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
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Spain: THEIR PROGRAM AND OURS





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SPAIN:



THEIR PROGRAM



AND OURS

The following lead article appeared in the February 1 issue of *Combate*, central organ of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Askatasuna-VI (Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-VI), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain.

1 The programmatic speech of the Arias government was a faithful reflection of the political project that defines it (the Francoist "reform"), of the methods by which the government intends to carry this out, and of the depth to which it has been hit by a month of mass struggles whose geographical and social breadth has been unprecedented. It was, then, a coherent speech. Only those who had harbored absurd illusions about the will and possibility of the government to "change" can be "disappointed" today. And harboring such illusions required previous acceptance of the notion of the evolution of Francoism, at the most hoping to exert pressure to gradually broaden and accelerate that evolution. That is why it was predictable and exemplary that the general staff of the "democratic" bourgeoisie should stand at the head of the army of complainers who are now whining their discontent in the pages of the newspapers.

But while they are complaining, the people are struggling. In the immense and solid ranks of the working class, among all the workers, there was no disillusionment, for there had been no illusions. It took only a few weeks to get to know the "reformers" of Francoism, through their deeds and not their press conferences, in the factories, the neighborhoods, the streets, the schools and universities, the hospitals, and the public services that were militarized or threatened with militarization, and not in the administrative councils of the capitalist corporations.

The working class and the people are already well acquainted with "democracy, Spanish-style." The January 28 program simply served to help them to know it better. That is, the better to destroy it, and soon.

2 As we have said on other occasions, the Francoist "reform" is the present political program of Spanish big capital and imperialism; it is aimed at forestalling the outbreak of a prerevolutionary situation in the country produced by the final assault of the mass movement against the dictatorship. The method of this "reform" is the "controlled evolution" of the regime toward a caricature of "bourgeois democracy." The essential objective of the project is to reverse the relationship of class forces, which is now favorable to the working class and has been for years. The Francoist dictatorship in its classic form commands only one weapon with which to achieve this objective: repression. But this weapon has only too clearly demonstrated its ineffectiveness, and has even stimulated the strength and combativity of the masses. Having become convinced of this, the bourgeoisie is now trying a different tactic, transform-

"The overthrow of the dictatorship is not a slogan of the past; it is the central slogan of the present period."

ing the political framework. Under the traditional political framework of the Francoist dictatorship, class battles had direct and frontal expressions. Each struggle, no matter how limited at its outset, immediately clashed with the state. Now it is necessary for the bourgeoisie to establish channels to protect the "new" bourgeois state from these direct confrontations and thus to permit the stabilization of that state. These channels are the bourgeois political parties, the historic Social Democracy, a fake parliament, and a shadow of legality for the mass movement.

Precisely these channels and no others, for the bourgeoisie knows very well that "the parliamentary representation of an oppressed class considerably reduces its real strength, while on the other hand, the representation of the bourgeoisie, even on the eve of its collapse, is always a mask that conceals its imaginary strength." But the bourgeoisie also knows that under the present conditions the working class would not use its liberty solely or even mainly to increase its number of parliamentary deputies.

Hence the rejection of amnesty and the refusal to legalize the communist and revolutionary nationalist organizations. All the promises of puppet democracy contained in the government program are not accidental, are not "errors" that are going to be corrected with the passage of time. They are the very reason for being of the Francoist "reform," a matter of life and death for that reform. If liberties and democratic rights are to live, the Francoist "reform" must die.

The overthrow of the dictatorship is not a slogan of the past; it is the central slogan of the present period.

3 Thus, it is no alternative to continue to give any sort of confidence, small or great, unconditional or conditional, implicit or explicit, to the Francoist "reformers."

The "democratic" bourgeoisie continues to speak of "democratic break," to reject any "open collaboration" with the government. This is its role; those are the terms of its alliance with the reformist workers organizations, the terms that are supposed to allow them to later become the protagonists of the "broad coalition provisional government," the signers of the "social pact," and the rebuilders of the threatened bourgeois state,

once the working class and the people have destroyed the Francoist "reform." At the same time, however, the "democratic" bourgeoisie, through Jordi Pujol, one of its most capable spokesmen, claims that "we are not interested in blocking the projects of the present government." They are surely not, because when thousands of workers fight for their demands, it is this government that has to protect the interests of these "democratic" bankers and employers, because they know that this government relies on the support of imperialism, Spanish big capital, and the army, and because this government represents "evolution," the possibility of the bourgeoisie's organizing freely, while the workers movement cannot, the possibility of "making up for lost time." Hence, the "democratic" bourgeoisie waits with folded arms, criticizing "sensitively," making its points "discreetly," without clear commitments but also without confrontations with the government, waiting for the time when it will be called upon "to save the fatherland" in the name of "united and indivisible democracy" from the "excesses" of the mass movement on the march toward socialist revolution.

4 But what permits the "democratic" bourgeoisie to hope to play this political role are the alliances it has with workers organizations. Thus, the line of class collaboration offers the reins of the mobilization of the workers to those who aspire only to control the workers more effectively, in another manner. Such is the result of this line.

The PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español — Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy) has to go further than the "democratic" bourgeoisie in its verbal criticism of the government and has to be more active, to occupy some position in the struggles of the workers. The Social Democracy can assume its political role, can appear as an effective administrator of the bourgeois order, only if it is able to rely on a fundamentally working-class social base. The bureaucracy of the PSOE knows this and also knows that it does not yet command such a base. In order to develop it, the PSOE has to make it seem that it is not entering into any compromise with the government, but has also to put itself in position to "utilize" the legality it is being offered, the possibility of becoming the only workers organization that is legal in practice. The Social Democracy also has some "lost time" to make up. Under the conditions of the class struggle in our country, this

"utilization" requires some ideological alibis, which provide samples of the project of the PSOE leadership. The PSOE secretary general has gone so far as to assert that the farcical municipal elections scheduled to be held at the end of this year can play "the same role as the elections of April 1931." This is not just parliamentary cretinism, it is worse. It is pre-parliamentary cretinism. In the present political situation, it is obvious that the mass mobilization that will destroy Francoism may be sparked by the most varied of factors. Thus, it cannot be excluded that one of these factors might be the government's convoking of an electoral farce. But, in the midst of the greatest mass struggles of the postwar period, to consider that "democracy" can be achieved by winning the majority in sham municipal elections that will take place ten months from now, if indeed they take place at all, is to carry electoralism to its ultimate and most nefarious conclusions. The bureaucracy of the PSOE dreams of ending forty years' of dictatorship through a victory in elections organized by the heirs of that very dictatorship. Luckily for the PSOE leaders, while they are busy dreaming, the working class and the people are throwing themselves into their final battle with Francoism, and they will win that battle; if things were otherwise, the Social Democrats would awaken from their dreams in prison.

5 And the Communist party (PCE — Partido Comunista de España)? What is the alternative put forward by the largest workers organization in the country, which has been expressly excluded from the projects of the Francoist "reform"? Here is what Jordi Solé-Turá, a member of the PSUC (the Communist party in Catalonia), had to say about the government program: "The basic problem is that . . . they want to make this change by reaching an agreement with the camarilla instead of with a democratic opposition that represents the population's genuine desire for change." Thus, the "democratic alternative" to the government's program is to reach an agreement with the government! It would be ridiculous if it were not so tragic, if these words were not spoken in the name of the workers party that holds hegemony in the country, if they were not consistent with the overall line of the PCE, if they were not the logical consequence of the theory of "peaceful transition." Each time the crisis of power of the Spanish bourgeoisie deepens an inch, the Spanish Communist party responds by descending one more step down the ladder of capitulation. From the "pact until the day of the fall of Francoism" we have moved to the "pact for the whole constituent period," from the "political pact" to the "social pact," and now, from the "pact against the dictatorship" to the "pact against the



"The foundation of our program is the self-organization of the working class and the entire mass movement."

camarilla." What does the PCE have in store for tomorrow? If every previous "advance" down the road to the "unity of the democratic opposition" has had its price, what price is the PCE prepared to pay for reaching an agreement with Fraga (the present minister of the interior)?

The alternative of the PCE boils down to attaining two objectives: First, to convince big capital that it is not possible to stabilize a bourgeois state in Spain while refusing to legalize the PCE; second, to convince big capital that it is possible to achieve this sort of stabilization with the collaboration of a legal PCE. Anything is valid in pursuit of these objectives, including, as we have just recently seen, reducing the PCE's own program to this miserable "desire for change," sufficiently modest to be shared with and agreed to by Francoist reformism.

On the day when the mass movement brings down the dictatorship, the PCE will have apparently achieved the two objectives mentioned above: Big capital will urgently call upon the PCE to collaborate in the reconstruction of its state. But the "triumph" of the PCE will be only apparent. What will have convinced big capital will not have been "peaceful mobilizations of citizens" or mythical "national democratic action," but rather the independent action of the masses breaking down the ramparts of class collaboration in practice.

6 In spite of the important differences that exist among them, the Maoist organizations, the PTE, ORT, and MCE*, share a similar conception of the "democratic alternative," very close or even identical to the conceptions of the PCE and the PSOE. There is only one difference among them on this score: The PTE, ORT, and MCE's faith in democracy is the faith of the converted, and they believe heart and soul in the words of the united "democratic" appeals. Thus, they believe that a great "antifascist" alliance can be forged between the "bourgeois-democratic current" and the "popular democratic current" (that is, themselves), that this alliance can bring about a "national democratic action" of "peaceful citizens," which will carry out the "democratic break" and open up a constituent process guaranteed by a provisional government "without exclusion or obligation" (that is, in which they will not be compelled to participate). This storybook vision of what the overthrow of the dictatorship will be like turns them into leftist appendages of interclass pacts in whose calls, proclamations, and programs nobody believes except the Maoists themselves. For in reality, the person who consistently upholds the "democratic break" is the sec-

*PTE: Partido del Trabajo de España — Labor party of Spain

ORT: Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores — Revolutionary Workers Organization

MCE: Movimiento Comunista de España — Communist Movement of Spain

retary general of the PSOE, when he asserts: "I see the democratic break as a gradual conquest of liberty." And the one who defined the provisional government in a consistent manner was Gil Robles, when he said: "Our party will stand at the head of the forces that will reconstruct the new Spanish state." And the consistent definition of the "antifascist alliance" was offered by Solé-Turá in the passage we quoted above. And the consistent definition of what the attitude of the "democratic opposition" toward mass struggles has to be was provided by Ruiz Jiménez, when he said, during the strike of more than 250,000 Madrid workers: "We will do everything possible to see that popular mobilization is peaceful and sectoral and does not obstruct the normal activities of the Spanish people."

These phrases reveal the real logic of the "democratic alternative." In practice, the PTE, ORT, and MCE stand rather far removed from this logic. In practice, in the activity of the masses, these organizations can find thousands of arguments by which to make their own break with the "democratic break."

7 Let us take a good look at our country. While Arias was recounting his program to the Francoist carrion, how many thousands of workers, toilers, students, men and women of our people were struggling or preparing for struggle, thinking about the experiences of the past strikes and demonstrations, or thinking about and expressing solidarity with the comrades who are fighting in other sectors, other cities, other nations of the state, in the Francoist prisons and in exile? The response to Arias's program is to be found among them. The program that inspires their struggles, that assembles all their demands, all their rights, including, most especially, those rights and demands that will never be granted in any form by even the most "democratic" of the bourgeois political factions — that is our program.

The road must be chosen: Either the point is to put "pressure" on the government and the Francoist monarchy or else the point is to destroy them.

HERE IS THE ROAD WE HAVE CHOSEN:

*Against the farcical amnesty of November and against any other amnesty that entails the slightest restriction: Amnesty, freedom for all political prisoners, return of all exiles.

*Against the caricature of "democracy" in the Arias program: Freedom of assembly, association, and the press; freedom to demonstrate, for the right to strike without any restriction whatsoever.

*Against the fraud of the "constitutional reform," the "democratic disguise" of Francoism: Elections to a constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage with the right to vote at age 16.

*Against all the limitations on freedom of artistic creation: Abolition of all forms of censorship.

