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DOCUMENTS FROM THE DISCUSSION IN SECTIONS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

		Page
CONTENTS		
WALLOON	1. Concerning the Debate on Latin America, By the Leadership of the Majority Tendency of the Walloon Section	3
	2. Platform of the Against the Stream Tendency in the Walloon Section	11
	3. Against the Stream: A Contribution to the International Debate, By Krasno, Reiner and Lemalouf	12
JAPAN	On 'The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe,' By the Japan Revolutionary Communist League	29

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Editorial Note

Every section and sympathizing organization of the Fourth International is conducting an internal discussion on the issues before the Fourth World Congress since Reunification (Tenth World Congress). As with the discussion in the Socialist Workers Party, only a small portion of the documents written as contributions to the debate will be submitted to the International Internal Discussion Bulletin. However, many documents from other sections and groups will have a general interest and value to SWP members. Knowledge of these documents will help comrades to understand the context of the debate and clarify the issues being discussed throughout the International. From time to time we will publish selected documents from the discussion in other sections in order to make this information available to the membership of the SWP.

Concerning the Debate on Latin America

By the Leadership of the Majority Tendency
of the Walloon Section

[The following article has been translated from the November 1973 issue of the internal discussion bulletin of the Walloon section.]

* * *

Foreword

This document was drawn up by the provisional leadership of the majority tendency, elected by the majority members of the central committee. It was later put forward and amended at a national meeting of the majority leaders of the regions. It therefore represents the position of the Walloon comrades who have decided to form a tendency in our country. This document does not commit the tendency at the international level. The international majority is not a faction, and within the framework of a common problematic intends to continue the debate now underway. For numerous reasons this debate, which affects the entire International, is only beginning. It parallels the political battle against the international minority, which is challenging fundamental orientations on which we have stated our position by adhering to the international majority. At the same time we reserve the right to propose in short order some amendments to the various resolutions put forward by the international majority.

Introduction

In many respects, the current polemic between the international majority and minority has been a rear-guard debate. This is a dangerous sort of discussion, to the extent that its requirements and its logic relegate to the background the majority's own critical balance-sheet and thus interfere with possible further progress in political elaboration. That is why this document, unlike others, will be essentially devoted to a critical investigation of the majority's positions. This investigation will allow the depth of the political gulf between the two tendencies to be measured that much more accurately.

If this contribution to the discussion is a belated one, it is because it is the product of an accumulation of information, of discussions, and of trips. It is the outcome of a process of reflection that began in the summer of 1971 and that showed results as early as the Christmas 1971 cadre school on Latin America. On the basis of this document we will propose amendments to the Tenth

World Congress draft resolution on Argentina and Bolivia.

It should be clear that all the political criticisms made of the International leadership are at the same time criticisms of the leadership of the ex-Ligue Communiste, which was especially involved in Latin American work and therefore must fully accept its responsibilities.

1. On the Period

One of the central points of discussion at the Ninth World Congress was the question of the analysis of the period, especially in Latin America. Since the congress, this question has frequently been shunted to the background, under the pretext that the confrontation was between "guerrillais" and "Leninist" conceptions of party building.

Now, while the document adopted at the Ninth World Congress insisted on "the general tendency toward the establishment of military regimes, whether open or hypocritically camouflaged," and while it considered the variant of military regimes as "the most probable one," it nonetheless did not develop the mechanistic outlook that the minority ascribes to it:

"This does not exclude possible oscillations in the most disparate leaderships, including new ephemeral pseudo-reformist attempts, political gambles, and even variants within the framework of military regimes (groups of officers are playing continually at 'Nasserism' in several countries and the immediate import of military coups is not always the same in every given situation). But this will change nothing in the general, deep-seated tendency. . . ." (*IIDB* Reprint, "Discussion on Latin America [1968-1972]," p. 46)

Thus prepared to understand these reformist regimes, the comrades of the majority showed themselves capable of analyzing their function and the place they occupy in current imperialist strategy. To recall this, it is enough to cite Livio's article on military reformism (*Intercontinental Press*, Vol. 8, No. 15, April 20, 1970, pp. 352-360), Ernest's article on "Imperialism and the National Bourgeoisie in Latin America" (*International*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1971, pp. 7-17), and, more recently, Ernest's speech in Mexico on "Old and New Oligarchies in Latin America" (which will be published in *Quatrième Internationale*). Likewise, in its first letter to the PRT(C) in October 1972, the majority showed that it was prepared to take advantage of the electoral opening in Argentina:

