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WITCHHUNT IN WEST GERMANY

EAST TIMOR: TOWARD

A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE





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Kaunda & Vorster

Zambia:

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

by JOHN BLAIR

For revolutionary Marxists in Africa the Angolan civil war is of crucial importance for two reasons:

1. As is underlined in the declaration of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (INPRECOR, No.39, December 4, 1975) and in the article by C. Gabriel (No.38, November 20, 1975), the struggle of the MPLA has set an internal dynamic in motion. Insofar as the MPLA is based on the most advanced sections of the proletarian and peasant population of the country and is forced by the very demands of the ongoing war to ensure a high level of mobilization of that population, the MPLA leadership, despite its thoroughly petty-bourgeois character, cannot avoid opening up at least a possibility of the struggle developing in an anticapitalist direction. If the coming months do in fact see the deepening of organs of popular power and control in Angola, even in the most partial and initially unstructured fashion, this will be of tremendous significance.

First, it will ensure that whatever weight imperialism is able to bring to bear on the situation through U.S. handouts to Mobutu and the direct intervention of the racist regime in South Africa, there will be no question of a purely military victory able to guarantee the long-term stability of a neocolonialist regime in Angola. Second, a struggle marked by the development of such organs can provide the populations of the states of the rest of black Africa with an example of the development of mass involvement in struggle and of embryonic dual power, historically virtually unknown on the continent.

2. The Angolan struggle is bringing the political contours of neocolonialist Africa into sharp relief in a way that can be more effective than a thousand pages of polemic in exposing the class nature of these regimes. These have relied on a smokescreen of "African socialism," "humanism," "authenticity," etc. in order more effectively to continue playing their role as junior partners of imperialism in the exploitation of the masses of Africa. But the current interventions being made quite openly by Washington and Pretoria have forced several of these regimes to abandon their camouflage in a fashion that will prove quite educational for the African masses.

It is already possible to draw some conclusions. At least two of Africa's neocolonialist regimes have clearly cast off any pretensions of independence from imperialism.

In the case of Zaire, it has long since been evident that the Mobutu regime was U.S. imperialism's most reliable ally in the area. The FNLA, led by Mobutu's brother-in-law, Holden Roberto, has been receiving covert aid from the U.S. government for many years. Now the American government openly admits its support to that movement, and Ford and Kissinger are engaged in a campaign to obtain reversal of the Congress decision of December, which blocked this help. In addition, it was clear that the eightfold increase in U.S.

military aid to Zaire announced in November was aimed at strengthening Zaire's Angolan intervention. The latter is now well documented. The FNLA has always had its main power base among the Bakongo peoples who straddle the border between Angola and Zaire. Hence, it has often been difficult to ascertain the exact origin of many of the FNLA fighters. But recent reports from Angola itself (for example, an interview on November 10 with South African mercenaries captured by the MPLA, reported in the November 16 Times of Zambia) affirm that half of Roberto's army is now composed of Zairois regulars. In addition, Mobutu has for many years provided a base for the totally ineffective FLEC (Front for the Liberation of Cabinda) in an attempt to break that oil rich territory away from Angola and annex it to Zaire.

In this situation it is the most blatant hypocrisy for the Mobutu government to talk incessantly of its commitment to the principle of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola. For ten years now the Mobutu regime has been the main transmission belt for the attempt to maintain U.S. imperialist interests in Angola, while at the same time maneuvering for a special kickback in the form of Cabinda and its oil wealth.



Mobutu

But if Mobutu's current hypocrisy on Angola merely provides further confirmation of an already well established trend in the evolution of the Zairois regime, that of the Kenneth Kaunda government in Zambia is of apparently more recent origin. During ten years of the liberation war, Zambia gave logistic and diplomatic support to the MPLA. But this has changed dramatically during the past eighteen months. First, a consistent campaign was waged for a whole period on behalf of Jonas Savimbi, the man whose charismatic personality would unite the country's strife-ridden peoples. Of late, the public line has changed somewhat. The Zambian newspapers have now placed Savimbi in the same garbage can as Neto and Roberto, and Angola is said to be awaiting the emergence of a leader with sufficient foresight and capacity to unite the three warring move-

ments. At the OAU summit in January, Kaunda was the foremost figure of the tendency that moralized about the need for unity, totally ignoring the class nature and support of the forces involved and shedding crocodile tears aplenty for the population of Angola, which is supposedly suffering purely as a result of the misleadership of three power-hungry and bloodthirsty warriors.

Why the Zambian turn

But all the rhetoric (and the waterworks, which are a well-established part of Kaunda's platform style) will not be capable of covering up the fact that Zambia's line on Angola does not stem from any concern for the fate of that country's people, nor from any noble "humanist" motives, but from the tactical turn the Zambian ruling group has made in the past eighteen months, a turn that has transformed the country into imperialism's most reliable ally among the black-ruled states of central and southern Africa. Three main factors lie behind the present position of the Kaunda regime:

1. The appreciation of the fact, to which we have already drawn attention, that the potential effects of the ongoing struggles in Angola cannot be contained within the boundaries of that country, and that they therefore constitute a threat to the preservation of capitalist stability not only in Angola but also in neighboring territories.
2. A deep-rooted fear of the consequences for the state of South Africa itself of any ongoing struggles in the region. As we suggested more than a year ago (see INPRECOR, No.14/15, December 12, 1974), the governments of neocolonialist regimes like that in Zambia, despite their verbal commitment to the ending of apartheid, are in fact well aware that because of imperialism's deep-rooted investment in that system, apartheid will be destroyed only as a result of struggles that will necessarily go beyond the question of race and will threaten the very existence of capitalist property relations. Any prolonged mass struggle in the region can serve as an example and inspiration to the oppressed layers inside South Africa itself and thus could potentially plunge the entire region into continual anticapitalist battles.
3. At the present time, the Zambian regime is undergoing what is acknowledged, even by government spokespersons, as its most deep-going economic crisis since independence. The economy depends on copper for 40 percent of its gross national product and more than 90 percent of its export earnings. This commodity has slumped in price since the middle of 1974 as a direct result of the international recession of the capitalist economy. The average price for the first eight months of 1974 was 1,541 Kwacha per ton; for the same period of 1975 it was K812 (1 Kwacha = US\$1.40). At a press conference held January 17, 1976, the chairmen of the two government-controlled copper companies revealed that for the eight-month period April-November 1975,



the Angolan struggle is bringing the political contours of neocolonial Africa into sharp relief

production costs were K896 per ton, yet the metal had fetched an average price of only K773 per ton (Times of Zambia, January 8, 1976). Thus, not only had copper failed to provide Zambia with any revenue through taxation, profits, etc., but in addition its production and sale had constituted a net loss to the economy of at least K40 million during that period.

The economic crisis and Zambian "independence"

The economic effects of this halving of Zambia's export earnings have been compounded by the transport difficulties arising from the Angolan war. Until it was closed in August 1975, the Benguela railway to the port of Lobito carried roughly 45 percent of Zambian trade. The most noticeable consequence of the shutdown of the railway has been a further worsening of the endemic problems of short supplies of all kinds. At the consumer level, such basic commodities as matches, soap powder, toilet rolls, cooking oil, etc. are virtually unobtainable. More seriously, there has been a

dramatic effect on jobs in industries such as textiles and light engineering, which are heavily dependent on imported supplies.

It is this third factor that has determined the timing of the government's present moves. The year 1975, a year of world recession, marked the conclusive failure of the attempt, initiated in the late 1960s, to reduce Zambia's links with white-ruled "Rhodesia" and South Africa, which at the time of independence in 1964 accounted for more than 60 percent of imports. For a whole period the Kaunda government staked everything on trying to break away from this economic dependence on the southern African subsector of the imperialist world. At the same time, attempts were made to create an "independent" industrial base. But far from being crowned with success, these attempts simply wound up exchanging one set of economic masters for another. Thus, Japan became the second largest trading partner and Italy a key source of investment.

These moves, especially those that involved the setting up of a number of enterprises in which the state held a predominant share in partnership with a variety of im-

perialist multinational companies, were designed primarily to stabilize the position of Zambia's new political elite by also giving it decisive economic weight. But the actual results can be quickly summarized:

* The industrial sector has remained stagnant. Employment there increased only from 40,620 in June 1971 to 43,130 in June 1974, and if figures were available for the past year, they would doubtless show that the figure has begun to slide again;

* Since import substitution has not been successful in any significant field, the only effect of Zambia's "re-orientation" of its trading links has been to increase the prices of commodities, many of which come from afar at considerably greater cost than when they were imported from the white south.

For the Zambian bourgeoisie, of course, self-preservation is a consideration that weighs much more heavily than economic independence. If the latter cannot be achieved and if dependence on metropolitan capitalism is more costly than the re-establishment of the former relationship with white-ruled southern Africa, and if, in addition, the world economic crisis has brought the economy to an all time low, then to hell with all the high-blown rhetoric about principled opposition to apartheid! Sink or swim with Vorster! This appears the safest option and indeed the only one capable of delaying the inevitable confrontation with the working masses of a country that is suffering in such a devastating fashion from the effects of recession and inflation.

It is only when we take these economic factors into account that we can fully understand the Zambian regime's present position on Angola. It is necessary to state quite plainly that Zambia's claims of holding a neutral position are no less hypocritical than the claims of Mobutu.

Positions on Angola

The public overthrow of Savimbi from the position of favored son has not at all been reflected in practice. In November correspondents traveling in a jet supplied by the Lonrho corporation from Lusaka airport to Huambo in UNITA-held territory found themselves accompanying crates of arms that were addressed to Zambia's ruling party, the UNIP, but clearly destined for the UNITA forces. On January 7 Savimbi, on his way to Addis Ababa, stopped over in Lusaka for "consultations" with his sponsors. UNITA remains the Angolan movement that is granted broadcast time on Radio Zambia. Thus, the Zambian regime is the de facto ally of Savimbi's main sponsors of the past five months, the racist Republic of South Africa.

For a whole period (until early December), the Zambian media maintained silence about the mounting evidence of direct South African involvement in support of the FNLA-UNITA bloc. Now — only after the South African

government has itself acknowledged the intervention — it is conceded to exist. But instead of condemnation, in the Zambian press we read only explanation of and justification for that presence. Here is what was said by the editor-in-chief of the government-controlled Zambia Daily Mail in a center-page article published January 7 (under the title: "Vincent Mijoni forcefully puts forward Zambia's viewpoint"):

"President Kaunda last week put it aptly in an interview to a foreign correspondent: 'The United States arms help for FNLA and UNITA is an effect of the situation not the cause.' And if the OAU will do justice to the people of Angola it must condemn the Soviet military assistance to the MPLA on a scale which gave encouragement to the MPLA to defy the other two political parties to the extent that it plunged Angola into a civil war. . . . It was because of this miscalculation on the part of the Soviets together with their badly timed adventure that has been responsible for the South Africans moving into Angola."

Later, Kaunda is once again quoted as saying:

"Much as we condemn the South African presence in Angola we cheat ourselves if we think that by condemning South Africa we are settling things. The South African presence too is an effect of the problem and not the cause."

The payoff

These are the fawning words of the leading representative of the pitifully weak Zambian bourgeoisie as he seeks to cover up for the intervention of his new-found masters. The payoff for Kaunda's betrayal of Angola's anti-imperialist fighters is the operation being mounted by South Africa to bail out the Zambian economy, no details of which have appeared in the Zambian press, of course. However, the December 20 Economist reported:

"South Africa's minister of economic affairs, Mr. J.C. Heunis, visited the Zambian capital in October and arranged an export credit deal with the Zambian government worth up to £71m — equivalent to about one quarter of Zambia's current import bill. Mr. Jan Marais, a leading South African banker . . . visited Lusaka at the end of October and held extremely fruitful discussions with President Kaunda about the 'tremendous advantages' to be derived from economic co-operation in southern Africa. And the South African Financial Mail reported in November that South Africa is now believed to be Zambia's most important foreign supplier. The Pretoria government, it was said, was providing long-term export credits to Zambian importers of capital and consumer goods. A meeting of general managers of the Zambian state-owned conglomerate, INDECO, was told on October 30th that import policy had changed and that imports from South Africa were now to be encouraged."

