

25c


# anvil

a student magazine

## asia, africa and hope

by fenner brockway, m.p.

- gandhi  
and new asian socialism
- sartre: politics vs. philosophy
- anti-americanism in  
the british labor party
- a house is not a home—  
liberals in the democratic party



editorials on german rearmament and UMT

# anvil and student partisan

Spring-Summer Issue 1955

36 East 10th Street, New York City

Volume VII No. 1.

(Whole No. 12)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorials on German Rearmament and UMT .....	2
Asia, Africa and Hope .....	3
<i>Fenner Brockway</i>	
A House Is Not a Home .....	7
<i>Jerry Phillips</i>	
Sartre: The Case Reopened .....	11
<i>Abe Stein</i>	
Gandhi and the New Asian Socialism .....	15
<i>Brijen K. Gupta</i>	
The British Labor Party .....	18
<i>Alan Ross</i>	
Correspondence: A Letter on Kenya .....	21
Review of McCarthy and the Communists .....	22
<i>Michael Harrington</i>	

## EDITORIAL BOARD

Margaret Levi, Editor

Bob Bone

Sam Bottone

Michael Harrington

Julius Jacobson

Business Staff: Don Jacobs, Mel Becker, Priscilla Cady

Shane Mage

Gene Sharp

Bill Shirley

Charles Walker

## Editorials

### On German Rearmament

The opposition which the West German trade unions and the German Social Democratic Party are displaying towards the projected rearming and re-militarization of that country deserves the applause and support of all democrats.

The banners displayed in the recent huge Munich demonstrations, organized by the unions, read: "We don't want to die for dollars or rubles!" They were an expression of resistance to the idea of being incorporated into an American military bloc, and were at one and the same time a proclamation of the right of national self-determination for the German people.

It is disturbing to see that many of the rather enlightened forces opposing German rearmament, do so with a premise and a program which gingerly ignores the basic democratic right of any country to

national sovereignty; thus many European "neutralists," British, French and Belgian socialists, and many American liberals, proceeding on the chauvinistic *all Germans are Nazi beasts* emotion, call for the continued disenfranchisement of the German people by Russia, the U.S., Great Britain and France, and the continued military occupation of the country by these powers.

It seems to us that those Munich workers who "... don't want to die for dollars or rubles" have the right to make their own decisions.

### UMT in America

Somehow word got to the White House that many people object to the idea of military training as a permanent form in American society. Somebody hinted that it is difficult for many of us to accept with grace the idea that a bondage of almost ten years to the military is a necessary part of the education of American youth.

And so in his January message to Congress, President Eisenhower went through the motions of placing a disguise-designed-for-palatability over his proposed universal military training program. What supposedly makes the difference are the provisions that 1) the program is to be enacted for simply a four year period, and 2) the young men have the option of either being drafted for two years (with a six year obligation to the reserves), or, under the military training program, of spending only six months away from home (with a nine and a half year obligation to the reserves). Thus the voluntary element is introduced.

A plan by which an entire nation of young men face the prospect of either eight or ten years under contract to the army, depending upon which of the choices they make, can hardly be accepted in the mood of "something designed to meet an emergency situation." This most sweeping of all military programs in the nation's peacetime history is, in spite of the current four year provision, the giant step towards the instituting of military training as a permanent part of American life.

The unpopular program has been, and will be further, defended, on the basis that it is necessary to the interests of America and the "free world." With this kind of explanation comes a basic admission: that today's American foreign policy is such that it can answer the impressive psychological gains of the Stalinist totalitarianism only with . . . the threat of military force.

We assume, and hope, that many liberal and labor groups will be strong in their opposition to the President's military training proposals. We suggest to these groups that opposition to the country's military program should lead to an examination of the policies which necessitate such a program, and to a call for a new democratic American foreign policy, one geared to the economic needs and political aspirations of the colonial peoples and democratic forces of the world.

# Asia, Africa and Hope

## *—The prospect of a third force*

*This article is excerpted from a talk which Fenner Brockway delivered in Paris this summer at a conference of the War Resisters' International. From his life-long experience in colonial affairs, he discusses the possibility that the colonial nations of the world, supporting neither the power bloc led by Russia, nor that led by America, will in their own struggle for freedom and social justice, provide a third buffer force which will aid in preventing a Third World War.*

THE COLONIAL and economic aspects of the Third Camp are more closely related than, perhaps, one would think at first and, before I have concluded, I hope that will be clear. There are even pacifists and Socialists who tend to regard the colonies as of little importance in world affairs, first, because they have not great industrial power, second because they have not great military power and, third, because they have no voice in the United Nations and the councils of the world.

I propose, if I may, to take a rather broad view of the title "Colonies" and include in my survey the countries which have obtained their independence and which were previously colonial. The first comment I would make on the view that they are of little importance is this, that I am quite sure that moral power is a much greater influence in world affairs than we sometimes think. I would say that among the statesmen of the world Jawarhalal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, is influencing international events at this moment as much as the heads of powerful economic and military states because Nehru not only speaks for India but he speaks for thousands of human beings in other countries. What was achieved at the recent Geneva Conference is of very great significance. The French representative was undoubtedly influenced by the great desire amongst the French population for peace, but why did Mr. Anthony Eden, with considerable courage, take a line that was different from that of America? Partly, I think, because we in Britain have not quite the same obsession about the menace of Communism as there is in America, partly, I think that we in Britain realize that a world war with 12 hydrogen bombs would mean the entire destruction of our small and crowded country, partly because in Britain we have an organized Left force in politics which is absent in America, but, more important than all those reasons, was the influence of India and of other Asian countries.

I happen to know that Mr. Eden went to untold trouble to be sure that Britain was walking in step with the desires of India. It was represented in the person of Mr. Krishna Menon in the Talks, but India,

Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma were the unseen guests at the Geneva Conference and their attitude and their moral stand for peace was, I think, the greatest factor in the British contribution which Mr. Eden made on the side of peace. That is one illustration of the great moral power that can still be exerted in the world even by nations which are not industrially or militarily powerful.

### **Coming Economic Power**

Secondly, I would say that, apart from their moral influence, the colonial countries may in the second half of this century be of great power even in their economic and political aspects. Japan became a mighty industrial country within the period of this century. Russia, within the period of 30 years, has become one of the two great dominating powers of the earth. China within a few decades can become as powerful. And even if the new countries do not become industrialized in the latter half of this century, the countries which grow the food of the world are going to be very important in the economic sphere. The population of the earth is growing in advance of the food supplies of the earth and within 20 years time the countries which are growing the food of the earth will have a very strong economic position in relation to other countries.

Therefore, the attitude of the colonies to the subject we are discussing, their attitude towards America, their attitude towards Russia, is of the greatest importance. A. J. Muste tells of how at the House of Commons he met representatives from the British Colonies who said to him that the attitude of the Third Camp is almost intuitive to the people in the colonies. I can say from my own experience that that is true. When Nehru takes that attitude he is representing something much more than himself. He is representing the instinctive mind of the peoples of many Asian countries and of the colonies of Africa and of the Caribbeans. In India itself it is not only the attitude of Nehru, it is the attitude of the Indian Socialist Party, which is now the second largest Socialist Party in the world. It is the attitude of the Asian Socialist Conference, which declined to become a section of the Socialist International because the Socialist International is too much bound up with one of the two powers into which the world is divided.

My own realization of this attitude of the colonial peoples came at a conference which was held here in Paris in 1948. Western Socialists, and particularly the French Socialist Party, had called together the peoples of Africa and Asia to work out with them a common economic plan with Western Europe and the attitude of the African and Asian representatives was

very decisive. They said, "We are not prepared to work out a common economic plan with Western Europe because that would make us part of one of the two blocs into which the world is divided." They said, "We have no responsibility for this division in the world. We are not going to identify ourselves with either one bloc or the other. When the time comes for us to have self-government our contribution to the world will be the same contribution of peace as India is already making."

There was one other decision by the African and Asian representatives at that conference which surprised me a little. They said, "We are opposed to occupation by one power; we are opposed to occupation by a group of powers, but we are not only nationalist, we are internationalists and we recognise that when we ourselves have self-government we should have loyalties to an international authority—indeed, we look forward to the time of world government." Those representatives, from Sierra Leone, from Nigeria, from the Gold Coast, from Morocco, from Tunisia, Algeria, the Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, India, Indonesia, Viet-Nam, Ceylon, were unanimous in that double attitude—"We stand for the conception of a Third Camp making for peace and not for identity with either of the great blocs, and we stand for the conception of one world and would be prepared to accept loyalty to it."

I could give many illustrations. I take one from Tunis, to which I have been recently. I attended the Conference of the U.G.T.T., the largest trade union movement there, indeed, the largest trade union movement in the Continent of Africa. I went to its last conference, three years ago and at that conference there was a discussion as to which of the international trade union movements the U.G.T.T. should be affiliated. Up to that point, it was affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions, which is Communist dominated, and there was a motion that the affiliation should be transferred to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The discussion took place between Russia dominating the W.F.T.U. and America, said to be dominating the I.C.F.T.U. The decision was reached after a speech from Farhat Hached, whom I called at that time the George Lansbury of Tunisia and who was afterwards assassinated by the French Mau-Mau in Tunisia. In that speech he said, "We are opposed to the policy of Soviet Russia; we cannot remain in the W.F.T.U. because in that organization we can only say that we support the Communists. We do not like the policy of the Government of the United States, but at least in the I.C.F.T.U. we have the freedom to speak our minds." The Conference reached its decision, despite its opposition to the two blocs, to join the I.C.F.T.U., but only on the ground that within it they could at least speak freely and urge their view against both the power blocs.

### **African Leaders for Third Camp**

I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that so

far as the British colonies in Africa are concerned every single African leader takes the view of the Third Camp. Dr. Nkrumah, who has stepped out of prison to become the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast—and it is the habit of Prime Ministers to step out of prison—has taken the line emphatically in the Gold Coast and I can give the name of colony after colony where that has happened; they all take the view of the Third Camp.

But I want to warn of two or three dangers. The first is the danger that unless the imperial governments, and particularly the Labor and Socialist parties in the countries of those imperial governments, adopt a much bolder policy for the liberation of the colonies the support which is now given to the Third Camp idea will turn to support of Communist Russia and the Communist countries. The generation of leaders in the British colonies to whom I have referred were students in London at the time of the upsurge of the Labor Party in the years immediately after the war. It is amazing how nearly everyone of them came under the influence of Harold Laski at the London School of Economics. But the present generation of students from the colonies in London, because they are dissatisfied not only with British Government policy but do not regard British Labor Party policy as being sufficiently bold, are inclined to turn towards the Communist position.

Another danger on which I wish to sound some warning is of political leaders in the colonies who, when they achieve a position of personal power tend to compromise their attitude of principle in favor of the Third Camp idea and to enter one camp or the other as a matter of bargaining for their political advancement or for the political advancement of their country. You will, therefore, sometimes find that leaders tend to identify themselves with one power bloc or another for the sake of a concession which will be given in return, but that attitude will not represent the attitude of the people of whom they are leaders.

The third danger to which I wish to refer arises from the discovery and explosion of the hydrogen bomb. A short time ago the people of the Marshall Islands petitioned the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations against the effects of the hydrogen bomb upon the people of their territory. Three resolutions came before the Trusteeship Council. The first, from Soviet Russia, asked that no more tests should be made. The second, from India, asked that no more tests should be made at least until the International Court at the Hague has reached a decision about the legality of dropping bombs in that area. The third resolution, sponsored by the United States of America, Great Britain and France, recognizing that the hydrogen bomb was being dropped "in the interests of world peace," nevertheless asked the American Government to be a little more careful in the future that it did not cause bad effects on the people of the Marshall Islands. Passing through that



experience, the people of the Marshall Islands are likely to lose their enthusiasm for the West and, because Soviet bombs are not dropped so close, to turn their interests towards Soviet Russia, unless the Third Camp idea can be brought before the world much more challengingly than it is at present.

The other illustration I give from Japan. *The Times* recently carried an article describing the anti-American and anti-West feeling which is just sweeping through the peoples of Japan because of the dropping of the hydrogen bomb in the Pacific; how they think that people who become ill have become ill as the effect of the hydrogen bomb, of their throwing fish back into the sea because they feel that the fish is being poisoned by the hydrogen bomb. Since I have been at this Conference I have met one doctor who has been invited to go to the University of Tokyo to lecture, but has been told to lecture in German because even the English language, spoken by Americans, is now so unpopular in that country.

### **Lure of the Communists**

Unless we can get across the conception of the Third Camp in the world in a very bold way, the effect of these policies is going to drive the peoples of these areas into the Communist camp rather than the Third Camp because, perhaps fortunately for Soviet Russia, the hydrogen bombs which they dropped were more distant.

