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THREE WORKER MILITANTS MURDERED!

At 12:30 a.m. on the morning of May 30, a gang of fifteen right-wing thugs, using walkie-talkies and armed with clubs, machine guns, and other firearms, broke into the Pacheco (north Buenos Aires) headquarters of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party), an Argentine sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. About twenty persons were present in the headquarters at the time. All were beaten. Six members of the PST -- three men and three women -- were kidnapped by the right-wing gangsters.

The men -- Antonio Moses, Oscar Dalmacio Mesa, and Mario Sida -- were forced into the trunks of the goons' cars. Their bodies were found several hours later. They had been tortured and murdered. Beside the bodies were found nineteen .45 caliber, thirty 9-millimeter, and four .22 caliber shells. The women victims were beaten, but later released alive.

Moses, Mesa, and Sida were all young workers and factory delegates in the area of northern Buenos Aires; Moses and Mesa were metalworkers, Sida a textileworker.

The incident was not the first case of right-wing violence in the area to be directed against the PST. On May 7 Inosencio Fernández, a 26-year-old PST member who was also active in the metalworkers union, had been gunned down. Fernández had helped organize an opposition slate to the trade-union bureaucrats in his local during the March elections in the metalworkers union.

The May 31 issue of the Buenos Aires daily Clarín reported that two additional attacks on the PST had been made in Mar del Plata on May 30: Carlos Petroni, a party activist and member of the Retail Workers Front, was shot by a group of thugs as he left the Commerce Employees Center; and a bomb exploded in the local PST headquarters, the tenth violent attack on the PST in recent months. No injuries were reported, but damage to the headquarters was considerable.

The attacks on the PST are clearly part of the general offensive of the Peronist trade-union bureaucracy and the Peronist government itself against the Argentine workers movement. Perón's attempts at "institutionalizing" his regime have been met with broad opposition from the working class, and the leaders of the Peronist movement have answered that opposition with armed attacks on all forces standing to the left of the regime. Not even the left wing of Perón's own movement has been spared. The murdered members of the PST were clearly picked out because of their activity in unions that have been the arena of struggle against the Peronist bureaucracy.

The PST has reported that work stoppages in response to the murders occurred in several factories and secondary schools that the victims had been associated with. Mass student meetings took place hours after the bodies of the murdered militants had been found. Augustín Tosco, one of the leaders of the Cordobazo (the 1969 insurrectional general strike in the city of Córdoba), addressed 2,000 students in the law school of Buenos Aires University in solidarity with the PST on the night of May 30. Statements of support were received by the party's national headquarters from all the left parties. The Juventud Radical Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Radical party Youth) called for mobilizations to oppose the right-wing violence. The Parliamentary Labor Committee of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (made up of the heads of all parties participating in parliament) called on the government to take steps to arrest the murderers.

It is clear, however, that the Peronist government, which is ultimately (if not directly) responsible for the armed right-wing attacks on the workers movement, will scarcely be the force to put a stop to the escalating right-wing terror. That is the task of the Argentine workers movement, for which the problem of the organization of armed self-defense is posed more sharply than ever, and of the workers movement internationally. The PST has asked that international solidarity messages be sent to its Buenos Aires headquarters: Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, 24 de Noviembre 225, Capital Federal, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

The international workers movement must respond to the attack of the Peronist bureaucracy with international solidarity with the victims and with the whole Argentine workers movement!



Some of the 4,000 people who demonstrated at the funeral of the slain PST members.

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AFTER THE BRESCIA MASSACRE

On May 28 a bomb exploded during a trade-union rally in the city of Brescia, killing seven persons and wounding several dozen.

It was clearly a fascist action, only the latest in a series of attacks and open provocations that began in December 1969 with the explosion of a bomb in the Agriculture Bank in Milan's Piazza Fontana.

The Brescia massacre was answered by a broad mass response. On May 29 the whole country was paralyzed by a four-hour general strike that was accompanied by enormous demonstrations (200,000 in Rome). In some cities, local offices of the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano -- Italian Social Movement, a neofascist organization) were attacked and destroyed.

In addition to the Brescia massacre and the mass response to it, the political crisis of the country was exacerbated by the worsening of the economic situation (increased rate of inflation, huge balance of payments deficit), which was pointed out in a report issued by Carli, the director of the Bank of

Italy. Once again, open polemics about what to do broke out among the bourgeoisie. Agnelli, the president of Fiat and of the Federation of Industrialists, began speaking of a new "Social Pact," explicitly referring to the national unity that was established at the end of the second world war. This new open political crisis was to lead to the resignation of the Rumor government on June 10.

The Italian Communist party reacted to the new situation by relaunching its call for a "historic compromise" (that is, collaboration between Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats).

We are publishing below the editorial on the Italian situation after Brescia that appeared in the June 5 issue of *Bandiera Rossa*, fortnightly organ of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International.

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The Brescia massacre came just two weeks after the divorce referendum, which had resulted in a stinging defeat for the most reactionary wing of the bourgeoisie and had showed that the crisis of political leadership was more intense than ever. Brescia once more laid bare the conflict-laden character of the present situation in Italy and stimulated a frantic search for "new" solutions. The extremely negative economic outlook dramatized the situation still further, suggesting to certain of the most representative members of the ruling class the perspective of a turn that could be concretized in a "Social Pact" similar to the one arrived at at the end of the second world war.

Results of the 'strategy of tension'

More than anything else, the Brescia tragedy proved that there are sectors inclined to play the strategy of tension out to its most odious conclusions. As was easy to foresee, the failure of the "moderate" policy of seeking a bloc between the Christian Democracy and the right gave rise to an attempt by the far right to turn to terror to bring the regime's crisis to a head. Everything that has come to light since the attack as to the responsibility of clearly identified groups has clarified for everyone what the revolutionary left has been saying ever since the attack at the Piazza Fontana in Milan: that the fascists could count on the connivance of the most varied sectors of the state apparatus and that their strength lay precisely in that connivance, as well as in the economic subsidies they were getting.

The response to the Brescia massacre, which took on enormous dimensions even emotionally, demonstrated another, no less clear, fact: The fascists are still very weak and any attempt to install a fascist or fascist-like dictatorship would inevitably run up against a vigorous reaction from the working class and broad layers of the petty-bourgeoisie and could trigger a civil-war dynamic whose outcome would be uncertain. It is this very fact -- and not any commitment to "democratic institutions" -- that led the great majority of the ruling class to join in the condemning of the Brescia action and to seek to create (through the medium of its best known spokesmen and press organs) an atmosphere of antifascist unity, taking up the thirty-year-old theme of national unity.



In the final analysis, the basic political question that is posed today is: Does the Italian bourgeoisie believe that it has reached the end of its rope and, given the impossibility of imposing a fascist or military dictatorship by force, is it prepared to carry out the sort of turn that it took in 1944-45; that is, to seek to create an alliance with all the components of the workers movement? Is the hour of the "Social Pact," or, to use the words of Berlinguer (the head of the Italian Communist party), of the new "historic compromise" about to sound?

Toward a new 'social pact'?

For our part, we have never excluded such a possibility. On the contrary, on several occasions we have pointed to important tendencies working in that direction. These tendencies have been strengthened to a considerable extent by the debasement of parliamentary democracy, the growing threat of an insoluble crisis for the regime, and the existing political relationship of forces that has been revealed by the divorce referendum and the mobilization after Brescia, to mention only the most recent events. The speech made by Agnelli to the Confindustria (the Italian industrialists federation) was the most important manifestation of this tendency. And for their part, the leaders of the Communist party have sought to utilize the referendum results and the response to Brescia in exactly this same sense. The bargaining power of the CP leaders has incontestably been bolstered, and certain international experiences during the past few weeks (in Portugal) have contributed to discrediting the legend that the Communist parties are subversive elements, instead showing the inclination of the CP leaders to be a brake on mass movements, canalizing them just at the most potentially explosive conjunctures.

Nevertheless, there are still very important obstacles to putting into practice the sort of policy that was implemented at the end of the second world war; that is, to bringing the Communist party into the government or into the parliamentary majority. On the level of the political forces of the bourgeoisie, the Christian Democracy and its right-wing allies have only recently reaffirmed their desire to continue on a center course, reserving for the CP the role of an opposition with which they can work, but without really integrating the CP into the governmental system. On the level of economic and social exigencies, these same bourgeois spokesmen who in past days have spoken about an explicit move toward a radical solution, have done nothing except demand that the CP and the unions show some "moderation," renounce the struggle for a generalized defense of real wages, and call a truce. But they have offered nothing in return. It is for this reason that in spite of the inclination of the trade-union bureaucracy, and in spite of the concessions it made in holding back a new rise of generalized struggles, the discussions between the trade-union leaders and the government have still not led to any concrete result and the union leaders have been unable to refrain from expressing their satisfaction, even if in a moderate fashion.

But beyond episodic confrontations, the basic contradiction that continues to be an obstacle to the realization of the "historic compromise" is this: The bourgeoisie can extract itself -- or better, try to extract itself -- from the present economic situation only by reducing even further the standard of living of the broad masses, by making deep changes in the economic structure that in the final analysis will involve an increase in the rate of exploitation and a maintenance or reduction in the level of employment. They can try to prettify the situation all they want, but that is the reality. And

that is exactly what the political and trade-union bureaucracies of the workers movement find difficult to accept in a situation in which the working class is still showing signs of a high degree of militancy and in which broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie are continuing to radicalize. On the more directly political level, it is hard to see how the much-desired "democratic" turn could be concretized, how the verbal declarations could actually be put into effect. Does anyone believe that it would be possible to "regenerate" all the state apparatuses from the police to the courts simply by affirming the desire for such a "regeneration" or at the most by changing the composition of the government?

The workers will not pay for the crisis!

Whatever may happen, revolutionaries must be absolutely clear on the fundamental orientation for the struggle of the workers movement during this period and on their crucial tasks. Above all, the working class must not be defeated in the battle that the bourgeoisie is ceaselessly waging against it to make it bear the costs of the economic crisis. On this score, all the speeches about "sense of responsibility" and "necessary sacrifices" must be rejected. That means that any idea of a truce must be rejected, and that the conditions for a general mobilization around goals that unite all layers of the laboring population must be created in the briefest possible time. The employers and the government will try to attack the already insufficient system of adjusting wages according to the cost of living. The working class must oppose this attempt with a mobilization for a real sliding scale of wages that would totally and immediately compensate for any reduction in buying power caused by price increases. This system must be under the control of the workers at all levels (from formulation of the cost of living index to control of prices in the stores).

The employers and the government are preparing to attack the level of employment. The workers must oppose these plans with a struggle against every suspension or layoff so that the existing work may be shared among all workers with no reduction in wages. If there must be reductions, they should be of working hours, not of wages. Finally, the working class must concern itself with the differentiations in its own midst. The least favored and least organized categories of workers are losing ground compared to the most militant categories, and they are consequently getting ever-lower wages. It is necessary to fight this tendency by demanding a guaranteed minimum wage. This total movement of the working class must prepare for a national general strike, which must not be simply a repeat of the symbolic demonstrations of the past, but must take on the character of a test of strength. To do that, the strike must be prolonged for as long as is necessary to make the enemy class yield. No one should have any illusions about the difficulty of such a struggle. But there is no other choice. Either victory will be won on this field of battle and through these methods or the workers will have to resign themselves to paying the price, the very heavy price, of the crisis; and that would mean a serious defeat.

As for the political battle -- whose urgency was demonstrated by the Brescia events -- revolutionaries must reject the solution of indiscriminate "democratic and antifascist unity." Their line must be based on the necessity for a united front, but a workers united front, that is, a front based on the unity of the working class and all layers of the laboring population. This applies not only to the content of such a front but to its methods of struggle as well. The policy of antifascist unity tends inevitably to rely on constitutional mechanisms (demand-

ing the outlawing of the MSI, for example) and on putting pressure on the state apparatuses (the police, the courts, the government) to make them defend "democracy." There is no longer any need to demonstrate how illusory such a perspective is. The policy of the workers united front implies the mobilization of the working class to repel fascist attacks and to defend the rights and freedoms that the workers movement has won through dozens of years of struggle. And that implies the necessity of forming workers self-defense detachments that are organized in the factories and neighborhoods and have ties among one another at the national level. This means self-defense of local workers centers, pickets, and demonstrations. And that means fundamentally that the working class must not fall under the tutelage of the apparatuses of the class enemy, which has no desire to track down the fascist bands and has

left a clear field for criminal bombers. The working class must rely on its own forces and its own organization.

The prime task of revolutionaries is to fight so that ever more important layers of the working class understand the necessity of this orientation and to become the direct protagonists of the anticapitalist and antifascist battles that are on the agenda.

This means that all opportunist and centrist confusion about the class nature of the struggle against fascism must be avoided. All sectarian positions must be swept aside. The initiatives of the vanguard must not be seen as ends in themselves, but must constantly tend to mobilize the broadest possible layers of the working class. That is the concrete way to wage the struggle against the hegemony of the bureaucracy.

PORTUGAL

THE WORKERS OFFENSIVE

by A. UDRY

More than a month and a half after the "coup" carried out by the Armed Forces Movement, the alignment of forces in the Portuguese political situation is emerging with ever greater clarity.

The workers mobilizations that broke out on a big scale after May 1 are declining, but a series of "exemplary" but limited struggles are keeping the general movement going. The Portuguese Communist party is stepping up its anti-strike, anti-"ultraleft" campaign and continues to proclaim its support to the program of the Armed Forces Movement. In addition, the CP is trying to set up a central trade-union apparatus, through the medium of the Union Federation, which utilizes the old corporatist "trade-union" structures.

The junta -- which formally functions under the form of the Council of State, which has sixteen military and five civilian members -- is initiating a policy of selective repression that is aimed at testing the far left's capacity to organize a broad response and at simultaneously preparing to take the strictest measures to limit as much as possible the accelerating decomposition of the bourgeoisie's decisive instrument: the army. This is all the more important in that on Tuesday, June 11, Spínola indicated clearly that the "process of decolonialization will be a long one." And that could produce new ferment in the army. Concurrently, the bourgeoisie is seeking through its many demonstrations of support to Spínola to re-

construct an instrument of political rule that will facilitate its operations. It is in this general context, within which economic difficulties (unemployment, inflation, etc.) and the "colonial question" will play decisive roles, that the various demonstrations, political positions taken, and mobilizations now going on in Portugal must be located.

A wave of strikes

The strike movement in the factories became generalized only after the massive demonstrations of May 1. To be sure, they fit into the framework of the upsurge of workers struggles during 1973 and the beginning of 1974 (there were 200 strikes in January 1974), an upsurge that was linked to the explosion of inflation that began in the middle of 1973. Nevertheless, the limits of this strike movement have appeared both in terms of their objectives and in terms of their dispersion and forms of struggle. On April 25 (the day of the coup), there was only one factory on strike, the Mague metallurgical company (2,000 workers). The demands of the workers were immediately granted. Work started again on April 26. The junta clearly showed its position: the strike was sharply attacked and the officers indicated that this "example" should not be followed.

Nevertheless, after the May 1 mobilizations revealed the relationship of forces between the bourgeoisie and the toiling



Striking dock workers in Lisbon.

... a wave of strikes broke out in all the economic sectors with a strength that the organizers of the coup never expected.

masses, a wave of strikes broke out in all economic sectors with a strength that the organizers of the coup never expected. To varying degrees, the strikes fused with the struggle against the fascist apparatus, including its representatives and its traditions. Because of this, the strikes took on a new dimension, whatever illusions may have been present (and still are) among very broad sectors of the working masses.

Thus, on April 30 Radio Renascença was paralyzed by a nineteen-hour strike after the owners refused to broadcast interviews with political exiles. On May 9 the workers at the printing company that publishes Portugal O Seculo, one of the biggest newspapers, went on strike for five hours because the owners had prevented the workers from using the front page to print the entire text of their communiqué. The workers of the newspaper A Capital walked out in solidarity with their comrades from O Seculo.

The movement extended into the construction industry, where immigrant workers -- most of them from Cape Verde -- fought side by side with Portuguese workers in a very militant struggle. On May 15, the workers of various construction companies went on strike (Habitat, Micorel, Compav a Francisco dos Santos, Lda.) and organized flying squads to protect their struggle. On May 13 immigrant workers (400 from Cape Verde) and Portuguese workers (1,200) in the Panasqueira iron mines launched a movement that lasted until May 20, when all their demands were met (guaranteed minimum wage of 6,000 escudos a month, extra month's pay every year, free medical assistance, one month vacation). The workers commission that led the strike was composed of four Portuguese and four Cape Verde workers.

The chemical industry (Laboratoire Pfizer, Bayer, Ciba-Geigy Portuguesa Lda, Robapharm-Suíça), the automobile industry and the industries related to it (Renault-Lisbon, on strike May 23; Toyota-Transmotor, where a struggle broke out on May 15; Firestone), the food industry, the banks and insurance companies, were all hit by workers mobilizations. The overwhelming majority of these movements had a semispontaneous character. The level of consciousness was limited; but the demands raised, although they were fairly strictly confined to the economic level, involved important goals and expressed the workers' conviction that they could win their demands because of the general relationship of forces. The demands that were raised in nearly all these mobilizations were: minimum monthly wage of 6,000 escudos, forty-hour workweek, thirteen and fourteen months' pay a year, one month vacation, guaranteed wages in case of illness or acci-

dent. Demands directed against the capitalist organization of labor were rare, but those concerning security of employment (rehiring of fired workers, no layoffs) became more and more numerous as the mobilizations went on. This is obviously important, for the fight against unemployment may well be one of the main axes of the mobilizations in autumn.

The process of conscious unification of the movement was very limited, being restricted to the textile industry, where the MES (Movimento da Esquerda Socialista -- Movement of the Socialist Left) has an important trade-union influence. On May 12, some 6,000 workers of the wool industry (Lanifícios da Covilha, Tortozendo, Unhais da Sena) initiated a struggle demanding a 1,000 escudo increase for all. On the same day, strikes broke out in the wool industry in Porto and Costanheira de Pêra. Thus, by May 14, more than 20,000 workers in the textile industry were engaged in struggle.

In many factories, democratic forms of organization of the strikes emerged. Workers commissions were elected in order to work out a platform of demands and organize the fight. This was the case, for example, in the Lisnave shipyards (where 8,400 workers went on strike on May 13) and in the Messa metal factory (on strike since May 16), in which a workers commission composed of nine members organized the occupation of the factory and the formation of picket squads. These workers commissions were somewhere between strike committees and factory committees. They united the workers vanguard in the leadership of the strike and also organized general assemblies of workers to make essential decisions. At Messa and Timex these workers commissions rejected the intervention of the Union Federation (controlled by the CP), which tried to interfere in the strike to take over its leadership and destroy the democratic forms of organization that had developed in the struggle. So the Portuguese workers struggles are taking on one of the dominant features of the workers struggles throughout Europe since 1968 -- and this in spite of (and partly because of) the several decades of oppression by the corporatist regime.

The wave of mobilizations has receded since May 30-31. But it would be completely wrong to interpret this decline in struggles either as a defeat or as evidence of the CP's or the Union Federation's ability to control the situation. The Portuguese workers, whose traditions of struggle and organization are weak and whose democratic illusions run high, returned to work after what they considered victories. As far as wages are concerned, although the CP supported the minimum wage of 3,300 escudos a month that had been "granted"

by the provisional government (before April 25 the CP was demanding 6,000 escudos), the increases won in struggle were generally on the order of 1,000 to 1,500 escudos and the minimum wages most often exceeded by several hundred escudos the national minimum "offered" by the provisional government. As far as the workweek is concerned, victories were less numerous. But vacations were won. And the decline of the struggles is not so strange considering that in a few days thousands of Portuguese workers will be able to go on paid vacations for the first time. The return to work must be considered in this context, and consequently, the crucial question remains what kind of reaction the toiling masses will mount to a worsening of the economic situation and to a counteroffensive by the employers.

New forms of struggle... and an old policy

At the time that a return to work is spreading, some strikes have arisen whose goals and organization indicate the deeper process of radicalization that is affecting advanced sectors of the working class. The strikes at Timex and Messa presage what could develop more widely during a new rise of struggles. It must first of all be understood that such strikes immediately confront the whole anti-strike campaign the CP has been waging, a campaign that has been taken up by the junta. The continuation of these strikes therefore involves a process of politicization -- breaking with the line of the CP and opposing the maneuvers of the Union Federation, which is seeking to get a tight grip on these struggles in order to be able to strangle them. This confrontation and this breaking with the CP line involves a strengthening both of the forms of self-organization and of the support campaigns for the struggles. On May 27, after having waged a strike from May 9 to May 15 and after having put the forty-hour workweek into effect themselves, the Timex workers occupied the factory. The workers commission that is leading the strike organized strike pickets, gained control over the company's stocks, prevented any watches from being shipped out, and planned an occupying the company offices and on establishing a "war chest" to make sure that the workers would be paid for the time they were on strike. The struggle at Lip in France had developed an influence that spread as far as Lisbon! And the Timex workers in Besançon and Glasgow will in turn integrate into their own struggles the experiences of their Portuguese comrades.

In addition, the working men and women of Timex, like those of Messa, published a newspaper in order to publicize their struggle, a newspaper in which they more and more consciously expressed their opposition to the strategy of the CP and the Union Federation. Finally, they organized demonstrations in conjunction with the Timex Support Committee, in which the militants of the LCI (Liga Comunista Internacionalista -- Internationalist Communist League, Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) played a decisive role. These few experiences that are developing today must be broadly popularized in order to prepare for the future struggles that may break out in September, after the vacations. The elements at work in these strikes (the demands like integration of bonuses into base wages, the initiatives tending toward workers control, the democratic organization of the struggle and the factory occupations, the de facto opposition to the policy of the CP) have allowed the revolutionary Marxists to develop agitation and propaganda that is winning a significant hearing among the young workers who, after having successfully led strikes and having fought for democratic management of the struggle, find themselves facing a Communist party that is actually opposing their struggle.

In fact, the CP has only intensified its anti-strike campaign and its attacks on the far left. The Executive Commission of the Communist party Central Committee has declared: "We face a conspiracy of reactionary forces that have not yet been dislodged from their positions by the April 25 movement and who, with the conscious or unconscious aid of groups of adventurers who claim to be leftists, are seeking to provoke a situation of economic chaos and destroy the democratic gains that have already been won. By playing on the poverty of the workers, such elements are revealing themselves as singularly generous in devising the demands they raise in order to provoke the ruin and bankruptcy of the small and middle-sized companies and press for a rise in wages that is incompatible with the possibilities of numerous sectors." On June 11, during a meeting in Baixa do Banheira, a city where the CP has a strong base, Dias Laureço, the director of the CP newspaper *Avante*, declared: "The far left, whether consciously or unconsciously, is acting in favor of reaction." (O Seculo, June 12.) And he strongly insisted on the fact that "the Communists are in the government in order to carry out the program of the armed forces" and that the main threat lay in the development of strikes that were desired by reaction and the "ultraleftists" who would take advantage "of an inexperienced, politically very young working class that could be plunged into an adventure"!

Thus, the CP is fighting in the front ranks in the battle to strangle struggles like those at Timex, Messa, and Mabor (a tire factory in Porto), struggles that could play the role of leavening for future mobilizations and challenge the project of constructing a sort of Portuguese CGT, which is what the CP is trying to do in uniting forty-nine corporatist trade-unions in the Union Federation. This policy has led the CP even to renounce defending the most immediate interests of the workers, the demands around which tens of thousands of workers have been mobilized (some of these demands being ones that the CP itself supported before April 25) and to present as resounding victories things like the agreement reached by one of the union leaders who, after sixteen hours of negotiations with the employers organization, "wrenched out" a minimum wage of 4,500 escudos and a forty-five-hour workweek in the name of the Civil Construction Union in the Baixo do Banheira region. Even in relation to the most immediate problems it appears that the CP is totally disarming the workers in face of the policy of the employers, who can only be expected to try to maintain the "wage advantages" they hold over their European competitors in the Common Market and who will try to win back what they have been forced to yield under the "pressure of events" -- not to mention the restructuring process that they are going to undertake to absorb the increase in unit production costs.

It is not likely -- and there are already various indications of this -- that the CP will be able to continue this policy and still maintain its present influence over the working masses. The demonstration to support the policy of the Ministry of Labor, at the head of which marched the "Communist" Pacheco Gonçalves, was a failure. On May 30, the day of the march, no more than 5,000 or 6,000 demonstrators expressed their support of the policy of "national union" and of the "antistrike struggle." The national anthem was sung in this demonstration, and portraits of Spínola were carried. Finally, the Union of Communist Students has just swelled the ranks of the workers favoring "social peace."

Obviously, the partial failure of the CP's policy depends in large part on the ability of the revolutionary vanguard to develop the broadest movement around goals the workers aspire to and to stimulate and popularize the experiences of struggles whose anticapitalist content is more and more mark-

ed. This also necessitates educational propaganda on revolutionary strategy as an alternative to the reformists' policy. Finally, revolutionaries must be present in the process of reorganization of the trade unions in order to build the initial elements of a clear opposition to the policy of the Union Federation.

Spínola details his colonial and repressive policy

Another main axis of the work of revolutionaries is anticolonialist and antimilitarist work. This is all the more important in that Spínola has just announced -- in choice language -- that independence for the colonies will not come soon. In his June 11 speech -- which was similar in both form and content to the "dogmatic" speeches of the Salazarist regime -- Spínola defined for the first time the colonial policy of the junta, since the "provisional government" is nothing but a screen for the real power of the military. Spínola said: "In the modern world, when real political independence exists, it is the product of genuine self-determination, and there can be self-determination only in a free atmosphere when democratic institutions are functioning perfectly. Now, we must conclude that such institutions do not exist in the overseas territories and, consequently, that their inhabitants do not possess effective forms of expression and participation and that what immediate independence really means today would be nothing other than a negation of universally accepted democratic ideas, which are the ideas that inspire the Armed Forces Movement. The right of self-determination of peoples, with all its consequences, must not be confounded with the imposition of choices in whose determination these peoples have not participated." (Diário de Notícias, June 12, 1974.)



SP and CP leaders Soares and Cunhal: We support General Spínola.

A nice piece of prose! The central option of the Portuguese bourgeoisie is thus confirmed. Soares, the Social Democrat, is supposed to try to obtain a cease-fire that would allow spirits in the army to calm down and to open up a long process of negotiations with the idea of maintaining maximum advantages for the Portuguese bourgeoisie in the two richest colonies (Mozambique and Angola), where important groups

(mainly Champolimaud) have enormous interests. The options Spínola has proposed under the name of "decolonization" range from the federation of "close cooperation" to the "community." In this context it is important and more vital than ever for the junta to strike at those who are carrying on systematic anticolonialist and antimilitarist activity and who are aggravating the process of disintegration of the army, the bourgeoisie's last stronghold. There is therefore a symmetry between Spínola's declarations on "decolonization" and the arrest of Soldado Sanches, leader of the Maoist organization MRPP (Movement for the Reconstruction of the Party of the Proletariat), and the police repression that was used for the first time during the demonstration at the military hospital demanding the release of Peralta (a Cuban officer arrested by Portuguese troops in Guinea-Bissau), and the veiled warnings Spínola has addressed to the CP, a Communist party that nevertheless keeps quiet about the colonial question at all its meetings.

International solidarity with the struggles of the portuguese workers

Our comrades of the LCI are fighting in the front ranks of a battle that is being waged on two fronts: the development of anticolonial and antimilitarist work and the response to the first attempts at repressing the far left. They are leading the Committees for the Immediate and Unconditional Independence of the Colonies (CICs). These committees are rank-and-file bodies fighting:

- * for the immediate and unconditional independence of the colonies and supporting the struggles of the liberation movements, the PAIGC, the MPLA, and FRELIMO,
- * against all the neocolonialist maneuvers like "self-determination," "referendum," and "federation,"
- * for the destruction of all forms of racism and chauvinism still present among broad sectors of the toiling masses, which are handles by which the bourgeoisie can dominate and divide the workers,
- * for developing the anticolonial struggle as an integral part of the struggle for revolution in Portugal, by affirming the identity of interests between the struggle of the peoples of the colonies and the struggle of the Portuguese workers.

In response to the arrest of Soldado Sanches our comrades of the LCI, along with the CBS, the PRP, and the LUAR (Socialist Base Commissions, Revolutionary Proletarian party, League of Revolutionary Unity), organized a central demonstration for Wednesday, June 12, to demand the immediate release of Sanches, the elimination of the fascist penal code and the fascist laws, for the freedom of assembly and expression, for the freedom to demonstrate in the streets, factories, and schools, and for the immediate and unconditional independence of the colonies. This was done despite the fact that the MRPP itself, which is heavily marked by sectarianism, obstinately refused to organize a demonstration. The far left's ability to respond to events and the audience it is able to win will be decisive in the development of the political situation in Portugal during the coming months. The responsibilities of the revolutionaries are immense. And international solidarity must measure up to the tasks that confront our Portuguese comrades. □

June 12, 1974

the liberation struggle in the portuguese colonies



..decisive hour

by C. GABRIEL

Most analyses of the struggle of the Portuguese African colonies, even the ones that are written in support of these struggles, are content to locate the liberation movements in the center of a triangle bounded by the metropolis, the colonial army, and imperialism. Everything is handled as though Portugal's three African colonies stood completely outside the history of the African continent. We believe it is necessary to place these struggles in the framework of the African continent and the African revolution, for we want to combine our support to the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC with an analysis of the direction of their political development. The Portuguese coup has opened a decisive period. The liberation movements are now confronted with complex problems of negotiations that require that they go beyond empiricism and more precisely grasp the role of reformism in Portugal and -- even more important -- the nature of the neocolonialist regimes' interest in, "support" to, and machinations with the liberation movements.

The Portuguese bourgeoisie and imperialism are seeking a neocolonialist solution. But is this possible? Can a Gaullist-style policy be applied under different historical conditions and achieve the same results? Mario Soares, the leader of the Portuguese SP, is fond of repeating that "what unites us is much stronger than what divides us." But he cannot turn the clock back fifteen years.

The neocolonialist trap will not be sprung through a crude seduction of the liberation movements through moralizing declarations from the general secretary of the Portuguese Socialist party. But the neocolonialist danger cannot be reduced to a question of good or bad morals. It could gain a foothold by using the illusions in a "democratic and national state," or, it could simply develop on the basis of certain multinational investments that have been plundering Angola and Mozambique for a decade and about which the Portuguese reformists have become suddenly silent. Silent about the private army of Gulf Oil in Cabinda in Angola. Silent about the sales of Cabora Bassa's energy sources to South Africa.

Lisbon's present policy is aimed at shunting the liberation movements to the sidelines by stimulating the emergence of "third forces" capable of breaking the intransigence of the PAIGC or FRELIMO.

The Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties, for whom the government of national union is an end in itself, are not above stooping to blackmail, saying in effect: "In order for the negotiations to go on, the present government must stay in power; and for it to stay in power, it must obtain a minimum number of concessions from you, the liberation movements."

The period that has now opened up will thus reveal either the depth or the limits of the political sophistication of the liberation movements. It will also test their cohesion. Will the crisis now shaping up in the MPLA facilitate the maneuvers of imperialism? The united front with the ANLF that is envisaged by a faction of the MPLA would amount to a front with N'Gouabi, Mobutu, Kaunda, and Nyerere (respectively the heads of state of the Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania). That is, it would amount to a neocolonialist front. It is only with an authentically anticapitalist program that the vanguard of Angola, as well as that of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, will be able to frustrate imperialism's neocolonialist plan.

-- SUPPORT TO THE PAIGC, FRELIMO, AND THE MPLA!
 -- IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE!
 -- AGAINST NEOCOLONIALIST SOLUTIONS!
 -- THE STRUGGLE GOES ON, SUPPORT MUST GO ON TOO!

At the end of the 1950s, when the struggle against Portuguese colonialism took a decisive leap forward, the political situation on the Black continent was marked by a deep downturn of mass struggles and by the integration of a good part of the nationalist movement into the framework of neocolonialist solutions. In the space of five or six years, nationalist parties nearly everywhere had enthusiastically accepted positions as imperialist lackeys. The urban petty-bourgeoisie, which had developed widely within the colonial administration, raised itself to the status of ruling class after having made use of the mass movement as a means of pressuring the imperialist governments.

The contradictory content of formal independence was a consequence of a twofold process. For the European bourgeoisie, breaking with classical economic colonialism in order to move to a higher stage of plunder in accordance with the contemporary development of capitalism was an empirical political response to the rise of the colonial revolution. For the African masses, it was a matter of the first generalized offensive against imperialist barbarism occurring within a social framework fashioned by colonialism, that is, under the political leadership of the "bureaucratic" petty-bourgeoisie. The neocolonial economy is not at all a "supreme" stage of imperialist rule, as Nkrumah claimed. The conversion did not open up a new era of bourgeois rule, but was rather a last resort allowing for a qualitative increase in plunder while at the same time temporarily easing the revolutionary pressure. In this light neocolonialism appears not as an objective development determined by the system of domination, but essentially as a defeat for the nationalist movement, which by its nature was unable to transform the independence struggle into an anticapitalist struggle.

In his book *Les Fleurs du Congo*, G. Althabe explains exactly the ideological game played by African nationalism: "The nationalist party as it was built during this period was for a section of the bureaucratic elite simultaneously an instrument of struggle against foreign rulers and a framework through which to establish a relationship with the mass of the population, a vehicle through which the bureaucratic elite succeeded in mobilizing the mass of the population around itself." (p.238.) "The nationalist party was thus built as a counterinstitution whose mode of existence was wholly determined by the adversary it was facing." (p.240.) "The aim of the struggle was to tear the population loose from the bureaucratic institution represented by the administration controlled by Belgians in order to reintroduce them into a new bureaucratic institution: the party, controlled by so-called nationalist politicians." (p.241.) "The sequel to the confrontation was simple: The nationalist party became the administration and the duality between the two bureaucratic institutions was erased." (p.241.)