"A regular air-freight service . . . has begun to operate between Johannesburg and Lusaka, but most of the goods are moved by road through Botswana. Rumours are also circulating in Lusaka that South Africa has agreed to finance Zambia's soaring oil bill. The country's oil imports jumped in value from £13.6m in 1973 to £36.2m last year. To avoid political embarrassment, the Zambian government has apparently made secret arrangements for South Africa to pay Iran directly for Zambia's oil imports."

These are the sort of facts that determine the Zambian government's present international posture and belie its claims to any idealistic motives.

A reactionary alternative



Ian Smith

Nor is Angola the only area where the Lusaka-Pretoria axis is currently at work, or where we are likely to see some remarkable changes of attitude by the Zambian government during coming months. Right now, the official attitude on the question of Zimbabwe ("Rhodesia") is a neutralist stance on the split in the African National Council (ANC) and a commitment to immediate majority rule or intensified armed struggle to overthrow the Smith regime. But it is quite safe to predict that the immediate period will see one of the following developments:

*Either Nkomo, who represents the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie of Rhodesia, will reach the only possible settlement available from Smith, which must fall far short of one man one vote and immediate majority rule. If this occurs, it is certain that the Zambian government will be among the most ardent advocates of the settlement. It is to this end that Nkomo is now jetting in and out of Lusaka at frequent intervals in Zambia Air Force planes to consult with Kaunda and that Zambia has provided Nkomo with the entire legal and technical staff for his negotiating team. Such a deal would be the signal for Zambia to officially reopen its border and reestablish the crucial rail link through Rhodesia to the port of Beira.

*Or the Smith-Nkomo talks will break down. In this case, one thing that will certainly not happen is the granting of Zambian facilities to the ANC's external wing for the conduct of intensified armed struggle. Indeed, 1975 saw the virtually total liquidation of any presence by Zimbabwean freedom fighters in Zambia; this was a result of a combination of detentions, liquidation, and emigration. Following the murder of Herbert Chitepo, chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), in Lusaka in April 1975, more than seventy leading ZANU members were rounded up; many have still not been released. In September at least thirty freedom fighters were killed in an incident at Kabwe Zambia Army base, where they were supposedly undergoing military training. No doubt heavily influenced by such events, the majority of militants have moved to hoped-for safer exile in Mozambique or Tanzania.

We have dealt at some length with the current positions of Zambia's rulers as they relate to the unfolding development of the struggle in Angola. Exposing the essentially capitalist nature of regimes of this kind, which attempt to disguise their true positions with humanitarian and anti-racist rhetoric, is of crucial importance to the development of the conscious revolutionary cadre that alone can begin to develop the conditions for the overthrow of these regimes. Precisely because its real foreign policy now stands at such variance with its verbal proclamations, the Zambian government can be severely embarrassed in the coming period by such an exposure. Already a campaign at the University of Zambia in Lusaka has been initiated to win support for a principled stand of solidarity with the MPLA; the Students' Union has announced its support of this position. Without doubt, the further development of such agitation will induce severe tensions between the ruling bureaucracy and those sectors involved in the campaign, which will in turn provide further lessons about the real nature of the Zambian regime.

We would further suggest that it is not only in Zambia that such a campaign will be a critical vehicle for anti-capitalist propaganda. Even those countries that have been shamed, largely as a result of the South African intervention, into diplomatic recognition of the MPLA regime have stopped short of providing adequate material assistance. This question certainly cannot be swept away under the pretext that such supplies are currently being supplied by Moscow. It is necessary to prepare for the provision of massive material aid to the Angolan revolution and to begin propaganda throughout the African continent that can bring this about. In the course of such a struggle, many steps forward will be taken toward the education of the most conscious sections of the African masses about the real nature of imperialism, neocolonialism, and the reigning regimes in their own countries.

January 9, 1976



WITCHHUNT IN WEST GERMANY

by A. ARMAND

There is probably no country in the world with a smaller number of communists than West Germany, communists who represent such a meager immediate threat to the bourgeois order but are nevertheless subject to so many measures of persecution. According to official statistics, nearly 500,000 applicants for civil service jobs were examined; of this total, 235, that is, less than 0.1 percent, were rejected on the basis of doubts about their "loyalty to the constitution."

The ruling Social Democratic party (SPD — Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) fully and completely supports the "decree on extremists" (*Radikalerlass*), which legalizes the witchhunt. Only formal objections have been raised by the SPD. For example, the spokesman for the SPD group in the Bundestag (the federal parliament) affirmed that all the political parties had agreed that no extremist should be employed in public services. He simply demanded that the procedure be the same in all the states (*Länder*) of the federal republic and explained that mere membership in a party that is not illegal was not sufficient grounds on which to bar people from working in their field. He explained that it was also necessary to interview applicants in order to be able to judge their loyalty to the constitution.

In the meantime, even the Social Democratic ministers of the interior of the *Länder* of Nordrheinwestfalen and Hamburg were compelled to admit that such interviews are used to obtain "clarification" about applicants for jobs in the civil service by making inquiries among the neighbors of the applicants and by engaging in "historical research" that delves as far as ten years into the past of the applicant. They check, for example, whether the applicant participated in demonstrations against the

Vietnam War or against the state of exception law (*Notstandsgesetz*) or in other similar actions. Many people have been surprised by the fact that in states like Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg even some left Social Democrats have been classified as "extremists" and barred from civil service jobs.

The Social Democracy, which ceaselessly calls for democratic liberties in the "socialist countries," is concerned about its democratic image. Thus, it energetically opposed describing the exclusion of "extremists" from public service jobs as a "ban on the practice of a profession" (*Berufsverbot*). According to the Social Democracy, it is simply a matter of defensive measures against rascals who intend to "undermine our constitutional order." After all, the SPD affirms, one can't very well finance enemies of the constitution out of the public treasury.

Five million people are employed by state agencies in West Germany. That represents nearly 20 percent of the work force. It is obvious that teachers, professors, judges, or railway workers would have difficulty finding employment in their own professions if they had to look in the private sector. In practice, therefore, refusing to employ such people in public services because of their political convictions amounts to refusing to allow them to work in their own professions. But the Social Democracy is interested only in the appearance of democratic respectability, after having strongly contributed to the undermining of democratic rights.

The political dangers of the "decree on extremists" lie not so much in the exclusion of several hundred far-left workers from the public services as in the possibility of establishing dossiers on hundreds of thousands of people,

of cataloging them politically, and of thus preparing for future repressive measures. The dangers also lie in the intimidating effect of the decree, the manner in which it stimulates depoliticization, conformism, and "discipline" among the five million employees in public services. The bad example of the "decree on extremists" has also contributed to undermining the best democratic customs in the trade-union movement. The trade-union leaders have followed the example of their Social Democratic party friends and have imposed similar measures in the trade unions, in the form of "decisions on incompatibility of membership."

The "decree on extremism" in the DGB

On October 3, 1973, the national leadership of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB — German Trade Union Federation) adopted a "resolution on delineation of political extremists." The resolution states that "activity for or support of far-left parties, associations, or groups is incompatible with membership in DGB-affiliated trade unions." Among the "far-left organizations carrying on activities hostile to the trade unions" were "for example, the KPD, the KP/ML (Communist party of Germany and Communist party/Marxist-Leninist, two Maoist organizations — INPRECOR), and the 'revolutionary' or 'red-union' opposition groups founded by them, the so-called rank-and-file groups, as well as any other group with the same or analogous aims."

The national leadership of the DGB, which includes some 7 million members organized in sixteen affiliated national trade unions, called upon these affiliated unions "to draw the conclusions of this basic resolution, if necessary by making changes in their statutes."

The metalworkers union goes further

While the DGB still uses somewhat strongly circumscribed "criteria" in determining incompatibility of membership in the DGB and "far-left organizations" — citing, for example, the "anti-trade-union activity" of the Maoist "red unions" or "revolutionary trade-union opposition," which consist largely of students who have donned the historical garb of the pre-1933 German Communist party, the mistakes of which they are copying — the leadership of IG Metall (the metalworkers union) has gone further. During the eleventh congress of IG Metall, held September 15-21, 1974, the leadership introduced a resolution with the following features:

1. It authorizes the appropriate local leadership bodies to bar people from the union or to expell new members who have been in the union less than three months if

they "by their behavior have supported measures or crimes against humanity, as well as persons belonging to opponent organizations and persons who belong to or support groups whose behavior and actions are hostile to the trade unions." (It may be noted that this resolution treats Nazis and Communist identically.)

2. It states that persons who have been expelled from IG Metall or from any other union and wish to join or rejoin IG Metall shall be readmitted only by special motion of the leadership.

3. It states that members can be expelled either on the basis of an investigation or "without such an investigation being conducted," simply by a decision of the leadership. Expulsions shall not be lifted during the process of appeal or complaint against the decision. Further, members are deprived of all protection provided under the statutes of the union — including legal protection against layoffs — as soon as the expulsion decision is made, even if the decision is under appeal. So long as the appeal procedure is going on, the expelled member "must abstain from any public mention of the procedure," which obviously prevents a mobilization of trade-union public opinion in favor of the member threatened with expulsion.

The expulsion of members without prior investigatory procedure may be applied "when they belong to an opponent organization or when they participate in or support activities hostile to the trade unions."

A young delegate who had herself previously contributed to getting the youth conference of the metalworkers union to adopt a resolution proclaiming the incompatibility of membership in the union and membership in any of the Maoist organizations that uphold the policy of "red trade-union opposition" spoke violently against the resolution introduced by the leadership at the September 1974 congress of IG Metall. She explained that this resolution:

1. Did not clearly name the organizations to which union members were not allowed to belong;
2. Broadened the "clear and indisputable criteria" of membership in an opponent organization, extending it to the notion of support for such an organization, "which in turn could be extended in any and every direction;
3. Tried to suggest that "the sixty-four extremists who have already been expelled on the basis of the decision of the Beirat (the highest body of the trade union between congresses, which had voted a resolution on extremists on April 16, 1973 — INPRECOR) could have in any way seriously harmed the action capacity of an organization of 2.5 million members," which she did not at all believe.

When a member of the leadership of the union tried to calm her down by claiming that each case would be carefully examined before carrying out expulsions without prior investigation procedure, one delegate pointed out that "since the Beirat motion was passed, there have been forty-six expulsions with no investigation and only eighteen with investigation."

This young delegate, who had already strongly attacked the resolution of the leadership, then summed up her objections in six points:

1. Expulsion without prior investigation can be applied when the local leadership is convinced that a member has given support to the policy of "red union opposition."
2. Proof of membership in an organization supporting a "red union opposition" policy no longer had to be furnished.
3. It was no longer required that the accused member be heard if the local leadership decided that it had proof that the member in question belonged to a proscribed organization. It was still required that the accused member respond to the proposed expulsion measure, but it was not necessary to wait for that response before ordering the expulsion or to take it into account in making the decision.
4. The local union leadership was no longer obliged, as had been the case under the statutes in effect until the congress, to furnish proof that an accused member had engaged in activities undeniably prejudicial to the union. The leadership simply had to furnish "sufficient material."
5. On the sole basis of the unilateral decision of the local leadership, the union member immediately lost all rights and duties and had to turn in his or her membership card. This also represented a change from the previous rules.
6. The accused member could not say a word or enter an appeal until after the local leadership had already decided that he or she belonged to an organization hostile to the unions and had already proposed his or her expulsion, which takes effect immediately.

In practice, sometimes worse than the rules

Like the metalworkers union, all the other national unions have successively adopted similar statutory modifications at their congresses, thus introducing into the trade unions the same proscription against "extremists" that prevails in the public services. In practice, however, things have often gone even further. According to the rules, for example, a trade-union member threatened with expulsion has the right to designate two members of the commission that deals with a normal expulsion procedure; in practice, however, it is frequently considered that carrying out such a procedure is damaging to the unions. There was one case in which the union openly refused to pay the travel costs of two commission members (workers in the same factory as the worker threatened with expulsion) from the Ruhr region to Berlin, where the commission was meeting. The bureaucracy, which always has money enough when it is a question of satisfying its own needs, suddenly became very frugal when it was a matter of applying the most elementary democratic rights, which are in any event guaranteed by the union statutes.