I turn to the economic aspect. It is perfectly true that *it would be possible* for the countries of Western Europe within a fairly reasonable period to make themselves economically independent of the United States of America by means of the development of the possible resources of the colonies. Except for oil, the continent of Africa could provide Britain with every raw material and every foodstuff that it requires. This would be a possible way of gaining that economic independence of America, which so closely ties Britain and Western Europe to American policies. But I want to sound some warnings against that policy. I think we have got to be very careful that we do not build up a third economic camp in the world just as we have to be careful we do not build up a third military camp in the world. I think that danger can be overcome, first, if we extend world trade as widely as possible both with East and West and, secondly, if we seek to develop, through the United Nations, a world fund which shall be of help to countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Reference to the world fund leads me to make a suggestion regarding the program of the Third Camp. In my view it is not enough for us to build up a Third Camp against war. If we are going to build a Third Camp it must be for something positive and constructive and the constructive conception is a world crusade against destitution and illiteracy wherever they are to be found on the earth; it is to transform expenditure now devoted to armaments to human salvation, to lift people from hunger and sickness and lack of education. The very nuclear power which now goes

into the atom bomb could achieve these things and the constructive task of the Third Camp must be to direct minds in the international sphere to this constructive work as the alternative to the destruction of war.

When I first became a Socialist, I became a Socialist because two-thirds of the people of Britain were poor and destitute. We cannot function just within our own territories. Now the world itself is one small place and today two-thirds of the population of the earth are poor and diseased, the minds of the children have no chance to grow. Not all those people are in Asia and Africa. One of the arguments which is used in America against economic aid to other countries is that part of their population is also impoverished and diseased and in Asia and Africa, while you may have impoverished people, you have Asians and Africans who also are living in conditions of luxury. Therefore, this appeal must not be on racial grounds; it must be a determination by the peoples of the earth to lift all, whatever their race and whatever their color to a human standard in which their personalities can develop. I believe we can capture the minds of people for this great constructive idea and so be able to fill those minds with something which would replace the negative conceptions of destruction and death and hatred which are involved in war propaganda.

### **A Social Revolution**

How is this economic aid to be given? I do not think we should accept the idea that it shall be by the investment of private capital. If it is by the investment of private capital economic imperialism will follow political imperialism. Northern Rhodesia at the present time illustrates the danger of this. One-third of the total value of the annual products of Northern Rhodesia, including an estimate of the value of subsistence agriculture—that is, food grown by the Africans for themselves—each year is paid in interest and dividend and profit to financiers who live outside Northern Rhodesia. The per capita income of Africans in Northern Rhodesia is £10 6/ a year. The per capita income of non-Africans in Northern Rhodesia, men, women and children, is £486 16/ and, even after that contrast between African and non-African, one-third of the value of the product goes to alien financiers. The contrast to that has been shown in the Sudan where 40 years ago a scheme to transform 1,000,000 acres of arid land into cultivable land was commenced as a tripartite arrangement between the Sudan Government, which was then a British administration, the peasants living on the land and two British finance companies. Even as late as 1938 the average income of those peasants was £30 a year. Last year the average income of the peasants was between £600 and £650. In a sense it was too successful; they were tending to sit back as kulaks and employ cheap labor to do the work. It is not only an economic revolution; it has been a social revolution. Seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds has been spent each year from the scheme on education, upon

health, village halls—I have seen football fields in every one of those Sudanese villages—but, perhaps what is more important is that in 1950, when the concessions to the two British companies came to an end, the British Labor Government declined to renew those concessions and the absolute property of that scheme is now in the hands of the Sudanese themselves; it now is a partnership between the Sudanese Government and the peasants, 50-50. The Sudan Government is now entirely a Sudanese Government and that great project is theirs without a halfpenny debt or a halfpenny to be paid back on any loan. Any economic aid to Asia or Africa must be on the basis of a term for the repayment of capital at the end of which that property shall belong to the people of the countries in which the investment takes place.

The economic aid must be given first by those companies which have directly exploited colonial countries, and I apply that direct to Britain. This year Great Britain is spending £1,963,000,000 on the armed forces; we are spending £120,000,000 on betterment in our colonial territories. I wonder whether I might make a special appeal to delegates from Germany? We are opposing the re-armament of Western Germany, but the argument against us sometimes is that if German trade does not have to bear the costs of armaments it will be in an unfair position in the world in competition. Might I suggest to our German friends that they might help us to meet that argument if they would suggest that Germany, instead of spending that money on armaments, spent it on world aid in the kind of way I have described?

It must come through the United Nations. When India proposed that a trifling percentage—I think it was 2 per cent—of world expenditure on armaments should be devoted to world aid, America, Britain and France voted against. When the United Nations set up a commission of nine nations to examine this problem and it unanimously recommended an international fund to which each nation should contribute in this way against want and disease, again, only recently at the United Nations, American, British and French votes have gone against on the ground that they are already doing as much as they can and they cannot give any more because of the size of their defense programs.

### **Main Coming Revolution: Colonial**

I want to say one thing in conclusion. The Third Camp movement, if it is to influence our time and generation, must be associated with the movement of this period, which is really fashioning and moulding the future. I have no hesitation in saying that the social revolution of this century will be the social revolution of the colonial peoples. It will be their struggle for political liberty, it will be their struggle for human equality, it will be their struggle for education. It is now proceeding amongst two-thirds of the population of the earth. They sometimes adopt methods which we cannot endorse. It was so in Indo-China, it is still in Malaya, it still is in Kenya. But,

nevertheless, the minds of the leaders of most of the colonial movements in the world today are thinking in the terms of the Indian example which was given by Gandhi. It may not be from deep principle, but from the point of view of recognizing the great power and force on the other side, that this is the way they choose to carry on their struggle.

In my view the Third Camp movement, which stands for something different from America and something different than Russia, which stands for building up a movement for peace between them, must identify itself with this revolution of the century, the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa and the Caribbeans toward their political liberty, towards an education which will make them fully developed human beings. If we do that we will find in those liberated colonial peoples the greatest allies in the cause of peace and in the cause, or movement in the world which will seek to prevent the two great blocs from going to war with each other.

FENNER BROCKWAY

*Fenner Brockway, Labor member of the British House of Commons, has devoted much of his life to working for the freedom of colonial peoples.*

**IF you reject world capitalism as a dying social order—**

**IF you repudiate the Stalinist alternative as modern barbarism—**

**IF you believe in academic freedom and civil liberties**

**IF you are willing to work for peace and social justice through democratic socialism**

**YOUR PLACE IS WITH THE  
YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE**

**To get acquainted, and for sample copies of the  
Young Socialist Challenge, write to:**

**YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE**

**114 West 14th Street**

**New York 11, N.Y.**

**Name** .....

**Address** .....

**City** ..... **State** .....

**School** .....

# A House Is Not a Home

## —Why the Democratic Party Fails Liberal, Labor Needs

THE NOTED American humorist, Adlai Stevenson, in his acceptance address to the 1952 Democratic convention referred derisively to the Republican party as "... a party with a split personality ... a hopeless case of political schizophrenia."

This intriguing picture of the Grand Old Party, apparently torn by dissension at that time, and since then irrevocably split by the events culminating in the condemnation of Senator McCarthy, has received wide and influential currency in recent months. The condition has become so serious as to produce speculation that a break-up of the party is imminent.

But, how critically divided is this Republican organization? And, perhaps, should we not in reality be more concerned with the basic contradictions in the Democratic Party—where "harmony" is said to prevail?

### **Republicans Are Unified**

It is my contention that in matters of domestic policy the Republican party is in fact a unified party; but that it is only in the areas of foreign relations and constitutional liberties where division seems to exist. Without of course minimizing the importance of foreign policy and civil liberties, it is nevertheless true that foreign policy is traditionally considered, rightly or wrongly, as being above and distinct from party politics, while basic liberties should and do find broad acceptance throughout the party system. Without arguing that foreign affairs is in actuality divorced from the main lines of domestic policy, I only say that it is generally so considered, making particular foreign policy issues therefore "unreasonable" requisites in the determination of over-all party unity.

Furthermore, in the two party system it is inevitable that anti-democratic factions will affix themselves to either or both of the two parties; and it is unfortunate and confusing when at times such factions appear to be much stronger than they actually are. But, if it is suicidal for the McCarthys to set up their own parties, it is equally dangerous for us to consign a major party to the scrap heap the moment an anti-democratic group within it asserts itself.

Issues, then, relating to foreign affairs and to constitutional liberties have classically been considered as in a sense "conscience" questions to be pondered by the legislator quite apart from any notion of loyalty to party. Where, however, in the two party system there is substantial agreement within a party in matters of domestic policy, there it can be fairly said that party unity exists.

It is certainly true that the GOP is plagued by a series of personal and sectional antagonisms: The Deweys vs. the Tafts; the investment bankers of the East vs. the protectionist industry and corporate

farms of the mid-west; the amateur politicians vs. the "old pros." Do these conflicts, however, result in a basic disagreement within the party over matters of domestic policy? Or are they merely expressions of differences within a broad framework of agreement?

A study of the voting records of the Republicans in Congress over the past few years is illuminating. Although clear-cut, "left-right" issues reaching the floor make up only a very small minority of bills voted on during this period, a certain few can be set up as criteria in order to determine the extent of Republican party unity.

On May 4, 1949, a bill to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act came before the House of Representatives for vote. Only thirteen of approximately 200 Republican congressmen voted against their party. And in the Senate a few weeks later, just five Republican senators joined with the opposition. In 1953, with the Republicans in control of Congress, only 17 GOP congressmen out of about 220 failed to support their party over the Tidelands Oil issue. Five Republican senators again voted against their party on this question. In 1954, with the composition of Congress virtually unchanged over the previous year, just twelve Republicans in the House, and only two GOP Senators, joined with the Democrats against the bill which gave tax relief to the holders of stocks. And finally, in the matter of the bill to provide a "sliding-scale" system of price supports for farm production, an area of the domestic economy in which sectionalism still holds some influence over both parties, the number of Republican representatives voting against their party totalled just 25, while eight Republican senators voted with the proponents of rigid supports.

### **No Progressivism in GOP**

The Republican party today is clearly a united, conservative party. With Wayne Morse now gone from the ranks, the Populist element which once could boast the names of Borah, Norris, Wheeler and McNary, is now down to its last remnant in the person of William Langer of North Dakota. In order to support the worn argument that "progressivism" is still very much alive in the GOP, it is now customary to cite the names of three or four law-makers from New England. But, more than anything else, I think this is the result of confusing responsible conservatism with legitimate progressivism. It has been so long since issues designed to separate right from left have reached the floor, that those remaining have in fact tended to be blurred and indecisive. When issues are treated in terms of "How little public housing can we get by with," rather than "How much public housing is needed," a man does not require much more

than a conscience to vote in favor of the bill that finally is carefully sifted onto the floor.

And now with Jacob Javits gone from the Republican side of the House, it is difficult to imagine who will be conjured up to replace him as the symbol of latent GOP progressivism in that body.

If any doubt remains as to the conservative unity of the Republicans, the almost unprecedented disciplining of Wayne Morse by the Republican 83rd Congress, and its unconcealed antagonisms toward William Langer should quickly dispel them. The denial of posts on the Labor and Armed Service Committees to Morse was surely motivated not only by his refusal to campaign for Eisenhower, but certainly because of his known pro-labor position. And it should be remembered, only one vote separates the majority party from the minority on the Senate Labor Committee. When we consider the traditional reluctance of our major parties to assert party discipline, even in matters of domestic policy, the handling of Morse by the Republicans is strong evidence of the Party's acknowledged basic unity as the party of business, industry, finance, and large farming—the party of domestic conservatism.

The brand of conservatism the Party will manifest at a particular time depends of course on many factors. But it does seem that given our pragmatic, non-doctrinaire politics, each major party has an inordinately profound and immediate effect upon the day to day policy of the other. The opposition party appears particularly to be influenced in this way. I am suggesting here that the kind of conservatism evidenced in recent years by the Republican Party is a direct reaction to the domestic program—or lack of program—of the Democratic Party.

### **Dems Fall Down on Legislation**

It is no secret that the Democratic Party has not been able to enact a major piece of domestic legislation since the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Party has, to be sure, shown remarkable agility in defending its early accomplishments as against "that good-for-nothing 80th Congress," or as in the campaign of 1952 when the cry "don't let them take it away" punctuated the Democratic attack—or rather "defense." What has been the effect of this negative approach on the Republicans? The responsible conservatives of the GOP have been forced into the politically inexpedient position of in effect agreeing with the Democrats and consequently earning the dreaded "me-too" label. With the Democratic organization usurping the role of protector of the domestic status quo and the area of controversy thereby narrowed to hyper-emotional questions such as morality, loyalty, and the Stalinist menace, the formal opposition if only by simple reflex action could easily appear to be the captive of the irresponsible conservatives of the Republican party.

It is undoubtedly true that we are in desperate need of a conservative party of intelligence and responsibility, perhaps similar to the conservatives of Britain.

But we must *first* have an intelligent progressive party, for after all, can conservatism in American politics have real meaning except in relation to progressive alternatives?

What has appeared then to be division in the Republican Party does not in reality deny the basic unity of the party, and in fact, ironically enough can be traced directly to the basic disunity of the Democratic Party!