And we may add that the erasure of the duality was effected either through the integration of the nationalist movement into the neocolonialist framework or by the repression of the most radical elements (the UPC in the Cameroons, Sawaba in Niger, the MNC in the Congo, etc.)

It was, then, primarily by these means that neocolonialism was able to become a realistic policy for the colonial bourgeoisies. To estimate the possibilities for a neocolonialist policy in the Portuguese colonies therefore implies examining factors like these in the context of a continental and international situation that is in all respects different from that prevailing in past years. The analysis of nationalism in the Portuguese colonies must therefore integrate two factors:

* The consequences of the character of the political period on the formation of the nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau at the end of the 1950s;

* The importance and the limits of their break with the traditional nationalism of this period and their own balance sheets on the countries that were granted independence.

Formation of the nationalist movements:

The PAIGC was founded in September 1956. A little more than six years later, in 1963, the armed struggle was launched -- after a process of political and military preparation. But between 1956 and 1963, this region of Africa was marked by

a significant decline of mass struggle and by the stabilization of a relationship of forces favorable to imperialism. The Senghor regime came to power in Senegal and, after the imprisonment of Mamamou Dia, a strong state was set up that for several years was to harass the PAIGC's rear areas along Guinea's northern border and lend its support to a right-wing grouplet, the FLING.

In Senegal itself, there was repression against the PAI, which resulted in the disappearance of a potential source of support for the PAIGC from within the neocolony itself. In Guinea-Conakry the failure of the first economic plan was to bring about an initial right-wing reaction from the Touré regime. To be sure, this episode scarcely affected Conakry's attitude toward the nascent PAIGC; to be sure, from a quantitative standpoint aid from Conakry remained large over the years. But from the standpoint of the birth of a revolutionary leadership in Guinea-Bissau, the political path followed by the Guinean regime played a not insignificant role, both in terms of the regional relationship of forces and in terms of direct political influence on the young cadres of the PAIGC. The impasse of Guinean nationalism could not prevent a process of radicalization within the PAIGC, but it nevertheless was not conducive to going beyond Guinean nationalism on a theoretical level, as Vasco Cabral's statements about the "party-state" attest to.

In reality, a complex jousting of political influence was going on, and its outcome would depend on the ability of the PAIGC to theorize its own struggle and to give it a class content.

The MPLA was created in December 1956 by the fusion of various small urban groups. The Luanda revolt broke out on February 4, 1961. It was followed by a peasant insurrection in the north. This occurred while the Congo crisis was at its height. American imperialism was determined to make the Congo the turning point for the counterrevolution in central Africa. The American bourgeoisie had always taken an ambiguous attitude toward African nationalism. U.S. imperialism wanted simultaneously to break the rising revolution and to exploit the crisis of European colonialism in order to win new markets that were inaccessible to Washington in the existing colonial economic framework. Toward this end, Washington began aiding the most right-wing elements of African nationalism, the tactic being carried out especially through the trade unions affiliated to the International Federation of Free Trade Unions.(1)

In Angola, the emergence of a movement of the "peoples of the north" (the UPNA), a predominantly ethnocentric organization, was a windfall for Washington. (It emerged, moreover, independent of direct American action.) The crystallization of a right-wing nationalist movement, a potentially valuable interlocutor with Lisbon and a possible "border army" with political-ethnic links to the Kinshasa regime, could only have come about through a coming together of this movement and American policy, even if their relationship went through ups and downs.

The victory of the counterrevolution in the Congo resulted in the expulsion of the MPLA from Kinshasa and the recognition by the Organization of African Unity of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile. Nevertheless, the "three glorious days" in Brazzaville in 1963 represented a conjunctural revolutionary upsurge that the MPLA was to exploit. The new, verbally nationalist regime of Massetat Débat accorded asylum to the MPLA after the overthrow of F. Youlou. This was done not only out of the revolutionary convictions of some of the regime's supporters. It was also a



key to organizations

MPLA	Peoples Liberation Movement of Angola
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
ANLF	Angola National Liberation Front. The Union of Peoples of North Angola was created in 1954. It later became the Union of Angolan Peoples, and the, after winning over several grouplets, became the ANLF, which for reasons of diplomacy founded the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, which is based in Kinshasa and controlled by Mobutu.
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. It developed in 1966 after a split in the ANLF. It concentrated in the

beginning on gaining a base in the south and center of the country. The main criticisms it makes of the MPLA are that the latter has a petty-bourgeois leadership and that it directs the liberated zones from outside.

FLING Liberation Front for the National Independence of Guinea. A sort of reactionary grouplet based in Dakar, supported for several years by Senghor, president of Senegal, and manipulated by the Americans.

GUMO United Group of Mozambique. A potential third force. Has just declared itself in favor of interracial, interreligious coexistence and for a Lusitano-Afro-Brazilian community!

reaction by right-wing elements (like Débat himself) to the threat of the formation of a Bakongo association under the leadership of Kinshasa.(2) On the basis of this situation, the MPLA was able to open a front in the enclave of Cabinda (a section of Angola separated from the rest of the country by a strip of Zaïre). The MPLA came out of this period in a weakened condition, caught between Portuguese repression and Kinshasa's support for the ANLF, which had its base along the northern border.

The relationships between the MPLA and Congolese nationalism are not easy to establish. It is probable that between the time of Lumumbaism and the Brazzaville Civil Defense the cadres of the MPLA had plenty of opportunity to draw a balance sheet. But was this balance sheet -- which was not very explicit -- extended to cover the experience of the N'Gouabi regime, the Diawara struggle, and the left wing of the Tanzanian Communist party? The question is important. For while the political influence of Congolese nationalism appears to have been weak, it is no less true that the political situation on Angola's northern frontier plays a decisive role for military perspectives in the economically developed regions.

In May 1966 the MPLA came out of the crisis by opening up a new front on the Zambian border. There again, the "socialism" of Kaunda scarcely had any influence on the ranks of the MPLA(3). But the political squabbles within the MPLA may parallel those within the Lusaka regime. We have recently seen the coincidence that may have existed between the Chipenda tendency of the MPLA and a faction of the Zambian regime. If there was no direct ideological influence, there was at least a political intervention through the bureaucratic structures of the organizational apparatus, especially in the delegations sent to foreign countries.

FRELIMO was formed in 1962 through regroupment of the MANU, the UDENAMO, and the UNAMI. It also included small groups of emigré nationalists in Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi. The nationalist movement in East Africa has been heavily influenced by the personality of Julius Nyerere. But in spite of that, and in spite of the importance of the Tanzanian-Mozambiquian border, interchange between Nyerere's TANU and FRELIMO remained weak. Since it was formed later than the MPLA and the PAIGC, FRELIMO was much less confronted by the struggles that preceded the winning of in-

dependence in most of Africa. It also appears that the greater integration of Mozambique (relative to Angola) into the southern African bloc had turned the attentions and relations of the militants more toward the movements in Rhodesia and South Africa. It therefore definitely seems that of the three organizations, FRELIMO was the one whose earliest development was least affected by the crisis of nationalism in the neighboring countries.

Nevertheless, for all three movements, the struggle began in a situation of general downturn on a continental scale. They were thus extremely isolated in their early years, and this isolation is not unimportant in understanding their difficulties of political clarification and the absence of a real theorization of the revolutionary process.

The limits of a political evolution

The three movements, then, were initially made up of young nationalists, members of the urban petty-bourgeoisie. They were more or less influenced by the struggles in the French or British colonies. Through the Portuguese Communist party they discovered the existence of the Western workers movement, which they viewed (unconsciously) through a Stalinist and social chauvinist prism. Heterogeneous and lacking a political past, the young leaderships were content for a time simply to raise a series of slogans that came down to the demand for independence. The content of the struggle, its strategy and historical perspectives, were scarcely detailed.

But is there any larger body of written material today? To be sure, we have Mondlane's book *The Struggle for Mozambique*, as well as Cabral's writings between 1961 and 1969. These works already indicate a break with the traditional analyses of an Nkrumah or a Sekou Touré. But in reality, it is mainly through interviews and speeches that progress in analysis and development and specification of detail can be seen. This leadership's production of theoretical works -- the educational and propaganda function of which is decisive in speaking to the world anti-imperialist movement -- has been meager. A comparison with the Vietnamese leadership is revealing. On the one hand we have militants whose large production of political analyses indicates their historic ties with the inter-

national workers movement; on the other hand, we have the African liberation movements, which, having been built in the stultifying framework of Portuguese domination, have a thousand difficulties in breaking with empiricism and discovering the tools of Marxism in order to formulate a theoretical structure for their struggles. And need we add that these efforts can be abortive if they are attempted through the application of sterile Stalinist concepts?

Cabral himself recognized the empiricism that prevailed at the beginning of the struggle.⁽⁴⁾ For his part, Dos Santos (a leader of FRELIMO) recognized the extent of pragmatism and the heavy influence of heterogeneity. In an interview with *The African Communist* (issue no. 55) he declared: "So right from the start in 1962 different ideologies were reflected at the top. But the tasks facing us in those early days demanded that we create a collective that would accommodate all those who were prepared to work together to get the basic struggle off the ground. So, the nature of the political, social, and economic realities of the situation as it was then demanded a pragmatic attitude." (p.47.)

Empiricism asserted itself first of all on the question of forms of struggle and on the analysis of the forms of colonial domination. Confronted by an adversary that, unlike French or British colonialism, lacked the political and economic means to alter the form of its domination at the end of the 1950s, the liberation movements saw the necessity of armed struggle after going through the experience of legal mass mobilizations that were met with repression that blocked any possibility of their developing into national independence movements. Thus, Cabral declared at the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations: "The Pijiquiti massacre committed by the Portuguese colonialists on August 3, 1959, against the striking dock workers of Bissau and the workers of the river transport boats cost us fifty strikers dead and more than a hundred wounded. It was a painful lesson for our people. We learned that there was no question of choosing between peaceful struggle and armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialists. . . . We then decided . . . to suspend all demonstrations for demands in the cities and to prepare ourselves for armed struggle."

In Lorenzo Marques (in Mozambique) anti-Portuguese demonstrations were savagely repressed in 1956 and 1962. In 1960 in Mueda and in 1962 at the cane plantations in Xinavane peasant demonstrations were repressed at a cost of hundreds dead. It was through the experience of such events, as well as through the example of Guinea-Bissau, where the struggle had been going on for several years, that FRELIMO little by little came to discard its demand for "negotiations" and turned to preparing the armed struggle, which was proclaimed on September 25, 1964.

Empiricism remained the method: empiricism to win the sympathies of a village in the heart of the bush country; empiricism to resolve conflicts between two ethnic groups within which the movement had to win a base; and empiricism to structure the guerrilla organization. Up to that time, such questions had been posed nowhere else in Africa. And the responses the liberation movements gave to these problems, even if they were only partial answers, constituted a fundamental gain for the future development of the African revolution.⁽⁵⁾

But certain questions are not merely subjective ones. The ethnic question, for example, has historical, economic, and social foundations that pragmatic good will is insufficient for resolving. To be sure, the PAUC, which was working in a

limited geographic area, was able to forge a national consciousness through slow preparation and a varied approach to the ethnic groups. FRELIMO also made some experiments in this field, especially with the Malonda group in the north. But the MPLA was functioning in the worst conditions for resolving this matter. The geographical conditions of Angola, its history of being divided between the Congo and Ovamboland, made the conditions for developing a "national consciousness forged in struggle" very difficult. The Bakongo population in the north, whose cohesion and "legitimacy" derives from the old kingdom of the Congo, is divided today among the Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, and Angola.⁽⁶⁾ In 1954 the Union of Peoples of North Angola (UPNA) was created in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) on the basis of Bakongo nationalism. The leaders of the UPNA were Barros Nekaka and Holden Roberto. In 1957 the latter wrote to the United Nations demanding the reconstitution of the kingdom of the Congo. Later, the UPNA, which had in the meantime become the UPA, was to support the Tshombe faction in the Congo, not only politically, but militarily as well. Today this right-wing faction of Angolan nationalism has become a real border army functioning under the protective wing of Mobutu. It can play the role of privileged interlocutor.

The accord signed in 1972 between the MPLA and the ANLF-UPA was of tactical concern to the MPLA, which wanted to unfreeze the situation on its main front in the north. But beyond this conjunctural significance, the accord represented a de facto recognition of the ANLF as a co-representative in the struggle. The ANLF was soon reintegrated into the public support extended to the Angolan struggle by the Organization of African Unity. Today it is recognized by Peking and Sofia.⁽⁷⁾ The confusing consequences of this accord were such that the MPLA felt obliged to issue a communiqué in which it reported to the world press: "The MPLA, as well as the ANLF, maintains all its structures. As should be clear, the present discussions do not entitle anyone to speak of the MPLA as though it did not exist." In the March 1973 issue of the bulletin *Afrique en Lutte* (Africa in Struggle), we wrote: "Because of the tactical plans of the MPLA, and contrary to the hopes of imperialism, the agreement reached under the tutelage of N'Gouabi, Mobutu, Nyerere, and Kaunda is not devoid of contradictions. It must be saluted for the new military possibilities it accords the MPLA. But we must still ask ourselves how the various components of the MPLA will envision the application of some of the clauses of the agreement." And in fact, several months later, the Chipenda tendency explained that the accord constituted an agreement of the peoples of the north directed against the peoples of the south, of which he, naturally, claimed to be the representative.

The existence of ethnic groups that straddle borders lends a means of pressure and intervention to the neocolonialist regimes that control a section of these populations. A regionalist faction, whether inside or outside a government, can then establish links with local leaders of the liberation movement. That is what a section of the Zambian government did with the Chipenda tendency in the MPLA. The situation is even more susceptible to operations like this in that the liberation movement lacks a homogeneous leadership and suffers from a certain amount of bureaucratization based on "villagism." Of the three movements, the MPLA is clearly the most vulnerable on these matters. Chipenda had been in charge of logistics. He was denounced as a traitor, but certainly a political explanation of why should have been offered. Not only was this never done; it also seems that a compromise may have been reached between the "traitor" and the rest of the leadership. This sort of functioning and this sort of heterogeneity cannot fail to have consequences on the organiza-

tion's general political line. The situation in Angola allows for all kinds of maneuvers by imperialism aimed at brushing aside the most radical tendencies. It is therefore especially disturbing to read the statement made on May 12, 1974, in Dar es Salaam by MPLA leader A. Neto in which he saluted the progress that has been made by the ANLF and expressed the hope that the MPLA and the ANLF would cooperate in driving Portuguese colonialism out of Africa. But on what program and toward what aim will such a compromise be made?

FRELIMO has also had to take a position on the regional and ethnic question. In his interview with The African Communist Dos Santos stated: "At the level of regional economic subsistence, at the level of an economy based primarily on agriculture at its lowest level, it is difficult for people to relate to one another in a truly national sense, in the sense of even sharing a common economy and all the social links that this creates. So I would say that national economic development is an essential part of the continuing process of building a nation. Of course a nation is a product of history and its formation goes through different phases. In this sense the work of the final achievement of complete nationhood will continue even after independence, although the fundamental elements of nationhood are already in existence and in the process of being further developed in Mozambique." (p.42.)

The armed struggle and the desire for national unification in struggle against the Portuguese oppressor have been two factors permitting a decisive break with the capitulationist and ethnocentrist elements that arose in the nationalist current in the French and British colonies and opted for a policy of diplomatic pressure and border warfare. It is not by accident that the FLING was supported for several years by the Senghor regime. Nor is Mobutu's support for the ANLF surprising. But because of the heterogeneity of the organizations, especially the MPLA, this break has not been absolute. That is why we should not underestimate the threat of deviations being introduced by compromises between the various tendencies. In the African context, such threats will not disappear so long as a definitive break with nationalist ideology has not been made.

To be sure, from the very beginning organizations were formed that unambiguously crystallized the most right-wing sectors of nationalism, the FLING and the ANLF being the two clearest examples. But the story was not always so simple. In Angola there were people who "passed" from the MPLA to the ANLF well after the struggle had been launched. There was also a split within the ANLF which was directed by Savimbi and was to result in the formation of the UNITA. In Mozambique, where FRELIMO was an association of various groups right from the start, the purge was carried out in the very course of the struggle. That was the case for the two main splits, that of Lazare Kavandamé and that of Uria Simango. In an interview with the July 9, 1971, issue of the Italian Communist party weekly *Rinascita*, FRELIMO leader Semora Machel explained these events this way: "The essential contradiction concerned general line. On the one side there was a purely nationalist position that reduced liberation to only one of its aspects, namely driving the Portuguese out. On the other side, there was the position held by the great majority: Liberation must be linked to the transformation of the colonial, native, and tribal structures." The two expelled members were aiming at definitively establishing fiefs in which they could exert their power in the framework of traditional structures. Machel continued: "But the conflict really broke out when vast territories of Mozambique had been liberated and the question arose as to how to organize

these territories in order to turn them into the driving elements of the development of the liberation struggles. . . . If we fight to drive the Portuguese out and then replace them with Africans who function under the same economic system as the Portuguese did and therefore exploit other Africans, then the struggle is for naught. Instead, after driving out the Portuguese, we must act so that the popular struggle remains permanent."