*Against the prevailing hypocritical and repressive sexual "morality": Full sexual freedom, right to sexual information, free and legal distribution of contraceptives, free abortion on demand.

*Against the oppression of women socially and on the job: Abolition of all discrimination against women.

*Against the "independence and mutual respect" between the church and the dictatorship: Complete separation of church and state.

*Against the "institutional organization of the regions" called for in the Arias program in order to maintain national oppression: Immediate election by universal suffrage exercised by all the inhabitants of the territory of each oppressed nationality of a sovereign national constituent assembly that organizes the free exercise of the right of self-determination.

*To carry the overthrow of the dictatorship through to the end, to prevent a single Francoist virus from re-infecting the country: Dissolution of the special repressive bodies and the Francoist tribunals. Abolition of all repressive legislation of the dictatorship. Exact responsibility for the crimes of Francoism. Throw the reactionary commanders and officers out of the army. Dissolution of the mercenary and colonial brigades. Democratic rights for soldiers.

*Against the wage freeze, unemployment, incomes policy; and any form of "social pact," against the constant degradation of the living and working conditions of the masses: For the demands of the workers. Against the militarization of public services. For a sliding scale of wages and hours.

*Against fake bankruptcies and factory shutdowns, daily manifestations of the "formidable force of private initiative" to which the government's program pays homage: Workers control of production. Nationalization without compensation of all factories that are shut down and reactivation of these factories under workers control. Nationalization of key industries without compensation and under workers control.

*Against capitalist commercialization of education: For free, secular, bilingual, rounded, compulsory education until 18 years of age. For the demands of the employees in education.

*Against class medicine: For social security financed by the state and the companies that includes the entire population and covers all illnesses. For all the demands of the health workers.

*Against the totally disastrous agricultural policy of the dictatorship: Radical agrarian reform. Expropriation without compensation of the landlords and big capitalists in the countryside. Abolition of all forms of

separation between ownership and cultivation of land; Land to those who till it. Nationalization of the trade networks of agricultural production and their administration by delegates elected by the agricultural workers, the agrarian cooperatives, and the small peasants.

*Against the promised "fiscal reform," which actually amounts to an institutionalization of capitalist fiscal fraud and the robbery of the workers: No taxes on wages. All fiscal revenues to be paid by the capitalists.

*Against the CNS (the government "trade union"), fascist trade union, and any "reform" of it, which in no case can or even seeks to change its essential reactionary content: For a united class trade union in which the right of tendency is recognized, which stimulates workers democracy (through its two fundamental instruments, the assembly and the elected and revocable strike committee), and whose organization is defined by a constituent trade union congress of delegates democratically elected in the factories.

*Against the projects of integration into the political and military alliances of imperialism, protector of the Francoist "reform"; against the new agreement with Yankee imperialism; against the traditional Francoist demagogy on Gibraltar: Break all imperialist pacts and alliances, including the secret pacts of police collaboration of the Fraga-Poniatowski type. Yankee bases out. Immediate restitution of Gibraltar to the Spanish state.

*Against the Francoist colonial policy and the occupation of Moroccan territory in North Africa, directly responsible for the present slaughter of the Saharan people: Independence for Sahara. Recognition of the Polisario Front as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan people. Immediate restitution to Morocco of all occupied territories in North Africa.

Unlike the "minimum programs," which serve only for bargaining with big capital, this body of slogans is intended to serve as an overall orientation for the inde-

CARRILLO WITH BERLINGUER





FORWARD TO THE GENERAL STRIKE!

pendent action of the masses. Hence, it must be translated, transformed, and broadened according to the needs of this action. In addition — and this is fundamental — it has a foundation that is clearly lacking in all the "democratic alternatives": This foundation is the self-organization of the working class and the entire mass movement; the organization of struggles by the fighters themselves is the basic organizational consequence of the line of class independence. For it is not simply a matter of mobilizing the masses, but also of the masses providing themselves with their own organs, holding discussions in assemblies about what direction to lend the struggle, electing and controlling their own representatives, forming strike committees and pickets to extend and defend strikes, vigilance committees and purge committees against all forms of counterrevolution, popular tribunals that exact justice from those responsible for Francoist crimes, soldiers committees, and so on. And all these organs must be coordinated and centralized, thus advancing on the road to organs of workers power.

The forms and names these bodies may adopt are of little importance. The important thing is that the mass movement see them as instruments of struggle. In the mobilizations that are going on right now we see the thousand forms that self-organization can take, the thousand roads that lead to the coordination of the struggle, to its extension, to the organization of solidarity, and to the drawing of new sectors into the fight. The point, then, is to struggle within all, absolutely all of them, to develop the content of mass self-organization that exists in all these forms, no matter how embryonic their present reality may be. The point is to advance in this way toward organs that directly represent the masses in struggle and are thus immediately in the service of the struggle, the organs of the workers united front from top to bottom. And to construct this united front it is necessary to pose to the workers and revolutionary nationalist organizations, through slogans and above all through action, the cry that sums up the battle against class collaboration:

Break with the bourgeoisie!

The various "democratic alternatives" always conclude with the slogan that sums up class collaboration: the "broad coalition" provisional government charged with reconstructing the Spanish bourgeois state in a "democratic" form. The central slogan of our program is precisely the government capable of carrying out our program, whose task is to satisfy the demands of the working class and the people unconditionally, which would be based on the combat organs of the masses, the organs that have been established to bring down Francoism, that embody the battle against exploitation, repression, and national and social oppression.

We call this government the workers government.

Between their provisional government and our workers government there is much more than simply a difference over the type of "coalition," although the workers government obviously cannot contain even the shadow of the bourgeoisie. Above all, there is a difference of function between the two governments. The function of the provisional government is to reconstruct the bourgeois order; the function of the workers government is to destroy it forever.

Some comrades, militants of other organizations and vanguard fighters, often tell us: "But you are not realistic. You don't take account of the fact that there is going to be a provisional coalition government, that the masses want it. It is necessary to be in that government, or to be close to it, in order to avert 'rightist' maneuvers. Your workers government is a slogan that is not understood, that has nothing to do with the present concerns of the masses."

So, are we "idealists" or "ultraleftists"? Not at all. We are communists, which is the only revolutionary way to be realistic. And we know that there is going to be a "provisional government." And we know that the majority of the mass movement believes, is made to believe, that this "provisional government" is the "alternative" to Francoism. But we do not deduce a political line from these two facts. In developing a political line, we have to ask ourselves, Why do the masses believe in this provisional government? The answer is quite clear: Because they believe that such a government will satisfy their political, economic, and social demands. The masses do not adapt their demands to this or that sort of government — that is the business of the reformists — but on the contrary "adapt" the government to their demands, which are the things that really count for them. Thus, we have to ask ourselves another question: Would an interclass government want or be able to satisfy the demands of the masses; is that the function of the "broad coalition provisional government"? And we must answer, categorically: No; it does not want to, it cannot, and that is not its function. And thus, we come to the decisive question: If that is the case, what should the attitude of revolutionaries be? To foster the illusions of the masses in the "provisional government" in order "not to be isolated," thus collaborating

in the real function of this government? This would be a typically opportunistic attitude.

The attitude of revolutionaries consists in fighting so that the masses, through their own experience, put forward their own demands, gain confidence in their own strength, acquire an absolute determination to realize their aspirations, and actually do so through their own action, constructing the organs best suited to achieving these objectives. Within this fight and linked to it, it is necessary to propagate the slogans of class independence, and in particular of the workers government. If the majority of the mass movement places its struggles under the banner of an interclass provisional government, we will continue to oppose this slogan and all its consequences, yielding no concession. No one will be able to accuse us of "dividing" the movement. First, because the basis of the unity of the workers lies in the agreement to defend the workers' demands against capitalist exploitation and against the dictatorship. The disagreements, even principled ones, over the composition of the government that should be established after the fall of the dictatorship should not affect the united combat of the masses. Second, because those who foster the division of the movement are those who try to subordinate the struggles of the movement to pacts with the bourgeoisie. Third, because we will always defend the unity in action of the workers, whatever may be the orientation that the majority of the workers adopt.


In the end, the orientations and slogans of the various workers organizations must be subjected to the test of practice, to the heat of the united struggle of the working class and the people. We are certain that the line of class collaboration will melt like wax in this heat, while the line of class independence will be forged like steel. When the forge has done its work, the masses will give liberty its real name. They will call it socialism, and the workers government will stand at the head of the offensive toward the achievement of the classless society. We are fighting right now for that day to come about.

8 That is our general position in a debate that is of fundamental importance, but which must not divert once ounce of strength for one second from the essential task of the moment: the organization of a general strike against the Francoist monarchy, against the dictatorship. The necessity of concentrating, of centralizing all the will for freedom that exists in the country today into a united effort was never so within reach, never so necessary, and never so well understood and desired by the working class and the people as it is today. Beginning from the mobilizations for amnesty, the days of struggle, the solidarity with workers strikes like the strikes of the education and health workers, with the comrades of the militarized sectors — forward to the general strike against the dictatorship!

January 30, 1976

SAVE

THE LIFE



MUSTAFA JEMILEV

During his press conference in Paris, Leonid Plyushch issued a pressing appeal to the international workers movement to fight for the release of thousands of political prisoners still detained in Soviet camps and "special" psychiatric hospitals. The conditions of their detention and the harassment and treatment inflicted on them place their lives in danger. One need only remember Galanskov, who died in a camp at the age of 33 because of lack of medical care. Plyushch declared that Mustafa Jemilev is now in danger of suffering the same fate. For more than ten years, Jemilev has been fighting for the right of the Crimean Tatars, deported to Central Asia by Stalin, to return to their lands. Throughout these ten years, Jemilev has been constantly persecuted and frequently imprisoned. If the bureaucracy is determined to get Jemilev, the reason is that he is the symbol of the struggle of an entire people for its national rights. The struggle of the Crimean Tatars is among the most important of the mass movements that have developed in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin. Since the 1960s, representatives of the left wing of the opposition — such as Pyotr Grigorenko, Ilya Gabaï, and Andrei Kosterin — have fought along with the Tatars.

Mustafa Jemilev is still in prison today; for many months he has been on hunger strike to protest a new accusation against him made up out of whole cloth by the KGB, the political police.

On December 15, 1975, Grigorenko, Pissarev, and Altunian, all old Bolsheviks, raised a cry of alarm: Jemilev is in danger of death!

The dossier below is an initial response. The broadest mobilization is needed to save Jemilev!

CRIMEAN TATARS

THE STRUGGLE



OF AN ENTIRE PEOPLE

by G. STEPANOVICH

In 1783, when Russian troops marching south occupied Crimea, the country was inhabited by more than 500,000 Tatars. By the end of the 1800s, persecution had reduced their number to less than 200,000. But the October Revolution represented a fundamental break with the past, a liberation for the Tatar nation. Not only were the cultural and linguistic rights of the Tatars recognized, but in addition, in 1921 they were granted the right to form an autonomous republic, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Crimea, even though the Tatars represented no more than one-fourth of the total population of the Crimea. During the second world war the Tatars actively participated in the anti-Nazi resistance. But as it turned out, the liberation of their country was the beginning of a nightmare that has yet to end.

On the night of August 18-19, 1944, "special troops" invaded the Tatar villages and gave the inhabitants twenty minutes to pack their bags. In the course of that night, 238,500 people were deported, 205,900 of them women and children. Slightly more than half of them survived the tribulations to which they were subjected. In 1946 a decree dissolved the ASSR of Crimea. For more than ten years the Tatars, along with other peoples of the USSR — the Volga Germans, the Balkars, the Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Meskhets, Kalmyks, and Black Sea Greeks* — endured the fate of proscribed people, forbidden to move around, required to report to police stations every two weeks, etc.

The reasons for these deportations have never been explained. None of the official or unofficial pretexts peddled by the bureaucracy to the effect that the peoples concerned had committed some sort of "treason" — in fact, none of them had collaborated with the Nazis and some had never even been in direct contact with the Nazi occupation — can stand up in the harsh light of the facts. As for the "strategic" reasons that have been cited in the West in the case of the Crimean Tatars, the Meskhets, or even the Black Sea Greeks, they are insufficient.