Now that the subject of party unity—or disunity—has become so vital, what of this Democratic organization? Here is a party which, unlike its Republican brothers, shows no surface signs of division. Mr. Stevenson, far from being sniped at by members of his own party, to the surprise of many, apparently, is accepted as the standard-bearer. He stands as a symbol of this Democratic unity, today equally welcomed at party conclaves from Minnesota to Mississippi.

The campaign of 1948? The days when the donkey exhibited a personality split not once, but twice? When a simple oath of loyalty to the party threatened to tear the organization to shreds? Forgotten!

All is harmony today in the ranks of the Democracy—but at what price? When Scott Lucas was defeated by Everett Dirksen in Illinois, his place as party leader in the Senate was turned over to Lyndon Johnson, a harmony candidate. This, despite the fact that Johnson had voted for the Taft-Hartley Act and the infamous Kerr Natural Gas Bill, both over President Truman's vetoes, against public housing, but for the exclusion of several hundred thousand workers from the protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act and its minimum wage provisions.

Committee chairmanships are in the midst of this cloying harmony still allotted according to seniority, the majority therefore going to Democratic conservatives. Senator George, of Georgia, for example, was so certain that his powers would not be threatened in the present Congress that weeks before it convened he announced to the press that not only had he decided this time to take the chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he would also recommend that his good friend and able colleague Senator Byrd of Virginia replace him as head of the Senate Finance Committee. The fact that Senator George is generally opposed to progressive measures, while Senator Byrd automatically votes against his own party on every major domestic issue does not of course change the picture Mr. Stevenson paints for us: Unity above all!

The most powerful committee in the House of Representatives, the Committee on Rules, is chaired by Howard Smith of Virginia, a man who votes with the Republicans much more frequently than he does with his fellow Democrats. But his control over the order in which bills are considered by the Democratic controlled House remains unchallenged.

### **Platforms O.K. with Conservatives**

A glance at the Democratic conventions of 1948 and 1952 is revealing. The platform of 1948 was repeated in 1952 in somewhat the same language, but there was little or no conflict in the latter to rival that of '48,

and certainly no real threat of a walkout by the conservatives. Perhaps Mr. Truman in his speech to the '52 convention lauding the party's platform unintentionally supplied the answer. "Now," cried Mr. Truman, "these elements of the Democratic program are not empty promises. I was elected in 1948 because the people wanted these things done." In two short sentences the former President had pin-pointed the symptoms of an unhealthy party split for Mr. Stevenson, the political lay analyst, who was sitting on the same platform, as it were. If Mr. Stevenson were really capable of recognizing "political schizophrenia" he would have noted that the same "empty promises" referred to by Mr. Truman had to be repeated in the 1952 platform precisely because the Democratic party was so badly split in 1948 that it could not enact its program into law.

It was obvious to the Democratic conservatives at the 1952 convention that there was no need to provoke an intra-party fuss over the substance of the platform. For, after all, as some cynic has said, and as had been borne out in 1948, the platform really was something on which to ride into office, and not something to stand on after the election is won.

And now the Democrats, after their defeat in 1952, have been returned to power in the 84th Congress. Presumably, in the absence of a mid-term convention, the platform of 1952 is still to be considered. One pledge, the one incidentally that precipitated the walkout of 1948, called for the enactment of fair employment practices legislation. But the first session of the 84th Congress had no sooner begun when the purring sounds of harmony emanated from the Democratic caucus. Marquis Childs reported in his column of January 7, 1955 that Senate Democrats, in the interest of maintaining party harmony, had agreed in caucus not to press for a rules change that would effectively stop the filibuster. This of course cancelled out the FEPC pledge. According to Childs, Hubert Humphrey led the fight against an attempt to amend the rules, arguing that "its only purpose would be to stir old party divisions."

Another example of Democratic incapacity revolves about the problem of maintaining the income of the farmer. In 1952 the Democrats promised at least 90 per cent of parity to the farmers, the extension of price supports to other storables and also to perishables. At the same time the consumer was promised farm products at reasonable prices.

To speak of price supports and reasonable prices to the consumer is to offer a bald contradiction; and to suggest extension of the support idea to perishables without explaining what is to be done with the inevitable surplus of these perishables, if not to let them rot, is to be ridiculous. But as an indication of how confused a situation we have, mainly as a result of Democratic impotence, the subsidy payment plan applicable to storables and perishables, and beneficial to farmer and consumer, which was proposed by Secretary of Agriculture Brannan in the Truman Admin-

istration only to be unceremoniously shelved by the Democrats, was resurrected without mention of Brannan by the Republicans in the 83rd Congress. The plan was suggested as both a method of protecting wool growers and as a trial balloon as the solution to the butter storage problem, by the Republican Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Benson.

The Democratic Party has now grown so conservative that the Republicans are in serious danger of "backing" into the progressive role!

### **Democratic Pledges Produce No Action**

What is the progressive's answer to all of this? Must we continue to tolerate a party that pledges progress, but produces only stalemate; that stirs hopes in the campaign which cannot be fulfilled in the governing; that makes cynics of millions?

There are those who would piously remind us that traditionally the major parties in American politics have been composed of numerous, even contradictory elements; that each party has comprised all segments of the community, and that is the way it should be.

Yet it is clear today that at least one major party—the Republican—is undeniably the party of conservatism. Should we not then have a party of domestic progressivism to provide a distinct alternative? Granted that the answer is "yes," can the Democratic Party, although presently sterile, provide that vehicle, or must the progressive look beyond to a new organization?

We have seen how the Democratic conservatives maintain a stranglehold on the actual policies of the party. Nevertheless, many progressives in groups such as Americans for Democratic Action and within the labor movement apparently believe that ultimately this grip can be broken. It is logical to assume, I suppose, that through the gradually increasing industrialization of the South, and the extension of the suffrage to the Negroes, the primary will become more and more a practical method for expressing real political differences, and will thus finally bring about a meaningful party division.

Aside from the urgent need for a positive progressive party *now* to cope with this overwhelming era of positive government, it seems to me that the liberal's logic omits at least one significant factor: Are the Democratic organization and leadership of the North and West of such a quality in structure and attitude as to permit progressives the luxury of presuming their desirability—or their willingness? It is my contention that we cannot afford to wait for Democratic conservatives to be defeated within the party, nor in fact, should we delude ourselves into thinking that the important faults with the Democratic party are to be met only in the South.

Today, more so than ever in our history, government is a positive force in the economic affairs of the nation and of the nations of the world. The Employment Act of 1946 proclaimed that it is the business of government to promote maximum employ-



ment and production. For the first time in the modern period, the federal government moved forward, at least in concept, from the essentially negative role of umpire over the economy, to the positive role of guarantor of economic prosperity. The general acceptance of this function of government was amply shown in the last political campaign, when the issues of full employment and an adequate income for the farmer predominated. We are in an era of national issues and, logically, of strong national government. In this setting of purposeful government, domestically and in its foreign affairs, we must have purposeful parties. Vacuum parties buffeted by pressure groups are as unthinkable as government by pressure groups; yet one leads inexorably to the other, and responsibility is sacrificed.

### 'Independence' vs. Responsibility

The Democratic Party is not only a party devoid of group content and responsibility, but in the words and actions of its leadership, seeks to remain apart from the very groups which respond most to its appeal for votes and support. It seems at best unconsciously to adopt the liberal view that independence and individualism in politics are the only safeguards against tyranny, and at worst reflects the fear of the party professionals that their perquisites will be threatened. The trepidation of the hack is understandable; but this misleading "independence" so cherished by the intellectual leadership of the party poses an obstacle for progressive groups not easily to be surmounted.

The position of Adlai Stevenson is illuminating in this respect. On numerous occasions during the campaign of 1952, he very carefully reminded progressive groups that they were distinct from the Democratic Party and apart from it. To the American Federation of Labor on September 22, 1952, he declared, "Labor unions like all private persons and organizations, must maintain an independence from government. Government, *including political parties* (emphasis mine), must be independent of any private bodies." He then added the benign, the emptiest of political clap-trap, "The Democratic Party is the party of all the people." On Labor Day, 1952, before a predominantly CIO audience in Detroit, he said, "... you are not my captives, and I am not your captive. On the contrary, I might as well make it clear right now that I intend to do exactly what I think right and best for all of us—business, labor, agriculture—alike. . . . I would intend to honor that office (the Presidency) by *complete freedom* (emphasis supplied) to serve not one man or a few, but the whole nation."

From the argument that government, and political parties too, must be independent of private groups, it is a simple next step for Mr. Stevenson to proclaim that the President must also be independent of the political party that carried him into office. This is, paradoxically enough, so that he may be free to serve "the whole nation."

The labor organizations were firmly, but at least gently put in their place; but not so the A.D.A! That

independent liberal group was dispatched by the independent liberal Stevenson without so much as a nod of acquaintance. *The U.S. News and World Report* of August 15, 1952 carried an interview with Mr. Stevenson which had included the question, "What is your reaction to charges . . . that the ADA . . . has taken you over?" Stevenson had replied, "If you refer to Wilson Wyatt—well, it is nonsense. I do not actually know much or anything about Wilson Wyatt's connection with Americans for Democratic Action, with which he was associated some years ago." With a simple shrug of the shoulders Stevenson disposed of ADA as if it were some ad hoc front group that Wyatt had innocently loaned his name to, perhaps at the time the Attorney General was preparing his first "list."

Stevenson's answer, when taken alone, might appear to be innocent enough; but when it is viewed in the light of the over-all relationship between the Democratic Party and ADA throughout the campaign it becomes symbolic. I recall too well a house meeting of an ADA group in a fairly large New England city early in the 1952 campaign. After the ritual of viewing a Stevenson television appearance was over, there appeared a speaker who was introduced as a representative of the organization known as "Volunteers for Stevenson." This "Volunteer," not himself a member of ADA, directly proceeded without embarrassment to advise his listeners that the official support of ADA was *not* being solicited, in fact to be blunt, was being discouraged. However, because he no doubt perceived the several peculiar expressions sticking queerly out from the group, the speaker quickly went on to reassure that active support as individuals would be accepted, that is, of course, if the individual's name was not too well known in association with ADA . . . It must be added that not a voice was raised in serious protest.

### Irresponsibility: America's Illness

This incident portrays strikingly the illness of the Democratic Party and of American politics generally. There stood a spokesman for a "volunteer" group which admittedly was created for the single transient purpose of electing a candidate to office; a group socially and politically irresponsible in the sense that once the election was over it would no longer be present to oversee the enactment of the program it so ardently espoused during the campaign; and the very definition of which is designed to render unto its idol the misleading "freedom" to serve "the whole nation" that Stevenson demanded. A spokesman for such a group had the temerity to instruct the members of a continuing, politically responsible organization—ADA—that their role in the campaign should be non-organizational! Despite its mistreatment, even today the leadership of ADA continues to cling to the Stevenson regulars of the Democratic party in the hope that they represent the key to a

(Continued on page 21)



# Sartre: The Case Reopened

## —The problem of relating his politics and philosophy

FRENCH EXISTENTIALISM seems to be enjoying a revival of interest at the present time. Articles on Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and the school of thought they represent crop up more and more frequently in the serious English and American magazines. The number of books devoted to a sober study of its philosophic and social doctrines is reaching respectable proportions.

The current concern with serious interpretation is a distinct change from the first wave of excitement and uncritical enthusiasm that accompanied the American discovery of French Existentialism. Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty paid a price for winning a wide hearing so easily in the immediate post-war period. While everyone brandished the extravagant Existentialist vocabulary with delight (who hasn't run across references to "commitment," "being in a situation," "the absurdity of being," "the anguish of responsibility"), few paid much attention to its philosophic claims.

Another and more damaging reason existed for the decline of interest in French Existentialism. And that was the suspect nature of Sartre's political beliefs and activities. Sartre's passage to Neutralism after his brief flirtation with the RDR,\* and his ambiguous relations with Stalinism turned the American intellectual community, now on its way to a graceless submission to the official ideology, against him. "Western freedom" had to be defended against totalitarianism and Sartre's vigorous and telling attacks on liberalism were unwelcome. Inevitably, his "anti-Western" politics became the focus of attack while a discussion of his philosophy and its relation to his social and political doctrines receded into the background.

In the current studies, it is not his Existentialist philosophy alone, but also the question of how it relates to these very politics, which are matters of concern.

For those of us who are democratic socialists, the question of how Sartre squares his pro-Stalinism with what he claims as his radical notion of freedom, has long been an important and interesting one.

Happily, the current stream of articles and books gives us some immediate reason for reopening this subject.

### Writers Clash in Interpretations

The first thing one notices about the current studies is the extent of the sharp differences on what it is that Sartre actually advocates. Two recent book-length studies on his philosophic and social beliefs illustrate this almost clinically. The first, by Wilfred Desan, is an exposition of Sartre's major philosophic work *L'Être et le Néant*, and significantly enough, is entitled, *The Tragic Finale, An Essay on the Philoso-*

*phy* of Jean-Paul Sartre. The judgment implicit in Desan's title is made explicit in the last chapter where the author says, "Sartre has made his choice and this choice is the misery of human existence."