There are some unions that go so far as to use the advantages offered them by the political police (*Verfassungsschutz*) in the struggle against ill-regarded oppositionists. For example, one of the leaders of the Public Instruction and Sciences Union (the GEW) in Frankfurt, who was afraid that the local leadership was going to be replaced by a more leftist leadership, publicly told a reporter from the *Frankfurter Rundschau* on January 6, 1976: "The expulsion of some members of the union and the fear of the activities of the *Verfassungsschutz* have very clearly slowed down leftist activities. The colder wind that is now blowing in the schools, the universities, and even the chambers of the law schools has wilted the flowering dreams of the leftists with surprising rapidity." He thus noted with satisfaction that the repression has been effective and that it probably prevented the democratic replacement of a right-wing trade-union leadership by a leftist one.

Why the witchhunt?

The relative insignificance of the communist movement in West Germany, including the pro-Moscow German Communist party, and the disproportionate intensity of the repressive measures, laws, decrees, and statutes raise the question of the reasons for all these measures.

First, the economic crisis must be taken into account. In a country in which the apparently uninterrupted economic growth since 1949 had nurtured the illusion of a "social capitalism" under which "permanent reform" was possible, this crisis is laden with dangers for the ruling class. The ideology of the "social market economy" constantly fostered by the Social Democracy and the trade-union bureaucracy and the identification of the organized workers movement with "our free democratic state of law" threaten to collapse.

Second, there is some apprehension that the *détente* policy could undermine the anticommunist ideology that has constituted a powerful factor ensuring the integration of the working class into the bourgeois state.

Third, the German bourgeoisie, like its Social Democratic lackeys, fears that an economic crisis that provokes massive unemployment could make the German Democratic Republic (DDR), which has maintained employment levels, look a little more attractive, despite all the repugnant features of the DDR in the eyes of the West German workers: the lack of democratic rights, the Berlin wall, the barbed wire along the border, the shooting of people trying to escape, the lower standard of living.

Fourth, the trade-union bureaucracy, and especially the local trade-union apparatus, is not at all armed to engage in discussion with a trade-union opposition. The attacks on the trade-union bureaucracy have generally originated from "outside," from radicalized students who made scenes during meetings and handed out leaflets denouncing the bureaucrats as traitors to the

working class. This occurred at a time when the bureaucrats were still able to win important material benefits for the union members. Thus, the mass of trade unionists did not clearly grasp the well-founded character of these accusations.

Today the situation has changed to some extent. Various far-left political groups have sent members into the factories, and they have been able to establish contacts with some, although not very many, workers — and essentially young ones. Nevertheless, during the last elections to the factory councils, "opposition lists" were presented by unionists in a number of factories in which the official lists were headed by candidates for the factory-council presidency who were particularly unpopular among the workers or particularly corrupt. These "counterlists" won some successes, which profoundly disturbed the trade-union bureaucracy.

More than in any other country, the trade-union apparatus in West Germany is composed of bureaucrats who act in a purely administrative manner as genuine functionaries lacking the slightest "historical memory of the workers movement" and lacking any experience at all in democratic debate with opposition currents. The union leadership is well aware of the insufficiency of its own apparatus. It hopes to avoid the unpleasantness of such debates by expelling opposition elements. It matters little to the bureaucracy that this places it in contradiction to the "democratic rights" it constantly claims to support. The bureaucracy gives priority to the defense of its positions of bureaucratic power and generally acts scarcely any differently from the bureaucracy in the workers states.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that up to now the policy of "decrees on extremists" by the government and of "motions of incompatibility" by the union leadership has been generally crowned with success. The crisis has not yet shaken the illusions of the working class to the extent that the bourgeoisie, the Social Democracy, and the trade-union bureaucracy had feared. The majority of the West German working class still clings to the hope that the crisis will be a passing phenomenon and that the subsequent upturn will put things in order again. The layers of the proletariat hit especially hard by the crisis — such as immigrants, youth, women, and unskilled workers — do not constitute the central nucleus of the working class organized in trade unions. The government and the trade-union bureaucracy can draw real advantages from all these facts. This explains in part why the resistance to the "decrees on extremists" and the "motions of incompatibility" has been so limited.

But these advantages for the government will not last forever. Some initial signs of a turnaround in the trend are beginning to emerge, even if only timidly. The bureaucracy is beginning to be afraid that the "decrees on extremists" may be used not only against the extremists proper, but even against massive active sectors of the working class. A declaration issued December 17, 1975, by the national leadership of IG Metall on the

"halt to employing extremists in public services" expressed this fear. The declaration stated in part:

"The leadership of IG Metall notes with concern that the effort to eliminate enemies of the constitution from public services has set in motion a dangerous practice of inquiries by the Verfassungsschutz, especially into citizens active in the political and scientific realms. There are no longer sufficient guarantees that criticism of existing conditions and legitimate attempts to change them will not be used as sufficient excuse to expel people from public services. The leadership of IG Metall rejects the disciplinary measures that are indiscriminately hitting active members of parties and unions. It is highly significant that the offices of the Verfassungsschutz are beginning to investigate the trade-union activity of the people being examined. . . . The most unpleasant zeal is being exhibited in the Länder of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, which on this question, as on others, represent the advance point of reaction in social policy. The employers and their political supporters are now trying to present any progress in social policy as an attack on the constitution. One can already envisage a time when even those who simply act resolutely for the aims and decisions of the trade unions will be slandered as enemies of the constitution."

But it is a very long road between this recognition and "concern" on the part of the IG Metall leadership on the one hand and any struggle against the "decrees on extremists" on the other hand. Especially when the IG Metall leadership simultaneously calls for a "set of legal rules as has been discussed in first draft in the parliament." It is precisely this set of "legal rules" that is aimed at barring the access of "extremists" to the public services, while nevertheless strictly respecting "the principles of the state of law," as IG Metall put it at its last congress. They want the omelet, but they don't want any broken eggs.

Practice has long since shown that far-right extremists are in no way affected by all this legislation, which is in fact aimed exclusively against the left. The line between the far left, the trade-union movement, and the active elements of the working class as a whole will be very fluid in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. That line will be drawn exclusively as a function of considerations of opportunity and relationship of forces. Already voices are being raised calling for classifying anyone who does not accept the "free market economy" as an "extremist." That would also strike at the leadership of the metal-workers union.

The appeal of this leadership to "all democratic forces to halt this dangerous evolution, to defend basic democratic rights and prevent them from being emptied of all content" has no credibility whatsoever as long as that leadership tramples on the democratic rights of its own members, utilizing an argument analogous to that of the witchhunters, and as long as it lacks the courage to oppose the witchhunt being organized by its Social Democratic friends who, after all, still hold government power in West Germany. □

THE WEAKEST GOVERNMENT OF THE DICTATORSHIP

The following resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the Liga Comunista (Communist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain.

* * *

1. The events that preceded the death of Franco (mobilization against the death penalties, Sahara) decisively sharpened the crisis of the regime. The disappearance of the dictator, key institution cementing together all the cliques of Francoism, qualitatively aggravated this mortal crisis and irreversibly accelerated the tensions among the "families" of the regime, completely upsetting its fragile equilibrium.
2. The government, which has not yet presented its programmatic declaration to the Cortes (parliament), has clearly exposed its positions. The fraudulent "bi-cameral system" of Fraga, the anathema of "terrorism, communism, and separatism," the "trade-union future" openly condemning the workers commissions, and the economic speech of Villar Mir patently mark the limits of this government. They clearly demonstrate its anti-democratic character in continuity with Francoism, a character the bourgeois opposition is attempting to mask.
3. The new Arias government is the weakest in the entire history of Francoism. Without having succeeded in taking any real step toward the much-vaunted "institutionalization" and facing the greatest economic crisis of recent years, the government is up against the powerful rise of a mass movement on which it has not managed to inflict any serious setback.

In order to embellish its appearance and plans, the previous government had to rely on its periphery of groups like Fedisa. The tremendous weakness of the present government, which is planning ever harsher attacks on the workers and people, is compelled to have this dirty role played by personalities like Ruiz Gimenez and Tierno Galván, who disguise themselves as "socialist" and "socialistic" in order better to deceive the proletariat and the oppressed. These bourgeois sectors of the "democratic opposition," which want to offer this government of continuity a truce while waiting for its acts, are proposing this policy, through the Junta Democrática and the Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática, to the Communist party, the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español — Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy), and the other workers parties that are present in these bourgeois bodies.

In reality, this truce that the workers parties are succeeding in imposing on the workers and the oppressed is

the only thing that offers the government a possibility of taking any steps toward implementation of its plans.

The weakness of the government, which may be considered as the political expression of the change in the relationship of class forces that has been achieved during past months, creates better conditions for the struggle of the workers movement.

For the moment, the government finds it impossible, without exposing itself completely, to prevent the mass movement from winning a limited de facto legality through its actions.

4. The government is absolutely incapable of holding back the advance of the mass movement toward the overthrow of the dictatorship. Any demagogic "reform" that may be carried out will have no result except to propel the workers and the oppressed forward and sharpen the contradictions among the Francoist cliques. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility, improbable right now, that steps backward will be taken under the pressure of the hard-line sectors of the dictatorship, whose influence cannot be underestimated because of their decisive role in the institutions of the regime, a role that big capital cannot dispense with, even though this solution has the inconvenience of creating a greater mass response on a state and national scale without decisively driving back the mass movement.

5. In face of the "evolution" of the Fragas and the democratic "rupture" that sectors of the dictatorship defending a program that maintains the fundamental features of the dictatorship are trying to win, the Trotskyists reaffirm more than ever that the only way to overthrow "crowned" Francoism is the general strike. Conditions today are better than ever for advancing toward this. The latest struggles clearly demonstrate the possibility of the masses' moving to direct action against the dictatorship.

We must pass to the offensive against Francoism, breaking any truce. Toward the overthrow of the dictatorship through the general strike. For the total destruction of Francoism to permit free elections to a Constituent Assembly based on National Constituent Assemblies of the various oppressed peoples. For a provisional workers government capable of convoking the Constituent Assembly and satisfying the most urgent needs and aspirations of the oppressed.

This is the requirement that is posed for all the workers parties; hence, we call for the creation of a class pact of all these parties in order to push for these objectives through the workers commissions.

PORTUGAL: THIRD CONGRESS OF THE LCI

The third (extraordinary) congress of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI — Internationalist Communist League), sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Portugal, was held January 10-11, 1976. The holding of this congress, only a few months after the second congress of the organization, reflected the very strong pressures to which the revolutionary vanguard is subject in Portugal today; it likewise reflected the capacity of revolutionary Marxists to extract from the very development of the class struggle the best instruments for going into the coming battles.

As the comrades of the LCI explain in their self-criticism, an extract of which is published below, the political orientation that had been adopted at the second congress had not sufficiently armed the organization to confront the situation opened by the political crisis of August 1975. With the LCI's signing of the August 25 accord (see INPRECOR, No.33, September 11, 1975, for the text of the accord and a statement of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on it) and the LCI's entry into the FUR, a growing number of militants began to challenge the orientation of the organization, especially on the question of the concrete application of the united front and on the analysis of the Socialist party, an orientation and analysis that could only maintain the division of the working class and isolate the vanguard.

A majority of the militants of the organization demanded that a special congress be held to draw a balance-sheet of the activity of the LCI since the summer and to work out an orientation responding to the requirements of the revolutionary struggle in Portugal. The preparation of this congress occasioned a broad democratic debate throughout the organization. Theses were extensively discussed and amended and then adopted by the congress. They were then immediately published in pamphlet form. The major axes of the theses may be summarized as follows:

- priority to the development of a response to the government's austerity plan;
- for the elaboration and centralization of the workers response: a national congress of workers commissions and a democratic congress of all the trade unions;
- release of the soldiers and workers imprisoned after November 25;
- for a workers and peasants government responsible to a national congress of workers commissions and a democratic congress of all the trade unions.

We are publishing below, in addition to the extract from the self-criticism, an extract from the theses; it is taken from the section on the mass work of the LCI.