*The Volga Germans were deported shortly after the beginning of the war. The other peoples, most of them Muslims of the northern Caucasus — except the Kalmyks, who are Buddhists of the Astrakhan region, and the Greeks, who are Greek Orthodox — were deported beginning in late 1943: the Karachais in October 1943, the Kalmyks in December. On February 22, 1944, it was the turn of the Chechens and Ingush, in March of that year, the Balkars. In 1949 the Meskhets, Muslims of southern Georgia, and the Greeks of the region suffered the same fate. Of all these populations, only the Meskhets and the Tatars were prevented from returning to their homes at the end of the 1950s.

As proletarian internationalism was abandoned by the Stalinists, great Russian nationalist ideology, already denounced by Lenin, became the de facto ideology of the bureaucracy and was reflected in a policy of Russification and outrageous centralization, which included the liquidation of the national intelligentsias and non-Russian cadres during the 1930s. The deportation of various nationalities was the most "paranoiac" aspect of this policy. Like the anti-Semitic campaign of the late 1940s and early 1950s, another break with October, this policy indicates the thread that connects certain themes of Stalinist ideology to the ideology of Tsarist Russia.

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the 1956 congress at which Khrushchev delivered his "secret speech," lifted these bans. Since then, the Tatars have been engaged in a long struggle that will not end until they have won the right to return to their country.



*In 1956, after being kept waiting in Moscow for one month, a delegation of Tatars was finally received by Khrushchev, who promised that the question of the Tatars would be examined by the Central Committee. Since that time, the movement of Tatars may be considered an organized mass movement.

*In 1957 a letter signed by 14,000 Tatars was sent to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, and tens of thousands of individual letters were sent to all the state bodies.

*In 1958 the letters and telegrams were still numerous. Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan received the representatives of the Tatar people and promised to present their case to Khrushchev. During this interview, the

delegates handed Mikoyan a letter signed by 16,000 people. That August another letter, signed by 12,000 Tatars, was sent to the Central Committee. The reaction of the bureaucrats was not long in coming: repression, primarily directed against Tatar members of the Soviet Communist party, who were expelled from the party and even deprived of their employment.

*In 1959 the movement continued, in spite of the repression: A new request, signed by 10,000 Tatars, was delivered to the authorities.

*In 1961 yet another letter, with 18,000 signatures, was sent to the Central Committee. Several months later, a delegation came with a letter to the preparatory commission of the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet CP; it was signed by 8,000 people. This delegation was forcibly expelled from Moscow.

*In 1964 (October) the Tatars used the fall of Khrushchev as an occasion to relaunch their struggle. A delegation sent to Moscow spent sixteen months seeking every possible audience with most of the leading bodies of the party and the state. During this period, more than twenty-four volumes of letters and documents backed by more than 100,000 signatures, not to mention hundreds of thousands of individual letters, were sent to the authorities.

*In 1967 the Tatar nation was officially rehabilitated by a decree of the Supreme Soviet; but this august body "requested" that the Tatars stay put. Nevertheless, in spite of the repression, some Tatars tried to return to their country without permission.

*In 1968, in March, a delegation of more than 800 Tatars was expelled from Moscow with unprecedented brutality. In April a huge assembly was organized in Chirchik in Central Asia on the occasion of Lenin's birthday; it was brutally dispersed. The year 1968 saw a linkup between the struggle of the Tatars and a part of the Soviet opposition. Support to the struggle of the Tatars is an expression of the most advanced part of the opposition, essentially its progressive wing. Several oppositionists have paid quite dearly for this support, not only General Grigorenko, but also Ilya Gabai, a young Muscovite, who was tried along with Jemilev and sentenced to three years' internment.

*Today the KGB is hunting down the most active militants of the movement, among them Jemilev, who may already be dead, for he has been on hunger strike for more than seven months.

In spite of the repression, the vitality and breadth of the movement of Crimean Tatars has exemplary value: The policy of Russification and centralization implemented by the bureaucracy is meeting growing resistance from the non-Russian nationalities. Today the national question appears as one of the most decrepit pillars of the bureaucratic edifice. □

LETTER FROM MUSTAFA JEMILEV



From Omsk Prison, September 5, 1975

... As far as I am concerned, there have been no big changes. The doctors examined me on August 18: pulse 57; temperature 95.9 degrees F. (35.5 C.); blood pressure 90/60; weight 99 pounds (45 kilos).

Considering that before the hunger strike I weighed 132 pounds (60 kilos), that means that I've lost an average of a little more than half a pound (250 grams) a day over sixty days. If you have a pencil you can figure out how long it will take me to get to zero at that rate. I'm joking.

They say they "don't let you die" around here. It seems to be true, because they took me to the hospital that very day and gave me shots of glucose and B1, besides daily transfusions. On August 26 they took me back to my cell in the basement, but they had to send me back to the infirmary on the first of September, because my stomach was in very bad shape. They kept me for four days, and today, September 5, I'm back in the basement.

The investigative bodies are not worried.

Another thing, on August 12 the following thing happened: Around two or three o'clock in the morning Lieutenant Colonel Surov came into my cell. He asked me if I was getting ready to give up my hunger strike. When I told him I had no such intention, he started screaming at me. He said he knew what a good-for-nothing anti-Soviet I was and that I was pretty naive to think that a hunger strike was going to help me get out of prison. Then he inspected my cell and since he noticed that there was graffiti on the walls he ordered them to give me a brush and some lime to clean off the walls, even though the nature of the graffiti clearly showed that I had nothing to do with it and even though I could hardly stand up. "If he doesn't do it, punish him," he told the guard. The punishment could consist of taking away the bed so I would have to lie on the wet cement floor.

When the guard out in the corridor told him that an arbitrary measure like that could provoke an act of desperation on my part, the director answered, "Let him hang himself, that would even be for the best." From this I learned that some people consider my suicide to be the most desirable way out.

But I have no intention of hanging myself and if one day they announce that I have hanged myself, you can be sure it's not true. . . .



AN APPEAL

MUSTAFA JEMILEV: active fighter for the right of the Crimean Tatar people to return to their homeland.

MUSTAFA JEMILEV: member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR.

MUSTAFA JEMILEV: in prison, on hunger strike to protest against new frame-up charges.

Mustafa Jemilev was born in 1943 in the Crimean village of Boskai. He was not yet one year old when the Crimean Tatar people were driven out of their native land. They were given not more than twenty minutes to get ready. They were transported in sealed freightcars, without food, drink, or air. They were all put together, the living and the dead. Nearly half the people died during the long voyage and the first few months of their deportation in an inhospitable desert location.

Mustafa Jemilev is an active militant of the peaceful movement of the Crimean Tatar people to return to their Crimean homeland. Since becoming a militant, he has been the victim of daily persecution by the Soviet administration. The "material" used to justify this persecution is, according to all evidence, lies; the accusations are false.

In 1966 and 1967 Jemilev was sentenced to a year and a half deprivation of liberty on charges of "refusing compulsory military service," but in reality because he wanted to return to Crimea with his people.

In 1969-72 he suffered three years' deprivation of liberty on charges of "spreading lying theories slandering the Soviet government and social system," but in reality for having tried to be received by the Soviet government administration in order to deliver a petition asking for the return of the Tatars to Crimea. The latest arrest for "hooliganism," on May 13, 1974, took place after

an unsuccessful attempt to draw Mustafa Jemilev into a scuffle; it was a preventive measure taken on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the exile of the Tatar people. To protest this illegal arrest Mustafa Jemilev went on hunger strike and was released on the ninth day.

On June 22, 1974, Mustafa Jemilev was arrested on charges of "refusing to participate in a recall of military service," but in reality because of his tenacious desire to recover their lost homeland for himself and his people.

Mustafa's parents, already aged and in despair, have addressed themselves to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and also to fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, and to the parliaments and governments of all countries. They asked A.N. Podgorny to release their son from the USSR and asked the governments of other countries to grant asylum to their constantly persecuted son. In order to protest against such an illegal condemnation (he should have been excused from military obligations for reasons of health), Mustafa himself began a long hunger strike. Nevertheless, he was condemned to one year's deprivation of liberty and sent to a camp in Omsk. Intense activity by the KGB and the camp administration was soon organized against Mustafa, most probably in order to prepare "material" for a new lying accusation. It is known that the organs of justice often launch a "case" and judge a man not for a crime that has been committed but as a prophylactic measure, on the simple presumption that such an individual represents a potential threat to Soviet ideology.

This, for example, is how "cases" were made up out of whole cloth against Anatoli Marchenko, Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Dremlyuga, and Leon Ubogko, who were detained on the basis of false testimony, obtained under duress, from their fellow detainees. Vladimir Dremlyuga was threatened with a third term; he paid for his release with an article of contrition in the magazine Soviet Yakuty.

On June 19, 1975, three days before the end of his term, a new accusation was announced against Mustafa Jemilev, once again for "spreading slanders." He was thrown into prison, his "case" was presided over by Gusselnikova, a judge from the Omsk prosecutor's office.

In order to fabricate this new "case," the functionaries of the state security organs counted on using Vladimir Dvorianski, a co-detainee of Mustafa Jemilev. But he refused to play along with the provocateurs and traitors; he drafted an account of his conversation with a representative of the administration and entitled it "deposition." False testimony, lying accusations, lies of prosecutors. Sentences that rest only on lies.

This whole arsenal of lies in order to force Mustafa Jemilev to keep quiet, to force us all to forget the truth, the truth about the deportation of an entire people, and to prevent this people from returning to their

native steppes, mountains, and villages.

Mustafa Jemilev has begun a hunger strike in protest against these notoriously lying accusations. The sufferings of an entire people cannot be consigned to oblivion! There is no compromising with lies! We cannot let a man die!

That is why we are protesting against the notoriously false accusations against Mustafa Jemilev, why we are addressing ourselves to all those who hold dear the rights of the citizen, of the individual; where there's a will, there's a way.

DEFEND MUSTAFA JEMILEV!

BAR THE WAY OF THIS NEW INJUSTICE!

July 9, 1975

T. Chodorovich
M. Landa
G. Podiapolski
A. Grigorenko
I. Yakir
I. Kaploun
A. Lavout
E. Kosterina

L. Alekseyeva
N. Lissovskaya
L. Ternovski
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Common Market - at a

by ERNEST MANDEL

Ever since its creation, it has been clear that the Common Market represented a transitional stage in the development of West European imperialism. Previously, three successive attempts at "European union" under the hegemony of a single imperialist power — Germany during the period 1900-1918; France on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles during the 1920s, and Germany again during the period 1938-1944 — had ended in failure. West European capital then tried to bring this union about no longer on the basis of the military-political domination of a single power, but instead through an alliance of the most important powers.

The objective necessity for this union derives from the growing internationalization of the productive forces, that is, the growing contradiction between the maintenance of the national bourgeois state on the one hand and the degree of development of the productive forces, the productive capacity of the large enterprises, the market for their production, and the objective socialization (technical interdependence) of the life of these enterprises beyond national frontiers on the other hand.

The objective difficulty in overcoming this contradiction within the framework of the capitalist mode of production during its imperialist stage lies in the fact that private property and competition do not permit the essential particular interests of certain groups of capitalists to be sacrificed to the "common interests" of the bourgeois class. As long as the means of production remain the private property of German, French, British, Italian, Belgian, or Dutch bourgeoisies, the "European bourgeoisie" and "European interests" will remain abstractions lacking the slightest real content.

The objective possibility of European union on a capitalist basis thus lies precisely in the level of the international interpenetration of capital. To the extent that European multinational corporations emerge, corporations that are no longer the exclusive property of capitalists of a particular nationality but are rather the common property of Dutch and German, Italian and British, French and Belgian capitalists (provided capitalists of other nationalities are not excessively involved), to that extent the weight of the common interest grows in comparison with that of the particular interest within the European bourgeoisie. Then the concepts of "European capital" and "European bourgeoisie" take on a concrete content.