Iris Murdoch, on the other hand, has given her brief, but very excellent study the title, *Sartre, Romantic Rationalist*. To illustrate how greatly she diverges from Desan, we have only to quote the following passage: "Sartre connects in an equation freedom as a general attribute of consciousness, freedom as the openness of our response to a work of art, and freedom in the sense it has acquired in the politics of contemporary social democracy."

Can there be a greater variance in judging the same writer than in these two cases?

The same uncertainty about what Sartre stands for and where he is going is evident in a number of magazine articles which attempt to relate his politics to his philosophy. We select two for inspection because in both instances the writers stress their belief that Sartre is a democratic socialist, and wrestle with the problem of his Stalinoid leanings. The Summer, 1954 issue of *Kenyon Review*, for example, carries an article by Herbert Spiegelberg, entitled "French Existentialism: Its Social Philosophy." After reviewing the writings and activities of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty Spiegelberg concludes that, "(1) Existentialism supposedly preoccupied with the problem of the solitary individual, has come to grips with the problem of social existence; (2) It is making some original contributions toward an understanding of the social bond; (3) It is developing a philosophy of democratic socialism which in many ways is not unlike the social philosophy of John Dewey."

The similarity which Spiegelberg finds between French Existentialism and Dewey's Instrumentalist social thinking will surely sound queer and surprise the American reader. And of course the question inevitably arises, "If, as Spiegelberg elsewhere claims, Sartre believes in a 'socialist democracy which is controlled from the bottom rather than from the top,' what about Sartre's defense of Stalinism?"

### And More Attempts . . .

This very question is also raised and an answer attempted in an article carried in the August, 1954 issue of the English magazine, "Twentieth Century." In an article bearing the title "The Politics of Existentialism," the sympathetic author, Everett W. Knight tries to answer the riddle: Is Sartre a Communist or not? He remarks:

He certainly was not when he wrote *La Mort dans L'Âme* and *Les Mains Sales*. However, we cannot suppose that he

\* RDR was an anti-Stalinist revolutionary socialist organization existing in France from 1948 to 1950

has changed his mind completely since then, because there is still his *Materialisme et Revolution* in which his purpose was to demolish the philosophical pretensions of dialectical materialism. And yet Sartre's articles "Les Communistes et la Paix" constitute far more masterful a justification of the tactics of the French Communist Party than one of which any member of the Party itself would have been capable."

The remainder of Knight's article is an attempt to explain on *philosophic grounds* why Sartre, to use the latter's own words, "has fallen outside of history," i.e., refuses to take sides in the world conflict, and therefore can't be considered a Stalinist *politically*. In outline form, Knight's reasoning runs as follows: Western intellectuals seek refuge in some Absolute, either the certainty of God or Science, and when these fail end in despair as Yogis, acquiescing in the existing social order. The Communists have their Absolute too. History as an inevitable process where the individual means nothing. They end up as Commissars. In both cases there is an abandonment of man's responsibility for his own freedom. For Sartre there are no Absolutes and man is free to create his own values and make his own history. And this, says Knight, is just what Sartre proposes. How Sartre proposes to formulate his program and why he defends Stalinism still remains obscure to Knight. However, he is confidently waiting for Sartre to explain all this in his yet-to-be-written-and-published great work on Ethics.

## II

What is the answer to the riddle of Sartre? Since *L'Être et le Néant* remains his major philosophic achievement to date and one which he has not repudiated, it must be the starting point for any attempt to unravel Sartre's inconsistencies. Wilfred Desan's study provides an excellent guide through the surrealist landscape of Sartre's universe.

### **Sartre's Philosophical Categories**

Sartre has borrowed Hegel's massive dialectic—but as we shall see—with a difference. We are introduced to one of philosophy's strangest heroes, the anonymous and impersonal "For-Itself," the "Pour-Soi." This is Sartre's designation for consciousness, mind, subjectivity or as Sartre himself prefers to name it, the "human reality." The "For-Itself" is variously described as the pure negativity, nothing, the hole or scar in being. It is forever in process of becoming something else, but this something else is always nothing, since it cannot in principle remain identical with itself. In short, it is always in flight toward an open future which it creates itself. Its freedom resides precisely in the fact that it is this permanent act of nihilation poised between past and future and completely self-determining. Its freedom is not through some mode of being but an absence from any mode of being. It is forever saying no. This is its power and this power of negativity is absolute and the substance of its freedom. Indeed, the "human reality" is freedom.

Although it would be illegitimate to transpose Sartre's philosophical categories directly to other

realms of discourse for the purposes of criticism, he himself has given his ghostly "For-Itself" dress of flesh and blood in the person of many of his literary heroes. The hero of Sartre's novel, *The Age of Reason* adequately exemplifies the pure negativity of freedom when he is described as being

free, free in every way, free to behave like a fool or a machine, free to accept, free to refuse, free to equivocate; to marry, give up the game, to drag his dead weight about with him for years to come. He could do what he liked, no one had the right to advise him, there would be for him no Good or Evil unless he brought them into being. All around him things were gathered in a circle, expectant, impassive, and indicative of nothing. He was alone, enveloped in this monstrous silence, free and alone, without assistance and without excuse, condemned to decide without support from any quarter, condemned forever to be free.

The world the "For-Itself" inhabits and confronts is lonely, hostile and dangerous. It is a lonely world because it is one whose value and being are given by itself; it is dangerous because consciousness is always liable to be dragged down into the muck of inert being; and it is hostile because other human existents lurk in ambush waiting to violate its sovereignty.

The world which the human reality confronts and is present to provides the other term in the dialectical relation—"Being-in-itself." This external world is just what it is, nothing more, nothing less. It has neither past nor future and therefore lacks potentiality. Becoming a possibility is not, as in Hegel, an attribute of things. For Sartre, the quarter moon is not potentially a full moon unless a consciousness is present to bind the sequence together. Being-in-itself is identical with itself and relationless. Only consciousness can be separate from and aware of itself to any degree. The In-Itself is massive, dense, opaque, contingent in character and void of all meaning and value. It is already too much and therefore absurd.

### **The Attempt to Establish Being**

Having set up the dialectical machinery, Sartre now puts it in motion. The For-Itself is lack of being but its paradox and tragedy is that it would like to combine the qualities of both the For-Itself and the In-Itself. Its fundamental striving is always in the direction of trying simultaneously to be aware of things, that is, to be their negation, and to be a thing-like being, at one with itself. Says Sartre, "The supreme value toward which consciousness, by its absolute being of the self, with its qualities of identity, very nature, is constantly transcending itself is the purity, permanence." And in a celebrated passage, Sartre presents the central theme of his philosophy:

Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to establish being and by the same stroke to constitute the In-Itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the *Ens causa sui*, which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion.

Elsewhere Sartre claims man is an existence before he is essence (hence the description "Existentialist"), that we are forever in the process of making ourselves

and cannot be trapped in the prison of any general definition of human nature which would limit our possibilities. But he does have a definition of man's "essence." He discovers, as we have just seen, that man's fundamental "project" is to strive forever toward the Absolute, to become unconditionally at one with himself, like God, and sharing his transcendent attributes.

At this point Sartre's relation to the main stream of classical philosophy becomes clear. He is part of it. For his notion of what Man should strive toward is no different than Aristotle's or Hegel's. The only difference being that he proclaims the pursuit a failure. Desan asks a legitimate question: Is Sartre's atheism based on his conviction that there is no God or on the rejection of God? Man is a useless passion and doomed to failure in Sartre's philosophy *only because he accepts the notion of an unattainable Absolute as the goal toward which man legitimately strives?*

Sartre understands the meaning of the Absolute as defined in classical philosophy, both ancient and modern. It is the religious mystification of man's striving for a world of security, abundance and the harmonious realization of man's creative possibilities. For Sartre, these ideals remain an absolute and impossible goal which it is impossible to achieve, i.e., there is no reason in the world. Consequently he relapses into an extreme subjectivism. The individual consciousness creates and injects meaning and value into the world.

### **The Individual, Not the Social**

For Sartre of *L'Être et Le Neant* the category of the social does not exist. He denies that truth, beauty and the good are created and given objective status in and through society. They are not historical concretions but personal inventions. He will not admit that the individual attains "objectivity" in and through his participation in society. To the extent that the individual enters into relations with others, he is in danger of losing his freedom.

Into the world of the "For-Itself" and "Being-Itself," Sartre introduces "The Other" and "Being-for-Other." In a famous passage Sartre demonstrates the nature of social interrelationships. Where the meditations of other philosophers have taken place on some lofty, abstract plane, Sartre locates his drama in the hall of a hotel where his hero is in the act of listening at a key-hole. In the moment when his Existentialist hero is caught listening and fixed by the gaze of the Other he experiences shame. Sartre's hero-at-the-keyhole feels the presence of another's liberty, and a certain detachment from himself. Alienated from himself, he apprehends himself as the object of another's stare, as "Being-for-the-Other" and because of him is "perpetually in danger in the world." This is so because "Being-for-the-Other is a fall through absolute emptiness towards being an Object."

Since each consciousness is perpetually seeking to appropriate the world in order to become like God, being-for-and-in-itself, the relation of human beings

to one another is that of struggle where one must be master and the other slave, one subject, the other object. For Sartre, the basic ontological traits of human relationships are summed up by love, hate, sadism and masochism. And of these, sadism and masochism precede the rest. Says Sartre, "All the complex behavior of men to each other are merely enrichments of these two basic attitudes, and of a third, namely hate."

The relation of cooperative and mutual collaboration between men is not a necessary feature of human existence in Sartre's ontology. Translated into the language of politics the implications are unmistakable. And in his essay "Un Auteur Scandaleux," contained in the book of essays entitled *Sens et Non-Sens* (1948) Merleau-Ponty tells us that "15 years ago Sartre said that politics was unthinkable (as in general the Other), that is, a consciousness seen from without." The sentiment expounded concretely in 1933, given novelistic form in *La Nausee* in 1938 is still present in mythological form in the abstractions of *L'Être et le Neant* which appeared in 1943.

### **Sartre as a Descendant of Kierkegaard**

An understanding of the Sartre of the pre-war period and *L'Être et le Neant* prepares us to comprehend the contradictions of the later Sartre. The "For Itself" of the early Sartre is the spiritual descendent of Heidegger and more important perhaps of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's lonely thinker repudiated Hegel's rational optimism and discovered the only meaningful relation to be that existing between the self and God. He lived only for the irrational and paradoxical moment of religious transcendence.

But where Kierkegaard's lonely hero chose God, Sartre's anonymous "human reality," since Sartre is an atheist, chooses itself in the act of choice. This choice is unique, irreducible, private and curiously devoid of content. As we have seen, there is no common bond between Sartre's "human reality" and the rest of mankind. Each person lives under the sign of isolation and the danger of mutual aggression.

This world is a far cry from that of Kant, where a universal morality governs a society filled with individual egos all sharing a common rational nature and pursuing ultimate harmonious ends. Where Kant taught that men ought to respect each other's freedom, Sartre writes: "Respect for the freedom of one's fellow men is idle chatter: even if we could so plan that we honored this freedom, such an attitude would be a violation of the freedom which we were so busy respecting." Sartre's heroic consciousness wants to be free from, not free for. And what it is free from, as his novels, dramas and polemical writings have made clear are the values of bourgeois society. All that remains is the individual consciousness, dependent on nothing, neither God, nature, nor society.

### III

Even philosophers live and learn. And Sartre lived through the Occupation, the Resistance, the Libera-

tion and the tumultuous politics of post-Liberation France. To his credit let it be said that Sartre plunged into the struggle and took up the standard of Socialism. The high point of this phase in his career was his participation in the RDR. But his political activity confronted him with two problems: How to bring his philosophical doctrine into consonance with his new social and political views, and what attitude to take towards Stalinism.

### **Politics Makes Philosophical Problem**

It was clearly impossible for Sartre to maintain the heroic solipsism of *L'Être et le Neant* in the post-war period. In his booklet "Is Existentialism a Humanism?" we find Sartre attempting to widen the meaning of his notion of freedom. He says there, "Nothing can be good for us which is not good for everyone." And still further, "At the same time that I will my own freedom it is my duty to will the freedom of others. I cannot set my own freedom as a goal unless I set that of others as my goal."

As Iris Murdoch points out in her study of the contradictions in Sartre's writings, "We now find Sartre using the notion of a kingdom of harmonising ends wherein human wills are to be united. That human ends in fact harmonize is clearly empirically false. It is apparently being used by Sartre in a way similar to the way it was used by Kant, as a regulative idea." "But," Miss Murdoch also says, "*L'Être et le Neant* claimed to be a work of a descriptive type." And we have already seen the misanthropic manner in which Sartre depicts human relations.