The congress also pronounced itself in favor of the unification of revolutionary Marxist forces in Portugal and for the immediate opening of discussions toward this end with the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT — Revolutionary Workers party).

In addition, the congress adopted a series of measures aimed at strengthening the organizational structure in order to overcome the uneven development between the North and South of the country and in order to endow the organization with means of propaganda and agitation corresponding to the requirements of the present situation (for example, regular weekly publication of the newspaper, *Luta Proletária*).

Many delegations from sections of the Fourth International were present at this extraordinary congress of the LCI. Understanding the importance of the Portuguese situation for the revolutionary upsurge in capitalist Europe, the Fourth International and its sections will be in the vanguard of the campaign in solidarity with the struggles of the Portuguese workers, for the maintenance and extension of their conquests, and for the strengthening of revolutionary leadership.

In the present period, all our forces must be turned toward open mass work in order to carry out the tasks described above.

The main direction of our work today is toward the mass organs of the working class. It is here that we must implant ourselves; in implanting ourselves here we will advance in the construction of the revolutionary workers party.

Make the workers commissions the backbone of dual power

In the present conjuncture all our mass work must respond to the necessity of stimulating and strengthening a response to the attempt of the government and the employers to extend the success they achieved on November 25 to the social sphere.

Our work in the workers commissions and the trade unions in the present phase must be oriented primarily in this direction. To assure the maintenance and revitalization of the workers commissions so that they fully and as rapidly as possible again assume their function as embryonic organs of dual power in the context of a new workers upsurge, it is necessary that the workers commissions take on concrete functions in the daily struggle to defend the conquests of the workers.

To the extent that they accomplish this function, they will be able to assert their role as the backbone of the emergence of a situation of dual power. Thus, today we must carry out mass work aimed at developing the response to the austerity plan, lending the workers commissions a decisive role in this counterattack. This is the basis of the link between our trade-union work and our activity in the autonomous organs.

In this perspective, the establishment of a situation of dual power and even the strengthening, extension, and independence of the autonomous organs of the workers vis-à-vis the bourgeois state apparatus requires that priority be placed on the struggle for the development, generalization, and expansion of the workers commissions.

The strengthening of the workers commissions means the effective strengthening of the independent organization of the class, the development of workers control, the raising of the consciousness of the proletariat; this implies the development of conditions for proletarian hegemony in the local coordinating bodies of the workers commissions, moradores commissions, etc., in all the organs that permit the alliance of the proletariat with intermediary layers of the population and that prefigure soviets.

The strengthening of workers control through workers commissions enables the workers to broach the economic problems with the perspective of their being resolved by the working class itself through the coordination of



OUR MASS WORK

the workers commissions at the local branch level and through the coordination of the workers commissions with the moradores commissions.

Thus, we can say that the strategic objective of our intervention in the factories is the stimulation, centralization, and extension of the workers commissions and the combination of this work with intervention in the trade unions.

Stimulate, extend, and centralize the workers commissions

Because of the grave crisis of Portuguese capitalism, the very development of struggles for their demands on the part of the workers gave rise to the emergence of commissions that most often went beyond the tasks of mere committees to lead given struggles and took on tasks of permanent workers control.

The development of the workers commissions was a factor of fundamental importance for the Portuguese revolution. These commissions paved the way for overcoming the division introduced by the craft unions and for endowing the workers with effective instruments for their struggle.

Our intervention must aim at pushing forward the workers commissions as the organized product of mass struggles in the factories, with the following essential functions:

- to exercise workers control in the enterprises (prices, raw materials, layoffs), to combat sabotage, to plan the economy;

— to organize self-defense, to struggle against capitalist reaction; to fight against the isolation of exemplary struggles and to fight for their generalization to ever broader sectors of workers;

— to lead the struggle for better working conditions, to struggle against restrictions on the democratic rights of the workers.

It is nonetheless necessary not to push the workers commissions forward in a vacuum, without the workers' understanding what they are and what their purpose is, because in that event the workers commissions wind up as forms for administering and controlling the workers. This is especially true in the North and Center of the country, where the role and importance of the workers commissions have been less understood.

In the case of the workers commissions in which we have some influence, all opportunities must be seized to pose the problem of sectoral and intersectoral coordination, especially in the sectors in crisis, where the demand for credits for the reconversion of raw materials, for example, enables the workers to more easily understand the necessity of coordinating the workers commissions with other commissions of the same branch or of other sectors.

It is here that the proposals for congresses of the workers commissions in industrial sectors or in complementary sectors takes on particular importance; we must take advantage of all opportunities to propel them forward.

But such a centralization must be able to be based on all the already existing experiences and to struggle for their fusion, which is the only way to broaden the mass base of the workers commissions and to guarantee proletarian democracy within them.

It is in this direction that we must orient the Provisional Secretariat of Workers Commissions of the Lisbon Industrial Belt (SPCTCIL — Secretariado Provisório das Comissões de Trabalhadores da Cintura Industrial de Lisboa), demanding that this body hold local and sectoral congresses to begin preparation of a National Congress of Workers Commissions.

Such proposals are intimately linked to the struggle for the formation of a tendency in the SPCTCIL, which must be the prime objective of our intervention, given the fundamental weight of the layers of workers led by the SPCTCIL. At the same time, in order to broaden the mass base of the workers commissions, it is necessary to struggle not only for the broadest democracy in the election and functioning of the commissions, for the right of the various currents of the workers movement to express themselves within the commissions, but also for the presentation by the workers commissions of clear projects to defend the interests of the workers and of overall solutions to the crisis of the system. Concurrently, the formation of a secretariat of the workers commissions of other basic industrial regions would be of major importance in preparing a National Congress of Workers Commissions.

The present tactic of the CP is to demobilize the class and paralyze the bodies that it leads, doing this through its policy of government compromise, its propaganda around the imminence of the fascist danger in order to justify its alliances, and its manipulation of the coordinating bodies that already exist, using them as instruments for pressuring and collaborating with bourgeois institutions. Against this, on the one hand we must stress the importance of the unity in action of revolutionaries in order to increase their weight in launching mass actions for demands and in the coordinating bodies, and, concretely, in order to strengthen their initiatives toward creating genuinely representative regional secretariats; on the other hand we must insist on the necessity for the independence and broadest democracy within the autonomous organs, consolidating the united class front within them and adopting the most appropriate forms of representativity (revocability, control by plenary sessions, election of delegates to the workers commissions from each sector or workshop so that the commissions will apply the program decided on by the majority).

Avoid the isolation of the workers commissions; trade-union work in the factories

It is on the basis of understanding the priority of intervention in the factories and the workers commissions that we must measure our trade-union intervention at the present time. Given the lack of centralization of the workers commissions and the fact that there are many factories in which they do not exist, and given the lack of a consolidated trade-union bureaucracy, many trade-union commissions may be able to be used: first, as instruments of the workers commissions in the more backward factories; second, to enable the vanguard workers commissions in this transition phase of the prerevolutionary situation in Portugal to make their weight felt throughout the entire working class, deepening struggles for workers demands and participating in the debates going on in the unions. Third, in the backward sectors, the emergence of factory trade-union commissions through the development of trade-union struggles can serve as a springboard for the emergence of workers commissions with a mass base.

Some comrades frequently complain that it is difficult to distinguish between workers commissions and trade-union commissions. This mixture of functions during the present period — during which the trade unions, even those led by the reformists, are most often unable to restrict themselves to mere economic demands and are compelled by the deep crisis of Portuguese capitalism to put forward overall proposals — must be utilized:

1. To develop, on the national level, the general problems of workers control and to introduce this same discussion among the more backward layers of the proletariat;

2. To avoid the isolation of the workers commissions;
3. To combine the struggle for immediate demands with the struggle for transitional slogans (workers control, sliding scale of wages and hours).

On this basis, not only can the work in the workers commissions serve as an important point of departure for the struggle for a trade-union organized on a branch basis, but also revolutionary work in the trade unions can contribute significantly to the development of the workers commissions, especially in factories with combative trade-union commissions, to the centralization of their struggle on a national level, and to the development of the factory structures on which they can base themselves. This requires a determined struggle for trade-union democracy, for decentralization of the discussion of forms of struggle at the factory and branch level.

On this basis the trade unions will be able to be in position to convoke congresses of industrial sectors based on elected structures in the factories in order to discuss the concrete problems of each sector, thus playing an important role in the coordination of the workers commissions.


It is in this sense that our trade-union work, centered primarily on the sectors of workers in which a more rapid radicalization can be expected because of the economic crisis, is axised around objectives of struggle complementary to those we attribute to the workers commissions.

It is also for these reasons that the LCI insists on the absolute necessity of combining both sorts of work, utilizing its overall weight at the level of factory work.

Moreover, the close combination of the two sorts of work leads toward placing on the agenda the slogans of the National Congress of Workers Commissions and the Democratic Congress of all the trade unions around the axes mentioned above in relation to the work in the workers commissions.

Not only are such slogans sufficiently concrete to be understood by broad sectors of workers, but they also appear as increasingly corresponding to the requirements of a workers response, to the objective needs of the working masses, and to the level of consciousness of the workers, which does not yet permit the immediate formation of a structure of centralization of all the autonomous organs.

Finally, given the differences in radicalization of the working class, it is an objective of struggle that takes account of the development of the workers commissions and the trade unions, aiming at the unification of the class. By placing the emphasis on the unions and not on the Intersindical, it permits the mass base of the congress to be broadened by addressing the unions controlled by the CP and permits the unmasking of the divisive policies of the reformist or sectarian leaderships. In sum, it is a question of an intermediary objective that better corresponds to the present degree of extension and centralization of the workers commissions. □




a) Since December 1973 the regular intervention of its revolutionary militants has permitted the construction of the LCI, the deepening of its implantation and ability to take important political initiatives (anticolonial movement in May-September 1974, antimilitarist actions), and the participation of the LCI in the leadership of some mass struggles.

But there was difficulty in freeing this intervention, conducted by a handful of militants that has since expanded to the present nucleus, from some initial errors that marked our history and were a logical consequence of our small implantation at the outset combined with a formal sectarianism and some dogmatic conceptions.

The uneven growth and the lack of a clear central political line, which reflected the weakness of our political experience, was nonetheless counterbalanced by the implantation that was developed and by the organization's breaking into new zones in which significant nuclei of workers were rapidly developed. But this development was often carried out at the cost of deepening the empiricism and regionalism of the intervention.

It is in this sense that, in spite of the errors committed, in spite of the limits of its education and of the political debates that were conducted within it, the LCI was always integrated into the dynamic of the Portuguese revolution and participated with all its strength in the important confrontations that strengthened the revolution (September 28 and March 11). Although these political errors contributed to weakening us and led us to underutilize important political opportunities, the consolidation and strengthening of the revolutionary Marxist organization and the commitment of its militants and sympathizers to important mass struggles in the factories, enterprises, trade unions, neighborhoods, and barracks constitute a point of departure for a qualitative leap that is now possible, provided we understand and correct our previous errors.



b) The fact that the revolutionary Marxists have held two congresses in less than five months is not evidence of any arbitrary subjectivism or a desire to discuss simply for the sake of discussion, but rather corresponds to the objective and subjective requirements of the revolutionary process itself. In this respect, Leninism, the Bolshevik practice to which the LCI adheres, certainly stands in contrast to the Stalinist and bureaucratic practice of holding congresses at intervals of years, congresses in which tendency differences and debates are replaced by the principle that unanimity is a virtue and differences a sin.

It was exactly five months ago, in August 1975, that the last congress of the LCI was held. But in the five elapsed months, the revolutionary process has developed much faster than had been expected. During this period, revolutionary Marxists found themselves facing tasks whose scope far exceeded their forces. But what made this third (extraordinary) congress necessary was the observation of the fact that the orientation approved at the second congress had not sufficiently armed the militants for carrying out the tasks required by the rapid development of the revolutionary process.

c) While the second congress, in August 1975, marked an advance in the discussion of some important questions, it nonetheless maintained and deepened some of the errors mentioned above. The analysis of the MFA, the CP, and the SP that was adopted at the congress facilitated political hesitations and turns that logically led to the signing of the August 25 accords, the acceptance of the September 10 FUR manifesto, and the participation in this front until its effective disappearance.

