4th
INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

Once more on the positions of the Chinese CP and Some Conjunctural problems

By Livio Maitan

The Law of Value in relation to Self-management and Investment in the Economy of the Workers' States

By Ernest Germain

The 25th anniversary of the Founding of the Fourth International

By Pierre Frank

Unpublished Articles of Marx & Engels on the Conquest of Algeria by French Imperialism

June 1964

18

50 Cents (U.S.)
2½ Shillings

Contents

All Correspondence and Subscriptions to:

PIERRE FRANK, 21, rue d' Aboukir, Paris 2.

Rates:	Single copies:	50 cents (U.S.)	One Year	4 issues:	$ 2.00
	,, ,,	50 cents (Ceylon)	,,	,, :	Rs. 2.00
	,, ,,	2½ Shillings	,,	,, :	10 shillings

In the Far East, Fourth International is available through the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 47 Drieberg's Avenue, Colombo 10, Ceylon.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL., the English Language Edition of the Theoretical Organ of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, is published four times a year. This issue is published by SYDNEY WANASINGHE, 51A, Peterson Lane, Colombo 6, and printed at the Wesley Press, 490, Havelock Road, Colombo 6, Ceylon.

★

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

ENGLISH - LANGUAGE EDITION OF THE THEORETICAL ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Number 18 *June* 1964

Editorial

Uninterrupted Struggles

THE political situation at the end of the year 1963 or the beginning of 1964 was characterised either by crises and turning points or by signs of new tendencies and noteworthy indications in various sectors of the world chess board, from the repercussions in American politics of the assassination of Kennedy to the recognition of Peoples' China by France, from the deepening of the Sino-Soviet dispute to the developments in England on the eve of elections which could bring about the fall of the Conservative government. But it is once again the sector of the colonial and semi-colonial countries which is the theatre of the most spectacular events, the events of greatest immediate as well as long-range importance. If in certain sectors the particular contradictions of imperialism and capitalism in general remain latent, not taking a socially and politically explosive form, in the colonial world these contradictions concentrate and develop on an ever broader scale and at a very fast rhythm towards open and direct explosion.

In Asia, the Pathet Lao now controls decisive positions in Laos, while in South Vietnam the belated coup d'etat against Diem did not serve to redress the political equilibrium of the country even slightly, or to arouse more serious resistance to the liberationist struggle of the Viet Cong. The new coup d'etat will be just as ineffective. In this region, which is rightly considered to be a key area for the fate of the whole of South-East Asia, the armed revolutionary movement of the peasants continues to progress, obliging the imperialists and their puppets to make new retreats in spite of the size of the military build-up there during these past years.

In Indonesia, after undeniably slowing down for a period, the mass movement is undergoing a new upsurge as an answer to the neo-colonialist operation which culminated in the creation of Malaysia. This was a further confirmation of the precarious situation in the country which, among other things, is suffering tension in the countryside—where Sukarno's "national democracy" has not undertaken the slightest agrarian reform—and increasingly dangerous inflation. The situation could be far more matured and the days of the very weak national bourgeoisie literally numbered, if the leadership of the Communist Party, allied to Sukarno, instead of curbing the revolutionary potential of the masses, had inspired it to the utmost on the basis of a correct orientation, squarely anti-capitalist and socialist.

In Latin America, the utter bankruptcy of the Alliance for Progress has been admitted so to say officially. American imperialism's operation has not had any substantial practical effects and has not been able in any country to help towards any social and economic stabilisation whatsoever. It is true that in Argentina the ruling classes have succeeded in surmounting the danger point of the prolonged crisis of decomposition in 1962 and the beginning of 1963 and that the working-class movement is passing through a phase of retreat. But the economic situation remains extremely precarious, the trade unions maintaining their strength and continuing to act as an opposition to the regime, despite the contradictions and hesitations of their Peronist

leaderships. In Brazil, Goulart has shown himself to be an unscrupulous manoeuverer, capable of backing several horses at one time, and operating in the final analysis as an ally of American imperialism. The right continues to exploit its strongholds. However, the economic and social situation of the country, constantly upset by inflation, far from improving, is progressively deteriorating, justifying completely the genuine anguish which the imperialists experience when they ask themselves what the Brazilian volcano might pour out in the next few years. The peasant movements in the North-East, stronghold of Francisco Juliao, are obviously not of a nature to quieten these fears.

In Venezuela, the partisans of imperialism have been able to congratulate themselves on the success—so far—of the relatively quiet operation of putting in a relief team for Betancourt with more limited response than had been expected to the appeal by the F.A.L.N. for an electoral boycott. In the workingclass and revolutionary movement of the country, discussion is taking place on the exact evaluation of the situation, of the real importance of the guerilla struggle at the present stage and of the orientation of large layers of the small peasants. In any case, it is clear that Leoni's victory is far from reassuring the imperialists about the fate of Venezuela, which remains shaken by a political and social crisis, of which the guerilla struggle, whatever its present dimensions, is a manifestation explosive in itself.

In the Dominican Republic, the overthrow of Bosch marked another defeat for Kennedy's policy, the policy of establishing so-called "democracy" in Latin America; a new dictatorship has been established in the country and at the same time, the Dominican vanguard has again passed over to forms of armed struggle against the state power.

Bolivia is now suffering an acute political crisis marked by a split between President Paz Estenssoro and Juan Lechin.

In Columbia, Nicaragua, Paraguay armed struggles are continuing to one degree or another. The sharpest outbursts in recent months, however, have occurred in Peru and Panama.

In Peru, the "reformist" Belaunde has not been able to halt the mass struggles, in particular the occupation of land by the peasants; and the popularity of the revolutionary Marxist leader Hugo Blanco, still in prison, is greater than ever. This country remains one of the principal bases of the Latin-American revolution at this stage.

In Panama, American imperialism has been directly threatened in its canal enclave, and whatever the consequences of this in the short term, the movements of the Panamanian students and masses of people have tolled the knell of another rampart of old-style colonial domination.

But it is above all on the African continent that the colonial revolution has undergone development of very great importance on three distinct levels. In Algeria, the thrust toward the establishment of a workers' state and the adoption of socialist solutions on an ever-increasing scale continues and has even been accentuated, in spite of inevitable obstacles, difficulties and conflicts. In Zanzibar, on the morrow of independence, the scaffolding set up to prolong the hegemony of a dominant layer as small as it was rapacious crumbled in the space of a few days, marking a victory for a mass movement among whose leaders were militants inspired by the most advanced experiences of the colonial revolution and whose political sympathies are clear. Without resorting to facile analogies, it is obvious that the Zanzibar movement represents another exceptional step forward for the African revolution, which has every possibility of experiencing even in the near future, new developments in Angola and South Africa. Finally, the conflicts which have erupted in East Africa (Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya) whose origin and nature are not completely clear at the moment, demonstrate the fragility of certain regimes upon which England counted for its long-term neo-colonialist operations, which moreover had been carefully prepared. There is no doubt that the Tanganyikan, Ugandan and Kenyan leaders, in resorting to the use of British troops, emerged weakened from the test, their prestige injured in the eyes of the masses.

(*Continued on Page* 40)

ONCE MORE ON THE POSITIONS OF THE CHINESE C P and SOME CONJUNCTURAL PROBLEMS

By LIVIO MAITAN

RECENT events, and the positions expressed in editorial articles in "Red Flag" and "The Peoples' Daily" enable us to analyse more precisely the orientation of the Chinese leaders, its significance and some of the general implications.

THE MOSCOW TREATY AND THE "LEADER STATE"

The Chinese have not associated themselves with the signing of the Moscow Treaty. The United Secretariat of the Fourth International has already defined its attitude on this subject (1) and it will not return to it here to consider the arguments advanced by supporters of the treaty who either underestimate or overlook the essential aspects of the subject whilst concentrating on aspects that are either non-existent or secondary. We still instead restrict ourselves to answering an argument advanced particularly in Communist circles.

It is absurd—so it is said—to oppose compromises in principle; and the Chinese by doing this, the argument runs, have arrived at an ultra-left and adventuristic position more or less of the same sort that determined Trotsky's attitude at Brest-Litovsk. If we leave aside the question of Brest-Litovsk, which too many people insist on exploiting in a dishonest way instead of studying it on the basis of historical criticism, neither the Fourth International nor the Chinese have arrived at their attitudes by using abstract criteria. Our atitude was determined by a concrete analysis, that is, by considering whether such a treaty was or was not profitable to the workers' states as a whole and to the international workers' movement. Our reply to this question was a negative one for all the reasons enumerated in the document of the United Secretariat and in particular because of the unwritten but vital clause in the treaty which implies an agreement by the Soviet Union not to entrust nuclear arms and secrets to the Chinese (in contravention amongst other things of the 1957 agreement). At bottom it is an agreement whose results have been insignificant as far as nuclear arms are concerned and dangerous or at least strongly contestable from the point of view of the nuclear balance (continuing underground tests are apparently more favourable to the USA,) dangerous with regard to the mass movements and in particular the anti-war-movement and also quite negative from the point of view of the repercussions inside the workers' states and relations, even at national level, between Russia and China.

Moreover, subsequent polemics have confirmed a serious implication in the Soviet position. The Soviet leaders have not only called for other workers' states to associate themselves automatically with an operation which they have carried through on their own from beginning to end, but they have declared outright that the U.S.S.R is, and must remain, the only nuclear defence of the workers' states; moreover, that the leaders of the state which has nuclear arms are the only ones competent to handle the matter. Krushchev and his ilk could not have expressed in a more brutal manner this conception of the leader-state which they have hitherto repeatedly denounced as an inheritance of Stalin's era.

Let us be clear on this point. Nobody can affirm that in principle all the workers' states should possess nuclear weapons whether they make the necessary economic effort themselves or whether they received the wherewithal from the USSR. It is necessary on each occasion to examine the problems in the given context and to weigh the advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the overall interests of the workers' states. But here a more general question is being posed: Who, and using

what criteria, is going to decide in each instance what constitutes the real common interest?

The present writer has heard this problem debated in the Italian Communist Party. "The real difference," say the cadres, "lies in the question of the relations between the workers' states and a common leadership of the socialist camp." One can think of this camp as a unity which must endeavour to overcome natural divisions and in such a case it is a common organ, a form of international leadership which must decide what is best; whether one should or should not, for example, sign a treaty such as the Moscow Treaty. One can, on the other hand, visualise "the camp" as an alliance between workers' states which remain quite separate and continue to have their own interests. In this case, one cannot pretend that the USSR decides for everybody and China is therefore fundamentally in the right to have nuclear arms if she considers them necessary.

For our part we have given a reply many times before and it is a reply which emerges from our conception of proletarian internationalism and the organisation of the workers' International. It is clear that problems such as this are raised at present at a higher historical level with practical implications more important than at any time in the past. To reiterate: it is not a question of reaffirming a just and abstract "desirable" principle but of understanding concrete political necessity. If the existing workers' states—in a few years it is quite probable that they will be more numerous—do not succeed in establishing a common leadership, a co-ordination on an equal level, there will be quite negative consequences for the anti-capitalist forces, including conflicts, fissures and schisms. The preconditions for the resolution of this problem—and we are ready to admit that in envisaging a major solution, general rules are easier to pronounce than to ensure effective application of them—are that the hegemony of the USSR in both theory and practice should be ended and the workers' states should operate as a homogeneous collectivity.

Whatever may be their particular arguments and political distortions, etc., the problems have been posed by the Chinese in objectively progressive terms and what is more they have undermined, and continue to undermine, the hegemony of the Soviet bureaucracy.

THE CHINESE AND THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCES

The first of the three articles published in September 1963 by the editors of "Red Flag" and "The Peoples' Daily" contains a history of the Sino-soviet dispute which has not yet been contested by the Russians. We have, therefore, a clearly direct confirmation of our analysis, of the two conferences of the Communist parties and particularly that of 1960. (2). The details about a first draft advanced by the CPSU and the amendments presented by the CPC, confirm in particular that as far back as 1957 the Chinese were criticising the right-wing policies of the Krushchevists and that resolutions adopted were the result of a compromise—at least on several fundamental problems. But these are precisely the points which raise a question: if it arises from compromise resolutions as is said in "Red Flag" and "The Peoples' Daily", why then do the Chinese continually present them as a true charter for the Communist movement?

Let us take, for example, the debate on the roads to socialism, which involves the question of the basic validity or otherwise of the Marxist and Leninist conception of the state. The ideas of the CPC on this subject are known: but can one envisage an effective theoretical clarification and by consequence, the adoption of a line on the basis of a deliberately eclectic text, (an eclecticism whose exact genesis is not known to us), which instead of concentrating on the essential points of the problem, abandons itself to casuistry, admitting the peaceful as well as the violent path? Our question is all the more pertinent because experience has shown us that various Communist parties have made whatever use they cared to of the 1957 Gospel, repeated word for word in 1960. To our knowledge, with two or three exceptions only, there is not a Communist party which has declared that in the light of conditions in its own country the peaceful path is possible.

Casuistry was replaced by a single pattern which essentially foresaw a peaceful and democratic path for the Italian Communist

Party living under a more or less constitutional bourgeois democratic regime, for the Indian Communist Party operating in a completely different social and political context, for the French CP which has to deal with Gaullist bonapartism, and several Latin American CP's where parliamentary democracy does not cease to be a sinister charade, and even for the unfortunate Spanish CP which dreams of a cold "peaceful" funeral for the Franco regime.

A second example concerns the revolutionary struggle in the colonial countries. On this level also there are eclectic formulations and verbal concessions in the Chinese critique, but it is above all the central formula —the independent, democratic and national state—which throws light on the bankruptcy of the document. Nobody has actually explained what will be the social nature of such a state and it is quite significant, even decisive, that the 1960 text did not explicitly apply this formula to the single plausible case in our epoch, namely Cuba, and that until recently they did not dream of utilising it in connection with the Algerian experience. Now, if a formula is considered to be a criterion for interpretation of the dynamic reality of the colonial world, and at the same time as a basic strategic perspective and is proved useless in the case of the two major revolutions of the sixties, then what good is it? The formula emerges as a sycophantic form of sociological characterisation —it only remains to be asked who the next national bourgeoisie will be to gain support.

In fact it is only by going further than the texts of 1957 and 1960 that one can give an answer to the major problems of the colonial revolution at the present time. The fact that the Chinese do not stand squarely on this basis is still a measure of their limitations and contradictions concerning which we will have more to say in the course of this article

ARE THE CHINESE STALINISTS?

The article of September 13 "On the Question of Stalin" does not reveal a change of position, but the attitude of the CPC to the 20th Congress and the destruction of the myth of Stalin is developed much more fully and explicitly than in any previous article, including the Twenty-Five Points

In brief, the thesis of the official authors of the article is as follows: Starting with the 20th Congress, Khrushchev has continually affirmed a revisionist course on a whole series of major issues, the denunciation of Stalin entered into this over-all operation and its essential object was to eliminate an obstacle on the path of right-wing opportunist entanglement.

Without going into details about an article that will undoubtedly have been read by our readers, what the Chinese are unaware of is the dual aspect of the 20th Congress, which, from the point of view of the subjective goals of the Khrushchev clique is contradictory in appearance only. Our movement has emphasised throughout this period that the 20th Congress on the one hand signified a leap forward on the path of destalinisation—after the timid thaw of 1953—55—and, on the other hand, for the first time in the movement claiming to be Communist, it advanced the theory, in an open and bare manner, of a peaceful way to socialism and a "new" conception on the question of war. It was immediately clear that because of this second aspect of the 20th Congress there was implied a very distinct accentuation of the right-wing nature of the international Communist movement. It was at the same time clear that destalinisation, at least in the manner of Khrushchev was a movement of reforms aiming at consolidating the bureaucratic regime at a new level and by new methods; but in fact, whatever the object of the leadership, the attack on Stalin brought to the surface conflicts and contradictions hitherto hidden underground; broke a rigid situation and set in motion deep explosive forces. Hence its objectively progressive import. If right-wing tendencies—men for example such as Togliatti and Gomulka have welcomed the 20th Congress, and have generally accepted it in so far as it is an affirmation of an ultra-moderate course, with regard to the struggle of the international movement and in so far as it is a shrewed and "modern" defence of the bureaucratic system, the Chinese, in seeking to drive back the right-wing revisionist elements and fearing that the destruction of the myth of Stalin might give the green light to "revisionism" (we use quotation marks because the Chinese characterise as revisionist even those ideas and conceptions which are not revisionist, particularly in the case of political and

economic forms of the transitional period) have sought to condemn the 20th Congress without distinguishing its various aspects. (3).