Philosophically, Sartre is caught in flagrant contradiction with himself. As an existentialist thinker in the line of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, he postulated an individual consciousness distinguished by its irreducible uniqueness and isolation. But to justify his political activities, Sartre has now adopted the Kantian notion of a regulative *ought*. Indeed he has gone further, since he implies this is not how they *should* act but *do* act. But to make sense of this new notion of the duty implicit in his freedom, Sartre must also ground it in a postulate of abstract reason common to all men. Each of the two positions is formally consistent in itself. But they cannot be combined as Sartre has attempted. The only real way out for Sartre would be to abandon that last bourgeois myth, the primacy of the individual consciousness, and start from the premise that man is first of all a social being. But this is just what Sartre has always fiercely resisted.

### **Stalinism: Attraction and Uneasiness**

The ambiguous relation which exists between Sartre and the Stalinists rests on two important features of his thinking. The first is that despite his philosophic conception of the primacy of the individual consciousness, Sartre has actually broken with all the values of bourgeois society. No one who has read the bulk of his works can escape the hate and disgust with which Sartre views the bourgeoisie. This repudiation of bourgeois society compels Sartre to seek

for allies in his private war, and with the failure of the RDR to grow into a meaningful social force, he was impelled in the direction of Stalinism.

But if the hatred of bourgeois values is strong enough to motivate his attraction toward the Stalinists, at least equally strong is the factor in his thinking which makes the alliance with Stalinism extremely uneasy: his belief in the sacred unconditional value of human freedom. This, he can hardly reconcile with the realities of Stalinism.

Everett W. Knight has pointed out that Sartre knows what the Stalinists are and showed it in "La Mort dans l'Âme" and "Les Mains Sale." Spiegelberg cites a letter written by Sartre in March, 1954, to the editor of *Humanité* which declared that among the three classes of intellectuals, i.e. the registered Party members, those who consider registering, and those who do not, "we ourselves belong to the third group and think as little of joining the C.P. as you do of accepting us."

Although there is no excuse for Sartre's apologetic defense of Stalinism, perhaps the last word that can be said about his contradictions is to be found in the concluding words of an article by J. M. Domenach, editor of the Left-Catholic magazine, *Esprit*, which appeared in *The Nation* of March 7, 1953. "I say simply that if in France there existed a non-Stalinist revolutionary party which could offer the working class an alternative to absorption by Stalinism, Sartre and Camus would both be in it. Their dispute enables us to evaluate both the tragic consequences of the collapse of Social Democracy in France and the work that remains to be done before the spirit of rebellion can embrace revolution without regret."

ABE STEIN

*Abe Stein is a political analyst who lives in New York City.*

**Anvil readers  
should know**

### **DISSENT**

**a new quarterly of radical opinion, independent,  
anti-Stalinist, tied to no party dogma, non-  
conformist and socialist in accent.**

**Spring issue includes:**

**What I think of Artistic Freedom, by Norman  
Mailer; Dreiser, Trilling and American Society,  
by Bernard Rosenberg; a Democratic Policy for  
Asia, by Asoka Mehta; Symposium on the Crisis  
of Liberalism—Irving Howe, Donald Harrington,  
Murray Kempton.**

**509 Fifth Avenue  
New York City**

**75 cents per copy  
Special student rates**

# Gandhi and Asian Socialism

## —a discussion of socialist ideas developing in asia

The Editors of *Anvil* feel that the views expressed in Mr. Gupta's article are of particular interest in that they represent an important Asian orientation toward socialism, one quite distinct from those socialist viewpoints which have developed in the Western world.

Several members of the Editorial Board have theoretical disagreements with Mr. Gupta. However, we consider his point of view worthy of attention both in itself and as a reflection and a guide to understanding of directions developing today within India and much of Asia.

THERE IS STING in a recent comment of Scott Buchanan that socialism is over. The remark seems repulsive and unpalatable to all those for whom socialism has become a life and blood proposition, and synonymous with social justice and economic equality. Yet, if one were to examine historically the recent trends and results of socialism in the Western world, one is likely to discover a great relevance in Buchanan's comment.

Thus, when the Asian socialists talk about socialism they do not generally mean what their Western comrades take for granted. To the former, the socialist—or if one prefers to call them Marxist—theories of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century appear out-of-date, for these theories were the outcome of the Industrial Revolution. If Walter Reuther is to be relied upon, a time has come when a reaction against increased scientific knowledge and technical advancement has become a necessity in the interests of the working class. And there is an irony in the fact that while capitalism has corrected some of its mistakes, (and thus by becoming more subtle and cunning has become more dangerous) the Marxian analysis and interpretations have stayed, more or less, where Marx had brought them.

### From Marx to Gandhi

Marx placed all his emphasis on the industrial proletariat, and neglected the peasantry. He welcomed industrialization and urbanization, for in the corresponding rise of capitalism he saw the proper institution which could precipitate a social change. In the *Communist Manifesto* he not only called the rural life idiotic but even prophesied that a revolution was least likely to occur in a backward rural society. Lenin's declaration,\* therefore, that a successful peasant revolution meant a good-bye to socialism was merely a perpetuation of an earlier Marxian mistake. So much reliance was placed on the instruments of production, viz: technology and industry, that it was

almost fanatically believed that socialism was impossible without industrialism. And how ironic is it that industrialism has led only to capitalism, both in the United States and the Soviet Union, and a truly socialist society still remains a distant dream.

Another fatal mistake in the Marxian philosophy has been the *amoral* concept of politics and economics. The whole philosophy became so relativistic that means became totally subordinate to aims, leading politics and economics from amoralization to demoralization. Combined with the concept of economic determinism, and the axiom that being precedes consciousness, the Marxian loyalty was placed only in the institutions and the environments, and the individual was neglected. Now it may be conceded that such an attitude was the reaction—or if one may prefer, rebellion—against the ecclesiastical scholasticism which placed total reliance on the individual, and ignored the society. But the Marxian mistake proved rather dangerous: the social reconstruction was being attempted by men who had a nature full of ambitions and pugnacity and nothing was being done to correct man's nature! And what happens when socialist movements are led by the Stalins and the Malenkovs? There is no longer socialism—it is Stalinism, with the emphasis on personal power rather than social strength. As Asoka Mehta points out: "The darkness at noon that characterizes the Moscow skies is the inevitable result of moral relation served in the interest of a one party state. This *denouement* is a travesty of socialism, a mockery of man's epic quest for freedom."

Thus a revision—not a rejection—of Marxian postulates is a necessity. Classical crude capitalism no longer exists. Marx and Engels prescribe in the *Manifesto* ten steps for a progressive outlook in political economy. And in the Western world Marx appears to have been out-Marxed by capitalism which has accepted the main propositions of the *Manifesto*, viz: a graduated income tax, control of banking by the government, in many countries control of communications and transport by the government, creation of social security benefits, effort to bring economic parity between the town and village populations, shorter daily working hours, free elementary education, abolition of child labor, etc. It is perhaps only in backward rural societies that feudalism and serfdom provide an incentive to bring about a revolution, without any awaiting for industrialism. Let us not kid ourselves any longer. Agrarian revolution taking a socialist direction has become reality!

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Marxian philosophy in Asia comes from Gandhism. Gandhi

\* *Agrarian Program of Social Democracy.*



concedes to Marx that being preceds consciousness, and that environment moulds the human being; but the Gandhians would like the Marxians to concede them in return that once consciousness is achieved, man is capable of altering his being, and man is capable of moulding his social environment. To give precedence to one or the other would, therefore, be an incongruity.

Thus it becomes imperative to redefine the ends-means relationship in the socialist movement. The philosopher of Indian socialism, Lohia, calls for loyalty to certain core-values, and these core-values are not to be considered relative so as to be sacrificed on the altar of expediency. With a vision of synthesis, he rejects the subservience of means to ends, and/or the total dependence of ends on means. Instead he offers a new formula, a new relationship, what has been described as the *test of immediacy*.

What we are doing should immediately square up with what we intend to do ultimately. If your present action is in consonance with the ideals that you have before you, there is no reason to doubt where we should ultimately land ourselves. For there is some rational ground for assuming that if our present action is in consonance with the noble ideals that we have before us, then ultimately it is bound to take us there. If, on the other hand, we indulge in activities which contradict these ideals, these values, on which that society will be ultimately based, if our present values contradict ultimate values, there is no rational ground for supposing that we will by some dialectical contrivance arrive at that goal.

### **From One Party Dictatorship To Pluralistic Society**

In the Western countries no adequate political framework of the socialist society has yet been developed. The disappearance of classes, parties and the state is yet a distant dream. We witness either the dictatorship, ruthless and totalitarianian, of the Communist Party, or a very uneasy and formal parliamentary (social) democracy. Neither of them has, in any appreciable measure, advanced the goals of socialism.

One of the reasons why the social democracy has not led to a socialist society has been a relatively short tenure of the control of the government by socialist parties. In order that the socialist governments may not lose the next election, they have not hesitated to slow the pace of social reconstruction, as is evident from the example of the post-war socialist government in England.

Perhaps it can be emphatically asserted that the failure of social democracy has been due to its failure to provide self-government to the people. As Jayaprakash Narayan points out, a mere control of parliament, by a socialist party does not make a country socialist. It is necessary that the people at all levels, in political as well as economic, and also in non-political non-economic social spheres, possess self-government. Modern Western socialism is a bourgeois liberalism, with an accent on a subtle form of centralism, where "inside the state, the ruling party wields absolute power and within the party, leadership is supreme."

If the state—which is different from government—has to wither away, a decentralization of political and economic power is a socialist *must*. We must have a multi-pillar society through the villagization of peasantry, through the workers control of industry, and a corporate social control of utilities like the means of transportation. Not at the top, but at the bottom, the power must rest; not in the federal unit, but in the fundamental community unit.

Political institutions are the reflex of economic institutions. The main economic institution that is going to bring about the socialist revolution in Asia is going to be land and peasantry. But a mere redistribution of land, from the haves to the have-nots, is not social reconstruction, it is bourgeoisification of the working class and the peasantry. The socialists had better stop considering the peasant naive and stupid, as the orthodox Marxians do. Indian socialism is peasant-conscious. It does not aim at the nationalization or collectivization of land, but at the villagization of land. Under this concept "the ownership of the land is transferred to the village community, not to an abstract entity known as the state or the nation, but to the concrete entity with which the peasant is acquainted and of which he is a part, namely, the village."

This means the elimination of the bureaucracy, which has become an ulcer in the Soviet body-politic. This also means the preservation of ethical awareness, which in the Soviet society has been murdered by developing the agricultural cities, or agricultural factories. The village communes, with their village handicrafts industry are then going to be the main pillar of Asian society.

### **Industrialization**

Industrialization of a country—and that too at a rapid pace—was considered by the early socialists as the key for economic development. This is understandable because their thinking was the result of the mood of their times, and the mood was the growth of industry and development of technology.

However, in a backward country there are several compulsions of an under-developed economy. Capital formation is extremely difficult. The Soviet Union tried to do it by condemning 15 to 20 per cent of its people to labor camps and Siberia, and by starving the people at large. The problem becomes more acute in Asia due to the factor of heavy pressure on land. Industrialization at a rapid pace is bound to create unemployment and inflation. Asian economy should therefore be labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive, and the under-employment should provide the necessary capital. Initially the accent has to be on light-industry. This has both the economic and the sociological advantages. Small industry offers a good media for decentralization of power. And in modern times, the backward countries can not afford to compete in heavy industries with the over-developed countries of the West. Such a competition would be the



wasting of their own resources and capital.

Sociologically, the Indian society is family-centered rather than individual-centered. Family gives security and what Kuo-Hengh Shih calls "social integrity." Economic development can not, should not, afford to lose sight of sociological conditions. The family provides a very interesting economic unit in a decentralized cooperative economy.

It should, however, be clearly understood that while the Asian socialism will be having its accent on peasantry, this does not mean that it rejects industrialization. It does reject such industrialization that will make Asia lose more than it can gain. One of the fundamentals of a socialist economy is full employment. Already fifty million people are unemployed in India alone. Introduce some more industry and another fifteen million will be unemployed. Until a full employment has been secured in village-economy, and rural public works, and labor-intensive cottage industries, and nationally operated utilities, no scheme of rapid industrialization or capital accumulation is likely to give a socialist structure to Asia.

Hidden unemployment constitutes hidden capital in a backward economy. This has to be taken advantage of. Voluntary labor, and an economy of austerity, will give Asia its capital. Between 1945 and 1948 the contribution of voluntary labor in the development of Yugoslavia amounted to \$160 million. In India the national savings, which are about six per cent at present, can be at least doubled by mobilization of volunteer labor, land armies, without creating either depression or inflation. It is on this faith of voluntary suffering and labor that the foundation of Indian socialism rests.

### **From Class-Hatred to Non-Violence**

The three symbols of Asian socialism are Spade, Prison and Vote. Spade is the symbol of constructive activity and voluntary labor, while prison stands for the way the social injustices and state tyrannies are to be eradicated.

