

Bulletin

OF THE WORKERS PARTY

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STATEMENT ON THE SLOGAN OF THE "SOCIALIST
PARTY--COMMUNIST PARTY--C.G.T. GOVERNMENT
IN FRANCE"

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The main political and economic struggles in France today revolve around the question of the character and course of the Constituent Assembly. The attention of all the classes is focused upon it. The propaganda and agitation of the Fourth Internationalists must therefore be concentrated in the next period upon the question of the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution it is called upon to draft.

The Government which bases itself upon the Constituent Assembly is composed of a coalition of the bourgeois, social-democratic and Stalinist parties. In this coalition, the de Gaulle bourgeoisie and its party, although they represent a minority of the popular vote and an infinitesimal minority of the proletarian vote, are actually the dominating political power. By his control of the army and the police and by virtue of the support he enjoys from the Western Allies, as against the social democrats and the Stalinists or a combination of both, de Gaulle has established a semi-Bonapartist regime in France. By means of typical Bonapartist threats, he has forced the social-democratic and Stalinist parties into toleration of his regime and a governmental coalition with him and his minority party. The social democrats keep the proletariat tied to the bourgeoisie out of fear that a break with the latter would thrust them into an unwanted alliance with the Stalinists. The Stalinists keep the proletariat tied to the bourgeoisie out of an unwillingness to take power into their own hands even though they have the great majority of the proletariat behind them - an unwillingness dictated by the present interests of the Kremlin's foreign policy and by the unfavorable relationship of forces which faces them in France and Europe in general; and by an inability to oust de Gaulle from control by means of a coalition with the reluctant social democracy alone.

The first big step forward toward restoring the class independence of the French proletariat requires a radical break with the bourgeoisie and its political representatives, de Gaulle and M.R.P. This demands first of all, at the present time, the breaking of the existing coalition and the ousting of the de Gaulle government. Together, the Socialist Party and the Stalinist Party represent a majority not only of the proletariat but of the people as a whole. No other central political slogan is possible for the revolutionary Marxists, and none corresponds better to the needs of the situation, than the slogan of a "Government of the Socialist Party-Communist Party-C.G.T."

With an agitation centering around this slogan, the Fourth Internationalists are in a position to offer the masses a political direction in which the urgent problems of France may be solved, are in a position to set the masses in motion not only against the bourgeoisie but also against the social-democratic and Stalinist leadership, and are in a position to approach positively and

effectively the ranks of the social-democratic, Stalinist and trade-union movements and gain a sympathetic hearing for our party and its program. Without such a central political slogan, all the other transitional slogans are left hanging in mid-air, for there is no political instrument indicated for their realization. Without such a slogan, the Fourth Internationalists are not only completely disarmed in their agitation among the proletariat against the semi-Bonapartist regime and its political outrages, but disarmed also in their agitation against the miserable class collaborationism of the Stalinist and social-democratic leadership. Finally, without such a slogan, the other economic and political transitional demands, if directed to the existing de Gaullist government, become a source of opportunism.

While the slogan of a "Socialist Party-Communist Party-C.G.T. Government" is clearly indicated by the situation, it would be worse than useless if it were employed alone - it would be a dangerous trap for the working class as a whole and for the Fourth Internationalists in particular. This slogan can and must be advanced by our party in France, but only if it is inseparably linked with and subordinated to a detailed and clearly explained program of transitional demands. Without such a program, the Fourth International would be taking responsibility in advance for a government for which it cannot take any political responsibility, and furthermore it would be incapable of educating any section of the proletariat and reaping the fruits of its political agitation in the event that such a coalition government did come into office. The Fourth Internationalists therefore call for such a government on the basis of their own program of action. Such a program of action is calculated at one and the same time to represent the real interests and needs of the French proletariat, and to reveal the anti-proletarian political character of the social-democratic and Stalinist leadership.

The program, around which the main agitation and propaganda of the Fourth Internationalists must be centered, should therefore prominently include such points as:

The nationalization of all basic industry, finance and transportation under the most democratic workers' control of production.

The adoption of the most democratic Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, with special emphasis upon unrestricted guarantees of the democratic rights of free press, free speech, free assembly, freedom to organize and freedom to strike.

The immediate and complete demobilization of the army and all special police and government spy services, and their replacement by a democratic people's militia.

The immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from conquered territories in Europe and the advocacy of an immediate democratic peace on the basis of no national dismemberment, no violation of national sovereignty and independence, no indemnities, reparations or tribute burden upon the conquered peoples and nations.

The immediate withdrawal of all armed forces from the colonies of France and the proclamation of their national independence; support of all national-revolutionary movements directed against French imperialism in particular and all imperialist rule in general.

All the other points in the program must be developed and propagated along these lines and in their spirit.

In the political conditions of France and Europe today, the advocacy of the slogan of a "Socialist Party-Communist Party-C.G.T. Government" undoubtedly carries with it grave risks. The Fourth Internationalists cannot be blind to them and must under no circumstances conceal or gloss over them in their agitation among the proletariat. The slogan is not the same, adapted to French conditions, as that put forward by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 in advocating a coalition government of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary Parties. It is not the same, adapted to French conditions, as that put forward, originally by the Communist International and in our time by the Fourth International, in advocating a Labour Party government in England. In those cases, there were involved bourgeois or petty-bourgeois democratic reformist workers (or workers' and peasants') parties. In France today, there is involved, so far as the Stalinist Party is concerned, not a democratic but a totalitarian party operating as an instrument of the Kremlin and the G.P.U. Hence, we oppose any slogan which means lifting this counter-revolutionary totalitarian instrument into the position of state power in any country, or into the position where there is a clear threat of its use of the state police power for the extermination of the independent working-class and revolutionary movements, as in Russia, as in Poland, as in Yugoslavia, etc.

However, a concrete and objective examination of the political situation and the relationship of forces in France today, and in Europe and the world in general, indicates that the totalitarian Stalinist party cannot and will not and does not seek to take state power in France in any way comparable to its seizure of power in Poland and Yugoslavia; and indicates further that in a coalition government with the S.F. and C.G.T., the Stalinists could not and would not proceed, either in the field of economic life or of political power, in any way comparable to their procedure in Poland and Yugoslavia, inasmuch as such a course, extended to France, would not only precipitate civil war in the country but would bring infinitely closer the outbreak of the third world war, both of which it is clearly the Kremlin's policy to avert, at least in the next period.