Because of its importance and because of the political and organizational consequences, it is necessary to systematically enumerate the errors of the FUR:

— The unity in action that was possible and necessary was replaced by a "frontist" policy based on an erroneous political platform, which inevitably led objectively to sectarian and divisionist actions relative to the workers movement as a whole and subjectively to confusion about the party, which facilitated the division of the workers vanguard and the development of the "nonpartyist" current within the independent organs (the workers commissions, moradores commissions, soldiers commissions, etc.).

— The lack of any conception of the workers united front at a time when it was particularly important to stimulate united actions that would have permitted the development and presentation of a political outlet for the process of self-organization, uniting the majority of the class in defense of its social and economic conquests and responding immediately to the economic and political crisis of the bourgeoisie.

— An incorrect and extremely dangerous conception of the Social Democracy, which was identified as the twin of fascism;

— The development of putschist and insurrectionist conceptions that facilitated the events of November 25 and made it difficult to put forward an alternative political solution.

The political dissolution and organizational consequences of the LCI's participation in the FUR were the product of serious errors that opened the way for a combination of sectarianism and tailendism towards the policies of the centrist organizations and the CP. In reality, a correct comprehension of the dynamic of class struggle that led to the fall of the fifth government, to the mass actions of the soldiers movement, to the new rise of generalized struggles for unifying economic demands (rural wage-earners, metalworkers, civil construction, bakers, etc.), and to the development of partial initiatives of centralization of the organs of direct democracy would have prevented the LCI from signing, on August 25, an accord that supported the MFA and the fifth provisional government, giving rise to all the centrist confusion about the character of the CP and developing a sectarian policy toward the SP. This political understanding also would have permitted a different policy, based on a break with the FUR (as soon as the FUR accepted the August 25 accords) and on the recomposition of the unity in action of the revolutionary organizations to attain essential objectives like the creation of a more favorable relationship of forces with the reformists so as to stimulate the centralization of the autonomous organs, thus addressing ourselves to all the workers and revolutionary organizations.

These political errors prevented a battle for the unity in action of the workers movement for its fundamental objectives: the deepening of the conquests and demands of the working masses for the development and centralization of the embryonic organs of dual power in a period in which the initiatives of the workers movement could have rapidly been transformed into new steps forward. □

TIMOR



TOWARD A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE

by G. FONTAINE

Only a few months after the decisive victory of the peoples of Indochina, a new breach has just been opened in the flank of imperialist domination in Southeast Asia. In fact, it is Indonesia, one of the major bastions of imperialism in the region, that has been hit by the national liberation struggle of the people of Timor. Until the open invasion of the eastern part of the island by Indonesian paratroopers on December 7 in response to the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, the events in this small Portuguese colony on the fringes of the Indonesian archipelago had generated little interest in the international political arena. The backwardness and isolation of the island probably had something to do with this, as did the blackout that had been imposed by the Salazarist dictatorship. But even after April 25, 1974, and the awakening of political life on the island, Indonesia and Australia, the two countries having the greatest interest in the future of Timor, preferred to try to achieve their aims by acting behind the scenes.

Solidarity with the struggle of the people of Timor is needed in order to break this conspiracy of silence; likewise, the tasks of any solidarity movement can be derived only from an in-depth analysis of the dynamic of the social and political process underway in the country. The following article is intended as a first contribution in this direction.

The Portuguese conquest

The island of Timor was "discovered" by the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century. From that time on, the sandalwood trade, which had previously been oriented toward China, began to attract the interest of the Portuguese. Holland soon sought to oust the Portuguese from all their Asian colonies. The struggle for control of Timor and its resources, which began in 1613, was to last for three centuries. During this struggle the Portuguese based themselves on the Topasses (or black Portuguese), a group of mestizos who soon acquired formidable commercial and military strength. Topasses based in the port of Lifau controlled the sandalwood trade. They succeeded in winning the allegiance of most of the *livrais* (indigenous village chiefs) of the island and thus in assuring Portuguese domination in exchange for the maintenance of their trade privileges. Nevertheless, large portions of the island remained outside Portuguese or Dutch control. A multitude of ephemeral kingdoms were constituted, according to fluctuating alliances. Those who could organize the work and deliver the wood to the coast won a virtual monopoly on the acquisition of manufactured goods and especially on the weapons imported into the island. Trade began to decline during the eighteenth century because the wood, the main natural resource, began to run out. At the beginning of the twentieth century, colonial domination was stabilized. After a century-long border conflict with the Dutch, the Portuguese finally managed to establish administrative and military structures throughout the eastern part of the island. The Japanese occupation during the second world war left the country

completely white. The capital, Dili, was razed. Some 40,000 Timorans were killed during the fighting, and the rest of the population was suffering from famine. During the thirty years that followed colonialism did nothing to bring Timor out of the depths of poverty and backwardness.

The economic structures

Portugal had been one of the pioneers of European colonial expansion, but its decline was very rapid. A prisoner of its trade links with Britain, Portugal did not experience the industrial development that the other countries of Europe went through. The large landed proprietors eclipsed the commercial bourgeoisie as a ruling class, and the paralysis of small industry prevented Portuguese colonialism from transforming itself into a modern imperialism. The major feature of this obsolescent colonialism was that it was based on forced labor and did not create an indigenous proletariat. The major instrument of exploitation, apart from direct slavery (which was still practiced until recently), was the annual tax, often payable in kind, that was imposed on all the male inhabitants of the island. Thus, the market economy only superficially penetrated the pre-capitalist structures that were dominant in Timor. The immense majority of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Because of the use of both traditional techniques, especially the system of rotation of burned out land (*ladang*), and archaic instruments, the productivity of labor is very low. Malnutrition is widespread and the population is constantly threatened by famine. At the beginning of the 1970s, Timor exhibited all the symptoms of underdevelopment. It exported agricultural products and imported manufactured goods. There is almost no industry on the island. It depends on a single factor for survival: the income from its foreign trade, which in 1971 was 90 percent dependent on coffee. Nevertheless, the level of exports is by far insufficient to compensate for the foreign trade deficit. Timor was a burden to the Portuguese, who always spent the least possible amount on this colony.

Existing social forces

The few investments undertaken, especially in equipping the port of Dili, not to mention the construction of a sumptuous international airport in Baucau, the second-largest city in the country, benefited only the coffee and copra planters and the Chinese merchants. This did not affect the Timorans. In 1973, some 40 percent of coffee production was in the hands of a single Portuguese firm; the rest was controlled by Chinese. Twenty-three of the twenty-five largest enterprises were Chinese; the other two were Portuguese.

Finally, of a total of 300 stores, only one or two were owned by Timorans. All trade, both foreign and domes-

tic, was dominated by the Chinese community, which numbered 10,000 people politically linked to Taiwan.

As for the Timoran working class, it existed only in an embryonic form. It is composed mainly of chauffeurs, dockers, and workers in construction and light industries (processing and wrapping of coffee). In spite of its weakness, however, the working class was to play an important role after April 25, 1974, as was the urban petty bourgeoisie (administrative employees, teachers, unemployed high-school graduates).

Education and the national movement

After first basing itself on the traditional chiefs (the *livrais*) during the early part of the century, Portuguese colonialism later created a new elite to respond to its need for administrative and military subalterns and to propagate colonial values. Religious colleges were opened to train "letrados" who for the most part came from the families of the *livrais* and were thus better able to defend the Portuguese order.

It was only in the 1960s that the Portuguese colonialists, having drawn the lessons of the abortive revolt led in 1959 by Indonesian soldiers who had taken refuge in Timor after the crushing of the independent republic of South Malucca, began to revise their policy. This revolt, which triggered a deep response from the Timoran population, occurred at the time when the new liberation movements were launching the struggle in the African colonies of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The Portuguese then tried to create a new neocolonial elite and soon opened a number of primary schools, a high school, a technical school in Dili, and a seminary in Dare. This new and relatively broad-scale education, even though its aim was to inculcate the youth of Timor with "love of Portugal," and even though it completely excluded the culture and language of Timor, nevertheless had profound repercussions. Those who graduated from the secondary schools and who were not among the few dozen youth who were allowed to continue their studies in Lisbon during recent years most often found themselves unemployed or else found very poorly paid jobs that were totally unrelated to their qualifications. Thus, the groundwork was laid for the discontent on which the development of the nationalist movement was to be based. The cadres of this movement were often students who had gone to Lisbon and acquired a political consciousness in the course of the crisis of the Portuguese fascist regime and in contact with the partisans of the African liberation movements.

When these youth returned to their country, they had no difficulty drawing the balance-sheet of four centuries of Portuguese colonialism as of April 25, 1974:

Average per capita annual income at the time stood at 1,000 escudos, that is, about US\$42, probably the low-

est figure for all of Southeast Asia. In spite of the progress of the educational system, 90 percent of the population remained illiterate. Tuberculosis and malaria were constant plagues and the infant mortality rate was estimated at 50 percent (in the absence of any statistics from the World Health Organization, which had been refused entry into the country). The health service had a total of twenty physicians (twelve of whom lived in Dili, the capital) for a population of 650,000. Finally, there was no communications network apart from the few miles of roads that had been built in and around Dili.

The coup and the creation of the UDT

There was no noticeable shakeup in the administration of Timor after the April 25 coup in Lisbon. The new Portuguese government was not much concerned with East Timor. The agents of the secret police (the DGS) were recalled to Portugal and political parties were granted the right to organize, but there was no explosion comparable to the one that quickly shook Portugal. No clandestine nationalist movement emerged immediately. That was the price that was paid for the extreme backwardness of the country and its almost total isolation from the outside world.

The Timor government remained in office for several months; Magiolo Gouveia remained chief of police and Costa Mouzinho remained mayor of Dili; the representative of the colony to the formerly fascist parliament in Lisbon was not changed. Nevertheless, the whole Portuguese administrative elite became "democratic" over night. It soon formed the União Democrática de Timor (UDT — Democratic Union of Timor), of which Costa Mouzinho became vice-president and Lopez da Cruz, a veteran of the African wars, president. The UDT immediately won the support of a good part of the functionaries and village chiefs, for these people owed their privileges and power solely to the Portuguese presence. Likewise, the UDT rapidly gathered the support of the owners of the coffee plantations and the entire Chinese commercial bourgeoisie. The political program of the UDT was clear: for the "accelerated promotion, under the Portuguese flag, of the cultural, social, economic, and political development" of the island and "self-determination for the Timoran people, oriented toward a federation with Portugal as an intermediary stage to achieve independence." This fit in perfectly with the neocolonialist plans of Spínola. In spite of its openly reactionary policy, the UDT registered some success at first. It owed this success to the passivity of the Timoran masses, a result of their age-old oppression, and to its many links of support within the state apparatus. But this domination was soon challenged by the development of the nationalist movement.

The birth of FRETILIN

The traditions of anticolonialist struggle in Timor go back to 1912, when the Portuguese finally succeeded in bringing the entire eastern part of the island under control. The last act of this conquest was the crushing of the revolt led by a tribal chief named Don Boaventura. He succeeded in uniting all the tribes against the Portuguese and in driving them from the interior of the country for a time. For two years the insurgents waged a movement of armed resistance in the Manu-Fahi district in the southwest of the island and even managed to extend the fighting to the streets of Dili itself. But the movement, led by the *livrais*, was finally crushed at the cost of 5,000 dead.

During the second world war, when Japanese troops and Australian commandos fought merciless battles for control of the island, a pro-Japanese nationalist movement arose among the Timorans. But racist anti-white demagoguery soon lost its effects in face of the reality of the plunder inflicted on the country by Japanese imperialism.

Finally, even though the Indonesian military refugees who initiated the 1959 revolt considered the aim of the revolt to be the creation in Timor of a base of subversion against the Sukarno regime, the revolt seems to have won a real response among the Timoran people. But in spite of these traditions, there was no clandestine nationalist organization on the eve of April 25, 1974.