Here again we discover a revision of the Marxian concept by the Gandhians. Marx's reliance on class conflicts and class hatreds and his obsession with a violent struggle to overthrow the privileged classes has done much harm to the ethics of socialism. Violent revolutions take a very long span of time to stabilize themselves, and during this process of stabilization not infrequently a military or political dictatorship comes into being. One type of political tyranny becomes replaced by another type. Political revolutions no longer get supplemented by social and economic revolutions. This was the irony of the French Revolution, and this turned out to be the paradox of the Russian Revolution, while on a miniature scale the same thing has been happening continually in the South American "republics."

Socialist ideology faces a tough question in the discussion of techniques for revolution. Socialist ethics demands that the technique should be democratic. By democratic techniques, as Jayaprakash

Narayan has repeatedly pointed out, the Indian socialists do not mean the parliamentary techniques, or the constitutional procedures. They speak "in terms of vital, large, mass movements, mass action of non-violent character, unconstitutional, and yet at the same time peaceful. If we are working with the sanction of the people behind us, if we have got their backing, there is no reason why it should not be possible for us to move the masses into such peaceful activity."

Thus, the non-violent, radical, non-cooperative mass movements, *a la* Gandhi, afford a more effective and ethical weapon to overcome injustices. The Indian socialists have rejected the approach of taking advantage of class conflicts promoted into violent class struggle, in favor of revolutionary non-cooperation. This does not mean that the Asian socialists do not recognise the presence of class conflict, which they do. This rather means that the class conflict is to be channelized constructively and creatively, and not merely made a synonym for bloodshed and hate.

Gandhi, like a real socialist, places his faith in the people. He considers them to be a revolutionary progressive force, something of an Internal Proletariat, in the Toynbee sense. This is why his concept of bringing "change of heart" among the masses is not a sentimental concept: it is no doubt, romantic, as every revolutionary socialist concept is. Harmony in classes and various sections of society is possible if harmonious means are used to achieve the harmony. The Land Gift Movement in India will probably explain the case. The Movement is a challenge not only to communist methods, or the capitalist-feudalistic accumulation, but to the parliamentary-democratic methods.

One more point. It should be recognised that any government will be far from being socialistically perfect. It is likely to commit mistakes. And until the state withers away, it is likely at times to suppress popular feelings. How, then, are the mistakes going to be corrected? Not by armed revolt, nor by waiting until the next government comes into power, but by the launching of a civil-disobedience struggle.

Such a concept gives to the masses a unique dynamic for social change. It puts the masses on the alert, makes them sensitive to social injustices. The difference between the elite and the masses, the leaders and the followers, is reduced to a minimum, if not removed totally.

This also means rejection of war and violence, not only as an instrument for international policy, but also for national policy. This is where Indian socialism stands today. Let's hope it advances from that position in the future.

BRIJEN K. GUPTA

*Brijen K. Gupta has been active in the Praja Socialist Party (India) for many years. He was Overbrook Fellow at Yale University last year and is currently writing a book on the theory of Asian political economy.*

# The British Labor Party

## *—complicated anti-Americanism*

THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY is the most powerful working class party in the world today. With more than a million members and the backing of an eight million strong Trade Union Congress, it is, indisputably, today's leading Social Democratic Party. In terms of practical achievements in domestic affairs—measures of nationalization, social services and general reforms—the Labor Party has shown itself to be far more radical than its Continental counterparts, despite their formal adherence to the theories of Marx and Engels.

### **The Early Stages**

Now, as the powerful opposition party in government, its views must be understood and reckoned with. In the field of foreign affairs, the dominant and most important attitude (with particular strength among the Bevanites) is that of anti-Americanism. It is an attitude which is at once tremendously important in itself, and also interesting in that it encompasses complicated motives and emotions, some progressive, some reactionary, which are elements in the *pot pourri* of ideas motivating the British Labor Party. There is involved in the anti-Americanism such varied elements as British chauvinism and a softness toward Stalinism, as well as a healthy hostility toward American war-mongering.

During the six year period of the British Labor Government (1945-1951), the social, political and military threat from the Soviet bloc forced America and England into a very close alliance. The main architect of this policy was Ernest Bevin, until early 1951 the Foreign Secretary of the Labor Government. However, despite repeated attempts from the floor of Labor Party conferences to call a halt to Bevin's foreign policy, the great majority of trade union delegates, together with a majority of delegates from the constituent parties, were bludgeoned into support of the official policy of the party by the rather effective means of labeling all opposition as being inspired by the Communists or fellow-travelers. The truth of the matter was that the only vocal opposition to the policy of Ernest Bevin came from Konni Zilliacus, the eloquent, persuasive fellow-traveling Labor M.P. for Gateshead (near Newcastle), and a small band of supporters. With the vocal opposition so weak, it was quite easy for Ernest Bevin to trundle out to the platform at congress after congress and sledgehammer the foreign policy of Vyacheslav Molotov, and to win the rather reluctant support of the delegates.

The Korean War and the subsequent stepping up of the arms program set in motion the first important differentiation both within the leadership of the

Labor Government, and within the Labor Party as a whole. The resignation of Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman in April 1951 opened up a new phase not only inside the Labor Party, but also in the relations between the United States and Great Britain. It was evident that the weight of the projected one and a half billion dollars arms expenditure was too great for the British economy to bear. In the words of Aneurin Bevan: "If, in order to meet the military threat of totalitarian machines, the economies of the Western World are disrupted and the standard of living lowered and industrial disturbances are created, then Soviet Communism establishes a whole series of Trojan horses in every nation of the Western economy."

It was not an accident, of course, that the first opposition to the American-inspired arms program should have come from the Labor Party, rather than the Tory Party. For it was the workers who were to suffer from the effects of this massive arms expenditure, and it was perfectly natural for their spokesman to come to their defense. At the same time, too, the capitalists through their spokesmen in the Tory Party stated that a break-neck arms expenditure would have an adverse effect on Britain's export drive. Thus for differing reasons the opposition to the weight and extent of the arms expenditure found an expression in both the Labor Party and the Conservative Party.

Running parallel to this opposition to the arms program, there emerged a current of resentment towards American foreign policy. The crossing of the 38th Parallel by General McArthur led to immediate intervention by Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister. A distinct feeling that American foreign policy was unstable, irresponsible and uncoordinated became increasingly a part of mounting criticism by Labor's Left Wing. It was felt that every effort should be made to test Russian reactions to a settlement in Korea or Indo China, and that part of the trouble in Korea was due to the intransigence of the American government to the Chinese Communist regime. All of these disturbing features of American foreign policy, which began to assume a distinct and real form after the outbreak of the Korean War, shook the confidence not only of the Left Wing of the Labor Party, but of the Right Wing and Tories as well.

These background developments in British attitudes were early stages of what is, today, a particularly strong opposition to American foreign policy. The full picture of Labor Party anti-Americanism is complicated by at least two important factors: British nationalism, and its attitude toward Stalinism.

The recent visit to Russia and China by the Labor Party delegation had the backing of the vast majority

of the British people. All the government newspapers supported it, although some of them thought it untimely, and the British Foreign Office took more than a benevolent interest in its progress. For the British people the visit was a show of independence on the part of British political leaders. It was felt that Britain has to act as the "go-between," or the "mediator" between an America losing all sense of responsibility and a Soviet bloc rigid through its isolation from Western contact. The huge British success at the Geneva Conference made Anthony Eden the darling not only of the moderate Tory wing, but also, oddly enough, of the Bevanite Left of the British Labor Party. Here was a man after their own heart, asserting British independence, and giving a distinctly British lead to the affairs of the world. Here was a man who could stand up to Dulles, and lunch with Chou en Lai and Molotov despite the differences of ideologies. Here was a man who believed in give and take, in compromise, in steering a middle course—in a word, a man who believed in peaceful co-existence. The close bonds that were established between Anthony Eden and Mendes-France (the "Bevan" of France) added still further to the prestige of Anthony Eden. It was not surprising, therefore, to find the *Tribune* (the magazine of the Bevanite wing) describing Eden as "speaking for Britain," when, in fact, he was speaking for Tory Britain. The Bevanites are so anxious to be independent of America that any sign of independence on the part of the Foreign Office or the Lord Beaverbrook press (which is conducting an "all Germans are Nazi beasts" campaign against German rearmament) is welcomed quite uncritically.

The *Tribune* does not recognize that a socialist opposition to American foreign policy is at one and the same time a socialist opposition to the present British foreign policy. It is this anti-Americanism which is the main motive force of the left wing of the Labor Party. It is a compound both of a healthy questioning of the irresponsible conduct of American foreign policy and a reactionary nationalistic hostility toward American policy to a point where all things British seem pure and without blemish. This combination of motives in Bevanite attitudes is well illustrated with the issue of German rearmament.

The question of German rearmament is now one of the key questions facing the Labor Party. It is generally recognized that the hand of Ernest Bevin, the former Labor Party Foreign Secretary, was forced during the period of the Truman administration. Much against his will, the American government pressed the Labor Government to accept the policy of a West German contribution to the defense of the "free world." The memories of World War II are still fresh in the minds of the majority of Englishmen and the fact that it was Germans who bombed all the main cities of Britain is firmly planted in the minds of all strata of the population. The indecent haste with which the American government pressed the

whole question, so soon after the conclusion of World War II, appears a mockery of the dead to most Englishmen. Quite naturally the Labor Party, which feels that World War II was a crusade against fascism and totalitarianism, is a particular foe of the rearming plan. The very thought of arming the Nazi jackboots again sends a shudder down the spine of every Englishman.

### **Chauvinism and German Rearmament**

But this opposition to German rearmament has a two-sided character. On the one hand, there is the justified alarm at the re-emergence of Nazi tendencies in Western Germany. On the other, there is a strong British chauvinist and anti-German coloration which has its origins in the Vansittartism of the war years.

Both sides of the debate have this under-current. Those who were in the forefront of the "crusade against the Huns" are now in the forefront of the new crusade in support of arming the Germans. The debate is not on whether the Germans have a *right* to rearm. It is a debate over whether the Germans shall be *forced* to make a contribution to Western defense, or whether they shall be *forced* to remain disarmed.

The result: On the one hand, an alliance of the Government, the Liberal Party and the official Labor Party leadership. On the other, an unholy alliance of the Bevanites, the *Daily Express* (organ of the Beaverbrook Empire Tories)—and the Stalinists.

Anti-Americanism is greatly strengthened by the debate. Those against rearmament are also against the country whose haste and self-interest forced the issue.

Labor Party anti-Americanism can be better understood, too, by considering certain aspects of its attitude toward totalitarian Communism. Some of the best reflections of British Labor Party thinking on the question of Stalinism came out of the recent visit to China and Russia by the delegation of Labor M.P.s. Laborites strongly supported the visits and deeply resented the attitude advanced towards the affair by the American government and press.

The British felt that the visit of the official leadership of the Labor Party could only improve the bad relations that exist between the West and East, could only assert the British desire for "peaceful co-existence." The fact that Americans and others assumed the official leadership of the Labor Party would be "taken for a ride" by their Russian and Chinese hosts, was particularly resented. They felt, indeed, that the sober and relatively objective account of what they saw and experienced in Russia and China quickly refuted the American allegations. They considered Attlee's articles in the *Star*, for instance, as models of social democratic objectivity. He did not "agree with Communism," but recognized that we have to "co-exist with her." He had no use for Communist doctrines and methods, but thought the Chinese were less rigid and doctrinaire than their Russian counterparts. He expressed the firm opinion that the Chinese

leaders had the support of the Chinese population and that the sooner Chiang Kai Shek was out of the way, the better. And Aneurin Bevin, whom the American press considers the great fellow-traveler, made it quite clear to his Chinese hosts that he was convinced of the revolutionary possibilities of a democratic parliament, even if they were not.

Certainly, as far as British opinion was concerned, the whole affair was to be counted to the credit of the Labor Party delegation.

Many of the Laborites, themselves, had definite emotions to the countries which they visited. The desire, particularly on the part of the left wing of the Labor Party, to feel a part of a great revolution taking place a long, long, way off, is very strong.

The memories of the Russian Revolution are still quite vivid. The Chinese Revolution, which spelled an end to Chiang Kai-shek as a political force, is looked on as a great progressive event with which British Labor must solidify itself. And although they recognize the totalitarian nature of Stalinism, there is a feeling that the police state can be talked into softness, or diplomatically cooed into mellowness.

That is how the British view it. The socialist alternative of political, socialist, working class opposition to Stalinism is just not heard of—in official circles. The June 1953 East Berlin uprising by the German working class evoked an interesting response in Britain. The attitude, to paraphrase the comment of the French general on Balaclava was, "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas politique." German freedom, they feel, can only be *bought by negotiation*, by bargaining with the Russians. Stalinist totalitarianism can only be wished away by patience in diplomacy, and compromise at the conference table.

Given this British attitude, the parallel bludgeoning anti-Communism of the American government (which sees Communism in every revolutionary, radical or even democratic movement that has the slightest real or fancied sympathy with the Stalinist apparatus) serves only to intensify the anti-Americanism of vast numbers of British people.