The EEC appeared when the "European multinationals" were still not very numerous and when their importance was still limited. Since then, their number and weight have increased, but much more slowly than had been

predicted by the advocates of a West European federal state. Hence, on the eve of the general economic recession of 1974-75, the EEC had still not gone beyond this intermediary stage.

Federation of states or federal state?

Nevertheless, during the stage of late capitalism, the state plays an increasingly important role in capitalist economic life. The illusion that the great monopolies, including the multinationals, "no longer need the state" has validity only during periods of rapid economic growth and boom. During an acute economic depression these gentlemen hold out their hands for state subsidies and orders just like the less important firms. (Examples: AKZO, ACEC/Empain and ACEC/Westinghouse in Belgium, British Leyland and Chrysler in Britain, Rhône-Poulenc in France.) Deciding which state will come to the aid of which monopolies in what forms and with what consequences is and will remain a decisive question in the context of the international competition that reigns among big capital.

This is also true of the inherent tendency of late capitalism to orient itself toward greater economic cooperation and more active programming between the state and the monopolies. The multinational monopolies have no interest in national economic planning. They could suffer from national protectionism. Rather, what they want is programming and protectionism applied over a broader geographical range.

Thus, for several years now the EEC has found itself midway between an economically strong "national" state and an economically strong sovereign federal state.

But such a weak and loose federation is not very effective economically and is not in position to intervene on a grand scale. Hence the alternative: Either there is a return to national protectionism in time of crisis or else there is forward motion toward a European federal state.

The present recession has thrown light on this dilemma. But it has not resolved it. The Tindemans report (requested of the Belgian prime minister in 1974 by his eight European colleagues of the EEC) is more a confession of impotence than a clear choice between growing disintegration or definitive consolidation of the EEC.

Originally, the EEC was a customs union, that is, a region of free circulation of commodities. This led to a shift in the location of factories (from which Belgian

snail's pace

capitalism profited extensively during the 1960s), which gave rise to the desire for monetary and economic union.

The six initial members of the EEC (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) wanted to bring this union about by 1980. A common currency (which would serve as the basis of the international monetary system alongside or even in place of the dollar), a common European budget, and a common credit policy would inevitably lead to a common rate of inflation, a common incomes system, and a common policy on investment, employment, and public works. This would thus lead to a common government and a federal state. That was the road that was and still is recommended by the bourgeois federalists and the reformists of the workers movement.

The major precondition for realizing such a project is the increasing homogenization of economic development: the growth rates of production, the rates of inflation, and the increases in incomes would have to be comparable in the various countries. During the 1960s this seemed to be increasingly the case. Today, however, it is not at all true of the "nine" (the original six plus Britain, Ireland, Denmark).

Britain and Italy are experiencing much higher rates of inflation, a growing decline in real wages and living standards, and a much lower growth in productivity and industrial production than West Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. Denmark and Ireland are also more fragile economically. This has eliminated the possibility of short- or medium-term monetary union, unless Germany, and to a lesser extent France and the Benelux countries, were prepared to finance the balance of payments deficit of Britain and Italy on a grand scale (among other ways through the creation of a common reserve of gold and money for a common West European currency).

The possibility of a West European monetary union disappeared with the nyet of Helmut Schmidt, with the lack of audacity of the West German bourgeoisie in this domain; this bourgeoisie did not dare to propose common gold and currency reserves in exchange for the French, British, and Italian capitalists' giving up their financial and economic sovereignty.

As of 1974 the only remaining solution was a combination of a customs union for the "nine" and an increasingly tight monetary union of the "five rich members" (West Germany, France, the Benelux countries). This intermediary "solution" — semi-disintegration and semi-consolidation — was advocated by Willy Brandt in Paris.

Since then, it experienced a beginning of realization when the French franc was again added to the monetary "snake," in which the various currencies fluctuate together around the German mark. The Tindemans report translates this pragmatic intermediary "solution" into practical language. As was pointed out by the January 15 issue of the German Social Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts*, this report could just as well have been written by Helmut Schmidt himself.

All the rest is just ideological camouflage. Granted, there are passages in the report favoring monetary and general economic union (but the when and how remains vague). In addition, the British bourgeoisie is furious. Granted, there is still an allusion to a European parliament that would have the right of initiative, which disturbs the Gaullists. Granted, there is also a plea for a common foreign policy by the "nine," which soothes these same Gaullists. But all this is just window-dressing. What is fundamental is that there is no move toward an economic union. Nor is there any desire to regress to the stage of national protectionism. Thus, things remain in mid-stream, with the addition of attempts to limit the damages caused by this immobilism. That is the deeper significance of the Tindemans report.

A real dilemma

This is a real dilemma and not a matter of misunderstanding or indecision on the part of the West European bourgeoisie. The crisis in Britain and Italy is too serious for the German and French bourgeoisies to pay the price of a short-term monetary and economic integration. And this crisis threatens to infect France and Belgium at any moment, which would make the position of the German bourgeoisie, Europe's "rich uncle," untenable. On the other hand, a breakup of the EEC would be a real catastrophe for the West German and Benelux economies. If only because of the loss of markets, which would throw these economies into a crisis similar to that of Britain. Thus, the bourgeoisie cannot return to the policy of the 1930s. They therefore cling to pragmatic intermediary "solutions"; they try to hold onto what they've got and to prevent the "positive" results of the first phase of the EEC from being lost (which is a very real danger if the coming social and political crisis or the economic recession in Italy, Britain, and France proves to be more serious than those of 1968-69 and 1974-75). No more than that can be done. "Après nous, le déluge," or, as Keynes said even more clearly, "In the long run, we're all dead."

The working class must have no illusions in the results of this pragmatism. We will vanquish these remnants of the nationalism of the European states, which maintain private property in the means of production and an economy rooted in the monopolies' search for profits.

The United States of Europe will mean full employment and will eliminate exploitation and oppression, for they will be the Socialist United States of Europe. □

The international position and role of the Vietnamese revolution altered significantly with its final victory over American imperialism on April 30, 1975. The period during which its international role was linked primarily to the objective effects of a long struggle for liberation on the world relationship of forces ended. A new period opened, one in which the political choices of the party and the government, choices made outside the pursuit of such a struggle, will progressively, but in large measure, determine the revolution's future place in the dynamic of world revolution.

To be sure, the triumph of the resistance did not close the period during which the course of the revolution in Vietnam and Indochina influenced the struggles in other countries by its exemplary character; the accelerated progress toward reunification, the ongoing overturning of the social structure, and the socialist transformation of a national liberation struggle continue to point to the road to follow for those who desire victory. And the policy of the Workers party of Vietnam (the Vietnamese Communist party) has not been suddenly transformed. But the orientation previously advanced by Vietnamese communists could not remain unchanged; it has to respond to the new factors born of the end of the military fighting. The nine months that have elapsed since then permit the main lines of the new policy that has been adopted by the Workers party during the present period of transition to be sketched out. These main lines confirm that in spite of the scope of the tasks of reconstruction it is facing, the Vietnamese Communist party does not wish to withdraw exclusively to its national terrain.

A "favorable moment"

The Vietnamese leaders today are extending the analyses they had long since developed about the place of their revolution. In his speech to the consultative conference for reunification, held in Saigon in November, Truong Chinh, a member of the Political Bureau of the Workers party, recalled that "for dozens of years" Vietnam was the country in which "the contradictions characteristic of the contemporary world" were concentrated. Hence the import of the American defeat, underscored by the document of the party Central Committee quoted by Truong Chinh: "If the victory at Dien Bien Phu marked the collapse of French colonialism, the victory of April 30, 1975, for its part, heralded the total and inevitable bankruptcy of U.S. neocolonialism in the world." (Nouvelles de la RDVN, No. 67.)

The Vietnamese leadership exhibits an effective understanding of the present dynamic of the world revolution and the consequences of the struggle that has been waged, even though this understanding remains deformed by its political misappreciation of the nature of the Stalinist degeneration of the Soviet leadership and its implications. "These victories have weakened American



**nine months
after the
victory**

VIETNA FOREIGN

by **PIERRE ROUSSET**

imperialism, lowered its authority. They are encouraging movements of national liberation. . . ." More generally, they highlight the "offensive position" of the "three great revolutionary currents" which "are converging" during our epoch: the "national liberation movement," the "revolutionary movement" in the capitalist countries, and the "growth of the system of the socialist countries." (Nouvelles de la RDVN, No. 71.) The imperialist rout has opened a "favorable moment" for the world revolution, even though its development remains uneven. Such is the analysis upheld by the leadership of the Workers party. The Angolan events, among other things, confirm that this analysis is well founded: The relative American paralysis and the unusual audacity of Soviet policy, despite the fact that the Soviet Union is terribly dependent on the United States to make up its grain deficit, can be explained in no other way. Nor can Cuba's ability to intervene directly on



MESE POLICY

the side of the MPLA, in spite of its geographic vulnerability to U.S. imperialism. On many occasions the Vietnamese leaders have drawn two lessons of their fight: one relating to the character of the revolution in the dominated countries and the other to the organic links among the struggles in the various parts of the world. It was mainly to the latter point that Vo Nguyen Giap referred in his speech to the first congress of the Communist party of Cuba: "In the present epoch, the struggle of peoples for independence and democracy is in general closely linked to the struggle for socialism and communism, although the process of the revolution in each country is distinguished by its own characteristics. The patriotic and democratic forces of the peoples are assembled around the most revolutionary class, which is the working class. . . . (The three great revolutionary currents) are in process of becoming an invincible force, a global force." (Nouvelles de la RDVN, No. 70.)

This body of doctrinal reference allows us to partially locate the originality of the position the Vietnamese leadership assigns itself in the international workers movement. In fact, this position differs clearly from that of the Maoist leadership, whose orientation is determined by the struggle between the "two superpowers" and above all against Soviet influence, even in Southeast Asia, where the maintenance of some American forces is viewed as a desirable counter to Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. It also diverges from that of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, which aims at the difficult goal of maintaining an essential status quo in the world relationship of forces during a period of a rise in the class struggle internationally. Nevertheless, while a study of the theses developed by the Vietnamese CP on this question confirms the originality of this leadership, it also reveals the profound ambivalence of the policy of this leadership.

The search for economic development and national independence is impelling the Vietnamese to diversify their alliances and aid sources as much as possible. This involves a threefold effort: to situate Vietnam on the border between the "socialist camp" and the so-called "nonaligned countries"; to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with all the imperialist powers; to avoid becoming too deeply involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) had joined the "nonaligned" bloc as long ago as September 1973. In August 1975, during the Lima conference, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was in turn admitted to this bloc. Reunified Vietnam will thus be part of this bloc, one of the few workers states, along with Cuba and the People's Republic of Korea, to participate with full rights in the "group of 77." The signs of a diplomatic "thaw" with the United States, the first contracts signed with Japan (financial aid, export of shrimp, establishment of a fertilizer factory) show that the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations is also probably well underway.

The first major difficulty with which the Vietnamese leadership was confronted in the international arena after the victory of April 1975 had to do with its relations with the People's Republic of China.

China/USSR: the balance broken

It is quite certain that the Workers party of Vietnam wants as far as possible to maintain an equal balance in its relations with the USSR and China. In fact, this corresponds both to the situation of the Indochinese revolution, which is compelled to seek the broadest possible aid in order to repair the damages of a war of thirty years' duration, and to the empirical analysis made by the Vietnamese leadership of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which is regarded as a fratricidal conflict that criminally divides the "socialist camp," to which

all three, the USSR, China, and Vietnam, objectively belong. But the policy of the Maoist leadership prevented the maintenance of this equal balance. There has been a sharp aggravation of tension between Vietnam and China, which has been visible since Nixon's trip to Peking in July 1971.