Nevertheless, some time before, a small nucleus of Timoran youth who had some education had gotten together to discuss nationalism and the future of the country. Among these youth were Nicolau Lobato and José Ramos Horta. In 1970 the latter had been sent into exile in Mozambique for reeducation. Working as a journalist and cameraman covering the war, he quickly assimilated the precious lessons of the struggle led by FRELIMO. In 1974, during a trip to Darwin, Australia, Horta issued some blustering declarations to an Australian journalist, thinking that they would never be printed. But the journalist quickly published them in the Northern Territory News. The colonial administration then gave Horta the choice of prison or exile. His bags were packed in preparation for moving to Darwin when the coup came in Lisbon.

The first strike in the history of Timor broke out immediately after April 25. It was launched in Dili by the employees of the colonial administration. José Ramos Horta and his comrades aided the organization of the movement by forming the Defense of Labor Committee. The strike, which spread throughout the city, soon triumphed; the salaries of the low-ranking employees were raised to 25 escudos a day in Dili and 20 escudos in the rest of the island. It was a 50 percent increase. But the Defense of Labor Committee, which had so quickly achieved great success among the embryo of the working class in Dili, nevertheless soon disappeared. In fact, its major leaders threw themselves into the construction of a new party, the Social Democratic



Horta

Association of Timor (ASDT), and devoted all their forces to it. One popular figure, Xavier de Amaral, a graduate of the Jesuit seminary of Macao, became the president of the party. A product of the first conjunction of the nationalist aspirations of the Timoran youth and the awakening of the urban workers movement, the ASDT had no real homogeneity. Bourgeois nationalist and Christian reformist currents, and even some revolutionary elements, were involved in its formation. The movement paid the price for the decades-long international isolation of Timor and for the absence of any cultural or political life proper to the island itself. The Chinese and Indochinese revolutions had not stimulated any echo in Timor. And the most powerful communist movement in capitalist Asia until 1965, the Indonesian Communist party, had never sent any cadres to Timor, even though the island is on Indonesia's doorstep.

Thus, the militants of the ASDT sought points of reference in Australia to some extent but mainly in the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. After April 25, Lisbon newspapers, which began analyzing these struggles, were avidly read in Timor, as were the works of Amílcar Cabral that were occasionally brought back by Timoran soldiers returning from Africa. During the summer of 1974 some students returning from Lisbon who had been affected by these ideas exerted a deep influence on the ASDT leadership.

The ASDT, which had already won a broad audience among the workers in the major cities (Dili and Baucau), already had about a thousand members. But its influence in the countryside remained very weak and unstable compared with that of the UDT. Under the pressure of elements recently returned from Portugal and profoundly influenced by the success of the African liberation move-

ments, the ASDT met in a general assembly on September 12, 1974, and decided to abandon construction of a European-style political party and to transform itself into a Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). Its program explained: "It is called a front because it calls for the unity of all Timoran patriots. . . . East Timor is a colony today, and as a colony the immediate and sole objective is the struggle for national independence and the liberation of the people. It is revolutionary because it seeks to modify, transform, and revolutionize the structures that have been inherited from 500 years of colonialism. . . . Independence is the only road toward the real progress and development of the people of East Timor." In addition, it called for "the active prevention of neocolonialism" against the Spinoist projects.

From its origin, FRETILIN experienced spectacular growth. Its first public meeting in Dili, held September 20, 1974, drew 20,000 people. After one month it claimed 80,000 members.

The reasons for this success must be sought in the concrete work undertaken by the cadres of the front: the struggle against illiteracy, the promotion of the Timoran language and Timoran culture, the creation of health brigades, and finally, the aid to peasants in the formation of agricultural cooperatives.

FRETILIN's action & the relationship of forces

At the end of 1974 some officers of the Portuguese MFA arrived in Timor and presented a program of "cultural dynamization" and a plan for gradual decolonization that included the establishment of a coalition government in the image of the one that had been tried in Angola. In December the FRETILIN rejected the establishment of the government council, arguing that too many of the expected members had collaborated with the old Salazarist administration; but it intervened energetically in the "dynamization" teams. On June 21, 1975, a FRETILIN-UDT-Portuguese government was formed. The UDT drew the lessons of the failure of the Spinoist project in Portugal itself and of the first contacts between the Australian and Indonesian governments; it more clearly affirmed the objective of independence. The FRETILIN hoped to be able to rely on the Portuguese representative to assure that the process of decolonization would be followed through to the end and to avoid international isolation.

Each of the parties concerned — the two Timoran formations and Portugal — held one-third of the seats in the coalition government. But behind this apparent unity, the confrontation between the organizations continued. In fact, the influence of FRETILIN continued to grow, and it recruited some former members of the UDT. Its leaders continued their campaigns. In December 1974

FRETILIN had published its platform in Portuguese and Tetum (the major local language); it set up two central schools for teaching literacy, modeled after the "conscientização" of the Brazilian Paulo Freire; many other schools were set up in the villages with the aid of FRETILIN cadres. Finally, the first production cooperatives were established in the Bazaar Tete region. Taking advantage of its audience in the secondary schools, FRETILIN stimulated the creation of the UNETIM (National Students Union of Timor), which was charged with accelerating the process of "the decolonization of culture."

During this entire time, the UDT proved incapable of engaging in any popular action. One of the elements of its social base began to disintegrate. Many Chinese merchants were preparing to leave the island, most of them hoping to be able to settle in Australia. The UDT was thus led to advocate a program of "promotion of Timoran compradors." This continuous degradation of the relationship of forces was probably one of the essential factors that led the UDT to change its policy once again. It seemed to have gained a good deal of international support: An apparently fruitful visit had been organized in Indonesia. During a conference held in Macao in mid-June (in the absence of FRETILIN), the Portuguese government reneged on its promise of independence. Lemos Pires, the MFA governor, then threw his support to the UDT openly, and important contacts were made with foreign investors. On August 11 the UDT launched a coup. The leadership of FRETILIN withdrew to the hills surrounding Dili; it tried some last contacts with the Portuguese to try to bring back the coalition government; then it issued a call to the Timoran forces in the Portuguese army. The reality of the relationship of forces was then revealed. The very great majority of these troops rallied to the nationalist movement, and in a few days the members of the UDT were arrested or driven across the Indonesian border.

The changes begun in East Timor accelerated with the failure of the UDT coup, and the policy of FRETILIN radicalized again. The Portuguese administration left the island definitively. A symbolic detail of what colonialism had meant: The last doctor left the island with the Portuguese. The FRETILIN forces experienced important growth, and the elements of a new administration began to take shape: committees including cadres of the front, the army, and representatives of UNETIM, the feminist organization OPTM (Organização Popular de Mulheres de Timor — Popular Organization of Women of Timor), and the workers associations. Makeshift medical centers were set up in the villages. Experiments in collective work were developed in agriculture. Doctor José Gonçalves took over direction of the economy; new land was cleared and the construction of cooperatives enabled a part of the population of Dili to leave the capital to aid in food production. Since the Chinese wholesale merchants had left, FRETILIN began to organize trade and to coin money.

In the absence of any Portuguese representative, the sovereignty of the Lisbon government was nevertheless guaranteed by FRETILIN. The Portuguese flag continued to fly over the administrative buildings. During this whole period, in fact, FRETILIN still hoped to avoid international isolation and kept affirming its will to cooperate with the members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), asking that Australia and Portugal guarantee the island's accession to independence.

On November 28, as invasion plans were underway in Djakarta, FRETILIN finally declared independence and founded the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Francisco Xavier do Amaral became its first president. Nicolau Lobato became prime minister and José Samos Horta minister of foreign affairs. On December 7 the massive Indonesian invasion began.

The Indonesian invasion & the international stakes

Ever since the first successes of FRETILIN, Indonesia had been engaging in a violent campaign in the name of anticommunism. Djakarta had long since coveted the resources of East Timor, many of which are still unexploited. Above all, the realization of independence for the eastern part of the island was considered a serious threat. It could stimulate liberation movements among many populations of the Indonesian archipelago (especially in New Guinea and the Moluccan Islands). Finally, the Democratic Republic of Timor could serve as a refuge for a number of organizations struggling against the Suharto regime and could foster a mass uprising on the western part of the island. In Djakarta's view, decolonization meant assimilation of East Timor by Indonesia.

As long ago as February-March 1975 there had been question of sending in an Indonesian expeditionary force. But the Djakarta government and the army general staff seem to have been divided over what policy to follow. In fact, the invasion of the Democratic Republic is laden with disadvantages. On the island itself, the intervention troops could become mired in an unending guerrilla war. These troops are ill-prepared for their task. The army that crushed the Indonesian workers movement in 1965 was a policy army, accustomed to being stationed in the cities and living off corruption; but this army had never succeeded in completely pacifying the entire archipelago.

Indonesia's international situation is also delicate. The scandal of the nationalized oil company, Pertamina, the urgent search for new foreign investment, the new rise of the defense campaign for the political prisoners who are still languishing in Suharto's prisons, the initial reactions of the Australian workers movement — all these factors made a massive and direct intervention by the central Javanese power little desirable. Gen-

eral Murtupo, chief of the "East Timor acquisition project," consequently sought to act from inside the country.

At first, the main instrument used by Indonesia in East Timor was the APODETI (Democratic and Popular Association of Timor), a puppet movement advocating annexation by Indonesia. It published a newspaper in Indonesian, which is less widely spoken in Timor than Portuguese. Lacking any social base in the country, APODETI was never able to play any important role. In face of the failure of APODETI, Djakarta thought about the UDT; then, after the failure of the UDT's coup, it fostered the creation of a bloc of four organizations: APODETI, two inactive grouplets, Kota and Trabalhista, and the UDT (or at least what remained of the UDT; some of its leaders were in prison in Dili and others had fled to Australia). They founded the MRAC (Revolutionary Anticommunist Movement). Indonesia



helped them to undertake military incursions into East Timor. With no success. Because of the abortive character of these attempts to gain control of the country quietly, the considerable development of FRETILIN, and the radical course of FRETILIN's policy, Djakarta opted for the invasion.

The world context permitted this. Ford, who stopped off in the Indonesian capital on his way home from China just before the invasion, reaffirmed the strategic importance of this region of the world for the United States. Since the preparations for the invasion were well known, Ford's speech amounted to a stamp of approval for the counterrevolutionary invasion.

Portugal, of course, protested the violation of its "sovereignty." But it neither wanted nor was able to do any more than that. The government had clearly indicated that it would not support FRETILIN in any event. Since

September 1974, on the occasion of a meeting between Suharto and then Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, Australia had implicitly recognized that the Indonesian claims were well-founded. The proximity of the island to Australia and the oil interests involved resulted in "regional stability" being valued above all else, in spite of the desire of the Australian government not to support the military enterprise officially. These considerations had already been at work when the UDT attempted its coup in August 1975. In fact, the special services and several international consortiums had impelled the UDT to break the coalition with FRETILIN. The political crisis that broke out in Australia in November and December 1975 weakened FRETILIN's positions still further. The ouster of the Labor government was to draw the attention of the population to the new election campaign and considerably weaken the intensity of the solidarity movement. The coming to power of the Liberal party was also not without consequences. The substance of the policies of the two formations, the Labor party and the Liberal party, were not different, but the previous government had been more susceptible to the pressure of the workers movement and to the divisions within the Labor party that began to appear on the question of Timor.

FRETILIN was not without international support, but it was of little immediate effectiveness. Mozambique was the first state to recognize FRETILIN as the "authentic representative" of the people of Timor, in September 1975. Since then, the nationalist movement had had some success among the so-called nonaligned countries. After the invasion was launched, the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and the USSR declared their support to FRETILIN. For its part, the members of ASEAN clearly ranged themselves on the side of Djakarta. The conflict in Timor took on a new dimension. It began to draw new political lines in the Far East for the first time since April 1975, when U.S. imperialism was defeated in Indochina. But the distance of Timor, the ease with which Indonesia can organize a naval blockade, and the difficulties created by the Australian government complicate the organization of effective support, not to mention the policies of the Soviet and Chinese leaderships. In this context, the UN resolution voted in December condemning Djakarta's action and asking for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops is of little consequence.

Toward a long struggle?