If, contrary to this analysis, the Stalinists should now be on the verge of taking state power in France in their own name, or in the name of a coalition with the Socialist Party which would, along with the French bourgeoisie, which is in turn backed by Anglo-American imperialism, prove to be as impotent to prevent the consolidation of Stalinist state power as their equivalents have proved to be in Poland and Yugoslavia, then an altogether different

conclusion would be dictated to the Fourth International. Then it would no longer be a question of raising or abandoning the slogan of a "Socialist Party-Communist Party-C.G.T. Government." The Fourth International would then have to reconsider and revise fundamentally not only its whole European and international perspective, but also its whole concept of the character of our epoch. Nothing less than such a reconsideration would be mandatory to the Fourth International if it were confronted by the reality of the consolidation of Stalinist power on the European Atlantic, which could mean nothing else but the complete domination of Europe and Asia, at least most of Asia, by Stalinism.

There are, however, altogether insufficient grounds for any such analysis and conclusion. Stalinism has not only not triumphed over Europe, but there are ample indications that its power and influence are receding from the immediate post-war peak and that the popular resistance to it is increasing. This is evident, in different degrees, not only in France and Italy, in Austria and Hungary, but even in occupied countries like Poland and Rumania.

Nevertheless, even under the circumstances indicated by an objective analysis of the actual situation and relationship of forces in France, the presence of the Stalinist party and its police machinery even in a coalition government with the Social Democracy, would represent a great danger to democratic rights, to the working class, to the revolutionary movement and to the future of socialism. This makes it incumbent upon the Fourth Internationalists, in the very course of advancing the slogan of the "Socialist Party-Communist Party-C.G.T. Government" to conduct a systematic and vigorous campaign of enlightenment and alerting of the working class against the anti-democratic and anti-socialist, i.e., the totalitarian character of Stalinism, concretized with examples not only of its record in Russia, but outside of Russia - in Spain, in Poland, in Yugoslavia, in Germany and in France itself. This propaganda and agitation from modern history cannot suffice by itself. It must be supplemented by, and main emphasis placed upon, a political campaign around such democratic demands as appeal to the democratic and socialist sentiments of the French masses, as correspond to their actual economic and political needs, and as would serve to unmask the totalitarian face of Stalinism.

January, 1946.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

ON THE SLOGAN FOR AN SP-CP-CGT GOVERNMENT

The resolution of the majority of the National Committee is correct in so far as it analyzes the relation of democratic and parliamentary demands to the requirements of socialist struggle in France. It draws, however, the false and illogical conclusion that, in the particular circumstances of the revolutionary movement in France, these democratic and transitional demands must be tactically concretized in a governmental slogan—namely, an SP-CP-CGT government.

This is an a priori judgment predicated on the assumption that any other approach is abstentionist, and that abstentionism is, under these special conditions, politically unjustifiable. However, the party's inability to put forward a governmental slogan in this situation does not necessarily constitute abstentionism. It merely means that the situation does not warrant this particular slogan, that there is no other governmental slogan adequate to the situation, and that our demands must be framed around other issues. Further, even if it did constitute abstentionism, we would not in any way be skirting our obligations because there are many circumstances in which revolutionists, for a variety of reasons, are compelled to be abstentionist on a given issue.

It is impossible to appraise the requirements of the French situation without (1) defining, however broadly, the nature of the Stalinist Party, and (2) estimating the responsibility of the revolutionary party in France in the light of its strength and influence.

At least this much of a basic definition of the Stalinist Party is required of us: the CP is a totalitarian, non-working class party, executing the orders of the Kremlin, and capable of carrying out anti-capitalist as well as anti-working class measures when its masters so dictate. Thus, for us to call for a CP-SP government is to call for a government in which a totalitarian, non-working class party would at the least be an equal power, and more likely than not a dominant power. The majority of the National Committee actually recognizes this, particularly in those sections of the resolution which emphasize as against the governmental slogan, the importance of democratic safeguards and the transitional demands.

The CP cannot be viewed on the same social plane as the traditional reformist parties. Whatever their historical function in upholding the capitalist order, we have defined these parties as working class parties, subject to the pressures of the working class or easily exposed before the working class. We have therefore under certain conditions demanded that the reformist party take power in order that it might be exposed as incapable of executing its mandate to overthrow the capitalist system, and thereby contribute to the development of the revolutionary party and ferment.

The CP, however, does not belong in this category. It is

virtually impossible to assume that it is subject to the pressure of the masses in any real sense. It is a totalitarian, police agent of the Kremlin regime and is therefore basically subject only to the pressure of its real masters. It is not based on democratic concepts as are the reformist parties even in their most brutal and suppressive manifestations. It is actively engaged in hounding genuine revolutionary elements. It is able, to the extent that this pleases the Kremlin rulers, to appear before the masses as opponents of capitalist economy.

In a governmental coalition with the SP and CGT (much of which it controls), the CP would be the dominant force. The SP is no match for the CP. The revolutionary elements, principally the Trotskyists, would be in immediate jeopardy of outright extinction. The Trotskyists would find ways of protecting themselves and carrying on, and the SP might even bestir itself to defend the Trotskyists, but the difficulties and the hazards of revolutionary operation would most certainly increase.

More important, however, the influence of the CP on the masses might well be enhanced, whereas it must be our function to destroy the influence of Stalinism. Significant in this connection is the fact that the CP has already called for an SP-CP government for it obviously works to their advantage. The call undoubtedly is a maneuver on their part, precisely because they know its net effect is to embarrass the SP. For us to designate the CP's slogan as insincere while we issue the same slogan will convince few people. Behind the SP stands the pressure of the French bourgeoisie and the manipulations of Anglo-American imperialism. These forces are against an SP-CP government because they understand that the advantage in such a coalition would be entirely with the CP.

An SP-CP government is no more capable of solving the social problem in France than the present government. In such a government the CP would be able to spread its totalitarian hold on the labor movement through the instrumentality of limited state power. Faced with its inability to eradicate social injustice, it need merely point to the spurious Stalinist record; that wherever it was able to take complete power (with the aid of the Russian army) it nationalized industry and acted against the bourgeoisie; that here in France it is restrained by the unwillingness of the SP to go along; that it is menaced by the as yet unvanquished French capitalist class and that it stands in threat of armed intervention by Anglo-American imperialism.

