

# **INTERNAL**

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## **Introductory Note**

On March 24 the SWP National Office invited the Leninist Trotskyist Faction and the Internationalist Tendency to submit written evaluations of the world congress, based on the reports being given to their respective caucuses, to be published for the information of the party in a special Internal Information Bulletin.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction submitted the report given by Comrade Joe Hansen to a meeting of the New York supporters of the LTF on March 12, 1974.

The Internationalist Tendency submitted a report by Comrades Bill Massey and John Barzman on April 16, 1974.

The Socialist Workers Party proclaims its fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International but is prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating to it. All political activities of members of the SWP are decided upon by the democratically elected national leadership bodies of the SWP and by the local and branch units of the party. Unconditional acceptance of the authority of these SWP bodies is a prerequisite of membership. There are no other bodies whose decisions are binding on the SWP or its members.

April 17, 1974

# Preliminary Report to New York Caucus of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on Fourth World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress)

By Joseph Hansen

I have been asked to present a balance sheet of the Fourth World Congress of the Fourth International Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) from the viewpoint of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction. Some of the conclusions I will offer are subject to modification after we have had an opportunity to study the final versions of the documents presented at the congress by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency. These were adopted by a majority of delegates but were subject to amendment and to editing, and are not yet available.

On arrangements at the congress there was a considerable improvement over the congress held in 1969. The facilities were better in general. For the first time the problem of translations was met in an adequate way. With the up-to-date equipment that was used, it was possible to have simultaneous translations in three languages—Spanish, French, and English. The time for discussion was thus utilized much more efficiently than at any previous congress.

The congress was the largest yet held by the Fourth International. Delegates and observers were present from all continents and all the major countries except the Soviet bloc.

In addition to delegates elected by official sections of the Fourth International, the congress was open to observers from sympathizing organizations—like the Socialist Workers Party—which are prevented by reactionary legislation in their own countries from affiliating to the International. Such observers were invited to express their views on all disputed political questions.

The discussion, which was quite intensive, centered on issues of the greatest importance to the future of the world Trotskyist movement. Some of the differences were sharp and deep-going.

To understand the congress, its limitations, and its outcome, it is necessary to bear in mind the context in which it was held. The context was a crisis in the orientation and leadership of the Fourth International.

The general outline of the development of this crisis can be indicated by noting the key points in the deepening internal differentiation.

The differences can be pegged roughly as having originated in the adoption by the Ninth World Congress of a "turn" that included an orientation toward "rural guerrilla warfare." A minority at that congress voiced strong opposition to the new orientation, predicting that the "turn" could do serious damage to the Fourth International, and that if it were persisted in, it would spread beyond Latin America and begin to impinge on the basic principles of our movement.

The debate on this question was resumed about a year

after the Ninth World Congress. Already it was possible to draw certain conclusions from the test of events, and these were made more emphatic by further developments, including the desertion of the PRT (Combatiente), the official Argentine section of the Fourth International.

The crisis in orientation and leadership of the Fourth International was precipitated by the failure of those responsible for the adoption of the orientation toward rural guerrilla warfare, and later urban guerrilla warfare, to recognize the lessons of the events in Bolivia and Argentina. This was shown by the documents they wrote going to great lengths in the effort to justify their course, and by the extension of their erroneous line in a modified form to other areas. ("The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe.") Their insistence on their mistaken course was formalized in the positions they upheld at the plenum of the International Executive Committee in December 1972.

The IEC plenum was followed by a sharpening clash over how to resolve the crisis.

The minority sought to reverse the guerrilla war orientation. It sought to gain adequate time for the ranks of the international to discuss the issues. Time was required for the presentation of documents, their translation and distribution, and clarification of the differences through debate. To this end the minority urged postponement of the congress. And at the IEC plenum it called for organization of a tendency to advance this point of view.

The majority sought an early congress. It talked about imposing stronger centralism in the international, a position that aroused fears that if it gained a majority it would attempt to resolve the differences through organizational means. It was reluctant about agreeing to postpone the congress, considering this to be an organizational concession to the minority instead of a genuine need of the world Trotskyist movement as a whole if clarification were to be reached among the ranks on the differences. At the IEC plenum itself, the majority announced the formation of a tendency to defend its positions, naming it the "International Executive Committee Majority Tendency."

At a conference held in Santiago, Chile, March 5-8, 1973, some of the leading comrades in the world Trotskyist movement who agreed with the minority position, formed the "Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency" on a principled platform stating the basis of membership.

Later it was discovered that the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency was in actuality functioning as a secret faction; that is, on an undeclared basis. It was discovered, in addition, that some of its leaders favored working toward a split in the Fourth

International.

In face of this evidence, the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency modified its platform somewhat, adding a call for a change in the leadership of the Fourth International and announcing that it was converting to an international faction and assuming the rights of such a formation, with the consequent change in functioning that this involved.

As the internal struggle continued to sharpen and to broaden in its ramifications, leaders of both sides recognized the danger of a split that would be politically unjustified.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction was particularly concerned over the delays in translating documents into languages other than English, the delay in providing French translations being particularly bad. This signified that the congress would not be well-enough prepared to settle the key issues in accordance with Trotskyist norms. In addition, the existence of a wing in the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency favoring splitting the movement was ominous. It remained to be seen whether those in the undeclared faction opposed to a split could keep them under control.

Yet the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency insisted on holding the congress without further postponements. They cited the statutes requiring a congress at least every three years; and on this they of course had a point.

The outcome of this situation was the unanimously agreed upon ten-point agreement of September 19, 1973. This limited the agenda to five points: (1) the world political situation, (2) the question of orientation in Argentina, (3) the question of orientation in Bolivia, (4) European perspectives, (5) statutes of the Fourth International. Other points of the agreement included refraining from expulsions or suspensions or application of disciplinary measures against sections or sympathizing groups, assurances on voting rights, and adoption of the temporary statutes without change. It reaffirmed the commitment to translate and circulate all contributions to the international internal discussion bulletin in at least French, Spanish and English.

Another important item was to hold over for further discussion the following questions: (1) the "cultural revolution" and China, (2) the radicalization of the youth, (3) women's liberation, (4) the Middle East, (5) Vietnam. It was agreed to publish a monthly internal bulletin of up to forty-eight pages for articles on these subjects.

It was also agreed that the next congress would be held within two years.

In face of the deepening and widening differences in the movement as a whole, the ten-point agreement outlined a possible *modus vivendi* until the next congress. However, it remained to be seen what would happen at the congress itself.

## **A New Point Added to Agenda**

The actual agenda turned out to be somewhat different from what had been agreed on in September. In particular, a point called "Armed Struggle in Latin America" was included—I will come later to the reason for this—so that the actual order was as follows: (1) world po-

litical situation, (2) orientation in Bolivia, (3) orientation in Argentina, (4) armed struggle in Latin America, (5) European perspectives, (6) statutes.

Since the resolutions themselves and the reports on them should soon be available for everyone in the Trotskyist movement to read and study, I will not attempt to go into them in detail or even to outline them. For purposes of a tentative balance sheet, I will try to give the gist of the positions. To do this as clearly as possible, I will put them in a certain logical order—which is not the same as the actual order.

First, the positions of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency:

On the world political situation, they held that there has been a revolutionary upsurge since 1968. The outstanding manifestation of this has been the rise of a "new mass vanguard." They cited Europe as the prime example of these developments, but maintained that similar phenomena are observable elsewhere in the world.

From this they drew the conclusion that the major task facing the Fourth International is to influence and win this new mass vanguard; and that the most effective way of achieving this is through a policy of "initiatives in action."

Comrade Ernest Germain, the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, summarized it as follows: "The problem of initiatives in action is at the center of the debate in the international."

On "Armed Struggle in Latin America," the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, Comrade Roman, made some sweeping generalizations which I will return to later. The resolution falls in place here because it amounts to a generalization of the problem of initiatives in action, of "minority violence," and of "injecting violence into the class struggle."

It includes criticisms of particular formulations made at the Ninth World Congress in relation to the "turn" adopted then, but these are secondary.

The reporter theorized on the question of "armed struggle," viewing the question from the angle of "initiatives" that might be taken by small groups, whatever the eventual link might be between such actions and those of the masses in motion in prerevolutionary or revolutionary situations.

On the question of perspectives in Europe, the reporter on this point, Comrade Livio Maitan, handled it as a particular application of the position taken by the majority on the political situation in the world as a whole.

Similarly on the question of the events in Bolivia, the reporter, Comrade Serrano, viewed this as a particular application of "armed struggle," maintaining that the orientation adopted at the Ninth World Congress was completely correct as a whole. Whatever criticisms could be lodged fell within the framework of application of the line. In this respect there had been some wrong estimates of the relationship of forces, and some tactical errors had been committed.

Argentina was dealt with in the same way. Comrade Saoul reported that what had occurred in Argentina was an application of the "armed struggle" orientation. The line still remained valid despite the experience with the PRT (Combatiente). The main error in Argentina had been a "militarist deviation." The speakers defending the

position of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency made some self-criticisms for having delayed so long in taking up the deviations of the PRT; but said nothing about having presented the PRT (Combatiente) as a model section, particularly in the way it had carried out the proguerrilla line of the Ninth World Congress.

As for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, its main positions on these questions should be presented in a quite different order inasmuch as its objective was to put up the strongest possible case for reversing a wrong orientation.

On both Bolivia and Argentina, the reporters for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, Comrades Lorenzo and Arturo respectively, started from the concrete situations in those countries and the actual experience of our comrades there. This included a résumé of the contrasting results of the application of two different lines in Argentina; that is, the disaster suffered by the Fourth International in the case of the PRT (Combatiente) and the successes gained for the Fourth International by the PST.

Likewise on the question of perspectives in Europe, Comrade Roberto, who was the reporter for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on that subject, besides offering a theoretical analysis, emphasized the concrete experience of the past few years, especially in Spain where the Trotskyist movement has made big strides.