The break with reformist nationalism

So it is with the Simangos and the Kavandamés that Spínola has to work today if his neocolonialist operation is to succeed. A decisive break has thus been made with the traditions of reformist nationalism that racked most of the freedom movements in the French and British colonies. With the new situation in Portugal and the proposals for a government of national union, an immediate capitulation under the spell of the neocolonialist charm is therefore improbable. There are certainly some genuinely right-wing tendencies in the MPLA that could get some support from outside the movement. But in general the dynamic set in motion by the specific features of Portuguese colonialism and by the years of struggle have incontestably separated this revolutionary nationalism from the swamp of rightism and reformism.

But while the neocolonialist solution has not been put into effect through a sudden capitulation of the liberation movements under the impact of the Portuguese coup, it is nevertheless true that neocolonialism can be nurtured by the myth of the national democratic state. The liberation movements have adopted a fluid and deliberately imprecise position on the social goals of their struggle. This inadequacy can be explained by the absence of a theorization of the revolutionary process. But that is not sufficient to account for such a "refusal" to define precisely the historic goals of the struggle. The major cause of this attitude is the heterogeneity of the leaderships. To be sure, everyone rejects neocolonialism of the Senghor or Mobutu variety. But it must not be forgotten that between Touré and the revolutionary Marxists there is an "impressive selection" of neocolonialists on the African continent! This is the question that must be discussed with the comrades of the PAIGC, the MPLA, and FRELIMO.

In the cases of Angola and Mozambique, a preliminary observation must be made before the scope of the negotiations is discussed. The guerrilla zones, especially in Angola, have made only very small inroads into the economically rich regions. Imperialist investments are especially large in these regions, and would represent a second-level stronghold for the Portuguese bourgeoisie in a neocolonialist framework. The first game the Portuguese bourgeoisie will try to play will be to seat groups representing the urban African petty-bourgeoisie and the "democratic" sectors of the Portuguese population at the negotiating table. Thus, the "Democratic Movement of Guinea" has suddenly appeared, along with the multi-racial GUMO of Mozambique. And to this it should be added that the international press has suddenly started writing about the FLING, despite the fact that only a few weeks ago everyone was reporting that this group had disappeared. The attempt here is to shunt the liberation movements to the sidelines in the name of bringing a representative of the "whole nation" to the negotiating table.

An urgent response from the liberation movements about the future of the capital owned by Krupp, the mines owned by Benguela, and the holdings of Gulf and other oil companies is therefore a necessity. If the negotiations should lead to freezing the current situation, granting FRELIMO and the

MPLA only partial authority, it would be impossible to counteract the neocolonialist tendencies that would inevitably be bolstered by an economy that is largely dependent on imperialist investments.

Thus, the only solution in Angola and Mozambique is to continue the fight to win a more solid base in the economically developed regions. Everyone knows that if such a base is won, it would soon lead to a test of strength between the present Portuguese government and the colonial hardliners. The hardliners, who have temporarily taken a wait-and-see attitude, would soon win hegemony among the white population, whose dearest desire is to remain in Africa. (A party has just been formed in Mozambique called Fico, which means, "I shall remain.") A Rhodesian type solution is a constant point under discussion among the white colonial population. In Mozambique the tendency favoring such a solution is supported by not insignificant economic forces, such as the Chamentalmaud industrial group and Jardim.

This threat of a break with the white population in Africa -- which would produce a deadly crisis that would definitively compromise their government of national union -- is the thing that really terrorizes the reformists of the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties. It is obvious, then, that these parties will put maximum pressure on FRELIMO and the MPLA to accept the compromise that we described earlier. A. Almeida Santos, a representative of the white democrats in Mozambique who is close to the SP has just been named minister of interterritorial coordination. And less than a month ago he declared: "The dialogue with FRELIMO should be easy for us. . . . But we have to move fast, because all Africans with even a minimum of political consciousness are now or soon will be with FRELIMO."

- to be continued -

Footnotes

1. In 1957 Nixon declared: "The future interests of the United States in Africa are so vast that they entitle us not to hesitate in aiding the departure of the colonial powers from Africa."
2. Fulton Youlou was a Lari, a group connected to the Bakongo. Within the Masebat Débat regime, there was a wing that favored aiding the MPLA for really internationalist reasons. But the leadership, and especially Débat himself, quickly proved to be a new tribalist and regionalist tendency. It was not long before repression began falling on the most radical elements, who believed they had discovered the key to "the national and democratic revolution."
3. Kaunda, like Senghor and others, utilized the phraseology of "African socialism," whose essence and goals were quite clearly reactionary.
4. Cabral seems to have believed that this empiricism would not last beyond the period of stabilization of the armed struggle.
5. The threat of militarist deviations in the PAIGC come to the surface in 1964 with the emergence of small local potentates. The PAIGC congress settled this question by purging several military leaders and by redefining the relationship between the political and military wings. Once again, the PAIGC had resolved a problem on the fly.
6. Calls for the reunification of the Bakongo people regularly come out of the Congo and Zaire, usually on the initiative of rotten politicians seeking a regional base. Let us also recall that during the Congo crisis, Kasavubu, one of the imperialist stooges, founded his credibility on the fact that he "represented" most of the Bakongo in the area.
7. On June 1, 1974, Peking sent 112 instructors to Kinshasa to train the ANLF. This was done following the signing of a Sino-Zaire agreement.

EEC

the common market in crisis

by ERNEST MANDEL

Once again the Common Market is going through a serious crisis, probably the most serious since its formation. This crisis was manifested in the failure of the "common float" of the currencies of the nine member countries, in the British government's decision to renegotiate the terms of Britain's membership in the EEC, and in the Danish and Italian decisions to suspend free importation of commodities originating from Common Market countries. Earlier, the crisis had been expressed in the most dramatic fashion by the inability of the governments of the member states to work out a common position when faced with the "oil crisis" or to negotiate a joint agreement with the oil-exporting countries.

To understand the origins of this crisis, one must first of all understand the real nature of the Common Market. The EEC is a transitory and hybrid phenomenon of international eco-

omic integration of nine imperialist countries (at the beginning, six imperialist countries). These countries decided to allow unlimited circulation of commodities and capital within their national borders. But they created neither a common bourgeois state, nor a common government, nor a common currency.

The institutions with which they endowed the Common Market are pseudostate institutions capped by a "commission" that has only consultative power, except in the strictly limited realms of circulation of capital and commodities. The real power in the Common Market rests with the "council of ministers." And, in practice, even this body lacks the power to enforce its decisions on any government that chooses to violate them.

The transitory and hybrid nature of the Common Market corresponds to the transitory and hybrid nature of the economic phenomenon that it expresses on an institutional political level: the progressive internationalization of the holdings of big capital. During the past twenty years there has been a process of European interpenetration of capital that has gradually expanded in breadth. We have seen the birth of industrial groups whose holdings are no longer those of a "national" bourgeoisie, but are instead shared among the bourgeoisies of various European nationalities, no "national" faction commanding a controlling share. (Dunlop-Pirelli and Agfa-Gevaert are two examples.)

But while this process of European interpenetration of capital is incontestably going on, it is far from having reached the point of no return. In certain cases, it has failed. The Fiat-Citroen experience in the automobile industry is a case in point. That new European supertrust was dissolved. In other cases, the process has taken the form of a single, controlling "national" capital absorbing a number of firms. The absorption of the French pharmaceutical company Roussel-Uclaf by the German Hoechst Farben trust is an example. In most branches of industry, "national" monopolistic trusts are continuing to act by means of international cooperation among European firms rather than by means of a real fusing of interests.

Thus, the internationalization of capital within the Common Market began by going beyond the stage of "national" monopolistic trusts. American, European, and Japanese multinational firms have accumulated unquestionable power. But the internationalization of capital has not yet reached the point that capitalist groups axed around "national" bourgeois states have lost all influence or all capacity to react. The result of the struggle between groups demanding a bourgeois state on a European scale and groups still attached to the national bourgeois state has yet to be decided. That is the indispensable background to understanding the present crisis of the Common Market.

The Common Market is a supranational institution lacking real state power just at a time when the state has become an indispensable instrument not only for maintaining the political and social power of capital, but also for permitting the realization and expanded reproduction of capital. We have always predicted that the fundamental contradictions of such an institution would break to the surface as soon as there was a generalized recession in capitalist Europe. It is exactly at the time of a serious economic recession that the intervention of the bourgeois state into economic life becomes decisive for saving the system.

Big capital of each of the member states of the Common Market is then confronted with a clear alternative: either create a real European superstate capable of working out an anti-crisis policy on an international scale, or fall back on an anticrisis policy on a national scale. In either case, the Common Market goes by the boards.

In the first case, it would be replaced by a federal capitalist state extending over all the capitalist countries prepared to take this step; it would have a common currency, a common government, a common policy on public works and employment, a common budget, and a common fiscal policy. In the second case, it would break up under the blows of a massive return to protectionism on the part of all (or most of) the "national" bourgeois states of Western Europe.

It is obvious that the European multinational trusts would react to a serious economic recession by demanding a super-

state on a European scale, for the simple reason that it is only on such a scale that their interests in the "struggle against recession" could be effectively served. This would also apply to those trusts that are already internationalized from the standpoint of holdings of capital, and to those that are still controlled by the bourgeoisie of a single nation but whose field of action already goes too far beyond a "national" field even on the level of production. The Philips electronics trust, to take one example, could not be protected from the effects of a serious economic crisis by measures taken solely by the government of the Netherlands or solely enacted within the territory of that one country. For this trust, an effective "antirecession" policy would have to be an "antirecession" policy at least within the nine Common Market countries as a whole.

Nevertheless, it is equally clear that in the absence of a real government and a real state power extending over all the nine countries of the Common Market (or over most of them), the more severe an economic recession is, the more the bourgeoisie of each separate country will find itself obliged to act against recession on a purely national level. The real choice with which the bourgeoisie would be faced would be, in effect, between "national" action or inaction, that is, between national action or no action at all. Given the relationship of forces between Capital and Labor in Western Europe today, it is unthinkable that any "national" bourgeoisie would stand by passively in face of the aggravation of an economic recession and a rise in unemployment. Under these conditions, passivity would provoke a social and revolutionary crisis of unprecedented gravity for the survival of the capitalist system.

That is why our prediction has always been that the Common Market would not pass the test of a serious economic recession unless it had succeeded in transforming itself into a real European government by the time the recession came.

Crisis of the common market: product of recession

The events of the past six months confirm the accuracy of this analysis.

An economic recession is now under way in most imperialist countries. It is already serious in the United States (where the gross national product has fallen by 6 percent in the space of five months), and it has begun in Britain, Italy, and Japan. West Germany is teetering on the brink of recession. France is the only big imperialist country that has not yet been affected.

Unemployment is on the rise in all imperialist countries. It is likely that during the winter of 1974-75 the previous postwar record in the imperialist countries -- which was 10 million, set in the winter of 1970 -- will be broken by a wide margin. The total number of unemployed in all the imperialist countries will probably approach 15 million.

Under these conditions, in the absence of a real government with real state power on the scale of the Common Market, it was inevitable that the bourgeoisie would move toward anti-recessionist measures on a national scale, that is, toward protectionist measures. This is what was done in a spectacular manner by Italy and Denmark. The governments of these countries imposed de facto limitations not only on imports in general, but also on imports originating from Common Market countries in particular.

It is sometimes asserted that this crisis might be "exceptional," that it might represent a "temporary accident" provoked only by the "oil crisis," which is said to have created significant balance of payments deficits in several European imperialist countries (especially Britain, Italy, and France).

This argument is incomplete and specious. In fact, the balance of payments deficits of some Common Market countries is almost completely "compensated for" by the no less spectacular balance of payments surplus in West Germany. The Benelux countries are also (still) enjoying a not unimportant surplus. The real nature of the "balance of payments crisis" thus emerges in a wholly different light. The Italian, Danish, and British governments have been obliged to resort to protectionist measures because of the refusal of the countries with large surpluses to pool (either wholly or in part) the exchange reserves of all the countries of the Common Market. Such a "pooling" of exchange reserves is obviously unthinkable without a common currency, a common economic, monetary, and fiscal policy, and a common employment policy; that is, without a common government and a common "superstate."

West German big capital faces



Schmidt, Giscard: Who will foot the bill?

unhappy choices

The nature of the dilemma with which European big capital is confronted is especially striking in the case of West German imperialism, today the most stable and prosperous of all imperialisms. Of all the great imperialist powers, West Germany has experienced the lowest rate of inflation, the most rapid expansion of exports, the most significant balance of payments surplus, and the lowest rate of unemployment (although the unemployment rate has increased seriously since 1970-72). When Helmut Schmidt succeeded Willy Brandt as Social Democratic chancellor, most observers stressed the "Atlantic" inclinations of the new government chief as compared to the "European" inclinations of his predecessor. But in a matter of just a few weeks -- when Schmidt held his meeting with the new French president, Giscard d'Estaing -- this estimation had to be abandoned.

German big capital now finds itself caught between two evils, and it is hard to decide which is the greater and which the lesser. If it opts for a "new push for the Common Market," it will have to absorb both the balance of payments deficits and the effects of accelerated inflation of three of its major partners -- France, Italy, and Britain. The health and consolidation of the Common Market would then be purchased at the price of putting into effect the old slogan of the French bourgeoisie at the time of Poincaré and Clemenceau: Let the Krauts foot the bill! And this despite the fact that this time

there is no military or political force capable of backing up this demand.

But if Helmut Schmidt should decide to refuse to foot the bill, as he proclaimed he would during the ceremony installing him as Chancellor, the consequences for Bonn will be no less disastrous. The protectionist measures would then threaten to spread from Italy and Denmark to France and Britain, and even to other countries as well. The cumulative effects of these measures (and of the retrenching measures they would provoke in turn) would deal a decisive blow to the single pillar of the "prosperity" of West German capitalism: soaring exports. (In the domestic market, sales of consumer goods are already on the decline.)

The partners of the German Federal Republic would then certainly succeed in "exporting" the recession to West Germany if West Germany did not export its exchange reserves to its neighbors. The recession would create a serious social crisis, and the pressure to deal with this crisis by turning on the faucets of inflation of credit would become irresistible. But increasing inflation in order to ameliorate the crisis would worsen the balance of payments deficit and provoke the evaporation of exchange reserves. Therein lies the dilemma.

The role of the state in inter-imperialist competition

Some may reproach this analysis with having made concessions to the Kautskyite myth of "superimperialism." When we assert that several European imperialist powers could "peacefully fuse" without the reality being that one is absorbing the others by force, as German imperialism tried to do during the first and second world wars and French and British imperialism tried to do in the aftermath of the two world wars, are we not postulating the possibility of interimperialist contradictions being peacefully overcome instead of intensified? In reality, those who oppose our analysis on this basis are revealing a formal and empty schematism of thought that borders on sophism and is a thousand miles removed from a dialectical appreciation of objective reality. What Lenin counterposed to Kautsky was the thesis of the aggravation rather than amelioration of interimperialist contradictions taken as a whole, and not the thesis that the contradictions between each of the individual imperialist powers must always intensify. We believe that Lenin's thesis remains absolutely correct and conforms to the events now taking place. Interimperialist contradictions are in fact intensifying rather than easing, and this, it may be noted in passing, belies not only the theory of superimperialism, but also the theory that North American superimperialism's sheer weight would crush all its competitors, reducing them to pure and simple satellites.

Lenin never advanced the theory that interimperialist competition would necessarily have to go on among a number of imperialist powers that are eternally equal in strength. During his own lifetime, Lenin saw the elimination of two great imperialist powers: tsarist Russia overthrown by the October Revolution and Austria-Hungary dismantled by the defeat of 1918. To assert that a fusion between a certain number of imperialist powers is impossible "because of the intensification of interimperialist competition" would be to lose sight of the fact that the fusion could be provoked exactly by the intensified competition itself.

Let us look at the recent example of the "oil crisis." It provoked a general rush on the part of all the world's big trusts not only toward sources of oil and uranium, but also toward sources of other so-called raw materials. The manner in which

the governments of the various imperialist countries maneuvered and are still maneuvering to facilitate achieving the goals of "their" trusts once again admirably confirms the correctness of the Leninist theory of imperialism and the state. But it is obvious that the stronger a state is politically, militarily, and financially, the more it can facilitate the access of "its" trusts to sources of raw materials. Now, while it is true that the West German state is financially powerful and that the French, British, and Italian states are moderately powerful financially, taken separately they are weak politically and virtually nonexistent militarily. The Japanese state, also very weak militarily, compensates at least partially for this weakness with a great concentration of political power and a consequent ability to maneuver and to make quick decisions. The results of all this were not long in coming. In the rush for rare raw materials from October 1973 to April 1974, American and Japanese trusts scored important gains at the expense of European trusts.

So the real import of the theoretical discussion can be understood. The "revisionism" is to be found not in our camp, but in the camp of those who oppose our thesis on the European interpenetration of capital. For what they are suggesting in reality is that the big European trusts are unable (or worse still, do not desire) to defend their interests in the inter-imperialist competitive struggle by utilizing state instruments adequate to the task. And what does this theory imply if not that these trusts are lined up behind American interests, that is, the thesis of ultraimperialism (or its superimperialist variant)?

What we are asserting, however, is that interimperialist conflicts and contradictions among American, Japanese, and European trusts are intensifying and becoming exacerbated. That is why there is a long-term tendency toward European interpenetration of capital and toward the creation of an imperialist superstate in Europe. Those are the indispensable weapons that the European trusts need if they are to have some chance of success in the intensified competitive struggle.

In following this reasoning, we are making no concessions whatever to the myth of "territoriality." There are those who polemicize against our position by operating in fact with the abstraction of "trusts established on the territory of France, of West Germany, etc." forgetting that irreconcilable conflicts of interest have developed between the European trusts and their American counterparts and that the bourgeois state cannot remain neutral in those conflicts -- nor can it stand above the fray as an "arbiter."

Either the bourgeois state defends the interests of the European trusts, no matter how ineffectively; that is, the interests of Philips, Siemens, ICI, Hoechst Bayer, P&G, Saint-Gobain, Fiat, Royal-Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Thyssen, Diamle Benz, and so on, as well as the sectors of financial capital that support them. In that case the question that is posed is deciding what state instrument can be the most efficient weapon in this intensified interimperialist competition. Or else one denies that these groups either want or are able to endow themselves with a state to defend themselves against U.S. imperialism. (This sort of argument is extremely weak, being supported by no demonstrable empirical evidence.) And those who hold to that argument are led, whether intentionally or not, to the Kautskyst theory that there is an ultraimperialism that unites all the trusts and crushes all those who oppose them.

European interpenetration of capital goes on

To estimate the future of the Common Market, then, it is appropriate to refrain from all superficial and short-sighted impressionism. The long-term tendencies on the economic, social, and political level must be grasped, as well as the contradictions within those tendencies. Just as in the past it was incorrect to affirm lightly that the economic integration of capitalist Europe had become "irreversible," so today it would be wrong to rush hastily to the conclusion that the Common Market is in the process of decomposition or that it is already dead.

In spite of the failure of the Fiat-Citroën merger (which, incidentally, poses the question of a Citroën-Renault or Citroën-Ford merger, for the European automobile trusts do not seem capable of getting through the current crisis in the automobile industry by functioning in an independent manner), and in spite of the crisis of the institutions of the EEC, European interpenetration of capital is continuing. In face of the passivity of bourgeois governments and the disarray of the institutions of the "community," European big finance capital has not ceased taking action. And nearly all its actions move in the direction of a greater and greater push toward European interpenetration of capital.

Thus, the "energy crisis" gave rise to a new European financial company to take its place among the many joint financial-banking groups created during the past decade. The Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the Société Générale, the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, the Midlands Bank, the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, and the Belgian Société Générale de Banque have created Finerg, whose goal is to facilitate the financing of large-scale investment projects in the energy field: creation of atomic reactors, oil prospecting in the North Sea, research on new sources of energy, and so on. This is a project that once more confirms the long-term economic logic that underlies the European interpenetration of capital: the growing inability of "national" trusts, even the strongest ones, to find sufficient capital and material assets to undertake some of the technologically advanced projects without whose realization the competitive race with U.S. and Japanese imperialism would be irredeemably lost.

In the negotiations with the semicolonial countries and the bureaucratized workers states, the big monopolistic European trusts are loudly demanding sufficient "European" governmental support to allow them to come away with the choice deals. While American diplomacy has paved the way for a spectacular reentry of the Rockefeller trust into the Egyptian market, European diplomacy has unquestionably scored some points in the Soviet Union, North Africa (steel, automobiles, and natural gas), Black Africa, and Brazil. So the cause is far from having been lost. More than ever, the future of the Common Market depends on the outcome of a battle being waged by living economic, social, and political forces. That is, it depends on certain real relationships of forces and not on any predetermined fate or "iron law."

The workers interests are not those of capital

In this grappling between real material interests, the working class and the workers movement must above all preserve their political independence and not identify with any of the battling bourgeois groups. Neither "national interest" nor "the European ideal" are anything but disguises donned by various capitalist groups in order to lead the workers to abandon

resolute defense of their own interests against those of big capital.

Those who oppose European interpenetration of capital and the creation of a European "superstate" in the name of defending the "national sovereignty" of the existing bourgeois states are identifying themselves with conservative and retrograde capitalist interests that will be unable to preserve their holdings (through a policy of austerity, deflation, and protectionism) except by seeking to reduce the buying power and standard of living of the working class. Those who call for a "European response" to the "American challenge" and who demand a "European state" to "block the advance of the multinationals" are in reality counterposing a plan to strengthen European multinationals in order to stop American multinationals. The working class has no interest in strengthening its own class enemy, nor in assuming that European supertrusts would be more "liberal" or "reformist" than the "national" supertrusts that exist today.

In its own way, the crisis of the Common Market expresses the growing incompatibility of the expansion of the productive forces and the survival of the bourgeois national state. We put forward only one historic solution to this incompatibility: the Socialist United States of Europe. To achieve the Socialist United States of Europe it is necessary to prepare the working class to seize upon each decisive weakening of its own bourgeoisie, on each sharp prerevolutionary crisis, with a view toward creating a real revolutionary situation, that is, with a view toward struggling for the conquest of power. The socialist revolution can still be initiated on the scale of a single country. In fact, for the time being, because of the uneven development of the relationship of forces

between the classes and because of the still-national character of the state and repressive apparatuses, it is possible to initiate the socialist revolution only on a national scale.

But at the same time, the growing internationalization of capital (of the "employers" in the most immediate sense of the word) imposes on the European workers and workers organizations a greater task of jointly cooperating, making alliances, and carrying out actions on a pan-European scale -- even for the most immediate demands, like wage increases. In this way an international class struggle is little by little developing in the image of the international organization of capital. Revolutionaries must not merely take part in this international class struggle. They must be its most lucid, energetic, and enterprising advocates, carrying out many initiatives of contact and collaboration on the level of factory delegates and combative trade-union militants of companies owned by the same multinational trusts or in the same branch of industry in the various European countries.

The combination of the two phenomena -- revolutionary crisis breaking out first on a national scale and workers struggles expanding little by little internationally -- entails a dynamic of progressive interaction of revolutionary crisis on a European scale that will be superior to that of the periods 1917-1920, 1934-38, or 1944-47. That is what makes the program of the Socialist United States of Europe not only objectively necessary, but practically possible as well. And, to an ever-growing extent, the Socialist United States of Europe will become a credible goal, first to the broad vanguard, and later to the toiling masses as a whole. □

CHINA

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE THREE WORLDS OF TENG HSHIAO-PING

—by PIERRE ROUSSET—

The Chinese delegation to the sixth special session of the United Nations, held in April 1974, was led by Teng Hsiao-ping. That in itself was something of an event. In 1965 Teng had been the general secretary of the Chinese Communist party. During the Cultural Revolution he was, along with Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen, one of the main leaders to be demoted. In Peking at that time he was called the "number two Chinese Khrushchev." For seven years he was not heard from. Then, about a year before his triumphal entry into the UN, he discreetly reappeared. Today he has once again become one of the most important leaders of the Peoples Republic of China.

This quiet rehabilitation, unaccompanied by any self-criticism from either Teng or his former detractors, occurred while the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin campaign was going full blast. That says a lot about the existence in China of a bureaucratic layer that has installed itself in power and is perfectly capable of settling important political problems completely outside the control of the masses. The Cultural Revolution, despite the mass mobilization that it gave rise to, did not overthrow this bureaucracy. It only modified the relationship of forces

both within the bureaucratic layer itself and between the bureaucracy and the masses.

But more important than the personal reemergence of Teng was the programmatic speech he made during the UN special session, which was devoted to a discussion of raw materials. During the discussion, the semicolonial raw-material-producing countries tried to forge a bloc against the imperialist countries.

Teng's three worlds

Not so long ago, the Chinese CP considered the world as divided into four great blocs: The two "superpowers" constituted the first bloc, the socialist camp the second; then there were two "intermediate" blocs, one made up of "secondary" imperialist powers (that is, imperialist powers other than the United States), the other of underdeveloped or dominated capitalist countries. Now it is true that the intervention of the Chinese delegation during the April UN session was obviously affected by tactical concern with having China be accepted into the "third-world" bloc that was forming at the session. But in his

speech, Teng Hsiao-ping went further than that. He formulated an overview of the world situation that revised the Chinese CP's earlier theses on several points and went a long way toward casting Chinese diplomacy in a more consistent light. In a single paragraph he defined the existence of three distinct worlds whose alignment determined the orientation of Peking's foreign policy.

"In this situation of 'great disorder under heaven,'" Teng declared, "all the political forces in the world have undergone drastic division and realignment through prolonged trials of strength and struggle. A large number of Asian, African, and Latin American countries have achieved independence one after another and they are playing an ever greater role in international affairs. As a result of the emergence of social imperialism, the socialist camp, which existed for a time after World War II, is no longer in existence. Owing to the law of uneven development of capitalism, the Western imperialist bloc, too, is disintegrating. Judging by the changes in international relations, the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World."⁽¹⁾

The most remarkable feature of the theses developed by Teng Hsiao-ping is the total marginalization of the role of the class struggle in the real sense of the word. The international arena, according to Teng, is dominated by the struggle of the "poor countries" against the "rich countries," of the "small" against the "large."

Third world: 'motive force' of revolution

There is nothing new in the Chinese leaders' assigning a decisive role in the dynamics of world revolution to the third world. Lin Piao's well-beloved theory of the "zone of storms" clearly showed the Chinese CP's relative skepticism about the capacity of the Western working class to overturn the capitalist system. During the period of the Cultural Revolution the Chinese CP leaders assigned a somewhat more important role to workers struggles. But the theses that are being defended now, as we shall see, do not amount to a new "reliance" on the third world. Just the opposite. But they do indicate three sorts of shifts that tend to systematize, theorize, and generalize features that had already been present in the practice and conceptualization of China's foreign policy in the neocolonial world:

* The historic tasks assigned to the struggles of the third world are reduced to the search for effective independence from imperialism and "hegemonism." Says Teng: "The numerous developing countries . . . still face the historic task of clearing out the remnant forces of colonialism, developing the national economy and consolidating national independence. . . . They (the developing countries -- INPRECOR) constitute a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel of world history and are the main force combatting colonialism, imperialism, and particularly the superpowers."⁽²⁾

The terminology Teng uses here shows that he is not simply making a declaration intended to comment on a conjunctural event, but rather is attempting to present a strategy for a whole period. The viewpoint expressed here is one of the elements that explains the extremely one-sided analysis the Chinese CP made of the "oil battle," an analysis that "forgot" that the increase in the price of oil benefited mainly the



'In this situation of great disorder under heaven. . .

multinational corporations and the indigenous bourgeoisies of the oil-producing countries and not the people of the third world. And we are of course leaving aside the "other problems" with which countries like India and Ethiopia are confronted!

* The Chinese CP's examination of the conditions necessary for realizing the historic task of achieving independence in the colonial and semicolonial countries completely ignores the social structure of the states involved. This was brought out most clearly by Huang Hua, vice chairman of the Chinese delegation, in his May 1 speech to the UN plenary session. Huang declared that "the necessary prerequisite . . . in safeguarding their (the developing countries' -- INPRECOR) political and economic independence and developing their independent national economies (is) that they should terminate the economic monopoly and plunder by imperialism, sweep away these obstacles and take all necessary measures to protect their economic resources and other rights and interests."⁽³⁾ In no way is the socialist revolution presented as an indispensable condition for achieving real independence from imperialism and the world capitalist market.

* Most serious of all, however, is the complete assimilation of peoples and "their" governments -- regardless of the governments concerned. Teng Hsiao-ping flatly declares that the "people of the developing countries have the right to choose and decide on their own social and economic systems."⁽⁴⁾ This is a novel notion of "choice" for a Marxist! If the majority of the anti-imperialist "people" of the third world "choose" the capitalist system, then the Chinese bureaucracy can accord the designation "anti-imperialist" to ultrareactionary and repressive regimes like the shah's in Iran or Haile Selassie's in Ethiopia. The same label can be bestowed on a man like Leopold Senghor, the president of Senegal and one of the most fully-formed products of neocolonialism in former French Africa. Senghor was recently received in Peking by Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung. In his welcoming speech, the Chinese prime minister did not hesitate to salute the Senegalese government, which, it seems, "pursues a policy of nonalignment, opposes imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism."⁽⁵⁾ One asks oneself why this assimilation of people to "their" government is not extended to the Soviet Union and North America. For by Teng Hsiao-ping's reasoning, is it not the people of these two "superpowers" who are exploiting the third world?

Chinese diplomacy allows of exceptions to this general rule only in cases of "puppet governments" or of colonial adminis-

trations confronted by already-developed revolutionary governments or fronts (the PRG in South Vietnam, the GRUNK in Cambodia, the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, etc.). But even here, the degree of exception has proved to be extremely limited. Mao's China has declined to break diplomatic relations with the Chilean junta and has recently accredited a new ambassador representing the junta. Likewise, Nixon's trip to Peking showed that while Peking's recognition of the PRG might not be called into question, the Chinese bureaucracy would not hesitate to define its international strategy without bothering about the grave difficulties it created for the "brother" peoples of Indochina. And today, Maoist policy on Angola is manifesting the same priority of defending state interests and relations. Chinese support has been given to Holden Roberto's Angola National Liberation Front, the right wing of the Angolan national movement that is much less representative than the MPLA.⁽⁶⁾ The Chinese government has even recently sent 112 instructors to Kinshasa to aid in organizing Holden's "army." This support to the ANLF is determined by the relations that exist between the Peoples Republic of China and the government of Zaïre, which is headed by Joseph Mobutu, one of the murderers of the African revolutionary Patrice Lumumba. This is part and parcel of the whole Maoist policy on central Africa.


The struggle against 'hegemonism'

So the openly proclaimed top priority of Maoist strategy in the third world is not to bolster revolutionary armed liberation movements, but to try to form a bloc with all the states of the third world as they are now constituted. The aim of this "bloc" is to struggle against the "imperialist" and "hegemonist" policy of the two superpowers. Its main axis is a common defense of "state sovereignty."

In this sense, Peking's foreign policy, while motivated by a bureaucratic conception of state interest, clearly differs from that of the Soviet leadership. The Chinese leadership decided that the opening toward Washington was necessary to enable China to reenter the arena of international diplomacy (to get into the UN, etc.) and to definitively put an end to the economic blockade that was depriving the Chinese economy of material resources that it needed. These were the primary considerations during Nixon's visit to Peking -- to the exclusion of all others, like the Indochinese revolution. This policy of "peaceful coexistence" accepted by the Maoist leadership dealt a severe blow to revolutionary movements in the third world. But it did not give rise to a concerted and protracted détente policy analogous to Moscow's. For one thing, U.S.-Chinese relations are marking time. But the main thing is that the search for a "bloc" with the developing countries implies denunciation of both the "great powers." And while for a time the emphasis seemed to be mainly on the especially pernicious danger to the third world of Soviet "social imperialism," a good dose of criticism is now being directed at both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The "détente" is now continually being described as illusory. On the other hand, Peking considers the struggle for "hegemony" being waged by the two superpowers as involving a constant threat of new world war. It is difficult to separate propaganda from analysis in Maoist assertions about the danger of war, whether between the Soviet Union and the United States (armed conflict between the two sometimes being presented as "inevitable") or between the Soviet Union and China. But since the clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops over the Usuri River in 1969, tension has clearly grown. The pretext for the clashes was exact delineation of the border between China and the Soviet Union. Since the arrest last March of a

Soviet helicopter crew that had strayed over the Chinese border, the Kremlin has suddenly hardened its position. It is now claiming title to part of the Chinese province of Heilangkiang, and particularly is demanding control over the important waterways of this region in which the Amor (Heilung in Chinese) and Usuri rivers flow together.



Painting shows Chinese women taking artillery class. How seriously does Mao take "the danger of war"?

This increase in Chinese-Soviet tension is very probably partly explainable by internal political factors. The "Chinese danger" is one of the rare themes on which the Soviet leadership can still count on finding broad popular support. But Moscow would also be uneasy about the emergence of a new nuclear power on its Asian border. According to Melville Maxwell, the Soviet regime had even established contact with the Kennedy administration to discuss a "preventive" nuclear attack on Chinese nuclear development sites.⁽⁸⁾ As of 1973 forty-five Soviet divisions were stationed along the Chinese frontier, as compared with only fifteen in 1967. But, according to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, that would be insufficient for a real attack on China. Moreover, the international context, which is marked by the end of Peking's diplomatic isolation, combined with the fear of nuclear conflict would make such a move very difficult and excessively costly politically.

Nevertheless, the struggle against "hegemonism" and the possible danger of war continues to dominate Chinese diplomacy: condemnation of the Asian "collective security" pact proposed by Moscow as an attempt to isolate China, denunciation during the visit of Cypriot leader Makarios to Peking of the competition of the "superpowers" in the Mediterranean, and so on.

It is in this area that Chinese foreign policy has suffered its most serious setback. The Chinese and Iraqi delegations were the only ones to abstain when the UN Security Council voted to send troops to the Golan Heights to separate Syrian and Israeli forces. The Middle East crisis and the Palestinian question had been one of the main axes of Chinese foreign policy. But Peking has not succeeded in detaching any of the Arab states from the "great powers," nor has it been able to win a favorable hearing among the leaderships of the Palestinian organizations, which are more closely concerned with the Soviet Union.

Europe: a 'complex' case

"The contention between the superpowers extends over the entire globe," declared Teng. "Strategically," he continued, "Europe is the focus of their contention." (9) Since the imperialist bloc has "disintegrated," part of the Second World (composed of industrialized countries) is supposed to rally to the cause of the Third World. In fact, "The hegemonism and power politics of the two superpowers have also aroused strong dissatisfaction among the developed countries of the Second World." (10) To be sure, this is not a simple problem: "The case of the developed countries in between the superpowers and the developing countries is a complicated one. Some of them still retain colonialist relations of one form or another with Third World countries, and a country like Portugal (the speech took place before the Spínola coup -- INPRECOR) even continues with its barbarous colonial rule. An end must be put to this state of affairs." But: "In varying degrees, all these countries have the desire of shaking off superpower enslavement or control and safeguarding their national independence and the integrity of their sovereignty." (11)

This Maoist analysis and the tasks that logically flow from it are especially serious. The emergence of a united European capitalist power of the sort that the Chinese CP is calling for would represent the birth of a new imperialist "superpower" to take its place beside the United States. A section of the European bourgeoisie desires this sort of European integration. It would put the European bourgeoisie in a better position to deal with both American competition and the current rise of the Western working class. Worse, a united European bourgeois state with its own government, its own army, and its own diplomacy, could be constructed only on the basis of the crushing of the working class and the defeat of the present upsurge. That would be the only way to allow for the necessary industrial reorganization and investment in the reorganization of production. And furthermore, the emergence of this new power would not put an end to international "tensions." On the contrary, it would provoke (and would have been created by) an exacerbation of world interimperialist competition -- competition for the plunder of the third world and the penetration of the workers states by the developed capitalist world. Revolutionaries cannot be for or against "Europe" in general or the Common Market in particular. They can only be against the Europe of the trusts and for a workers Europe.

The Chinese leaders also turn a blind eye to the counterrevolutionary role of Japan, a role that has been intensified by the strengthening of Japanese imperialism relative to U.S. imperialism. This is not because of an "error" of analysis. It is a manifestation of a world outlook determined by the narrow point of view of a state bureaucracy that is seeking to cash in on the "positive" aspects of the policy of each government in such a way as to bolster its international and internal position. It tries to justify this through the "theory" of primary and secondary contradictions. Peking Review occasionally reports on European workers struggles. But the main thrust of Chinese foreign policy is to find "positive aspects" in the policy of existing governments or of bourgeois oppositions seeking to come to power. Peking made no secret of its preference in the French presidential elections: Chaban-Delmas, who was described as representing the continuation of the Gaullist policy of independence. But as a last resort, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was preferable to Mitterrand, who was saddled with a host of disadvantages: He represented the "Atlanticism" of the Socialists and would have allowed "revisionist" ministers from the Communist party into his government.

While it might have been somewhat "surprising" to see Peking Review report with satisfaction the speech of the most reactionary representative of Swiss general staff, who demanded the "strengthening of national defense," the case of Britain was most "astonishing" of all. At the end of May, Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative party of Britain, who had just been defeated in the elections, was received in Peking as a chief of state. He got a triumphant reception and was even granted a one-and-a-half-hour interview with Mao Tse-tung. Chinese protocol is extremely exacting, and it is not by accident that these honors were bestowed on the leader of the British opposition. In his speech Teng Hsiao-ping shamelessly sang the praises of the foreign policy of the Conservatives and during the toast proposed at the banquet he "forgot" the unfortunate Mr. Wilson. Heath took advantage of the opportunity to deliver a real election-type speech, touching on Europe, NATO, and the situation of the "medium-sized powers."

The Maoist leadership sometimes tries to justify its opportunism by claiming that it rejects "interfering in the internal affairs of another country." (That is one of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.) But it seems that what's good enough for the Chilean junta is not good enough for the Labour government in Great Britain. And the reason is simple: Heath is a supporter of "Europe" (capitalist Europe, that is), while Wilson, under pressure from broad layers of the workers, is making noises against the Common Market.

As for the "Peoples Democracies" (which Teng Hsiao-ping includes in the Second World), the Maoist leadership has a clear preference for Rumania, since the Bucarest regime has shown some independence from the Kremlin. And Rumania has the sad privilege of being the first bureaucratized workers state to have decided to make significant investments in Pinochet's Chile.

The development of Asian communism

In spite of the failures it has suffered in the Middle East, in spite of the continuing American intervention in Indochina, and in spite of the extent of the continued Soviet presence in Asia, Chinese diplomacy has been able to ring up some success. Economic trade with advanced capitalist countries is expanding rapidly and has provided China with much ultra-modern equipment. (France, China's eighth largest supplier and fourth largest customer, has just opened in Peking the largest industrial fair it has ever organized abroad.) It is this need for economic trade that accounts for Peking's failure to advance any concrete demands about Macao, which, along with Timor, is Portugal's Asian "province." Peking considers Macao, as well as Hong Kong, to be part of China. But Macao -- again like Hong Kong -- is an essential transit and financial exchange center between the capitalist world and the Peoples Republic of China. This is what led Ho Yin, a multimillionaire who serves as Macao spokesman for the Chinese Communist party, to declare that the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal would change nothing in the status or structure of Macao. (13)

For the Maoist leadership, this qualitative and quantitative increase in commercial exchanges with the capitalist world is essential for enabling the Chinese economy to make a new leap forward. In itself, there is nothing wrong with carrying on such trade. But there is quite a lot wrong with the political moves the Chinese bureaucracy has made to foster that trade. (14) A diplomatic offensive is being aimed at Africa, especially central Africa. (Since January, four African heads of state have visited Peking: Kaunda of Zambia, Boumediene

mao's china has declined
to break diplomatic
relations with
the junta's chile



of Algeria, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Senghor of Senegal.) The "battle for raw materials" has enabled China to integrate itself into the third-world "front." But more especially, the situation is evolving very quickly in Southeast Asia and in the Far East.

In April 1974 Peking signed an accord on Sino-Japanese air transport with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. The signing touched off a furor in Taiwan. To obtain this agreement, Tokyo had to tolerate the rupture of its airline link with Taiwan, which has been an important transit point and will cost the Japanese economy quite dearly. The pro-Taiwan lobby in Tokyo seems to be really running out of steam.

Malaysia in its turn has established diplomatic relations with China, sending its prime minister, Abdul Razak, on a trip to Peking. Malaysia was the first non-Communist country of Southeast Asia to do this. Peking is also rapidly developing its relations with Thailand (which sent a mission to Peking in December 1973) and with the Philippines, whose government is headed by the extremely pro-American Ferdinand Marcos. Even Suharto's Indonesia seems prepared to change its attitude (gradually) toward China. But all this will inevitably have serious consequences for the Communist parties of Asia. The trip of Khieu Sampan, leader of the Khmer Rouge, to Vietnam and China probably resulted in the recementing of ties between China and the FUNK. But the announcement in 1971 of Nixon's trip to Peking provoked the first serious political break between China and the Vietnamese Communist party -- a break that has only widened since then and that will affect all the Indochinese Communist movements.

Japan has now become the world's second imperialist power. It is intervening in Southeast Asia and was the target of mobilizations during Tanaka's trip to South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In all of these countries there are more or less developed guerrilla movements led by Communist parties of Maoist inclination. Now these movements will once again face an alternative: take their distance from Peking or "moderate" their actions. During his speech welcoming Abdul Razak, Chou En-lai alluded positively to the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia, a project that strongly resembles the plans of the extremely anti-Communist states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He did not repeat these allusions upon the departure of the Malaysian prime minister. But they remain disquieting nevertheless.

After the overthrow in October 1973 of the Bangkok military regime by the popular and student mobilization, the Communist parties of Thailand and Vietnam pointed out the reactionary character of the new government and called for continuing the struggle. Peking Review, however, was silent on the statements and military actions of the Thai Communist party. (Significant guerrilla zones exist in Thailand.) The New China News Agency (Hsinhua) limited itself to publishing in its daily bulletin a belated recapitulation of the main actions of the Thai CP. (16) There was not a word about the political positions taken by the Thai CP!

The Maoist leadership has just recently given some support to the Communist party of the Malaysian Federation by distributing the declaration published after the defection of many insurgents (some leaders among them) to the government in northern Kalimantan (the island province of Malaysia). (17) But it appears that the development of Chinese diplomacy has touched off hard debates within the Malaysian CP. (18)

Further west, the Indian Maoist currents have yet to emerge from their crisis, and China's policy on Pakistan and Bangladesh has crushed all possibility of the pro-Peking CPs developing any revolutionary activity in these two countries.

China's foreign policy, along with its inconsistency on questions of working-class strategy, has also been one of the factors leading to the disintegration of the Maoist movement in the developed capitalist countries. The Mao-spontaneist tendency has little by little abandoned its strict adherence to China. The Mao-Stalinist organizations have for the most part been reduced to sects, thanks to the twists and turns of Chinese foreign policy. And the Mao-centrist organizations are no longer able to define a consistent orientation on many questions, often taking refuge in silence.

The present development of the regional situation will most likely accelerate a process of breakup and recomposition among the Asian Communist movement. And this in a continent where the class struggle is especially developed and where Maoist influence has been deepest. That breakup and recomposition may be one of the major consequences of Chinese diplomacy.

For the Maoist leadership, "the east wind is prevailing" and the world situation is "excellent." The sense of this metaphor must be regarded as somewhat elusive. The disappearance of

the workers states (with the emergence of "social imperialism") and the disintegration of the "socialist camp" would seem to indicate a situation that is other than excellent. The international tasks the Chinese CP has set for itself in accord with supporting workers and revolutionary struggles throughout the world, struggles that are now developing quickly, especially with the new potential rise of the colonial revolution in several areas (Africa, Southeast and South Asia) and (the most important thing) the deepening class struggle in Western Europe. Once again, the objective conditions for the world socialist revolution are manifesting their maturity. The essential weakness of the present international revolutionary upsurge remains the disorganization and confusion of the vanguard. The essential task of an internationalist leadership standing at the head of a workers state like China would be to aid in the recomposition of a real world communist movement. The Maoist leadership, however, is aiding in its splintering. □

Footnotes:

1. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, p. 1.
2. Ibid, p.11.
3. Peking Review, May 10, 1974. It is true that Huang Hua expressed some reservations about the UN document presented by the third-world countries. But they amounted only to regretting the use of terms like economic "interdependence" and "world division of labor," which could be taken over by the great powers.
4. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, 1974, p.V.
5. Peking Review, May 10, 1974, p.14.
6. On this subject, see the article on the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies published elsewhere in this issue of INPRECOR.
7. The capital of Zaïre, formerly the Congo.
8. See *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 1974, "Le Conflit Frontalier entre le R.P.C. et l'U.R.S.S." (The border conflict between the Peoples Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.)
9. Supplement to Peking Review, April 12, 1974, p.11.
10. Ibid. p.11.
11. Ibid. p.11.
12. *Pékin Informations*, November 26, 1973 (French edition of Peking Review).
13. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, issues of May 6 and May 13.
14. The problem is not only one of international policy. It also rebounds on the sort of internal development chosen. INPRECOR will return to this problem in future issues.
15. It appears that Cambodia is the only issue that still gives rise to real anti-imperialist mass mobilizations in China.
16. *Cahier de la Chine Nouvelle*, March 22, 1974. On the other hand, there were many dispatches reporting attacks in the Bangkok press against the Soviet Union. There was even an account of a badminton tournament being held in Thailand. Let us recall that aside from the Indochinese CP, the Thai Communist party is the strongest one in the region and that it is of Maoist orientation.
17. *Pékin Informations*, April 19 and April 29, 1974.
18. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 24, 1973, and January 14, 1974. This information must be looked at with some caution, especially as regards the extreme form of the conflict. What is certain is that the CP in northern Kalimantan has just suffered a very serious split. But while a link between that split and Chinese foreign policy is possible, it has not been demonstrated that one exists.

IRAN

the shah: new cop in the arab-persian gulf

by A. PARSI

In recent months there has been no lack of declarations from the shah of Iran about Iran's growing role in the region of the Arab-Persian Gulf, a role that the shah has been assigned by imperialism. Thus, the shah told a reporter for the American magazine *Newsweek* (May 21, 1973 issue): "European security is nothing but an empty phrase without stability and security in the Persian Gulf. Western Europe, the United States, and Japan consider the Gulf as integral to their security, but they are not in position to guarantee this security. That is why we are doing it for them. . . . America does not like to play the role of policeman, even when its vital interests are at stake. Anyone with the slightest geopolitical sense must come to the conclusion that we had scarcely any choice -- any more than the United States did -- when they decided to extend us their support."

This policy is tied to a series of military, political, and economic factors. The sort of investments made in Iran by the

big multinational corporations and the restricted size of the internal market (a result of the low wages paid the industrial workers and of the exclusion of the major part of the population from the market) combine to create a gap between the growth of production of manufactured goods on the one hand and the growth in the demand for these products on the internal market on the other hand. The social layers that have sufficient income to purchase such products are relatively narrow. The demand stimulated by the state sector cannot completely measure up to the requirements of the multinational firms. Hence, a policy of intensive export of essential and luxury commodities has become a decisive aspect of the regime's general economic policy. Consequently, the huge income that Iran derives from oil has generated a tendency toward exporting capital to the Gulf, to Afghanistan, and to other areas. Furthermore, the Iranian regime is deeply concerned with cutting off any development of revolutionary struggle in the whole region around the Gulf, for such devel-

opments would have strong repercussions almost immediately in Iran itself. And finally, American, European, and Japanese imperialism are interested in Iran not only as an importer of automobiles manufactured by General Motors and Toyota, but also as a link in the counterrevolutionary military chain. The policing policy of the Iranian regime in the Gulf region must be viewed in that context.

Counterrevolutionary surrogates

Given its setback in Vietnam, its internal social and political difficulties, and the requirements of interimperialist competition, American imperialism decided to modify its strategy of direct military intervention and to work toward establishing counterrevolutionary surrogates that could enjoy a certain amount of relative independence. Nixon himself proclaimed this new strategy during his visit to the island of Guam on July 25, 1969. As Nixon put it, the strategy consists of shifting part of the costs and responsibilities of "defense of our allies and of the free world" to allied powers that are able to assume those costs and responsibilities. Thus, American imperialism is counting on these counterrevolutionary surrogates to crush or contain revolutionary movements in various parts of the world (the Israeli army in the Near East, the Iranian army in the Middle East, the Brazilian army in Latin America). Obviously, this strategy does not preclude direct intervention in cases of crucial necessity for imperialism.

Nixon recalled this doctrine once again in his January 21, 1972, State of the Union message: "We will maintain a nuclear deterrent force sufficient to deal with any threat to the security of the United States or its allies. Our commitment to liberty remains solid and unshakable. But others must bear their fair share of the burden of defending freedom throughout the world." In April 1970 Elliot Richardson explained American imperialism's attitude toward Iran: "The Nixon doctrine postulates that in order to attain its goals of peace and security, the United States must pay close attention to the countries of the region (of the Gulf -- INPRECOR), and especially to Iran."

Clearly, this special attention to Iran is not fortuitous. The importance of the local bourgeoisie, the strategic role of the country, and the regime's ability to "bear its share of the burden" are important factors in determining which governments can play the role of ally and policeman.

Imperialism in the Arab-Persian gulf

At the beginning of the twentieth century England held a dominant position in the Arab-Persian Gulf. Oil had not yet been discovered. The Gulf region had a commercial and strategic importance (protecting the route to the East Indies) and was favorably located to serve as a ground on which to compete with tsarist Russia. From the start of its rule, British imperialism tried to break the region up into various emirates, each subjected to colonial domination. With the discovery of oil and the creation in 1909 of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), the Gulf region took on decisive economic importance for British imperialism, and more generally, for European imperialism. France was shut out of the area. Britain and Russia sought to coexist through various compromises.*

* In 1907 a treaty was concluded between Britain and Russia according to which northern Iran was handed to Russia and southern Iran (and the Gulf) was ceded to Britain. But Russia tried to gain both access to the Gulf and a share in the oil of the south.

Russia dominated northern Iran and played an important role in Iranian commerce. Through the medium of the APOC, London built its own administration and its own police force in southern Iran and in the Gulf. The APOC acquired the status of an independent ruling power in the region.

After World War I, British imperialism was obliged to modify its policy of divide-and-rule and to turn to less brutally direct methods of exploiting the Middle East. This shift in policy was caused basically by the weakening of world capitalism immediately after the war, the rise of liberation movements in the colonies (e.g. the 1920 mass revolt against the British in Iraq), and, most importantly, the October Revolution in Russia. The new policy favored the creation of a few centralized regimes that could rule the area more effectively. The Feisal regime in Iraq, the Saudis in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran, all originated in this period.

Having won its struggle against French and German competitors, London found itself confronted with a U.S. drive into the region and especially into Iran. But it was only after the second world war that American imperialism began to acquire an increasingly dominant position in the Arab-Persian Gulf.

The 1953 CIA-organized coup that deposed the Mossadegh government in Iran allowed American imperialism to make further gains and forced Britain to recognize Washington's military and economic superiority. After the coup, American oil companies obtained a much greater participation in the exploitation of the region's oil. On October 29, 1954, a petroleum accord was signed by the new government, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and a consortium of Western companies. This consortium, called Iranian Oil Participants, was owned by the following firms: APOC, which had become British Petroleum, 40%; Royal-Dutch Shell 14%; Gulf Oil 7%; Mobil Oil 7%; Standard Oil of New Jersey 7%; Socal (Standard Oil of California) 7%; Texaco 7%; CFP (Compagnie Française de Pétroles) 6%; and Iricon, made up of American independents, 5%. These figures alone give some indication of the degree of American success in gaining control of Iran's oil resources.

At the beginning of 1968 the British Labour government announced that during the following three years it would withdraw militarily from the Gulf emirates in line with the policy of "disengagement east of Suez." The British withdrawal naturally posed the question of who would fill the vacuum left by the departure of British imperialism, which for decades had been the "guardian" of this part of the Gulf. In 1970 a conference of American ambassadors to countries in the Near and Middle East was held in Teheran. Also attending, in addition to the ambassadors, was Richard Helms, then director of the CIA and now U.S. ambassador to Iran. The purpose of the conference was to work out the concrete application of the "Nixon doctrine" in the region. According to reports given by James Sisco, U.S. undersecretary of state for Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian affairs, the results of the conference were quite simple: The policing role that Iran would thenceforth play in the entire Gulf region was confirmed. London did its part by sending an emissary to Iran, Sir William Luce, who was to prepare Iran's occupation in November 1971 of the Gulf islands of Abu Moussa, which had previously belonged to the Sharjah sultanate, and of Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which had been part of the emirate of Ras el-Khaima. This occupation, carried out by the Iranian navy, took place just a few days before the proclamation of the "independence" of the Union of Arab Emirates (December 2, 1971). The occupied islands were transformed into Iranian military bases. During the same trip, the representative of British imperialism convinced the shah to give up his attempts

to take over the island of Bahrein, which was not incorporated into the Union of Arab Emirates.

The Union of Arab Emirates was thus created under the auspices of British and American imperialism. Three emirates did not join the union: Qatar, Bahrein, and Rass el-Khayma. Their nonadherence may well have been the result of a decision by imperialism that these states could better be controlled separately.

The objectives generally sought by British and American imperialism may be summed up as follows:

1. To create an entity capable of cooperating more effectively with imperialism, i.e. the Union of Arab emirates.
2. To step up investments in the Gulf region and especially in Iran in order to foster the emergence of a "middle class" (which is developing in the banking, insurance, marketing, and advertising sectors, and includes engineers and technicians) that could serve both as a social base for the Iranian regime and as a market for a series of durable consumer goods and luxury items being produced by factories built in Iran.
3. To develop the Iranian dictatorship into the main agent for maintaining a social situation conducive to imperialist projects in the entire region.
4. To transform Iran into a top-level purchaser of arms constructed by the weapons and aerospace industry in the United States (and in other imperialist countries as well). The Iranian regime would need such arms to fulfill its new role of policeman of the region, and its oil income would provide it with sufficient currency to purchase such arms.

Economic role of Iran

Iran's economic role was brought out very clearly during the "oil crisis." Based on 1972 figures, the Gulf region contains more than half the world's oil reserves. The table below indicates the relative importance of the oil resources of the various countries of the Gulf:

*Country	*Reserves (in millions of tons)	*1972 production (in millions of tons)
Kuwait	9,271	152
Qatar	777.6	23
Iran	9,286	254
Abu Dhabi	2,529.6	50
Bahrein	86	3.8 (in 1971)
Dubai	205.9	6.5 (in 1971)
Iraq	4,143	67
Oman	689	14.7 (in 1971)
Saudi Arabia	19,714	285

In addition, a good part of the oil delivered to Israel comes from the Arab-Persian Gulf. Iran's function is also of crucial importance both in maintaining surveillance of the Gulf and in controlling the "demands" of the Gulf's oil-producing states, which must remain within the confines set by American imperialism. The shah's "leading" role in the oil negotiations of the past few years serves a double purpose: In each round of such bargaining, the first "demands" set the pattern for all other countries to follow. It also provides the shah with a facade of "anti-imperialist" demagoguery for home consumption.

Imperialist investments in Iran are growing at a very rapid rate. American imperialism is in the lead, but German and Japanese companies are also on the offensive. Nissan and Toyota are planning to build a dumptruck factory and an assembly plant. Japanese capitalists have submitted a credit plan of more than \$1,000 million. It is linked to plans for participation of Japanese companies in construction of cement factories, automobile plants, a refinery (with a capacity of 500,000 barrels a day), and in the development of production of oil and natural gas. This increase in imperialist investment has led to the production of commodities that cannot be absorbed by the internal market and are therefore directed toward the markets of certain countries in the Arab-Persian Gulf and in Southeast Asia. According to the report of the Iranian central bank, the value of exports of Iranian industrial commodities increased 40 percent between 1971 and 1972. This export policy is manifested in the many Iranian industrial fairs held in the Gulf countries and in the flow of capital from all the Gulf countries (and from the imperialist corporations in Iran) into Iranian banks. At a time when an explosion of oil revenue is going on, this influx of capital is not negligible. And it in turn permits the export of Iranian capital to other countries.

A few months ago the Iranian Ministry of Economics declared: "The Gulf region provides the greatest potential market for our products. We have set ourselves the top-priority objective of becoming the principal suppliers of the oil emirates, whose per capita income is the highest in the world. Geographical proximity, brief delivery time, and reduced shipping costs have allowed us to double our exports in three years, and we hope to increase them another 200 percent by 1978." (Le Monde, October 7-8, 1973.) As for Rezaei, one of the biggest Iranian capitalists, he declared: "Iranian consumption is too limited to absorb the products of our large-scale industries. We are therefore constrained to export, particularly to neighboring countries."

In addition, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have become increasingly attractive markets for machinery assembled in Iran, in particular trucks, buses, and automobiles. In this case, Iran's role as middle-man in addition to providing the usual advantages (cheap labor, production close to markets) also gives the companies better political cover: the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries importing from an "underdeveloped" country rather than directly from imperialist centers.

J. Klochkov, the director of the Iranian subsidiary of General Motors, asserted when discussing the construction of a Chevrolet assembly plant in Iran: "After having conceived the plan of building a Chevrolet plant in Iran, we began to think about the possibility of exporting the products of the factory. . . . We are now conducting negotiations with all Iran's neighbors, especially with the emirates of the Persian Gulf and with Arab countries. At the end of this year, we will still be engaged in discussions with delegates from these countries. I should also say that one of our aims is to penetrate the markets of the countries of Eastern Europe." (Teheran Economist, February 2, 1974.)

A military power

In response to a question from a reporter for the West German newsweekly Der Spiegel about Iranian military expenditures and Teheran's intervention in the Gulf, the shah replied, "I have proposed a regional pact, or treaty, or agreement, or whatever you want to call it, aimed at guaranteeing the integrity and security of this region. Up to now, we have re-

**\$6,000
million
for arms...**



**... paid
in cash**

ceived no response. Access to the Persian Gulf is a life-or-death question for us. We intend to guarantee this access, with or without the cooperation of others. And that is the answer to your question about why we spend so much money on our defense." So these are the "good reasons" that "justify" a huge military intervention in the Gulf! The emirates have invited the shah to "guarantee access to the Gulf" and to "guarantee the integrity and security of the region."

And the expenses are not exactly trivial. In 1973 Iran spent \$3,000 million on armaments. Orders for new military equipment that the shah has already placed raise the figure to \$6,000 million. For the capitalists of the arms industry, these orders represent an especially valuable windfall, because the shah's oil income allows him to pay his bills in cash.

Strengthening of the Iranian army is a critical necessity since the shah "does not conceal his desire to set himself up as the policeman of the region. With the support of the United States and Great Britain, he has assigned himself the task of 'upholding order' especially by combatting any subversive force in the Gulf." (Le Monde, May 25, 1973.) At present nearly 60 percent of Iran's oil revenues are spent on arms, and military expenditures account for 47 percent of the total budget. Iran's arms imports, noted the January 12, 1974, Le Monde, "averaged \$85 million a year at the beginning of the 1960s, rose to \$156 million in 1968, and will reach \$2,000 million a year during the fifth five-year plan launched in March 1973." And these enormous figures may well be outstripped.

The Iranian armed forces today number some 200,000 men, of whom 20,000 are in the air force and 10,000 are in the navy. And this leaves aside the 40,000 police charged with assuring the success of the "agrarian revolution" in the countryside and the 60,000 agents of Savak, the political police, which is a decisive factor in Iran's "independent economic development." The Iranian army has the most sophisticated matériel: F4 Phantom jets, laser-guided bombs, latest-generation British tanks, and so on. And there are many military bases: Ahwaz, Abadan, the Kharg islands, Quishm (air bases), Korramshar (naval base), Bandar Abbas, and Chah Behar (which is the largest military base in the Indian Ocean). Those are just the most important military fortresses. The list leaves aside Teheran's military implantation in Oman. Le Monde's correspondent Eric Rouleau offered the following description

of the Iranian helicopter base at Isfahan: "Isfahan will be the site of the world's second-largest helicopter base; it will be run by more than 500 American instructors. The shah's latest U.S. purchases are quite impressive. For \$3,000 million he has equipped his regime with, among other things, a fleet of some 300 heavy and light bombers, half of which are Phantoms that will be delivered within five years. That is more than has been promised to Israel, the only other country in the Middle East that Washington has agreed to supply with this type of advanced equipment." (Le Monde, October 7-8, 1973.)

These "purchases" must be viewed in the light of the conditions of the Iranian workers, who work an average of twelve hours a day for a wage of about 60 rials (a little less than one dollar) and in the light of the standard of living of the Iranian peasant masses, whose income is scarcely enough to live on.

The shah against revolutionary movements

In a rather loose-mouthed mood, the shah told Newsweek senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave: "There is a possibility that certain of the regimes on the other side of the Persian Gulf might be overthrown by extremists currently engaging in subversive activities. For example, let's take the rebellion in the sultanate of Oman. If it ever succeeded, imagine for a moment what we would be faced with in Muscat, the capital, which lies just across the Straits of Hormuz. First a few rifles, then naval artillery and missiles. This is ridiculous. I will not tolerate subversive activities." (Newsweek, May 23, 1973.)

Thus is defined the basic role of the Iranian army, an army that (aside from its occupation of the Gulf islands in 1971) extended its aid to the royalists in Yemen, to the Sana government during the October 1972 war between the two Yemens, to Haile Selassie's regime in its struggle against the Eritrean Liberation Front, to Hussein's regime in its battle against the Palestinian revolution, and to the Pakistani government in its war against the Baluchi independence movement.

The Iranian prime minister was referring to all these actions when in April 1973 he said: "Iran is strong enough to prevent any trouble in the region of the Persian Gulf. . . . We are a world power that must be reckoned with."

The Iranian army's most important foreign intervention today is in the sultanate of Oman, where 3,000 Iranian troops are fighting alongside 1,000 British troops in an attempt to crush the armed struggle that has been going on for the past nine years in Dhufar, the southern province of Oman. The shah "justifies" this intervention by claiming that the militants of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arab Gulf are "savages" who represent the "forces of subversion, destruction, chaos, and murder." (Daily Telegraph, February 7, 1974.) The forces of the Iranian dictatorship are trying to destroy the armed fighters of Dhufar, who have already liberated a good part of the inhabited regions of the province. The Iranian dictatorship is also trying to play on the conflicts between the Iranian and Arab communities in the emirates, in an attempt to be able to justify mili-

tary intervention and line up "the Iranian people" behind the interventionist policy, whose declared goal would be "protecting the Iranians" against the "expansionist aims of the Arabs."

In 1970 PFLOAG responded clearly to Teheran's policy, asserting in its program: "The British colonialists and the Iranian and Arab reactionaries are trying with all the means at their disposal to transform the struggle against British imperialism in the region into a chauvinist conflict between Arabs and the national minorities that moved into Oman and the Gulf after the discovery of oil and to whip up racial hatred between Arabs and Iranians." It can be seen, then, that PFLOAG intends to develop its struggle against the collusion between Sultan Qabus of Oman and the shah of Iran on the basis of an internationalist position. So for the development of a broader struggle throughout the Arab-Persian Gulf region, it is all the more important for Iranian revolutionary militants to be able to develop solidarity actions with the fighters of Dhufar and to denounce the policy of the shah of Iran from a clear internationalist perspective. □

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A BLEAK ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

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In looking at the development of the Czechoslovak economy, one cannot ignore certain factors that are slowly but surely leading toward an economic crisis. The world energy crisis that has already made itself felt in the Western world will further worsen the economic situation in Czechoslovakia. For although Czechoslovakia has been only lightly affected by the increase in oil prices on the world market, the effects of the increases have been felt nonetheless. To keep up their own production Czechoslovak factories need a series of raw materials and semifinished products that are imported from capitalist countries. For the most part, this trade is conducted through short-term agreements often concluded on a case-by-case basis -- which means under conditions that are unfavorable to Czechoslovakia. The cost of production (in which energy costs play a big part) is reflected in the prices of these imports, including the increase in oil prices. A monetary crisis is consequently developing for the Czechoslovak economy.

The cost of production of Czechoslovakian goods is increasing, and, at the same time, the bulk of these goods are ex-

ported to Comecon countries at prices fixed by long-term agreements that are not easily modified. During the period extending from the second half of 1973 to March 1974, the losses suffered by our economy as a result of this system amounted to some \$11,000 million. It is clear what this means for our economy, which already finds itself in a chronically serious situation with no apparent way out: Estimates of the rate of inflation range from 2.5 percent (the official figure, on which the State Plan is based) to 6 percent (the figure suggested by skeptical economists). While our economy was able to sustain last year's price increases (not, however, without demanding repayment of the long-term loans accorded to the developing countries), this is no longer the case today. In 1974 Czechoslovakia lacks currency to buy raw materials on the capitalist market. And, concurrently, it must be added that if the present drought results in a bad harvest, money will have to be found to purchase food, and that will further aggravate the balance of payments problems.

The causes of the crisis of the Czechoslovak economy must be sought outside the energy crisis, which has affected the situation only slightly. It is rather a question of a heritage from the past. The costs of production of Czechoslovak industry have always been high: in 1971, for each crown's worth of gross national product, 0.44 crowns were expended for materials. That represents an increase of 6.4 percent as com-

pared to 1970, although the State Plan anticipated an increase of "only" 3.3 percent. The share of material expenditures in the price of commodities was 65.1 percent in 1970 and 65.5 percent in 1971. For 1971 this represented a loss of 5,000 million crowns. At the same time, the growth in basic production, which averages 5 percent a year, shows that productivity is not increasing that much either, contrary to what official propaganda continually claims. The increase in productivity is a result of the introduction of new industrial investment, and not of rationalization.

The leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist party is going to try to find a solution to this situation, and there is no doubt that this will have the effect of raising prices. But it can be predicted that price rises will not be enacted in the form of massive and generalized increases of the sort that provoked work stoppages in Poland in 1970 and 1971 or of the sort that had been planned in Czechoslovakia for June 1973. Even though the new price lists had already been printed and distributed, those increases were not put into effect, for the bureaucracy feared the reaction of the population. Another increase had been planned for April of this year, but after receiving reports from the secret police on the state of the spirit of the population, the CP leadership had to recognize that it was still too dangerous. So the price increase was introduced by stages -- by making various changes; by going back to (higher) initial prices; by surcharges; by substituting new, better quality but more expensive, products for older ones; by changing the names of some products, thus making them more "modern" or "nourishing," facts that of course had to be reflected in their new prices (a typical example being the new cleaning product, TIX).

Price manipulations

In the past, the leadership has tried to maintain control of the situation through exactly these kinds of price manipulations. It is especially notable that since the introduction of price freezes in 1970, the prices of basic foodstuffs have not gone up. The prices of construction material, however, have gone up (in April of this year, the price of cement jumped 100 percent). As a result, rents for apartments in newly constructed buildings affected by the change in the cost of production have risen from a monthly average of 400 crowns in 1969-70 to a monthly average of 700-800 crowns in 1973.

On the night of March 27, 1974, an official communiqué was released announcing changes in the price scales for urban transportation in Prague, to go into effect on May 9, 1974. The television broadcast a conversation between Ljuba Mes-tekova, a television producer, and Zuzka, the mayor of Prague. Both of them praised this price increase, explaining how profitable it would be for the future; but they forgot to mention that they would not be affected. People who ride around in Tatra 603 service automobiles will surely not have to pay.

Basically, we can say that the official communiqué amounted to increasing the price of urban transport. Even with the addition of cheaper monthly tickets, the price of a ride will be more than it was before the price structure was changed, probably about twenty crowns a month higher. Thus, for about half the citizens of Prague, the cost of living will go up by 3 percent. Even though this is not a very big increase, official circles are trying in a most determined fashion to prevent anyone from seeing it as a price increase. The elimination of ticket takers on the trams will undoubtedly have

an effect on transport security, for the driver will have to check all six doors.

The government's justification for increasing the price of transport was very weak, as was its excuse for raising the price of gasoline. Official propaganda claims that it was a question of a new struggle against the imperialists, who were coming to us to buy cheaper gasoline. But let's make a comparison: A West German worker has to work six minutes to make enough to buy a liter of gasoline, while a Czechoslovak worker has to work sixteen minutes to make enough to buy the same quantity of gasoline of inferior quality. And this is after a 65 percent price increase, so that even before the price rise, he was in a worse position than his West German counterpart.

The critical situation of Czechoslovak balance of payments can also be illustrated by the example of oil. A five-year contract with the USSR was signed (it expires on December 31, 1975) setting the price of a ton of oil at 32 rubles, which at the time was double the world market price. It is true that Czechoslovakia is still paying that price today, even though the price of oil per ton has risen in four years from \$16 to \$75-80. (On currency exchanges, one ruble is approximately equal to one dollar.)

The discussion now going on within the Comecon, during which Czechoslovakia insisted that as of January 1, 1976, the price of oil be set beneath the world market price, were resolved as follows, according to the newspaper *Krasnaja Zvezda* (Red Star): It declared (the April 25 *Rude Pravo* reported) that the USSR will deliver oil to its "brother" countries at the prices that were in effect at the time of the signing of the previous accord. During their visit to Prague, the Libyan leaders had demanded \$300 a ton for oil and also asked for Czechoslovak investments in Libya. But the Czechoslovak leaders had to refuse. Their foreign investments have already reached 175,000 million crowns.

Although the increase in the cost of living is leading to a relative decline in the standard of living, it should be mentioned that the incomes of many branches of industry have risen sharply. This is the case mainly for branches that are the property of the state or the party apparatus, like the agricultural companies. In addition, the incomes of employees in the tertiary sector (services) have risen rapidly. Once again, there are millionaires in Czechoslovakia. (In the tenth district of Prague, for example, there are eight of them, in Nymburk there are thirteen. These sums of money have been made by "accident"; artists, actors, and pop singers are already a minority of these new millionaires. These people can't help but have large bank accounts, for they have no real way of spending their money.) The official figure for the size of Czech (not Slovak) savings reached 90,000 million crowns in 1973. In addition, an unofficial source speaks of stocks of merchandise valued at 30,000 million crowns. Other sources assert that there has been an inflation of money in Czechoslovakia equivalent to 75,000 million crowns. In light of these facts, the rumors about a monetary reform and a price increase -- rumors that spread panic among the population, which wanted to take its money out of the bank and buy all sorts of useless items -- have a rational foundation. Nevertheless, it is not likely that the government will take such measures. But we can expect one new action by the government: enactment of a new system of wages, the last word in so-called socialist rationalization.

But the government has had some unhappy experiences with this measure. When it was introduced this spring in part of the Skoda state company there was a strike. And it was not

an isolated one; there were others. Although these strikes were repressed (they were short-term strikes, lasting for a maximum of one day, with only a section of the workers participating in them), they did serve as a warning. Practically nothing is left of the government's original intention to diminish wages by about 5 percent. The case of a section of the CKD factory in Prague, where the introduction of the new wage system resulted in layoffs of about 500 workers, also served as a warning to factory managers. The idea of reducing the number of workers cannot be applied either, because of an acute shortage of labor; in fact, the government has already called for the import of foreign labor. For example, the textile factories in northern Bohemia could not function without Polish workers. Poles are also working in the AVIA airplane factory in Prague, as well as in the washrooms and laundries, where Czechoslovaks have ceded the nonmechanized jobs that pay low wages and entail miserable working conditions to the Poles. The most ironic thing is that this is the way Poland is repaying some credits that were extended to it by Czechoslovakia.

The strike movement

The strike movement in Czechoslovakia today is the expression of the discontent of the workers in face of this situation.

Although the Czechoslovak news media suppress all news of strikes, a few reports have reached abroad. For example, before Christmas 1973 there was a strike of transporters and conveyors in a transportation company (the details are still unknown). In January 1974 there was a three-day strike by employees of the public-works firm that is building the Slavia-

Areal to Prague-Vrsovice road. There again, the cause of the workers' discontent was the new wage system. The strike was a success: wages were not modified (that is, they were not lowered). This was a spontaneous strike accompanied by occupation of the worksites. The workers asked that the strike be waged jointly with the trade-unions, but that did not happen.

On February 14, 1974, there was a one-day strike in the rail-construction firm that is building the Prague subway. The number of strikers was the same as the number that participated in the public works strike: 100. This time the strikers were truck drivers who were supposed to carry material for the construction of the subway. Once again, the trade unions did not take part in the strike. What is important is that 70 percent of the workers were members of the union and 5 percent were in the Communist party. The cause of the strike was nonpayment of five days' wages. The result of the strike was that the five days' wages were paid, but not the wages for the day of the strike. A manager was blamed for the original nonpayment of the five days' wages.

In March 1974 there were unofficial reports of a short protest strike in a steel factory in eastern Slovakia, a strike that also broke out in opposition to the new wage system. In many factories implementation of the new system was postponed because of the opposition among the workers.

To conclude, we can say that a certain not unimportant social pressure is coming to the surface. But we must not count on an explosion or broadening of the strike movement in the medium term. In case of economic catastrophe, the workers will more than likely respond to the fate of their political leaders with total indifference, following the watchword, "They did nothing for us, let them to go hell." □



FRANCE

Conference of the 'groupes taupes'

The Front Communiste Révolutionnaire (FCR -- Revolutionary Communist Front, the French Trotskyist organization) held a national meeting of its worker militants and factory sympathizers (members of the Groupes Taupes, or Mole Groups) on June 1-3. The conference, held in Lyon, was attended by 1,300 comrades. During the three days, discussions were held on a series of subjects: the European economic crisis and the demands that must be raised by the workers; the orientation of the FCR and the Groupes Taupes after the presidential election; self-management, socialism, and the struggle for power; the concrete tasks that revolutionaries can and must take up on a European scale. The discussions were

held in a series of workshops organized by branch of industry and by union; there were also workshops on the struggles of women and immigrant workers and on the fight against inflation.

Statistics (unfortunately only partial ones) indicate the following composition of the conference (in general, teachers were not invited to the meeting):

- 11% unskilled or semiskilled workers,
- 33% workers in the public sector
- 30% white-collar workers,
- 10% professional and skilled workers,
- 16% technicians.

The trade-union affiliation of the participants was about equally divided between the two main union federations, the CGT and the CFDT, about 40% in each. Less than 5% were members of the FEN, the teachers union, and 18% did not indicate union affiliation. The vast majority of participants were between twenty and twenty-five years old.

There was a very high participation by women workers. This was the second Groupes Taupes conference held by the French Trotskyists. (The first, held a year ago, was attended by 900 comrades.) It enabled them to take stock of the degree of their success in gaining a base within the working class and to prepare for the struggles to come.

SRI LANKA

CMU-rmp mayday action

Responding to the joint call of the Ceylon Mercantile Union (CMU) and the Revolutionary Marxist party (RMP), Sri Lanka section of the Fourth International, some 2,500 workers assembled to celebrate May Day in Colombo, despite the fact that the government forced the organizers to hold the meeting at a remote site and despite the absence of adequate transportation. The main slogans of the demonstration were: No socialism without revolution! To stop reaction overthrow capitalist rule! To fight capitalism build the left! and For the rebuilding of the Left Movement!

At the rally the RMP distributed the first issue of its new

periodical, *Ithiri Maga*, and copies of its political resolutions. These were distributed in English, Sinhala, and Tamil editions.

The "United Front," which is composed of the reformist and bourgeois parties that constitute the government, also held a demonstration, which was attended by about 25,000 people. Unlike the CMU-RMP rally, it was provided with a special government car service to bring demonstrators to the rally. Those who attended were offered free food and, it seems, drink. Finally, the United National party, the main right-wing opposition party, also organized a significant-sized rally in the center of the city of Colombo.

SWITZERLAND

out with the chilean junta!

The annual conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO), a body that includes representatives of employers, trade unions, and governments and meets each year to "discuss labor relations throughout the world," opened in Geneva the first week of June. This year there were representatives of the butchers of the Chilean people present: a direct representative of the junta and representatives of the fascist unions set up after the September 11, 1973, coup.

By attending the meeting, Pinochet's junta was seeking to "legitimize" its regime of terror, torture, and superexploitation in order to facilitate the search for profits of imperialist trusts in Chile (ITT, Dow Chemical, etc.). Above all the junta wanted to gain recognition of the new "labor relations" established by the coup:

- interdiction of the workers organizations, massive and systematic repression against militants, interdiction of the right to strike;
- institution of a system of police control and forced militarization based on spies and informers;
- growing exploitation of the workers: compulsory work on Saturday morning, worsened conditions, freezes on wages, and huge price increases.

To denounce this maneuver and to exclude the representatives of the butchers of the Chilean people from the ILO and from Switzerland, the National Coordination of the Chile Committees, which is led by revolutionary militants, launched a several-weeks-long broad campaign of agitation which was to culminate with an intervention on the day of the opening

of the conference and with a demonstration in Geneva on Saturday, June 8.

Once again the Stalinists and other reformists refused to participate in this campaign, just as they refused eight months ago to join into a united campaign to support the Chilean people.

On the day the conference opened a leaflet was distributed inside the general assembly and slogans were raised by anti-imperialist militants who had been able to get inside. This intervention was met by vigorous applause from a series of delegations.

After this intervention, the general assembly confirmed the principled vote it had taken last February that the only representative of the Chilean workers was the CUT (United Confederation of Labor), which is now banned and whose militants are imprisoned or being hunted down. The supposed "representatives" sent by Pinochet were therefore excluded from the conference by a virtually unanimous vote (only the delegates of the American AFL-CIO were opposed).

The following Saturday the Geneva demonstration was attended by 3,500 to 4,000 people, with delegations participating from the Chile Committees in France and Belgium. This militant action demonstrated once again that the vigilance of anti-imperialist militants is not flagging and that they will be able everywhere to act to denounce the bloody Pinochet junta and affirm their support to the Chilean workers and peasants.

SAIGON'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES



from
the
four
corners

In a speech delivered June 6 in Thu Duc, an area north of Saigon, Nguyen Van Thieu made his first public criticisms of the United States. One time does not a habit make! "You have to give us money," he enjoined his American mentors, "or the U.S.A. would be fleeing from its responsibilities." INPRECOR No. 0 published an article on the economic and social crisis of the Saigon regime. Since that article was written, Thieu's uneasiness has mounted, for the U.S. Congress has proved reluctant to approve the aid budgets proposed by the Nixon administration. On June 11 the U.S. Senate voted down a resolution to reduce aid to Thieu from \$900 million to \$700 million for the next fiscal year. But the resolution was defeated by only one vote. And, one month earlier, this same Senate had rejected Nixon's request to increase the aid for the previous fiscal year by \$266 million. So for the fiscal year extending from 1973 to 1974, Thieu will have received only \$1,260 million instead of the \$1,600 million originally promised.

For its part, the World Bank recently postponed once again its meeting that had been set for June 5 at which aid to Saigon had been scheduled to be discussed. Certain governments that have lent money in the past, such as Canada, have rejected the new projects proposed by Washington. According to Francois Nivolon (writing in the June 8, 1974, *Le Figaro*), Thieu's advisers are pessimistic about incoming aid and Thieu has issued economizing orders to his army and administration. The budgetary conditions that will prevail for Saigon in 1974 (for which year Saigon will maintain an army of more than 1 million) threaten to be even more drastic than they were in 1973. (See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 15, 1974.)

Obviously, financial and military aid is still pouring in, and it will continue to fuel the puppet machine. But the social crisis in the zones under Thieu's control has been confirmed once again (see the articles by Patrice de Beer in *Le Monde*, May 8, 9, and 10, 1974) and will certainly tend to worsen still more.

YUGOSLAVIA

STOP THE REPRESSION AGAINST THE MARXIST PROFESSORS AND THE COMMUNIST STUDENTS

by C. VERLA

Ever since December 1971, the Titoist bureaucracy has been engaged in a vast operation aimed at "regaining a grip" on all political, economic, and social life in the country. At the same time, the economic reform of 1965 has not been challenged explicitly. The background of the increase in social tensions (which reached a new stage as long ago as the end of 1971, when the "Croatian crisis" broke out) is the combination of the contradictions of any bureaucratized society and the specific contradictions of Titoist "economic liberalism." These contradictions have led to growing regional inequalities, the development of unemployment,⁽¹⁾ and significant price increases (of about 20 percent in 1973). These crucial problems have in turn fueled many conflicts: between nationalities, between the federal bureaucracy and the bureaucracies of the various republics, between the political functionaries and the leaders of the banking and financial sectors. There have been strikes by workers demanding wage increases and respect for their right of self-management.

The Titoist bureaucracy has dealt with these tensions in the

only way consistent with maintenance of its own privileges. Far from confronting the causes of the inequalities and social tensions, it has instead sought scapegoats that could be sacrificed to assuage the anger of the masses (hence the well-known campaign Tito waged against those who had "abusively enriched themselves") and has repressed all opposition, trying to remodel the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to make it a more suitable instrument for regaining a grip on Yugoslav society.

But the decentralization that was more and more widely introduced after the 1950s has had some effects. The cultural and political life of Yugoslavia is unparalleled in the "peoples democracies" of Eastern Europe. The philosophical re-view Praxis and the Korcula cadre school have achieved an international fame that also corresponded to an image that the Titoist bureaucracy wanted to preserve. But beyond these expressions of Yugoslav Marxist philosophers, the breadth of the student movement and the themes of struggle that it took up in June 1968 ("The revolution is not over! Self-manage-

ment from the bottom up!") testified to the development of revolutionary-Marxist ideas among militant youth. So "regaining a grip" has not been accomplished, nor will it be easy for the bureaucracy to accomplish it, especially if it wants to preserve both the appearance of democracy and its autonomy from the Kremlin bureaucracy, which it apparently does.

The number of internal purges in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia since 1971 has been large (more than 55,000 people have been demoted). The repression has struck at both "pure and hard" neo-Stalinists who are taking advantage of the present conflicts to press for a return to total centralization and "liberals," "anarchists," and "various sorts of restorationists," who are sometimes real advocates of extending the laws of the market but are often simply hostile to the repressive course of the LCY and the new role that has been assigned it.

In fact, the brunt of the attack is now being directed against those who have best expressed the rejection of bureaucratic centralism and the gains of self-management but who at the same time want these gains to be made a reality: the Marxist professors who have worked with the review Praxis and the students who are actively working not only for the freedom of expression and work of their professors, but also for developing a genuine socialist struggle.

For several months the Yugoslav authorities have been trying in every way to expel eight professors from the philosophy faculty at Belgrade University. All eight are collaborators with Praxis.⁽²⁾ All kinds of pressures -- withdrawal of passports, press campaigns, letters from "workers" who have suddenly acquired an interest in philosophy -- have been brought to bear to fire them. But the legal bodies of the faculty resisted.

The bureaucrats then tried to change the laws! They tried to set up a new faculty council, half of whose members would be named by the authorities. New "moral and theoretical" criteria for certifying professors qualified to teach were defined. But for the time being, the resistance has been too strong. The professors are still at their posts. Their students have organized to support them. Solidarity has spread to the philosophy faculties in Zagreb and Ljubljana. In January 1974 the three faculties established coordination and adopted a resolution that, in addition to supporting the professors, called for a common struggle with the students for a socialism that would really put power in the hands of the workers. The resolution called for coordination of all socialist efforts to struggle against bureaucratic privileges, against social inequality, and against the exodus of workers from the country. This represented a militant program that could only be met with repression from the bureaucracy.

Already in March one student, Vladimir Plancin, was arrested "for having read such a resolution." Indictments are pending against eleven students from three campuses. The bureaucracy is threatening to stage trials to step up repression during the summer months when political activism and mobilization will be less intense, especially since the LCY congress has reaffirmed the leadership's control.

The Titoist bureaucracy will run up against the solidarity that

revolutionaries throughout the world will offer to the Marxist professors and communist students of Yugoslavia. At the very moment that the bureaucracy is demagogically affirming its desire to strengthen self-management, it is repressing those who want to put such promises into effect. Once again it has taken to road of trials and repression against the real socialists, for the time has come when the Yugoslav proletariat may well find in the calls of the students and professors the road that the bureaucracy has closed to them: the road that leads to power.

Footnotes:

1. There are more than a million Yugoslav workers living abroad and some 300,000 unemployed in Yugoslavia itself.
 2. The professors under attack are: Mihailo Markovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Svetozar Stojanovic, Miladin Zivotic, Zaga Pesic-Golubovic, Dragdjub Miconovic, Nebojsa Popov, and Trivo Indjic.
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