Perhaps the French working class will see through the fraud of Stalinist nationalization. Millions, however, have not yet done so, and there is no guarantee that we shall be able to bring home the fightfulness of Stalinist rule in nationalized Russia or Poland within a few months. We must make the French workers see through this fraud, but we cannot do this by, in any way, catering to the illusion that Stalinism represents the working class interest. We are also obliged to recognize that up to the point where they risk engagement in serious dispute with bourgeois military might (French, American or British), they are

able to deliver blows at French capitalism, as in specific steps towards the nationalization of given industries.

In fighting Stalinism as well as capitalism we are at all times compelled to distinguish between nationalization and nationalization under workers' control. Our fight against capitalism is clearly marked for us; there is a great body of instruction left us in text and experience. The Stalinist menace is not so well documented for those workers who live far from the terror of Stalinist rule. The fact of Stalinist nationalization is known everywhere. Not so well known is the tyranny of nationalization where it is not democratically controlled by the workers. In making that emphasis before the French working class, it is wrong to lend any credence, however minute, to the idea that Stalinism is capable of being tested as a working class instrument. The SP leadership will expose itself. So will the CP - but we dare not risk, in making this exposure, greater disaster for the working class.

An SP-CP government does not necessarily mean CP state power. There are many reasons for arguing that the CP is unable at this moment to take state power, and the majority of the National Committee, in declaring its opposition to a CP government, makes this clear. That, however, does not solve the problem. The fact remains that it may be able to extend its totalitarian hold on the working class; also, that it may use its positions in the government against the revolutionary wing of the working class. Both of these are illustrated by the expressed opposition of many comrades, to permitting the CP to obtain the ministries of interior and war. It is further illustrated by the reluctance of the bourgeoisie, for their reactionary reasons, to place these ministries in the hands of the CP because they realize that the Stalinists will be able to avail themselves of these vital state instruments.

Should the CP take power many consequences would follow, among them the necessity of re-evaluating the character of the epoch. However, the introduction of this issue in this discussion is irrelevant and inverted. If history compels us to make such a re-evaluation, we shall have to do so. It has not yet done so, and it is our responsibility to do what we can to avoid it becoming a necessity. In any case, we are obliged to decide our policies according to the realities, not according to the horror of a new evaluation. And the reality today in France is the potent influence of the Kremlin-GPU apparatus. In their dissatisfaction with bourgeois rule, workers have by the millions joined the CP. We must tear them away from the Stalinists. Anything, any slogan, that may strengthen the influence of Stalinism is wrong.

It is true that the masses are occupied with parliamentary solutions. It is true that we must project democratic demands. It is not true that we must accompany this by a governmental slogan. Perhaps the greatest reality for us today is the absence of a party with mass influence. We cannot lift ourselves over this reality. The organized revolutionary force of the Trotskyist party is small. There is no organized revolutionary opposition

in the SP. There are only individual dissidents in the CP. Given the possibilities of the situation, the weakness of the PCI is especially tragic. In sum, the difficulties of the situation are not easily resolved.

The task, the main task, is to build the revolutionary party. To build such a party, we must put forward a program. This program is adequately summarized in the resolution of the National Committee. To conclude that it must be accompanied by calling for an SP-CP government to effect this program does not at all follow. In propagandizing for these demands, in agitating among the masses, we link this program with the necessity for a workers' government, and explain why we do not call upon the parties that have the majority of the working class to take power.

It is altogether unreasonable and illogical to assume that it is more difficult to make this explanation than to explain that the slogan "would be a dangerous trap for the working class as a whole and for the Fourth Internationalists in particular" (as the National Committee resolution reads) unless it were "subordinated to a detailed and clearly explained program of transitional demands." "Without such a program," says the National Committee, "the Fourth International would be taking responsibility in advance for a government for which it cannot take responsibility." Precisely. The program is our main point of emphasis. That is why we must declare our opposition to the government as it is now constituted, and to an SP-CP government. If we can explain that we take no responsibility for the SP-CP government that we are calling for without our program, our voices will be equally loud and clear and understood in explaining why we cannot call upon the CP and SP to form a government. Should such a government come into being, it might be too late for us to make explanations - except as we can issue them through underground channels, or through the cover of the SP. We should not forget that even today our French comrades have not yet succeeded in getting the right to publish Verite legally.

The program is the main line of attack in exposing the policies and nature of the CP and the SP, and in building the revolutionary party. That is what we must develop if ours is not yet adequate. That is all we can, and need, do. The future of the revolutionary movement in France depends upon the program it puts forward, the manner in which it employs the transitional demands, and the organizational steps it takes to put this program before the masses most effectively.

H. Draper
R. Ferguson
E. Garrett
A. Gates
I. Howe
A. Victor

STRATEGY IN THE PENDING RUBBER STRIKE

By George Whitney

Akron, Ohio, February 2, 1945....The big four Rubber companies, Goodrich, Goodyear, Firestone and US Rubber, will soon be out on strike. That is the present indication from developments to date between the United Rubber Workers CIO and the industrialists involved. In all four companies the Union has grievances, some of them as old as four years, numbering in the hundreds and gathering dust because the companies choose to ignore them. They have stalled the Union along throughout the war years on one pretext or another and now they decline to make even a serious effort at collective bargaining. Goodyear, for example, claimed in 1944 that they were willing to adjust the wages of their engineering department but were unable to because of war time restrictions. Now they refuse to make any serious adjustment and refuse to pay that adjustment retroactive to 1944 when the negotiations began. They also are welching on their agreement to bargain on a company-wide basis by refusing to allow Kelly-Springfield, Goodyear subsidiary, to be included in the agreement.

At Goodrich things are no better. George Bass, President of Goodrich Local 5 URW, told committeemen that the Union has on file hundreds of grievances dating as far back as 1941. They have been referred to every conceivable type of national board and committee in the company's long stalling act. Now Local 5 has decided that they are to be cleaned up along with the wage question and before any signatures are appended to an agreement. These concrete examples are characteristic of the condition existing throughout the rubber industry, conditions which are forcing the URW into strike action.

The strategy of the heads of the big four rubber locals has been revealed to be the simultaneously closing of all four of these companies on an industry wide basis rather than tackling one company at a time in the manner of the UAW. This represents a change in their original plan.

Some of the reasoning behind this decision, now being made public, is as follows: The experience of the URW in collecting funds for the General Motors strikers has not been satisfactory and the heads of the four big locals agreed that it was possible they might encounter a similar difficulty if they closed one of the big companies and expected those still working to support financially the local on strike. Another line of reasoning was that none of the big four companies would effect a settlement without consultation and agreement from the remaining three and that the final settlement would be made, not by the public heads of the companies, but by the controlling force, Wall Street. Not the least of the reasons considered was the feeling that to strike the industry company by company would take too long, while if the big Four were struck simultaneously the whole process would be shortened.