On "Armed Struggle in Latin America," as the comrade explaining the views of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, I pointed out how the guerrilla orientation had now been generalized in such a way as to become a line for all continents, as had been predicted by the minority at the Ninth World Congress. I showed how the resolution contradicted the positions held by the Trotskyist movement since its foundation, and warned of the disasters that could be expected from revising the program of Trotskyism on this question.

Finally, on the world political situation, Comrade Jack Barnes, explaining the views of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction offered a broad analysis of the objective reality for the past few decades. The purpose of this was to call special attention to the changing pattern of the world revolution, which was now bringing to the fore the leading role of the working class, including in the imperialist centers, and opening up immense new opportunities for the world Trotskyist movement. In taking up the tasks facing the Fourth International, he called for a realistic assessment of the stage of development of the Fourth International and particularly of the resources at its disposal. If this were done, then the world Trotskyist movement had every reason to count on highly encouraging advances in the coming period.

In general, what the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction sought to do at the congress was the following:

1. Clarify the issues, particularly the meaning of the resolution on "armed struggle" placed on the agenda by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency.
2. Block the would-be splitters, those who were counting on the congress ending in a blow up.
3. Maintain the unity of the Fourth International despite the development of some very deep differences.
4. Prepare the best possible conditions for the next stage, in which our movement can expect big openings in the class struggle in various areas.

A third tendency participated actively in the debate that took place at the world congress. It was announced at the beginning of the sessions. It called itself the Mezhrayonka Tendency.

In its announcement, it said that it was formed to gain equal rights in the discussion and to fight against any split. Its platform consisted of documents advanced for the most part by the Kompass Tendency and a lengthy critique of the IEC Majority Tendency's political resolution, which was distributed in French at the world congress itself.

The components of the Mezhrayonka Tendency consisted of the Kompass Tendency in the German section; the Kompass Tendency in the Danish section; the Revolutionary-Marxist Tendency in the Italian section; Comrade Krasno, a member of the steering committee of the Contre le Courant Tendency in France; and Comrade Kailas Chandra, a leading member of the Indian section.

The Mezhrayonka Tendency played a progressive, if brief, role at the congress, dissolving itself after the vote was taken.

On the world political situation, Comrade Luigi of the Mezhrayonka Tendency gave a counterreport based on their document. It was highly critical of the positions of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency.

On "Armed Struggle in Latin America" the report by Comrade Willi was likewise highly critical, coming close to the position of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction except on the question of forming an "armed wing" of the party. This flaw made the position of the Mezhrayonka Tendency unacceptable to the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

On European perspectives, the reporter for the Mezhrayonka Tendency was comrade Herb, whose position was likewise critical of the resolution of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, particularly its concept of a new mass vanguard, which he held to be amorphous and open to all kinds of interpretations.

On Bolivia and Argentina, the Mezhrayonka Tendency agreed with the general line of the balance sheet submitted by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction and did not ask for separate reporters on those two points.

In announcing that it was dissolving, the Mezhrayonka Tendency said that this did not affect its components. These would be maintained on a national basis and would correspond and collaborate with each other in the coming period.

## Significance of the Outcome

The International Executive Committee Majority Tendency carried the vote on its resolutions, although by a narrower margin than at the Ninth World Congress. For example, on Bolivia and Argentina 51 percent of the delegates voted for the IEC Majority Tendency's resolutions, 46 percent for the balance sheet of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, and 3 percent abstained.

What is the significance for the Fourth International of this outcome?

It means, in brief, that in face of vigorous and increasing opposition, the ultraleft course on which the international was placed at the Ninth World Congress will be continued until at least the next congress.

First of all, the vote meant reaffirmation of the "turn"

of the Ninth World Congress along with rectification of what have been called "unfortunate" or "elliptical" formulations, plus some criticisms of what have been put down as "tactical mistakes" and "wrong estimation of the relationship of forces," and some self-reproof for having failed in time to criticize the tactical errors and political deviations of the now admittedly "non-Trotskyist" former official section of Argentina.

Secondly, the vote meant generalization of the "turn" taken at the Ninth World Congress. The generalization has been codified in the resolution on "armed struggle in Latin America" and the accompanying report. It could be said that the "turn" has now been virtually completed. It goes far beyond Latin America. It includes adoption of a policy favoring "minority violence."

The adoption of this line means that a new stage in the history of the Fourth International has been opened. A key point of program—the position of the Fourth International opposing "minority violence" in both theory and practice—has been revised.

In conformity with this change, the axis of work has been officially shifted toward a supposed "new mass vanguard." That means—above all in Europe—away from the masses who are organized in the Communist and Social Democratic parties and in the trade unions.

Of first concern now are the interests of the "new mass vanguard," or more correctly what the "new mass vanguard" is interested in. The orientation is toward small demonstrations of a "spectacular" nature—"initiatives in action" and "exemplary" deeds.

In this orientation, the one saving point—if it can be called that—is that it includes work among the radicalizing youth, especially in the high schools and universities. But the basis of the approach is a disorienting one that stands in the road of the key task facing our movement of becoming integrated and rooted in the working class.

Lest anyone draw hasty and unwarranted conclusions, the adoption of the new line on "armed struggle" should not be taken as signifying that the Fourth International is beyond reform. It is a situation conducive to sharp internal differentiation and struggle; but so long as democratic centralism is observed and no ban is placed on the organization of tendencies or factions, the Fourth International can be brought back to the correct course on this issue.

In fact, the maintenance of unity at the congress and the organizational conditions that were agreed to at the end of the sessions make it possible to test the line further, to review its results during the preparations for the next congress, and in all likelihood to reverse it at that time.

It should be said, however, that strong centrifugal forces were observable at the congress. It must be said, too, that while the immediate danger of a split was averted and an agreement was reached on measures to help maintain unity following the congress, unity remains precarious. Recognition of this reality facilitates the struggle against a split that would be quite unjustified politically.

The unity of the Fourth International remains precarious because of the nature of the resolution on "armed struggle." It involves the public stand to be taken on current events of an acute political nature.

Unlike broad theoretical questions that can be discussed in a leisurely way within the movement, events involving the use of violence in the class struggle require taking

public positions—and without delay.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the mounting unrest observable throughout the world today has been the recrudescence of primitive and outmoded forms of struggle such as individual terrorism. This is highly symptomatic, signaling the approach of more effective forms of struggle. In anticipation of the great mass actions to come, it is absolutely essential for our movement to take clear public positions on events of this kind that gain wide notoriety. The issue cannot be evaded. To attempt to evade taking a correct public stand would mean political death for our movement.

Thus a heavy responsibility rests on the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency. If they resolve the contradiction between their newly adopted position on "armed struggle" and the classic Marxist position by completely junking the old Trotskyism, this could place the unity of the Fourth International in jeopardy.

The issue, of course, is not confined to an abstract level; it will take very concrete forms. The question depends on how each individual case is handled. Consequently it would be a mistake to attempt to forecast what the variations might be.

## A Transitional Situation

The outcome of the congress; that is, the vote and the accompanying organizational agreement on measures to help maintain the unity of the Fourth International, was unsatisfactory to both sides. But it reflected a transitional situation in the world Trotskyist movement that still remains to be resolved. Most importantly, a split was prevented.

The centrifugal forces observable at the congress go back as far as 1968 when the Argentine section split wide open in a struggle involving adaptation to the strategy of rural guerrilla warfare. Since that time splits have occurred in other sections or groups.

The primary cause of the divisions was the influence of Castroism, Ho Chi Minhism, and ultimately Maoism on our movement, the intermediate link being the ultraleft currents that appeared as part of the process of the radicalization of the youth. This pressure, however, could become a major problem for our movement only because it was coupled with the failure of the leaders of the majority to oppose it effectively—in fact by their bending to it.

Another important element in the outcome at the congress was the lack of understanding among the ranks of the issues at stake. This was one of the consequences of the uneven development of the groups and sections of the Fourth International. Some of them are very new and very inexperienced. In addition, the discussion prior to the congress was quite uneven. In some areas the discussion had barely got under way because of the difficulties of translating and distributing documents.

An additional complication was the pace of recruitment. The world Trotskyist movement as a whole has made considerable gains in this respect in the past few years. In the feeling of satisfaction over the number recruited, it is easy to overlook the relative possibilities—what could have been gained—and to miss the meaning of the considerable recruiting that has been scored by competitive groupings during this same period. It is also easy to miss the significance of a high rate of turnover in member-

ship. Consequently, one of the harsh tests of the validity of a line—its capacity to win members of the working-class vanguard and hold them—has not come prominently to the fore in this period.

The new recruits, of course, in the first stage of their life in the movement come heavily under the influence of the cadres who first brought them the message of revolutionary Marxism and who are not always above also indoctrinating them along factional lines.

In this transitional situation, the congress could not resolve the issues in a definitive way. A considerable part of the world Trotskyist movement still faces the task of catching up with a discussion that in some areas reached the point of temporary exhaustion.

This uneven situation was reflected in the voting pattern in a number of European sections on the eve of the world congress. High rates of abstention indicated a justified refusal by many comrades to vote on questions they felt had not been adequately clarified.

The reports presented to the mandates commission at the congress confirmed the fact that neither the IEC Majority Tendency nor the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction have yet won a majority of the ranks of the International. While a few more comrades actually voted for the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction (5,663 as against 5,277 for the IEC Majority Tendency) the important fact is that neither tendency has yet convinced a majority of the members of the Fourth International.

Under these circumstances, to demand that the delegates at the congress make a decision on a far-reaching new line on "armed struggle" represented, in my opinion, a grave default in responsible leadership.

## Single Most Important Development

The adoption of the resolution "Armed Struggle in Latin America," which was submitted by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, was the single most important development at the world congress.

First as to the circumstances of its inclusion on the agenda:

It was originally submitted to the discussion as a statement of position, being published in the English edition of the *International Internal Discussion Bulletin* in October 1973; that is, a month after the September agreement on the agenda of the congress.

Later, on the eve of the congress, the International Executive Majority Tendency made a unilateral decision to include it on the agenda in the form of a resolution. This unilateral decision was, of course, in violation of the ten-point agreement defining the preconditions for an authoritative world congress.