It would nonetheless be false to conclude that the defeat of FRETILIN is near. The first balance-sheet that can be drawn from the ongoing actions shows this. To be sure, Dili and Baucau, the two major cities, were conquered by Suharto's forces in several hours. But FRETILIN seems to have maintained active networks there. The FRETILIN troops withdrew and are now active in the surrounding hills. A good part of the coast of certain populated areas remains under FRETILIN's control. The ability of the Indonesian troops to use

some of the major communications links is not even assured. Djakarta's losses in men have been heavy (they are numbered at least in the hundreds and perhaps even in the thousands). The expeditionary force has had to be heavily reinforced. It started at 2,000, but there are nearly 10,000 troops today. And there is little chance that this will suffice. FRETILIN has demonstrated the reality of its mass base. The nature of the terrain and the extreme scarcity of paths of communication are favorable to the organization of a guerrilla war that cannot be easily rooted out. Two-thirds of the territory appears to be under FRETILIN control today. It is therefore likely that the fighting will develop into a protracted struggle. For FRETILIN, this poses the problem of the present limits of its program. On several occasions it has already had to radicalize its action in order to assure itself popular support against the UDT. It has had to abandon its hopes — or illusions? — in the support for decolonization it expected to receive from Australia and Portugal. FRETILIN knows that it has to rely above all on its own struggle and that outside aid will be belated and limited. In this battle, it will find itself facing a twofold problem: that of social reforms, agrarian and urban, much deeper than those undertaken up to now, and that of the regional extension of the struggle. The situation in West Timor, a former Dutch colony today under the heel of the Djakarta dictatorship, which in large part serves as the base of operations for the Indonesian invasion, cannot be ignored. FRETILIN's capacity to resist the invasion victoriously and in a lasting manner may in the end depend on the extension of the struggle. Its present program has consciously avoided responding to this question.

But if the evolution of the present situation assigns new tasks to FRETILIN which it is not yet prepared to assume, it lends a heavy responsibility to the international workers movement. The importance of the solidarity movement is strikingly manifest in Australia. The traditions developed during the solidarity struggles with the Indochinese peoples have been awakened on this occasion. Common action has been waged by many trade unions, student associations, support movements, religious groups, and political organizations of the left and far left. Demonstrations, occupations of Indonesian offices, and concrete solidarity actions are not all that has been done. Boycott movements have also been launched, the most important after December 7. The Waterside Workers Union (dockers) of Sydney has called for a boycott of all Indonesia-bound ships; the government workers of the plane factories, who manufacture the Sabre aircraft, have forbidden the sending of the military equipment they produce to Djakarta. Several flights of the Indonesian airlines company have been blocked by the transport union in Sydney. The Meat Industries Employees Union organized the boycott of meat shipments to Indonesia. Although these actions have not permitted a total boycott, they have nevertheless been very important; above all, they point to the road that must be followed. The struggle of the people of Timor requires active international solidarity.

January 30, 1976



**DECLARATION OF THE
UNITED SECRETARIAT
OF THE
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL**

SOLIDARITY WITH THE STRUGGLE OF THE FRETILIN!

Timor, Portuguese colony in the Indonesian archipelago, was no longer but a vestige of a colonial order that had fallen into obsolescence. After 450 years of colonial domination, the 650,000 inhabitants of this eastern part of the island owned by Portugal were living in poverty and illiteracy, most of them still engaged in subsistence agriculture.

April 25, 1974, marked the end of a colonial era, but did not lay down any outlines for the future. The accelerated emergence of political parties was as sudden as the collapse of the colonial system. Each of these new political parties found a base of support among the social classes and groups that composed colonial society.

The Democratic Union of Timor (UDT), created by indigenous functionaries of the colonial administration, soon rallied behind its program the traditional village chiefs, the coffee planters, and the Chinese comprador

bourgeoisie that dominated the island's trade. Its objective: the long-term independence of the colony within the framework of a federation with Portugal, a direct echo of Spínola's neocolonial project.

The Democratic Association of the People of Timor (APODETI) called for the attachment of this eastern part of the island to the Indonesian state. The western part of Timor had already been annexed to the Indonesian state at the end of the second world war, when Indonesia won its independence. APODETI, which expresses the political and economic interests of the Indonesian dictatorship, lacks any social base in this country, where the Indonesian language is less widely spoken than Portuguese. The APODETI is maintained by subsidies from Djakarta.

The Social Democratic Association of Timor (ASDT)

emerged after the first victorious strike of the employees of the colonial administration. In September 1974 it transformed itself into the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). Lacking local political traditions, the intellectuals who founded this front drew their essential political references from the models provided by the African liberation movements against Portuguese colonialism: FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC. Calling for immediate and total independence, FRETILIN was initially based mainly on urban layers, but it soon acquired an influence in the villages, particularly because of the intervention of its literacy brigades and the politicization campaigns it conducted in the major local language, Tetum, as well as the aid granted to peasants in creating cooperatives.

On November 28, 1975, FRETILIN proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. And on December 7 Indonesian troops invaded the new state. In several hours they imposed their control over the capital, Dili. But they were not able to extend this control over more than one-third of the territory. The FRETILIN popular militias threw themselves into a protracted struggle against the forces of the Indonesian military dictatorship. Beyond the confrontation in Timor itself, it is neocolonial order in this region of Asia that has been challenged.

The fall of Spínola and the Indonesian intervention led the UDT to demand independence. It then formed a coalition with FRETILIN for several months, hoping in this way to block the extension of FRETILIN's influence. Under the impact of the successes of FRETILIN, the pressure of the Australian and American secret services, and the pressure of oil companies looking for deposits, this alliance broke down in June 1975. On August 10, 1975, acting with the complicity of the Portuguese colonial administration, the UDT fomented a coup in an attempt to annihilate FRETILIN. But FRETILIN was then joined by the majority of the Timoran soldiers of the colonial army. In September this period of civil war led to the victory of FRETILIN, the Chinese merchants and the Portuguese colonial authorities leaving the island.

Subsequently, there was a regroupment of political forces favoring the passage of East Timor under the hegemony of the Indonesian dictatorship. The remnants of the UDT allied with the APODETI. From their bases on the Indonesian side of the border, they tried to organize incursions into the zones controlled by FRETILIN, with the material and military support of Djakarta. The Indonesian dictatorship took serious measures to assure their success, and Ali Murtupo, the chief of Bakin (the secret police), was named "officer for the East Timor acquisition project." But the weakness of Indonesia's allies — the APODETI and UDT — did not permit realization of the initial project of the leadership of the Indonesian state, which was aiming at a "quiet" annexation. The only solution became invasion. The Indonesian officers want to eliminate the threat of East Timor becoming both a base of support for opponents of their regime and an example for the peoples of the Indonesian archipelago subject to the terror of the central, Java-

nese power. In addition, they want to preserve the strategic value of East Timor; Adam Malik, the foreign minister of the Indonesian government, has recognized that "it is security and stability, both national and regional" that is at stake, the rise of struggles in East Timor reflecting both the final crisis of Portuguese colonialism and, at the same time, the ongoing realignment of forces in the Far East after the defeat of American imperialism in Indochina.

The invasion of East Timor by Indonesian troops on December 7, 1975, was falsely portrayed as a response to an appeal by four political parties of the country: the APODETI, the UDT, and two other formations slapped together for the occasion, Kota and Trabalista. The Indonesian forces plundered and sacked the capital. Numbering more than 10,000, the Indonesian troops were able to crush the FRETILIN forces, which retreated to the hills to wage guerrilla warfare.

The struggle that has been launched promises to be a hard one, long and difficult for the population of Timor, for the invader commands material and military superiority. Only a social mobilization of the entire peasantry and of the urban workers and popular layers can lastingly defeat the Indonesian invasion. The liquidation of the existing property relations in the countryside is a precondition for this. The risk of being "closed up" in the half-island of East Timor is very great. That is why extension of the struggle to the part of the island under Indonesian domination acquires great importance, and this cannot be done without a mobilization of the peasantry to overthrow the existing order. In order to win victory the struggle now going on in East Timor will have to go beyond the limits of the program currently formulated by FRETILIN and fully respond to the interests of the social layers on which it is based. Born in isolation and without deep anti-imperialist political traditions, FRETILIN is a movement of national liberation that can find no third road between the neocolonial threat and the struggle for full national liberation, which can only be socialist.

The mobilization of the masses constitutes a very important element in this struggle, which must be supported because it represents a link in the anti-imperialist struggle in the region and because it is fighting against an Indonesian military dictatorship that has not faced any opposition since it took power in 1965. The international dimension of the situation thus created in Timor must be utilized to denounce and isolate the Indonesian dictatorship. The Australian dockers have shown the way, boycotting Indonesian ships.

Portuguese revolutionaries must organize the broadest solidarity in all forms to vigorously denounce the maneuvers of the Portuguese government, which are facilitating the imperialist operations.

The Fourth International extends its unconditional support to the struggle FRETILIN is waging against the Indonesian invader, for the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. □



BEHIND THE REVOLT OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCANS

by **NATHAN WEINSTOCK**

For several days the Netherlands were marked by an atmosphere of state of siege. In flagrant violation of the Constitution, South Moluccans were forcibly "removed" from their homes on orders of the police. Television newscasts were subject to preventive censorship; press photographers were forced to hand in their films; an entire region was subjected to a genuine military occupation. All this was topped off by the clamor of the right demanding the adoption of draconian measures to combat "terrorism"; there were rumors of the implementation of a crisis plan patterned after the infamous "Prometheus Plan," which served as the scenario for

the Greek military coup in 1967.

In view of this situation, it is clear that the action of the South Moluccan commandos provided the Dutch bourgeoisie with an opportunity to psychologically and materially prepare public opinion for the establishment of a strong state. Now, these events occur at a time when the economy of the Netherlands is being hit by the world crisis of the capitalist system and, highly significantly, at a time when the government is preparing to expel a large number of immigrant workers from the

country. In this climate, marked by a recrudescence of racism among the population, enlivened by the anti-immigrant campaign being waged by newspapers like *De Telegraaf* on the subject of the influx of immigrants from Surinam, the events around the action of the South Moluccan commandos took on a sinister resonance. The South Moluccan affair was tailor-made to serve as a dress rehearsal for the advocates of a hard line among the bourgeoisie.

What is particularly noteworthy in the Beilen affair was that the painstaking preparation and total success of the taking of the hostages was in contrast to the weakness of the "message" that the terrorist action was supposed to support. The quasimilitary action succeeded perfectly; but on the political level there was an almost total absence of any political program, apart from the impact of the action on public opinion. To understand this discrepancy, it is necessary to back up and look at the genesis of this ill-known movement of South Moluccans. This history permits an understanding of the colonial background that throws light on the problem of the South Moluccans and illustrates how their fate confirms the fact that repression in the colonies constitutes preparation for assaults on democratic rights in the metropolis.

At first a problem of harkis

The uprooting of the South Moluccans has its origin in the colonization of the Dutch East Indies, particularly the island of Amboina. The exploitation of the South Moluccans (in the spice trade) dates back to the time of the Dutch East Indies Company and more particularly to the capitalist and western penetration of the Indonesian archipelago. The result of this penetration was the formation of a particular culture combining traditional features and imported patterns. The Christianized Amboinians, whose particularism was carefully preserved, served as the advance guard of Dutch colonialism. The indigenous shock troops for colonial repression (the KNIL) were recruited from among them. They were the instruments of colonial butchery throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Uprooted from their place of origin and alienated from the Muslim Indonesian masses, the Protestant Amboinians became dependent on the colonial power.

The participation of "loyal" South Moluccans in the military repression of Indonesian nationalism after 1945 concluded the process of compromising the South Moluccans in the eyes of the masses. Left stranded by the withdrawal of the Dutch forces and the dissolution of the colonial troops (the KNIL), they constituted, with complicity whose source can be easily guessed, an ephemeral neocolonial state, the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS — Republic of South Moluccans). The South Moluccan soldiers stationed on Java intended to go to the RMS. In the meantime, however, The Hague had worked out a modus vivendi with the Sukarno re-

gime. The forces of the KNIL could not be demobilized in Java, where they would have risked being lynched. The new Dutch policy ruled out their being allowed to go to Ceram in the Moluccan archipelago to continue fighting against the Indonesian Republic. The difficulty was resolved in a typically colonial manner: The KNIL troops were loaded aboard Dutch naval vessels, forcibly disarmed, and deposited in the Netherlands, where no better solution was found than to lodge the South Moluccan ex-fighters and their families in old camps built by the Nazis.