In 1974 a border conflict broke out. It was in mid-January of that year that China militarily occupied the islands of one of the archipelagos whose ownership is contested: the Paracels, which were held by Thieu's forces at the time. The PRG and the DRV then made it known that the question of the ownership of the Parcel and Spratly islands would be settled by negotiations. But these negotiations never took place, and the conflict has recently taken on a new dimension. The December 15, 1975, issue of Peking Information published a long peremptory article. "The islands of the South China Sea," the article stated, "have been Chinese territory since ancient times"; some of these islands "have not yet come into our possession again, but the Chinese people will liberate Taiwan, and all the islands belonging to China will return to their fatherland." (p. 15.) Both Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the magazine of the Vietnamese army, and Radio Hanoi have called for preserving national unity "in the territorial waters of the continental shelf." (Quoted by J. Decoroy in *Le Monde*, January 6, 1976.) It appears that the Vietnamese leadership may be prepared to have the army occupy the Spratly archipelago.

Whatever the stakes involved in the border conflict — which affects the national independence and economic interests (oil) of each side — the overall divergences that are being manifested today are probably the more profound. True, an aid agreement has been signed between China and Vietnam for 1976, and during his September 1975 visit to Peking Le Duan, first secretary of the Workers party of Vietnam, delivered a very warm speech. He extensively hailed the "militant solidarity" that unites the two peoples, who are "close friends," and the "friendship between comrades and brothers." But Le Duan recalled that the struggle against imperialism must take account of the fact that imperialism's "chief is American imperialism." (Nouvelles de la DRVN, No. 62.) Le Duan's Chinese counterpart, on the other hand, called for a struggle against "hegemonism." The Sino-Vietnamese meeting did not conclude with a joint communiqué, although as the Vietnamese delegation continued its trip, important communiqués were signed with the USSR and five countries of East Europe. As for Peking Information, it exhibited a remarkable lack of enthusiasm on the occasion of the announcement of Vietnamese reunification.

Clearly, whatever appearances may be maintained, there is a profound incompatibility between an orientation based on denunciation of Soviet "social imperialism" and an orientation for which "solidarity among the revolutionary forces" (including the USSR) "is the ticket to victory." (Nouvelles de la DRVN, No. 69.) The joint Soviet-Vietnamese communiqué went so far as to recognize the USSR as "the first proletarian state in the

world." (Nouvelles de la DRVN, No. 65.) As long as the Maoist leadership maintains its present policy, tension between the two countries can only increase. In fact, the Vietnamese workers state is tending to become an "objective enemy" of the People's Republic of China in that it is helping to strengthen Soviet influence. Obviously, it remains possible that in face of the very high political price of its present orientation (especially in a case like Angola), divisions may appear in the Chinese leadership and this orientation may be modified.

The Sino-Vietnamese confrontation became particularly lively on two issues: Portugal and Angola. Vietnam immediately recognized the People's Republic of Angola and extended its support to the MPLA. On this point, the Maoist leadership experienced its greatest isolation among the workers states. Cuba denounced its policy violently. Even the People's Republic of Korea wound up withdrawing its instructors from Zaire and supporting the MPLA.

On Portugal, the DRV not only supported the "complex struggle for national independence and socialism," but also stated that this support constituted the "touchstone of genuine proletarian internationalism" today. (Nouvelles de la DRVN, No. 62.)

The main alliance

The main alliance desired by the Vietnamese leadership is the alliance with the official Communist movement on an international scale. The Maoist defection has tended to reduce this to an alliance with the world Soviet Stalinist movement.

The Workers party of Vietnam systematically supports the Communist parties throughout the world. In the past this was the case in Chile and today it is the case in Portugal and Spain, where the denunciation of Francoist crimes is accompanied by salutes to the efforts of the Spanish Communist party to extend its alliances to include "rightist forces that do not approve of the fascist regime." (Nouvelles de la DRVN, No. 66.) Hanoi has agreed to follow Soviet diplomacy in the case of India, analyzing the state of emergency decreed by Indira Gandhi as a response to an attempted coup by "right-wing reactionaries," (1976 *Asia Yearbook of the Far Eastern Economic Review*, p. 318) and has allowed the Indian press to avail itself of Vietnamese support.

Symptomatically, the Vietnamese position on India has been very discreet. But it nonetheless covers up for a regime that now holds an unenviable world record: the largest number of political prisoners. Finally, in the Soviet-Vietnamese communiqué the DRV agreed to hail the holding of the Helsinki conference and to "support the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the government of the Soviet Union

in their external activities aimed at concretizing the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence . . . and at making the process of détente irreversible." (*Nouvelles de la DRVN*, No. 65, p. 3.)

A short while ago, the Workers party of Vietnam was virulently condemning the "illusion of détente." It has apparently not changed its view of the fundamental aggressiveness of imperialism, since all the elements of its previous analysis of the world situation remain current for it. The previously expressed differences of orientation with the Soviet leadership have not disappeared. But this relative alignment with Stalinist diplomacy highlights the limits of the empirical political consciousness that was developed during the Vietnamese revolution; it further highlights the limits of the objectives the Vietnamese leadership has set itself today, for it



Giap

does not claim to be playing a direct role in the recomposition of an international revolutionary leadership, or, more precisely, its profound incomprehension of the nature of the crisis of the international workers movement and the choices that this leadership consequently makes: the choice of a fundamental alliance with the world workers movement through the official Communist movement, Stalinist in its majority.

This alignment is relative and certainly not absolute. Vietnamese diplomacy asserts its autonomy, both in relations with the workers states and in relations with the dominated countries. The trip of the Yugoslav Dzemal Bijedic to Hanoi in October, like Giap's trip to Cuba, enabled the Vietnamese to hail revolutions that were able to win victory without the support of foreign armies. It seems that Vietnam has recently received a rather large number of foreign militants. The Workers party refused to rally to support of the Soviet project of a "collective security pact" in Asia. It accepted an important confrontation with Thailand at a time when the USSR was seeking to normalize its relations with that

country. And it obtained official Soviet recognition of its own regional role and responsibility. The above-quoted joint communiqué in fact asserted that "the DRV has become a solid base for the revolutionary struggle of all the Vietnamese people, a genuine advance post of socialism in Indochina and in Southeast Asia. The prestige of the Workers party of Vietnam has clearly risen once again." (p. 2.)

This recognition of the regional place of the Vietnamese CP by the USSR is important. It shows the limits of Soviet action in Southeast Asia today. Above all, it enters into resonance with an intense diplomatic activity being deployed by the Vietnamese leadership.

The regional "forward post"

As long ago as 1949 Ho Chi Minh affirmed the regional responsibility of the largest workers party of Southeast Asia. In his report to the consultative conference Truong Chinh explained that the most immediate of the effects of the victory of the Vietnamese revolution was that it "broke the American front line of defense in this region." From the editorials of the North Vietnamese daily *Nhan Dan* just after April 30 to the Soviet-Vietnamese communiqué, one theme is central: "Southeast Asia belongs to the peoples of Southeast Asia." More precisely, the Workers party of Vietnam stresses the existence of an active liberation movement in Thailand and Malaysia.

The case of Thailand is the most significant today. The victory of the Indochinese revolution has deeply affected this neighboring country in which a class polarization is under way and in which the regions bordering Laos and Cambodia are the seats of insurrectional communist movements. The tension between Vietnam and Laos on the one hand and Thailand on the other broke out at the end of 1975. On November 17 a Thai provocation created a violent military incident along the Mekong River. The Bangkok government decided to close the border leading to Vientiane for six weeks. Tens of thousands of refugees from the CIA-backed Meo army of General Vang Pao were received in northern Thailand, and some of them seem to have been organized into new commando units. On December 15 Thai King Bhumibol declared: "There have been various forms of sabotage against our kingdom. This has developed to such a serious stage that it is a direct aggression against the country." (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 2, 1976.) In the spring of 1975 the fact that the Thai government had handed many planes and ships of the South Vietnamese puppet army over to the Americans instead of returning them to the PRG had already blocked the normalization of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Thailand.

The present tension may ease up in the future, and diplomatic relations will probably be established some day. But the tension will not disappear entirely. In spite of the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, Thailand re-

mains a base of U.S. action against revolutionary Indochina. The echos of the social transformation, like the genuine independence that has been won on the other side of the border, will continue to resonate in a country in full political and social crisis, especially in the Northeast, which is inhabited by Lao-Thai peoples. The military right will not abandon its anti-Vietnamese campaign, which is one of the instruments in a policy of internal tension in Thailand. And important links between the Vietnamese Communist party, the Laotian revolutionary forces, and the Thai Communist party have been woven.

Moreover, Vietnamese communism is tending to play an active role in the recomposition of the regional Communist movement. This success of its struggle must pose important questions for the militants of the Communist parties of Southeast Asia that follow a Maoist orientation. The Vietnamese Workers party's appreciation of the orientation of these parties is clearly critical, and the Vietnamese would obviously like to see greater independence from Peking on their part. And this desire is in harmony with the concerns and tensions that, apparently at least, are beginning to be manifested in the Thai and Malaysian parties. From this standpoint, the Southeast Asian communist movement is also one of the stakes involved in the political confrontation of Vietnamese communism with Maoism. Since Moscow hopes to make progress in its relations with Bangkok and since Peking has temporarily ceased to speak of the action of the Thai CP since it is trying to gain recognition of the People's Republic of China by Thailand, the Vietnamese CP has been alone in consistently denouncing the various "civilian" Thai governments and their links to imperialism.

From this standpoint, the regional role of the Workers party of Vietnam may become more direct and important than it was during the war years. This depends partly on the evolution of the class struggle in the countries concerned. Concurrently, the Indochinese equilibrium itself is changing. The great rhythms of the revolution in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam obviously remain common ones. Cambodia has adopted a new constitution that proclaims the "Democratic Kampuchea." The great majority of the Sihanoukists have not returned to Phnom Penh, preferring to remain in exile despite the position of Sihanouk himself in support of the Khmers Rouges. The monarchy has been abolished in Laos and the "Revolutionary People's party" has assumed full effective political leadership of the new Democratic Republic. The era of "national union" in Indochina has been aborted before ever really seeing the light of day.

Nevertheless, a deep fissure has appeared between Laos and Vietnam on the one hand and Cambodia on the other. The Thai blockade accelerated the Vientiane-Hanoi rapprochement. Since the Laotians no longer had an outlet to the sea, only an aerial bridge and the opening of a Thakhek-Vinh road enabled them to avoid being strangled. The Khmers Rouges, unlike the Laotian leadership, have chosen a triple option different from that of the Vietnamese. Their international alliance is above

all with China. A détente policy toward Bangkok has been developed. On the very day of the Mekong incident in November 1975, Chatichai Choonhavan, Thai minister of foreign affairs, and Ieng Sary, Cambodian vice prime minister, met in Poipet. A barter agreement was signed between the two countries. Finally, Cambodia's economic development choices, linked to the country's extreme underdevelopment and to its rejection of an Indochinese federation, favor national self-reliance: limit foreign aid, assure a qualitative increase in rice production, and import goods on the basis of the rice exports in order to avoid falling into debt.

The international action of the Workers party and the DRV is unfolding on several levels. Their intervention among the countries of the third world is symbolic in this regard. It combines support to the "group of 77" against the imperialist powers (on questions of maritime rights, oil prices, etc.), support to some of the governments of these countries (such as the Algerian regime; during his visit to Algiers, for example, Giap described Boumediene as a "comrade in arms"), and solidarity with liberation movements. In this Vietnam is seeking to appear as one of the advanced wings of anti-imperialist combat. "What Vietnam did all determined peoples can do against the imperialists of all stripes," Giap declared in Algiers. He added, explaining the support extended to the Saharan Polisario Front, "We struggle for the independence and liberation of peoples. We have supported all struggles for independence and liberty. It is in this spirit that we support the struggle of the Saharan people for self-determination, the just struggle being waged by the People's Republic of Angola under the leadership of the MPLA, and the struggles of the peoples of the Middle East for the national rights of the Palestinian people." (Afrique-Asie, No. 11.) He could have added, in Asia, the support to the formation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor and to FRETILIN's resistance to the Indonesian invasion; the FRETILIN minister of defense visited Hanoi in January.