Thus many sections and sympathizing groups were unaware that the statement was proposed for adoption as a resolution by the congress even if they had received it, translated it, and made it available for consideration by the membership in advance of the congress. The result was that it was debated in only a few countries. And it was not voted on in most countries as a basis for selection of delegates.

No final version was offered for discussion at the congress. Many extensive amendments were offered after the congress opened and some of these were presented in an incomplete form.

This undemocratic procedure met with strong protests, particularly on the part of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction. The procedure was clear evidence of the lack of adequate preparation for the congress. In view of the circumstances, it was highly in order for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency to request postponement of the congress so as to provide time for discussion of their resolution on "armed struggle" and the selection of delegates on the basis of that resolution.

The leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency had no adequate reasons to offer for not requesting postponement of the congress in view of their decision to place this question on the agenda. They maintained (1) that they had a "right" as a majority to do this, and (2) that, after all, the question of orientation on "armed struggle" had been one of the central issues in the internal discussion since 1969.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction decided in caucus to agree under protest to discuss the question of "armed struggle" as a separate point and to do the utmost in the limited time available to clarify the question. Against the objections of prominent members of the International Executive Majority Tendency, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction succeeded in doubling the time for discussion of this point from four hours to eight.

## The "Problématique" of "Armed Struggle"

The discussion on the resolution was quite revealing. The reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, Comrade Roman, said that the question arose for the Fourth International in the context of the economic, social, and political conditions in Latin America but that the "problématique" of "armed struggle" is not confined to Latin America. (The translators are still undecided on how to put the term "problématique" into good English. It appears to mean the technique of posing problems or the set of problems you succeed in getting into a single bag.) In the opinion of the reporter, the Trotskyist movement had not answered the questions posed by the "problématique" of "armed struggle" and it was high time that this was done.

To prove how far the subject extended beyond Latin America, the reporter placed great stress on the pattern of resistance in Spain to Franco's bid for power in 1936. And he sought to construct an analogy that could be applied in considering the events in Chile when the military seized power there last fall.

In addition to that, the reporter sought to establish some general rules that the world Trotskyist movement could apply in situations involving urban uprisings on any of the continents. These rules included the following:

1. Advancing propaganda in favor of arming the working class. This, he maintained, was one of the themes of the Transitional Program, why shouldn't it be advanced like any of the other themes?

2. Carrying on work in the army. This meant not just seeking to democratize the army, or to defend the democratic rights of members of the armed forces, but to split off segments at the appropriate time and place in conjunction with "armed struggle" conducted by small civilian groups.

3. Intervention by the party through "armed struggle" under its own guidance both before and after a rightist

coup such as the one seen in Chile.

4. Preparing well in advance for all technical and military contingencies. This did not mean opposition to mass action but it did mean opposition to any "pseudo massist" concepts such as those supposedly displayed by the PST in Argentina.

In addition to the above, the reporter stressed an alleged dialectical relationship between "minority violence" and "majority violence."

Perhaps the most significant item was the statement by the reporter that he was formulating only the first approach and that a lot still remains to be done in working out the "problématique" of "armed struggle."

He said he was all for the Transitional Program but the specific forms it outlines does not provide the answers for new situations.

He ended by promising to follow up this encouraging beginning with theoretical and practical work.

Frequent references to the assassination of Franco's prime minister Carrero Blanco by the Basque nationalists in December were made during the discussion.

A Spanish leader of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, for instance, reaffirmed the position that the assassination gave an "impulse" to the class struggle in Spain and caused a crisis in ruling circles. His defense of the assassination followed the classical lines of the terrorist position long ago analyzed and opposed by the revolutionary-Marxist movement.

In showing how the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency had bent to the pressure, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction pointed to a scandalous headline in the January 11, 1974, issue of *Red Weekly*, the paper of the International Marxist Group: "Spanish Trotskyists give total support to Carrero Blanco assassination."

Comrade Livio Maitan was perhaps the most consistent in advancing the new line. He argued that the headline of the *Red Weekly* was in error. The British comrades should not have said "total support"; they should have said "critical support to Carrero Blanco assassination."

Comrade Maitan offered his own version of the resolution on "armed struggle in Latin America," or some very extensive amendments—I am not sure which, nor am I sure of their full content inasmuch as page 2 of his four-and-a-half page draft resolution was missing in the copy I received and a corrected copy was not readily available. Here are two revealing sentences from the pages of the copy I received. In explaining what the resolution on armed struggle passed by the Ninth World Congress was about, Comrade Maitan included the following:

"That it was imperious for sections of the Fourth International, particularly in certain countries (Bolivia, Argentina)—where the threshold of a minimum accumulation of cadres had already been reached, not only to elaborate an orientation for armed struggle, but also to engage in the concrete implementation of such an orientation. Guerilla warfare was considered the predominant form of armed struggle at this particular stage."

What is new in this is the statement that in Bolivia and Argentina a minimum accumulation of cadres had *already been reached*. Hitherto the "minimum accumulation" has remained algebraic. Now the arithmetic has been supplied. The number is astonishingly low.

Here is another proposal offered by Comrade Maitan:

"We must reject any cursory characterization, which, under the disguise [guise?] of remaining faithful to the anti-terrorist concepts of revolutionary marxism, would condemn forms of struggle which have been widely implemented in the past few years (expropriations, kidnappings of exploiters, executions of those responsible for massacres and torture, etc. . . .)"

The evidence could hardly be clearer of the influence of alien class pressures. Comrade Maitan proposes rejecting a characterization that remains faithful to the antiterrorist concepts of revolutionary Marxism. And why? Because of the number of violations of those concepts in the past few years!

In defending the orientation toward rural guerrilla warfare adopted at the Ninth World Congress, the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency said: "So we lost a section in Argentina. But then we won one in Spain and another in the Antilles."

Comrade Germain added the following comment: "We did not lose one in Bolivia; and this sticks like a fishbone in the throat of Jack Barnes."

More significant was Comrade Germain's silence on the assassination of Carrero Blanco. Despite repeated challenges to state his position, he refused to do so, keeping his lips buttoned on that question.

Comrade Maitan filed a statement for inclusion in the minutes stating that while he had voted for the resolution he disagreed with some aspects of it; but he made no specifications.

A noteworthy reaction was that of Comrade Kailas Chandra of India. He said that he had come to the congress with an "absolutely open mind," but after hearing the speeches on Latin America made by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency he had "felt quite sad," and had become convinced by the discussion that they were wrong.

The reporter for the majority on "armed struggle" had used a language that was "alien and strange" in comparison with the language used heretofore in congresses of the Fourth International. This was a significant judgment since Comrade Chandra has been a member of the Fourth International since 1939 and belongs to the older generation of leaders.

He said that with respect to Comrade Germain he had admired him and expected a great deal of him. His "psychological block against split" was an admirable thing.

Comrade Chandra said that he had not joined either of the two main tendencies out of fear of a split and the feeling that he could counter a split better if he remained outside of the two main tendencies.

He found Comrade Germain's arguments on Chile "astounding"; particularly the view that one or two thousand armed guards could have saved Allende. Not even ten thousand armed guards could have saved Allende in face of the political training that had been given to depend on the army.

The strategy followed in Bolivia had proved to be a disaster, in the opinion of Comrade Chandra. "Now it is to be realized on a global scale," he said. "It is a bad approach, a dangerous approach."

He ended by calling for reversal of the line of the Ninth



World Congress.

Later he told some of the comrades that in India, before coming to the congress, he had misjudged the situation. After what he had seen at the congress, he was convinced that the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction had saved the congress from a split.

In conclusion on this point, let me reiterate that passage of the resolution on "armed struggle" was the gravest development at the world congress. It affects orientation on tasks in an unhealthy way and constitutes a political time bomb.

## Agreement to Help Maintain Unity

I have referred several times to an organizational agreement that was reached at the end of the congress to help maintain the unity of the Fourth International. This consisted of reaffirming the agreements previously reached in April and September 1973. The new agreement included general formulas to be followed in determining the status of sections and sympathizing groups in various special conditions. (See Appendix: "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain Unity of the Fourth International.")

The application of these general formulas aroused protests among members of both sides. Among other things it was clear that the distinction between sections and sympathizing groups was breaking down, and it could create a very bad precedent.

There were other reasons for dissatisfaction. A sector of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency was particularly unhappy. I think that this was because some of these comrades had been counting on a split and had based their calculations for the future on that perspective.

In any case, there was an extraordinary amount of caucusing by the majority tendency over the nine-point agreement before it was accepted.

## Nature of the IEC Majority Tendency

I have spoken about the political conclusions to be drawn concerning the outcome of the congress—that is, that the main line of the Fourth International will continue to be ultraleftist for the next two years.

There are some other aspects that warrant consideration.

The International Executive Committee Majority Tendency can be viewed as a bloc consisting of two tendencies—one that favored a split at the congress. This wing gave every indication of being disappointed at the outcome. The other wing was opposed to a split and sought to circumvent it, seeing that such an outcome would be a big setback for the world Trotskyist movement.

As between these two wings, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction did what it could to help the wing favoring unity, although it must be added without much encouragement from that wing.

In the final analysis, however, the differences between these two wings, viewed from this angle, may amount only to a matter of tactics. Such differences are not decisive in the long run.

There is still another way of looking at the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency that may prove enlightening; that is, gauging the sociological pressures

to which it is responding.

We have refrained up to now from taking up this question inasmuch as it could appear to some comrades to be a mere exercise in epithet-mongering and a diversion from an objective discussion of the political issues in dispute. Up to this point we have deliberately sought to confine our polemics mainly to the *political* differences. This required careful examination of the concrete experiences of our movement; the facts had to be established as accurately as possible. We sought to examine the connection of all this to the general positions held by the Trotskyist movement since its foundation.

But certain questions remain to be answered; and some of the comrades, especially the Argentinians, have pressed for answers. For example:

1. How are we to explain the attraction of the "strategy of armed struggle" to the leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency?

2. How are we to explain the blindness of these leaders to the lessons of events showing the bankruptcy of that strategy?