The judgements and positions expressed in the article on Stalin are basically undermined by this analytical error in fact, they are intrinsically wrong. A criticism of certain analyses of Stalin's role, of certain grotesque allegations, arbitrary reconstructions, summary and essentially bankrupt acts, can now be made in fact, not only from the point of view of our movement, that of revolutionary Marxism, but also from the viewpoint of a certain number of historians and sociologists and political students who claim to be Marxists in a broader way. (4) It goes without saying that we are always ready to conduct the fullest discussion on this subject with no matter whom. It is necessary to say in passing that slanderous methods that have been used against us should be eliminated; recent cases demonstrate that in this respect there is not a great difference between the editors of the Chinese and Moscow weeklies. (5).

We said, in the second place "contradictory in their formulations," for on one hand the Chinese texts explain to us that Stalin committed extremely grave errors, even genuine crimes, on the other hand they pretend that the over all balance sheet is at the same time positive and that it is correct to refer to Stalin as a "great Marxist-Leninist". We will give only one example, that even the Chinese leaders themselves will not seriously be able to consider an exception or an accident. Speaking about the Chinese experience, the article we have quoted states that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were able to avoid the negative influence of the errors of Stalin on their revolution, "From, the end of the twenties, throughout the thirties, right up to the middle of the forties." Strange indeed that such a great Marxist Leninist was mistaken in a happening of such capital importance as the Chinese Revolution at the moment when it was necessary to make the crucial choice! If one recalls the role of the same individual in Russia after February 1917 and his hostile attitude to the Yugoslav Revolution (at a time when it was uncontaminated by revisionism, even of the Chinese variety!) then there is plenty from which to draw up a positive balance-sheet!

But let us not harp upon the pernicious tactical implications of the Chinese attitude on the question of Stalin. It is obvious that a polemic conducted in such a manner will not have much interest for the militants and cadres of the colonial countries whose attitude is essentially determined as a result of the present actual orientation in the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle. In the advanced capitalist countries, particularly in the Communist parties, where nostalgia for Stalin is still alive, as in the Italian CP, appeals to Stalin can only arm the right-wing bureaucrats who are pleased to represent the Chinese as backward Stalinists, stomping out everything that could burn their fingers. Finally, we do not know what basis the Chinese have for talking about "increasing affection" for the memory of Stalin in the USSR: everybody knows that the opposite is the case and that the anti-Krushchev critical tendencies which are effectively growing are not demanding a return to a past era or return to a boss whose "errors" they themselves esperienced, but are showing a new anti-bureaucratic spirit far beyond the paternalistic reformism of Khrushchev.

As was to be inevitably expected, the latest Chinese documents have again brought together all those who characterise the present ideas of the CPC as fundamentally Stalinist and who pretend to explain them by the fact that the Chinese are living out their own "thirties". The elementary task of a Marxist analysis is not to limit itself to superficial or marginal aspects and not to lose sight of the real objective significance of a given phenomenon. (6)

Our international movement which was the first to understand and emphasise the significance of the rupture between Yugoslavia and the Kremlin some fifteen years ago was equally able to understand from the outset the profound logic of the Chinese Revolution. It analysed in fact the victorious development of the Revolution against the express wish of the Stalinist bureaucracy as well as the objective effect in breaking in the monolithism of the Stalinist system which formation of the Chinese workers' state

would have. The latter inevitably represented a new pole of revolutionary attraction and raised the question of a certain co-leadership of the Communist movement, at least in certain spheres of influence (a fact which became clear enough as a result of the Korean War). Even if for some years the Chinese seemed to accept the leadership of Stalin, and to adopt Stalinist models, the base of the system was objectively undermined. If we do not limit the meaning of Stalinism to the use of authoritarian methods or appeals to ritualistic formulas, but employ it to define a specific form of bureaucratic degeneration pushed to the extreme, whose final logic and most ruinous manifestation lay in the subordination of the most vital requirements of the International workers' movement to the needs of the Soviet bureaucracy of which Stalin was the supreme expression, then the Chinese Revolution, the formation and the progressive reinforcements of the Chinese workers' state were anti-Stalinist as objective facts as much in their genesis as in current developments which are becoming increasingly powerful expressions of the original tendency.

Let us be still more precise. Today the Chinese repeat as a leit-motif, particularly in the articles already mentioned, that it is not necessary that the leadership of the party and the Soviet state should impose its own interests and orientations on everybody and that it is inadmissible if the CPSU adopts at its Congress, or example, a new attitude, that the turn should automatically be compulsory for all the Communist parties. By way of commentary on the Moscow conference of 1960 where the Soviets were criticised and were obliged to back down, the article of September 6 explains this:

> "Here ends one of the most abnormal situations, where criticism was not tolerated, however slightly, of the errors of the CPSU leadership, the latter only having to open its mouth for its words to be ratified. This was an event of great historical importance for the international Communist movement."

It was the very axis of the Stalinist conception of the international Communist movement that was aimed at here. (7).

Can one characterise as Stalinist or neo-Stalinist the orientation of a party which during a whole period has begun to talk in terms of the majority or minority in the Communist movement, not only on an international but also on a domestic level? (8). Can one overlook that as far as the education of public opinion is concerned. the Chinese have given a lesson not only to the Soviets but also to other CP leaderships by extensively publishing in their press all the most significant documents, whereas in Moscow this has been left to the political grapevine; even the leaders of the Italian CP, who pose as champions of liberalism, are extremely miserly in their daily paper and devote less space to news from China than to the most banal things.

Let us consider, in addition, the present domestic policy of the CCP. It would be difficult to demonstrate that the economic course being followed has the traits of the Stalinist course of the thirties. It is sufficient to note the orientation based on the conception that agriculture at this stage is the basis, the prerequisite; and the realistic character of what is said about the rate of socialist industrialisation (after the exaggeration of a few years ago). We will not discuss here whether such a policy is intrinsically correct or not, nor what ought to be taken by the Chinese as their perspective in order to get out of a grave impasse and to stimulate a more substantial and more balanced economic development. We limit ourselves only to emphasising that in our opinion comparison with the Stalinist policy of the thirties will not stand up. Especially with regard to relations with the peasants, it cannot be contended that the criteria are the same as in those years of the Stalinist epoch. Unless we have been misled by actually defective information, the prices of agricultural products delivered to the government are not set to the complete disadvantage of the peasantry, in contrast to the situation existing in the USSR for a very long period. In addition, whatever malpractices occurred in the feverish campaign for the accelerated formation of the communes, and whatever the conflicts this led to, they cannot be placed on the same plane as the hecatombs and destruction under Stalin's forced collectivisation, without mentioning the fact that the Chinese moved rather quickly toward a retreat.

In addition it is significant that whatever the hiatus between their remarks and the reality, the Chinese newspapers have recently insisted on certain themes. "The bureaucracy," one reads, for example, in the "Drapeau Rouge" quoted by Hsinhua Daily Bulletin July 11, 1963, "has profound social, and ideological historical roots. One must work seriously to eliminate it. It is necessary to establish and apply standards and rules which can shackle and overcome bureaucracy. One of the most important is the rule adopted by the party which concerns the participation of functionaries in collective productive work".

The Canton journal already quoted gives on the other hand an echo of discussions on bureaucratic privileges: "You have also said it is logical that those cadres who have suffered greatly whilst working for the masses should have a more comfortable life. You are mistaken, Comrade. If you were to have said that, the masses would have demanded: 'Have you made the revolution for that, Comrade?' How would you have replied? I don't think that you would have been able to find a satisfactory answer." (9)

Once again it is not a question of blurring the qualitative differences that exist between the revolutionary Marxist analysis of the bureaucracy as a social layer and the Chinese criticism of the bureaucracy; but nostalgia for Stalinism does not take such attitudes nor write such articles.

Let us return briefly to another question, that of the direction of the revolutionary struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. We have often emphasised that the Chinese documents are far from being precise on the problem of the exact nature of the process of the colonial revolution. A document like the Twenty-five Points, moreover, is most equivocal regarding the social forces which must participate, and on their mutual roles. Certain specific attitudes—for example towards Sukarno —have also been criticised by our movement. But one should not forget that the Chinese have expressed the theory of the uninterrupted revolution which is not without comparison with the theory of the permanent revolution and that they have usually taken a much more critical attitude towards the national bourgeoisies than have the Soviet leaders. "The proletariat", declares a Chinese journal, (10) "must unite with the bourgeoisie in its support for national movements, but it must resolutely fight against positions of compromise, of capitulation and of opposition to the revolution and to the people. Measures must be taken to prevent the bourgeoisie from monopolising the results of the revolution and putting under way a bourgeois dictatorship. The national struggle and the class struggle of the oppressed nations are bound together. It is only when the national struggle is victoriously concluded that it is possible to speak of liberation for the oppressed classes, and only when liberation of oppressed classes is realised is it possible to achieve a nationally integrated revolution. This is why the proletariat of the oppressed nationalities must not only play an active role in the movements of national liberation, but must also be in the first rank of the struggle and attempt to become the leading force. The proletariat must oppose the inauguration of a bourgeois dictatorship and must endeavour to form a popular democratic dictatorship to lead the revolution in a way that will culminate in socialism and completely suppress inequalities among the nationalities and classes."

If we examine concretely the situation in Laos, insofar as accurate information is available, it could be said that whereas the Kremlin plays basically a role of compromise in the spirit of "national unity", the line of the Pathet Lao, influenced by the Chinese, is in reality a kind of application of such orientation towards the national bourgeoisie, which in practice rejects compromises favourable to the latter.

All this being so, can the objective conditions in China today—namely its persistently backward character—bring about an orientation and evolution like that of the USSR in the thirties? Such is the basis of the analogy with Stalinism beyond current attitudes and generalisations.

Above all, the extreme bureaucratic degeneration of the USSR under Stalin was the result not only of backward internal conditions but of a combination of multiple factors of which backward con-

ditions, the international context, the conjunctural state of mind of the masses (demoralisation, social disintegration), the orientation and the level of comprehension of problems—to a large extent of a new nature and even unforeseen—on the part of the cadres themselves. It is clear that if the factor represented by economic underdevelopment was in itself the only determinant, in Yugoslavia there would have been the necessary preconditions for a Stalinist regime equal or worse than that in the USSR and the same thing would, all proportions guarded, have been true for Cuba.

In reality, in the present context, it is the international conditions which play a decisive role and, and when we speak of international conditions we include the very rich experience that the workers' movement has already had in countries where capitalism has been overthrown. In the situation of mounting revolution which by and large characterises this stage of world history and in the light of the bitter lessons of bureaucratism in the USSR and the peoples' democracies, we have the explanation for the forthright anti-Stalinism of a Fidel Castro or of the course followed by Ben Bella in the Algerian Revolution. It would be absurd to believe that in such a context the economic conditions of China might be able to determine by their own action a repetition of the Stalinist experience in its specific traits.

We say "in its specific traits" because another aspect of the problem exists. The danger of bureaucratism and bureaucratisation is inherent in all societies transitional from capitalism to socialism, characterised by backward economic conditions an inadequate cultural level and the absence or the bankruptcy of revolutionary leadership and organisation. In this sense, the objective base for bureaucratisation has existed and exists in China, as it exists in Cuba. But one should not, however, identify bureaucratism with Stalinism.

In fact, Stalinism was historically a specific case of bureaucratic degeneration which was produced under conditions that were quite particular, even unique. In the USSR under the regime which has ruled since the death of Stalin, the bureaucracy continues to dominate but under forms, with orientations and perspectives quite different from those of the Stalin era. The Yugoslav experience, which has however, not emerged from the cycle of bureaucracy, was, and is characterised by other particular forms. The future reserves other variants and a multitude of experiences, ranging from the "Cuban" variety—where the bureaucracy is limited—to types characterised by strong deformations, extreme oppression and severe repression. But nothing allows us to seriously affirm that the Chinese experience actually identifies itself, or will have a tendency to identify itself with the form of degeneration that the USSR has known in the Stalin period. All the more significant indications permit a conclusion in accordance with an opposite argument.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE "BUREAUCRATIC COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE".

We have repeatedly condemned the summary accusations hurled by the Chinese at the Yugoslavs and their characterisation of Yugoslavia as a capitalist state. But in view of the latest article devoted to this question by the editors of "Red Flag" and of the "Peoples' Daily", one cannot limit oneself to denouncing inadmissible polemical methods, because this article claims to be a sociological characterisation bolstered by a whole series of arguments.

It will be necessary to examine these arguments in detail in a special article. It is a question, in any case, of a deplorable construction, where arbitrary conclusions are drawn from certain actual facts, the facts are grossly distorted, sociological notions are introduced which are at the very least odd; essential points on which one would wish to know not only the criticisms made of the Yugoslavs, but also the conceptions of the Chinese themselves, are but lightly touched upon, for example, it is true that a very high percentage of the land in Yugoslavia is still privately owned; well, in the first place, the proportions change enormously if we consider, not the surface area, but, as is necessary, commodity production. In the second place, if private ownership of the greater part of the land were sufficient criterion for characterising a country as capitalist, Poland would also be involved,

even though so far the Chinese do not appear to have contested its nature as a workers' state (or socialist, according to their terminology). If the Yugoslavs have in effect allowed the laws of the market to operate too freely, it is untrue to say that there is no more economic planning, and it is on the other hand evident that the phenomenon of private enterprise affects a very limited part—from the quantitative as well as from the qualitative point of view—of the national economy. If the undoubted excessive autonomy allowed to the enterprises has given birth to a whole series of dangerous phenomena, it is only on the basis of arbitrary extrapolations that they can be compared to genuine capitalist enterprises. We know very well that the powers of the workers' councils are quite simply, limited, so that a distribution of the national income very favourable to directors, managers, etc., is not completely avoided. But the authors of the article—who forget, among other things, that in the time of Stalin the extreme centralisation and the absence of workers' councils did not prevent the hegemony of directors and their crystalisation as a privileged layer—should tell us if, in their view, the remedy consists in the abolition of any form of workers' council and of autonomy of the enterprise, or, on the other hand, in the creation of organs of workers' management and of collective leadership to a qualitatively superior level.

Finally, what then is this strange "bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie" transferred from the sociological reality of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and which they apply to a completely different social and economic context, to a country where the qualitative leap of the socialist revolution has in fact taken place? This concept, which undoubtedly has claims to originality, is a curious mixture of reminiscences of analyses developed in the past on an entirely different subject, and of an actual reconciliation with the outworn conceptions of some ultra-left groups. Yugoslavia, is in effect, according to the actual words of the Chinese editors, "State capitalism of a particular type."

The worst is that at the end of the article on Yugoslavia there is a disquieting allusion: "We have no alternative but to state that the leadership of the CPSU imitates Yugoslavia in every way, and that it is committed to a particularly dangerous course." In the article of September 6th, the programme of the CPSU is, moreover, characterised as a "revisionist programme for the maintenance and restoration of capitalism." Is it necessary to emphasise that, if they dared in effect to transfer the new sociological characterisation of the Yugoslav scapegoat to the Soviet addressee, the Chinese communists would commit a monumental theoretical and political error, which from a tactical point of view, would put them in an untenable position.

THE CONFLICTS OF THE EPOCH OF TRANSITION

The Sino-Soviet conflict, preceded moreover by the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict and, even if only for a very brief period, by the conflict between the Soviet and Polish leaderships, prompts some considerations of a general nature. In fact, we have now entered into a relatively advanced phase of the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism and a whole series of phenomena so broad and complex appear, that differentiations, conflicts, contradictions, are inevitable. A certain superficial agreement emerges on this point; for example, arguments of this kind were recently developed by the leadership of the Italian CP. However, this is too often limited to a very general reminder about the "specific conditions," which at bottom is only a loophole for avoiding having to deal with the heart of the matter, Moreover, the issues are discussed in such a way as to give the impression that it was thought that the specific conditions themselves provoked tactical, political and ideological differences, without there being any underlying conflicts of interests. Now those who avail themselves of the Marxist materialist method of analysis know very well that, even in societies of transition from capitalism to socialism, the conflicts and contradictions (12) are precisely determined by divergent or opposed interests, and that it is necessary to set out from this basis not only to understand them but also to decide upon a political orientation. Not the least of the havoc wrought by Stalin and his school was to replace Marxist method in the analysis of post-capitalist Soviet society by mechanical casuistry, vulgar empiricism, by apologetics pure and simple.

