result of the large-scale enrolment, of new members was that when the Party's Fifth National Congress was convened in 1954, the membership was nearly twenty times that of 1951, and the ratio between probationary and full members was three to one. Nat­urally such rapid development gave rise to certain shortcomings. For instance, many of the new proba­tionary members were not organized as they should have teen and many newly-set-up units—Party branches, district committees, different kinds of Party fractions — lacked experience. Although the new Party members received some preliminary education by studying the Party Constitution and Programme, they did not have enough systematic education in Marxist-Leninist theory. It may therefore be, said that there was already a powerful communist movement in Indonesia in early 1955, but this movement should have produced a powerful communist organization. This task was realized with the completion of the Party's First Three-Year Plan. The outcome was that the Party's primary organizations became very active, and the cadres received theoretical education through study in Party schools or training classes. Steeling in the struggle against the counter-revolutionaries proved to be very useful in consolidating the Party organization. The struggles against the terrorist DI-TII gang (Darul Islam-Indo­nesian Islam Army) and the separatist rebellion of the PRRI-Permesta clique ("Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Charter of Total Struggle") greatly raised the militancy of the Party organizations and Party cadres. It was in these areas that the building of the Party made most rapid progress.


The great progress we have, made in building the Party is definitely inseparable from the correct political line pursued by the Party. It may even be said that the correctness of the Party's policies was the decisive factor in this progress. The correct policies, which reflect the interests of the revolutionary classes in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle, have rallied more and more people of various social strata round our Party of drawn them, into our ranks.

Slogans are important in putting these policies into concrete terms. For instance, the strategic slogan "Unite and Completely Realize the Demands of the 1945 August Revolution!” which the CPI put forward at the Fourth Plenary Session of its Central Committee held in July 1956 did great service in popularizing the correct understanding of the basic questions of the new-type bourgeois-democratic revolution in Indonesia. Similarly, the tacti­cal slogan "Change the Balance of Forces and Completely Realize the Formula of President Sukarno!" which the Party put forward at the Fifth Plenary Session of its Central Committee in 1957 had a great effect in uniting the revolutionary forces and mobilizing support for the establishment of a national coalition government or a Gotong Royong cabinet with NASAKOM as the fulcrum.

The progress made by the Party in the formation of the national united front also greatly affected the progress of Party building. The broader and stronger the united front, the greater the number of people who will under­stand and rally around the Party.

To ensure the security of the Party? the working method of combining the three forms m struggle is of decisive significance. It also guarantees the steady devel­opment of the Party.

Progress in the building of the Party has also created more favourable conditions for carrying out the policies of the Party. For if the Party is weak and its member­ship small, even though they are correct, the Party's policies cannot be carried out.

For the same reason, the stronger the Party, the more capable it will be of forming a national united front. A small party will not be taken seriously by other classes. The more important thing is, in order to build up a solid worker-peasant alliance, which is the foundation of the national united front, the CPl must strike firm roots among the peasants.

Dear Comrades and friends!

This is what I wanted to say as regards some questions concerning the Indonesian revolution and the condition of the CPI.

What is my purpose in discussing these questions? My sole purpose is further to strengthen the close friendship between the Indonesian and Chinese peoples and between the Indonesian and Chinese Communist Parties. We need to understand each other still better; it is not narrow and superficial but profound, true mutual understanding that we need. This means that we need first understand each other's society, revolution and Communist Party. I think the time has come for us to have such understanding because it is absolutely necessary. The people of our two countries and our two Parties must devote their efforts to this end.

Finally, let me acclaim:

Long live the everlasting friendship between the great courageous Indonesia and Chinese peoples!

Long live the everlasting friendship and International­ist unity between the Indonesian and Chinese Com­munist Parties!

Long live the international communist movement guided by the banner of great, invincible Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism!

Thank you.