3. How are we to explain their persistence in continuing it with whatever partial self-criticisms?

4. How are we to explain their growing tendency to generalize this line and to convert it into something of universal application?

5. How are we to explain their tendency to elaborate a new theory on it the way their reporter did at the world congress?

6. How are we to explain their striking drift away from the positions long ago reached on this question by the revolutionary Marxist movement?

7. How are we to explain their brazen, or in some instances shame-faced, support of such a terrorist action as the assassination of Carrero Blanco?

8. How do we explain their mounting determination to put this line more and more into practice?

Where are the answers to such questions to be found?

I think that the key lies in their lack of roots in the working class and the labor movement. They lack the steadying influence of immersion in the proletariat.

Consider how revealing is their constant preoccupation with the problem of "linking up" with the workers. If you are rooted in the working class this problem does not arise.

Consider again their insistence on small group actions. This is not characteristic of the working class, which prefers to use the most powerful weapon at its disposal—the mobilization of its vast numbers in a cohesive way as seen in strikes.

The rural guerrilla warfare, with which these leaders were enamored in 1969 and for a time after that, is characteristic of the peasantry. The appearance of guerrillas is a sign of a rising peasant movement.

Similarly urban guerrilla warfare, which the leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency took up next, is characteristic of the lower layers of the petty bourgeoisie of the cities. It is an anticipatory sign of a general proletarian upsurge or an accompaniment of it.

Or take the theory of the wonders to be worked by the "exemplary actions" of individuals or small groups. It is

held that such actions set examples for the masses to which they can be expected to respond. But this is quite false. Individuals may respond but not *masses*.

What the theory of "exemplary actions" on a small scale expresses is the *hope* of radicalized petty-bourgeois elements *impatient* about moving ahead. The same holds for the theory of an alleged dialectic between "minority violence" and "majority violence."

From this angle, what does the theory of the "new mass vanguard" amount to?

It consists by and large of a search for ways and means to utilize the radicalized petty bourgeoisie to "link up" with the working class and impel it into motion from the *outside*.

This is a most telling indication of the isolation of sectors of our movement from the working class and from the labor movement.

Thus we can say that the class nature of the *majority line* is coming to the fore. Enough evidence is accumulating to make it possible at some point fairly soon to offer a convincing analysis so that the term "petty bourgeois" will appear as a correct label and not as an invidious epithet applied to *persons*.

The distinction between *line* and *persons* is very important. The line of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency represents a bending to the radicalized petty-bourgeois milieu from which many young cadres of the Fourth International have emerged and in which they are still working.

## Role of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction

In conclusion, a few words on how the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction functioned.

It held several meetings in advance of the congress to get acquainted, to hear the latest reports, to exchange impressions, and to discuss preparations. The discussions were exceptionally free and comradely. Such differences as appeared concerned tactical questions. A steering committee was elected to coordinate actions during the congress.

During the sessions, the steering committee was on constant call, while the caucus as a whole met almost every day. There were continual reports. Discussions sometimes lasted until early morning.

The faction displayed increasing effectiveness in its organization and functioning. It acted in a disciplined and cohesive way. Throughout the congress there were not more than a couple of speeches that could be said to have been counterproductive.

The Bolshevik way in which the faction functioned was shown by the impact of its arguments and the difficulties faced by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency in trying to answer them.

For some comrades this was the first time they had traveled outside their country. For many it was the first world congress they had attended. And for most of them it was the first time they had participated in a faction struggle.

It was a tremendous educational experience for them. And it was remarkable to see the comrades develop in such a short time. Of course, it was an intense experience. Moreover, they had the good fortune to be participating

in a faction that was a good one, that gave a model demonstration of its principled nature, and of its capacity to play a positive role in the life of the world Trotskyist movement.

The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction sought only limited objectives at the congress. All of these were achieved.

In the discussion, the members of the faction did an extraordinarily good job in clarifying the issues and arguing for a reversal of line in light of the experience of the international since 1969.

They succeeded in blocking any exclusionary moves. For example, a move was on foot to exclude the Chinese section, but this died without ever coming before the delegates.

The campaign that had been waged against the PST and the PRT (Uruguay) was set back considerably. It will be recalled that the PRT (Combatiente) had urged the expulsion of the PST. Instead, all the mandates of the PST were recognized. Representatives of the PST were included as part of the incoming International Executive Committee. Perhaps most important of all, through first-hand encounter the delegates of the International Executive Committee Majority were able to see for themselves that the propaganda used against the PST had to be discounted, and it had to be admitted that the PST is a Trotskyist organization, an integral part of the Fourth International.

Another objective of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction was to do its utmost to block any splitting moves. Its course was decisive, in my opinion, in enabling the congress to chalk up a success in this respect.

Finally, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction sought to establish the best possible conditions for the maintenance of unity following the congress. While it remains to be seen how well this works out, the caucus assured the delegates that it would act as a responsible minority in continuing this policy in the coming period.

Following the congress, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction held a two-day conference in which there was a free and very educational discussion assessing the outcome and what course to follow in the coming period. All of the points I have touched on were taken up there.

Four decisions were made:

1. To try in the coming period to relax the factional tensions that built up before the congress. Both sides as a whole will welcome this, I think.

2. To give the majority an opportunity to make a further test of its line. One can hope that this will not provide further ammunition for the minority when the discussion resumes, but a realistic assessment of that line indicates that the minority will probably face an embarrassment of riches.

3. In view of the nature of the resolution on "armed struggle" that was adopted, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction will not dissolve but will continue to function in a disciplined, coordinated way.

4. The Leninist-Trotskyist Faction recognizes that the unity of the Fourth International remains precarious because of the possible consequences of the majority line on "armed struggle."

March 12, 1974

## **APPENDIX: Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain Unity of the Fourth International**

Adopted by Fourth World Congress Since Reunification  
(Tenth World Congress)

1. No exclusion of any groups or members now belonging to the tendencies or factions in the Fourth International.

2. No reduction in status of groups currently recognized as sections or sympathizing sections.

3. Adoption of a general formula to determine status in the following special situation:

In countries where adherents of the Fourth International are divided into two or more groups acting publicly apart from each other no group shall be recognized as a section, but all groups shall be recognized as sympathizing sections. But if the groups in any of these countries fuse before the next world congress, the International Executive Committee is empowered to recognize the united group as a section.

These are exceptional measures not to be taken as setting a precedent of any kind. It is not the purpose of these measures to encourage splits by giving minority groups the hope that they will receive recognition from the International if they leave a section and set up a public formation.

4. No recognition of challenges to mandate claims placed before the mandate commission by sections, sympathizing sections, or groups applying for recognition.

5. The vote cast on the counterposed political resolu-

tions shall be taken as the criterion in determining the approximate proportional representation in membership of the different tendencies or factions on the incoming International Executive Committee and Control Commission.

6. Enlargement of the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee to reflect the growth in size of the Fourth International since the last world congress.

7. Adoption of the following two categories in the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee:

a) Full status for members of sections.

b) Consultative status for members of sympathizing sections.

Full members and consultative members shall have the same rights in everything except voting. Full members shall have decisive votes; consultative members consultative votes. For purposes of replacement, alternate members shall be listed according to tendency or faction and placed in numbered rank.

8. Reaffirmation of the ten-point agreement defining the preconditions for an authoritative world congress that was unanimously adopted by the United Secretariat September 19, 1973.

9. As part of the implementation of this agreement, each of the tendencies or factions shall make statements at the close of the congress proclaiming their firm support to maintaining the unity of the Fourth International.

## Recommendations to the Delegates of the Coming World Congress

Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat, September 19, 1973

The fear has been voiced that the differences under discussion in the Fourth International and the organizations in sympathy with it could lead to a split. To counteract this danger and to strengthen the unity of our movement, the United Secretariat reaffirms its statement "The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress" that was unanimously adopted on April 9, 1973.

In addition, the United Secretariat unanimously recommends to the delegates of the Fourth Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) that they adopt the following proposals:

1. That there be no expulsions or suspensions or application of disciplinary measures against sections of the Fourth International or any of its sympathizing groups.

2. That all sections and sympathizing groups be granted full voting rights at the world congress in accordance with the number of their members in good standing, as specified in the statutes of the Fourth International.

3. That the present temporary statutes of the Fourth International be adopted without change.

4. That in those countries where two or more groups exist because of splits or other reasons, the united moral authority of the Fourth International be brought to bear for the earliest possible fusion of the groups on a principled basis.

5. That only resolutions and counterresolutions on the

following points be placed on the agenda of the coming world congress for a vote: (a) the world political situation; (b) the question of orientation in Argentina; (c) the question of orientation in Bolivia; (d) European perspectives; (e) statutes of the Fourth International.

6. That the international discussion on these points be closed following the world congress for one year unless the IEC decides to reopen the discussion earlier.

7. That the following points be considered in commissions or panels at the coming world congress: (a) the "cultural revolution" and China; (b) youth radicalization; (c) women's liberation; (d) Middle East; (e) Vietnam; (f) Eastern Europe.

8. That votes on these topics not be taken at the coming world congress.

9. That the international discussion on the questions listed in point No. 7, excluding analysis of conjunctural events in Vietnam and Eastern Europe, be continued in literary form following the coming world congress in a monthly bulletin not to exceed 48 pages.

10. That the Fifth Congress After Reunification (Eleventh World Congress) be held within two years following the coming world congress.

September 19, 1973

## The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress

Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat, April 9, 1973

In view of the backlog of translations still to be done of documents submitted to the preparatory discussion for the next world congress and the number of documents already announced for presentation in the coming weeks, it appears unlikely that these can be placed in the hands of the rank and file before the conferences of the sections are held to choose delegates for the next world congress.

To overcome this difficulty and thus help to assure a fully democratic discussion and election of world congress delegates, the United Secretariat therefore unanimously recommends to membership of the I. E. C. postponement of the world congress. In accordance with the new date it also recommends that the final date for submission of material be set approximately three months in advance of the world congress. The United Secretariat is not bound to translate and publish material submitted after that date.