"Let us make it clearer. Above all what has to be under-

stood is that over and above the 'acuerdist' bloc's proposals and all the diversionist maneuvers, the 'democratic' interlude will in any case be marked by great struggles, by a deepgoing process of clarification and demystification. (The Peronist movement will be the first to find itself facing agonizing choices.) A very rapid maturation of a very broad social vanguard will take place. In the framework of this perspective, developing *direct ties with the masses in the union and political area assumes an absolute and immediate priority and all initiatives in the armed struggle must be subordinated to this task*. The PRT and ERP should be prepared to assign their best cadres to the mass movement, cadres equipped with a rounded political education. And at the same time the defense of the mass mobilizations and actions from the attacks of the enemy should be assured. Only to the degree that they effectively exploit the possible 'democratic' interval will the revolutionists be able to go over from an armed struggle that consists essentially of urban guerrilla actions carried out by specialized detachments to an armed struggle in which sectors of the masses will be directly involved and where cadres come directly from the working class and the most exploited layers of the population will play a role of primary importance." (*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 7, p. 24)

That was six months before the first Argentine elections.

Many times the minority has reduced the main argument of the Ninth World Congress resolution on the general tendency of Latin American regimes to a simple mechanism of repression: threatened by the rise of revolutionary dangers, the weak Latin American bourgeoisie backed by imperialism would, according to us, be unable to tolerate the slightest forward thrust by the masses. But the real problem goes deeper. It is a social problem, not merely one of repression. For imperialism and the Stalinist bureaucracy are in even less of a position to tolerate revolutionary developments in West Europe; the heart of the citadel would be affected and the whole balance of forces called into question.

The reasoning of the Ninth World Congress began from an application of the theory of permanent revolution to present-day Latin America. Parliamentary democracy and the "democratic rights that go along with it" and the means by which the rising imperialist bourgeoisie maintains its political domination—no Latin American bourgeoisie today is strong enough to stabilize such a system of political domination. At best, certain Latin American bourgeoisies can attempt to implement a Bonapartist policy aimed at taking advantage of interimperialist competition. But that is not enough for them to be able to sufficiently consolidate themselves as a class in order to resist the mobilization of the masses and establish a lasting social peace.

On the other hand, the arguments of the Ninth World Congress resolution insisted on the growing political role of the army on the Latin American continent, on its role as the "army-party." Not only its repressive role, but its political role as well. This means that the army becomes the social expression of the old declining oligarchical layers and the middle bourgeoisie, the channel by which they enter the political scene to participate in the new ruling oligarchy at the side of the industrial bourgeoisie. This role has been confirmed in several coun-

tries. And it is interesting to note that the first overtures made by the Peronist regime in October toward the army, which had become totally discredited under the dictatorship, were aimed at reintegrating the army into the process of "national reconstruction." A highly symbolic operation was even launched toward this end: "Operativo Dorrego," which was a scheme to make the military and the militants of the Peronist youth collaborate in the social tasks of land improvement and road-building in the poor neighborhoods. On that occasion we saw the left Peronist youth form up and parade, picks and shovels in hand, past a reviewing platform occupied by General Carcagno, a well known torturer and confirmed putschist.

In 1968, during the debate leading to the split in the PRT, Comrade Moreno, the minority's champion in Latin America, developed a distinctive analysis of the period:

"Paraguay and our country are lagging behind at the moment. They are the two most stable countries in Latin America. . . . The position of the bourgeoisie and of broad sectors of the middle class is relatively stable and the workers movement is in retreat." One year before the Cordobazo! And Moreno predicted: "several years of stability for the southern part of Latin America." The southern part of Latin America; that is, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina. Unfortunate prediction!

These considerations on Moreno's part then served to reject armed struggle and to restrict the tasks of revolutionists to the field of propaganda. Three years later, after the Argentine Cordobazo and *viborazo*, after the fall of Ovando in Bolivia, after the Unidad Popular's electoral victory in Chile, it was no longer possible to resort to such arguments. So the axis of discussion changed. The pretext for rejecting armed struggle was no longer the retreat of the workers movement, but on the contrary the democratic vistas opened up by the vigorous upsurge of the masses. Yesterday, armed struggle was not on the agenda because of the lack of mass combativity; today it is not on the agenda either, because the masses' excessive combativity has struck fear into the bourgeoisie and encourages extended reformist experiments.