That is where the tragedy of the South Moluccans began. They were totally cut off from the Moluccan archipelago, where the South Moluccan republic had meanwhile suffered an inglorious and unlamented demise. They found themselves administratively penned up under frightful conditions, first in camps and later in ghettos built specially for them. Their quite understandable bitterness took the form of an intense aspiration to concretize the totally artificial dream of the RMS. (In their time, the Jewish camps for "displaced persons" after 1945 also served as hotbeds for the diffusion of Zionist ideology.) Moreover, this secular messianism drew clear encouragement from the Dutch right, which had not given up hope of stimulating separatism in West Irian, the Moluccan islands, and elsewhere in order to bring about the fall of Sukarno, or at least to weaken the Indonesian regime.

Penned up in their quarters and fixated on the ideal of the RMS, the South Moluccans found themselves completely cut off from the Dutch community. The rigid and military ambiance that permeated their families, in which paternalist power was colored by an "NCO-like" atmosphere, completed the disorientation of the youth. These youth were rejected by the population (the South Moluccans are even more unpopular than the immigrants from Surinam) and deprived of Dutch nationality (the parents maintained their fictitious South Moluccan nationality); they sought psychological compensation in aggressiveness, criminality, suicidal behavior, and flight reactions (nostalgia for the RMS somewhat resembles a sort of daydream).

When the generals' putsch overthrew the Sukarno regime in an unprecedented bloodbath, the Dutch right lost all interest in the separatist aspirations of the South Moluccans. But it was not enough to simply dismiss the Moor who had finished his job. More than 30,000 South Moluccans were languishing in their quarters, clinging with frenetic tragedy to their mythical South Moluccan Republic. The youth, caught between the reactionary and authoritarian nostalgia of their parents and the hostility of their Dutch surroundings, were suffocating. They were no longer in the mood to docilely follow the old models.

They suffered from this difficult situation. They had bitterly endured the forced dispersions, the deprivation of military pensions suffered by their fathers, and the brutal repression of the internment camps for Moluccans. In return, they experienced colonial repression.

SOUTH MOLUCCA

The revolt

This collective frustration exploded with the occupation of the home of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar in 1970. (Other spectacular actions followed.) But this action was not merely a break with passivity. It cannot be understood without taking account of the repercussions within the South Moluccan community of the campaign waged by the Dutch left against the Suharto regime. Thus, the appearance of political activism among the South Moluccan youth is explained by a curious combination of colonial nostalgia and sensitivity to the rise of the colonial revolution! Thus, E. Virecht, writing in the December 19, 1970, issue of *De Groener Amsterdammer*, stressed that the South Moluccans were manifesting a "black power" mentality. Young South Moluccan militants in prison were asking to read Eldridge Cleaver, Che Guevara, and Mao. In 1971 some released militants, along with other South Moluccan youth, founded the South Moluccan Liberation Front, which emphasized their group particularism and called on the Dutch and Indonesian masses to join them in a common anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggle against both the Suharto regime and the Dutch government, for the liberation of the South Moluccans, but also for the liberation of all the peoples of Indonesia. (See *De Groener Amsterdammer*, December 18, 1971.)

The entrance of the South Moluccans onto the Dutch political scene was met by a severe repression. The police savagely clubbed demonstrators and leaflet distributors. Police raids conducted at bayonet point took place in the South Moluccan neighborhoods, especially in Isseloord. The discovery of a plot to kidnap the queen sowed panic among the "forces of order." When 5,000 Moluccans met to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the stillborn Republic of South Moluccans, 2,650 policemen showed up and helicopters circled the assembly. The surrounding of South Moluccan communities by police accompanied by dogs and equipped with armored vehicles became a constant occurrence — Ulster in the Netherlands.

In short, a genuine state of war inside their quarters unfolded, amidst general indifference among the Dutch.

Such is the background to South Moluccan terrorism. We may add that this hybrid movement was sensitive to the "profitability" of the terrorist actions of the Palestinians from the standpoint of their impact on the mass media.

It remains to be seen whether the combativity of the South Moluccans and their collective frustration will be susceptible to being integrated into the class struggle in the Netherlands, if their inclination for revolutionary action can be channeled by the revolutionary vanguard toward realistic objectives, if their movement can articulate itself around Indonesian and/or Dutch reality. Obviously, a precondition for this would be the rise of critical consciousness among them about the ahistorical and profoundly reactionary character of the hope of seeing the rebirth, or rather the birth, of the Republic of South Moluccans. □

SRI LANKA

11 sentenced to death

Eleven political prisoners have been sentenced to be hanged. Hundreds of others are languishing in prison. Most of them are youth, accused and condemned for infractions relating to the so-called insurrection of April 1971. Thousands have been imprisoned for two, three, and even four years without ever being charged, on the pretext that they must be "rehabilitated" before being released. The great majority of these youth had simply attended political courses organized by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a revolutionary youth group. Many others, among them some young militants of the Tamil people, are still being detained without charge.

Even the political prisoners who have been released are denied genuine liberty. As convicted criminals, they are subject to various restrictions and to constant police surveillance. And several political groups and organizations remain banned under the state of emergency.

All this has been done in the name of "public security." Moreover, the witchhunt against government employees and workers in the state enterprises is going on unabated. The same is true for the trade unions that reject collaboration with the government, which suffer discrimination, especially in the institutions the government controls.

It is under these conditions that the government of the Sri Lanka Freedom party, supported by the CP, is preparing to hold general elections. The government's main opposition in parliament, the United National party, acts in the same manner. There is a basic agreement between these two political formations of the capitalist class, the SLFP and the UNP, on the question of the repression of political activity and of the masses whenever capitalist domination is threatened. The Public Security Law, which allows the use of "emergency powers," and other repressive legislation such as the Criminal Justice Commissions Bill, provide the legal base for these enterprises. We must demand:

Save the lives of the political prisoners condemned to death!
Free all political prisoners!
Lift all restrictions on the liberties of the political prisoners who have been released!
Lift the ban on political organizations and groups!
Stop the witchhunt and stop discrimination in all its forms!



MEXICO: 200,000 WORKERS DEMONSTRATE

MEXICO CITY— From the standpoint of revolutionary politics, the year 1975 ended with a huge and impressive proletarian demonstration in Mexico City. Even the bourgeois press estimated the crowd at between 150,000 and 200,000 people, the majority of whom were workers.

Called by the Tendencia Democrática (Democratic Tendency) of the SUTERM (one of the two electrical workers unions), the significance of this demonstration went far beyond the trade-union issues that were at its origin. Of course, the formidable display of workers and revolutionary solidarity can justly be cited as support for the struggle now being waged by the Tendencia Democrática. But the political context in which this demonstration took place lent it the character of an expression of the consciousness of political opposition to the regime.

In fact, in 1975 the presidential candidate of the official party, the PRI, was "revealed" to be José López Portillo. (See INPRECOR, No.37, November 6, 1975.) On November 15, López Portillo held his first big meeting in Mexico City, in Zócalo, the main square. The meeting of the PRI took place in the morning and fell far short of attracting the enthusiastic working-class crowd that the electrical workers demonstration assembled that same afternoon. The obvious contrast between the two political expressions was impressive; it showed a clear decline in the political strength of Echeverría's successor.

The great significance of the action on the trade-union level was also evident. The Tendencia Democrática

succeeded in mobilizing more than 50,000 of its members from throughout the country, thus demonstrating that it holds a large majority within the SUTERM. The struggle of this trade-union tendency inside one of the key national trade unions is the highest and most conscious expression of a workers movement that is beginning to go beyond the limits imposed by the official trade-union bureaucracy (the well-known and detested "charros"). The demonstration represented a clear blow against the bureaucracy of the electrical workers union, which has been attempting to oust the Tendencia Democrática from the union.

A sector of the revolutionary left criticized the enormous efforts expended especially by the CP and the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International (the Liga Socialista and the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista) to make this demonstration a great success. The criticism was based on the fact that the leadership of Rafael Galván, recognized leader of the TD, is "revolutionary nationalist" and does not break with official views and policies. But, as always, the ultra-leftist criticism fails to distinguish between the leadership and the movement that follows the leadership, in this case one of the broadest and most combative sectors of the Mexican proletariat. It also forgets that in the case of the two organizations of the Fourth International, no concession was made to "revolutionary nationalism" and that their united action with the workers of the SUTERM and the rest of the trade-unions that demonstrated in solidarity with the electrical workers permitted these organizations of the Fourth International to participate with a broad contingent in one of the

most important proletarian mobilizations in Mexico today.

This was also understood by the thousands and thousands of student and worker activists who came to the demonstration, lending it a clearly socialist and revolutionary coloration and character, the spirit of which was picked

up by thousands and thousands of workers who chanted and took up slogans coined by the communist movement. The presence, for the first time in a demonstration of this size, of a revolutionary Marxist contingent of 1,000 people sealed a commitment: From this point on, all the workers demonstrations will be marked by a revolutionary Marxist presence. □

FREE ALL INDIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS!

cont'd. from page 32.

political prisoners; such a movement must be broadly based and nonexclusive, grouping together all the workers parties and organizations. This divisive attitude goes hand in hand with an opening toward the far right on

the part of these same Maoists, who have made common cause with the partisans of the Indian fascist organization Jana Sangh, which preaches intolerance against the Muslim masses and an exclusive Hinduism that aims at dividing the workers in the worst manner. A representative of this organization spoke at the meeting preceding the January 25 demonstration, under the cover of the "Friends of India" organization.

The revolutionary Marxist militants of the Asian Socialist Forum opposed the presence of this speaker and shouted the slogan: No to Indira, no to Jana Sangh, for workers power! The organizers threatened to exclude these militants from the demonstration if they did not desist. But the organizers had to give up when hundreds of demonstrators took up this slogan, as well as another: Stop the torture! Stop the killings! Down with the state of emergency! In the course of this demonstration, the contingent marching behind the banner of the Campaign for the Release of Indian Political Prisoners (CRIPP), supported by the Asian Socialist Forum, numbered more than 300 people.

The mass of Maoist militants at this demonstration were divided according to their counterposed political positions: some of them sided with those who booed the representative of the fascists. It appears that the disintegration of the Indian Maoist current may inhibit solidarity actions in defense of Indian political prisoners because of the hegemony this current has held up to now. Since the Indira Gandhi regime has committed itself to a long period of suppression of basic liberties and has made the state of emergency its daily law, all demonstrations of solidarity with prisoners and of condemnation of the existing regime must be pushed forward. Everyone who agrees to act in this way should be brought together, without the slightest exclusion. □



NOTE: The comrades of the CRIPP in London have published a very detailed pamphlet on repression in India: "Land of Political Prisoners." The address of the CRIPP is: G. Kumar, 22 Boundary Road, London NW 8.



CAMPAIGN
FOR THE
RELEASE OF INDIAN
POLITICAL PRISONERS

FREE ALL INDIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS!

On January 25 more than 2,000 people demonstrated in the streets of London against repression in India and for the release of tens of thousands of political prisoners who have been held without trial for several years now. The very great majority of these political prisoners are Maoist militants belonging to the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or to other Maoist groupings; these various political groupings have exploded into many rival fragments, some of which have broken with their Maoist orientation.

This Maoist orientation had acquired a predominant influence among Indian communities abroad, and solidarity actions have consequently had leaderships controlled by the Maoists. The January 25 demonstration in London had been called by this sort of movement.

The Indian Maoist movement, in clear decline in India itself, has exhibited a similar trend abroad. On January 25 the Indian Maoist current in Britain demonstrated the reality of its degeneration; the extension of the revolutionary Marxist current in the Indian left was also demonstrated.

Because of the ultrasectarian positions of the Maoists (Naxalites), the majority of the disillusioned militants of the pro-Moscow Communist party of India and of the Communist party of India (Marxist) did not join the demonstration. Rejecting these militants unless they agree to attack Russian "social imperialism" and line up behind Peking can only have the worst divisive and weakening effects on a movement of solidarity with the people of India. cont'd. on page 31.