In the international arena, as in the realm of the social dynamic of the reunification (see INPRECOR, No. 42, January 22, 1976), the role of the Vietnamese revolution remains active. The maintenance of this potential will depend on the balance the Workers party leadership strikes between relations among governments and support to mass struggles and above all on the quality of the links that are forged with the revolution in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese Communist party is now confronted by a threefold task: reconstruction, to which it is trying to respond by broadening its aid sources without depending too much on any one of them and thus threatening to find itself beholden even to one of its "brother countries"; solidarity with the movements that represent the continuity of the process of permanent revolution on a regional scale, tasks that have been increased by the very success of the struggle in Indochina; and delicate political choices of alliances and international support, in the determination of which the limits of the Vietnamese leadership are coming to the fore even more clearly than before. □

Zambia: END THE STATE OF EMERGENCY!

by T. NKOLE

In the early morning of Saturday, January 31, Lionel Cliffe, senior lecturer in political science at the University of Zambia, was taken from his home on the campus by police and placed in detention. No reason was given for the arrest, but the government's 28-day order allows a detainee to be held without charge or trial for that period while "investigations" are made and it is decided whether a further longer-term order will be made.

Cliffe's wife, Doris, was quoted in the February 1 Sunday Times of Zambia as stating that the house had been



Kaunda

searched for "any literature on Angola." It had been obvious from events over the past week that such arrests were likely to take place. On Sunday, January 25, President Kaunda addressed a demonstration of Lusaka secondary school students who marched to his residence at the State House "to demonstrate their support for Zambia's stand on Angola." There Kaunda declared that a big campaign was afoot "to change the course of our revolution. I know the big powers behind this campaign. We are going to reveal them very soon." He said that "counterrevolutionaries have infiltrated a number of institutions and companies to cause confusion."

On the same day, Frank Chitambala, a member of the Central Committee of the ruling United National Independence party (UNIP), told a similar demonstration in Ndola that some "misguided Marxist lecturers" at the University of Zambia were inciting students there to oppose the government's stand on Angola. In the same speech, he made the first reference ever to appear in the Zambian media to a demonstration that took place on the University of Zambia campus on January 15. The campus was occupied for the entire day by students demanding an end to Zambia's neutralist position on the Angolan war and the rendering of full support to the MPLA. On that day the entire campus was ringed by police and traffic on the Great East Road which passes the university gates was diverted so that travelers would not see the posters that decorated the gates declaring solidarity with the MPLA.

On Wednesday, January 28, Kaunda went on radio and television and declared a "full state of emergency" to

take effect immediately. Because Zambia has been under a "partial" state of emergency since the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia in 1965, it is difficult to immediately assess the actual legal implications of the move. But the total eradication of Part III of the constitution effectively suspends civil liberties, allowing the authorities to enter any premises, search any persons, ban the circulation of any literature, etc.

Once again the university was indirectly referred to in the statement that "we have saboteurs and subversive elements sowing seeds of discord. These are foreigners or Zambians either working separately or in collaboration to infiltrate institutions. . . . Some of our institutions of learning have been infiltrated. Some student groups are like an orchestra with an invisible conductor on the payroll of a social imperialist power." (This, incidentally, is the first recorded use by Kaunda of the Chinese characterization of the Soviet Union, which has recently become a stock element in the vocabulary of Holden Roberto and President Mobutu of Zaire.)

tion, to reach a constitutional settlement with Smith which cannot conceivably embrace the central nationalist demand for "one man, one vote." Concerning Angola, the Zambian government has systematically maintained a policy of at first totally ignoring and now playing down the involvement of South Africa and U.S.-backed Zaire in the Angolan civil war. Instead, ever increasing attacks are made on the support given to the MPLA by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Lionel Cliffe is not the first victim of the purge of foreigners resident in Zambia (see the article by Tony Hodges in *Intercontinental Press*, January 12, for details on the treatment by Zambia of Zimbabwean freedom fighters opposed to a compromise). It should also be noted that two British correspondents of the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Financial Times* were held in Lusaka the day before Cliffe's arrest under the same emergency regulations.

It is sadly ironic to note that Lionel Cliffe has a history of principled support for the liberation of Africa from colonial rule going back over the past fifteen years.



Despite the fact that Kaunda's speech also contained references to various economic crimes involving hoarding of scarce commodities to the detriment of the consumer, it was quite apparent that the venom of the state was about to be directed against that tiny section of the population which openly expresses opposition to the whole trend of Zambia's détente policies in southern Africa over the past two years. These policies have involved a more and more open collaboration with the apartheid regime in South Africa both economically and politically. This line has expressed itself most clearly in the attitude toward the struggles in Zimbabwe and Angola.

Concerning Zimbabwe, there is now de facto Zambian support for the efforts of Nkomo, leader of the tiny petty-bourgeois section of Rhodesia's African popula-

As is well known by comrades in Britain, he was a leading activist in the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. The urgency of a massive international campaign for freedom for all political prisoners in Zambia is underlined by the sinister implications contained in the following words from Kaunda's January 28 speech: "If you engage in diabolical activities against the state, spoiling and corrupting Zambians . . . then I pledge to deal with you very firmly and absolutely without mercy. Deportation will only be part of the firm action."

**END THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN ZAMBIA!
FREE LIONEL CLIFFE AND ALL OTHER POLITICAL
DETAINEES!**

February 1, 1976

THE NATIONAL FRONT

a bourgeois maneuver and its consequences

by **CARLOS RODRIGUEZ**

The Bonapartist regimes of Laureano Gómez and Rojas Pinilla, which held power in Colombia from 1950 to 1957, succeeded in opening the way to foreign investments in industry by according these investments excellent conditions. This was done through the state trade-unionism of the Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC — Workers Union of Colombia) and the Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC — Workers Federation of Colombia), which aimed at maintaining extremely low wage levels.

Under these conditions, industrial production costs were lowered so as to permit greater competitive capacity on foreign markets. This favored not only foreign capitalist industrialists, but also Colombian industrialists in the sectors of textiles, food products, carbonated beverages, beer, and clothing. Foreign capital penetrated the sectors of chemicals, pharmaceutical products, paper, and plastics, that is, all industry producing intermediary products. It was in these sectors that the greatest productive capacity of all industry was concentrated in an amalgam of interests between the Colombian bourgeoisie and foreign capital.

Nevertheless, these conservative Bonapartist regimes were marked above all by the big rise in coffee exports during the decade 1950-1960, a rise that guaranteed the support of the mountain peasants for the regime. The currency accumulated through coffee exports flowed into funds that were to fatten the coffers of a powerful financial bourgeoisie and satisfy the needs of small and middle-sized industry.

The basic problem of the Colombian bourgeoisie was the agrarian question. The backwardness of agriculture and the importance of agricultural products and agrarian production as a whole in the development of a neo-colonial capitalist economy determined the choices of the bourgeoisie, in relation both to its system of internal rule and to its links with imperialism. Liberal finance capital, linked to foreign investment in that it served as a transmission belt in raising national capital, could not afford to see its links to the countryside break down. During the decade 1950-1960 liberal landed

proprietors tacitly supported the liberal guerrillas of the eastern plains, Tolima, and the Cauca Valley, at least so long as these guerrillas did not attack the property system and acted solely as a sort of permanent guard for the landholders. Through the guerrillas in these regions, the liberal bourgeoisie succeeded in securing bargaining conditions that included the fall of the Rojas regime and the establishment of the National Front, with the two parties holding the presidency alternately and sharing out government posts. Thus, there was a Liberal president from 1958 to 1962, a Conservative one from 1963 to 1966, a Liberal from 1967 to 1970, a Conservative from 1971 to 1974, and finally, a Liberal since 1975.

The agreement was reached on the basis of the interests of the financial bourgeoisie, which bestowed its favors on the Conservatives through the rise in coffee exports and on the Liberals through intensive agriculture and ranching. In the first sector we find the Bank of Bogotá, led by the Ospina family; in the second the Bank of Colombia, headed by the López family. Politically, the agreement entailed the Liberals' abandoning the guerrillas and the Conservatives' cessation of support to violence in the coffee regions. This provided the basis for a conjunction of interests that were in harmony with the stabilization of an overall economic project and of a political project that involved the return to representative democracy through an extremely narrow system that allowed no other choice than Liberalism and Conservatism, while still relying on the effects of the strengthening of the organs of repression that had occurred during the Rojas period.

The Colombian Communist party, which did not understand what the liberal bourgeoisie really represented, was perplexed when confronted by a situation that could have impelled the struggles of workers and peasants toward assuring their political independence from the bourgeoisie. But it succeeded only in salvaging a faction of the peasant guerrilla movement in the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC — Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).

The working class, which came out of the industrialization process in a strongly controlled condition, remained the prisoner of its inexperience, of its lack of revolutionary leadership, and of the administration of bureaucrats bought off by the bourgeois state in order to control the radicalization of the workers. Since the National Front began with Lleras Camargo, the workers lost a good part of the gains they had been conceded by the López Pumarejo regime. The working class lost rights it had not even begun to utilize, like the unlimited right to strike, and even the minimal right to strike such as existed in the banking sector.

The National Front was formed around three major axes: the consolidation of finance capital, which included the leading sector of the Colombian bourgeoisie; the development of an industrial base of production of intermediary goods in liaison with imperialist capital (on the basis of imperialist capital's tendency to link itself to the manufacturing sector in Latin America), and, last but not least, the attenuation of the polarization in the agricultural sector between production of coffee and production of cash crops like cotton, rice, sorghum, and other high-yield crops. These three axes were closely linked to one another, from which derived the necessity of rationalizing state activity through programs generalizing the state's intervention in the economy. But not only did the agrarian situation suffer from the traditional evils, there was also a constant deepening of the contradiction between the agrarian sector and industry. During the 1960s, the growth rate in the agrarian sector was only 3%, while the size of investment in machines and equipment as a percentage of total gross investment in all industry rose to 33.6% and an industrial growth rate of 6% was maintained.

According to recent figures, "in the Colombian manufacturing industry the greatest growth rates have been achieved in industries in which the dominant firms are owned by foreign capital, which allows us to conclude that the process of industrial expansion has been accompanied by the denationalization of industry. During the period 1958-68 the percentage share of foreign firms in the gross domestic product in manufacturing industry has risen." (Gabriel Misas, Degree of Concentration in Manufacturing Industry.)

Although there is a quantitative predominance of national capital per factory unit, the foreign companies surpass the national enterprises in terms of capital intensity. In general, industry tended to be concentrated in the intermediary goods sector. The sector of industry that has experienced the most rapid rate of development has been construction (where national capital is mainly concentrated), with an investment of 60% in machinery and equipment, compared with an average of 33.6% for industry as a whole.

Two striking facts emerge from an examination of the relations between the financial and industrial sectors. Capital markets have not functioned around stock-exchange values, which is the mechanism by which indus-

try appropriates public savings in order to convert them into investment capital. The decline of the stock market has been constant, and industry has had to resort to bank loans in order to support itself. Nevertheless, in the framework of the program of replacing imports and protecting industry, the state ordered a ceiling on interest rates, which remained at about 24% per year. The difficulties of industry in obtaining credit through the stock market were transferred to the financial sector, which had to maintain a cheap credit policy and thus found itself caught in a straitjacket as far as obtaining savings funds was concerned. Through a policy of growth of consumption, industry was able to maintain certain levels of stability and even growth, to the detriment of the accumulation of finance capital.

The low interest rates offered industrialists good possibilities of increasing the organic composition of capital



Colombian bank workers strike for higher wages.

try in their enterprises and thus of increasing productivity without resorting to additional hiring. From another angle, inflation favored the industrialists, who paid off their industrial loans with depreciated money. In general terms, it can be concluded that during the period of the National Front there was a tendency toward a reduction of the relative weight of finance capital compared with that of industrial capital; but in any event, it must be noted that the latter continued to trail after the former, and all that was needed to turn the balance definitively in favor of finance capital was a change in financial policy.

For its part, the state played a clear role defending industry through labor legislation, wage freezes, the maintenance of rigid interest rates, and subsidies to export industries through the CAT (certificates of fiscal payment), which deducted a portion of industrial taxes in negotiable instruments. It is certain that finance capital was among the most favored by state policy, since bank employees were exempted from the minimum wage, which kept wage levels in the banking sector well below those prevailing in the other sectors of economic activity.