There are several points that should be made in connection

with the above reasons. The discouraging aspect of the collection of funds for the General Motors strikers was not due, in any large degree, to the membership of the URW itself. No real effort has been made to sponsor such a collection. Paul Ferguson, Executive Secretary of the Akron Industrial Union Council, was planning a mass meeting to bring before the membership the problem of aid to the UAW strikers and to make plans for giving effective aid. This was never done. As a matter of fact, what effort has been made, has been made primarily by individual locals. Goodyear Local 2 is one example. The membership themselves have raised this question on the floor no less than once each meeting and each time there are objections to the various plans proposed on the basis that the URW in its recent convention, mandated the International Officers to handle all funds for the UAW strikers and no one seems to be quite clear on how that is to be done. Consequently, the membership of Local 2, despite the fact that they are willing and eager to contribute, have not had an opportunity to do so. If the International, through the locals, had called on the entire membership to contribute a day's wages to the UAW strikers, they would not now be in the position of supposing that they couldn't get financial backing from their membership for one of their own URW locals.

On the question of consultation between the heads of the big Four companies prior to any one company making a settlement, it is necessary to point out that this is nothing new, nor is it peculiar to the rubber industry. The UAW understood that the auto magnates would consult with each other, that they would attempt to reach individual settlements only with the approval of their brother manufacturers. Yet they decided on the company by company plan.

Two different systems, peculiar to this particular period, are here involved. One is the system used by the Auto Workers and the other is the system employed by the Steel Workers. The first allows production by everyone in the industry except the struck plant or plants and the other closes the whole industry. In the first system, rival manufacturers are allowed to market their products while the idle manufacturer misses out on the reconversion scramble for dominance of the market. In the second system the whole industry is shut down and no one takes anyone else's market.

It is common knowledge by this time that none of the manufacturers stand to lose financially as a result of the present strikes. This is because of the "carry-back" provision on income taxes which allows big business to write off all losses at the expense of the people and receive kick-backs on previous income tax payments sufficient to give them a profit equal to that which they earned during 1945. Consequently, when the entire industry is struck, only the weight of "public opinion" and pressure applied from without can force a settlement. All too often this "public opinion" is nothing more than the voice of the industrialists themselves as expressed over their radio programs by their newscasters, in their newspapers by their columnists and reporters and controlled "public polls", or as expressed by their congressmen, the Bilbos, the Tafts, et al. One need hardly wonder at what point the pressure of this

"public opinion" is applied. Or what is infinitely more important, economic circumstances themselves force the workers to return to their jobs without a satisfactory agreement. The industry-wide strike tends to accentuate this difficulty by virtue of the fact that the entire membership of the International Union is involved and the finances which are dependent upon that membership not only cease temporarily but accumulated reserves are rapidly depleted.

It is also necessary to understand that while the associated manufacturers of any given industry operate in unison against the labor movement (just as all big business, irrespective of its particular product, operates in a conscious, planned and unified fashion to break the labor movement) none the less, striking one company at a time in this particular period effects that company in a way that it can and does understand, namely, it allows the competitor first chance at the post-war market and allows him to satisfy the demand for the idle plant's product. This is true despite the fact that the particular industry involved may have agreements not to attempt to take the accounts of any one of their number that happens to be on strike. The fact remains that the market will get the desired product from those sources still producing and through the retail outlets that the non-striking plants supply. That means that the company still doing business will draw to its retail outlets, that section of the public which might otherwise have been expected to purchase the product of the idle company. This constitutes an argument for settlement of the strike that the individual manufacturer can appreciate. It means that the future market for his product is being endangered by a competitor. It means that the post-war public is turning to the product of his competitor because the machines and plants over which he enjoys control are idle.

It is lastly necessary to state that the considerations here involved are peculiar to this particular period and not the "norm". If this were not a period of reconversion from war production to the production of civilian goods, if there was no "carry-back" provision on corporation income taxes, the problem of union strategy involved would assume an entirely different form. So too would the problem be completely transformed in the event a General Strike appeared possible. In that light the political consideration would become paramount for the entire labor movement and these otherwise important considerations would be dwarfed into insignificance. But for the present the important consideration is to win the strike and to maintain and further the high level of the struggle launched by the General Motors workers with their demand of "open the books", their insistence on determining the company's ability to pay and their unequivocal rejection of any rise in the price of the product they are producing.

EDUCATION AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY

By O. Orozco and Thea Madera

In a recent article, "Education For Our Returning Veterans", Comrade Stein attempts to justify a university education in spite of the present needs of the party. Does Comrade Stein understand what this means in terms of building the party? He seems to have an inkling of it in the back of his mind for he suggests the miserly time of one year or more. One year (or more?) to learn the basic principles of natural sciences, to learn the main trends in human development, and to learn about the ideology of our capitalist enemy (!) And in order not to subtract too greatly from our forces we can after one year yank some comrades out of industry and any trade union work they may be engaged in, send them to university, replacing them with those fresh from one year's education. No, Comrade Stein, the party cannot afford the luxury of embarking on the type of educational program you propose, nor am I thinking only of immediate needs. The task of the revolutionary party in this respect is to attract engineers, scientists, historians, philosophers, etc. to the support of the movement, not the utopian task of making a proletarian into one who is "capable of giving long term direction to the confused movements of contemporary humanity." (This also is not a slur on the proletariat. I am sure the proletariat is intellectually as capable as the bourgeoisie. The question here is simply one of distribution of forces.) If a famous anthropologist, says Engels' "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" is wrong in the light of present knowledge, do we then call proudly upon a comrade who has been trained for just such an emergency to contend with him? The only path which will not lead us to adventurism is to seek the support of those who are already qualified to give an answer. As our party grows we will be able to bring specialists under our banner.

We don't think that a revolutionist can learn all he needs to know in the factory or trade union. Such an assertion is either a conscious distortion of fact or a confession of utter ignorance. A reading list could be given you on what a revolutionary should study that would make four years of college look like child's play. It is material which cannot be found in university courses. Comrade Stein, one year's study of Marxism will equip our comrades to answer questions on Catholicism, logic, human nature, etc. better than four years of university study. If it is the attacks of the renegades from our movement that you are worried about, you are looking in the wrong direction. They are loaded with the knowledge obtained in universities. We do not simply answer bourgeois science with more bourgeois science. We oppose Marxism to bourgeois science at every point. And Marxism will be learned through the education by the party and through self study.