Thus, in a report on the world situation delivered last April to the National Committee of the SWP, Comrade Barnes predicted new democratic concessions from the ruling classes in Chile and Argentina, as a "by-product" of the mass struggle. He neglected, however, to foresee the coup. And thus, in a document of the PRT(U)—the Uruguayan organization affiliated to the international minority—published in No. 10 of the PST's journal *Revista de America* (April 1973), the most probable trend was analyzed as follows:

"Now, by way of conclusion, we must define the tendency that we see as most probable. We believe that the perspective is one of a strengthening of the nationalist sectors of the left and an accentuated populist policy on the part of the government, maintaining bourgeois institutions. In short, we believe that the tendency will be toward a democratic opening with nationalist characteristics of the Peruvian style, but within the framework of the present institutions."

And among the arguments justifying such optimism: "The tendency of the bourgeoisie on a Latin American scale [and the minority accuses the Ninth World Congress of having made continental-wide generalizations!] in this

stage of deep imperialist penetration will be toward regimes of the Peruvian type. . . . [and] . . . The weight of institutional tradition in the country." The weight of institutional tradition in the country no doubt being just as solid as the professional tradition of the Chilean army. And all this two months before the June coup!

This perspective of a continental tendency toward "anti-imperialist" regimes of the Peruvian type pushes the minority down the opportunist road of anti-imperialist fronts with parties representing the bourgeoisie. How else can its insistence on recommending the Bolivian POR's entry into the Political Command along side the MNR be understood? How else can the PRT(U)'s participation in the Uruguayan Frente Amplio, defended to this day by the PST, be explained? How else can we explain the language used at the economic information meeting convoked by the Argentine minister Gelbard, at which Coral, the PST presidential candidate, after expressing thanks to "this economic ministry, which has shown a democratic sensitivity that contrasts with the technocratic direct agents of imperialism and the oligarchy," affirmed agrarian reform as "indispensable for industrial development and for expansion of the internal market, which is also an indispensable basis for the proposed industrial development." (*Avanzada Socialista*, October 10, 1973)

This tailending of the "democratic anti-imperialist" bourgeoisie goes a long way. It goes so far as to confuse revolution with reformism, which prepares the way for counterrevolution. The August 1972 issue of *Revista de America* (No. 8-9) published a document on "Latin American Governments and Revolutionary Struggle" passed at the October 1971 Fifth Congress of the PRT-La Verdad. There we read:

"We do not understand the violence of the criticism of the Uruguayan electoral accord and the silence about the electoral campaign in Chile and Fidel's guerrilla war in Cuba. Was it necessary to make an alliance and intervene in the Cuban guerrilla war? What was its class difference from the Frente Amplio in Uruguay? For us there is none. The Cuban guerrilla front was also a democratic movement controlled by the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, according to the definition of Guevara himself." (page 14)

All in the same bag, the Frente Amplio, the Unidad Popular, and the Cuban guerrillas! In the same bag go the Uruguayan popular front that prepared the way for the coup and the Cuban revolutionists who struggled arms in hand against the bourgeois army and carried out the agrarian reform in real life! In their zeal to cover up their electoral capitulation, the minority comrades are coming to revise the theory of permanent revolution. For if they admit that Cuba is a workers state, how was this guerrilla movement "controlled by the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie" able not only to bring down the Batista regime, but even to undermine its own social base by collectivizing the means of production? Could the proletarian character of the Cuban state result from the contribution of the Cuban CP, which jumped in belatedly to share in the victory? Such a laurel would be too noble for these Stalinists who, right up to the seizure of power in January 1959, refused to believe it would happen.

On this central aspect of the debate at the Ninth World Congress the events of the past four years have rendered a verdict. In Uruguay it took only four months for the

PRT(U)'s optimistic forecasts to be refuted. In Chile, which at the Ninth World Congress was considered as a possible exception, the UP lasted for three years. As for the new Peronist experiment, without venturing to make exact predictions about the hour of its demise, we can say that even now its character is clear. On the very day of his inauguration, Peron's first gesture was to ban the PRT's press. Then, to break out of his isolation, he advanced a \$10-million loan to the Chilean junta and agreed to hold joint naval maneuvers ("Unitas") with the American and Brazilian armed forces. He also passed a law on trade unions freezing the CGT bureaucracy in place for two years. All these things have already singularly tempered the atmosphere of the democratic opening and set narrow limits on "Peronist democracy." And this leaves aside the proliferation of kidnappings and assassinations committed by commandos of the trade-union bureaucracy.

In this sense the political analysis of the Ninth World Congress has been confirmed on a decisive point and on one of its main consequences: the impossibility of an organic legal growth of the revolutionary party except at the cost of concessions that border on capitulation; in short, the fact that the revolutionary party must pose from the outset in clear and practical terms all the questions relating to the construction of the armed party.

2. On the Ninth World Congress Resolution

1) Beginning from a fundamentally correct analysis of the period and of the historical tendency on the continent, the Ninth World Congress resolution proceeded to make a dangerous extrapolation:

"Thus not only in a historic sense but in a more direct and immediate one, Latin America has entered a period of revolutionary explosions and conflicts, of armed struggle on different levels against the native ruling classes and imperialism, and of prolonged civil war on a continental scale." (*IIDB* Reprint, "Discussion on Latin America [1968-1972]," p. 46)

The Argentine PRT(C) fully believed that war had been declared and made that the framework of its activity. Today a more prudent note has appeared in the documents of the majority. Thus, in the first letter to the PRT (October 1972) it is stressed that "the party did not make a clear distinction between a situation of embryonic civil war in which guerrilla actions are developing and a situation of revolutionary war properly so called." The draft resolution on Argentina also takes up the formulation "embryonic forms of civil war." But does the Ninth World Congress resolution help to make the distinction so clearly? Formulations as categorical as the one just quoted leave room for doubt. And so does the importance given to the notion "strategy of armed struggle." The importance of the formulation "strategy of armed struggle" is explained by the necessity to stress the differences between Europe and Latin America from the standpoint of party building. But the notion "strategy of armed struggle" does not provide the necessary instruments for detailed elaboration by a section in Latin America. It is ambiguous and identifies a part of revolutionary strategy with the whole. These confusions are not clarified

by the draft. For example, in point 10 of the Tenth World Congress draft resolution on Argentina we find:

"In a situation marked by a structural crisis and revolutionary tensions such as exists in Argentina, the question of power, of overthrowing the capitalist system and establishing a workers' state is objectively posed. But no positive solution of this problem is possible without an adequate strategy of armed struggle and without a revolutionary party intervening to apply this strategy." (*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 21, p. 7)

The danger in Argentina is the fragmentation of class breaks with Peronism, the proliferation of localized currents in the absence of a unified revolutionary alternative. What is lacking is the rooting in the masses of a revolutionary perspective including its armed struggle aspect, that is, a revolutionary policy defended by a revolutionary party. To speak only of a revolutionary party "that applies this adequate strategy of armed struggle" does not allow for clarifying the ambiguous formulations of the Ninth World Congress.

Furthermore, in points 11 and 12, the draft resolution gets tangled in approximations. Beginning by reaffirming the "strategy of armed struggle," point 11 quickly reduces this strategy under Argentine conditions to "those forms of armed struggle that make it possible to establish or strengthen ties with major strata of the masses." Better still, point 12, reaffirming "the precariousness of the 'democratic' interlude and the inevitability of armed confrontations," deduces from this "that the revolutionary organization must not give up its specialized underground apparatus. . . ." From the strategy of armed struggle to the forms of armed struggle, from the forms of armed struggle to the conservation of a specialized apparatus; such is the strategy, boiled down to its quite modest proportions. The imprecisions of the Ninth World Congress on the question are only thrown into sharper relief.

2) Unfortunately, the only explicit indication given in the Ninth World Congress resolution on the application of the strategy of armed struggle was the axis of rural guerrilla warfare:

"Even in the case of countries where large mobilizations and class conflicts in the cities may occur first, civil war will take manifold forms of armed struggle, in which the principal axis for a whole period will be rural guerrilla warfare, the term having primarily a geographical-military meaning and not necessarily implying an exclusively peasant composition of the fighting detachments (or even necessarily preponderantly peasant composition). In this sense, armed struggle in Latin America means fundamentally guerrilla warfare." (Point 17, *IIDB* Reprint, p. 48)

Furthermore, this formulation appears a second time: "Under the perspective of a prolonged civil war with rural guerrilla warfare as its principal axis, even in the most difficult phases of severe repression and temporary prostration, the problem of liaison between the guerrillas and the masses will be a vital one." (Point 18, *IIDB* Reprint, p. 48)

The international minority polemicizes against these formulations in a general way. It sees in them a generalized guerrillaist deviation. This discussion is not very fruitful. In fact, the first quotation is more precise than may appear. It envisages great workers mobilizations in several countries. Now the Ninth World Congress resolu-

tion was not a stylistic exercise. The concrete stakes in the discussion were the practical orientation of the two main existing sections, the Bolivian and Argentine. It may be considered that the hypothesis of great workers mobilizations (confirmed, incidently, by the facts) related above all to Argentina. And even under this hypothesis, according to the resolution, the axis should have remained rural guerrilla warfare. At the time of the Ninth World Congress, this meant agreement with the PRT's plan to launch guerrilla warfare in the sugar-growing region of northern Argentina in alliance with the Bolivian guerrillas, a plan that was not so absurd at the time, but which would have had to be carefully followed as it unfolded, making the appropriate changes and corrections.

Another element of the quotation confirms the reference point of this plan. The document attributes a "geographical-military significance" to the axis of rural guerrilla warfare. This means that the development of the guerrillas was to be relatively independent of the social substrata that the agrarian question could have provided it in certain countries. The political and military perspective of this uprooted guerrilla warfare can be understood only if the "conjunctural" significance of "the prolonged civil war on a continental scale" is taken seriously. That is, if the intensity of class confrontations had already reached such a level that class war was objectively posed as a direct military problem for the masses to deal with; in other words, if the civil war was already more than embryonic. In this sense and on this point, there is no basic gulf between the Fifth Congress of the PRT and the Ninth World Congress resolution.

3) This orientation of the Ninth World Congress resolution rested in part on the unity tactic of the Trotskyist movement toward the Castroist current that emerged under the impact of the Cuban revolution, a current that reached a political highpoint in 1967 with the holding of the OLAS conference. The Ninth World Congress resolution posed as a task "integration into the historic revolutionary current represented by the Cuban revolution and the OLAS, which involves, regardless of the forms, integration into the continental revolutionary front which the OLAS constitutes." (*IIDB* Reprint, p. 50) In the spring of 1969, however, OLAS as an organization hardly existed except on paper. What did exist were bilateral relations between the Cuban state and the Latin American revolutionary movements. The difference is important. For while the direction of the Cuban leadership at the time was not so well sketched out as it might be today, a turn had already clearly begun with the Cuban leadership's positions on Czechoslovakia, France, and Mexico. It was possible to foresee that Cuba's aid to revolutionary movements would become increasingly conditional politically. This meant that unitary relations with the Castroist current, which remained a central question, presupposed a political battle, the only way to harden up the sections of the Fourth International against the predictable pressures that were weighing on them, pressures that in the case of the POR were reflected in the loss of some members to the ELN. This battle was all the more important in that the PRT's illusions in the Cuban leadership were known, since the Fourth Congress of the PRT had judged that on the Latin American continent "there already exists a revolutionary leadership with a correct strategy for taking power." Today, the

majority's document on armed struggle in Latin America recognizes that the Ninth World Congress resolution "minimized the crisis of the Castroist current incorporated in the OLAS, a crisis that was nonetheless already manifest in 1968-1969." But it does so in a single sentence.

3. On the PRT Combatiente

1) It is scarcely useful or necessary to point out the PRT's ideological confusion and heterogeneity to a reader of the resolutions of the PRT's Fourth Congress. From this standpoint, the PRT was in part the product of Moreno's previous dubious operations, and even today, after so many splits and disappointments, after its break with the International, it must still be considered that the Ninth World Congress's recognition of the PRT(C) as the Argentine section (which was voted unanimously) was absolutely justified. What was serious was the failure to politically characterize this party.

The draft resolution on Argentina for the Tenth World Congress recognizes that "immediately after the Ninth World Congress, a frank discussion should have been initiated with the Argentine comrades on all the political and theoretical differences." That is an observation, not a self-criticism. It remains to be explained why this was not done. In his document on the PRT (*Bulletin de sociologie internationale*, no. 3), Sandor attributes "this undeniable opportunism of the United Secretariat" in the first place to the very great weakness of the International center and, more precisely, "in the final analysis to its organizational weaknesses." This is true in part, but it is not the main point. Actually it was a matter of political weakness: on the one hand failure to characterize the PRT(C), and on the other hand the absence of a clear line for applying the Ninth World Congress resolution was more apt to cover for rather than contradict the orientation of the PRT(C).

At the time of the Ninth World Congress the PRT(C) could have been characterized as a centrist party, but centrist in a manner distinct from the Castroist current in general. The roots of this centrism were twofold: the impact of the Cuban revolution and the weight of Peronism in Argentina, which fostered the flowering of patent revolutionary-populism in the PRT's ideology. But through its links to the Trotskyist movement the PRT maintained a definition of the party and its necessity distinct from the haziness of the organizational definitions of the MIR or the Tupamaros, not to mention the Castroist current in general. Even in the confused formulations of its Fifth Congress, in which it included in "its" International the Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, and Albanian Communist parties, the PRT maintained a vision of the International and the necessity for it that went beyond the vistas of OLAS. Finally, in however confused a fashion, the PRT assimilated the theory of permanent revolution, which has led it today to remain the best-known pole of revolutionary opposition to Peronism in the country. The Communist Party capitulated electorally to Perón, not the PRT. Moreover, under the military dictatorship the PRT showed itself really capable of actually initiating an armed struggle, whatever the political errors, for which it has paid both in losses and in splits. This aspect of its political activity corresponded to a deep need posed

by the period; it would be impossible to understand in any other way how the PRT, in spite of its errors, commands the influence and prestige that it does today.

For all these reasons—and in the framework of integration into the Fourth International of an organization representative of the new vanguard and of an educational process within it—the recognition of the PRT was, we repeat, justified. But characterizing it as a centrist party made necessary a conscious political battle and a perspective of building a Trotskyist faction within it.

2) If a discussion with the PRT was not opened, it was also because of a lack of basic understanding of what its orientation involved and the lack of a definite political alternative. And the draft resolution for the Tenth World Congress demonstrates this:

"The maintenance of this perspective, even after the Cordobazo, had no practical implication, but it was at the origin of the new crisis that shook the party during the first part of 1970 and led to the departure or expulsion of the majority of the members of the Central Committee. The Fifth Congress marked a decisive step in the founding of the ERP: correcting in part the orientation of the previous congress, the Fifth Congress outlined a combination of rural and urban guerrilla warfare.

"But these corrections, carried out in an empirical fashion, proved to be insufficient. . . ." (*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 21, pp. 9-10)

Likewise, the first letter (October 1972) to the PRT notes:

"At its Fourth Congress, the PRT correctly considered that the class struggle in Argentina had reached a stage where armed struggle was on the agenda. At its Fifth Congress it created the instrument to begin this struggle, the ERP." (*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 7, p. 23)

This is a rather coy interpretation of what happened. The Fourth Congress of the PRT did not speak only of a level of class struggle in which armed struggle would be on the agenda; it spoke of open war and drew definite conclusions:

"Only in geographically favorable zones and *with the support of the population* is it possible to form large mobile units that can carry out mobile warfare. Without these large mobile units it is impossible to talk of a revolutionary army. If we call the dispersed detachments of combat that operate in the cities the revolutionary army we will only introduce confusion. These units can never by themselves, even with the aid of a massive proletarian mobilization, defeat the modern imperialist armies.

It is necessary to take all this into account to combat adventurist tendencies which issue premature calls for insurrection.

"For all these reasons, and for a period of several years, our strategy will be the creation of an army in the countryside in order to build the revolutionary army plus the formation of hundreds of armed detachments of workers and common people that will fight in the cities." ("The Only Road to Workers' Power and Socialism," in *IIDB* Reprint, p. 244)

Now there is a program that has the merit of clarity and that points up in a useful way the dangers of the weakness of the Ninth World Congress resolution when it speaks of the axis of rural guerrilla warfare being justified by "geographical-military" rather than social considerations. But it is false to say, as the draft resolution

does, that the Fifth Congress of the PRT "marked a decisive step" toward a rectification. The problem is not the harmonious combination of rural and urban guerrilla warfare; apart from a series of tactical compromises, the key point of the Fifth Congress was the confirmation of the line of the Fourth Congress by the creation of the ERP. Moreover, even the October 1972 letter to the PRT presented the ERP as "the instrument for applying the line of the Fourth Congress."

Certainly, the creation of the ERP was the important innovation of the Fifth Congress. It marked the victory of the Santucho tendency, a victory won at the cost of secondary concessions (rehabilitation of the value of urban guerrilla warfare). It confirmed the idea that war had already been declared and that rural guerrilla warfare was the point of departure for a mass peoples army. At the time of the Fifth Congress, Santucho even spoke of cutting the country completely in two along some parallel, like Vietnam. The idea of war dominated the congress:

"Just as it is difficult to conceive of a revolutionary militant separated from the masses or from political work, in a war situation we cannot have party activists or sections of the party not involved in waging the war on the level that is realistic in their region or area of work. A combat party is distinguished precisely by the fact that it fights: and in an Argentina at war, political activity is fundamentally armed activity. Therefore in those places where the party is active among the masses, members must promote military actions. They must fight, form the army through practicing armed struggle. Anyone who does not fight does not exist politically. Our revolutionary war will not be and is not (as it has already begun) a regional war. It is a national war, a popular war of the masses that will develop wherever there are masses, adapting itself to the concrete forms demanded by each region." (*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 5, pp. 16-17)

In his document on the PRT(C), Sandor writes: "The error of our comrades was to have conceived of a gradual development of the ERP into a peoples army, of not having understood that the bourgeoisie would not stand by passively before such a deterioration of the situation but would be capable of reacting politically, apart from intensifying the repression." That is true. But it is a question of a strategic error, not an error of assessment or a simple misunderstanding. For the PRT's orientation forms a coherent system. To start from the idea that "it's war" is to suppose that the masses are already at war and are ready to enlist. And that is to suppose that the problem of the proletariat's political, economic, and ideological domination is already resolved to a large extent. Because that is the logical precondition for forming "large mobile units" in the countryside for "geographical-military" reasons. This means to presuppose that the mechanisms of ideological exploitation and oppression are already broken. That is the basis for the gradual organic growth of the army as the central perspective of mass work. Its corollary is the subordination of other mass activities to the building of the army. The PRT, while it did not abandon all work in the trade unions, gave priority for whole periods to organizing supporting commandos or rank-and-file committees that were direct auxiliaries of the army. And another corollary was the political charac-

ter of mass work: it was conceived of basically as building democratic support for the fighting army and as a means of recruiting to the front. Thus, today many members of the PRT are intervening in the FAS (Anti-imperialist Front for Socialism), which was created from the top. Members of the FAS on university campuses, for example, refuse to participate in self-defense under the pretext that this is the task of the ERP and not of a legal democratic front. The idea that war has been declared can also lead to justifying special alliances such as that with the CP, the alliances being conceived as a democratic front to support the war.

When the PRT(C) speaks of protracted war, it is not a matter of a rhetorical formula, but of an immediate and practical perspective. If regular work in the factories has been given less weight, it is because for the PRT the workers organs thrown up in struggle do not represent the backbone of dual power. According to the PRT perspective, dual power must take a dual form: a territorial expression (liberated zones) and an organized military expression (the peoples army). This is also what explains the importance the PRT gives to distribution of food in the poor neighborhoods, which are regarded as the red bases of the peoples army. That is straightaway a sharp strategic deviation. Thus, the decision to create the ERP cannot be reduced to the creation of a new "instrument." Even in relation to the Ninth World Congress resolution it amounted to a political innovation representative of a coherent orientation. It is by no means accidental that this question of the army is coming up again today in the center of the discussion within the Fracción Roja (Red Faction).

As far as the appearance of the ERP and the problems posed around it were concerned, the Fifth Congress of the PRT should have been taken as a warning signal. In fact, the debate resulted in the expulsion of one tendency (the Communist Tendency) that even according to the documents of the congress itself represented 13 percent of the organization, as well as the departure of another tendency (the Workers Militia). The majority of the members of the Central Committee either left the organization or were expelled. Among them were the three signers of the Fourth Congress document; the editor of the magazine, who was also a delegate to the Eighth World Congress; and the PRT's delegate to the Ninth World Congress. These things could not have passed by unnoticed. There was a stack of documents that posed the problem of the political significance of the Fifth Congress, although with some confusion. Despite this, no written balance-sheet was drawn up at the international level. The majority of the PRT(C) was de facto recognized as the legitimate successor of the former PRT and the two other tendencies were more or less ignored. The method was scarcely correct in general, and still less so in that what was at stake was a thing so serious and delicate as the application of the armed-struggle orientation adopted one year earlier at the Ninth World Congress.