Political consequences of the National Front

When the National Front began, the Liberal party was best equipped politically. It represented the landed proprietors and the financiers, who were grouped together in a bloc, and had the support of large numbers of workers in the urban areas, who had been hard hit by the conservative regimes and were discontented with their employers. The Conservatives, who represented the dominant economic sectors (finance capital linked to industry), had the support of the mountain peasants, who formed a great portion, but not a majority, of the electorate.

Liberalism ordered a parody of an agrarian reform that essentially favored the landed proprietors; the Conservatives supported the reform, since it did not affect industrial interests and maintained a low level of development in the countryside. Behind the Liberal agrarian reform proposal lurked the intention to create an export economy in the countryside, the aim being to replace coffee with saleable goods produced by the landed proprietors who supported the Liberals. The promotion of the export of cotton, rice, and sesame, and the impetus given to the commercialization of meat were among the basic elements during the period 1966-70 under the Lleras Restrepo government.

The rationalization of the state with the 1968 reform aimed not only at a relative stabilization of the relations between the state and the private sector, but also at assembling political and economic resources for the state through increasing taxes. The creation of the National Savings Fund with the pensions of employees in the public sector and the abortive attempt to create Regional Capitalization Funds out of the pensions of the workers of the private sector represented an attempt to construct a state that could intervene in the economic domain. Thus, Liberalism succeeded in developing roots among sectors of the middle peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, which were encouraged by the "statist" policy, which was myopically considered a sign of the weakening of the capitalist sectors.

For their part, during the rule of their most repressive government, that of Misael Pastrana Borrero, the Conservatives made a turn in their protectionist policy toward basic industry. A regression to the conception of "Operation Colombia" occurred within the framework of optimal conditions for investment in the construction industry. The Ospina family, which also has interests in urban real estate, gave important support to the construction industry: the creation of the UPAC (units of constant purchasing power), through which finance capital converted itself into an intermediary between savings at interest rates readjusted to the increase of inflation and investment in the construction of housing units, the costs of which were assumed by the customers.

The world crisis

Colombian capitalism is in chronic crisis. The balance-sheet of the National Front corresponds to what could

be achieved under a completely dependent social formation with a "national" bourgeoisie that is unable to act alone but only hand in hand with imperialism. No matter how much the "patricians" seek to present an attractive face to the masses, the masses can only meet this flattery with a grimace of disgust. Per capita exports are among the lowest of the continent, which displeases the bourgeoisie; wages are among the lowest of the continent, which displeases the laboring masses. The industrialization on which the growth of the intermediary-goods sector is based concentrates capital that provides few jobs, since technical innovations were used which increase productivity and reduce utilization of labor.

The industrialization plan fell short of the goals set. In spite of its slow growth, the agricultural sector remains at the head of exports, according to the following figures:

	Agricultural exports as % of total exports	Coffee exports as % of total exports
1970	80.1	63.8
1971	76.5	56.5
1972	69.2	49.3
1973	64.4	48.5

(Source: Bank of the Republic, ANIF calculations.)

Actually, industrial growth surpassed the agricultural sector in relative terms, while in absolute terms the share of the agricultural sector in gross domestic product declined from 37.8% to 26% between 1950 and 1973. During the same period, while total gross product grew 217%, gross agricultural product grew only 118%.

The diagnosis also indicates the effects on industry of the strengthening of the intermediary-products sector, which, in spite of its high productivity, did not create new jobs and which, moreover, utilizes a great quantity

López Michelsen



of raw materials and other imported components. On the other hand, the mass consumer goods sector created many jobs, since the organic composition of capital is much lower in this sector, and consumed a much lower imported component.

The world crisis, which presents the features characteristic of a recession in the advanced capitalist countries, accentuates the inequalities of foreign trade, with a decline in export revenues for raw materials and the closing off of foreign markets because of the protectionist measures taken in imperialist countries. In face of this concrete situation, the choices of the Colombian bourgeoisie were as follows:

1. Abandon the industrialization project in the intermediary-goods sector.

All López Michelson's propaganda was based on the fact that statistics showed the negative aspects of the intermediary-goods sector, its inability to develop because of the closing off of foreign markets. This was a result of an objective situation. But López Michelson used this situation to develop a factional struggle against the industrial bourgeoisie. First he launched a campaign against the stimulants that were protecting industry and eliminated some of them, such as the CAT; he broadened the tax base of industry; and finally, he developed an ideological campaign against the "monopolization" of industry.

Of course, there was no question of breaking with the industrial bourgeoisie, far from it, but rather of submitting to the interests of the financial faction. The government protects the industrialists as far as their relations with wage-labor are concerned, maintaining iron legislation in the social domain, authorizing layoffs in a hidden manner.

2. Establishment of a "realistic" policy for industry and agriculture.

The plan of social, economic, and regional development, paradoxically entitled "To Heal the Breach," places special emphasis on agriculture, under the pretext that it has "now" been converted to the sphere of the bourgeoisie, that agriculture produces about 30% of domestic product, that about 80% of the total value of exports comes from agriculture and livestock, and that this same sector provides about 50% of the raw materials used by industry. ("Para cerrar la brecha," *Planación Nacional*, p. 27.)

As for the agrarian sector, the plan begins from the fact that there is a division in the countryside between traditional agriculture, which includes the majority of the peasant population, which lives under conditions of backwardness and poverty, and the so-called modern agricultural sector, which is engaged in production of cotton, sesame, soya, etc., mainly for export. The plan stresses the necessity of offering credit and market facilities to the "traditional" sector and of giving an important impetus to production for export.

Thus, the point is to create two complementary economies in the countryside, one producing for domestic consumption, the other for foreign markets:

The financing of this plan has been undertaken by the World Bank and its agencies. About \$200 million has been allotted for generating a productivity increase among the poor peasants in the countryside and for developing technical facilities in the agricultural export sector. Needless to say, the World Bank, directed by MacNamara, is especially interested in such plans throughout the underdeveloped world, partly in order to create an effective complementary base for industrial production in the imperialist countries and partly in order to prevent the peasant revolt from provoking "another Vietnam," which cost North American imperialism so dearly.

The plans for the traditional agricultural sector are being stimulated through the DRI (Integrated Rural Development), which concentrates all the financial, technical, and educational means of the sector of agricultural production destined for domestic consumption; there is also an attempt to organize the peasantry into cooperatives and communal associations set up by the government, with an obvious political aim. If the plan seems to have lent priority to the poor peasantry, the real economic benefits will be reaped by the landed proprietors who control the cash crops and are in the best position to seize the advantages that derive not only from the greater export revenues but also from the increases in prices on the domestic market that result from the monopoly on these crops, which has been guaranteed them by the state.

As for industry, the emphasis has been placed on small and middle-sized industry through credit and state assistance in the realm of technological innovation. The point is to develop the consumer goods industry and food products through credit and technical advances.

While this plan for small and middle-sized industry is developing, monopolist industry has oriented itself toward particular productive sectors such as automobiles, petrochemicals, and steel. This complementary character of industry will accentuate inequalities; the most dynamic sectors will be given an impetus through enormous factories (which already exist) in the three above-mentioned sectors, creating a narrow sector controlling the greatest portion of productive capacity and leaving food, drinks, and textiles as bases of development for small and middle-sized industries.

3. Concentration of state powers.

The strengthening of the national state through the executive is a continental strategy that has specific features within each country. In the context of the Colombian nation, these specific features come together in a basic element: the strengthening of the financial faction of the bourgeoisie.

Within the financial faction, there are subfactions. The first corresponds to the interests that are very closely

linked to the industries of national private capital; it is this faction that has maintained a policy of low interest rates for industrialists. This subfaction has also advanced the creation of the UPAC as flux mechanisms between savings and investment in construction. In the financial sector, the present situation is characterized by the predominance of interests that lean toward the strengthening of the banking system within this sector through the placement of forward deposit certificates at "realistic" interest rates linked to the monetary correction of the UPAC in order to bring their capacity to attract savings into line with the accounts controlled by the banks, increases in interest rates on these same savings accounts, through increases in interest rates on these same savings accounts, and through the investment in emergency semiannual loans and development bonds. These latter two elements, which flow into the government's accounts, are intimately linked to the others, which flow into the accounts of the banks. It is no accident that financial policy occupies first position in the plan, nor that the bourgeoisie presents an impressive consensus, not only within the banking system but also in relation to the government plans.

The credit mechanisms adopted are intended to stimulate the development of industry with a very high level of concentration of capital and technique, industries that are consequently monopolist. A good part of the sectors of intermediary industry will find their credit resources reduced, and since it will be impossible for them to get funds from the stock market, they will remain backward.

The Liberal policy in command

The economic panorama presents a picture of clear Liberal hegemony resting on the interests of finance capital in alliance with the capitalists of the agrarian sector and big industry. What remains of Conservatism are the electoral votes that the Conservatives have attracted in the coffee zones up to now; but the peasantry of these regions, which is integrated into the DRI, threatens to turn to the Liberals. The entire Liberal project may be characterized as "thinking a little" about agriculture and industry but "thinking a lot" about the leading role that must be played in this process by the bankers, landed proprietors, and big industrialists. The polarization of the economy into well-differentiated wholes fits in with the Colombian bourgeoisie's desire to absorb the shock of the world crisis of capitalism and provide a more solid leadership for the critical processes. The calls for "Colombianization" of the banks and the insistence on Andean capital, which limits foreign intervention, are part and parcel of the process of the Colombian bourgeoisie's readjustment to the crisis.

It would be wrong to believe that the liberal bourgeoisie is trying to develop a program of independence from imperialism. Just the opposite. The point is to reduce the sector that can negotiate with imperialism, to the detriment of the interests of the masses and even of some sectors of the bourgeoisie. In the case of the latter, it is important to note that although they have been hit by the Liberal policy, their reactions tend toward the right,

against social demands and against socialism and communism, as has already been seen in the case of the industrial circles of Antioquia. This sector is the last remnant that remains in the Conservative party, which is divided over whether to support industrial capital in the intermediary-goods sector or to support the policy of the Liberal government. This is what accounts for the split of J. Emilio Valderrama from conservative progressivism and the divisions now taking shape within the faction of the Ospina family.

In the countryside, the attitude of the peasants will be divided between the wait-and-see stance of the minifundistas of the regions affected by the DRI and the total support of the landed proprietors and ranchers to the government measures. Although the latter may at some time withdraw their support of the Liberals and shift to the ANAPO (which explains the growth of this movement in the peasant regions integrated into intensive agriculture), for the moment they remain adherents of the policy of López Michelson.

Perspectives

The plan set in motion by López Michelson's policy would lead to a "rational" capitalist expansion if the factors of capitalist development were all located within the country and if internal development itself did not engender contradictions. One of the bases of capitalist development is inequality between the capitalist process in the advanced countries and that in the so-called underdeveloped countries, between agriculture and industry, and between various sectors of industry. The emphasis placed by the Colombian bourgeoisie on subsistence agriculture and the direct consumer goods industry represents no more or less than a sanctioning of backwardness and of the breadth of the gap between Colombia and the advanced capitalist countries. This does not mean that there is a regression to a semifeudal conception of the development of the Colombian social formation. Capitalism will deepen in agriculture and in the cities themselves, but it will be a capitalism controlled by the monopolist interests of the capitalists of the countryside, the big industrialists, and, above all, the knights of finance.