The desire of our comrades to become educated is a healthy one that must be encouraged, but we must root out all illusions

concerning the nature of universities and how they can contribute significantly to the education of a revolutionary. Today universities function mainly for specialists: scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers and other professionals necessary for the functioning of modern capitalism. Economics, sociology, history, philosophy are tolerated only to the extent that they don't conflict with bourgeois ideology, and in fact tend more and more to become the means whereby bourgeois ideology is supported and propagandized among the bourgeois intelligentsia, thereby acting as a brake on further development. Viewed from this standpoint, a revolutionist who attends a university for a general education can expect to gain little but a sense of deep disgust.

But the objection is made, before I can really understand Marxism I need a general background, I need to learn the logical method of thought. Comrade Stein, think this thing over! Before we succumb to vulgar theories of education we can at least put up a fight. We hear the excuses; the lack of general background, the lack of logical method, in fact, anything which can be used as an alibi for lack of study, lack of effort, or lack of initiative. A college education (general background) is not necessary to understand Marxism. It must not be. It cannot be. Our task is to train thousands of uneducated workers in Marx and Lenin, not only so they can understand, but so they can also apply in practice and teach to others what they understand. If this is not possible, we may as well throw in the sponge now. It is quite true, indeed, that in order to be a finished Marxist, in order to interpret history, in order to analyze correctly contemporary society and its development it is necessary to have a thorough, broad comprehensive education. But this has nothing in common with the general education, the general background received in four years of university training. It is the result of only one thing - hard study. There is no place in the Marxist movement for diletants.

Today an "educational program" for our veterans can only be a reactionary step. It is reactionary in respect to the party, it is reactionary with respect to the revolution. There is only one place for our veterans: in the class struggle. The party must discourage the return or entrance of veterans into universities. The party must make clear to new members the necessity of participating in the working class movement. Where this is impossible we must in time replace the new members' dominant interest and activity in art, sciences, law or medicine with the revolutionary struggle. If we are to recruit, if our influence is to grow in the working class, all our energy, all our forces must be thrown into the struggle. This is the test of our party. Our success or failure will depend largely on how we handle the small forces we have.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA

By J. Brad

In the Bulletin for January 8, 1946, there appears a resolution on the "Situation in China" which has the earmarks of hasty writing and inadequate discussion with resulting formulations that can be only kindly designated as ambiguous. There is no focal orientation for the resolution, no statement of the fundamental issues except in the most attenuated sense. One illustration: the resolution does not mention the recently concluded imperialist war anywhere, nor that China was on the Planet Earth during this war, nor that Japanese imperialism played some role in China's recent history. Indeed, neither of the nouns "Japan" or "war" mar the unadulterated pristine abstraction of the resolution.

The title of the resolution leads one to expect several possible purposes: "the situation" may refer to any particular situation or to China's political and social struggle for colonial independence and China's position in the imperialist war. A resolution on this second subject is quite necessary now if we are to draw the balance sheet of the correct position we adopted in June, 1942, in "China in the World War." Against the analysis of such a balance sheet it would be possible to understand and make clear in shorter documents any immediate problems. It is clear, however, that this current resolution does not take this as its aim. Is it then any situation at all that is under discussion?

The second paragraph states: "The committee discussed the situation in China and takes the following general position." One might pause here and attempt to anticipate. "The situation", "general position", surely anything can follow, since no specific event or aim is designated. The denouement is somewhat frustrating. Our "general position" on the "situation" is literally: "As is usual with political affairs in China, the present situation is somewhat complicated." I do not wish to belabor, but this is not a good position. The problem here is one of loose formulation, careless and hasty writing: the effect is ludicrous.

The next paragraph opens with the phrase: "the base of revolt among the Chinese masses is the peasantry." Apparently the resolution has its *raison d'être* in a revolt among the Chinese masses, the most active revolvers, or the chief support or origin of the revolt being the peasantry. Just what revolt is referred to is for me a mystery. There are two possible references: the calculated, planned and coordinated military movement of the Chinese Stalinist armies out of Yen-an to collaborate with the Red Army in its imperialist mission in Manchuria, or the incidental, bureaucratic division of land, induced or carried through by the Red Army invasion, of a similar nature to that in Poland, for example. Neither of these were revolts but part and parcel of the imperialist maneuvers for power and con-

trol by Russia in north and western China against the antagonistic designs of American imperialism through its agents in the Kuomintang. Involved are the secret treaties agreed upon at Yalta, in which a new division of North China was decided upon as part of the Russian loot as an inducement to enter the war against Japan. But this is imperialist not revolutionary politics. Where is the revolt?

With the destruction and expulsion of Japanese imperialism, the barrier which separated the conflicting aims of American and Russian imperialism has been removed. America aims at the domination of all China and, if necessary, its national consolidation, the establishment of a central government with real power and of a national army of considerable potency; both dependent on loans, political and military advice and support of American imperialism. The American bourgeoisie see as one of their great possibilities as victors an intensified exploitation of China. For this they need a free hand from both the Chinese proletarian and peasant masses and from Russian imperialism. In order to achieve this freedom of action they will undertake to perform for the corrupt Chinese compradores what they themselves are incapable of doing: national unification and establishment of a national state. And to grant concessions to Stalin, provided he agrees to the castration of his Chinese Peasant Armies. In return the Chinese CP would be granted liberty of political action, but within the national arena provided for this activity and not through the separatist active instrumentality of its armies. American imperialism would even concede autonomy to the Stalinist controlled areas around Yen-an, temporarily, in return for the establishment of conditions essential to its national policy for China. This is the meaning of the role of Marshall and others before him as "compromisers," of the American military mission to the Kuomintang armies, of the American occupation of the key ports. One of the objectives of this national policy is to consolidate the American position in the Yangtze valley and the southeastern provinces, formerly spheres of British and French influence.

This policy is in contra-distinction to the previous imperialist policy in China, of division into separate spheres of influence among the powers. This policy represents the new imperialist relationships in Asia that have emerged from the war: (1) the defeat of Japan, her expulsion from Korea, Manchuria, Port Arthur, the coastal cities, etc.; (2) decline of British political, economic influence and prestige in the entire colonial world and especially in Asia (and the transfer of securities, investments and control of many British colonial properties during the war). Britain has been driven out of the Yangtze Valley by the Japanese and the Americans intend to restrict her to her Hong Kong tee-hold; (3) reduction of French colonial empire to satellite stature, dependent on British and American sustenance; (4) America can best enforce the expulsion of these rivals (allies) through a subservient national regime. Such a national regime would serve to consolidate China into a potent buffer against Stalinist encroachments. It is in Stalin's interests to disrupt this policy. But his efforts are limited by the fear

of too great provocation against America. That is why he must rely on the Chinese CP armies as far as possible for his dirty work; (5) the American lead in ending extra-territoriality in China and forcing Britain, etc. to sign away their imperial privileges now appears in a new light, in consideration of American policy for China, for example. This departure by America from old colonial policies permits her to pose as "democratic" and proponent of colonial independence.

The failure to date of the Chinese masses, proletarian or peasantry, to react, as for instance the Indonesians or the Indians have, has permitted these imperialist designs to be conducted on the more abstract plane of top maneuvering. The outstanding fact of China is that the Chinese proletariat has not succeeded in rousing itself from the 19 years of cruel repression by Chiang and his sadist gangster police, later by the Japanese and Wang Ching Wei police; and from the desertion of the Stalinists following the Canton uprising. The peasantry has nowhere shown an ability to rise in independent revolt around its own demands in the last few years of war or in the last 6 post-war months. In North China where peasant political activity has occurred it has been exclusively under the inspiration, total control and in the interests of Stalinist imperialism and subordinated to this imperialism. Furthermore, there is no evidence, to my knowledge, of any active peasant movements anywhere else in China, which would have surely followed in response to activity and certainly to "revolt" in the Stalinist areas, if this activity had had any dynamic or progressive anti-landlord character. Finally, the Stalinist agrarian program of reform was diluted during the 1937-1939 popular front honeymoon with Chiang and has never regained its original revolutionary character.

The discussions between the Stalinists, the Kuomintang and the Democratic League of the past several months have occurred under the watchful eye of Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer, representing American policy, and the external but potent pressure of the Russian Armies in Manchuria, the diplomatic pressure around Stalin's demands in Manchuria and the Stalin-Chiang pact. The party resolution states that the program of this revolt is land. "The chief concern of the peasant masses is for land. This demand is directed at the government and the landlords." The tragic truth is otherwise. The issue of land or of an anti-landlord or anti-exploitation struggle has not appeared in the power maneuverings of the Stalinists, the various groups in the Kuomintang or the Democratic League. These groups have been discussing, in abstractio, without popular diversion, the carving up of relative power in China, the power of political and economic exploitation. The movements of armies is the typical backdrop of these discussions - not popular revolt, demands or actions, but the precise manipulation of armies is the characteristic of the political struggle today. That is why Stalin is loathe to surrender his Chinese 4th and New 14th Armies. They are the weapons of power. If demands for agrarian reforms have been presented to the "government and the landlords," and by means of "revolt" at that,

these events have occurred off stage, so to speak, and decidedly sotto voce.

"The leadership of the peasantry -- is directly in the hands of the native Chinese Stalinists", says the resolution. The Chinese Stalinists are the leaders of the peasants in their own territories, in the areas where they have state and military power. And in these areas there are no rank and file peasant movements based on overthrowing the landlords to our knowledge, only Stalinist agrarian organizations based on a program of landlord collaboration within the political limits set by the CP. Elsewhere in China, there is not, to my knowledge, a peasant movement. The resolution continues with references to peasant movements without at any time indicating who is meant. It may be that the PC acted on information of its own or had something else in mind. In any case, the resolution only beclouds and befuddles. If it is a peasant revolt against the government and landlords on the issue of agrarian reform, why cannot we give political support, critical or otherwise. True we could not give it direct political support but surely critical support is indicated since such a movement would be progressive. It is true we cannot grant even critical support but not for the reasons given - the reasons are not even discussed in the resolution. They are that there is no peasant movement in action, the active role of Stalinist imperialism and the predominant inter-imperialist conflict character of the present political scene in China.

The resolution indicates in several places that perhaps a China resolution is not really necessary, that perhaps any resolution is gratuitous or at least supererogatory. "Our" role in China is described as "hypothetical" and "the question arises -- insofar as it is necessary that we have a position on such a situation." Little comment is needed to such statements. According to the resolution an agrarian revolt challenging government and landlords requires comment only "insofar as it is necessary that we have a position." This is a unique viewpoint. There is no need to elaborate on the history of Trotskyist interest in Chinese political affairs, not to mention colonial revolts, or our elaborate resolution of June, 1942, etc. With such a dubious approach to the question the resulting resolution can be comprehended, at least from a psychological viewpoint.

In the final sentence the phrase occurs "we do not give even political support to the movement." Since this has been made abundantly clear in the previous sections of the resolution, this may be a misprint and should read "even critical support." If the original has this latter phrase then it is a typographical error which does, however, confuse.

I have attempted here, in addition to criticism, a brief, general and sketchy analysis which is more appropriate to the "situation" in my opinion as a basis for a resolution. I ask the comrades to consider the need for a clearer statement.

USE OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS BY FASCISTS By R. Saunders

In a recent bulletin issued by the party, the PC expressed its position on the question of our party demanding that the School Boards deny the use of school buildings to fascists.

The question first arose in Los Angeles and San Francisco, when the Civic organizations formed to combat Smith decided to utilize the School Boards and other forms of public pressure. In Los Angeles there were several hearings before the School Board, at which the Mobilization for Democracy and Smith presented their respective cases. Many of the organizations affiliated to the Mobilization spoke up individually and demanded that Smith be denied the use of the school.

Our representative attended the hearing but did not participate on the grounds that we, the Workers Party, could not demand that the School Board refuse a permit to anyone. After Comrade Draper informed us of his point of view, both the Pedro and Los Angeles branches had lengthy discussions on the question.

When we received the party bulletin, both Draper and those of us who differed with him agreed that the party statement was inconsistent.

In this article I wish to discuss Draper's position as stated verbally, and the PC position as stated in the bulletin.

Comrade Draper has two major motivations for his position; the first is that we, the revolutionists, are usually in a position where we demand the use of schools and other civil liberties and if we go to any government agency requesting or demanding that civil liberties be denied any one else, including the fascists, we put ourselves in an impossible position because the following day, all of our arguments against the fascists are used against us by the same school board. In other words, his main objection is the use of a double-edged weapon.

Let's see whether this question really can be viewed in the way for example, Draper correctly views Barrett's ideas on legislating fascism out of existence.

Our party has a position on the question of civil liberties for the fascists. We are opposed to giving them the right of free speech and all the other liberties we demand for working class organizations and minority groups. I do not wish to discuss whether or not this position is correct or incorrect because I must assume that the party as a whole agrees with this policy. Unlike the Socialist Party, we not only refrain from pleading the "case" for the fascists, but our policy of mass picketing is clearly not only for purposes of protest but mainly for the purpose of PREVENTING the fascist meetings.

To whom do we express this position? To our party members, sympathizers, to the working class and the world at large. We believe that this policy is correct. We don't apologize for it, we don't hide it, we don't express it secretly among ourselves. We argue for it and defend it articulately in our press. Why then must we hide it from the School Board?

Suppose we go to the School Board and demand a permit for ourselves. Suppose we have never asked the School Board to deny Smith a permit. Doesn't the School Board still have a plentiful supply of arguments against us? Can't we still appear inconsistent in THEIR eyes? Can't they pick up a copy of the New International, or Labor Action and throw our position right back in our faces? Of course. Our position with the School Board, our position in the courts, and our position in the eyes of the working class remains the same whether we have gone to the School Board or not. Draper's first argument can stand up only if he adds to his position that our entire position on civil liberties for the fascists be kept underground, quiet and unknown to anyone but ourselves.

Suppose one week we picket a fascist meeting and prevent them from meeting. The next week the fascists picket our meeting and attempt to prevent us from meeting. Leaving aside our general line of defense, namely, Defense Squads, varied kinds of independent class action, etc., would we not also make an appeal on the grounds of civil liberties to the public, and demand that the government take action against the fascist thugs. Lest someone accuse me of depending upon the government to defend the working class, let me make clear immediately that this demand upon the government would be subsidiary to independent class action and would be made primarily with a view to exposing the state and its protection of fascist goons.

Clearly, our actions one week would seem inconsistent with our demands of the next week. Our success in both ventures would depend entirely upon the relationship of class forces at the given moment. If we have sufficient strength we could successfully challenge the fascist meeting and the following week either smash the fascist picket line or arouse mass protest to the degree where we force the government to meet our demands or expose itself completely.

The second argument Draper raises is similar to the PC position. It seems however that he has answered his own argument in his polemic against Barrett. He points out the fact that we do make demands upon the government and proceeds to enumerate them. He makes clear that the NATURE of the demands are decisive. He correctly points out that we cannot make demands which Barrett wishes to make, such as legislation which prevents the expression of opinions, legislation which would obviously be used primarily against us.

What is the nature of the demand that the School Board

deny Smith a permit? Is it a vague piece of legislation attempting to silence "undemocratic" attitudes? Is it a piece of legislation demanding that facts which are written or spoken must be used to bring malicious persecution upon someone? Or, is it a demand which falls into the category of demands which Draper would make upon the government? Is it the type of demand which satisfies Draper's conditions, 1) to expose the inability and unwillingness of the government to fight fascist tendencies, and 2) that we take advantage of the differences of perspectives within the capitalist class at a given moment and the capitalist government's initial reluctance to accept totalitarian methods.

When for example the question of fighting Smith comes up on the floor at a union meeting or at the Mobilization for Democracy, someone, under the illusion that the School Board represents the people, gets up and says, "Let's go to the School Board and tell them we won't stand for fascists speaking in our school buildings. We demand that they refuse Smith the permit." What do we reply? We try to get the idea across that the School Board is just another tool of the capitalist state, that in all likelihood the reactionaries on the Board are pro-Smith, that the capitalist government gives aid and support to the fascists, etc. and the **ONLY WAY WE CAN REALLY STOP THE FASCISTS IS BY OUR OWN ACTION.**

We say that we must be prepared to have a mass picket line that will keep the fascists out of the hall, that we must have workers defense guards to defend and protect our line against the fascists, etc. The worker replies, "Well, O.K., let's have a mass picket line, let's have some kind of organization to defend ourselves. It's true that the bosses and government help the fascists but after all, this School Board is supposed to represent us and if we're strong enough we can **MAKE** them listen to us."

How do we prove to the worker that we are the most consistent fighters against fascism? We should say, "The main thing is to be prepared to fight the fascists our own way but let's go to the School Board too. Let's mass in hundreds and thousands, representatives of all unions and tell this School Board that we will not tolerate the fascists in our city, in our schools. We know that they are the worst enemies of the labor movement, out to destroy our organizations, to take away our democratic rights, etc. Let's tell the School Board we're going to picket and keep the fascists out. Let's insist with our strength that they must refuse the permit."

After we go to the School Board in such a manner, not cringing and begging, but with mass strength, the School Board will generally continue to grant the permit. What then have the workers learned? They have the best object lesson they can possibly get on the nature of government agencies and the necessity for depending upon themselves. They have yielded nothing. They still continue to prepare their picket lines only now with renewed determination.

Suppose however, the School Board does refuse the permit as it did in San Diego? Does that strengthen the workers' illusions? Not at all. It drives home the point very emphatically that the exertion of mass pressure, the militancy of the workers is the ONLY METHOD of gaining any concessions from the government. Here, Draper's two conditions are fulfilled and the thing he fears is not present. We have done nothing which establishes legislation or for that matter even a precedent which can be used against us. What we have done, is fought the issue out on a semi-legal plane as well as the plane of independent action, and we have done it with one weapon, INDEPENDENT CLASS ACTION.

The PC position is far closer to this approach than to Draper's. In actual fact, there were picket lines around the School Board, and if some or even most of the organizations went in there with a spirit of pleading, and argued on the basis of outlawing "subversive" groups, certainly we, the Workers Party must distinguish ourselves by our own unique approach.

The inconsistency in the PC position is that on the one hand it agrees with Draper's position that we cannot ask the School Board to deny the permit and in the following paragraph states very emphatically that we do not have a "hands-off policy." We should go to the School Board, we should make our protests heard at the School Board, in other words, that we utilize this government agency to agitate for our point of view, to expose the Board, and possibly to pressure the Board sufficiently to prevent the meeting from occurring by this prior demonstration.

On the basis of the PC position let's imagine the dialog which might well take place at the School Board.

Workers Party: We protest the granting of this permit. We consider the holding of a meeting by Smith a provocation. If this permit is granted we will organize a demonstration against the meeting, picket the building in which the meeting is held and attempt to arouse the working class to action.

Board of Education: Do we understand you to say that you are demanding that we refuse Smith the permit?

Workers Party: Certainly not, what do you think we are, class collaborators? We want you neither to grant nor refuse the permit, we are unconcerned with that question. We are merely here to inform you that if you do grant it we will picket.

Board of Education: Well, when you first came in here you said that you protested the granting of the permit, now you say you don't wish to discuss the question of granting the permit. Beside which, your pickets outside have placards saying that the School Board gives aid to the fascists. It would seem then that you wish us to refuse the permit, to stop giving aid to the fascists.

Workers Party: It's clear to us that you are agents of the capitalist class and as such permit the fascists to organize and grow, in fact, even assist them in such growth. We, for our part are just telling you what we think of you.

Board of Education: Well then, get out of here before we send you to the asylum where you belong.

Now, of course, this is an exaggeration, but if the PC position is read carefully, that is literally the sort of dilemma it leads to. If the PC was merely trying to make clear the different approaches possible then I must agree with their position. The question of the begging or class collaborationist approach, and the approach of demands in the form of mass pressure and militant activity is pertinent not only to this question but to every field of work. It should be made clear by the PC that they do not support Draper's position of "hands off", that they are not straddling the fence and taking both positions at once. If we go to the School Board with a picket line to protest, that means we are demanding the refusal of the permit.

REPLY OF D. COOLIDGE TO R. SAUNDERS

Before submitting your school board piece for the Internal Bulletin I thought it would be well to discuss with you certain aspects of the position which you take. You say "unlike the Socialist Party, we not only refrain from pleading the "case" for the fascists, but our policy of mass picketing is clearly not only for purposes of protest but mainly for the purpose of PREVENTING the fascist meetings." You say further that we tell the working class what our position is, we don't hide it. Then you ask, "Why then must we hide it from the school board?" We do not hide it from the School Board. The communication said that we go to the School Board and "protest the granting of this permit. We consider the holding of a meeting by Smith or any other fascist a provocation. If this permit is granted we will organize a demonstration against the meeting, picket the building in which the meeting is held and attempt to arouse the working class to action." That is, we serve notice on the School Board that we are going to call on the working class to take action if Smith holds a meeting. We are not concerned primarily with whether or not the School Board does or does not grant a permit. What we are primarily concerned with is the fascists holding the meeting. We would say to the School Board, to the public or to anybody else that we will not peacefully or quietly permit fascists to hold meetings.

If we picketed a fascist meeting one week and the fascists picketed our meeting the following week you ask, "would we not also make an appeal on the grounds of civil liberties to the public and demand that the government take action against the fascist thugs." You add, "that this demand upon the government would be subsidiary to independent class action and would be made primarily with a view to exposing the state and its protection of fascist goons."

I do not think this is correct. It would be necessary for us to use the same measures for the protection of our meetings against the fascists as we used in attempting to keep the fascists from holding a meeting. We say the fascist meeting is a provocation. We would attempt to arouse the working class to stop the fascists from going through with this provocation. In the case of our meeting or any working class meeting we would also attempt to arouse the working class to defend that meeting. In both cases the police, that is, the government, would probably be on hand "to preserve law and order." We might find the police perpetrating a provocation also. The important point is that we would attempt to arouse the working class against the fascists. If it cannot be done there can be no efficacy in calling on the government for protection.

At the time of the Madison Square Garden fascist meeting we did not call on the mayor to revoke the permit for the meet-

ing. We took the initiative and called on the working class and all other anti-fascists to support the demonstration.

It seems to me that there would be no point in massing "hundreds and thousands, representatives of all unions and tell this School Board that we will not tolerate the fascists in our city, in our schools." The place to mass hundreds and thousands is at the place where the fascists are meeting. This is what we should say to the workers in the unions. Workers are already too much indoctrinated with the notion that they should go to government groups, to Congress and the President for relief in such cases as this.

In the days of the unemployment movement we used to mass thousands of workers around relief stations or on the lawn of the State Capitol. We did this because we were demanding something of a very material sort, that is, relief which the state had the power to grant or to refuse. However, if we found a relief worker snooping around to discover whether or not a man was working, we did not report this to the relief board. We had other ways of taking care of such snoopers. You say that in San Diego, I believe, "there were picket lines around the School Board." What we have to emphasize to the workers is that the real point of contact against the fascists is not the School Board but the place where the fascists themselves are assembling.

You say that the PC position is inconsistent, but I do not think you are correct about this. We do not go to the School Board "to agitate for our point of view, to expose the Board, and possibly to pressure the Board sufficiently to prevent the meeting from occurring by this prior demonstration." We go to the School Board as the communication says, "representing the class interests of the proletariat, warns the permit granting authorities that the working class will be called on to resent the provocation and to resent in action and to repudiate by a demonstration all those who collaborate in any form with the fascists." We simply tell the Board that we do not intend to ignore any action which they may take. When we say to the Board that we will "arouse the working class to action" we are really warning the governmental agency that we intend ourselves to stop the fascists.

The imaginary conversation between the WP representative and the School Board would never take place in the way which you outline it. The PC position does not call for a demonstration at the School Board. There would be no pickets outside with placards, only a committee inside telling the Board that we were going to stop the fascists from meeting. What the Board does is their business not ours. If the Board says, "It would seem then that you would wish us to refuse the permit, to stop giving aid to the fascists", we would not reply as you indicate, by saying to the Board, "it is clear to us that you are agents of the capitalist class." We would know before we went to the Board that it is an agent of capitalism. We would

only say what the communication says. Of course we would protest the granting of the permit. Our presence in the board room would be an expression against the granting of the permit. The important thing is what is said to the Board, namely, that we consider a Fascist meeting a provocation and that we will arouse the working class against it.

If we were dealing with the matter in the union, this point is also covered in the communication. Only where the union voted for a demonstration at the Board of Education, would there be this kind of procedure. We might not be able to demonstrate or prove to the union that the proper place and the only place for a mass demonstration would be at the place where the Fascists were holding their meeting. If the union went to the Board to demand that the permit be denied we would, of course, go along with them. There is a difference between the procedure of the Party acting on its own and what party members would be called upon to do acting as members of a union. The party would proceed as outlined in the first part of this letter. In the union, however, the procedure would have to be different.

The last thing I want to call to your attention is that the communication was for the party. There are some points, I suppose, that need further clarification or elaboration. I think however, that the position is sound, and that there is no inconsistency. If there is any inconsistency it is of the type which always exists in connection with questions which must be worked out in the course of tactical procedure.

Fraternally yours,

David Coolidge,
National Organization Sec'