Whereas in the Stalin epoch the methods of construction of a workers' state were conceived on a rigid model, the present-day panorama, fifteen years after the victory of the Chinese Revolution and a few years after the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba, is seen to be extremely differentiated and tends toward greater differentiations. Indeed, according as the collectivist system broadens out on a world scale, a tendency develops, as in previous historical epochs of transition. That is to say: in the first place, the qualitative leap may be accomplished under different forms and conditions as a result of the entanglement of multiple factors; secondly, at least in the initial stages with which we are acquainted, very different basic structures appear, finally, the political structures, themselves take on differing forms and show themselves susceptible to increasingly pronounced differentiation (we are thinking here of the short and medium terms). All this inevitably involves frictions, conflicts and contradictions. There is not necessarily a single solution, or one recognizable a priori to the various problems which are posed; different solutions can appear, as a function of specific conflicts of interest or even following errors of judgement which are always possible.

This is so much the more plausible and inevitable in view of the fact that the workers' states which exist at present—with the partial exception of the Cuban workers' state—are not led by revolutionary Marxist leaderships, democratically thrown up by the proletarian and peasant measses, but by leaderships which are bureaucratized in different ways and to varying degrees and which, consequently, view all problems, not from the point of view of the real interest of the masses and of the development of the revolutionary movement on a world scale, but from the point of view, in their eyes more important, of the interests of the dominant bureaucratic layer.

Let us take a few examples. The Soviet bureaucracy, at the present stage, is above all else interested in finding a modus vivendi with imperialism which would allow it to envisage less "explosive" and more "controllable" processes on the international scene, to partially reduce the vast military expenditure and thus to increase the economic concessions to their own masses (the more so since they are not prepared to make important concessions on the more strictly political plane). They may be interested in concentrating their efforts of economic aid to the national bourgeoisies of the "Third World" always of course within the framework of the same strategy, even to the detriment of aid to a workers' state such as China which, on the one hand, would require aid on a gigantic scale (which in any case would pose a tough problem) and which the Soviet bureaucracy on the other hand has no interest in seeing strengthened at an accelerated rhythm. They may be interested in propelling in the peoples' democracies economic development of a certain type, in stimulating, for example, an agricultural sector instead of an industrial one. The experience of the first post-war years and even the first experiences of Comecon (see the conflict with the Rumanian leadership) demonstrate that there is no guarantee that the Soviet bureaucracy strives to find solutions corresponding not to its own particular interests, but to the general necessities of harmonious development of an international plan, of a rational international division of labour.

In the field of economic development, more generally, the Soviet leadership is preoccupied above all with the further economic growth of the country which they lead, relegating to second place the needs involved in rapid porgress of the system of workers' states as a whole. If it can be said in very general and abstract terms that the two things are not contradictory—in principle, further development of the Soviet economy can be profitable to the system as a whole and vice-versa—a more balanced development of the system creates more favourable conditions for Soviet growth; it is otherwise with regard to concrete decisions: conflicts are always possible, likely, and have in effect arisen. (13). To return for a moment to the quarrel about atomic weapons, the Soviet Union could abstractly be justified in saying to China: there is no need for you to make heavy sacrifices, we will shield everybody. But, in practice, as we have seen, the Chinese leaders could have a thousand reasons for believing that, if atomic weapons are not destroyed, the only real guarantee for China is to have them, even to the partial detriment of normal economic development.

Finally, to touch upon a central point in the conflict which has been emphasised several times in our documents, given the level attained by the USSR and taking into account the incidence of the factor of "defence of bureaucratic interests," one can see why Khrushchev has established more and more his fundamental strategy, in which the decisive element in the historical struggle of the two systems on a world scale will be the victory of the USSR in economic competition with the US. But one can see at the same time that the Chinese leaders, who control an economically backward state, who have undergone and are undergoing the most direct and brutal imperialist pressure, who are forced to note the serious consequences for their economic development of the geographical limitation of the collectivist system, emphasise above all the element represented by the revolutionary struggle of the masses; and they have been lately pushed in this direction even by their inferiority in regard to the most decisive armaments.

The Chinese leadership is also a bureaucratic leadership with its own specific interests. For us this is ABC and we have never been reticent on this point. But objectively the important thing is that the bureaucratic Chinese leadership is impelled by different forces than those which condition the Khrushchev leadership and that, thanks to these forces, objectively they take more progressive stands, closer to positions corresponding to the real needs of the defence of the workers' states and of the development of the international working class movement. There is the essential reason for our attitude on the Sino-Soviet conflict.

18*th October*, 1963

Our article was already finished when the Chinese published a new editorial in "Red Flag" and the "Peoples' Daily" concerning the policy of the leaders of the USSR toward the colonial revolution.

The criticisms expressed in 1960 in a veiled and partial form (see our article published at the time in "Fourth International") are formulated in the new text much more clearly and organically. Obviously one could never accept all the arguments which are put forward or forget that certain serious deficiencies in the Chinese position remain, or let pass without comment the once again completely misplaced, arbitrary and false quotations from Stalin (made, moreover, while forgetting the practice of the same Stalin, in the first place with regard to the Chinese revolution). Nevertheless, the criticism of the Khrushchev conception of coexistence, of the subordination of revolutionary struggles to the policy needs of the leaders of the USSR of Khrushchev's babbling about UNO about the possibilities of collaboration with imperialism (including American imperialism) in the matter of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries etc., is fundamentally correct and pertinent and draws close to the criticism made by our movement.

To this must be added that the Chinese also give concrete examples, by speaking also of Khrushchev's policy towards the Algerian Revolution—whose government was not recognised till after Evian!—and above all of the treachery of the French CP which *Pravda* and the Soviet press praise even for its attitude to the Algerian people. The criticism of the French CP was accompanied by the publication, almost on the same day, in the Chinese bulletin, of a speech of the Algerian leader Ouzegane to the Chinese students on the opportunist atitutude of the French CP. The Soviet press is hardly to be expected to report these same criticisms!

It should be remarked, moreover, that in their polemics on the role of the colonial revolution—which the Soviets reproach the Chinese with exaggerating through considering it to be fundamental and decisive—the Chinese document says that today the revolutions of national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America deal direct blows to imperialism. The contradictions of the world are concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It adds afterwards: "The centre of world contradictions, of the world political struggles, is not fixed, but changes in relation to changes of the international struggles and of the revolutionary situation. We believe that with the development of the contradiction and the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Western Europe and the United States, the day of the decisive struggle will come also in the citadels of capitalism and imperialism. When that day comes, Western Europe will certainly be the centre of world political struggles, of world contradictions."

FOOTNOTES

(1) See the September 1 declaration of the United Secretariat.

(2) Cf. Fourth International, July 1961 where in particular it was stated: "On some points, compromises were evidently reached. On others the solution consists of adopting or repeating sufficiently elastic formulas, and on others, the Chinese communists are retreating, accepting for the moment the discipline of the majority."

(3) The Chinese seem moreover to forget or to be unaware of one central point: even in the Stalin period a number of Communist parties applied an orientation of the "peaceful road" even if they did not explicitly theorise about it. Is it necessary to judge if Stalin's policy with regard to the Chinese Revolution was at least as right-wing as that of his successors, who were nevertheless on occasions obliged to adjust their policy in the light of pressures of the international revolutionary struggle?

(4) For a reply to some of the arguments in the article on Stalin see issue No 3. of World Outlook (by E Germain).

(5) We allude here to passages in the Chinese articles of Sep. 6 and 13, 1963 and the article which appeared in *Izvestia*. The mutual accusations about Trotskyism can appear grotesque and paradoxical, but they are in reality the reflection of the bureaucratic character common to the two leaderships both of whom consider Trotskysists as their enemies, guilty of expressing a revolutionary Marxist criticism of the phenomena of bureaucratic degeneration in the workers' states.

(6) We are not referring here to the critics of Khrushchev and Togliatti who whilst posing as opponents of Stalin have fluctuated not a little in their judgements and even since 1956 themselves used the description "great Marxist-Leninist" for Stalin, and have a record which despite everything is negative. We have in mind certain affirmations in the analyses of authors like Baran and even Sweezy, and ideas current in the Italian CP, for example.

(7) A good many leaders of the Communist parties have not in fact ceased to be Stalinists in substance despite their Khrushchevism, for they have automatically aligned themselves with the leadership of the CPSU in accusing the Chinese of high treason.

One could say that the Chinese were the last to drop the slogan, "The Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union". If this was a reflection of the bureaucratic ideas also held by the Chinese leaders it likewise demonstrates at the same time that it is always necessary to seek the reality hidden behind the slogans. Paradoxically the Chinese sought to act as disciplined members of the "socialist camp" at the very moment when in practice they were already opposed on major questions to the CPSU and were sounding the knell of monolithism under Soviet tutelage.

(8) In the article which appeared in Nan-fang Jih-pao of Canton on April 12, 1962, under the title "Reinforce Democratic Centralism" one was able to read:

> "In normal conditions the positions of the majority are the base on which we are able to determine problems. At the same time, this does not signify that we have no need to listen attentively to the minority. In exceptional circumstances it is the minority which may have the correct ideas, for truth is usually discovered first of all by a small number of people and cannot immediately be accepted by the majority."

The same journal returns to the problem of the majority and the minority when it envisages the possibility of a secretary placed in a minority and thus forced to apply the decisions of the majority of the committee of which he is a member. March, 21, 1962: "Who has the Final Word?"

(9) "The Communist's Outlook on Material Life", July 13, 1963. We recall, on the other hand that in 1960 the Chinese decided that their experts in Guinea would be paid the same as the local experts.

(10) V. Kuo-Chin-Jun: "Proletarians and Oppressed Nationalities of the Whole World, Unite!" July 25, 1963.

(11) The English text reads "in every way".

(12) Mao Tse-Tung, as is known, has used the formula of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions in order to distinguish the contradictions of a society characterised by class exploitation from those of a socialist society or a society of transition to socialism. Leaving aside questions of terminology, we would say that it is a question of contradictions of a historically new type, with a new social content.

(13) The Soviet leaders have made a great noise against the Chinese assertions that a socialist country must above all count on itself, and have sung the praises of the international division of labour. Unfortunately for them, it is not a question, as we have seen, of stating an abstract principle, but of ascertaining the reality of USSR policy on the question. This is emphasised in an important passage of a speech by Liu Chao-chi at Pyong-Yang: "Everyone knows that to rely on one's strength does not mean a 'closed-door' policy, or a refusal of foreign aid. But in its revolution and construction, every country should rely principally on its own strength,

(*Continued on Page* 40)

THE 25th ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

By PIERRE FRANK

TWENTY-five years ago the Fourth International was founded. This decision was taken on the insistence of Leon Trotsky after a struggle of almost a decade to reform the Communist International and its sections, during which he vigourously opposed those who wished to create a new International earlier. He made the decisive turn after Hitler came to power; that is, after a decisive defeat of the German working class which then constituted the main centre of the international proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries. From 1933 on, Trotsky worked with all his strength for the creation of a new international leadership... The foundation of the Fourth International in 1938 is without doubt a decision of Trotsky's that has been much disputed. The Trotskyist movement itself hesitated for some time; thus in 1936, an international Conference of the Trotskyists did not accept the proposal of Trotsky to found the Fourth International. Even in 1938 resistance had not died and the echo can be found in a passage of the Transitional Programme:

"Sceptics ask: but has the moment for the creation of the Fourth International yet arrived? It is impossible, they say, to create an International 'artificially'; it can arise only out of great events, etc., etc....The Fourth International has already arisen out of great events: the greatest defeats of the proletariat in history. The cause for these defeats is to be found in the degeneration and perfidy of the old leadership. The class struggle does not tolerate an interruption. The Third International, following upon the Second, is dead for purposes of revolution. Long live the Fourth International!

"But has the time yet arrived to proclaim its creation?....the sceptics are not quieted down. The Fourth International, we answer, has no need of being 'proclaimed', It exists and it fights....."

Trotsky, recognising that it still consisted only of cadres, emphasised that its strength lay in its doctrine, its programme, its tradition, the temper of its cadres.

It is by no means pointless to recall the epoch in which this decision was taken. The working class movement was suffering defeat after defeat. Europe was increasingly, covered by Fascism. Stalinism ruled in totalitarian fashion in the U.S.S.R and in the Communist parties. World war loomed on the horizon. Demoralisation was spreading in vanguard circles; the centrist formation showed themselves the most ferocious adversaries of the formation of a new revolutionary International.

The creation of the Fourth International, undertaken above all under the inspiration of Trotsky, went really against the current. Of what use was it? What have you achieved? Such are the questions which we hear often enough and which an anniversary such as this gives the opportunity to deal with.

Let us agree that at the time, the Trotskyists and Trotsky himself had illusions, not with regard to the immediate difficulties (these incited the creation of the Fourth International) but about the time needed by the Fourth International to become a mass organisation. But important though the rate of development be, it is not by this that Marxists judge the historical correctness of a position. The vitality of the organisation, the historical setting, theoretical and political contributions, these are the real criteria for judging the decision to found the Fourth International.

Despite enormous material difficulties, the gigantic pressures to which it was subjected, the Fourth International, unlike all the national centrist organisations and the London Bureau, has not disappeared; on the contrary, it alone has continued to strug-

gle for its ideas and its programme. Against the scale of the fifty years which separate us from the unleashing of the First World War—and it is this historic scale which alone does not deceive—it can be said that, in this epoch packed with wars, revolutions and counter-revolutions, only the organisations adhering to the Socialist International, the official Communist parties and the Fourth International have had any continuity. It was so because these three organisations are not arbitrary or conjunctural creations, but formations which have powerful historic and social roots. The Socialist parties, going back to the beginnings of the European working class movement, have social roots in reformism, the Communist parties are connected with the Soviet Union; the Fourth International is connected with the Bolshevik Party and the Third International through the Russian and International Left Opposition, and it represents the fundamental historic interests of the international proletariat.

If the Communist parties have maintained themselves (although they have been practically eliminated in some countries in the course of events as in Cuba and Algeria where the national revolutionary leadership was assumed by others) the Communist International was liquidated with few words by Stalin, and since the end of the war, the Communist parties have found themselves caught between their need to constitute a united international organisation and the discords which developed among them along national lines due to their bureaucratisation and their exercise of power in a series of countries. The gigantic crisis of Stalinism, in the form at present of the Sino-Soviet conflict, indicates at the same time the definitive end of the memories of the Third International in its Stalinist period, and the need for the revolutionary currents breaking from Stalinism to find an outlet internationally.

The Fourth International has not only defended the theoretical heritage of Bolshevism and maintained the concept of a revolutionary Marxist international, it has also in the course of these twenty-five years enriched Marxism in the light of the grandiose struggles of this period, and participated in all these struggles.

The militants of the Fourth International have participated in the struggles of the European masses against Nazism, in the Spanish Revolution, in the uprisings in Asia, in the struggles of the Latin-American masses. They have participated in the Algerian Revolution and in the struggles which are presently developing on the African continent. The American Trotskyists are involved in the struggles of the Negroes, connecting the colonial revolution to the North American revolution. And the Trotskyists, quite naturally, are coming in touch with the new generation in the workers' states who oppose the bureaucracy—including its 'liberal' form—and are trying to discover their historic connection with October.

To summarise the ideological contributions of the Fourth International to the understanding of the phenomena of the richest of revolutionary epochs is not easy. By its origins, by its connections with the Left Opposition, it owed it to itself to pursue the study of developments in the U.S.S.R and in the workers' states, of the problems of planning, of agriculture, of the efforts of the bureaucracy to adapt to altogether new situations; above all, it had to explain "de-Stalinisation", this self-defence of the bureaucracy faced with the demands of Soviet society.

The Fourth International has also been led to consider the problems posed in the economically developed capitalist states, where an unforseen and prolonged economic boom has been witnessed. It has explained the causes of such a conjuncture, its temporary character, the new problems which it placed before the working-class movement, also new phenomena such as the formation of the European Common Market. It did this while faced with an extraordinary strengthening of the reformist and revisionist tendencies in the working-class movement, not only in the form of centrist groupings, unimportant in the long range, but open rejection of Marxist traditions by the Social Democracy and the shameless adoption by the Communist parties of the 'democratic' conceptions opposed by the Bolsheviks in the earliest years of the Russian Revolution.