Unemployment in the cities exceeds 12% for men and 19% for women. Massive layoffs in industry and the banks have been matched by similar measures in public administration, the aim being to rationalize economic activity. The intent is to drive down the wage levels of the workers in the consumer-goods industry and to lower the standard of living of the peasants engaged in subsistence agriculture. It is the typical mechanism of capitalism during a crisis: Make the workers bear the costs. The state protects itself from the fiscal deficit by printing money with no backing. The banks protect themselves from inflation through the UPAC and profitable interest rates. Industry protects itself from the recession through price increases and massive layoffs. The full weight of inflation and the other effects of the crisis is borne by the workers of the cities and the countryside. □

ANTI-ZIONISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

ABSTAIN	AGAINST	FOR
ARGENTINA	AUSTRALIA	AFGHANISTAN
BHUTAN	AUSTRIA	ALBANIA
BOLIVIA	BAHAMAS	ALGERIA
BOTSWANA	BARBADOS	BAHRAIN
BURMA	BELGIUM	BANGLADESH
CHILE	CANADA	BRAZIL
COLUMBIA	CEN. AFR. REP.	BULGARIA
ECUADOR	COSTA RICA	BURUNDI
ETHIOPIA	DENMARK	BYELORUSSIA
GABON	DOMINICAN REP.	CAMBODIA
GHANA	EL SALVADOR	CAMEROON
GREECE	FIJI	CAPE VERDE
GUATEMALA	FINLAND	CHAD
JAMAICA	FRANCE	CHINA
JAPAN	GERMANY (WEST)	CONGO
KENYA	HAITI	CUBA
LESOTHO	HONDURAS	CYPRUS
MAURITIUS	ICELAND	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
NEPAL	IRELAND	DAHOMY
PAPUA-NEW GUIN.	ISRAEL	EGYPT
PARAGUAY	ITALY	EQ. GUINEA
PERU	IVORY COAST	GAMBIA
PHILIPPINES	LIBERIA	GERMANY (EAST)
SIERRA LEONE	LUXEMBOURG	GRENADA
SINGAPORE	MALAWI	GUINEA
THAILAND	NETHERLANDS	GUINEA-BISSAU
TOGO	NEW ZEALAND	GUYANA
TRINIDAD/TOB.	NICARAGUA	HUNGARY
UPPER VOLTA	NORWAY	INDIA
VENEZUELA	PANAMA	INDONESIA
ZAIRE	SWAZILAND	IRAN
ZAMBIA	SWEDEN	IRAQ
	UNITED KINGDOM	JORDAN
	UNITED STATES	KUWAIT
	URUGUAY	LAOS
		LEBANON
		LIBYA
		MADAGASCAR
		MALAYSIA
		MALDIVES
		MALI
		MALTA
		MADRITANIA
		MEXICO
		MONGOLIA
		MOROCCO
		MOZAMBIQUE
		NIGER
		NIGERIA
		OMAN
		PAKISTAN
		POLAND
		PORTUGAL
		QATAR
		RWANDA
		S. TOME/PRINCIPE
		SAUDI ARABIA
		SENEGAL
		SOMALIA
		SRI LANKA
		SUDAN
		STRIA
		TANZANIA
		TUNISIA
		TURKEY
		UGANDA
		UKRAINE
		U.S.S.R.
		U.A. EMIRATES
		YEMEN
		YEMEN (SOUTHERN)
		YUGOSLAVIA

by **NATHAN WEINSTOCK**

1. Few United Nations resolutions have generated as much passion in the West as the November 11, 1975, resolution of the General Assembly on Zionism. It would be simplistic to consider this purely as a result of the pressure of the pro-Zionist lobby on the mass media, although it is true that the influence of this lobby is not negligible, especially in the United States. The UN decision — or rather, as we shall see, the manner in which the decision has been presented — gen-

erated great emotion among a broad sector of public opinion and in particular in the workers movement, especially but not exclusively in Social Democratic circles. It thus offers a good opportunity to take a look at the attitude of western "public opinion" on the question of Zionism.

2. Let us say straightaway that for the majority of people in the West the question of Zionism is confounded with the Jewish question. First of all because a minimum of political education is required to know that all Jews are not Zionists, that Israelis and "Israelites" are two different things, and still more education to understand the process of the Zionist colonization. Second, because Israeli propaganda and the leaders of the Jewish communities attempt to give credence to the idea that Jew equals Zionist, and they are often aided in this by governmental Arab propaganda with racist overtones.

Now, since the fall of the Third Reich, racism has become discredited as an avowed ideology and anti-Semitism is taboo. There is much ambiguity in this "immunity" that has been accorded the Jews. The scandalous treatment reserved for the Gypsies, another people victimized by Nazi genocide, suffices to demonstrate this. And the success of the campaigns of an Enoch Powell in Britain or a James Schwarzenbach in Switzerland also proves that there is a very real risk of foreign workers' becoming the target of a fascist campaign. But this has not prevented the Jews from constituting a sort of bad conscience for the West on the question of racism. Someone may admit that he "can't stand" the Arabs or the Blacks, but would not dare say the same of the Jews. In addition, the struggle against anti-Semitism has given rise to antifascist consciousness (the two French, anti-racist movements, for example, have conserved in their names specific reference to the fight against anti-Semitism). Thus, the struggle against anti-Semitism is part of an antifascist leftist tradition. This discrediting of open anti-Semitism explains why the actual anti-Jewish purge in Poland after 1967 was waged in the name of "anti-Zionism," while during the time of Stalin anti-Semitism was practiced under the cover of the struggle against "chauvinism" or "cosmopolitanism."

3. The pro-Israeli bias that is so clearly felt in western public opinion and in western media is evidently the corollary of the desire, highly laudable in itself, to perpetuate the antifascist spirit. But there are other causes of this emotional atmosphere. Rejection of anti-Semitism is also an affirmation of antifascism that has been put to good use and has sometimes even served as an alibi for genuine racism in that the designated victims of racism during the postwar period have been the colonial peoples and the immigrant workers rather than the Jews.

"Philosemitism" has even been used as a justification for anti-Arab racism or colonial oppression, particularly during the Algerian war. And this sheds light on another aspect of the pro-Zionism peddled by the mass media: To be pro-Israeli is to support a bastion of colonialist

inspiration, an attitude that flows quite logically from colonialist and Eurocentric traditions. It is also an emotional identification that in the final analysis implies a choice in favor of imperialism and against the oppressed. (This was especially evident when the Zionist leaders tried to cool down certain critics of the war in Vietnam out of fear of jeopardizing American aid to Israel.) The pro-Israeli fanaticism of the Social Democratic right is in harmony with its "Atlanticism."

4. The bastion of pro-Zionist opinion is obviously represented by the organized Jewish communities. Structurally, these communities have undergone a sort of mutation. First of all, Polish Judaism, the majority of which had been won to the reformist but anti-Nazi Bund, was exterminated, and the Bund along with it. In the two other great centers of Judaism, the United States and the Soviet Union, the Jewish workers movement has also disappeared. In both countries the Jewish workers have lost their collective specificity and have gradually dissolved into the mass of the proletariat (in the USSR Stalinist repression "activated" this process by physically liquidating Jewish workers' leaders and suppressing the press of the Jewish workers movement). In the major capitalist states the Jewish community has gone through a process of social climbing that has entailed the rapid assimilation of the Jewish workers by the petty bourgeoisie and of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie by the middle bourgeoisie. This sociological evolution is at the root of the political shift of the political organizations of the Jewish community from center-left to rightist positions.

Here again, alignment with Israel — facilitated by the disappearance of the Jewish workers movement, which had constituted an organized anti-Zionist base — logically implies open support to imperialism. The appearance of fascistic Jewish groups like the Jewish Defense League in the United States is characteristic in this regard. It also reflects, of course, as does adherence to Zionist ideology, the frustrations and fears of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie.

5. Let us now broach the problem raised by the UN resolution. Is Zionism racist?

To pose the problem in that way is not correct. Zionism is a movement of colonial expansion, belated and even anachronistic, a *sui generis* colonial movement because it aimed at displacing the Palestinians rather than exploiting them. Like every variety of colonialism, it rules by virtue of the implicit postulate that the rights of the colon take precedence over those of the indigenous people. When the Zionist leaders invoke the "historical rights of the Jewish people," they are simply rationalizing their colonial practice, the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinians. In other words, Zionism is racist not in the sense that the Israeli governments openly proclaim an ideology defining the Arabs as subhuman (on the contrary, for obvious reasons they claim to be partisans of equality of rights for all), but in that all colonialism supposes a racist practice. It is sufficient to coolly ana-

lyze what happens in Israel to be convinced that in this sense Zionism is obviously racist. When the government speaks of "peopling" the regions of Galilee that have remained predominantly Palestinian, or when it speaks, more honestly, of "Judaizing" Galilee, is that not racism? (Who would dare to speak of "Aryanizing" Scotland or Frisia?) When then Prime Minister Golda Meir confessed that she was losing sleep over the birth rate of the Arabs in Israel (her own citizens, supposedly!), was that not racist language? (Imagine François Mitterrand evoking the birth rate of Algerian immigrant workers in such terms!) It is well known that 90 percent of the land in Israel is managed by the Jewish National Fund, which requires, as a principle, that only Jews settle on that land. One could continue to cite examples, all of which can be summed up as follows: The whole Zionist project consisting of implanting a purely Jewish state on Arab land falls within this spirit.

6. Moreover, this is what is said in sum by the resolution of the UN General Assembly, only the last phrase of which is generally quoted — "declares that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination" — forgetting that this conclusion is justified mainly by reference to the resolution adopted in Kampala in July 1975 by the chiefs of state and governments of the Organization of African Unity. This resolution judged that "the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, given that they form a whole, that they have the same racist structure, and that they are organically linked in their policy." It is understandable that the Zionist lobby prefers to become indignant that Zionism could be labelled as racism rather than to try to explain how Israel, particularly in its present de facto borders, differs from Rhodesia.

The UN vote cannot be explained solely on the basis of "petrodollars," as some have affirmed. It corresponds to a gradual transformation of the General Assembly, within which the "third world" now has a large majority and imperialism has lost its "automatic majority." These states feel with irritation that western pro-Zionism is the logical perpetuation of a colonialism from which they have long suffered and which has been protected and supported by the imperialist West in Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique in the past and continues to be supported in Rhodesia, South Africa, and Israel today.

The third world, which has no anti-Jewish massacres for which to excuse itself but which has suffered in great measure from colonialism, has difficulty understanding why western public opinion is so reluctant to fully admit what is really going on inside the borders of Israel.

In this sense, the General Assembly resolution is the logical extension of the Bandung conference of the 1950s, which symbolized the awakening of the previously colonized peoples. Even at that time, Israel was excluded while the Palestinians were represented by an observer. And as long ago as that, the conference called for the right of self-determination for the Palestinians.



SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE IRISH PEOPLE!

The February 13, 1976, meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International has learned with anger that Frank Stagg, Irish political prisoner, has died in a British jail from the effects of his long hunger strike. The Fourth International salutes the heroic protest and struggle of Frank Stagg as yet another incident in the struggle to free Ireland from the domination of British imperialism.

The death of Frank Stagg was cynically brought about in cold blood by the Labour government. Instead of releasing Frank Stagg from solitary confinement and granting him political status by transferring him to the Six Counties, the government preferred that he die.

This crime against the Irish people is yet another confirmation of the anti-working-class character of the Labour government and of its role as servant of British imperialism against the Irish, British, and international working class.

But the death of Frank Stagg is also a sign that after nine centuries of British oppression, after suffering countless martyrs, and after seven years of the current struggle in the north of Ireland, the spirit of resistance to British imperialism lives on undaunted among the Irish masses. Despite the presence of more than 15,000 British troops, despite the presence of the notorious torturers and murderers of the SAS, despite the harassment, brutalization, and repression of the masses, the struggle goes on.

Frank Stagg has not died in vain. His death will redouble the efforts of the Irish masses in their struggle against the imperialist aggressor; it will redouble the determination of all socialists and militants in Britain and throughout the international working class in the fight for solidarity with the struggle of the Irish masses, of all those fighting to drive British imperialism out of Ireland. The Fourth International calls for full solidarity with its British and other sections in their tasks of developing a mass struggle for the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland and with its Irish section, the Revolutionary Marxist Group, in its struggle for an Irish workers republic.

The IEC of the Fourth International expresses its complete sympathy with the relatives and Republican comrades of Frank Stagg and its militant solidarity with all those fighting for the liberation of Ireland.

RELEASE ALL IRISH POLITICAL PRISONERS!
BRITISH TROOPS OUT OF IRELAND NOW!
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE IRISH PEOPLE!