On yet another issue, anti-Americanism thrives in this country: McCarthyism. McCarthyism is regarded as a threat to the free world at least the equal of the threat from the Soviet bloc. McCarthyism is considered as an unpleasant blot on the landscape of the "free world," which the American government is too cowardly to deal with. The icy-cold reception which Cohn and Schine received on their visit to this country gives an inkling of the attitude of the British press to McCarthy. It is felt that McCarthy and McCarthy-

ism are the most useful assets the Soviets have in the free world. McCarthyism is identified with fascism in every quarter, and the Stalinists have little difficulty in making the identity. McCarthyism is also identified with the anti-internationalist wing of the American ruling circles—or with the "Asia-firsters." Naturally, the British government is not too anxious to be "crossed off" by the American government in the event of war, and it is, therefore, none too happy about the activities of McCarthy and his henchmen.

Yet again, this anti-McCarthyism has its reactionary sides. The McCarthyism and witch-hunting in Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus—in British Guiana and Jamaica—is all conveniently overlooked by the laborites, while all attention is focused on the American representative of this loathsome disease. Worse still, there is a tendency to counterpose the "good" Democrats and the "sober" Eisenhower Republicans to the "lunatic" McCarthy and his followers. It is not understood that *McCarthyism* is not the same thing as *McCarthy*; that McCarthy may go but the McCarthyism of Nixon and Brownell may well continue.

In this necessarily sketchy analysis of the basic motive forces of anti-Americanism in Britain, and in the Labor Party in particular it must be emphasized that British anti-Americanism is not "Communist-inspired." Fundamentally it is a product both of reactionary nationalist hostility to a dominant America displacing the old role of the British Empire and a progressive opposition to the verge-of-the-trigger arrogance of the American spokesmen in the cold war, who have more than enough to say on every question.

It is quite wrong to identify Bevanism with Stalinism. Despite some of its blindnesses regarding Stalinism, Bevanism is actually more anti-American than it is pro-Russian, and in its "softnesses" it shares the illusions of important sectors of the neutralist and semi-neutralist European bourgeoisie. The indisputable fact that Stalinism tries to find a base in these moods does not make the moods basically Stalinist.

The word *moods* is a lot closer to describing Bevanite reactions than the word *policies* would be. The frequently vague, often conflicting and complex reactions are hardly solid and well-defined *policies* presented to the powers that be. Their criticism of American actions does serve, however, the very useful purpose of holding in check the most aggressive elements on the American political scene, who are in this way made to realize that America cannot "go it alone."

ALAN ROSS

*Alan Ross is a British student.*

Both the regular "practical" and the regular "intellectual" leadership of the Democratic Party have adopted the position that organized progressive groups should minimize their role in political campaigns. Not only is this desired because of "practical" power considerations and patronage control on the one hand, and "intellectual" convictions on the other, but also as a result of serious misconceptions on the part of both as to the methods of winning elections. The practical politician seeks not so much to positively influence the voter as he does to refrain from alienating him. Thus his platform tries to please all segments and offend none, if possible. He dreads the thought that his party will ever appear to be dominated by a particular interest to the extent that a counter-interest will be permanently alienated.

The "intellectual" regular is motivated less by the bare desire to win elections than he is by the sincere belief that if elected, his mission is really to represent "all the people" . . . What is more logical than for him to appeal to "all the people" in the campaign? The role of the progressive groups is consequently de-organized, as it were, in Democratic campaign tactics.

An amusing illustration of the kind of thinking at work is the lament attributed to one of "Jumping Joe" Ferguson's party aides in the sorry campaign to unseat the late Robert Taft in 1950. According to Fay Calkins in her *The CIO and the Democratic Party*, Clarence Doyle, Ferguson's publicity manager, is known to have said that "Labor operated too much

above board," and thus apparently helped to defeat Ferguson by antagonizing too many voters who "normally" might have supported Ferguson except that they didn't like "labor"! The fact that the Democratic Party in Ohio was, and still is, a vacuum organization, held together only through the tenuous lines of patronage, unable and unwilling to effectively support its own candidate, present the issues, or to provide funds for the campaign was not overly significant to Mr. Doyle.

I suggest finally to the progressive who is anxious to see the rise and growth of a party of progress to effectively combat the already established Republican Party of conservatism, that he look hard and long at the present Democratic Party and its organization, both North and South, before he commits himself to the task of molding it into an instrument of progress.

### **Labor, Progressives Need Own Party**

I am convinced that our time and energy can and should be devoted to the creation of a new political party calculated to replace the inept Democratic organization; a new party based solidly on organized labor and other progressive groups. The times demand a socially and politically responsible progressive party—a party of content, of purpose, and of the ability to enact its program, once elevated to power. A modern industrial democracy can tolerate no less and long survive as a democracy.

JERRY PHILLIPS

*Jerry Phillips is a Midwestern C.I.O. organizer.*

## — C O R R E S P O N D E N C E —

To the ANVIL Editor:

Usually when Mau Mau is discussed in the U.S., a picture is conjured up of some half-crazed, half naked savage, chopping off the hands of a poor defenseless white settler. Great Britain is portrayed as the paternal godfather seeking the welfare of backward Kenyans, leading the savages to ultimate enjoyment of a higher life, and forced to use repression only because of the handbiting of ungrateful barbarians. Liberals in particular tend to discuss the colonial policies of America's number one ally, perhaps unconsciously, in these terms. Glossing over the atrocities, which if committed by Stalinists would correctly be howled down to hell, is common for liberals who choose "lesser evilism," and thus find themselves partners of Franco, Chiang, Strijdom of South Africa, Rhee etc. And when matched with these worthy gentry, British maneuvers in Kenya seem to represent enlightened colonialism at its best.

Thus one rarely hears the full account of the situation in Kenya. Yet it above all explodes the myth of enlightened British colonialism. These facts must be

underscored if only for the benefit of those liberals whose democratic feelings haven't completely been warped by reaction or cynicism.

Olaf Fischer began the job in his article "Behind the Mau Mau Terror" (*Anvil*, Summer-Fall, 1954), clearly showing the role Great Britain has played in Kenya. The British and their settlers simply grabbed the land from the Kikuyu (the major tribe in Kenya), with, of course, the typical legal mumbo-jumbo. They set about to exploit the natives to such an extent that, even as hardened as we are in this age of vicious exploitation, the figures are eye-opening. The average *per capita* personal income of Europeans in 1949 was \$820 (with many settlers having annual incomes of \$100,000), whereas the average for Africans was \$18 per year. Add to the exploitation a rigid, all-pervasive color bar. And cement everything with the British breaking down the Kikuyu's culture. As Fischer points out, one winds up with a fine example of crude imperialism.

But British barbarism was not completely decked out in Fischer's article. The circumstances surrounding the cre-

ation of a state of emergency in October, 1952 and the events which followed were not mentioned. Yet only including these facts can one fully evaluate British imperialism as well as take the hard stand that all democrats must take in Kenya.

On October 20, 1952, the world was suddenly startled. The British had created a state of emergency in their Kenya colony in order to put down a secret, terroristic society known as the "Mau Mau." Of course, from June to October, 1952, only four Europeans had been murdered; no matter, such a society existed and, as a grave threat to British rule, had to be crushed by armed might!

From the events that immediately followed, one must start questioning the official reasons for creating martial law. If these reasons (the existence of Mau Mau) were honestly held by the British their method of approach was strange to say the least, for besides fighting the "Mau Mau," they managed to accomplish these tasks as well:

(1) On May 20, 1953, the British colonial government announced the banning of the Labor Trade Union of East  
(Continued on next page)



(continued from preceding page)

Africa (formed in 1937), the largest and oldest labor organization in Kenya, without giving any official reason. They were *not even charged* with supporting the "Mau Mau." (2) On the same day slave-labor was officially instituted. British district commissioners were given the right to force native Africans to work for a maximum of 90 days a year with or without pay. (3) The suppression of the Kenya Africa Union completes the pattern; other reasons for a neat, imperialist's aggression against its *own* colony come to light. This suppression of the K.A.U. was most important, was the major reason that the British found it necessary to create the emergency state, as we shall see in examining its history.

In the face of the economic, political and social hardships besetting them, the Kikuyu set about to change things in a *peaceful* way. Since there were only 49 primary schools with a total enrollment of 5,500 children (there are 5½ million Africans in Kenya) and only six secondary ones, the K.A.U. set up their own—the Kenya Independent Schools Association—a total of 180 with 21,000 students. But at the same time the K.A.U. was more than an educational society. It was a *political* organization fighting for freedom of press, speech, universal franchise, fighting for the return of the White Highlands to their rightful owners (these were the lands the British had taken away from the Kikuyu), fighting for African self-government. And the organization was growing. It already had a membership of 100,000 in 1952. And it was growing even bigger.

But, naturally, because of their "connections" to "Mau Mau," the British prohibited K.A.U. activity, shut down their newspapers (over 30 in all), suppressed their schools (34 were immediately proscribed, the rest "warned") stopped their gatherings, rounded up their officials and members. Although the K.A.U. was not outlawed officially, the result was exactly the same.

The suppression of the K.A.U. is what

the British and their settlers had wanted all along, for this European group is determined to stay and knows that in order to maintain its position it must remain politically dominant. Without political control this European minority would soon lose its present economic status." (W. Wieschoff, *Colonial Policies in Africa*, Univ. of Penn. Press., 1944, pp. 68-9). The K.A.U. was a *political* threat to British rule! It had to be stopped! And what better way was there than through a little state of emergency?

British brutality reaches a peak in the collective punishment they have instituted in Kenya. Both deportation and sequestration of property (besides the out-and-out killings, which are, of course, the best way to suppress people) are used as the means to a more general end: the total subjugation of the African population, the liquidation of any threat to British rule. The means are well chosen.

Cattle, as the British government well knows, play an important part in the spiritual and material life of the Kikuyu. So that is what is taken from the Africans; eight thousand head were rounded up in the first month after the emergency state was proclaimed. If no evidence about "Mau Mau" is then given by the group from whom the cattle are taken, the livestock is sold on the open market. A neat way of cowing any healthy political feeling, isn't it?

The second type of collective punishment is the wholesale deportation of people from one area to another. The total number of deported Kikuyu is so great that Fenner Brockway, Labor MP, maintains the British have no record of them. But an indication of the extent of this type of collective punishment was given by Lyttelton, the British Colonial Secretary, who stated that from October, 1952 to June 30, 1953, over one hundred twelve thousand Africans were taken into custody for questioning! Can one think of a better way to suppress the political aspirations of a colonial people?

The British attempted aggression in Kenya in order to maintain their abso-

lute control over the colony. But they found, and still find, themselves confronted by mass opposition, not by a simple terroristic society, but by an enraged oppressed people. The British have thrown large-scale forces, jet planes and the like, into the field, have killed 7,000 Africans, imprisoned another 65,000, and still haven't defeated the now-determined Africans. With the extension of the field of hostilities to Uganda, the eastern neighbor of Kenya (a state of emergency now exists there too), with a bloody war raging for two and a half years, can one still say that the British are combatting simply a secret terroristic organization, can one maintain no real mass revolt is in progress—can one be that blind? No, one can only conclude that a national-liberation civil war is being fought in eastern Africa, on one side the British imperialists and their settlers, on the other the oppressed African mass.

Now it is quite right that democrats should, as Fischer did in his article, call for British reforms in Kenya. As Brockway has repeatedly done in Parliament, they must insist on abolition of serfdom, distribution of land, cooperative farming, minimum and better wages, universal suffrage, etc. But democrats go further in all colonial questions; they call for self-determination. They say that the people of a nation have the right to determine for themselves who is to govern them.

But when a national-liberation war is raging in the colonial country, democrats are pushed even further. While abhorring violence and strongly opposing terrorism, they still support the oppressed people rising against the foreign exploiter! In order to remain democrats and not capitulate by default to the foreign oppressors, one must take the hard line in Kenya. One must vigorously assert: "I support the Africans in the war, *Britain and the settlers must get out of Kenya!*"

MEL BECKER

Member, Young Socialist League

## Book in Review

## Who's Betraying What?

*McCarthy and the Communists*, by James Rorty and Moshe Decter. Beacon Press, 1954.

"McCarthyism" is one of the vaguest terms that has ever achieved wide currency in American political life. To the sixty-seven Senators who voted for the censure resolution, it evidently was synonymous with rudeness, or bad manners, for this was the essence of the charge. To some of the new conservatives—John Lukacs writing in *The Commonwealth*, for example—it is a reactionary radicalism

which is to be deplored. To others, McCarthyism means fascism; thus Senator Flanders compared his Wisconsin colleague to Hitler.

To the liberal, McCarthy has too often served the function of a ritual scapegoat. He, and he alone, is the source of all anti-civil-libertarian evil according to this point of view. If he would only disappear, then the right, the true and the good would reassert itself. In the passage of the Humphrey anti-Communist law, this view of the problem as

a personal one reached its apogee; it was all right for a liberal to introduce a McCarthyite law, for after all, he was a liberal, a vice-president of Americans for Democratic Action, and not Senator McCarthy.