The Fourth International has above all not failed to make its contribution to the colonial revolutions which have developed uninterruptedly since the end of the Second

World War. It was prepared for this by its untiring defence of the theory of the Permanent Revolution against Stalinism. Without this theory it is impossible to achieve a correct over-all view of these revolutions, to place them in the world march towards socialism. The Fourth International has not failed to explain the importance of factors which were not given extensive consideration in classical Marxism, such as the peasantry, guerilla wars, revolutionary leaderships influenced by the great examples of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. It endeavoured to disentangle the specific roads of these revolutions, so different from the traditional working-class movements of the old capitalist countries.

It would not have been possible to produce such a theoretical and political contribution without the creation of the Fourth International, without precisely the existence of an organisation which unites on an international scale revolutionary thought and action. Specialists in their specific spheres have made contributions which are very valuable for Marxist theory and for the working-class movement, and the Fourth International has been the first to recognise these services to the cause of socialism. But it is neither egoistic nor smug to say that the Fourth International alone has made the most complete and rounded contribution, that it has fulfilled as far as its forces permitted, the task for which it was in the first instance founded. It has done this in spite of extraordinary difficulties, not least being the ruling bureaucracies of the workers' states, disposing of material forces incomparably greater in all respects than the old reformist bureaucracies so often denounced in the past.

Nobody knows the political strength of the Fourth International better than these bureaucracies, the Soviet bureaucracy in the first place. It has an infallible nose for its own interests and is completely empiricist. This is generally appreciated, yet even specialists wonder why the bureaucracy has not given up seeing Trotskyism as a danger to be destroyed at all costs; why it has in fighting Trotskyism and the Fourth International, devoted money and forces which appear incommensurate with our numerically weak organisations, with this movement so often buried, but which never dies.

Better than anyone else, the bureaucracy knows the extraordinary importance of the Fourth International, it knows it not as a result of theoretical understanding, but through a keen instinct of self-preservation.

The crisis of international Stalinism is in process of becoming very acute. The Sino-Soviet dispute has given rise to a big debate on the most important political problems of our epoch, including the road to socialism in all sectors of the present-day world (colonial countries, workers' states, developed capitalist countries). Connected with these problems, with their discussion in the Communist parties, is the question of the political instrument, of a new leadership, of a mass revolutionary International capable of unifying and leading the struggles on such a vast scale, in such diversified conditions. It is precisely because of this that antagonists, suddenly frightened, accuse each other of playing the game of the Trotskyists, of the Fourth International. It was due to force of circumstances that IZVESTIA celebrated in its own way the Twenty-fifth anniversary of the Fourth International, by publishing an article which, for the critical public that is not lacking in the USSR, was an involuntary eulogy.

It would not be right to celebrate this twenty-fifth anniversary without taking up an argument often invoked against the Fourth International, i.e. its numerous internal difficulties, the many crises and splits to which it has been subjected. There is obviously no need to reply to the idiotic giggles of people belonging to centrist formations hostile to Trotskyism, who are incapable of either formulating a programme or of building an organisation. It is to the numerous militants attracted by Trotskyist ideas but repelled by the organisational weakness and discords among Trotskyists that we owe an explanation for the phenomenon. Let us add that they will understand this situation better in future as the crisis of international Stalinism widens in the official Communist parties. Many objective causes—above all the weight of the Stalinised Soviet State on the one hand and the capitalist state power on the other in the working class movement—explains the difficulty which the organisations of the Fourth International have had to face in breaking through as mass organisations.

(*Continued on Page* 25)

The Law of Value in relation to Self-management and Investment in the Economy of the Workers States

(Some remarks on the discussion in Cuba)

by ERNEST GERMAIN

THE Cuban magazine *Nuestra Industria —Revista Economica*, organ of the Ministry of Industry, published two polemical articles in issue No. 3 (October, 1963) of great interest, one written by Ernesto Che Guevara and the other by Comandante Alberto Mora, Minister of Foreign Trade. This polemic testifies to the vitality of the Cuban Revolution in the field of Marxist theory, too. It deals with a number of questions of the utmost importance in the construction of a socialist economy: role of the law of value in the economy during the epoch of transition; autonomy of enterprises and self-management; investments through the budget or by means of self-investment, etc. Involved in these issues is the problem of the ideal model for the economy in the epoch of transition from an underdeveloped country, a problem of absorbing interest to the Bolsheviks during the 1923-28 period and which arose again, even if on a rather low theoretical level, in Yugoslavia, Poland and even in the Soviet Union in recent years.

The Law of Value in the Economy during the Epoch of Transition

The question of the "application" of the theory of value in the planned and socialized economy of the epoch of transition has been subjected to the worst confusion, mainly because Stalin, in his last work, posed it in a both gross and simplistic way: "Does the law of value exist (sic) and does it apply in our country?....Yes, it exists there and it applies there." This is an evident truism. To the extent that exchange occurs, commodity production survives, and exchange is thereby objectively governed by the law of value. The latter cannot disappear until commodity production withers away; that is, with the production of an abundance of goods and services.

But this does not answer the *concrete question* around which turns the fundamental discussion begun in 1924-25 between Preobrazhensky and Bukharin and which has continued to develop, with ups and downs, among Marxist economists and theoreticians up to now: *to what exact degree* and *in what sphere* does the law of value apply in the economy during the epoch of transition ?

Stalin himself, while muddling the problem, had to admit a fact which the Khrushchevist economists are nevertheless beginning to bring into question; namely, that in the "socialist" economy, the law of labour-value cannot be the *regulator of production*, that is, cannot determine *investments*.

In developed capitalist economy, the law of value determines production through the play of the rate of profit. Capital flows toward the sectors where the rate of profit is above the average and production increases there. Capital recedes from the sectors where the rate of profit is below the average, and production decreases there (at least relatively). When the means of production are nationalized, so that there is neither a market for capital nor its free entry and withdrawal, nor even the formation of an average rate of profit with which the rate of each particular branch can be compared, clearly there is no longer a possibility for the "law of value" to be directly the "regulator of production".

If in an underdeveloped country which has carried out its socialist revolution the

"law of value" were to regulate investments, these would flow preferentially toward the sectors where profitability is the highest *in relation to prices on the world market.* But it is precisely because these prices determine a *concentration of investments in the production of raw materials* that these countries are underdeveloped. To escape from underdevelopment, to industrialize the country, means to deliberately orient investments toward the sectors that are least "profitable" for the time-being according to the law of value, but more profitable according to the criterion of the long-term economic and social development of the country as a whole. When it is said that the monopoly of foreign trade is indispensable for industrializing the underdeveloped countries this means precisely that it cannot be accomplished until these countries are able to "pull the teeth" of the law of value.

But perhaps this qualification applies only to the "law of value on the world market"? Cannot the law of value at least alter investments on the national scale, once world prices are left aside? This is wrong again. The industrialization of an underdeveloped country cannot be carried out rapidly and harmoniously except *by deliberately violating the law of value.* (1)

In an underdeveloped country, and precisely because of its underdevelopment, agriculture tends from the beginning to be more "profitable" than industry, handicrafts and small industry more "profitable" than big industry, light industry more "profitable" than heavy industry, the private sector more "profitable" than the nationalized sector. To channel investments according to the "law of value", that is, according to the law of supply and demand of commodities produced by different branches of the economy, would imply developing monoculture for the export trade by priority; it would imply preferential construction of small shops for the local market rather than steel plants for the national market. The construction of comfortable lodgings for the petty-bourgeois or bureaucratic layers (an investment corresponding to "effective demand") would have priority over the construction of low-cost homes for the people which clearly must be subsidized. In short all the economic and social evils of underdevelopment would be reproduced despite the victory of the revolution.

In reality, the decisive meaning of this victory, of the nationalization of the means of industrial production, of credit, of the transportation system and foreign trade (together with the monopoly of the latter), is precisely to create *the conditions for a process of industrialization that escapes from the logic of the law of value.* Economic, social and political priorities, *consciously and democratically chosen,* take the lead over the law of value in order to lay out the successive stages of industrialization. Priority is placed not on immediate maximum returns, but on the suppression of rural unemployment, the reduction of technological backwardness, the suppression of the foreign grip on the national economy, the guarantee of the rapid social and cultural rise of the masses of workers and poor peasants, the rapid suppression of epidemics and endemic diseases, etc., etc.

That is why the industrialization of the workers states follows a different road from that of the capitalist countries where industries are built beginning with the sectors that will most easily satisfy "effective demand".

To violate the law of value is one thing; to *disregard* it is something else again. The economy of a workers state can disregard the law of value only at the price of *losses* to the economy which could be avoided, of *useless sacrifices* imposed on the masses, as we shall later demonstrate.

What does this mean? In the first place, that the whole economy must be carried on within the framework of a strict calculation of the real costs of production. These costs will not determine investments; these will not automatically go toward "the least costly" projects. But to know the costs means to know the exact amount of subsidies which the collectivity grants the sectors which it has decided to develop by priority. In the second place, that it is necessary to have a stable yardstick for these calculations; without stable money, no rigourous planning. In the third place,

that all sectors where economic or social priorities do not dictate any preference are to be actually guided by the "law of value", (for example, different crops aiming at the domestic market). In the fourth place, so long as the means of consumption remain commodities, and aside from the commodities and services deliberately subsidized or distributed free by the state (pharmaceutical products, school and training materials, books, etc.), the preferences of the consumers will freely operate on the market the law of supply and demand will affect prices, and the plan will adapt its projected investments to these oscillations (within the limits of what is available in finances, equipment, raw materials, etc.).

In the light of these initial remarks we can consider the importance of the two problems raised in the Guevara-Mora polemic: What is value? Are means of production commodities in the transitional epoch? Mora affirms that value is not essentially abstract human labour; that it is "a relation existing between the limited disposable resources and the growing needs of man." (p. 15). Still better: he holds that value is a "category created by man under certain conditions and for certain(!) ends." (p. 15).

It is clear that we are faced here with a *subjective deformation* of the Marxist concept of labour-value, of which Marx specified the essence to be *abstract human labour.* It is not by chance that Mora refers to the "neo-Marxist" Soviet economists (2), who have been attacked, in the USSR itself, and rightly so, as wanting to introduce surreptitiously the marginal theory of value. His conception, according to which the "law of value is the economic criterion for regulating production" in the epoch of transition (p. 17)—while he affirms that it is not the *only* regulator—necessarily involves the notion according to which "exchange of the means of production" occurs even when these are completely nationalized, that "sale of commodities" occurs even when these means of production pass from one nationalized enterprise to another, and that the "contradictions" between the state enterprises justify the assertion that a "change in ownership" occurs at the time of these exchanges (p. 19). All these affirmations are contrary to the reality and to Marxist theory. On all these questions, Che Guevara is entirely right against Mora.

Mora states that if in investments, one leaves aside the law of value, one must pay "the price"; in doing this, you automatically limit the social resources available to satisfy other needs. This is true, and we, likewise, underline the necessity for strict calculation of production costs in all fields. But in limiting oneself to this economic truth, the social content of the epoch of transition is done away with; that is, *in abstracting from the class struggle,* Mora leaves out a whole important side of the problem.

In fact, it is impossible to operate in the economy of the epoch of transition—any more than in any other economy containing different social classes—with aggregates like "social revenue", "social costs", "social price of investments", without at the same time posing the question, "Who is to pay this price to whom?"

The society of the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism is not homogeneous. In conducting an appropriate policy of investments, of prices, wages, foreign trade, etc., the workers state can act in such a way that the *social benefits of priority investments* (numerical reinforcement of the working class; elevation of its standard of living, skill, culture and consciousness; reinforcement of its leading role in the state and economy; accentuation of its participation in political life, etc., etc.) *are paid economically by other social classes*: the residue of the former owning classes; imperialism; the small commercial entrepreneurs and independent peasants. In an expanding economy, this economic price, paid particularly by the merchants, artisans and independent peasants can moreover be accompanied by a rise in their standard of living, on condition that this rise is less than it would have been in the framework of the "free play of the law of value" (thanks, for example, to a progressive income tax). (3)

The Law of Value and Foreign Trade

All the preceding evidently constitutes only a general framework for replying to the

specific problems which the question of economic calculation and the orientation of investments raises in each particular workers state. Here Mora is right when he stresses (p. 18) that in a small country like Cuba, which depends strictly on foreign trade for the current functioning of its industry (spare parts and raw materials) and for the equipment of its new enterprises, the necessity for rigorous economic calculation is imposed with all the more reason than in a big, largely autarchic country like the Soviet Union.

Exports are made according to prices on the world market. So that these will not constitute a constant drain on the national economy (they must be met in any case in order to keep industry and industrialization going through imports), it is necessary that the production costs of exported goods should as a whole be below the prices obtained on the world market. It is necessary to fix the objective on progressively suppressing all exports at a loss, so that exports are not only a means of supplying the national economy but in addition an important source of accumulation, a means of defraying part of the expense of industrialization—a part of the costs of not observing the law of value on the national market!—from abroad. The tendency for current prices of sugar to rise on the world market creates, moreover, a favourable framework for the success of such a policy. The *progressive diversification of exports*, to render the Cuban economy independent of future fluctuations of current sugar prices on the world market, must point to the selection of other export products where production costs remain below the prices obtained abroad (that is, average prices on the world market).

But Mora mixes up the need to carry out all these calculations in the most strict way with the extension of the field of application of the law of value in the Cuban economy. The two phenomena are not identical; they can even be directly contradictory.

The law of value determines the exchange value of commodities according to the quantity of labour socially necessary to produce them. The concept of "socially necessary" labour is determined in turn by the average level of the productivity of labour in a country, and by the concept of the effective demand of society—which must never be confounded with human needs or social needs from an objective point of view. In an underdeveloped country like Cuba, *all* production of many industrial branches can correspond to an "effective demand", that is, all labour in these branches can appear as "socially necessary", despite a very low level of productivity. The reference to the law of value, far from thereby resolving the problem of rapid improvement in the productivity of labour, of the technological transformations which these industries must undergo, can only obscure it. Because the law of value will have a tendency to *keep alive* archaic enterprises, as long as the state of scarcity exists, from the moment there ceases to be free movement of capital and free imports of commodities which could stimulate competition with these enterprises.

Far from being a field of application of the law of value, the dependence of Cuba on foreign trade thus implies the necessity of *economic calculation of comparative international costs*, which could provide a choice of economic criteria, independently of any rigid "law". The necessity to *assure* the country's supply of spare parts and raw materials *imposes* a certain volume of exports, even if these are carried out at a loss. The necessity to maintain and to develop the existing level of industries dependent on foreign supplies imposes searching, as quickly as possible, for profitable exports *in relation to prices on the world market*—even if this means switching investments toward branches that are already profitable *in relation to the national market* (branches that already sell their commodities at their exchange value). The possibility of exporting at a profit, of gaining supplementary resources from exports, of transforming trade into a constant source of socialist accumulation, will moreover permit just the *liberation of the economy* from the tyranny of the "law of value", that is, will permit the development of new industries despite the fact that their production costs at the beginning will be higher than the prices of imported products, without lowering the standard of living or the rate of accumulation in the country. This is an aspect of the real dialectics of the

dependence on foreign trade and the play of the law of value that is decidedly more complex than Comrade Mora thought !

The Law of Value and Autonomy of Decision at the Enterprise Level

In the debate which has raged in some of the workers states, the problem of the area of application of the law of value is intimately linked with the problem of autonomy of decision at the enterprise level in the field of investment. The Yugoslav authors have even formulated with regard to this a veritable new dogma which requires critical analysis: "Without the right of the self-management collectives to dispose of a considerable part of the social surplus product, no genuine self-management." (4) This analysis must examine the problem from two aspects: economic efficiency (criteria for choosing one investment project rather than another), social and political efficiency (success in the struggle against the bureaucracy and bureaucratization).

The more backward a country is, the more conditions of almost universal scarcity rule not only in the means of production sector but also for much of the industrial means of consumption (at least for the great majority of the population), and *the more detrimental the practice of self investment is* the more detrimental is it to permit the self-management collectives to determine for themselves the projects for priority of productive investments.

It is evident in fact that under conditions of almost general scarcity of industrial commodities, *almost all* the investment projects can be economically profitable, no matter how gross the economic errors that are committed. Almost every profitable industrial or agricultural enterprise (providing funds for investment) is like an island in a sea of unsatisfied needs. The natural tendency of self-investment is therefore to attend to what is most pressing, both locally and in each sector.

In other words: if the self-management enterprises hold large funds for self-investment, they will have a tendency to orient their investments either toward the commodities which they lack the most (certain equipment goods; raw materials; auxiliary products; emergency sources of energy), or toward the commodities which their workers or the inhabitants of the area lack the most. Thus criteria of local or sector interest are placed above national interests, not because the law of value is "denied" but precisely *because it is applied* ! This means, once more, to orient industrialization toward the "traditional road" which it followed in the historic framework of capitalism, in place of reorienting it according to the requirements of a nationally planned economy.

An attempt can be made to reconcile national planning requirements and allocating self-managed enterprises considerable funds for self-investment. The means chosen for this aim can be a levy-tax in behalf of national development funds and equalization funds for regional development. This is evidently a step in the right direction, but it does not at all resolve the problem.

Since an underdeveloped economy is characterised precisely by the fact that the enterprises of high productivity are still the exception and not the rule, it is sufficient to leave them a part of their net surplus product and the inequality of development between the industrialized localities and the non-industrialized localities, the inequality of development and of revenue between the archaic enterprises which enjoy only an average level of productivity and the enterprises technologically "up to date" will increase instead *of diminishing*. It is necessary moreover to insist on this fundamental idea of Marxism: any economic freedom, any "autonomy of decision" and any "spontaneity" *increases the inequality* so long as there exist side by side strong and feeble enterprises or individuals, rich and poor, favoured and unfavoured from the point of view of location, etc,. This is the reason why, it should be noted in passing, that according to Marx the mechanism of the law of value leads to its own negation, competition inevitably ends in monopoly.

The economic logic of a planned economy therefore speaks completely in favour of *productive investment by budgetary means* at least for all the big enterprises. What

must be left to the enterprises is an amortization fund sufficiently large to permit *modernization of equipment with each renewal of fixed equipment* (gross investment). But all *net* investments should be made in accordance with the plan, in the branches and places chosen according to preferential criteria selected for the society and its economy as a whole. In this respect, too, the thesis of Comrade Guevara is correct.

The problem has been obscured, above all in the USSR, through associating it with the problem of *heightening the material incentives in enterprises.* Numerous Soviet economists have criticized the stimulants still employed today in the economy of the USSR to incite the enterprises (?) to carry out the plans. This criticism is in general pertinent. It has but to repeat what the anti-Stalinist Marxists have said critically for many years. Yet it is only necessary to examine closely the arguments of these economists to see that what is involved in reality is *heightening material incentives for the bureaucracy* for whom the growth of revenues must in some way be the essential stimulus for the expansion of production in the enterprises.

This is where certain partisans of self-management, particularly in Yugoslavia, maintain that *decentralization of the decisions on investment would be a powerful guarantee against bureaucratization.* This thesis is based on a fallacy. The Yugoslavs are right in stressing that the power of the bureaucracy grows in relation to its freedom in disposing of the social surplus product. But the technicians and economists of the planning commission "dispose" of the surplus product only in the form of figures on paper; the real power of disposal is situated *at the level of the enterprise.* (5) The more that means other than consumption funds (distributed revenues and social investments) are left at the free disposal of the enterprises, *the more is precisely bureaucratization stimulated,* at least in a climate of generalised scarcity and poverty; also the greater the temptation becomes for corruption, theft, abuse of confidence, false entries—temptations that do not exist at the level of the planning commission, if only because of multiple checks. The concrete experience of Yugoslav "decentralization" has shown, moreover, that it is an enormous source of inequality and bureaucratization at the level of the enterprises.

But doesn't the possibility of complete centralization of the means of investment at the state level create the danger of the *economic policy as a whole* favouring the bureaucracy, as was the case in Stalinist Russia? Obviously. But then the cause does not reside in the centralization itself, it lies in the *absence of workers democracy on the national political level.* (6) This means that a genuine guarantee against bureaucratization depends on workers management at the enterprise level and workers democracy at the state level. Without this combination, even the autonomy of the enterprises will eliminate none of the authoritarian, bureaucratic and (often) erroneous character of economic decisions made at the government level of the plan. With this combination, the centralization of investments—priorities being democratically established, for example through a national congress of workers councils—would not encourage bureaucratization, but on the contrary suppress one of its principle sources.

The Law of Value and Self-Management

"Heightening material incentives" in the enterprises cannot be a "stimulant" in the question of investments. But "heightening material incentives" in the self-management collectives can actually stimulate continual growth of production and productivity among the enterprises.

Certainly, under a regime of genuine socialist democracy, creative enthusiasm, the free development of all the capacities of invention and organization of the proletariat, constitute a powerful motor for the growth of production. But it would be a grave idealist and voluntarist error to suppose that in a *climate of poverty*—inevitable in an underdeveloped country immediately following the victory of the socialist revolution—this enthusiasm could last long *without a sufficient material substructure.*

The example of the Soviet Union, where the proletariat gave proof of an enthusiasm

and spirit of self-sacrifice without parallel in the first years after the October Revolution, is instructive in this respect: a long period of deprivation ended inevitably in mounting passivity of the workers, daily material concerns taking precedence over attentiveness to meetings.

It is therefore imperative to link self-management to the possibility for the workers to immediately judge the success of each effort at increasing production *by the elevation of their standard of living*. The simplest and most transparent technique is that of distributing a part of the net revenue of the enterprise among the workers in the form of one or more months of bonus wages, the amount increasing or diminishing automatically with the level of revenue. *The increasing collective material interest* of the workers in the management of the enterprises moreover is superior to piece wages, inasmuch as it does not introduce division and conflicts in the workers collectivity, inasmuch as it corresponds better to contemporary technique, which places less and less importance on individual output and more and more importance on the rational organization of labour.

Self-management (and not mere workers control) seems to be the ideal model for organising socialist enterprises. But it by no means hinders more or less unlimited competition among the enterprises, which flows from their autonomy in the domain of prices and investments. This autonomy cannot but reproduce a series of evils inherent to the capitalist regime: monopoly positions exploited in the formation of prices and revenues; efforts to defend these monopolies by "hiding" discoveries and technical improvements; waste and duplication in the field of investments; high cost of errors in decision, revealed *a posteriori* on the market (including the shutting down of enterprises); reappearance of unemployment, etc., etc. Useless and detrimental from the economic point of view, it by no means constitutes a sufficient guarantee against bureaucratization, as we have indicated above.

In this connection, the polemic of Lenin and Trotsky against the theses of the "Workers Opposition" is still completely valid. Marxism is not to be confused with the doctrine of anarcho — syndicalism The genuine guarantee of workers power lies on the political level; it is on the state level that it must be established; any other solution is utopian; that is, unworkable in the long run and a source for the reappearance of a powerful bureaucracy.

For all these reasons, self-management does not at all imply wider recourse to the "law of value" in relation to centralised planning. (7) The fundamental data of the problem remain the same. It is necessary to carry out strict calculations of production costs to show in the case of each commodity whether its production has been subsidized or not. But nothing calls for the conclusion that prices must be "determined by the law of value", that is, by the law of supply and demand. If such a conclusion still has some meaning with regard to the means of consumption, it is senseless for the means of production which, we repeat, are not commodities, at least in the great majority of cases. And even means of production which are still commodities—those produced by the private or co-operative sector for delivery to the state, and which the state furnishes to private enterprises or co-operatives—cannot be "sold at their value" without encouraging under certain conditions private primitive accumulation at the expense of socialist accumulation. But, if the means of production are not sold "at their value", the "value" of the means of consumption is itself profoundly modified.

Prices are, then, instruments of socialist planning and cannot be anything else in the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism. If you say instrument of planning you likewise say instrument for *determining the distribution of the national revenue between consumption and investment, an instrument for determining the distribution of revenues among the different classes and layers of the nation.* To leave the determination of this distribution to the "law of value", is to leave it in the final analysis to the "laws of the market", to the "law of supply and demand", that is, to economic automatism. And economic automatism would rapidly take us back to an economy of the semi-colonial type.

But to say that prices cannot be *determined* by the law of value, does not at all

signify that they can be *independent* of the latter. Society can never distribute more values that it has created without progressively destroying its accumulated wealth and impoverishing itself increasingly in the absolute sense of the term. The total sum of prices must therefore be equal to the total sum of value of the commodities produced (granting that there has been no monetary depreciation). The distribution of certain products—in goods or vouchers—below their value (subsidies!) automatically signifies a distribution of other products above their value. Without strict calculation of production costs; without book-keeping aided by an objective criterion; without a kind of double entry system that faithfully registers, for each product, alongside the price fixed by the state the real cost and the subsidy (or the tax), there is not only no possibility for genuine scientific planning, there is above all no stimulus for the fundamental economic dynamic of the epoch of transition—the dynamic that progressively elevates one new branch of industry after another to the point of rendering it "competitive" in relation to prices on the world market, up to the time socialism announces its next triumph when socialist industry as a whole operates with a productivity superior to that of the most advanced capitalist industry.

At that moment, the "law of value" could theoretically govern the dynamic of the workers state (or more exactly: the workers states as an international whole; because it appears excluded that this situation could be first obtained "in a single country"). But at the precise moment when it is on the point of triumphing, its reason for being disappears. The highest level of productivity attained under capitalism in all its branches cannot be surpassed without approaching such a level of abundance that commodity production withers away. In the workers state the "law of value" cannot channel investments except to the precise degree that it withers away and to the degree that along with it all the economic categories, products of a relative scarcity of material resources, likewise wither away.

December 1, 1963.

NOTES

(1) "Planned economy in the transitional period while founded on the law of value, violates it nevertheless at every step and establishes relations among the different economic branches, and between industry and agriculture in the first place, on the basis of unequal exchange. The state budget plays the role of a lever for forced accumulation and planned distribution. This role must be increased in accordance with the latest economic progress. Credit financing dominates relations between the coercive accumulation of the budget and the fluctuations of the market, insofar as the latter enter in..... If the domestic Soviet market is 'freed' and the monopoly of foreign trade suppressed—exchange between the city and the countryside will become much more equal, the accumulation of the village (I refer to the capitalist accumulation of the farmer, the 'kulak') will follow its course, and it will soon be seen that Marx's formulas likewise apply to agriculture. Once on this road, Russia would rapidly become a colony that would serve as the base for the industrial development of other countries." (Leon Trotsky: "Stalin Theoretician." Available in French in *Ecrits* 1928-40, Tome I, p. 106)

(2) Among others Novochilov, Kantorovitch and Menchinov. This question likewise underlies the famous debate on the possible use of profit as the sole criterion in carrying out the plan. In reality these economists are the spokesmen of the economic bureaucracy, who demand *increased rights for the directors of enterprises*—particularly the right to freely dispose of a part of the "indivisible funds" (fixed equipment).

(3) From 1924 to 1927, the Stalinist faction violently accused the Left Opposition—Preobrazhensky in particular—with wanting "to increase the prices of industrial products". Preobrazhensky had simply proposed that industrial products could be sold "above their value" to the village, which could have been tied in perfectly with a progressive lowering of the sales price in view of the rapid growth of the productivity of labour. But when the Stalinist faction made the turn to accelerated industrialization, it increased the prices of industrial consumers goods through extremely high indirect taxes. While in 1928, the tax on turnover was not above 17·9% of the real turnover of retail trade, it rose to 78.1% in 1932, and in 1936, the nominal turnover of this trade was 107 billion rubles, of which taxes accounted for 66 billion rubles and the real turnover only 41 billion! (L. H. Hubbard: *Trade and Distribution in the Soviet Union*).

(4) Thus Milentiji Popovic, in an article titled "Self-management and Planning": "On the other hand, in the sector of expanded social reproduction, in perfecting the system of investment on the basis of the new relations, our results are less conclusive, although the first steps have been taken in this direction. The establishment of non-administrative relations,

of economic relations, in this sphere, reverts quite simply to the establishment of credit-interest (!) relations, and to taking them as the basis.....

"One must first of all counteract the contradiction which arises from the fact that the resources serving social reproduction are deducted exclusively through administrative measures (taxes, duties, contributions) thus leaving free the organization of labour without the latter on the other hand becoming the 'proprietor'; the organization of labour evolves, in fact, into a unique system of credit in which these resources are at one and the same time 'theirs' and 'common' (article 11).....

It is possible to avoid, on the other hand, having subjective and political considerations as the only ones to be taken into consideration at the time of the adoption of the decisions concerning investments. It goes without saying that this method cannot and must not ever be pushed to its final conclusion. But a system can be constructed in which the political decisions will bear on the general orientation of the political economy while the distribution of the means destined for investment is carried out in accordance with the credit mechanism, according to financial and material (!) criteria fixed with more or less precision. In operating in this way the process of expanded reproduction is likewise depoliticalized". This 'depoliticalization' is not absolute. It is carried out to the degree that *bureaucratism must be deprived of its base in this sphere as in the others.*" (My emphasis)—*Current Questions of Socialism*, No. 70, July-Sept. 1963, pp. 67-8.

(5) This obviously does not apply to cases where raw materials, equipment goods and sometimes even means of consumption are centrally distributed, becoming veritable hotbeds for germinating corrupted buraucrats.

(6) "Only the co-ordination of these three elements, state planning, the market and Soviet democracy, can assure correct guidance of the economy of the epoch of transition and assure, not the removal of the imbalances in a few years (this is utopian), but their diminution and by that the simplification of the bases of the dictatorship of the proletariat until the time when new victories of the revolution will widen the arena of socialist planning and reconstruct its system." (Leon Trotsky: 'The Soviet Economy in Danger". Available in French in Tome I of *Ecrits* 1928-1940, p. 127).

(7) Certain Yugoslav authors take quite correct positions in this respect. See for example Dr. Radivoj Uvalic "While the open market can be widely utilized, it cannot be the sole or even the principle regulator of the socio-economic relations of a socialist country." And again: "The importance of the planned guidance of economic development under the conditions of socialism lies first of all in the possibility that is offered of considering profitability from the point of view of the economy as a whole and not from the point of view of each particular unit of the economy.....This is the case in all branches of high concentration of capital (?), such as the production of the means of production and raw materials, which could be never developed sufficiently on the basis of the accidental play of the market,' with the rate of profit as the sole stimulate.', (In: *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 6 pp 47 and 55).

(*Continued from Page* 16)

Where their ideas have begun to gain influence they have been the most violently hunted. A consequence of this organisational weakness, the lack of a broad working class base, is the favouring of centrifugal tendencies (sectarian or opportunist) inevitable during long years of isolation in any case. Observing the violence of the disputes now affecting the official Communist movement, despite all that exists is to check and restrain the bureaucratic leadership, one cannot be too surprised that the enormous world tensions should affect an organisation so numerically thin as the Fourth International. It is not a question of a weakness inherent in the programme, in the ideas, but of a weakness resulting from the conditions of existence of an organisation which has maintained and enriched revolutionary Marxism in the most extraordinary of epochs which humanity has shown.

Only a few years ago, the Stalinist myth still dazzled great multitudes and any number of intellectuals. In the minority which resisted this, how many lost hope, saw no end in sight to this nightmare in the life of the working class movement? The collapse took place in record time, although the after-effects are still with us. The present crisis of the Communist movement will not be short or smooth. But it will never be able to create a new myth. It will find its solution in the flowering and expansion of revolutionary Marxism. After twenty-five years of an existence which nothing has been able to destroy, it can be said with complete certitude that this crisis will find its organisational solution in the reconstruction of a mass revolutionary International which will recognise its origin in the founding of the Fourth International by Leon Trotsky in 1938.

October, 1963.

THE LESSON OF BRAZIL

By MANULO SARMIENTO

THE coup d'etat organized by the "gorillas" (reactionary militarists) in Brazil is the logical continuation of the coups d'etat which have occured in a number of countries in Latin America. This one, however, is of much greater significance than all those in Argentina, Ecquador, Peru, El Salvador, Guetemala and the Dominican Republic put together.

Goulart stood in the center of the Latin-American nationalist stream. His efforts to resolve the burning problems of his country were sincere—insofar as his nationalism permitted him to move. In addition Goulart was practically the only Latin-American leader who considered the Alliance for Progress to be something more than subject matter for speeches. The reforms he sought were all outlined in the Punta del Este Charter. These included a timid expropriation that did not involve more than 5% of the land in the hands of the latifundists, a timid control of rents in Rio de Janeiro, the expropriation of a few oil refineries, and the extension of the right to vote to illiterate citizens.

This touched off a violent reaction among the ruling classes, who supposedly support the Alliance for Progress. They unleashed a campaign in which they identified Goulart's moderate nationalism with "communism".

One of the outstanding features of the events in Brazil was the clarity with which it showed the depth of the revolutionary situation in Latin America and—the crying need for revolutionary Marxist leadership. By supporting Goulart as a nationalistic, reformist, progressive bourgeois, the leftist circles around the communist party led by Luis Carlos Prestes, proved how blind they were to the reality in Brazil and what criminal misleadership they offered. To place confidence in Goulart as a leader of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, or at least that sector that stood for the "structural reforms" needed by Brazil, signified playing into the hands of reaction.

The catastrophe in Brazil was prepared by illusions sowed among the masses by the petty-bourgeois nationalists and the Krushchevists. As they depicted it, the problem in Brazil was to struggle only against the "feudalistic landlords" who constitute the main obstacle to development. The way to fight imperialism, according to this school, is "democratically," "with a nationalist struggle", by no means deepening the struggle to an anticapitalist level, since this would alienate the national bourgeoisie, the important ally for this "stage".

One of the cries of Latin-American reformism is precisely to advocate this profoundly mistaken and anti-scientific concept of revolution in sealed off stages that is, first against "feudalism" and then—we will see.

In Brazil 2% of the population Controls 80% of the arable land. The struggle against this feudal structure, according to the reformists, thus involves the urban bourgeoisie as an extremely important element. The reformists placed all their cards on this nationalist, allegedly anti feudal bourgeoisie.

Even a brief indication of the facts will show how erroneous this view is. The development of Brazilian industry, above all in the south, in the Sao Paulo region, is due primarily to the dollars obtained from agricultural exports like sugar, cocoa, cotton, tropical fruits and above all coffee. In Brazil, a most common phenomenon is the urban industrialist who has his cattle ranch or coffee plantation.

This production of raw materials is directly linked to the world capitalist market. With the money received, the Brazilian landholder, in accordance with the times, was sooner or later compelled to begin investing as a *capitalist*.. In feudal days it was quite different, but as in the rest of Latin America, the landlord of today is not a feudal lord but the descendant of feudalists. A big sector of the Latin-American bourgeoisie developed out of this landed aristocracy.

Mariategui, Peru's great revolutionary Marxist theoretician, writes in his *Seven Essays*: "Thus it was that this caste (the landholding aristocracy), was forced by its economic role to assume in Peru the function of bourgeois class, although without losing its aristocratic colonial vices and prejudices."

The Brazilian landholder, like his kind in Peru, does not view his land as a feudal estate provided with serfs but rather as a capitalist enterprise producing for the market, although there are notorious similarities between the European feudalists and the American latifundists. Mariategui says again: "Along the coast, the latifundist has reached a more or less advanced level of capitalist technique, although exploitation still rests on feudal practices and principles. The organization of the production of cotton and sugar cane is in correspondence with the capitalist system. Considerable capital is involved and the land is worked with machines and modern methods."

The Brazilian plantation owner, on receiving his profit in dollars cannot accumulate them by simply storing them in his mattress. He has to invest. The enormous growth of exports and the consequent rate of import dollars is evident in the rise of the banks and gigantic financial enterprises of Sao Paulo. This, then, is the origin of the finance capital of that city.

In view of its own origin, its present relations and its position (the most important in the country) this bourgeoisie is not against the status quo in the countryside. On the contrary, the composition of this bourgeoisie its multiple links with landholding families as well as the control of the banks by the big exporters, show how utopian (and therefore criminal it is to advocate making a "revolutionary" alliance with it.

Brizzola and Goulart are representatives of a tiny nationalist bourgeois sector that wants to avoid a revolutionary storm through reforms. But their bourgeois lucidity is such that an abyss exists between what they preach and what they do. They appealed for "structural reforms," but when the time came to act, they saw that the only forces that were with them were the popular masses and that their own class, as a whole, had abandoned them.

Goulart's aim was to save the bourgeoisie from a socialist revolution, not to build a bridge towards it. In announcing his reforms and appealing to the masses, he remained highly conscious of his role as a bourgeois leader. He refused to follow the example of the sorcerer's apprentice. He understood perfectly that the forces unleashed by "structural reforms"— under circumstances requiring a mass struggle against his own class—could not be confined to reformist channels but would burst over everything, opening up the process of permanent revolution and paving the way for the establishment of a proletarian power. Before this perspective, Goulart preferred to look like a demogogue who was really only interested in maintaining himself in power. In that way he helped to keep the lock on the flood-gates of social revolution.

The Brazilian bourgeoisie ruled out even the smallest reforms proposed by Goulart, immediately cancelling the minor measures he had taken. Is any better indication needed of its real position in Brazil? Its resistence to reforms, even those completely within the limits of the Alliance for Progress, shows what a profoundly conservative force it is.

The role of imperialism, utterly in contradiction with the objectives outlined in its own Alliance for Progress, shows once again what a farce this programme is. What North American imperialism is interested in is the 1,500,000 dollars invested in Brazil.

The scandalous and shameful events in Brazil show that Trotsky's words in 1938 are as timely as when they were first uttered: "The crisis now facing humanity is the crisis of the leadership of the proletariat."

UNPUBLISHED ARTICLES OF MARX & ENGELS ON THE CONQUEST OF ALGERIA BY FRENCH IMPERIALISM

WE are publishing three articles by Marx and Engels concerning the conquest of Algeria by France. These formed part of articles devised by the two founders of Marxism for the NEW AMERICAN ENCYCLOPAEDIA, a popular encyclopaedia edited in the USA by Charles A. Dana and George Ripley, a work in which Marx and Engels collaborated and which was published in 1858.

In actual fact it was Marx alone who was commissioned to draw up a series of articles for Vols. 1—4 of the New American Encyclopaedia which appeared between 1858 and 1865. However, in order to help his friend and allow him to devote the maximum amount of time to the preparation of CAPITAL (Marx had just completed *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie* and was starting work on *Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie*, the introduction to which was to become in large measure the classical formulation of the theory of historical materialism), Engels took it upon himself to write several articles, in particular those dealing with military questions. In general he sent much of the material to Marx in order to assist with the articles contributed by the latter.

Although this work was quickly finished and was to some extent compiled by the examination of other reference books, numerous passages reflect the depth of thought of Marx and Engels and their unerring judgement on a large number of different subjects. The article on the Army written by Engels for Vol. 1 of the *New American Encyclopaedia* constitutes a thorough synopsis of a universal military history and of the influence that social and economic history exercised on the evolution of the military art.

The articles in the *New American Encyclopaedia* are unsigned. Identification of some of these has given rise to controversy, particularly in view of the fact that the compilers of the Encyclopaedia did not hesitate to modify, add or omit portions of the articles that they solicited, including those by Marx and Engels.

Controversy exists particularly with regard to the article *Abdel Kadr*. Maximilien Rubel (*Bibliographie des Oevres de Karl Marx*, Libraries Marcel Riviere et Cie., Paris 1956, p. 137) attributed it to Engels, and several letters exchanged between the two friends seem to confirm this paternity. However, the review *Voprossi Istorii KPSS* (Questions on the History of the CPSU, 1958 p. 192) contests this and attributes it to W. Hamfris.

The new edition of the Complete Works of Marx and Engels by the Institute of Marxism - Leninism — an edition faithfully followed by the Gesammelte Werke K. Marx—Fr. Engels in the German language by Dietz-Verlag in East Berlin—reproduces in Vol. 14, articles by Marx and Engels published in the *New American Encyclopaedia*. The article on Algeria is said to have appeared in Vol. 1 of the New American Encyclopaedia; the Bugeaud article in Vol. II. The Abd el Kadr article was not part of this edition.

Nevertheless we feel it is just as useful to reproduce here the *Abd el Kadr* article, especially as it expresses in an impressive way the admiration felt by the founders of Marxism for the Algerian resistance to the French conquest, admiration expressed moreover in the articles on *Algeria* and *Bugeaud de la Piconnerie*.

As far as the article on *Algeria* is concerned we are printing only the second part, relating to the French conquest. The first section, which deals with geography and Algerian history before the French conquest is clearly a composite from other encyclopaedias of this period, and contains comments on the "barbarous piracy and the "anarchistic demands" which hardly conform to the spirit with which Marx treated the conflict between the empires of Europe and those of Asia and Africa in past centuries.

ALGERIA

From the first occupation of Algeria by the French to the present time, the unhappy country has been the arena of unceasing bloodshed, rapine and violence. Each town, large and small, has been conquered in detail at an immense sacrifice of life. The Arab and Kabyle tribes, to whom the independence is precious, and hatred of foreign domination a principle dearer than life itself, have been crushed and broken by the terrible razzias in which dwellings and property are burnt and destroyed, standing crops cut down, and the miserable wretches who remain massacred, or subjected to all the horrors of lust and brutality. This barbarous system of warfare has been persisted in by the French against all the dictates of humanity, civilization, and Christianity. It is alleged in extenuation, that the Kabyles are ferocious, addicted to murder, torturing their prisoners, and that with savages lenity is a mistake.

The policy of a civilized government resorting to the *lex talionis* may well be doubted. And judging of the tree by its fruits, after an expenditure of probably $ 100,000,000 and a sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of lives, all that can be said of Algeria is that it is a school of war for French generals and soldiers, in which all the French officers who won laurels in the Crimean war received their military training and education.

As an attempt at colonisation, the numbers of Europeans compared with the natives show its present almost total failure; and this is one of the most fertile countries of the world, the ancient granary of Italy, within 20 hours of France, where security of life and property alike from military friends and savage enemies alone are wanted. Whether the failure is attributable to an inherent defect in the French character, which makes them unfit for emigration, or to injudicious local administration, it is not within our province to discuss.

Every important town, Constantine, Bona, Bougiah, Arzew, Mortaganem, Tlemcen, was carried by storm with all the accompanying horrors. The natives submitted with an ill grace to their Turkish rulers, who had at least the merit of being co-religionists; but they found no advantage in the so-called civilization of the new government, against which, beside, they had all the repugnance of religious fanaticism. Each governor came but to renew the severities of his predecessor; proclamations announced the most gracious intentions, but the army of occupation, the military movements, the terrible cruelties practised on both sides, all refuted the professions of peace and good-will.

In 1831, Baron Pichon had been appointed civil intendant, and he endeavoured to organise a system of civil administration which should move with the military government, but the check which his measures would have placed on the governor-in-chief offended Savary, duc de Rovigo, Napoleon's ancient minister of police, and on his representation Pichon was recalled. Under Savary, Algeria was made the exile of all those whose political or social misconduct had brought them under the lash of the law; and a foreign legion, the soldiers of which were forbidden to enter the cities, was introduced into Algeria.

In 1833, a petition was presented to the chamber of deputies, stating, "for 3 years we have suffered every possible act of injustice. Whenever complaints are preferred to the authorities, they are only answered by new atrocities, particularly directed against those by whom the complants were brought forward. On that account no one dares to move, for which reason there are no signatures to this petition. O my lords, we beseech you in the name of humanity, to relieve us from this crushing tyranny: to ransom us from the bonds of slavery. If the land is to be under martial law, if there is to be no civil power, we are undone; there will never be peace for us." This petition led to a commission of inquiry, the consequence of which was the establishment of a civil administration.

After the death of Savary, under the ad interim rule of Gen. Voirol, some measures had been commenced calculated to allay the irritation; the draining of swamps, the improvement of roads, the organisation of a native militia. This, however was abandoned on the return of Marshal Clausel, under whom a first and most unfortunate expedition against Constantine was under-

taken. His government was so unsatisfactory, that a petition praying inquiry into its abuses, signed by 54 leading persons connected with the province, was forwarded to Paris in 1836. This led eventually to Clausel's resignation. The whole of Louis Phillippe's reign was occupied in attempts at colonization, which only resulted in land-jobbing operations; in military colonization, which was useless, as the cultivators were not safe away from the guns of their own block-houses; in attempts to settle the eastern part of Algeria, and to drive out Abd-el-Kader from Oran and the west.

The fall of that restless and intrepid chieftan so far pacified the country, that the great tribe of the Hamianes Garabas sent in their submission at once. On the revolution of 1848, Gen. Cavaignac was appointed to supersede the Duc d'Aumale in the governorship of the province, and he and the Prince de Joinville, who was also in Algeria, then retired. But the republic did not seem more fortunate than the monarchy in the administration of this province. Several governors succeeded each other during its brief existence. Colonists were sent out to till the lands, but they died off, or quitted in disgust.

In 1849, Gen. Pelissier marched against several tribes, and the villages of the Beni Sillem; their crops and all accessible property were burnt and destroyed as usual, because they refused tribute. In Zaab, a fertile district on the edge of the desert, great excitement having arisen in consequence of the preaching of a marabout, an expedition was despatched against them 1,200 strong, which they succeeded in defeating; and it was found that the revolt was wide-spread, and fomented by secret associations called the Sidi Abderrahman, whose principal object was the extirpation of the French. The rebels were not put down until an expedition under Generals Canrobert and Herbillon had been sent against them; and the seige of Zoatcha, an Arab town, proved that the natives had neither lost courage nor contracted affection for their invaders. The town resisted the efforts of the besiegers for 51 days, and was taken by storm at least. Little Kabylia did not give in its surrender till 1951, when Gen. St. Arnaud subdued it, and thereby established a line of communication between Philippeville and Constantine.

The French bulletins and French papers abound in statements of the peace and prosperity of Algeria. These are, however, a tribute to national vanity. The country is even now as unsettled in the interior as ever. The French supremacy is perfectly illusory, except on the coast and near the towns. The tribes still assert their independence and detestation of the French regime, and the atrocious system of razzias has not been abandoned; for in the year 1857 a successful razzia was made by Marshal Randon on the villages and dwelling-places of the hitherto unsubdued Kabyles, in order to add their territory to the French dominions. The natives are still ruled with a rod of iron, and continual outbreaks show the uncertain tenure of the French occupation, and the hollowness of peace maintained by such means. Indeed, a trial which took place at Oran in August, 1857, in which Captain Doineau, the head of the *Bureau Arabe*, was proved guilty of murdering a prominent and wealthy native, revealed a habitual exercise of the most cruel and despotic power on the part of the French officials, even of subordinate rank, which justly attracted the attention of the world.

At present, the government is divided into the three provinces of Constantine on the east, Algeria in the centre, and Oran in the west. The country is under the control of a governor-general, who is also commander-in-chief, assisted by a secretary and civil intendant, and a council composed of the director of the interior, the naval commandant, the military intendant, and attorney-general, whose business is to confirm the acts of the governor. The *Conseil des contentieux* at Algeria takes cognizance of civil and criminal offences. The provinces where a civil administration has been organised have mayors, justices, and commissioners of police. The native tribes living under the Mohammedan religion still have their cadis: but between them a system of arbitration has been established, which they are said to prefer, and an officer (*L' avocat des Arabes*) is especially charged with the duty of defending Arab interests before the French tribunals. Since the French occupation, it is stated that commerce has considerably increased. The imports are valued at about $ 22,000,000, the exports $ 3,000,000. The imports are cotton, woolen, and silk goods, grain and flour,

lime, and refined sugar the exports are rough coral, skins, wheat, oil, and wool, with other small matters.

* * *

ABD EL KADER

Abd el Kader, an emir of the Bedouin tribe of Hashem Garabo, in the province of Oran, and western part of Algeria, was descended from an ancient family of Marabouts, that could trace its origin as far back as the caliphs of the Fatimite dynasty. His name at full length is Sidi el Hadji Abd el Kader Oulid Mahiddeen. He was born in 1807 near Mascara, and educated at a college for the study of theology and jurisprudence. His father, Mahiddeen, emir or prince of Mascara, enjoyed in his lifetime the highest repute for wisdom and sanctity, to such a degree indeed, that his house was an asylum for debtors and criminals. His influence gave rise to apprehensions in the Turkish governor of Oran, that he was projecting the subversion of the Turkish rule. To avoid the enmity of the bey, Mahiddeen made a pilgrimage to Mecca. He died in 1834, of poison administered to him by Ben Moossa, chief of the Moors of Tlemcen.

Abd el Kader had accompanied his father to Mecca, and thereby gained his title of El Hadji (the Holy). He is said to have early manifested powers far beyond his age; he read and wrote Arabic with facility, and during his pilgrimage taught himself Italian, or more probably the lingua Franca. In 1827 he visited Egypt, and spent some time in the court of Mehemet Ali, studying the reforms and the new system of that astute politician. His noble and prepossessing exterior, with his affability and simplicity of manners, won the affections of his countrymen, while the purity of his morals ensured their respect and esteem. He was the most accomplished of Arab cavaliers, a perfect man at arms, and the bravest of the brave.

The French occupation of Algeria met with little effective opposition from the Turks, but it aroused the fierce, independent spirit of the native tribes, and after shedding rivers of blood, and spending millions of treasure, the French held little more of the soil than their own garrisons. In 1831 Abd el Kader, the most formidable of their opponents, endeavoured to consolidate the tribes into an organised system of resistance. His elder brother had already fallen in conflict with the French, when he began to harass them at the head of his own and the neighbouring tribes, avoiding any thing like an engagement, and satisfied with surprising the outposts and cutting off convoys.

In the spring of 1932, General Boyer, commandant of Oran, made an ineffectual demonstration against Tlemcen, Abd el Kader's stronghold. The emir was encouraged by this to commence more decided operations, and at the head of 5,000 Bedouins he ravaged the province of Oran, and even menaced the town itself, summoning the French to evacuate the territory. The courage and daring he showed in this expedition, though unattended by any practical result, won him the admiration of the Arabs, and no less than thirty-two of the tribes immediately declared for him, and he was elected chief of the believers in December 1832, when only 23 years of age. He was thus placed at the head of 12,000 warriors, with whom he blocked the city and intercepted all the communications.

In April 1833, General Desmichels, the successor of Boyer, made a sortie and cut to pieces a number of the Garabats. On learning this disaster, he again advanced upon Oran, but without achieving any success; and on the 7th of May the French carried by assault the town of Arzew, one of the posts which enabled the Arab chief to keep up a communication by sea. These reverses did not, however, affect Abd el Kader's reputation with his countrymen. He garrisoned Tlemcen, and advanced against Mostaganem, a town in the possession of the Turks to the north-east of Arzew; but the French anticipated his movements, and seized Mosataganem.

General Desmichels now endeavoured to undermine Abd el Kader's power, and to induce the native tribes to acknowledge the supremacy of France. He succeeded in detaching the Smailas from Abd el Kader, a defection for which the chieftan afterwards took full vengeance. In December 1833, and January 1934, Abd el Kader,

chiefly through the desertion of his followers met with serious reverses, and was compelled to conclude peace with the French. He stipulated to exchange prisoners and to protect all European travellers and residents; while the French on their part acknowledge him as an independent prince, and engaged to assist him in maintaining his authority over his own tribes, while he, on the other hand, was not to interfere with those under French protection. Abd el Kader now occupied himself in the restoration of his influence among the tribes, which had been somewhat shaken by this ill success; he also endeavoured to introduce European discipline and tactics among his followers.

A powerful desert chief, Moosa el Sherif, was daring enough to measure arms with Abd el Kader, of whose power he was jealous. The emir seized upon his hostilities as a pretence for crossing the Sheliff, the boundary assigned him by the treaty, and soon chastised the insolence of his rival. This expedition confirmed his reputation, and several desert tribes gave in their allegiance, and acknowledged him as their sultan. He made use of his extended power to establish the security of public travelling, to reform the gross abuses of the courts of justice, and to assure the rights of property. In the hope of recruiting his finances, he granted to a Jew named Durand a monopoly of trade and commerce in his dominions, by which he gained an immediate revenue, and interfered with the supplies of the French settlers and garrisons.

The French government now took alarm, and recalling Desmichels, whose want of energy they disapproved, appointed General Trezel commandant of Oran, in his stead. An excuse for hostilities was not long wanting. In 1835 the chiefs of the Smailas and of the Douars, who had placed themselves under French protection, besought Trezel's interference against Abd el Kader, who had insisted upon their renouncing the French alliance. General Trezel advanced with his troops towards Mascara. On his march he was surprised by Abd el Kader in the defile of Muley Ismael, and compelled to retire upon Arzew, having lost one gun, his baggage, and nearly 600 killed and wounded. Abd el Kader addressed a justificatory epistle to Count d'Erlon, governor of Algeria, in which he threw all the blame of the recent affair upon General Trezel. At the same time he sent messengers to all the tribes, pointing out the faithlessness and insolence of the French, and calling on them to rally round his standard for mutual protection.

Marshal Clausel was now sent to Algiers as governor, with instructions to crush Abd el Kader at one blow; who, on his part fully alive to all that was going on, was not slow to meet his enemies. He promulgated the most terrible denunciations against all who should be found siding with the French or supplying them with provisions; the consequence of which was, that the French garrisons and outposts were almost starved, and could not obtain food except by forays, in which friend and foe were treated alike. The emir mustered upwards of 50,000 men, and by his manoeuvres succeeded in postponing the French advance until the wet season. It was not until November that the French arrived at Oran on their march against Mascara. Mostacanem and Arzew were strongly garrisoned, and Clausel advanced into the enemy's country with 13,000 men. After several days of constant fighting, he succeeded in reaching Mascara, on the 6th of December, and avenged himself on Abd el Kader by reducing it to a heap of ruins. This wretched exploit achieved, the French were obliged to retire again.

They next took Tlemcen in January 1836, and garrisoned, it and then returned to Oran. But although they defeated the Kabyles in a battle, the indefatigable emir harassed their retreat, which they only effected after severe losses. This murderous and savage mode of warfare, which was nothing better than a system of forays, was without practical result to the French. As soon as the army had retired, the inhabitants of Tlemcen rose upon the French garrison, their convoys were cut off, and General d'Arlanges, the second in command, was ordered to establish a fortified camp on the Tafna, for the purpose of covering Tlemcen and keeping open the communications between that post and the districts favourable to the French. He advanced with 3,000 men by land, while another division of 4,000, was despatched by sea. When about five miles from Tlemcen, he was attacked by Abd el Kader and 10,000

Arabs, and driven back on his fortified camp, where he was shut up and compelled to remain until relieved by Bugeaud at the head of 4,000 men.

Abd el Kader disseminated reports of the ruin of the French cause, and by these means roused the Arab tribes to such a pitch of fanaticism, that they rose en masse against their detested invaders. General Bugeaud now assumed the command. His uncompromising character infused new spirit into the French army. Abd el Kader was repulsed, and the garrison of Tlemcen, which was on the brink of starvation, relieved. Abd el Kader now threatened the French fortified camp on the Tafna, and Bugeaud accepting his challenge, quitted his entrenchments, and totally defeated him on the 6th of July 1936. This defeat would have been, however, insufficient to check the intrepid Arab, had not a revolt of the powerful tribe of the Flita occurred at the same time, to chastise whom he was obliged to retire.

Abd el Kader was soon again in arms, and Clausel, who was fully occupied at Constantine, sent Bugeaud a second time into the province of Oran in 1837 at the head of 12,000 men. The French commander issued proclamations, announcing his intention to march into the Arab districts at the head of such a force as must crush all resistance, but at the same time offered peace to those tribes which should come in and make their submission. These proclamations had such an effect that Abd el Kader was compelled to sue for peace; and a personal conference having been held between himself and Bugeaud, an armistice was concluded on the 7th of May 1837, by which he acknowledged the sovereignty of France, and agreed to surrender the province of Oran and to confine himself to Koleah, Medeah, and Tlemcen.

BUGEAUD DE LA PICONNERIE

Thomas Robert, duc d'Isly, marshal of France, born at Limoges in October 1784, died in Paris, June 10, 1849. He entered the French army as a private in 1804, became a corporal during the campaign of 1805, served as a sub-lieutenant in the campaign of Prussia and Poland (1806—7), was present in 1811 as major, at the seiges of Lerida, Tortosa, and Tarragona, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel after the battle of Ordal, in Catalonia.

After the first return of the Bourbons, Col. Bugeaud celebrated the white lily in some doggerel rhymes; but these poetical effusions being passed by rather contemptuously, he again embraced, during the Hundred Days, the party of Napoleon, who sent him to the army of the Alps, at the head of the 14th regiment of the line. On the second return of the Bourbons he retired to Excideuil, to the estate of his father. At the time of the invasion of Spain by the duke of Angouleme he offered his sword to the Bourbons, but the offer being declined, he turned liberal, and joined the movement which finally led to the revolution of 1830. He was chosen as a member of the chamber of deputies in 1831, and made a major-general by Louis Philippe. Appointed governor of the citadel of Blaye in 1833, he had the duchess of Berry under his charge, but earned no honour from the manner in which he discharged his mission, and became afterward known by the name of the "ex-goaler of Blaye".

During the debates of the chamber of deputies on Jan. 16, 1834, M. Larabit complaining of Soult's military dictatorship, and Bugeaud's interrupting him with the words, "Obedience is the soldier's first duty" another deputy, M. Du long, pungently asked, "what, if ordered to become a goaler?' This incident led to a duel between Bugeau and Dulong, in which the latter was shot. The consequent exasperation of the Parisians was still heightened by his co-operation in suppressing the Paris insurrection of April 13 and 14, 1834. The forces destined to suppress that insurrection were divided in to 3 brigades, one of which Bugeaud comanded. In the rue Transnonain a handful of enthusiasts who still held a barricade on the morning of the 14th, when the serious part of the affair was over, were cruelly slaughtered by an overwhelming, force. Although this spot lay without the circumscription made over to Bugeaud's brigade, and he, therefore, had not participated in the massacre, the hatred of the people nailed his name to the deed, and despite all declarations to the contrary, persisted in stigmatising him as the "man of the rue Transnonain".

Sent, June 16, 1836, to Algeria, Gen. Bugeaud became invested with a commanding position in the province of Oran, almost independent of the governor-general. Ordered

to fight Abd el Kader, and to subdue him by the display of an imposing army, he concluded the treaty of Tafna, allowing the opportunity for military operations to slip away, and placing his army in a critical state before it had begun to act. Bugeaud fought several battles previous to this treaty. A secret article, not reduced to writing, stipulated that 30,000 boojoos (about $ 12,000) should be paid to gen. Bugeaud. Called back to France, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and appointed grand officer of the legion of honour. When the secret clause of the treaty of the Tofnaozzed out, Louis Philippe authorized Bugeaud to expend the money on certain public roads, thus to increase his popularity among his electors and secure his seat in the chamber of deputies.

At the commencement of 1841 he was named governor-general of Algeria, and with his administration the policy of France in Algeria underwent a complete change. He was the first governor-general who had an army adequate to its task placed under his command, who exerted an absolute authority over the generals second in command, who kept his post long enough to act up to a plan needing years for its execution. The battle of Isly (Aug. 14, 1844), in which he vanquished the army of the emperor of Morocco with vastly inferior forces, owed its success to his taking the Mussulmans by surprise, without any previous delclaration of war, and when negotiations were on the eve of being concluded. Already raised to the dignity of a Marshal of France, July 17, 1843 Bugeaud was now created duke of Isly.

Abd el Kader having, after his return to France, again collected an army. he was sent back to Algeria, where he promptly crushed the Arabian revolt. In consequence of differences between him and Guizot, occasioned by his expedition into Kabylia, which he had undertaken against ministerial orders, he was replaced by the duke of Aumale, and, according to Guizot's expression, "enabled to come and enjoy his glory in France." During the night of Feb. 22-23, 1848, he was, on the secret advice of Guizot, ordered into the presence of Louis Philippe, who conferred upon him the supreme command of the whole armed force—the line as well as the national guard. At noon of the 23rd, followed by Gens. Rulhieres, Bedeau, Lamoriciere, De Salles, St. Arnaud, and others, he proceeded to the general staff at the Tuileries, there to be solemnly invested with the supreme command by the duke of Nemours. He reminded the officers present that he who was about to lead them against the Paris revolutionists "had never been beaten neither on the battle-field nor in insurrections," and for this time promised to make short work of the "rebel rabble".

Meantime, the news of his nomination contributed much to give matters a decisive turn. The national guard, still more incensed by his appointment as supreme commander, broke out in the cry of "Down with Bugeaud! "Down with the man of the rue Transnonain!" and positively declared that they would not obey his orders. Frightened by this demonstration, Louis Philippe withdrew his orders, and spent the 23rd in vain negotiations. On Feb. 24, alone of Louis Philippe's council, Bugeaud still urged war to the knife; but the king already considered the sacrifice of the marshal as a means to make his own peace with the national guard. The command was consequently placed in other hands, and Bugeaud dismissed. Two days later he placed, but in vain, his sword at the command of the provisional government.

When Louis Napoleon became president he conferred the command-in-chief of the army of the Alps upon Bugeaud, who was also elected by the department of Charante-Inferieure as representative in the national assembly. He published several literary productions, which treat chiefly of Algeria. In Aug. 1852, a monument was erected to him in Algiers, and also one in his native town.

RESOLUTIONS

GREETINGS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ZANZIBAR

THE United Secretariat of the Fourth International sent the following message to President Abeid Karume, Vice-President Abdullah Kassim Hanga and Foreign Minister Mohamed Babu of the People's Republic of Zanzibar.

"The Fourth International hails the victory of the social revolution in Zanzibar which overthrew the neo-colonialist regime of Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdulla, who was supported by the compradore bourgeois descendants of slave dealers.

"The Fourth International greets the establishment of the People's Republic of Zanzibar, an outpost of social revolution in East Africa, which is bound to exercise a profound influence through out Black Africa, encouraging all the forces inclined to convert the struggle for national independence into a struggle for socialist revolution.

"The Fourth International appeals to workers and oppressed peoples everywhere to help defend the People's Republic of Zanzibar against any attempt at military intervention, economic blockade or diplomatic pressure, particularly by British or US imperialism and the United Nations."

27th January 1964

* * *

USE OF TROOPS IN EAST AFRICA

The following protest was sent by the US of the Fourth International to the British Prime Minister Sir Alex Douglas Home.

"The Fourth International protests in the sharpest way against the use of British troops in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. The claim is that the troops were needed to put down a mutiny and that it is "legal" because invitations were issued by Kenyatta, Nyere and Obote. These are shameful pretexts like the pretext used by Belgian imperialism to justify military intervention in the Congo in July 1960.

"The real aim of the armed intervention is to initimidate the popular masses of these countries, who have been encouraged by the victory of the Zanzibar revolution, and to prevent them from unleashing a vast movement to break definitively with neo-colonialism and imperialism. The imperialist troops went into action the same day a general strike was scheduled in Dar-es-Salam (January 25). One of the aims of the military intervention was to block this strike.

"The Fourth International appeals to the British Labour movement to manifest its disapproval of this neo-colonialist intervention and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all British troops from East Africa.

"The Fourth International is convinced that the masses of these countries—with whom it expresses fraternal solidarity—having seen in action the vacillating or outright traitorous rule of Kenyatta, Nyere and Obote, will turn boldly down the road of the permanent revolution in the example shown most recently by the peoples of Cuba, Algeria and Zanzibar."

27th January 1964.

* * *

FRENCH RECOGNITION OF CHINA

The US of the Fourth International issued the following statement on the recognition of People's China hy France.

The US of the Fourth International issued the following statement on the recognition of People's China by France.

"The Fourth International calls attention to the great significance of the diplomatic recognition won by the People's Republic

of China from the French government, whatever de Gaulle's motives may have been.

"France's diplomatic move testifies to the growing stature of China as a result of the transformations following the victory of the socialist revolution. France's resumption of relations under present conditions constitutes a decisive breakthrough in the imperialist diplomatic blockade which has been maintained against the People's Republic of China since 1950. It will serve as the point of departure for widening economic relations between China and the capitalist world at a time when trade between China and other workers' states has dropped dangerously low.

"China's diplomatic victory also helps in an indirect way to further counteract the slanders which were spread in connection with the Sino-Soviet conflict concerning the alleged 'belligerency' of the Chinese leadership.

"It also testifies to the progress registered by the colonial revolution in the world as a whole.

"But this big diplomatic gain, which is a victory primarily at the expense of American Imperialism, should not be taken as any indication of any weakening of the Atlantic coalition or any abandonment by the imperialists of their plots and designs against the colonial revolution, above all in those areas where it is developing toward a socialist revolution.

"It by no means justifies a policy of so-called 'peaceful coexistence' aiming at maintenance of the status quo on a world scale. For the mass movement of the workers, peasants and oppressed peoples. above all in the colonial countries, China's great gain in the diplomatic arena will serve as a stimulus in revolutionary struggles pointing towards the overthrow of capitalism on a world scale.

"The diplomatic victory implies no relaxation of the struggle against bourgeois governments every where, above all the Gaullist government which finally decided to grant recognition to China."

27th January 1964.

THE CHARACTER OF THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT

The US of the Fourth International issued the following statement, summarizing the views of the world Trotskyist movement on the character of the Algerian government.

"For some time the course of the new regime in Algeria has shown that it is a "Workers and Peasants Government" of the kind considered by the Communist International in its early days as likely to appear, and referred to in the Transitional Programme of the Fourth International, as a possible forerunner of a workers state.

"Such a government is characterized by the displacement of the bourgeoisie in political power, the transfer of armed power from the bourgeoisie to the popular masses, and the initiation of far-reaching measures in property relations. The logical outcome of such a course is the establishment of a workers' state; but, without a revolutionary Marxist party, this is not guaranteed. In the early days of the Communist International it was held to be excluded in the absence of a Marxist party. Experience has shown, however, that this conclusion must be modified in the colonial world due to the extreme decay of capitalism and the effect of the existence of the Soviet Union and a series of workers states in the world today.

"An essentially bourgeois state apparatus was bequeathed to Algeria. A crisis in the leadership of the FLN came to a head on July 1 1962, ending after a few days in the establishment of a de facto coalition government in which Ferhat Abbas and Ben Bella represented the two opposing wings of neo-colonialism and popular revolution. The struggle between these two tendencies within the coalition ended in the reinforcement of the Ben Bella wing, the promulgation of the decrees of March 1963 and the successful ousting of Khider, Ferhat Abbas and other bourgeois leaders although some rightist elements still remain in the government. These changes marked the end of the coalition and the establishment of a workers and peasants government.

"As is characteristic of a workers and peasants government of this kind, the Algerian government has not followed a consistent course. Its general direction, however, has been in opposition to imperialism, to the old colonial structure, to neo-colonialism and to bureaucratism. It has reacted with firmness to the initiatives of would-be new bourgeois layers, including armed counter-revolution. Its subjective aims have been repeatedly declared to be the construction of socialism. At the same time its consciousness is limited by its lack of Marxist training and background.

"The question that remains to be answered is whether this government can establish a workers' state. The movement in this direction is evident and bears many resemblances to the Cuban pattern. A profound agrarian reform has already been carried out, marked by virtual nationalization of the most important areas of arable land. Deep inroads have been made into the old ownership relations in the industrial sector with the establishment of a public and state controlled sector. Yet to be undertaken are the expropriation of the key oil and mineral sector, the banks and insurance companies, establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade and the inauguration of effective counter measures to the monetary, financial and commercial activities of foreign imperialism.

"Among the most heartening signs in Algeria are; (1) in foreign policy the establishment of friendly relations with Cuba China, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and other workers states with the possibility this opens up for substantial aid from these sources; (2) the active attitude of the government toward the development of the colonial revolution in such areas as Angola and South Africa; (3) within Algeria the establishment of the institution of "self-management". "Self-management" with its already demonstrated importance for the development of workers' and peasants' democracy offers the brightest opening for the establishment of the institutions of a workers' state.

"As a whole, Algeria, as we have noted many times, has entered a process of permanent revolution of highly transitional character in which all the basic economic, social and political structures are being shaken up and given new forms. This process is certain to continue. It will be greatly facilitated and strengthened if one of the main problems now on the agenda—the organization of a mass party on a revolutionary Marxist programme—is successfully solved.

"The appearance of a workers' and peasants' government in Algeria is concrete evidence of the depth of the revolutionary process occurring there. It is of historic importance not only for Algeria and North Africa but for the whole African continent and the rest of the world.

17th February 1964.

* * *

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION

The US of the Fourth International issued the following statement indicating its position on the recent developments in the movement seeking Angolan independence.

"Since the summer of 1963, radical changes have occurred in the national revolutionary movement of the Angolan people against Portuguese imperialism.

"On the one hand the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has become badly split and weakened, the majority of its members, under the initiative of Viriato Da Cruz, leader of the radical left wing, having broken with Dr. Agostinho Neto who united with dissident neo-colonialist and feudal organizations.

"On the other hand the Angolan National Liberation Front (FLNA) has been officially recognized by the organization of African Unity (QUA) as the only really combat organization and it has been reinforced by the entrance of numerous former members of the MPLA. The Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile (GRAE) set up by the FLNA has been given "de jure" recognition by nine independent states of Africa including Algeria.

"At present the MPLA forces remaining in emigration are virtually cut off from the Angolan underground; whereas the guerilla forces under the leadership of the FLNA are undertaking, after a lull, increasingly broad military action against colonialism, not only in the bokongo region, but also in other districts of Angola. strengthening the position of the Revolutionary Government among the Angolan Tashokwes, Luenas, Umbundus, Bailundos and Kimbundus, thereby overcoming in practice the drawback of Bokongo preponderance within the Union of the People of Angola (UPA) out of which the present movement evolved. This national expansion has been accompanied by a vigorous campaign of the FLNA against tribalism.

"The promise of help from the African states has not materialized on the necessary scale due to pressure from neo-colonialist and openly imperialist forces. Thus the FLNA leadership is being forced to turn more more and more towards revolutionary sources for aid, including, the workers states, above all China. That this leadership has given indications of being willing to turn in this direction is an encouraging sign.

"On the programmatic level, the FLNA is, of course, far from the perspective of revolutionary socialism and its leadership is not immune to neo-colonialism and the pressure of imperialism. However, once a dynamic mass movement is launched, it cannot remain static. In the very process of the struggle, the great programmatic question will inevitably come to the fore. These include the necessity for constructing a revolutionary-socialist party, the need for a revolutionary land reform, nationalisation of the major means of production, a clear break with world imperialism and the establishment of fraternal relations with workers' states.

"The most effective way in which revolutionary marxists can help the Angolan freedom fighters find their way to the programme of socialism is to participate actively in the struggles led by the FLNA, to help them obtain material support in fighting against Portuguese imperialism, and to back them in resisting every neo-colonialist maneuver, above all those emanating from American imperialism."

17*th February* 1964

HANDS OFF GABON

The US of the Fourth International issued the following press release on the use of French troops in Gabon.

"De Gaulle's intervention in the internal affairs of Gabon through the use of French troops in Libreville yesterday is brazen revival of gunboat diplomacy.

"The swiftness with which French imperialism reacted to the attempt in Gabon at a military coup d' etat, casts a most revealing light on the servile character of the government of Leon Mba. This is obviously a puppet government entrusted with preserving French exploitation of Gabon's rich mineral and forest wealth at the expense of the Gabonese people.

As justification for this brazen intervention in the internal affairs of a country granted its independence in 1960, reference is made to the recent British intervention in the internal affairs of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya where imperialist troops were employed to bolster neo-colonialist governments there.

"The question that is really raised, however, is whether the use of French troops in Gabon following the use of British troops in East Africa, does not signify a new phase of imperialist domination of Africa—the resumption of naked use of force on an increased scale.

"Another grave question is implied—if France and Britain can get away with it in Africa, won't this encourage the US to try it in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America?

"Freedom fighters in Africa and throughout the world must consider the ominous implications of these recent imperialist power plays, and step up their own struggles accordingly.

"Get the imperialist troops out of Gabon, Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya!

"Hands off the newly independent countries!"

20*th February* 1964

F. I. DENOUNCES RABAT VERDICT

The US of the Fourth International issued the following statement on the Rabat trial in Morocco.

* * *

"The Fourth International denounces with indignation the scandalous verdict in the Rabat trial against the militants of the vanguard belonging to the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires of Morocco.

"The eleven death penalties, which included Mohammed Basri. Moumen Diouri, Omer Ben Jelloun, imprisoned since last July, and Ben Barka, who was already condemned to death for expressing solidarity with the Algerian revolution, constitutes a new stage in the only real plot involved in this case—the plot of the neo-colonialist Moroccan authorities against the movement which has conducted the struggle in recent years against French imperialism and sought to win genuine economic and political independence for the Moroccan masses.

"The Rabat trial has placed a glaring light on the plot masterminded by the Moroccan monarchy following its stinging electoral defeat. The defense exposed the torture practiced by the police on the defendants, the violations of judicial procedures, and especially the denial of the right of defense to bring in French attorneys in accordance with Moroccan law. After some weeks of battling these deliberate, illegal procedures of the court, the lawyers and the defendants ceased to participate in what had become a mockery of justice.

"Together with the odious death sentences, the court made a repugnant effort to divide the defendants.

"The Fourth International, in sending its greetings to the defendants, appeals to the world workers' movement and the liberation movements of the colonial peoples to indicate their feelings about the scandalous Rabat verdict and help save the lives and win the release of those militants of the Moroccan vanguard."

15th March 1964

US TROOPS IN VIETNAM!

The US of the Fourth International issued the following statement regarding the use of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

* * *

"In recent weeks the Imperialist rulers of the U.S. have been threatening to extend their undeclared war in South Vietnam into North Vietnam . At the moment they have somewhat muted their beligerent declarations about bombing Hanoi. Since McNamara's return to Washington the talk has been reduced to mounting guerrilla forays into North Vietnam and to increasing the already colossal flow of weapons and dollars to keep the rotten Saigon regime in power.

"The danger thus remains that U.S. intervention in South Vietnam can "escalate" at any time. This in turn would almost surely bring in China and the Soviet Union.

"The basic fact in South Vietnam is that U.S. imperialism and the reactionary puppets it is maintaining there face a military debacle. In the same region where Imperialist France suffered a historic defeat a decade ago, the still mightier power of imperialist America now faces a still more spectacular catastrophe at the hands of an insurgent people seeking national liberation and socialism.

"What power the colonial revolution is revealing! With a courage that will live forever in the memory of mankind, the Vietnamese people are following the example of the Chinese, the Cubans and the Algerians and, almost barehanded, are seizing the very arms brought to suppress them in order to turn them against their would-be conquerors.

"This lesson will ring throughout the rest of the colonial world with thousand fold force, bringing fresh tens of millions to their feet in rebellion against the schemes of the new imperialist combination that was created on the ashes of World War 11.

"And inside the United States itself, big sectors of the population, particularly among the workers, farmers and minorities, will recall the lessons of Korea and speak out more insistently against the insane policy

of plunging American forces into military adventures in foreign lands, The same sectors that created an irresistible pressure at the end of World War II to bring the G.I.'s home, will gain in courage, in demanding that the American troops be withdrawn from Vietnam.

"The whole world will back them in three slogans that are the most realistic in the situation.

"Hands off Vietnam'!

"Let the Vietnamese People determine their own fate!

"Get U.S. Troops out of Vietnam!"

15*th March* 1964

GREETINGS TO FLN CONGRESS.

To the Congress of the Front de Liberation Nationale, Algiers.

Brothers, Comrades,

The Fourth International sends you its warmest greetings. Through you it salutes the Algerian Revolution, its magnificient example, its militants and its glorious martyrs. The Fourth International wishes the most complete success to the work of your congress. which will constitute a memorable date in the construction of Socialist Algeria.

Long live the Algerian Revolution!

Long live socialist Algeria !

PIERRE FRANK
For the United Secretariat
of the Fourth International

(*Continued from Page* 2)

What has happened in the course of the last months, particularly, in Africa, is a further confirmation in a new arena of the validity of the theory of the permanent revolution in its essential aspects. The colonial peoples who are shaking loose from the ancient yoke of imperialism, if they wish to really consolidate their victory and begin to resolve the enormous tasks which face them, must necessarily develop their revolution in an uninterrupted, *permanent* manner, without stopping artificially at a "democratic national", "democratic bourgeois" stage, which in the case of Africa appears particularly unreal. And, as soon as they have chosen, Like Algeria, the socialist road, they must go forward without respite, constantly enlarging their "invasions" of socialist ground.

In such a context the revolutionary Marxists of the Fourth International are able to much more than any other current of the international working-class movement, to grasp the essential tendencies of developments, to understand the whole significance and the real stake in the struggles which break out, and consequently to bring to these struggles a major contribution.

(*Continued from Page* 13)

> outside assistance playing only a supporting role. In any case, the international division of labour and the co-operation of production must not be used as a pretext for opposing the principle of counting on one's own strength. The essence of the controversy does not lie there. Those who speak against us, do not really adhere to internationalism and do not wish sincerely to increase the power of the socialist camp as a whole through an international division of labour and co-operation in production answering the needs of every country and bringing mutual advantage. They only use them as a seductive cover for their real manner of dealing, which is to seek advantage to the detriment of others, a manner of dealing which is characteristic of relations between capitalist countries, in order to impede the efforts made by the economically underdeveloped socialist countries to develop an independent national economy, and to make these countries economically dependent on them and bring them under their political control." (Hsinhua, 18 Sept. 1963).

SURIYA BOOKSHOP

List of Books (June 1964)

1.	Permanent Revolution *by Leon Trotsky*	Rs.	6 00
2.	Guerilla Warfare *by Guevara*		17 00
3.	Cuba—an Anatomy of a Revolution *by Huberman and Sweezy*		9 00
4.	M—26 The Biography of a Revo. *by Robert Taper*		22 50
5.	Stalin School of Falsification *by Leon Trotsky*		12 00
6.	Third International after Lenin *by Leon Trotsky*		12 00
7.	British Guiana *by Ved Prakash Vatuk*		1 85
8.	The First Ten Years of American Communism *by J. P. Canon*		24 00
9.	Foundations of Christianity *by Karl Kaulsky*		10 00
10.	Essential Trotsky		6 80
11.	Collected works of Lenin—Vol. 1—14 & 38		3 00
12.	The Struggle for a Proletarian Party *by J.P.C.*		12 00
13.	A History of Cuba *by Philip S. Foner* Vol. 1.		10 00
14.	Essence of Christianity *by Fuerbach*		10 00
15.	My Life *by Leon Trotsky*		12 50
16.	Castro's Revolution *by Draper*		9 00
17.	Arms and Politics in Latin America *by E. Lieuwen*		12 50
18.	90 miles from Home *by Warren Miller*		3 50
19.	Souls of Black Folk *by W. E. B. Dubois*		4 00
20.	Negroes on the March *by Daniel Guerin*		4 00
21.	The American Revolution *by James Boggs*		4 75
22.	American Labour in Midpassage *by Bert Cochren*		6 25
23.	Capitalism Yesterday and Today *by Maurice Dobb*		4 75
24.	Wither Latin America *by Carlos Fuentes and others*		7 50
25.	American Radicals, some problems and personalities *by Harvey Goldberg*		7 25
26.	Man's Worldly Goods *by Leo Huberman*		9 00
27.	Alienation of Modern Man *by Fritz Pappenheim*		8 75
28.	The Present as History *by Paul M. Sweezy*		17 50
29.	Caste, Class and Race *by Oiver C. Cox*		36 00
30.	The Empire of Oil *by Harvey O'Connor*		24 00
31.	The Men at the door with the gun *by Cedric Belfrage*		21 75
32.	North from Mexico *by Carey McWilliams*		24 00
33.	Puerto Rico: Freedom & power in the Carribean *by Gordon K. Lewis*		48 00
34.	The Second Revolution in Cuba *by J. P. Morray*		16 25
35.	The Theory of Capitalist Development *by Paul M. Sweezy*		29 00
36.	World Crisis in Oil *by Harvey O'Connor*		36 05
37.	Revolution Betrayed *by Leon Trotsky*		6 00
38.	Wither France *by Leon Trotsky*		1 00
39.	Problems of Life *by Leon Trotsky*		1 00
40.	Where is Britain Going *by Leon Trotsky*		2 00
41.	Latin America and the Alliance for Progress *by A. Aguilar*		1 85
42.	Reflections on the Cuban Revolution *by P. A. Baran*		1 85
43.	The War in Vietnam *by Hugo Deane*		1 85
44.	The ABC of Socialism *by Huberman and Sweezy*		1 25
45.	Socialism is the only Answer *by Huberman and Sweezy*		1 25
46.	Economic Development, Planning and International Co-operation *by Oskar Lange*		2 10
47.	Marxian Socialism; and Power Elite or Ruling Class? *by Paul M. Sweezy*		1 25
48.	The Theory of U.S. Foreign Policy *by Sweezy and Huberman*		1 25
49.	The Split in the Capitalist World and in the Socialist World *by Sweezy and Hyberman*		1 85

(Postage Extra)

All correspondence and remitances to:

Sydney Wanasinghe,
51A Peterson Lane, Colombo 6.