All national pre-world congress conferences should be rescheduled to be held as close to the world congress

as practical, but not earlier than 6 weeks before the congress.

Some comrades have expressed fear that the delay in translating documents might be part of a process that would bring into question the authoritativeness of the next world congress.

The United Secretariat is of the unanimous opinion that fulfillment of the following conditions, regardless of the date of the congress, will assure recognition of the statutory authority of the decisions of the next world congress by all sections, sympathizing groups and international tendencies of the Fourth International.

1) A fully democratic preparatory world discussion.

2) Translation and circulation at least into English, French and Spanish of all documents submitted before the final deadline.

3) The democratic election of delegates to the world congress.

4) Democratic conduct of the congress.

# Report on the Tenth World Congress

By Bill Massey and John Barzman  
(Internationalist Tendency)

The Tenth World Congress, which was held in Sweden at the end of February, reflected the deepening political division of the International. The character of the Congress was predominantly that of recording the present stage of the debate. The discussion in the plenary sessions was frozen on a limited number of topics; the arguments were repetitious. However, the Congress took decisive strides forward on a number of fronts. The resolutions of the majority on the World Situation, Europe, Argentina, Bolivia and Armed Struggle in Latin America were adopted with a quite clear majority.

The discussion, the proceedings, and therefore the authority of the Congress itself could not be challenged by the minority faction. This opens the way for a viable outward orientation of the International under the leadership of the Majority. In addition, significant progress was made toward developing the IMT for the continuing struggle which the maintenance of the minority faction imposes. In this context, an organizational agreement was arrived at. Despite some organizational concessions to the LTF, it preserved the unity of the International on a principled basis, providing the framework for further progress on the external and internal fronts.

## I. Origins of the debate

Although the first differences to emerge clearly between the two sides revolved around the question of armed struggle in Latin America—at the time of the Ninth World Congress—it was clear that they were merely the reflection of much deeper differences. In fact in all the questions under dispute, two different conceptions of the Transitional Program and of the role of the revolutionary vanguard organization appeared as the basis of the division. It was the adoption of the resolution on the "Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" by the International Executive Committee Plenum of December 1972 which led to the official announcement of the Minority Tendency. It was the Minority's vote against this resolution which led to the formation of the International Majority tendency.

In fact, the leadership of the future Minority Tendency had long before been making criticisms of the activity of the European sections. This tended to focus in particular around a vicious campaign against the young British section, the IMG. But as early as June 1969, Comrade Tom Kerry, representing the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party at a YSA National Committee Plenum, had used his greetings to make a direct attack on the newly formed Ligue Communiste's presidential election campaign. He attacked in particular the former Ligue's election propaganda as ultra-left. This attack corresponded with the YSA and SWP's turn toward

complete immersion in the anti-war movement at the time of the Moratorium, and the elimination of the red flag and Ligue-style hammer and sickles from the YSA's propaganda arsenal.

This first volley was later followed by the beginning of a systematic criticism of the Ligue's opposition to the document "The Worldwide Radicalization of Youth and the Tasks of the Fourth International." The essence of what the SWP leadership saw in this document was summarized by Comrade Barnes at the 1971 SWP convention in a paraphrase of Comrade Hansen's "Assessment of the Draft Resolution on Latin America": "Cde Hansen's document centers on the central need to orient the world movement towards the radicalizing youth, primarily the student youth at this stage of its development, as the next key step in increasing the cadres of the world Trotskyist movement." (SWP DB, Vol 29, No 19) The Communist League came to be known among the SWP and YSA ranks as "ultra-left and workerist." In the five years since 1969, all reports on the situation in France by the SWP leadership have always emphasized the opportunities for gains in the student and high school movement—most often praising the CL's use of these opportunities—while passing under silence the tremendous strides forward made in implanting the Ligue among a layer of advanced workers. For example the SWP press showed only passing interest in the workers conference of Red Circles held in May 1973 in Rouen, and attended by 990 workers working with the Ligue.

Although the SWP leadership's lack of interest in the progress of our European co-thinkers' efforts at implantation reflected the exclusive work of the SWP in the petty-bourgeois milieu, the differences could not be reduced to a difference over work in the working class. In fact the European sections' estimate of the possibility of gains among advanced workers, through a certain type of activity was only one particular instance of their orientation to what was beginning to be codified as the new mass vanguard. On the other hand, the SWP leadership's worldwide youth radicalization perspective, was only one instance of its developing theorization of minimalist approach to the transitional program. This minimalist approach was evidenced in the activities and proposals of the elements under the influence of the SWP leadership. It was reflected in the lack of an anti-imperialist focus within the broader anti-war movement, the campaigns for the legalization of abortion, and the exaltation of strictly nationalist demands, as in its support for the slogan of a "Democratic Secular Palestine." It led to the isolation of those sections who carried out such an orientation from the advanced layers emerging out of the struggles of the period.

For a while, the differences over Latin America seemed

to be diminishing as Cde. Joe Hansen wrote in 1970: "Our Bolivian comrades made a correct turn in resuming activities in accordance with the method indicated in the 1938 Transitional Program. Trotskyists throughout the world will feel gratified that the Bolivian section was able to make this readjustment."

What appears to have rekindled the factional heat is the SWP and LSA's public disavowal of the action of the PRT, at that time the Argentinian section. In addition, it seems that a possible bloc with the tail-endist economist La Verdad group was beginning to appear. And so Comrade Linda Jenness took a trip to Argentina to teach the future PST about feminism, defensive formulations and electioneering. Despite the very different methodological tradition of the Moreno group—and its practice in a totally different milieu than the SWP, the working class, a political bloc seemed to have been established on the basis of abstract orthodoxy, and a tail-endist and minimalist approach to mass work.

The growth of the PST and the increasing difficulties of the PRT seemed to make possible a reversal of the numerical relationship of forces in the International, and probably induced the SWP leadership to bring out its full differences, and announce political agreement with an international tendency. Thus, the vote at the IEC plenum, and the minimal platform of the Minority tendency, designed to allow the broadest possible combination of forces. The same minimal platform was maintained as the basis of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction which openly proclaimed its goal of overthrowing the leadership of the International with its heterogeneous combination and no stated alternative. There seems to have been a miscalculation in this plan. The LTF was unable to win any significant support in Europe, and Asia, while the IMT gained fresh support in North America. For a time, it seemed as if the LTF would bolt from the International. This was particularly plausible at the August 1973 convention of the SWP, although Comrade Barnes' brinkmanship could also have been interpreted as blackmail to the ranks of the International. It was also the clear message emanating from the PST, already the perpetrator of several splits and confident in its linear growth throughout Latin America. The possibility of such a course by the LTF remains. However, it seems that the leadership and the ranks of the LTF who were less willing to dismiss the majority of the International as lost to Trotskyism prior to a more lengthy discussion temporarily had the upper hand.

## II. Preparation of the congress

The Congress was attended by over two hundred people including a small technical staff. Fifty-two organizations from forty different countries were represented. This represented a qualitative numerical growth of the International since the last world congress, and the progress which has already been made toward regrouping vanguard elements around the world under the banner of Trotskyism. The problems of the International which were evident in the existence of tendencies and a faction are the problems which the International will continue to face in its efforts to transform itself from a propagandistic formation into a world party leading the revolutionary activity of the proletariat; the problems of linking itself

to the new vanguard emerging in the present situation of crisis of world capitalism and the crisis of the traditional leaderships of the working class.

The growth of the International was illustrated by the presence of 26 delegates from the Walloon section, the first world congress to reflect this massive development. In addition, new sections in many European countries, in the Antilles, and the Middle East brought home the opportunities of the Trotskyist movement. Contrary to rumors of its disappearance, the Bolivian section, the POR, was represented by six delegates who reflected its proletarian composition and its deep traditional roots in the Bolivian class struggle. Even the growth of the PST was an expression of the renewed interest in Trotskyism. The most important loss was that of the majority of the PRT, a result of the International's failure to integrate this militant left-moving formation of considerable influence in the Latin American vanguard.

The Congress was prepared by the most thorough discussion ever conducted in the world Trotskyist movement. It included the publication in English, French, and Spanish of all the documents submitted. Particularly noteworthy was the achievement of the Walloon section, which was entrusted with the publication of the French documents at a time when the French section was banned and intervening in a situation of intense class struggle. In addition, the most important documents and many others were printed in other languages. In the vast majority of cases, the discussion was concluded by a special convention of the sections, and the election of delegates to the world congress on the basis of tendency positions. The number of votes of each section (mandates) was determined by the number of dues paying members in that section. The ratio of tendency representation in these (mandates) was determined by the total number of votes cast by full members in the basic units of the sections. Thus, candidate members who are required by the statutes of the International to follow a candidacy program could only cast consultative votes.

The discussion in the Walloon section for example was conducted in the following way. The documents were circulated to all members. The majority of the Central Committee announced the formation of a tendency in support of the IMT; other CC members formed a tendency Against the Stream (ATS); a few rank and filers declared for the LTF. Travel costs of all tendencies were paid by the section as a whole according to a budget and schedule approved by a parity commission. Discussions were held at the cell, section, regional, and national levels. A crew of twelve international representatives of the LTF was given a tour of the regional conferences, and equal time was given to all tendencies at the national convention. The Walloon section was thus allocated fifty-two mandates, reflecting a dues paying membership of over 2,600. Two mandates were given to each delegate. The LTF received only six votes throughout the section and thus could not receive a mandate—30 votes were necessary. The other mandates were divided proportionally with 48 to the IMT, and 4 to the ATS.

The major irregularities in the preparation of the world congress took place in the LTF products of splits in Argentina, Spain, and Mexico. Neither the Liga Socialista

of Mexico, nor the Liga Comunista of Spain held conventions for the world congress. As for the PST of Argentina, it claimed an alleged membership estimated at 3,500. This membership, contrary to the statutes of the FI, was not educated through a candidacy program. It was recruited on the basis of agreement with the platform of two election campaigns in the space of a year. The national convention, which by all accounts seems to have been more like a rally, voted unanimously, all 3,500 members for the LTF, with not a single vote for the IMT reported, not a single Kompass, not a single abstention. Even if this procedure was accepted as valid, there are strong indications that the actual membership was closer to 2,400. Using this methodology the Walloon Section could claim 5,000 members or 100 mandates.

The delegates at the world congress fell into two categories: delegates from recognized sections (such as the Belgian) or fraternal observers from organizations which used to be official sections, but could not maintain that status because of reactionary legislation (such as the SWP); and delegates from sympathizing groups petitioning for full status as sections (such as the Columbian Gruppo Espartaco) or splinters previously granted sympathizing status (such as the PST). The statutes allow for votes only from the actual recognized sections.

### III. Composition of The Tendencies

Some of the outstanding results of the membership voting can be summarized here. In North America, about 160 members of the LSA/LSO in the pan-Canadian state, which included about 30 from the Dowson groups which was not represented in the LSA delegation, and approximately 900 members in the USA indicated their fraternal agreement with the political platform of the LTF. In Latin America, all the LTF support came from organizations which exist in a situation of split in the Trotskyist movement: Mexican LS, Uruguayan PRT(U), Venezuelan PST, Peruvian FIR-Blanco, In Europe, the LTF received the well known 35 votes of the Williams group in the IMG; an alleged 200 in the Spanish LC which did not hold a convention; 28 in Germany—the German LTF was allowed 1 delegate even though it did not have the 30 required votes, an example of bending over backward for minority representation which deserves to be emulated; and under a dozen in Sweden, Belgium and France. This despite the presence of a permanent LTF representative in Europe for a prolonged period. In Asia, the LTF received support on an unclear basis from the majority of the Indian section; only one vote in Japan; the majority of the small official Chinese section; and the votes of the SWL and SAL in Australia and New Zealand.

In most cases, the votes for the IMT were based on tendency declarations in each country which while endorsing the general line of its platform, included some criticisms and elaborations. The most significant of these was the declaration of the majority of the Walloon Central Committee. Its amendments included nuances to the characterization of the world situation by indicating secondary counter-tendencies, clarification of the concept of the new mass vanguard in Europe by distinguishing it from elements with only an episodic break from reformism, and a specification of the different stages of armed struggle

in Latin America, and the means of linking the revolutionary nucleus to the armed struggle of the masses through transitional initiatives. The Japanese delegates gave support to the IMT on the basis of critical evaluations of its documents. In Latin America, the IMT received the support of the Bolivian POR delegates, the Chilean PSR and CL, the Antilles GRS, the Mexican GCI, the Columbian GE, the Peruvian FIR-Combate, the Brazilian POC, the Argentinian Fraccion Roja, Fraccion Bolchevique, and Grupo Obrero Revolucionario (GOR).

A third international tendency, "Mezhraionka," was formed at the opening of the congress and dissolved at its close. It arose out of a coalition of national tendencies. It was based on three separate kind of appeals. The first was represented by the German and Danish Kompass tendencies, and the Italian TMR. It is equally opposed to the sectoralism of the LTF and the new mass vanguard approach of the IMT, a point which was not apparent during Comrade Herb's intervention at the SWP convention at a time when he was seeking a bloc with the LTF to retain the leadership of the German section. One of the distinguishing features of the German Kompass is its characterization of the Social-Democratic Party as a bourgeois party, moving in the direction of the American, Democratic Party, a characterization which both the LTF and IMT opposed, although from different angles. The Kompass used dogmatic and workerist formulations, and denied any common features between the radicalization of even a section of the advanced workers, and that of the militant non-proletarian youth. An interesting aspect was that Comrade Herb used quotations from Cannon long forgotten by the SWP leadership.

A second trend in Mezhraionka was the "Stop-the-Split-Save-Unity" appeal, which attempted to prevent further divisions by taking a middle of the road position. This seemed to be the basis that Comrade Kailas Chandra of India, who had come as a supporter of the LTF (although not a member of the faction), passed over to Mezhraionka. He stated he had not read all the documents.

Finally, in France, the 80 votes or so of the Against the Stream tendency (ATS) were mainly determined by discontent with the lateness of the discussion—which also caused a number of abstentions, and by a desire to register a critical vote in relation to specifically French questions, which were to come up at the French convention. Some of these criticisms were not incompatible with the general line of the IMT. Comrade Dumas' report to the national convention for example, dealt with a history of the FI's relation to centrist currents, without focusing on the actual questions in dispute. At the world congress, Cde Dumas, one of the two ATS delegates, disassociated himself from Mezhraionka, stating that their tactical bloc with the LTF was pushing them more and more toward LTF positions. He gave partial support to the IMT. We can expect a similar process to occur within the ATS tendency as a whole.

### IV. The intervention of the LTF

Comrade Barnes reported, as an observer, on the political line of the LTF Political Resolution. It was the world

situation report that he had already given in Chicago in December. He claimed that the Ninth World Congress could be reduced to a turn toward minority confrontation with the bourgeoisie and its state. Such direct interventions into the struggle between classes should only be conducted by our organizations when they have obtained a majority within the working class—more modestly referred to as the "masses," in the case of the USA—"organizations." Until then, the tasks should be limited to "propaganda, agitation, and organization," as they always have since 1938, and even before. Every problem is answered always and everywhere with a call to accumulate cadre around the transitional program. There can be *no revolutionary situations* without a *revolutionary party*, he said—raising questions about what his interpretation of the Cuban and Chinese events might be. Therefore, the revolutionary organization should stick to propaganda. This abstract, circular, and sectarian rhetoric was the dominant theme of the LTF throughout the Congress.

The purpose of this dogmatic verbiage is two-fold. On the one hand, it represents a real reflection of the sectarian, abstentionist retreat of the SWP in the American situation. On the other, it provides formulations so general and so vague that they could serve as an umbrella for a political bloc with the anti-"peripheral-sectoralism" Kompass, and the dynamically opportunist PST. The IMT pointed out that, in fact, in practice, the LTF did *not* use the Transitional Program, but rather a minimal program; and that the propagandistic approach could only lead to abandoning the possibilities of strengthening the revolutionary potential of the working class, which is decisively affected by the experience of its vanguard.

The PST observers delivered the LTF's presentations on Bolivia and Argentina. On Bolivia, they appeared as an extremely sectarian group, grinding an old factional axe against the leader of the Bolivian section, apparently considered as a rival, Comrade Moscoso. The fundamental political differences did not come out clearly amidst a deluge of accusations of betraying the 1952 and 1971 revolutions, and of the successive mistaken analyses of the Political Command, Popular Assembly, and the FRA. One of the PST speakers who had accused the International of betraying the 1971 revolution was apparently forced by his faction to retract his statement, which he tried to explain as a misunderstanding. In fact, conversations with Comrade Norma of the PST confirmed that the PST analyzes the Fourth International, and in particular its leadership and its French section, as petty-bourgeois and un-reformable, and considers the tradition of Morenoid Trotskyism to be the most "non-sectarian" and consistent trend of Trotskyism.

On Argentina, the opportunist character of the PST was more clearly visible. The PST dodged the main question of analyzing the nature of the period, of the Peron regime, dismissed the possibilities of a coup or a repressive turn of the regime. They stressed the numerical gains, the possibilities of legal work, and the damage done by the armed struggle. Comrade Norma even analyzed the elections as a massive defeat that the working class inflicted on the ultra-left at the polls. The level of debate of the PST sometimes sunk to a ridiculously low level, as when one of their speakers summarized the positions of the IMT as "Nada, Nada, Nada" (Nothing) and those of the LTF

as "Partido, Partido, Partido" (The Party). Comrade Paille's intervention was somewhat more honest. He described his experience with the Cordoba workers, and in so doing vividly showed how the problem of self-defense had posed itself. However, he failed to provide a systematic line to solve this problem, which is not surprising since the PST denounces the Fraccion Roja efforts to deal with the problems of self defense as a new "strategy of self-defense" replacing the old "strategy of armed struggle," which replaced the "strategy of the urban guerrilla," which replaced the "strategy of rural guerrilla," and offers nothing in its place except peaceful mobilizations to demand democratic rights.

The LTF view, expressed in Comrade Joe Hansen's observations, protested the decision to present the armed struggle in Latin America statement of the IMT to a vote. They even staged a walk-out to gain a four-hour extension of the discussion on this point. In the process, they made the congress lose five hours, displaying a cavalier attitude toward the representatives of the ranks of the International, and attempting a new split blackmail. The former secretary of Trotsky—as he frequently identified himself (probably for the benefit of the "raw green youth" not steeped in the reading of Trotsky, and unfamiliar with any of the other secretaries of Trotsky—some of whose presence at the world congress they may not have noted either)—claimed that the IMT resolution represented a generalization of the mistaken line of the Ninth World Congress, and the theorization of minority violence. He characterized this as a fundamental revision of Marxism, the most important issue facing the Fourth International.

Comrade Cesar of the PST stated that armed struggle could not be posed for either the masses or the vanguard before the party had been built.

Comrade Roman answered this with a comparison between the instant defeat of the working class at the hands of a military coup in Chile in 1973, and the resistance to the fascist coup in Spain in 1936, an obviously more desirable course, although still not sufficient for victory. In neither case was a revolutionary party present. However, the education and practice of the Spanish workers vanguard in self defense provided for the possibility of reaching a higher level of the class struggle.

Comrade Roberto of Spain spoke for the LTF, using the Spanish experience as the test of the two lines in Europe. The two main themes were 1) attacks on conciliation to terrorism, as allegedly took place in relation to the execution of Carrero Blanco, and 2) the need for a strategy of the workers united front mobilizing the masses for their immediate concerns. Comrade Scott of the Susan Williams tendency of the IMG brought back memories of May 1970. He posed the Red University strategy as the central focus of the IMG in the general strike situation of Britain at the time of the Congress.

On the whole, the gap between the LTF and the rest of the International was widened. Many comrades of the IMT were seeing the LTF leadership in a political debate for the first time, and many were shocked by the contrast between the image of Cannonite Trotskyism and mass leaders that they had seen projected, and the actual reality. The GRS of the Antilles, who had come uncommitted, came over to the IMT. The LTF strategy appeared to be



predicated on the need to win a base in Europe through a bloc with Kompass. This required the ability to continue to operate within the International. In contrast, the PST was clearly on an immediate split course, characterizing the International as unreformable, and steaming ahead full blast in the establishment of new splits and PSTs throughout Latin America. Even the British LTF tendency has moved to establish a "Friends of Intercontinental Press" chapter. . . .

There are clear differences between the SWP and the PST on the applicability of women's liberation work in Latin America (reflected in the contradictory influences on the Mexican LS); the analysis of the Chinese workers state which the PST dates to 1949 and a break of Mao from Stalin; and the class nature of the NLF which the PST considers as a proletarian force. There are also differences on the analysis of the Latin American bourgeoisie, the nature of the Unidad Popular, and the Uruguayan Frente Amplio. The Spanish LC had definite Lambertist colorations. It is no secret that the Lambertists applauded the LC's expulsion of a Vargaist minority (linked to the OCI splinter of the Hungarian Varga). However, the LC seems to be rapidly assimilating the SWP's focus on democratic demands, and uncritical stance in relation to nationalism, something which goes against the grain of the Euro-centric Lambertists.

## V. The intervention of the IMT

The factional conditions under which the congress was held prevented the holding of the panels on a number of issues which were supposed to be discussed: Women's Liberation, the National Question, the youth radicalization, China, and Cuba. These discussions were left for the post-congress period, to be taken up either within the monthly internal discussion to be conducted on a low key inside the International as a whole, or within the tendencies, or both. The IMT report on the world situation was given by Comrade Walter. He answered the accusations of catastrophism and of an objectivist, mechanical determinist view of the relation between the economic crisis, and a rise of world revolution. Walter pointed out that the explosive character of the period was not determined by such a one to one relation between the deterioration of living standards and workers' militancy, but rather by the combination of three factors: the general crisis of social relations (values and political rule of the bourgeoisie); a broad cycle of economic downturn; and a cycle of mutually reinforcing successful workers struggles and rising combativity, centered in Europe. Comrade Alberto of the PST answered that the International did not need economic geniuses—he later added under the Argentinian point that it did not need military geniuses either.

Comrade Walter pointed out how the LTF's vision of masses on the one hand, and the Revolutionary Party on the other, failed to take into account the important different levels of mediating factors between the objective factors and the subjective factor: the strength of the mass movement, the degree of development of the workers vanguard, the intervention of the revolutionary nucleus. In comparing Europe and America, he described the successful resistance of the European working class to the bosses'

offensive, thanks to the relative cohesion of a broad vanguard which was able to outflank the bureaucracies in major struggles (like the Fiat actions, May 68, the British strikes). This resistance has already had a serious impact on the health of European capitalism. In America, the atomization of such elements made it possible for the bosses with the help of the bureaucracies to impose the wage control contracts with few struggles, thereby allowing capitalism to weather the first storm.

In the discussion, Comrade Roman demonstrated how the Indochinese revolutionary forces had actually strengthened their military and political positions within the framework of the Accords of Paris. Comrade Mill of the Quebec GMR showed how the practice of the LSO reflected the ultimate logic of the LTF's position. He pointed out that although the LSO was constantly shifting its position, which made any attempt at a rational debate comparable to attempting to nail a bowl of jello on the wall, it was possible to give two concrete examples of their tail-endism. On one instance, the LSO, criticizing the Parti Québécois for not being consistent nationalists, challenged it to call not only for an independent Quebec, but also for the indispensable tool of such an independent state, the formation of a regular army. A week later, the PQ, taking heed, had called for an 8,000 man standing army. The LSO then withdrew its call, hopefully having realized that it was wrong to call for an army of unspecified class character. He also described how the LSO's attempt to focus the struggle strictly on nationalist demands such as French unilingualism had led it into a Common Front with as sole partners two proto-fascist groups: the Republican Militias of Québec, and the Knights of Independence, who had denounced English Canada, U.S. imperialism, and . . . international Jewry.

In the discussion by observers Comrade Horowitz denied that the SWP had ever supported "consistent" nationalism. Comrade Massey was able to refute this attempted cover-up with a quote from Comrade Barnes 1971 political report, indicating that unrestrained love for feminism and nationalism were distinctive features of the revolutionary. He then invited Comrade Horowitz to form a tendency to get repudiation of that position, saying that he would use all his influence to protect Horowitz's democratic rights.

The discussion on Europe was in large part taken up by answering the accusations of the LTF. Comrade Gabriel answered the slanders of Moreno against the former Communist League. He pointed to the Ligue's consistent work in defense of those struggling against French colonialism, a campaign which was directly responsible for the Antilles GRS joining the FI. He described in detail the progress of work toward Black Africa. Throughout the discussion, LTF delegates, apparently suffering a morbid obsession, not unlike that of frightened pacifists, repeatedly brought up the question of the execution of Carrero Blanco. Comrade Maitan, while criticizing the "total" support formulation used by some of the FI's press, and pointing out that it could not substitute for a revolutionary strategy, reaffirmed the traditional Marxist position that such actions must be judged by their concrete effect on the development of the class struggle at a given juncture.

The need to patiently answer the misunderstandings, distortions, and incantation of dogmatic truths emanating from the LTF, seriously reduced the discussion about the real problem faced by our European comrades. How-

ever, some questions could be taken up, and will probably reappear and be settled at national conventions of the sections. In France, the problems include the need to balance central initiatives and the patient work of implantation; the exhaustive activity of expansion and the need for Marxist education. The tremendously diversified work of Rouge—in the CGT, in the CFDT, in the teachers union, through factory red mole work, the Chile committees, the FSI, the anti-abortion law MLAC, the women's liberation movement, immigrant work, high school Red circles, and student work—calls for politically centralizing themes, and the concretization of an overall action program and of the call for unity of the class. There is also a general discussion on governmental slogans, the role of Social-Democracy, and the evolution of the CP's links with Moscow.

The position of the IMT on Latin America represented an evolution in the light of the experience since the last world congress. Significant contributions were made by the comrades from Bolivia, and those from Argentina, who had evolved in a struggle against the liquidationist faction of Santucho. In general, the resolution of the Ninth World Congress was seen as a positive attempt to come to grips with a problem whose full dimensions had not been entirely mastered. A large section of the Latin American vanguard has rejected the CP's view of a peaceful road to socialism, and is aware that the problem of armed struggle will be posed in any revolutionary strategy. Within this framework, two answers have been given as to how the revolutionary vanguard should react to instances of armed struggle which occur, willy-nilly, prior to the actual insurrections—partial insurrections, fascist attacks, police repression, land seizures, etc. The trend referred to as spontaneist-insurrectionalist believes that the revolutionary vanguard should stay out of and not relate to any armed struggle prior to the masses as a whole being confronted with it. The other wing, the Leninist wing, believes that the revolutionary vanguard must bring answers to the armed aspects of the class struggle under whatever form they appear.

The PRT represented a militarist deviation. It telescoped different kinds of armed struggle corresponding to different stages of the class struggle, and it started from the false premise that Argentina was already in a state of civil war which would of course require the building of a revolutionary people's army. The international leadership was unable to back up the Trotskyist wing of the PRT—which had suffered severe blows from repression—in part because of the weakness of the international center, at a time when the PRT leadership might still have responded to a discussion.

Comrade Serrano of the POR defended the POR's past record, and reaffirmed its commitment to leading the masses as it had repeatedly done over a period of thirty years. He mocked those who kept exhorting the POR to link itself to the working class, saying that the POR was OF the working class, and had been for many years. He analyzed the cycle of Bolivian class struggles: mass upsurge, formation of workers and peasant militias, and defeat at the hand of the superior army. He said the Transitional Program had in great part been adopted by the Bolivian unions long ago with the Theses of Pula-cayo, and that this was not the panacea. He pointed to

the peasant barricades in Cochabamba at the time of the Congress itself as further evidence of the role of rural guerrilla in the Bolivian revolution. The cycle could be broken by a vanguard conscious of the problems of armed struggle. He concluded with a call for relaunching the struggle of the POR to win the masses to its program and its actions.

Comrade Saul of the Fraccion Roja made a precise analysis of the Argentine situation, pointed to the limits of the Peronist regime's democratic overtures, the economic situation, and the multiple forms under which armed struggle was already appearing in the conflicts between the masses and the police, union bureaucracy, the army, or the fascists. Comrade Rossi of France demonstrated how the PST's analysis of the Latin American class struggle was based on a triangular conflict between the masses, imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie. This explained their positions on the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, and their formulations in relation to the Peronist regime and the Justicialist slate. Comrade Pierre Frank described the precedents to the position of the PST, and characterized this party as a centrist formation. The status of the PRT(U) in relation to the Frente Amplio is somewhat unclear. However, years after the SWP's public criticism of the PRT(U)'s participation in this popular front, no public statement by the PRT(U) disassociating itself from the Front has yet been issued. In fact, the PRT(U) boasted that to the extent that the Front still existed, it was still participating in it. This blatant act of class-collaboration can only be described as a scandal to the International. Persistence in error raises serious questions as to the appropriateness of this formation's existence in the International. Only the desire on the part of the IMT to make every concession to the needs of maintaining the unity of the International staved off the raising of this particular question. However, every desire has its limits of patience.

Comrade Roman reported on the IMT resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America. The IMT's position started from the same orthodox Marxist-Leninist position which led the Kompass tendency to call for the formation of armed wings of sections of the Fourth International. The contradiction of the Kompass is that it is unable to say what these armed wings should be used for. This would require a concrete analysis of the problems posed by the Latin American class struggle. This was the purpose of the Ninth World Congress resolution. The mistakes followed from a failure to realize the consequences of the right turn of Cuban diplomacy, and unclarity as to the distinct forms of armed struggle required by the distinct stages of the class struggle. Roman reaffirmed the centrality of the Marxist conception of the revolutionary crisis. Armed struggle is not a strategy, but one of the strategical axes around which our Latin American sections must be built—that is to say that it is present at every stage of their construction, as it is present at every stage of the class struggle in general. Revolutionary parties are not built in a vacuum.

On a more general level, the reporter took up the question of the relationship between the masses' ability to victoriously conduct struggles, and the degree of awareness both political and practical that the broad vanguard has acquired on the question of armed struggle. One aspect of this problem is the ability of the masses to successfully

wield revolutionary violence and the degree to which this depends on the experience of its natural organizers and leaders—the broad vanguard—with violent actions. This problem was referred to as the question of the dialectic of minority violence and mass violence, to the dismay of the former secretary of the leader of the Red Army, who as an observer was reporting on the political views of the LTF.

## VI. The organizational settlement

The strategy of the IMT to the world congress had been to make a certain number of organizational concessions (postponement of the world congress, limitation of the issues to be settled, proportional representation of LTF groups outside the Fourth International) in order to insure a clarification of the key political differences. **THE IMT THUS WON A CLEAR POLITICAL MAJORITY IN THE DEBATE.** The World Congress had to settle two organizational questions: the credentials of voting mandates claimed by several groups, and the post-congress status of a whole number of groups aspiring to become sections. One of the main considerations in this matter was to establish the authority of the World Congress, reaffirm the principles of democratic centralism, and strengthen the international center sufficiently to give effective leadership to the International.

Although there were numerous grounds on which the credentials committee could have challenged the figures of the PST and others, it was agreed that in order to avoid a giant-organizational hassle, no credentials whatsoever would be challenged. It is very difficult to gauge exactly the amount of puffing which went into the PST figure. We have already discussed the conditions of the discussion in the PST. It may be useful to add that at the time three IMT representatives traveled to Argentina, they only reported to approximately two thousand people present at various meetings. Furthermore, the character of the audience, which called the French Comrade an agent of French imperialism, and shouted him down for twenty minutes with chants of "Si O No" (Yes or No) calls into question the seriousness of this organization's interest in Trotskyism. The question of the lack of a candidacy program is not irrelevant either. Although the development of the YSA modifies the judgment, the SWP is obviously affected by the absence of such a requirement of political education and commitment. What can be said then about formations like the PST who recruit directly to themselves, or like the Mexican LS which claimed to have grown threefold in the two months before the deadline for the world congress? Unfortunately, the congress was not able to fully clarify such questions, but it refused to establish a precedent for further such breaches.

The final voting results are not available to us at this time. The voting took place by placing check marks on questionnaires. However the provisional figures on voting results fell into three categories: the vote of sections; the unchallenged votes of all present; and the unanimously agreed to estimate of proportional representation for the IEC. The first category, which is the voting procedure outlined by the statutes of the FI, and which is based on only the votes of recognized sections of the FI (this does not include former sections, like the SWP or other organi-

zations like the PST, at present prevented from affiliation by reactionary legislation) yielded approximately the following results: 114 for the IMT, 14 for the LTF, and 7 to Mezhrayonka. The second category of voting procedures which lumped together every group that staked a claim at the outset, and with no possible challenge, yielded approximately the following results: 142 for the IMT, 118 for the LTF, and 7 for Mezhrayonka. Given these figures, the LTF and IMT accepted that the proportional representation of the tendencies of the IMT would be based on a ratio of 60 to 40 in favor of the IMT.

As far as the organizational status of groups was concerned, a resolution was passed with the support of the IMT and LTF. About thirty abstentions and a few no votes were recorded; they came mainly from Latin America, Spain, and a few French delegates, and reflected the comrades' awareness of the problems posed by an undisciplined minority posing as representatives of the International in their countries. The observers of the IT cast a fraternal vote for the agreement although we felt that it left many problems that would arise in the immediate future, unresolved. The agreement contained three basic principles and a number of commitments arrived at through meetings of a parity commission. The main points were that 1) no groups would be left out of the Fourth International 2) that those substantial groups challenged by neither side would be recognized as sections 3) that in countries where a division existed no section would be recognized until a merger was achieved. The agreement included pledges to abide by democratic centralism, to stop all public attacks, and to strengthen the center. Some of the outstanding results are the recognition of the GMR and RMG as a sympathizing section of the FI in the pan-Canadian state. The LSA which had expelled some, and refused to recruit the others remained the official section, but in a considerably weakened state. On the other hand, in Mexico and Spain, the GCI and LCR which had functioned for years as the only organization linked to the FI, and which had clearly been victims of LTF splits, were not recognized as official sections, but only as sympathizing groups like their spin offs.

The Congress then moved on to the election of the leadership of the International. The IEC was expanded to 54 full members and 21 alternates. The IMT received 60 percent representation, the LTF 40 percent, and the Mezhrayonka 2 spots. A consultative IEC status was established for representatives of sympathizing groups.

Then came the election of the United Secretariat. The LTF was offered 7 seats out of 21, on condition that it actually dispatch top cadre as a guarantee of serious intentions to participate in the work of building the center. The LTF protested this slightly lower representation on the United Secretariat (33 percent instead of 40 percent) even though the USFI is executive and not deliberative. It also put up candidates that the IMT considered to be mere note-takers and phone-callers who would paralyze the work of the center. As a result only 3 of the LTF's candidates were elected, and two slots were left open for LTFers, and two more in case of a permanent move by top cadre to Europe.

The question of finances of the International was raised. The norm is for sections to contribute one sixteenth (1/16 or 6 percent) of their income to the international center.

Since most sections have a system of single progressive taxation, the calculations are rather simple. Other sections, however, have a financial system based on nominal dues, large sustainers, and special funds of all types. Some of them have been known to use this nominal dues system to only contribute small sums to the international and they were warned that this practice would have to cease. Some Trotskyist parties, like the SWP, who are prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating to the Fourth International, can make no financial contribution.

## VII. Prospects and Responsibilities

It should be clear from this report that we believe that the International remains threatened by a sectarian opportunist trend. While this trend embodied in the LTF is by no means the only problem of the International, it tends to act as the most important internal block to its development through its retrograde, business-as-usual, and tail-ending approach. This situation calls for a struggle on two fronts: an outward campaign to further expand the International and its links with the vanguard; and an internal political fight to clarify the roots of the LTF, isolate it, and politically defeat it. The International Majority is being maintained for the purpose of directing this two-fold struggle, of balancing both aspects in relation to the conjunctural needs of the class struggle.

In summary, although the Congress only dealt with a limited number of issues, it represented a significant step forward. A line was set, the principle of democratic centralism was reaffirmed. A number of international campaigns were decided. It is now the responsibility of every section, and every member of the International to see to it that this line is effectively implemented and that the positions of the International are vigorously defended. We of the IMT in the United States, although not members of the Fourth International, intend to take all the necessary steps to see that this takes place. This should in no way be construed as a provocation against the minority faction, which retains the right to hold its ideas, and whom we hope to win over to our views in the greatest possible numbers. It is not our putting forward of the line of the Tenth World Congress that would be "undisciplined" or "disloyal," but our refusal to put it forward. Likewise, anyone who would seek to stop comrades from putting forward this line would be guilty of disloyalty or indiscipline. Concretely, any refusal on the part of a national or local body to defend the line of the World Congress must be called to order and brought to a halt. This is part of the duty of all loyal supporters of the Fourth International.

The turn taken by the Ninth World Congress was reaffirmed, clarified, and strengthened at the 10th World Congress. The Fourth International sees itself not simply as a propaganda sect carrying out moral duties for all times in all places, but rather as the World Party of the Socialist Revolution in the era of the New Rise of the World Revolution. The Minority Faction has had five years to get its line out to the World Movement—the cadre of that World Movement have listened, have debated, and have voted in their majority to reject the line of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction. While the members of the Faction have the right to maintain their faction, they also have

the higher duty, with the close of the discussion and the vote, to carry out the line. The cadre of the World Movement will now turn their eyes to see how the Faction acts in carrying out the line of the Majority. All the future declarations of the Faction will be weighed on the scale of how loyally they have sought to carry out the line of the Tenth World Congress.

The line of the International is quite clear, it calls for an active intervention with the political line of the FI into the emerging vanguard of the class struggle. It calls for solidarity campaigns with the struggles going on in the various parts of the World. In particular the struggles in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and Japan, in Latin America and specifically in Chile, and in Southeast Asia, where the heroic struggle of the Indo Chinese peoples goes on. This calls for militant campaigns of solidarity with the fighters of the French Lip factory, the British Miners, the MIR of Chile, and the National Liberation Front of Vietnam. The International takes on the responsibility not only to be the militant supporters of these struggles, but also to give a political explanation to them and more than that to participate in them and give them leadership. The underlying thread of the decisions of the Congress was to emphasize the point that we are not mere book-keepers of history, but rather the agents to change it. The Fourth International today will either push itself forward in the emerging radicalization of the working class on a global scale, or it will fail and become just one more, not so very interesting propaganda sect. The decisions of the Tenth World Congress mandate that we move forward. It is on this note that the unification of the International rests. If in the course of the unfolding class struggle the various components of the LTF cannot change their outlook and practice, it intensifies the chance that they will find no other course than to split off from the revolutionary dynamic of the International. Their tendency has been in this direction since the Ninth World Congress. The lines put forward by observers like Comrades Barnes, Hansen, and Moreno at the Tenth World Congress does not lend itself to our being able to see a change in this course of events. The LTF, whose political supporters include the petty bourgeois SWP, and the workerist PST, the non proletarian based North American parts and the Argentinian economists, in addition to the Lambertist-like Spanish group, and the PRT-U of Uruguay, to add a popular front dimension, faces the choice of either stopping its course at five minutes before the decisive hour or proceeding on its downward plunge. At this point the disease is not yet gangrene, but it is certainly more, considerably more, than a scratch.

In conclusion, the IMT views the outcome of the World Congress as having accomplished the main task set for it. The World movement and its cadres went thru a most extensive discussion. Every organizational concession necessary to keep the International united was made while at the same time conceding nothing to principle in the political sense. The International has now decided its line, there is a Majority, and there is a leadership. Forward to the Building of the Sections of the Fourth International—Forward to the Victory of the World Revolution.

April 16, 1974