This last attitude, conceiving of McCarthyism as the individual creation of one person, Senator McCarthy, is probably the most pervasive in the anti-McCarthy movement. It completely overlooks the fact that McCarthy's career is only five years old, dating from the



Wheeling West Virginia speech, and that his effectiveness was immediate, not because he created a situation, but because he discovered one. And the point that this is a favorable liberal analysis of McCarthyism is not an accident.

For if the liberal were to admit the role which the climate of opinion played in being receptive to McCarthy in 1950, he would also have to acknowledge the role of the Truman Fair Deal Administration in civil liberties, for it was under Truman that McCarthy became possible. This would almost inevitably lead to a discussion of the liberals' use of the Smith Act, the liberals' Attorney General's List, the liberals' Loyalty and Security Program, and so on. It would involve the admission that, far from being able to "fight" McCarthy, the liberal was actually an unwitting collaborator in his rise to prominence.

Yet, the contrary view which sees McCarthyism not in terms of the Senator as an individual, but rather as a well-defined social movement, fascist in character, is almost equally fragile. It ignores the fact that McCarthy has not presented a demagogic social program of any kind, and that his rise centered around the issue of subversion and foreign policy rather than domestic crisis. As a result, it cannot deal with the multi-class nature of the McCarthy movement. Certainly the cadres of American fascism have taken McCarthyism as their immediate slogan, but this hardly exhausts the nature of the phenomenon, and it does not provide the basis for such a specific definition as "fascism."

Any kind of exact definition at this time must be extremely tentative. The events of the past year — the Army-McCarthy hearings, the censure proceedings, McCarthy's attack on Eisenhower—indicate that McCarthyism as a social movement has not jelled. It is, for instance, doubtful that McCarthy could retain his working class support in the face of internal economic crisis. At the same time, it is clear that McCarthy the demagogue, is part of a social process, not creator but exploiter, and that it is impossible to make even the most hesitant of analyses without reference to the broad movement of American society in the last decade.

### Current Liberal Position Revealed

However, the appearance of *McCarthy and the Communists* by James Rorty and Moshe Decter, does provide an opportunity to state some of the facts about McCarthy which are definite. More, it is an extremely revealing document in terms of the current liberal position, endorsed as it was by the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. It is illuminating with regard to both McCarthyism and liberal anti-McCarthyism. Specifically, an analysis of *McCarthy and the Communists* involves an examination of the relation between liberalism and foreign policy, liberalism and civil liberties, and liberalism and Stalinism.

And by seeing McCarthy from this point of view, certain aspects of the McCarthyite movement become much more clear.

By and large, the liberal has neither attempted, nor is capable of understanding McCarthyism as a social movement. In order to do so, it would be necessary to analyze it in terms of the whole phenomenon of liberal anti-Stalinism, to relate it to the failure of American foreign policy and the concomitant growth of domestic reaction. However, Rorty and Decter are considerably more sophisticated than most liberals. Therefore, they advance a social analysis—of sorts.

### Attempt at Social Analysis

"Senator McCarthy," they write, "is not a unique phenomenon in American political history. He stems from the frontier tradition rooted in the Midwest. . . . The hero of this image was independent, self-reliant, virile, strong, simple and direct . . . simple, unsophisticated, and uncomplicated panaceas could be put forward as solutions for large, complex problems. The region understandably became a breeding ground for demagogues and demagoguery. Senator McCarthy is an ambitious politician of this school."

This is not the place to go into the "frontier hypothesis" of American history, which is apparently the source of Rorty and Decter's general image. Granting, for the sake of argument, that such an image can be generalized from the development of American history, why does McCarthy, scion of the frontier tradition, emerge at this time? For if the mere existence of such a tradition is enough to explain McCarthyism, then it must also be continuously operative for the other Senators from the same area; we should be able to explain LaFollette progressivism in the same manner.

Such an historical analysis explains practically nothing about McCarthy and McCarthyism. For if it is true that there is a Midwestern isolationist tradition, more complicated than the Rorty-Decter analysis implies, to be sure, we are still faced with the problem of explaining why it was actualized *at this time and by this man*. Traditions enter into the general process of social movement and are modified by it; they are relevant only when understood in the context of the present.

At this point, then, we must go from the Rorty-Decter image of the Midwestern past to their version of the American present. It is here that we will find the factors which gave the tradition its current form (if that tradition is involved in any major sense at all.) And it is here that we do find the very heart of the liberal difficulty in dealing with McCarthyism.

McCarthy leads an *anti* movement; anti-communist, anti-subversive, etc. The social context in which he became meaningful had many elements, but two of the most important were the revelation

of Stalinist infiltration into American government and the liberal reaction to that fact. And in understanding these points, it is necessary to make reference to the broad outline of American development in the last two decades.

On the first element, the success of Stalinist infiltration, Rorty and Decter are considerably more frank than most liberals. They write, "For Americans there was indeed real ground for apprehension. Communists and their sympathizers had actually nested in many government agencies. They had arrived in Washington early, during the first years of the New Deal, and had dug themselves deep into both the newly created alphabetical agencies and the old-line departments. They rose high and stayed late."

It was the inability of liberals to admit this fact which is important in understanding their position in the current witch-hunt. For once having said, with Truman, that the charges of Stalinist infiltration were a "red herring," it was almost inevitable that the liberal would be captive of his critic when the critic's version of reality turned out to be accurate. The transition involved was not simply to an acceptance of the critic's picture of the past, but to an acceptance of the critic's method in dealing with the present.

The anti-Communist law sponsored by Hubert Humphrey in the summer of 1954 is the extreme point of this particular process. Here, the liberals clearly admitted that they intended to destroy McCarthy by using McCarthyism. No longer were they reluctant captives of their critics; they were now vying with them to see who had most enthusiasm.

Yet, again we must stop and relate this reality to an even larger context. If, as Rorty and Decter argue, the "frontier tradition" is operative today in the rise of McCarthyism, this must be explained in terms of the present reality which actualized it. And if the process which we have been describing, that of the inability of the liberal to face up to the reality of Stalinist infiltration, is operative today, it too must be seen in terms of facing up to a larger present reality.

### The Real Struggle

That reality is the struggle between Stalinism and American capitalism.

In 1946, the dominant liberal image of Russian society began to shatter. During the Popular Front period of the Thirties, and throughout the Great Alliance of the Forties, American liberalism had been largely uncritical of the nature of Stalinist totalitarianism. Lacking any kind of structured idea of Stalinist society, the liberal had been prey to infiltration. Then, in 1946, a process began in which the entire liberal movement became anti-Stalinist.

But this anti-Stalinism shared with the previous pro-Stalinism a lack of any concrete idea of the workings of Stalinist society, or the political appeal

of Stalinism throughout the world. The "good guys" had become "bad guys." And operating on such an hypothesis of conspiracy, the liberal shaped a foreign policy aimed at Stalinist military strength, but not at Stalinism as a social movement, and a civil-liberties policy concerned only with the conspiratorial aspect of the American Stalinist movement. The *political* meaning of this attitude was that of fairly uncritical defense of American capitalism in the cold war.

McCarthy was another aspect of the same phenomenon, of the inability of America to fight Stalinism politically, either abroad or at home, of the almost exclusive reliance on coercion as a means of struggle. For this reason, a liberal analysis of McCarthyism in its larger political context would also involve a monumental act of self-criticism. Specifically, it would mean that the whole development of American foreign and domestic policy, under liberals, in the last decade would have to be rejected.

Rorty and Decter make the admission of the reality. Do they then reject the development of liberal policy during the last ten years? Do they criticize both the failure of American foreign policy and the tragic capitulation to hysteria on the home front?

### Accepting the Smith Act

Hardly. Rorty and Decter show themselves to be more sophisticated than most liberals. For most liberals are not as clear as they on the subject of the reality of Stalinist infiltration — and most liberals are somewhat ashamed of the laws which they have supported in the last decade. But Rorty and Decter refuse to open the Pandora's box of rejecting the liberal reaction to domestic Stalinism (and therefore raising the question of the liberal reaction to international Stalinism). Rather, they discard the sense of shame and come out positively for that reaction. All other sensibility is blotted out by the desire to protect American capitalism. What is involved is the workings of a fairly basic psychological process: that a man can support the lesser evil as such for only so long; then the lesser evil becomes the positive good. One can say, "We used the Smith Act to put Stalinists in jail to forestall the reactionaries from shooting them." But then the rationalization is lost, and the Smith Act becomes (cf. Sidney Hook) a positive virtue. Rorty and Decter belong to the positive virtue school.

Thus, they cite with pride the following measures: "1939: Emergency Relief Act, prohibiting payment of funds to any member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of the government by force and violence." "1941: Emergency Ship Construction Act, making it illegal for subversives to receive government wages." And so on, through a long and grisly list of anti-libertarian measures. This reading of the past is

summarized: "Although he (McCarthy) was not the first anti-Communist campaigner to call public attention to lax security procedures in the State Department, he alerted many people who had not previously been aware of the problem, to the danger of Communist infiltration. . . . The subsequent security procedures stemmed, at least in part, from the Senator's charges in public forums and during the Tydings committee hearings."

In other words, Rorty and Decter favor the process of the "tightening" of the loyalty and security program! They specifically mention, for instance, the Eisenhower intermingling of the loyalty and security programs as a step forward. In this case, the actual result was to place almost anyone fired in Washington in the position of being "disloyal"; it resulted in the famous "numbers game" and so on. Which Rorty and Decter approve.

Thus, what Rorty and Decter have done is to go back and make a clear admission of the reality of Stalinist infiltration. But then, rather than explore the significance of this fact in terms of how the liberals became captive of their critics, and of the ineffectuality of the liberals' method in both the foreign and domestic struggle against Stalinism, they ratify as a positive good all the worst that has been done. Their objection is not against the liberal capitulation; it is that the liberals did not capitulate soon enough, and that they administered the institutions of their betrayal in a sloppy fashion.

In this way, the defense against the rough-and-ready frontiersman, McCarthy, becomes an offense against civil liberties, enthusiastically rather than reluctantly conceived.

### At Root Is America's Foreign Policy

If, as has been pointed out, the authors' objection to McCarthy is not against his major assumptions, but against his rough and readiness, then it must also be pointed out that they have a still more basic reason for objection. For Rorty and Decter see McCarthy as a threat to American foreign policy, which they support. Politically, one of the major reasons for their struggle against McCarthy is the danger he represents to American leadership of the "free world." And it is probably not an accident that the American Committee for Cultural Freedom endorses such a work, for this is a significant if not the guiding element in that organization's point of view.

Thus, McCarthy "has spread disunity in the free world by symbolizing the fanatic forces of unreason which free men abroad fear may be overtaking America." And, a little later, "We in America know that McCarthy is far from taking over this country. We know the limits as well as the extent of his power. We know that the weight of our democratic traditions is more than

enough to overwhelm any threat he poses. We know that the chorus of opposition grows daily. But just as it is infinitely more difficult to refute a lie than to tell it—to wipe off the mud than to sling it—so is it more complicated to convey to our European friends an accurate picture of the real situation, with our profound faith that McCarthy too will pass."

"Our European friends" are, in this case, those many people in Europe who have certain hesitations about or even opposition to, the subordination of the political destiny of all countries in the "West" to American capitalism. And herein one of the major motivations of this kind of analysis of McCarthyism becomes clear. For if Rorty and Decter did go back and explain the development of the witch-hunt in relation to the development of the American reaction to Stalinism, then this would be giving aid and comfort to the Bevanite-Neutralist-Socialist, etc., opposition to American policy. Given support to American foreign policy, such an analysis would be disastrous.

### Document of Capitulation

Thus, the Rorty and Decter book is not simply a revelation of attitudes toward McCarthy, or of McCarthyism. It is far more complicated than that.

On the one hand, with regard to McCarthy himself, this book demonstrates the necessity of an analysis of his rise in terms of the recent politics of America. In this context, it is clear that McCarthy is a demagogue, leading a movement which is still amorphous, who rose to power by the exploitation of the witch-hunt and not by creating it. In a perverse way, Rorty and Decter make this point, for they see McCarthy as a frontiersman extremist element in a legitimate movement which includes the liberals.

But on the other hand, *McCarthy and the Communists* may well be a preview of the new liberal ideology with regard to civil liberties. Rorty and Decter, in their sophistication, see that it is impossible to use the lesser evil argument for ever. At some point, one must be for the good. And rather than go into the whys of those ten years, rather than jeopardize their support of American foreign policy, they are willing to positively embrace the liberal capitulation. Or rather, for them, there has been no capitulation. The flaw has been that the liberal did not administer his anti-civil-libertarianism well enough.

And given such an analysis, one is seized by a very real fear: for McCarthy is now irrelevant to McCarthyism. His defeat will symbolize little.

The process which gave rise to him—that of the witch-hunt—will continue without him. And in this book, we have the institutionalization of the liberal's betrayal—for it turns out not to have been a betrayal at all.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON