

LABOR ACTION

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Democrats Capitulate to Dixie Racists on Civil Rights, Liberal Opposition Crumbles

By SAM TAYLOR

The Democratic Party capitulated to the Southerners on civil rights on Wednesday, and on Thursday was scheduled (according to all observers) to nominate Adlai Stevenson for president.

This was not 1948, when the Northern liberals managed to win on a substitute civil-rights plank. This time, the smaller band of liberals from the big cities (where the Negro vote is strong) who brought the question to the floor did not even manage to get a meaningful discussion, were denied a rollcall, were gavelled down by Chairman Rayburn, but can say that they put themselves on record.

The "compromise" civil-rights plank adopted not only fails to promise implementation of the Supreme Court decision but also fails to state any sort of approval of it. This is the maximum the South hoped to get. The plank limits itself to generalities against discrimination.

In vital respects it is even weaker than in 1952. So was the Democratic liberal bloc, whose former forces fell apart under the pressure in favor of the capitulation exercised by Truman with the support of other paladins such as Mrs. Roosevelt, and with Adlai Stevenson, "leader," keeping his mouth shut in the clinch.

During the caucusing on Wednesday, James Carey of the AFL-CIO reportedly cried that if the "compromise" plan were adopted, the Democrats would be selling out the people. Well, it was adopted. . . .

[More on the civil-rights fight next week—Ed.]

This flare-up on civil rights was the first—and may be the only—moment at the convention when the realities of political issues intruded into the hurly-burly, hullabaloo and hoopla.

The truism that the platforms of the Democratic and Republican Parties are made to run on and not to stand on is once more being demonstrated at the convention.

The civil-rights issue is the prime victim of this cynical maneuvering. There is little

doubt but that with very few exceptions the entire leadership of the Democratic Party would have liked to bury the civil-rights issue and the issue of the Supreme Court decision if they thought they could get away with it. There is also little doubt, with the same few exceptions, that the main if not only reason why civil rights has been pushed at all is that the Democratic politicians know that they must have solid backing from the Negro people to win the presidency.

This is the instructive exception that proves the rule: The one real political issue with which the Democrats cannot avoid dealing seriously is the civil-rights issues, *because behind this issue are masses in motion.*

They do not have to deal with real politics seriously in any other field because labor is not in motion, because it is standing on the sidelines, because it is still acting as an object and not a subject.

And even with respect to the civil-rights issue, the way in which the politicians have tried to deal with it seriously is limited to the following problem: *how to avoid dealing with it seriously.*

HOLLOW NOISES

But the vacuity of the Democratic convention did not start nor does it end with civil rights. It is the pervading atmosphere at the convention and in the maneuvering for delegates in the preceding weeks.

For all of the shouting over "moderation," civil rights, desegregation, plight of the farmer, foreign policy and the "best qualified man," there is a strange emptiness. Through the din of all the noise it becomes apparent that no one is talking political issues: what are the problems facing the United States at

home and abroad, how to deal with them, and where the candidates stand.

The issues which are raised are not necessarily statements of beliefs and proposed actions, but statements on which to run the campaign program.

The only question asked about the leading Democrats thus far in the presidential race—Stevenson, Harriman, Symington, Johnson or any of the nameless and faceless dark horses—is: *Can he win?* Specifically, in the race between the leading contenders up to this time—Stevenson and Harriman—does anyone really believe that there is a real difference between the two? that Harriman is more of a liberal or that Stevenson is actually "softer" on civil rights than Harriman, even doubling the amount of Harriman demagoguery on the issue? Does anyone seriously believe that the Democratic nominee will be chosen on the basis of his beliefs?

Listen to the line being used in the first days of the Democratic convention by the Harriman camp in the attempt to dump Stevenson. If the Harriman forces are arguing on the basis of political differences between the two, it certainly has failed to reach the pages of the press. Instead their *only* argument is: "Stevenson can't win." Truman openly banks his party position on this.

When the "political" discussion has reached this stage, then issues do not have any intrinsic importance as problems which face the people and the country. Issues become part of a manipulative process; the "art of politics" then is the process of combining the right issues in the right proportion, each pinpointed for a special group or bloc of voters.

To an extent, to be sure, this is true everywhere, but nowhere so dominantly so as in the U. S.

TWO TACTICS

The race for the Democratic nomination between Stevenson and Harriman shows how this works. The starting point is that each wants the nomination and each thinks that he has the formula to win against a president who has shown great personal popularity and against whom they have a difficult time finding real political differences and alternative policies.

Adlai Stevenson starts with the following propositions: (1) "moderation is the spirit of the time" and in order to win the Democrats have to move closer to the "moderate" position occupied by President Eisenhower; (2) the Democrats cannot win without the backing of the Solid South since it is going to be a close race; (3) on the decisive civil-rights issue, it is necessary to take a "moderate" position—which translates as failure to take a vigorous stand in support of the Supreme Court desegregation decision in order to placate the racist sentiment in the South; the expectation is that the Negroes will not defect from the Democratic Party because they have won their greatest economic gains under Democratic administrations.



STEVENSON

Averell Harriman appears to be proceeding from a different set of assumptions; mainly, that the Democrats can win only with more social demagoguery in the platform and in the speeches—à la Truman in 1948—and that the South and the "moderates" ought to be plenty satisfied with the firm knowledge that all the "immoderate" verbiage will have no more to do with reality than did Truman's verbiage in 1948.

Now whether the Stevenson or the Harriman approach is closer to a correct estimation of the situation is a different point. They arrive at their respective postures of "moderation" or "militant liberalism" as a matter of manipulation, not as a matter of politics.

The civil-rights issue then becomes a stalking-horse; for Harriman it becomes the leverage point in the attempt to dislodge the Stevenson candidacy. The politicians and ward-healers, among whom Harry Truman must occupy the first rank, are primarily merchants and brokers of votes.

Part of the politics of manipulation is the politics of being all things to all men. It involves a tight-rope balancing act at which, it must be admitted, the Democrats are more proficient than their Republican counterparts. The razzle-dazzle of "stands" on civil rights reaches the point where you cannot tell the "moderates" without a scorecard.

It would appear that the tactic of the Harriman-Truman camp thus far has been to split off the liberal Northern Democrats from the Stevenson bandwagon on the civil-rights issue. The gambit was to dress up Harriman as the heir of the New Deal and Fair Deal tradition. Lloyd Benefield, manager of the Harriman campaign, announced that "Harriman is not bucking the tide of

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He Doesn't Know What It Means

REPORTER: "Is your stand as before—one of moderation?"
STEVENSON: "I don't know what that means. No one has ever defined it for me."

There's a careful thinker for you, obviously a man who talks sense to the people.

However, last November the same careful thinker had said in a speech: "Moderation is the spirit of the times."

One wonders who defined it for him then.

Anyway Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt set out to define moderation for her man. She explained:

"Moderation is a wise word; it does not mean that you stand still. I would consider that my husband's policies, strangely enough, were policies of great moderation, because he did the new things that had to be done, but he tried not to destroy what his backgrounds and his beliefs led him to feel were valuable in the old things."

Now you know.

THE SUEZ CRISIS TWO FACES EAST:

How the State Department Backs the Colonialist Camp

By HAL DRAPER

On the eve of the London conference over the Suez crisis, called and handpicked by the Big Three in an attempt to give an international cover to their plans for roughing up Egypt, the biggest blow against this international crime was struck so far by a rank-and-file and left-wing revolt inside the British Labor Party, which has changed the policy of the party leadership.

At the same time, on the other hand, the State Department is reiterating its "complete agreement" with the British-French colonialists, in spite of some apparent second thoughts.

Just before the conference is scheduled to open on August 16, the mutual bluffing and/or jockeying for support is still so fluid that a compromise can possibly result—provided that Britain and France are thoroughly convinced that they could not effectively get away with the military assault on Egypt which they are planning.

Such a compromise might be along the lines of a setup for international supervision of free shipping through the canal, as against the Big Three's project for "internationalization" of its operation and revenue. Egypt has left this open.

Hence the possible decisive importance of the British socialists' overdue revolt, and hence the reactionary import of Dulles' new announcement of "complete agreement" with London and Paris as against such a possible compromise.

U. S. policy has so far remained not so much fluid as ambiguous on the vital point of military intervention. The problem before it has been of a pattern that has become virtually standard in the post-war world.

In part the problem is of the same character as the U. S. faces with respect to the French slaughter of the Algerian liberation fighters (and of the Moroccan

and Tunisian nationalists before that). U. S. interests themselves can easily tolerate an independent Algeria. But whenever France demands support of its colonial policy, the State Department effectively obliges; because the highest good for its military-minded foreign policy is the maintenance of the NATO alliance and the good will of its fellow imperialists in NATO.

This is a big element in the Suez crisis. The U. S. has been trying to balance (and juggle) a number of conflicting considerations, but as always the big one which outweighed everything else is its solidarity with the British and French.

Thus, the U. S. prefers to see Suez under the control of "reliable" allies, rather than uncertain Middle Eastern nationalist regimes which play footsie with Russia. Yet (as the British still grumble today) it looked with favor on the removal of the British troops from the canal zone, on the theory that it could control the Nasser regime to its satisfaction. As long as the British occupation remained, there was explosive nationalist hatred and discontent hanging over the canal.

SQUEEZE THAT FAILED

The diminution in British influence in the region which followed their withdrawal from Suez was no skin off Washington's back—on the contrary, the expectation was that U. S. influence would move in as the British waned. Hence the proposed Aswan Dam bribe, and in general the policy sparked by U. S. Amba-

sador Byroade (who is now being symbolically removed from the Cairo embassy.)

As far as the naked eye can tell, this perspective was shaken by Nasser's arms deal with Russia. At the very least this indicated that the Nasser regime was not content to organize Egypt as a docile sphere of influence for the U. S. instead of Britain.

Then (this time according to Washington's story), Nasser tried to drive too hard a bargain on the Aswan Dam, using alleged Russian offers to pry out more dollars. No one can claim that this is a mortal sin in international relations, but it also served to convince Dulles that this Egypt was not "reliable" enough.

Washington learned that the Russian offers to finance the dam were non-existent and that Nasser was bluffing; he decided to pull the rug from under. At a juncture calculated to make Nasser look silliest, after all arrangements had been virtually completed, the U. S. suddenly announced that it was withdrawing the dam offer. The reason that was fudged up was also calculated to be most disconcerting: the Nasser regime was accused of being too weak economically.

Presumably, the strategy was to force Nasser to jump through the hoop and then crawl.

The manner and circumstances in which the U. S. withdrew the Aswan Dam offer have been strongly emphasized by virtually every comment on the question outside the U. S., especially by diplomats of other small countries. But we note that in the N. Y. Times of August 11, C. L. Sulzberger's column ruefully says the same thing:

"We abandoned support in a manner calculated to produce maximum resentment. There we succeeded."

Of course, Sulzberger doesn't really mean that the State Department wanted to produce "resentment." It wanted to produce docility, the docility of a whipped dog that has reached out for a piece of meat from the master's plate and been swiped over the nose to teach him his place.

Washington columnist Marquis Childs suggests another element too:

"But abruptly, and with almost no warning to officials of the [World] bank, who were still discussing aspects of a bank loan, Dulles withdrew the American offer. One reason is said to have been pressure from senators from the South, anxious to prevent more world competition from Egyptian cotton, who stipulated that the Aswan Dam deal be called off in return for their support of the foreign-aid bill. But whatever the motive, the way in which the offer was pulled back seemed deliberately designed to send Nasser off on some new adventure." (Aug. 10.)

That may have helped. In any case, it was miscalculated. It didn't work.

MILITARY HEDGE

This is the reason the British and French bitterly insist that the Suez Canal crisis was precipitated by the U. S., even though the brunt of Nasser's counterattack fell on their own shoulders and pocketbooks. See us through, they insist to Uncle Sam; you can't get us in trouble and then leave us holding the canal company. Or else...

The U. S. would very much like to see its friends through. But it can also afford to take a more objective and detached view of the suicidal consequences of crude armed intervention, since it is not the U. S., after all, that loses the canal's revenues or, more important, loses the footholds in the Middle East that are likely to go if Nasser comes through unscathed. It is not the U. S., after all, that is fighting tooth and nail to hold on to a remnant of empire in Algeria, or a corner of the Mediterranean in Cyprus.

On the other hand, it has to remember that the American ox can be gored in the Middle East too. American capital

dominates about two-thirds of the Middle East's oil. (When Lebanon decided to impose an income tax on the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company, the U. S. rushed in to lodge a protest with Beirut, which rejected it. As we have reported in LA, the American press shuddered at this galloping "Nasserism.")

So the State Department line has been to get behind its allies with full moral and political support, but to hedge on the threats of military action against Egypt.

It is not a question of hedging on military action by the U. S. That is pretty much out of the question in any case. London and Paris have openly said as much, giving as their reason the fear that U. S. military involvement might draw in Russia. One is entitled to believe that their reason is also that the U. S. wouldn't do so anyway, especially in an election year. In any case, the other two don't need U. S. military strength to lick Egypt, they are sure.

For the U. S., it is a question of merely hedging on approval of armed intervention by its friends. The question is whether the State Department's influence is used to RULE OUT armed intervention. All that Britain and France need to go ahead, as far as Washington is concerned, is toleration.

THE BIG IF

According to recent categorical statements in Times Washington dispatches, which obviously reflect the State Department's firm story, Britain and France were determined on precipitous military action until Dulles persuaded them to go through the London conference tactic before trying it the hard way. The former are quoted as saying now: "If the Americans hadn't interfered we'd have fixed Nasser's wagon right away and avoided the subsequent complications." (Times, Aug. 12.)

Even if we take this State Department handout with a grain of salt, since it fits in too well with the desire to make out that Dulles "brinkmanship" is the great force for peace that Life always said it was, still it is clear that the U. S. has been for going slow on open force.

If—a big if—the U. S. were to say openly to the world that it ruled out armed compulsion of Egypt, then it could appear with a remnant of some international morality before the world; it could speak with some authority for a meaningful compromise; and it would go a long way to quiet the dogs of war in Britain and France.

This is precisely what Dulles and Eisenhower have refused to do.

This was dramatized at President Eisenhower's August 8 press conference when a British reporter cut through the president's maudlin sentimentalities with the question whether he was "opposed to the use of military force under any circumstances."

"The president stiffened and flushed. 'I didn't say that, he asserted. 'I was very careful not to say that,' he added . . . 'Now, I don't mean to say that anyone has to surrender rights without using everything they can to preserve their rights.' . . ." (N. Y. Times, Aug. 9.)

The day before, Dulles had spoken extemporaneously to a meeting of Latin American ambassadors. Under questioning, he was willing to speculate on what Britain and France would consider prop-

(Continued on next page)

THE SUEZ CRISIS

British Socialists Say No

The socialist rank and file of the British Labor Party may be changing the whole course of the Suez crisis.

Under the impress of the chauvinist hysteria that burst out over Nasser's nationalization of the canal, the Labor Party leadership first went along with the Tory government, while muttering about caution on military moves. Party leader Hugh Gaitskell supported Eden's speeches.

Then the Bevanite organ *Tribune*, which has been pretty good on colonial issues, spearheaded a revolt with a lead article entitled "Stop This Suez Madness." Dissent seeped upward from the ranks of the party workers.

About this time press dispatches reported that the Tory government "was trying to soft-pedal its tough anti-Nasser line" while "government" officials are still saying privately—and earnestly—that they were going to impose British control on the canal "by fast, ruthless military action." (Times, Aug. 8.)

On August 8, twenty-four Labor MPs published a joint statement warning against the use of force on Egypt. On August 11, the United Nations Association on the isles denounced the government's course in bypassing the UN.

On August 12, a N. Y. Times London dispatch reported that "the bellicose mood of last week" was shifting "into lower gear." Two BLP leaders, Denis Healey and Douglas Jay, colleagues of the right-winger Gaitskell, now started bending the leadership's emphasis toward anti-war warnings.

"It was clear that within the powerful Labor Opposition the initial anger over

Colonel Nasser's abrupt anti-Western move was beginning slowly to cool.

"Yet as in most countries, democratic or authoritarian, the ministers made their decisions behind closed doors and the people waited for orders, and wondered."

But this correspondent was echoing "The Charge of the Light Brigade," not the ranks of the Labor Party.

The next day: "The Labor Party appeared to be moving swiftly away from the initial enthusiastic support its leaders had given to the militant policy of the Conservative government . . .

"The Sunday Times [of London] commented that Mr. Gaitskell was facing a major challenge to his leadership. The Sunday Express said that since Mr. Gaitskell could not rally his party behind him, he 'has decided to rally smartly behind his party.'"

Likewise party secretary Morgan Philips, who inveighed against "threats of duress," and Laborite foreign-policy expert Alfred Robens, who hit at sabre-rattling.

On the Monday before the opening of the international conference, the Labor Party leadership formalized its break with the Tory policy on Suez by demanding the recall of Parliament. The issue of armed intervention was laid down by the parliamentary group of the party in so many words.

Bevan's followers, reported the N. Y. Times, "had played a leading part in the recent criticism of Mr. Gaitskell's apparent support of the government."



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Washington Lines Up with Its Military Friends in NATO, As Usual

(Continued from page 2)

er grounds for military occupation of the canal.

Avoidance of force was deliberately left out of the joint statement which Dulles agreed to in London on August 2. And the next day in Paris, Premier Guy Mollet, in a speech slandering for Nasser's blood, implied that Dulles had approved the forcible imposition of the Big Three plan. The dispatches from London said definitely that Dulles had at any rate "acquiesced in their well-publicized military preparations." (N. Y. Times, Aug. 3.)

At the same time the State Department kept assuring Washington correspondents that Britain and France were determined to use armed force—this in the face of increasing reports from abroad that London itself was getting more uncertain about it because of internal dissent.

PASSING THE WORD

This was dramatized by the White House call to congressional leaders (accompanied by a full panoply of military men) for an emergency consultation on Suez, because of the "gravity of the crisis." On August 10, a Times dispatch from Washington passed on one of those authoritative versions of what Dulles would tell the meeting, "it is understood":

"There is absolutely no disposition on the part of Britain and France to back down. . . . If Nasser doesn't accept "at least some degree" of their plan, "the British and French are fully prepared to fight. Then there probably would be a war in the Middle East."

Correspondent T. J. Hamilton (Aug. 12) wrote specifically: "Just possibly the British and the French may resort to force if the conference is a complete failure. Indeed, the word is being passed in Washington that they will definitely do so."

And: "Thursday a high Administration source told reporters it was inevitable unless Egypt gave way." (Aug. 12.)

This was the State Department's contribution to the game of bluffing (or terrorizing) Egypt into capitulation, by trying to convince it that the British-French



warmongers meant business and would not be dissuaded.

This was the way in which, while remaining formally uncommitted to military force, the U.S. helped to put teeth into the British-French threat. (These are the same teeth which the British Labor Party's stand is now pulling.)

ECONOMIC CLUB

The State Department's second line of offense against Egypt was, in contrast, taken openly for a change. This was the public threat of "economic pressure" against the country unless it capitulated to the imperialist demands.

At the above-mentioned address to the Latin American ambassadors, Dulles threatened an economic assault if the London conference failed to bring the desired results. This is a method of duress much more palatable to American sensitivities than the franker recourse to guns.

There had been plentiful hints right along that weapons of this nature were in the arsenal.

As early as August 2, Foreign Aid Director Hollister, announcing that there was no present intention to cut off the aid going to Egypt, pointed out that this would be taken up after Dulles' London conversations. On August 8, William Caldwell, speaking for the International Cooperation Administration, explained that shipment of large items involving large expenditures would be "reviewed" before they left port.

On August 12, a Times Washington dispatch reported: "An indication of the underlying vulnerability of Egyptian economy, especially to any severe strain, was given by the revelation that within the last two months Egypt has requested the United States to permit her to purchase 100,000 tons of flour and 350,000 tons of wheat from surplus stores, to be paid for in local currency."

DOUBLE PLAY?

But the military and economic weapons are not necessarily entirely separate. One can be a preparation for the other, in a double play.

If the London conference does not provide a sufficient basis for going ahead with armed intervention, Britain may want to wait for a better-seeming setting, like an attempt by Egypt to raise the canal fees. They know that Nasser would not want to do so. But suppose he were forced . . . ?

In his nation-wide speech, Prime Minister Eden had said:

"Just now Colonel Nasser is soft-pedaling. His threats are being modified, but how can we be sure that the next time he has a quarrel with any country he won't interfere with that nation's shipping, or that the next time he is short of money he won't raise the dues on the ships that pass through the canal?"

The idea would be to hasten this along by making sure that he does run "short of money." As a Times dispatch from London put it, describing "what the British really want":

"An alternative to force might be widespread economic sanctions, possibly squeezing Nasser to the point of raising canal dues, which the British would regard as justification for moving in and nailing the enemy." (Emphasis added.)

That would be a pretty division of labor: the U.S., washing its hands of any dirty military business, would force Egypt to

the wall economically, while its friends did the blackjacking.

This is the contribution of the United States to the international gang-up against Egypt, as the London conference gets ready to meet.

But one is glad to see that even among the brain-trusters of the State Department there have been some second thoughts, strong enough to elicit a public repudiation from Dulles. This is what happened on Monday before the London Conference.

It appears from the account in the press that the secretary of State "was disturbed by a report that the United States would not back the British and French demand for an international agency to run the Suez Canal, but would be satisfied with international supervision."

This "disturbing" report, it seems, emanated right from the State Department itself, and so one can suppose that it represented the views of some circles there. Dulles sought to scotch it.

The key difference is between "run the canal" and "supervision." The difference is crucial to the possibility of a compromise.

Under "supervision"—a course left open by Nasser—Egypt's nationalization would stand and Egypt would control and operate the canal, but some international body would be given rights to ensure that free shipping through the canal is maintained.

What, then, was the idea that cropped up in the State Department, behind Dulles' back? The N. Y. Times account, leaving sources very vague, described it as follows:

"Other authoritative sources commented that the State Department spokesman [who?], when questioned, had declined to say that 'means to insure the practical and efficient functioning of the canal' must necessarily involve creating an 'international authority with the job of running the canal.' Nor would the spokesman say that the formula of agreement ruled out the possibility of Egypt's running the canal with some kind of supervision.

"These sources said that, as far as the United States was concerned, an international authority that would actually run the canal was a 'maximum demand,' which might be modified in the course of negotiation.

"Differences with the French and British have not arisen, they said, but might arise if the French and British remained entirely rigid in their original position. . . .

"Such a solution would not necessarily require reversal of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. It is thought that it might be sufficient to have key individuals representing an international body in the nationalized canal company.

"These points were mentioned not as fixed proposals but as an indication of some of the thinking in the United States delegation [to London]." (Aug. 14.)

FEASIBLE COMPROMISE

This, it would seem, is what Dulles spoke out against, in reasserting "complete agreement" with Britain and France. Why?

These ideas represent a possible line along which a feasible compromise with Egypt can be reached—but it would be a compromise that would be entirely unacceptable to the British-French elements that want to turn the clock back in Suez. It points (albeit vaguely) to a kind of compromise which India and the other uncommitted nations would support.

Candor obliges us to say that it would be a compromise that would represent a substantial victory for Nasser's position. He has never ruled out a "supervisory" setup.

The Big Three, on the other hand, have put forward a so-called "internationalization" plan for Suez which clearly ruled out mere "supervision." The new international canal authority would have "genuine control over the canal's operations, tolls, general finances, maintenance and development," said the Times account, based on the written document. There would be "provision for a reasonable income for Egypt."

"Officials of all the Western Big Three



emphasized that the new authority actually would run the canal and not just supervise it in name only. That, of course, is expected to be the one thing that Egypt will be least willing to accept." (Aug. 11.)

The tug of war at the London conference is going to be, in good part, over this question of control-operation-management versus supervision.

The question cuts right through the hypocrisy of the Big Three claims to be interested only in ensuring unimpeded shipping. In order to ensure free shipping, for example, there is no reason to insist that the revenue must be taken away from Egypt, except for a "reasonable income."

This then is what it means when Dulles reasserts his determination to go to London as lawyer for his imperialist allies in NATO.

Once again, before all the world, the United States gets ready to act as the bulwark and savior of a colonialism which is on the defensive everywhere in face of the hatred of all peoples.

BLUFFING?

According to one report, the leadership of the British Labor Party, in turning against the Tory Suez policy, considered that British threats of force were a bluff, that the bluff was being called, would fail, and would discredit Eden.

They are not the only ones who suspect that, when push comes to shove, the British can not make their armed intervention stick.

The powerful London *Economist*, an independent Conservative weekly, was calling it a dangerous illusion to believe that an expeditionary force could go abroad, knock Egypt on the head and then come home, "leaving the Middle East clear for the tranquil and ordered flow of commerce."

It asked:

"Is Britain, in fact, prepared, having clamped a control by force on an actively unwilling Egypt, to sit on the lid forever, while keeping further massive military strength handy to deal with the inevitable wide repercussions in the Arab world?"

In France some once-sensible words by Foreign Minister Pineau have come back to haunt him, precisely on the question of bluffing.

Last June 1 he was speaking in the Chamber in reply to bitter attacks on Egyptian aid to the Algerian guerrillas:

What action can France take against Egypt, he asked.

"Economic sanctions? France has 450 billion francs invested in Egypt, which has nothing invested in France. Do you want the French fleet to bombard Alexandria? There can be no question of it. There is no worse humbug than to make threats that will not be carried out. Let us not brandish a saber when it is a wooden saber."

(As Algeria shows, M. Pineau is in favor of brandishing only the kind of saber that is useful for successful massacres.)

Now this same Pineau is yelling for armed force against Egypt. What has changed? Can it be because a big enough part of that 450 billion franc investment has been taken by Egypt anyway?

A Train Of Gunpowder

If Britain and France move their troops and warships against Egypt, where will the forces come from?

(1) From NATO, the alliance, which—remember—was set up to defend Our Way of Life against the Communist threat. The British are already moving their crack Second Infantry Division out of Western Germany to bolster her strategic reserves for the Suez crisis.

This is the second time that NATO troops have been moved out to be used for colonial massacres. The first was French forces transferred to Algeria. This time too, the move had to be cleared with the United States' military commander General Gruenther.

(2) From Algeria. . . . "France . . . has indicated she would be willing to give ground in Algeria to detach troops for an Egyptian operation." (N. Y. Times, Aug. 8.)

(3) From Cyprus. . . . "Most of Britain's 18,000 troops in Cyprus are occupied in combating the nationalist terrorist movement there. About 1800 Royal Marine paratroopers are believed to be available for duty elsewhere."

In addition, Britain is making preparation for using Cyprus as its base for the "Egyptian operation." But EOKA, the Cypriot nationalist movement, has announced that it would "paralyze" the island in solidarity against any military action against Egypt.

The British have designated their military buildup in the Mediterranean as "Operation Magic." They'll need some. It looks as if an attack on Egypt will be the signal for a flare-up all along the colonialist front, from Algeria to Cyprus.

THE SUEZ CRISIS WHO'S VIOLATING WHAT?

The Legal Pretexts For the Big Three Gang-Up

The juridical basis for the threatened British-French assault on Egypt is plainly a secondary matter from everybody's standpoint. Therefore it has been receiving the primary attention in public. Because the primary matter, the primary motivation of the colonialists, is not something they like to flaunt.

The problem of the Big Three imperialists, from the angle of public relations, has been how to confuse world opinion thoroughly about their complete lack of a legal basis for manhandling Egypt. Let's see what the facts seem to be on this sector of the Suez issue.

First of all, is Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the canal a violation of the 1888 Convention which sought to establish a guarantee, by the then big powers of the world, of free and unimpeded shipping through the canal?

No, it is not. And this much is being widely conceded in the press. For the most part, we have to discuss other types of attempts to establish a legal pretext for imperialist intervention in spite of this fact.

Yet, so insistent and insidious is the pressure against truth that even this clear fact is often baldly falsified. Last week, we mentioned the Scripps-Howard press in this connection. In contrast, the N. Y. Times' news columns have been chock-full of correspondents' reports that all sorts of Big Three statesmen, spokesmen and observers concede that the nationalization (or the "nationalization itself") is no violation of the treaty.

Yet the Times falsifies too, editorially. Its editorial of August 3 stated that the canal "has been operating under an international agreement. That agreement has been unilaterally destroyed by the Egyptian dictator."

FALSIFICATION

What "international agreement"? Because of the context, the reader will naturally interpret this to refer to the 1888 Convention. This is the falsification. Or is the Times referring to a different "international" agreement, the pre-existing agreements and contracts between Egypt and the canal company itself? It goes without saying that these agreements were canceled by the nationalization, but an agreement between Egypt and a company which exists jur-

1888 and All That

For as blatant an example of factual falsification as any, see the U. S. News and World Report for Aug. 17. David Lawrence's editorial systematically equates the 1888 treaty with the Canal Company's contracts. Here's how he does it:

"For Nasser has made a 'scrap of paper' of the treaty of 1888 by which nine nations became guarantors of international operation of the Suez Canal. It is not a question of mere 'nationalization' of property. . . . A contract—a treaty—is in effect. It has twelve more years to run. If Nasser considered the terms onerous, he could have sought a reopening and a negotiation. . . ."

It is the contract that has "twelve more years to run," not the treaty. It is the contract with the private corporation that was canceled by Egypt, not the treaty with other nations.

And, by the way, this treaty did not provide for "international operation" of the canal at all; it provided only for an international guarantee of free shipping and international supervision. The vital difference between "operation" and "supervision" is likely to be the dividing line at the London conference.

There is good reason to muddle it up until no American reader can be expected to understand what is going on—except that Egypt has done Something Dreadful.

idically under Egyptian law and sovereignty should not be disingenuously confused with an international treaty by so respectable an organ as the Times. And no one doubts that a state has the right to cancel a contract with a private company, or nationalize it.

Again, on August 11, in an unsigned article which presumably gave the results of the paper's own research, the statement is made that Nasser "was violating an international agreement signed in 1888." The peculiar thing about this flat falsehood is that it appears, completely unsupported and unaccompanied by any evidence whatsoever, in an article which for the most part recites the abundant evidence that exists to prove that Nasser nationalized the canal company "with a weight of precedence under international law"!

It looks exactly as if an editor had simply arbitrarily inserted the falsified statement into a research man's otherwise objective summary of the juridical situation.

PRECEDENTS

Thus the article itself proceeds to explain rightly that "international law recognizes the sovereign right of countries to expropriate foreign private properties within their borders, provided that adequate compensation is made."

For example, when Mexico in 1938 expropriated oil properties of 17 foreign companies, including U. S. firms, Washington did not challenge Mexico's right to do so. (The U. S. reacted by twisting our good neighbor's arm with an economic squeeze.) Nor did the British dispute Mossadegh's right to expropriate the Anglo-Iranian oil property in 1951. (The Anglo-American oil companies and their governments merely engineered the overthrow of Mossadegh and the installation of a terroristic dictatorship by the Shah.)

The same paper, on August 5, reported from London, with regard to the nationalization, "This, British officials concede privately, was justifiable legally. The post-war British Labor government had itself nationalized many companies in Britain—and companies whose shares were held in many cases by non-British subjects."

The Manchester Guardian categorically stated: "Nasser has not broken the 1888 Convention nor do any of the later undertakings appear to have been breached. . . . It is hard to see how Colonel Nasser can be said to have acted against international law."

ADVICE FROM A PROF

Certainly, no one has yet quoted any clause, sentence or word in the 1888 treaty which has so far been violated by Egypt (with the exception of the independent issue of Israel's exclusion, which is elsewhere discussed in these pages).

A professor of international law, in a letter to the N. Y. Times, advises that although he is in favor of anti-Egyptian action, such action should not be based on the juridical grounds which we are discussing, because there are no such grounds. "The status of the Suez Canal Company is not in any direct way linked with the Convention of 1888," he writes.

He himself then tries to make out a case based solely on the "special status" of the company as embodied in agreements between it and the Egyptian government. This professor, who thinks he is proposing a better pretext, does not deny, or affirm, or indeed discuss, that a government has an undisputed right to

cancel such agreements with a firm unilaterally, and that in any case it is an enormity for a foreign government to threaten armed intervention on that account.

In his August 12 statement, Nasser pointed out that the 1888 Convention cannot possibly be tied to the canal company, since everyone agrees that in 1968 the canal company would be out anyway, while the Convention would still be in complete force.

TEARING UP THE TREATY

A few days previously, Egyptian spokesmen had made another point which we have not seen disputed. Article 8 of the Convention had set up a committee of the signatory powers which was supposed to meet yearly in Egypt and be on call to investigate any charges of violation. The Egyptians recounted that the British "categorically refused any supervision by the international committee," and that the committee was never actually even formed.

Note that the British, since they controlled the canal themselves, torpedoed even supervision by the international committee. Today Nasser has not ruled out such supervision. The Big Three proposal for internationalization is a plan to take control and operation (and the money) out of the hands of Egypt.

A point which no one seems to think worthwhile to bring up (for obvious reasons) is that the most indisputable violation of the 1888 Convention is the Big Three's conference and their internationalization plan. This proposal is that a complete change be made in the international setup to assure the canal, not by the signatory powers or their successors but by a group of nations handpicked by the Three (one of whom, the U. S., was not itself a signatory of the Convention.)

It is one of the curious but symbolic and compelling sidelights on this whole situation that, in the name of the sanctity of international treaties, the Three are actually proposing to tear up the whole Convention, while it is Egypt that is really insisting on compliance with it, formally sepaing.

OFFICIAL VERSION

But the imperialists cannot be without a legal pretext, however thin. The time is long since passed when they could brutally rape a small country with only a cynical reference to "manifest destiny," or "national honor," or "the white man's burden," or the necessity of spreading the benefits of Christianity.

This choice of a pretext was one of the tasks of the August 2 cabal in London to which Secretary Dulles flew, and which issued the call for the 24-nation conference.

According to the Paris *Le Monde* it was our own giant intellect, John Foster Dulles, who "persuaded the French and British foreign ministers that the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Company went beyond Egypt's rights" (N. Y. Times, Aug. 3). The French, according to this version, merely wanted to base their case on "Nasser's alleged untrustworthiness."

In any case, the results of their cogitation were embodied in the tripartite statement which represented what the U. S. was willing to go along with at the side of its two bellicose friends. Here in its Section 2, we have a formulation of the official juridical pretext for imperialist intervention—three formulations, in fact.

(1) They do not "question" Egypt's right to nationalize—what? To nationalize "assets, not impressed with an international interest, which are subject to its political authority."

But as we have seen, there is no doubt about a sovereign country's right to nationalize companies which have an "international interest."

And do they really question whether

So Young, So Unilateral!

The Dutch government also has its objections to "unilateral action" by anti-colonial peoples. It formulates this objection with refreshing preciseness on August 2 when it issued a statement expressing "shock" over Egypt's nationalization of Suez.

"The Netherlands is particularly concerned by unilateral actions on the part of young countries in general," the Dutch officials added (N. Y. Times, Aug. 3).

Franker than that you won't get. Of course, the officials were thinking of Indonesia, and forgot that in Egypt's case the country was a center of world civilization centuries before the aborigines of the Netherlands came out of the Stone Age.

the Suez Company is subject to Egypt's political authority? It is worth noting that in fact they do not deny this directly; of course, the rest of the verbiage in the statement is designed to do exactly that by implication.

(2) Why is Egypt's action "far more than a simple action of nationalization"? Because it is "arbitrary," says the statement—as every expropriation of foreign interests is in the eyes of the expropriated.

Because it is "unilateral," says the statement—as every expropriation is by its nature; even Dulles couldn't dream up a "bilateral" nationalization.

Because the company is an "international agency," suggests the statement. The gimmick is in the word "agency." Is it the agent or agency of some other governments, who are therefore legally involved? No, it is a private company merely owned by foreigners. Is it an agency that performs a service of "international interest"? Of course, but this is not in dispute.

(3) Then the statement adds that the nationalization is "more serious" because Egypt's aims are "purely national purposes," in contrast with the "international purpose" of the 1888 Convention. But as we have seen, Egypt claims to hold by the particular and specific purpose laid down in 1888—free shipping. And for the rest, any adult person can freely snicker at the smug morality implied—which was given words in Dulles' TV report to the nation when he preached that it was "inadmissible" for the canal to be "exploited by one country for highly selfish purposes."

As everyone knows, England controls Gibraltar or Cyprus, and France controls Algeria, and the U. S. controls the Panama Canal and Okinawa, solely and altruistically for the good of humanity at large, with no thought to "selfish" national interests.

BRAINSTUFFING

A Times editorial of August 6 was more to the point when it wound up one of its then daily homilies: "This is not merely the 'sanctity of treaties.' It is a way of doing international business."

But then, on the other hand, look at the following statement:

"[The Canal] cannot be used as a source for the irresponsible draining off of revenue to finance projects that cannot stand on their own merits. World trade should not be taxed to finance wild-cattling adventures. The canal ought to pay its way and can do so. It ought not to be a private bonanza for any person, regime or corporation." (Emphasis added.)

This subversively anti-capitalistic attack on profit-making (or is it only bonanza-making?) by private or corporate exploiters of the canal rolls off the Times editorialist's typewriter (Aug. 3, this time) in spite of the fact that this is exactly what has obtained up to now—with millions of dollars in profit per year flowing into the pockets of private foreign capitalists; whereas, whatever may be the fiscal merits of the Aswan Dam project, no one doubts that it would be of enormous aid to the development of Egypt.

From Dulles' "ecclesiastical foxiness" in London to the Times' Pecksniffian preachments, and on to the shriller and more openly chauvinist cries of rage from the right-wing press, a whole vista of imperialist morality is on display, as outright lies, distortions, sophistries, equivocations and guileful deceptions pour out of the brainstuffing agencies of the ruling powers.

THE SUEZ CRISIS *Egypt's Rights, Nasser's Wrongs*

Israel's Stake in the Dispute

When socialists defend Egypt's right to nationalize the Suez Canal, and denounce the threats of colonialist intervention by Britain, France and the U. S., they do not thereby become political defenders of Nasser or of the Nasser regime in Egypt. Not in any way.

But one of the facets in the current official propaganda campaign against Egypt is the pot-and-kettle routine: *Nasser is a reactionary dictator; he himself has imperialistic ambitions to dominate the Sudan; he is a Pan-Arabic chauvinist who wants to subordinate all the other Arab states to his personal ambitions; he wants to get his hands on his neighbors' oil resources; his bureaucracy wastes a lot of money . . . etc., etc.*

The suggested conclusion is, presumably: Since Nasser is a Bad Man, it is justifiable for a trio of foreigners to take the country and its rights away from him.

Naturally, no one is so stupid as to say just this. It is a question of affecting the climate of opinion by indirection.

But even from the point of view of freeing the Egyptian people from Nasser's regime, it is the outside imperialist pressure which consolidates support behind him. If Nasser could not whip up nationalist support by justifiably pointing to the real threat from the Big Three junta, he would have to look for mass support to his domestic-reform program—and that would be harder.

There are strong progressive, radical and socialist forces fermenting in Egypt, and in the rest of the Arab world. One thing that keeps them off Nasser's back is his role as loud champion of Egypt's rights against real imperialist threats. Of course, if he finds it necessary to hang on to power, he might be ready to make a rotten compromise, if he dared. Meanwhile, his popularity among the Egyptian masses is conferred upon him not by his own achievements on their behalf but by England and France.

This is not a special case but a classic pattern. In general, one of the progressive results of every fight for national independence is that victory makes it possible for the internal class struggle to

emerge from under the overlaying national struggle.

In a sense, Egypt is artificially united under Nasser precisely by the imperialist pressure from without. Take the latter away and that factitious national unity would fall apart.

The road to social reform at home would be opened wider.

Yet somehow it is possible for Western pundits and politicians to be taken seriously when they point to Nasser's own crimes as justification for the foreign squeeze against him.

ACT OF WAR

This is the picture particularly behind the current use that is being made in the West of Nasser's offenses against Israel especially his violation of the 1888 Convention when he closed the canal against Israel seven years ago.

This act was part and parcel of Egypt's (and the other Arab states') blind and provocatively reactionary refusal to recognize even the existence of the new state of Israel and to make peace with it. Since we are not here discussing the complex problem of Arab-Israel relations, we need not repeat here our previous discussions of Israel's own contributions to this impasse. Be that as it may, it would be disastrous to try to settle the Arab-Israel score by renewed war.

Egypt's closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships was an act of war, and was in fact juridically based on the fact that technically a state of war still exists between the two countries.

This is all part of a very important question. All that need be pointed out here is: it is a *different* question from the present one.

The worst thing that could happen to

Israel is that its cause should be used as a pretext for the shameful assault on Egypt's sovereignty which is planned, or at least threatened, by the country which once oppressed them both—Britain, and Britain's friends.

RATIONALIZATION

In point of fact, it is perfectly clear at the moment that any tender references to Israel's interests on the part of Britain or France are strictly hypocritical rationalizations.

The fact is that Egypt's closing of the canal to Israel goes back to 1950-1 when Britain itself was still astride the canal zone, before Egypt forced the occupying troops out. In 1951 the UN Security Council passed a routine motion requesting Egypt to lift the ban on Israel, but did nothing whatsoever about it.

Now, when Britain and France want to justify armed intervention by the prediction that Nasser will impede free shipping, they naturally turn to the one known case and try to utilize it demagogically.

It must also be noted that when Egypt bases its closure of the canal to Israeli ships on the state of war which it insists on maintaining, it is doing more or less the same as England did during two world wars. The 1888 Suez Canal Convention called for free shipping during both war and peace. Britain violated this during both wars. Egypt is doing the same as Britain, but this time Israel alone is the victim.

What is involved is, then, Nasser's reactionary anti-Israel policy; but this, unfortunately, has been going on for a long time.

On August 8 the British Foreign Office officially told a press conference that the Suez Canal issue is to be kept "separate from the Arab-Israel dispute. Any attempt to inject the latter dispute into the former would not help toward the settlement of the Suez Canal dispute."

That goes double for vice-versa.

If one wishes to conjure up an appalling prospect that would finish off Israel in the Middle East, then one can take seriously a suggestion made by the Franco-fascist organ *Arriba* (Madrid) that Britain use Israeli troops as "Se-poys" to reoccupy the Suez Canal.

So far, indeed, is Britain from mixing the Israeli issue into it, that it did not even invite Israel to the handpicked London conference. As I. F. Stone remarks ironically, "The one nation with a legitimate grievance over the canal is not even invited to London."

If Britain is insistently keeping the Israeli out of this so far, that is not because it wants to do Israel any good. It still hopes to appeal to Nasser's Arab allies, not to speak of the possibility of a deal with Nasser himself. Its motivation is its own.

TWO "PLOTS"

Some of the pro-Zionist spokesmen in this country (no doubt in other countries

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THE CRISIS
OVER SUEZ

114 West 14 Street, N. Y. C.

THEY COLLECTED EIGHT TIMES OVER

- Britain, which picked up its 44 per cent of the Suez Canal Company stock when an Egyptian khedive found himself in financial straits, has been repaid eight times over its original investment.
- In 1954 the net profits of the canal company amounted to \$44,553,747, and the gross dividend paid per capital share was \$30.51.
- In the last five years, says an Egyptian statement, the canal company distributed more than \$140 million to shareholders.

too) are, however, loth to let this alone. The N. Y. Post, for example, in two editorials—which are as chauvinistic as this liberal organ usually gets as soon as politics reaches the water's edge—actually insists on discussing the Suez crisis primarily in terms of Zionism and Israel. They could not be more misguided.

In an editorial of August 10, the Post reveals "the historic failure of judgment that shaped the present crisis." It all goes back to what Dulles told the premier of Lebanon in 1953: the New York Jews had voted against him (Dulles) in the 1949 senatorial race, and against Ike in 1952, and "the U. S. wants to recapture the Arab world's friendship." So the U. S. has been appeasing the Arabs. . . .

These are the parochial spectacles through which this organ sees the Suez crisis. It reminds one that, the other day, a Syrian notable made the routine claim that the lineup against Egypt is all a "Zionist plot"; for the Post pundits, it's all an anti-Zionist plot. They can choose up for the honors.

One might wish that an Israeli government could have the statesmanship and the vision to seize this opportunity to line itself up with the rights of small nations against the imperialists. It could have a spectacular and dramatic impact on the Arab masses, as part of a wider program of appealing to the Arab masses over the heads of the Nassers.

But with the present Israel government, that is a pipedream. The best one can root for is that they have at least the good sense to keep out of the imperialist lineup, not to dishonor themselves irremediably in the eyes of most of the world's population and all of their neighbors.

This seems to be their present course, more or less, at this time. On August 13 Menachem Beigin, leader of the extreme-reactionary Herut party, second largest in the country, denounced the government for its "passive" policy in the Suez crisis, and called for open backing of the British-French assault on Egypt. For Beigin and his following (which extends from mere reactionaries to fascist elements), this is in order: they have openly been for preventive war by Israel right along. Judging by Beigin's outburst, Ben-Gurion is ruling out this suicidal course.

Crack Newshawk At Work, by Heck (hic)

"Some military experts here [London] asked a very merciless question which will have to be faced sooner or later: 'Suppose Russia uses Egypt-held Suez to ship a flock of submarines into the Mediterranean to be based, say, in Communist Albania?' This is a possibility which would literally change the entire conventional or non-atomic strategic picture in the world."—William Richardson, the poor man's poor man, in the N. Y. Post, August 3.

As soon as Mr. Richardson stumbles out of that pub, will someone please ask him the merciless question: Just where is the Suez Canal anyway? Has Nasser nationalized the Dardanelles yet? How many glasses does it take to make the Red Sea look like the Black Sea,

Another merciless question comes up: Suppose Khrushchev, with fiendish ingenuity, decides to confuse us all by sending his Communist submarines all around Asia in order to enter the Mediterranean via Suez, does Mr. Richardson propose that said submarines should be kept out? Or did we hear him saying something a moment ago about the sanctity of free shipping through the canal?

THE SUEZ CRISIS

Moscow Is Sitting Pretty

The Big Three blackjacking of Egypt, of course, plays right into the hands of the Russian totalitarian camp, which lives and feeds on the crimes of the Western capitalist camp.

But the Russians are not interested in Egyptian sovereignty or international justice.

On August 11 Pravda suggested that the London conference would have "full powers only if its own list of suggested invitees were carried through—i.e., if the satellites were also allowed to pack the meeting."

For the Stalinists, it's a question of who does the dividing-up. Give us a hand in it, they say, and we'll go along with the game.

But since they are frozen out, they

CAN EGYPT PAY?

Can Egypt pay for the canal? In spite of the abundant denunciations of Nasser on the ground that he could not afford both to compensate shareholders and maintain the canal, the N. Y. Times' Harold Callender reported from Paris:

"It is now pointed out in both Paris and London that the sterling balances Egypt still owns as a result of credits on Britain during World War II are more than enough to pay the shareholders even at the former market values—to say nothing of the much smaller gold values at which the stock is being retired by the company itself." (Aug. 12.)

have an unparalleled opportunity to make propaganda hay. They are using it.

Moscow's August 9 reply to the conference invitation was a highly effective bid for the sympathy of all the peoples who bristle at the Big Three dragooning of Egypt. In point after point, it said what many are thinking, even though the Kremlin leaders may snicker at their own demagogic points.

It is easy, for example, to demonstrate how arbitrary was the selection of the nations to attend the conference. States that are the recognized successors to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was a signatory of the 1888 Convention, are not invited—because, of course, they are now Russian satellites. The only state with a proved grievance against Egypt's operation of the canal, Israel, is not invited. Arab states which are part and parcel of the canal region, and which are moreover successor states of the Ottoman Empire, a Convention signatory, are not invited—because, of course, they will vote with Egypt.

At the same time, while getting all the credit for opposing the Big Three's designs, no matter what happens Russia gets a bigger finger in the Mediterranean pie and more say over the canal, since it is bound to be included in any international body set up. It is furthermore in a position to raise, and has raised, embarrassing questions about international participation in other international waterways.

Once again, support of capitalism and imperialism means that only Moscow wins.

Six Guards and Six Hundred Americans: Some Secrets of Stalinist 'Brainwashing'

By GODFREY DENIS

Many will remember the violent reaction in the United States to the news that a large proportion of American prisoners of war in Korea cooperated to one extent or another with their jailers. The popular press at that time was filled with articles on "brainwashing," "bestial oriental tortures," and the like. Dire punishment was demanded against the relatively small number of prisoners who became active "progressives," and a number of officers and men were court-martialed for various offenses including signing "germ warfare" statements for the Stalinists.

However, it soon became clear that with a very few exceptions the "brainwashing" in question had taken the form of political education and argumentation, not any kind of torture. In connection with this an interesting article appeared in the Sunday N. Y. Times (Aug. 11).

The article is based on an interview with the army's expert on the subject, Maj. William E. Mayer, a psychiatrist who had previously written on the subject after interviewing over a thousand former prisoners from Korea. The article is a discussion of the training that servicemen are undergoing in the Far East to teach them to "be tougher prisoners than those who were influenced in large numbers by Communist prison-camp blandishments in Korea."

Apparently this educational program is divided into two parts; one part teaches the troops to resist "brainwashing" and similar techniques, and the other is supposed to instill "the military values that many Americans seemed to have lost in Communist prison camps." For example, troops are told that it is their duty to try to escape, and that the right to escape is recognized by the Geneva Convention. (Stalinist China does not recognize the Geneva Convention.)

Mayer points out that out of about four thousand Americans captured in Korea there was not a single successful escape from the camps, and this despite "extraordinarily light restraints." He cited as an instance a camp of 600 American POWs that was run by only six guards with only a single strand of barbed wire between the prisoners and freedom.

Apart from the bad publicity effect of cases like these, there is also the military consideration. Mayer points out that as a result of their techniques the Stalinists were able to use far fewer troops than would have been normally necessary to guard the prisoners, thus freeing them for combat.

One may begin to wonder what ingenious or "fiendish" devices the Korean or Chinese must have used to get their results. Six guards to guard 600 Americans, Americans, mind you, who probably came to Korea sure that they were not just as good but one heck of a lot better than any number of "gooks." One third, "at least," cooperated!

There are no comparable figures for the Second World War but one thing is certain: many more Americans were captured by the Germans and Japanese and only a small handful cooperated. What then is the "secret"?

ROAD TO COLLAPSE

The Stalinists, it seems had a two-point program too. First, the captors began by treating the prisoners well, "winning their trust with kindness and pretended friendship." Later they "managed in various subtle ways to create an atmosphere of mutual distrust among individual prisoners so that group spirit necessary to concentration and escape never had a chance to develop. This was done, among other ways, by appealing to the Negro and Spanish-American minority soldiers on the basis of Jim Crow attitudes that they had experienced.

The second step was education which plants doubts in the minds of the prisoners regarding some traditional American political and economic values, particularly those of free enterprise."

In other words, the "secret" of the Stalinist technique was nothing more than (a) decent treatment of the men, at least at first, attempting to treat them not as "enemies" but as people to be won over; and (b) anti-capitalist propaganda.

Before this political assault the American soldiers collapsed; since they were totally unprepared for an attack on their beliefs.

Story after story noted that Stalinist educational officers knew a great deal more about the United States than did most Americans; and, more to the point, even they could convince American soldiers that there were all kinds of injustices in America, and that the Korean War was unjustified.

Think of it for a moment: soldiers of the richest, stablest, capitalist democracy (racist, imperialist democracy, to be sure, but democracy nevertheless) collapse ideologically before the criticisms of their social system by representatives of a vicious totalitarianism! Further, they collapse under circumstances where the Stalinists' arguments seem to have all odds against being accepted: after all, the guards are of an "inferior" race, from a backward and poor country, and above all they are the enemy against

whom the soldiers in question fought not long before. Yet a third cooperated with their captors.

One must hasten to add that the Stalinists had the common sense, according to Major Mayer, not to try to attempt to convert the prisoners to Stalinism, that is they concentrated on criticizing the American camp.

NO GIMMICKS

But if this is what happened to American troops—troops that come from the last stable capitalist regime—imagine what the morale of the Western allies' soldiers would be in a war against Stalinism, if that war were to be fought in a way similar to the Korean War. If the American troops became ideologically shaky about the validity of their social system and unable to defend it, would the soldiers from the poorer countries in Europe or the semi-colonial countries in Asia show more enthusiasm for the capitalist Western camp? How would the troops of the "reliable" American allies—Rhee, France, Chiang, etc.—stand up?

The explanation of why American POWs collapsed also illuminates two other propositions—why the Stalinists have won adherents all over the world and why independent socialists point out that in a very real sense the continued

existence of capitalist imperialism is the breeding ground for Stalinism. If it is so easy to plant doubt in the minds of American soldiers about the validity of "traditional American political and economic values, particularly those of free enterprise," who else will defend those values?

The true bankruptcy of the traditional values in question is only made more evident when one remembers that the Stalinists defend a social system that is, if anything, more vulnerable to attack, with its slave labor, total absence of democracy, a new parasitic ruling class, extermination of whole peoples. But it is not vulnerable to effective attack by pro-capitalists. Stalinism is able to use the rhetoric of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. It is also able to pose—not to the American prisoners but to the colonial masses of the world—as the enemy of the old colonial system, and because of this demagoguery it is able to win the support of mass movements all over the world.

To this challenge the army brass have one answer: tighten the discipline, remind the young conscripts that they are soldiers and under military discipline. This, plus of course the gimmick approach of the psychological warriors from the Pentagon—calisthenics in "brainwashing" such as a number of army units underwent.

But no gimmicks and no exhortations and no calisthenics can substitute for what is lacking: a social system which can inspire men to defend it, that can offer a dynamic alternative to Stalinism's ideological drive and appeal. This capitalism cannot do, not even the richest and smuggest capitalism in the world.

The Democrats Capitulate — —

(Continued from page 1)

progress to pacify prejudice. He is not standing moderately astride any fences."

BACKING AND FILLING

The pressure was therefore building up on Stevenson to make some statement in the direction of a stronger civil-rights plank. The next day, August 6, Stevenson in a sidewalk interview stated: "I've had a very strong feeling that the platform should express unequivocal approval of the Court's decision, although it seems odd that you should have to express your approval of the Constitution and its institutions."

The statement was a calculated risk since it went as far as Harriman is supposed to have gone and farther than any Harriman supporter at the convention went. The reaction among the Southern delegates was unanimous in opposition. Senator Sam Ervin Jr. of North Carolina, one of Stevenson's strongest Southern supporters, blustered that this stand "might cost him the election." Another Stevenson partisan, former Gov. John Battle of Virginia, said that the endorsement of the Supreme Court decision is "the one thing we won't go along with."

Harriman supporters thereupon jumped into the breach and began to warn Southern delegates that Stevenson was "too liberal" on civil rights.

Now that Stevenson had made his gesture toward the anti-segregationist forces, his campaign headquarters began the job of convincing the Southern delegates that it did mean anything and that it was meant for Northern consumption.

Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler elucidated: "I believe the platform should clearly and unequivocally enunciate the principle of law stated by the Supreme Court in the school case. It should state that every American child, regardless of race, is entitled to all opportunities for education under the law. But in my opinion, it is not necessary to say in the platform that we support the Supreme Court in the school segregation case. It is unnecessary and unwise."

The feelings of the Southern racists were further soothed when the chairman of the Platform Committee, Rep. John McCormack of Massachusetts, handpicked a platform subcommittee on civil rights which Southerners found "eminently satisfactory." Nothing too "liberal" would come out of this committee, which had a majority of what the Southern Democrats consider to be "reasonable" liberals.

Further mollification came from Ste-

venson's press secretary, Roger Tubby, when he explained that Stevenson had spoken "on the spur of the moment." Stevenson, Tubby emphasized, "isn't trying to dictate to the platform committee."

THE "IMMODERATE"

Up until this time Harriman had been silent on what his proposals for a civil-rights plank were. It was widely expected, however, that when Truman spoke before the subcommittee, he would demand strong endorsement of the Supreme Court's decision.

However, when Truman did speak up it turned out that he was more "moderate" than Stevenson and that he did not propose that the convention go beyond the 1948 and 1952 statements. The N. Y. Times reported that "the Southerners experienced an almost dazed sense of relief." Former Gov. John Battle of Virginia, the leader of the Southerners in the fight over the loyalty oath at the 1952 convention, said, "I was surprised by Mr. Truman's sensible approach to this problem."

The situation before the convention opened seemed to have reversed the colors on the horses in this race: Stevenson had the more "liberal" stand, apparently, and Harriman and Truman were in the "moderate" camp.

On Sunday before the convention began, Harriman supporters began circulating what they called "minimum requirements for a civil rights plank." This called for "implementation and enforcement by all public officials—federal, state and local—through the normal processes, of the Supreme Court decision on desegregation, including those relating to education and transportation." But Harriman never issued a direct statement in favor of the Court's decision.

However, on the subcommittee itself, a Harriman supporter, Rep. Emanuel Celler of New York, began circulating a draft of the plank endorsing the "principle" of the Supreme Court's decision without mentioning it by name. This is the position of Stevenson's Democratic National Committee chairman, Paul Butler.

Truman, after "bucking the tide of progress to pacify prejudice," thereupon threw his weight behind the presidential aspiration of the self-appointed champion of "progress," Averell Harriman. He calmly and straight-facedly announced that due to "the mounting crisis in the world" it is necessary to have a man of "experience and ability" as presi-

dent in order to avoid a costly period of "trial and error" upon assuming office. And for good measure he also threw the mantle of the New and Fair Deals on Harriman's shoulders.

The reasons for Truman's action are absurd on the face of it since Truman supported Stevenson against Harriman in 1952 in the midst of the Korean War. It raises questions about the personal game the former president is up to.

No matter what Truman's maneuvers mean, it is clear that only the top of the power struggle protrudes above the surface.

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BOOKS AND IDEAS

Burns: The Lion and the Fox

Penetrating the Roosevelt Myth

By EDWARD HILL

Shortly after he became president, Franklin Roosevelt went to see Oliver Wendell Holmes. After the new president had left, Holmes summarized the man: "A second class intellect. But a first-class temperament."

This scene is described in James MacGregor Burns' new political biography of Roosevelt, *The Lion and the Fox*. (The title, significantly enough, is taken from an injunction of Machiavelli to the effect that the Prince must be both a lion and a fox.) It could serve as a summary of the biography's subject.

For what emerges from MacGregor's study is the picture of a charismatic leader devoid of any developed consciousness of the situation in which he found himself, without any consistent approach to solving problems; indeed, a man who was led rather than a leader. The impact of this new analysis is to reinforce Richard Hofstadter's brilliant aphoristic summation of Roosevelt, in *The American Political Tradition*, as the "patrician as opportunist."

Burns writes from a pro-New Deal point of view, but he is remarkably objective. Here you will find the first term of the New Deal as it was, a contradictory, improvised attempt to patch up capitalism, based upon business as much as upon labor.

Here, for example, is Roosevelt's initial lack of interest in the Wagner Act, his early unconcern for the labor movement. This picture, like Hofstadter's, is at variance with the standard liberal campaign portrait which is usually drawn from the Roosevelt rhetoric of 1935 and 1936 rather than from the Roosevelt reality of 1932 to 1945.

But this is perhaps all familiar enough to most LA readers. What is unique about Burns' study is its concentration on the problem of leadership. And here again the conclusion that emerges is in plain contradiction to the ADA myth of the New Deal: Burns makes it plain that Roosevelt was led by events, that he was not particularly committed to those aspects of his administration, like pump-priming, which have been hallowed by his admirers ever since.

COOL TO LABOR

Here, for example, is Roosevelt's relation to the Wagner Act, i.e., to the struggle for labor's rights as it unfolded in the Thirties.

The "program" of the early New Deal had been a grab-bag of reform measures: an NRA with similarities to corporate-statism, and huge parades reviewed by Hugh Johnson; a farm plan favoring the richer farmers; a persistent desire, even in the midst of the depression, to "balance the budget." By 1935 this first phase of the New Deal had about run its course. There had been a certain business recovery, but millions still walked the street idle. Roosevelt was threatened by various radical movements, particularly by Huey Long and Father Coughlin. During this period, Roosevelt had not bothered with labor or with the Wagner Act.

Burns writes: "The supreme test of Roosevelt's leadership in this area was his handling of the Wagner Act. . . . Unlike much of Roosevelt's reform and relief program, the act cut through labor-management relations. It had an essential part in building powerful unions that in turn would furnish votes, money and organization for future liberal coalitions. Yet for months Roosevelt was cool to the Wagner bill; he threw his weight behind the measure only at the last moment, when it was due to pass anyway. He long showed a special indifference, even obtuseness, to the cardinal question of employee representation. In May 1934 he told reporters with some irritation that the workers could choose as representatives whomever they wished—including the Ahkond of Swat or the Royal Geographic Society, or a union, or the Crown Prince of Siam. . . ." (My emphasis.)

Thus the Roosevelt of the first period of the New Deal. On a measure which a sympathizer like Burns regards as crucial

to his whole program, he exerted no leadership (the bill was going to pass anyway), he was indifferent, even obtuse, and he was not beyond little jokes about workers choosing the Ahkond of Swat to represent them.

His eventual support of the Wagner Act came as a response to political factors (a menace on his right; the invalidation by the Supreme Court of various New Deal measures, etc.) and not from any particular commitment to the cause of labor.

VITAL FAILURE

Another case in point was Roosevelt's attitude toward pump-priming, a technique now considered to be the central economic contribution of the New Deal. Burns' judgment: Roosevelt never understood Keynesianism; and in Burns' opinion this is one of the reasons for the recession which took place from late 1936 into 1938:

"Roosevelt's deficiencies as an economist were as striking as his triumphs as a politician. It was a major failure of American democracy that it was not able in the late 1930s to show that a great nation could provide jobs for workers, and food, clothes, houses for its people. . . . Halfway through his second term the man who had ousted Hoover on the depression issue knew that eight or nine million people were walking the streets. . . ."

The facts which Burns describes are well-known: that the New Deal did not solve the depression. But what is striking is Burns' assertion that Roosevelt simply didn't understand the problem, that he carelessly rejected the advice of Keynes, that he was still concerned, at the outset of his second term, with the idea of balancing the budget!

Here again is the contrast between liberal myth and actual fact: Roosevelt, the leader of the New Deal, was not committed to, did not understand, the main economic plank of his administration as it is seen in retrospect.

But even more illuminating than the cases of the Wagner Act and pump-priming is Burns' analysis of Roosevelt and party leadership. The main fact here is that the Roosevelt coalition only lasted for six years at best—the New Deal was over by 1938—and that Roosevelt himself did practically nothing to remedy the situation. His "purge" adventure of 1938 was his only attempt to face up to the problem, and it failed.

Otherwise, Roosevelt simply floated along on the top of that curious party which he supposedly led, and after a decade of protracted social and political movement in America he had nothing to show in terms of political realignment: he failed, even though tremendous forces were at hand, to build a liberal organization.

THE CAPTIVE

This is how Burns summarizes the point:

"The main reason, however, for Roosevelt's failure to build up the party lay in his unwillingness to commit himself to the full implications of party leadership, in his eternal desire to keep open alternative tactical lines of action, including a line of retreat. The personal traits that made Roosevelt a brilliant tactician—his dexterity, his command of a variety of roles, his skill in attack and defense, above all his personal magnetism and charisma—were not the best traits for hard, long-range purposeful building. The latter would have demanded a continuing intellectual and political commitment to a set strategy—and this kind of commitment Roosevelt would not make."

Here, from a liberal's point of view, is a devastating criticism of Roosevelt—that he failed liberals.

He squandered all of the social capital which was his inheritance in the Thirties, he wasted it in a programless and unsuccessful attempt to halt the depression, and when it was all over he hadn't even created an organization for his point of view. And this, as Burns implies above, is partially a function of the fact that he didn't really have a point of view in the first place. That kind of "intellectual and political commitment" he wouldn't make, perhaps because he couldn't.

It is here that Burns organizes his summary image of Roosevelt as a leader:

"...to a surprising degree [he] was captive to the political forces around him rather than their shaper. In a democracy such must be the case. But democracy assigns a place for creative political leadership too. The forces handcuffing Roosevelt stemmed as much from his own actions and personality as from the unyielding political environment. He could not reshape his party, reorient foreign-policy attitudes, reorganize Congress and the bureaucracy, or solve the economic problem largely because he lacked the necessary intellectual commitment to the right union of ends and means."

FDR AS LEADER

This last sentence, implying as it does that the main failure of the Roosevelt regime arose out of its leaders' inadequacies, deserves comment.

What we have to realize is that we are dealing here with two failures: the one, the historical inability of American capitalism in the Thirties to solve its own crisis, a fact which could not have been altered by Franklin Roosevelt or anyone else; the other, the personal peculiarities and qualities of the leader of the American party of reform in that period.

The first point is plain enough. Even if Roosevelt had been a sophisticated Keynesian (indeed, had Keynes himself been president), the crisis still could not have been mastered. As Keynes realized in a retrospective New Republic article of 1940, the size of the economic commitment which his plan for the reform of capitalism required came into conflict with the political structure of capitalism itself; that except for the case of military spending, it could not be accomplished on a bourgeois basis. This fact was the underlying reality of the Roosevelt period in American history.

There is no sense in taxing Roosevelt for not having accomplished that which he couldn't accomplish. American capitalism, under any leadership, could not have solved its own crisis in the Thirties short of what actually happened: war, and the war economy.

But the second point, the quality of Roosevelt's leadership, is not made irrelevant by this historic fact. For there is a Roosevelt myth alive today which is a contemporary political focus, and part of it centers on the question of Roosevelt's capacity to lead. This too must be put into perspective, and when it is, the point that emerges is an important one: that even from a liberal viewpoint, Roosevelt failed to do what he could have done; that although certain things, such as the regeneration of the system on a democratic and peaceful basis, were impossible, other things, such as political realignment, a more conscious support to the labor movement and so on, were possible; and that Roosevelt failed here.

"PRAGMATIST"?

From Burns one gets the picture of a leader who had one important quality and only one: his charisma, his ability to develop a following on the basis of his personal qualities.

Intellectually, politically, Roosevelt was undistinguished. He spent when the situation forced him to spend; he pared the budget as soon as there was a let-up; he moved now to his right, now to his left; he was, in short, a creature of historical circumstance rather than a creative leader. Such a judgment is harsh, but it is forced upon one when one considers Roosevelt's relation to the central elements of the New Deal as they are now defined by liberal mythologists.

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Stoolpigeon System for Teachers?

By MICHAEL HARRINGTON

An extremely important victory for academic freedom was won in New York last week when the New York State Commissioner of Education, James E. Allen Jr., ruled that teachers cannot be required to give the names of persons they know, or knew, to be members of the Communist Party. If Allen's holding sticks, it will be the second break on the academic-freedom front in a matter of months.

On May 7, 1955 the New York City Board of Education voted that teachers who were summoned for questioning by the Superintendent of Schools or by the Corporation Counsel could be required to name names, with refusal being grounds for a discharge. Even at this, this motion was a somewhat watered-down version of the original plan, which would have made dismissal mandatory when a teacher declined to become an informer. Under the ruling that passed in May 1955, dismissal was not automatic but was left up to the discretion of the authorities.

Nevertheless, the informer-ruling was a serious blow to civil liberties. It put the power of the state in the hands of administrative officials, giving them the right to threaten teachers unless they spoke up.

Indeed, the city has made it plain how important they feel this power is by announcing an appeal from Allen's decision. According to Corporation Counsel Peter Campbell, Allen's ruling promises that the program against individuals suspected of Communism might be "thwarted at a vital stage."

But Allen's decision went to the heart of the matter, and that's what all of the fuss is about. The commissioner had ruled:

"The courts have quite recently indicated that a board of education cannot convict a teacher of being a Communist unless that board can establish its case in a jury trial. In my judgment the board is most optimistic if it believes that a jury will convict on the flimsy evidence of informers.

"If is, of course, perhaps true that the board, when the name is known, might be able to obtain corroborating evidence. It is also possible for the board to call the teacher in and ask whether he or she is a Communist. The argument that the board needs someone to name names is of no value here because the board in any event can call in any teacher or, for that matter, all teachers and ask them if they are Communists. In case of denial the board is still up against the necessity of obtaining proof and the use of an informer is of little value."

SLOCHOWER CASE

The point which Allen was raising was the crucial one of competence. For as soon as one determines to stick by the notion of fair trial and rejects the idea that a Board of Education is equipped to do the job of investigation, prosecution and judgment, one has moved toward opposition to the entire program against civil liberties in the areas of education.

But one further step is clearly required: that it be understood that the only test which a board can apply in the case of a teacher is that of academic competence. This is in line with the recent convention decision of the American Association of University Professors.

The Allen decision comes on the heels of the Supreme Court ruling in the Slochower case. In that instance, Dr. Harry Slochower, an associate professor of German at Brooklyn College, had invoked the Fifth Amendment before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1952. Slochower would not say whether he had been a Communist in 1940-41. The college used Section 903 of the New York Charter, a law which provides for automatic dismissal for any municipal employee who refuses to answer questions

about his official work on the grounds that to answer might tend to incriminate him.

In the Slochower case, the high court held that this automatic dismissal could not be implied from the fact that a teacher invoked his constitutional rights. This decision was in the news recently in New Jersey when the State Senate balked on confirming the nomination of Judge Bigelow to the Board of Trustees of Rutgers, primarily on the grounds that he had once defended a client who had invoked the Fifth Amendment on security questions. One of the things which disturbed the senators was the fact that the judge testified that he would not, because of the Slochower decision, vote for the automatic dismissal of a Rutgers professor who pleaded his constitutional privilege.

But the Allen decision on compulsory informing goes to an even more crucial aspect of the repression of academic freedom, and, for that matter, raises an issue central to the whole question of academic freedom in America today: that of naming names.

This question has been raised in a number of ways.

There is the recent compulsory-immunity statute passed by Congress and upheld by the federal courts. Under this law, a witness who pleaded the Fifth Amendment can be offered an immunity by a congressional committee and must

accept it. If he does not, an automatic waiver of high rights under the amendment is then implied, and he can be sent to jail.

This provision has not yet been completely adjudicated (there is a case on appeal to the Supreme Court at the present time), but it has been upheld.

Then there is the famous Supreme Court decision which stated the general doctrine of waiver. Under this ruling, if a person answers any one question about Communist activities, he is construed to have "waived" his privileges on all other questions about that activity and may be required to answer.

The unfairness of this comes up normally in the case of witnesses who were past members of the Communist Party, who perhaps have become anti-Stalinist, but who nevertheless do not want to name names. Under the Supreme Court holding, these witnesses must invoke the Fifth on all questions, and not simply on those which they do not want to answer. A crafty committee counsel can then ask a series of fantastic questions (*Have you ever spied? Were you part of the Communist espionage apparatus?*) and the witness must plead the Fifth in each instance, not because he can't answer this particular question, but because he is guarding himself against the presumption of waiver, usually on the issue of naming names.

TWO ELEMENTS

In all of this, two elements are almost invariably confused.

On the one hand, there is the generally recognized obligation of the citizen to testify if he has knowledge of criminal activity. Thus, a man who has knowledge of a murder does not have the right to refuse that information to a court.

But on the other hand, there is the question which arises in the witchhunt. A headline-hunting congressional committee, with few procedural niceties, descends upon an ex-Stalinist. The witness probably has no knowledge of criminal activity. He knew party members who mistakenly and stupidly felt that Russia was the hope of mankind, that an American party should act to aid the Russians, etc.; he may even know of the party membership of a wife, or a close friend. He is hauled before a tribunal which is not a court; he is asked to testify about activity which is not clearly criminal; and yet he understands that, in the present atmosphere, such testimony can have very real consequence for the people named, i.e., they can be fired from their jobs, hounded in their community, and so on.

This is the heart of the matter: that much, if not most, of the activity of the Communist Party in the United States was politically vicious, reprehensible, and so on, but that it was not criminal, and yet revelations about it can have considerable non-judicial consequences.

Given this problem, the witness is faced with an impossible choice. On the one hand, he can betray a confidence, and subject someone to harassment for non-criminal activity. On the other hand, he can invoke the Fifth on every question and face the fact that many will draw the implication that he was guilty of all kinds of actions. In such a case, an anti-Stalinist might even find himself in the position of being unable to answer the simplest question about his anti-Stalinism.

This is bad enough in a court where the government uses the compulsory-immunity statute. It is worse before a free-wheeling congressional committee where the "waiver" rule confronts the witness.

But when a Board of Education arrogates to itself all kinds of judicial functions, and is able to back this usurpation up by having the power to fire anyone who doesn't want to name names, we have reached some kind of ultimate denial of due process. And this leads, once again, back to the question of what criterion is invoked in the case of teachers.

CENTRAL QUESTION

It is clear that a Board of Education does not have the investigative system which can (if it were a good thing) determine membership in the Communist Party. Even the vaunted FBI has its difficulties in this regard with all of its power, money, and personnel.

It is even clearer that a Board of Education is not constituted so as to guarantee due process to witnesses before it, i.e., that it does not have rules of procedure and a tradition which are proper to a courtroom. And it is just as obvious that hunting spies is now the function of a Board of Education. Yet, under the set-up developed in New York State before Commissioner Allen's ruling, all of these things were done, this tremendous arrogation of power was undertaken.

This is not to say that Allen's ruling has ended the witchhunt in the New York schools. The Feinberg law remains on the books. The Corporation Counsel is appealing from Allen's decision. Brooklyn College fired Slochower as soon as it reinstated him after the Supreme Court decision.

And yet Allen, in a very central manner, has raised the crucial question which could undercut all of these provisions: **What is the competence of a Board of Education in these matters?**

Clearly, a board can determine whether or not a man is a good teacher—but to give it the power to enforce informing, to draw conclusions from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment, that is another thing entirely.

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