The orientation of the PRT(C) raises a basic political problem: the concept of revolutionary crisis has disappeared from its documents and its perspectives. If war has already broken out, the revolutionary crisis is part of the past, the masses are at war, and it is enough to organize them, above all militarily. The concepts of protracted war and of gradual growth of the army thus

reinforce each other. Again on this point the Ninth World Congress resolution, speaking of protracted civil war in a conjunctural sense, allows of no clarification of the problem. For us, civil war is not proclaimed by the vanguard, it is declared by the masses at the moment of a revolutionary crisis in which class antagonisms are laid bare and in which organs (or embryos of organs) of dual power arise. It is only then that the masses of the working class can arrive at the total conception of a confrontation for power between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The disappearance of the notion of revolutionary crisis from the PRT(C)'s frame of reference is not accidental. It also derives in part from a mechanistic view of imperialist and bourgeois repression, a view that has been refuted by reality. In Bolivia the revolutionary situation lasted for several months; at the time of the coup in Uruguay, the workers occupied the factories for two weeks; and finally, in Chile, after the October 1972 crisis, it was not certain that the bourgeoisie would have had a united attitude (including, for example, the Christian Democracy) in face of a revolutionary offensive. In spite of the lack of a correct revolutionary response, some divisions appeared in the armed forces in Chile and Bolivia.

To exclude the revolutionary crisis as a decisive strategic link can only lead either to despairing of the revolution or to ascribing to the masses from the outset a level of consciousness that they do not in fact possess. To assume that thousands and thousands of workers are prepared to enlist in a full-time peoples army not only to defend their struggles and their work places but to carry out offensive actions against the repressive forces is to assume that thousands of workers have understood the need to attack the state. In short, it is to assume that the revolutionary party has been built and that the problem of its link to the masses has been resolved. But that is the whole problem.

The majority's document on armed struggle in Latin America, with which we are basically in agreement, reproaches the Ninth World Congress resolution for "some elliptical, one-sided, and simplistic formulations that telescoped several successive phases" of the armed struggle.

This notion, itself elliptical and telescoping, displays confusion about the rhythms of development of armed struggle and above all a lack of precision about the qualitative change represented by the revolutionary crisis. This question must be developed.

Whether a revolutionary crisis leads to partial insurrections and the birth of an armed resistance, including a rural armed resistance, or whether it leads to a direct imperialist military intervention and the organization of a revolutionary liberation resistance movement, in either case the crisis marks a qualitative change in the relationship of forces, including on the military level, and the entry of the masses onto the scene. Without understanding this point, one risks sinking into military gradualism, a leftist version of the electoral gradualism of the reformists.

For its part, the international minority has formulated apolitical criticisms of the PRT(C). It condemns the milk distributions in the slums as populism and the kidnappings as publicity seeking, failing to recognize that it is really a matter of an erroneous but consistent orientation for

the seizure of power, an attempt at a revolutionary response to the problem of confronting the bourgeoisie. For this reason, the minority's responses, which reaffirm the necessity of building the Leninist party independently of analyzing the period and the concrete situation, do not allow even a half-step forward. On the other side, if we, in collaboration with the Latin American Trotskyist groups, are capable of drawing the lessons and reorienting the intervention, the experiences of the PRT(C) can be a basic gain for the Trotskyist movement on the Latin American continent.

4. On the Ninth World Congress

The discussion at the Ninth World Congress and the current tendency debate reflect a radically new situation for the international Trotskyist movement. Born after the defeat of the German and Spanish revolutions, the Fourth International found itself driven back by the ebb in the revolution into a propagandist position, denouncing the betrayals of the reformists but unable, except in a few cases, to directly take the leadership of the mass revolutionary process. The change in the relationship of forces that occurred during the 1960s, the appearance of a new vanguard escaping from the control of the Stalinist and Social Democratic bureaucracies has qualitatively transformed that situation for the first time. This is what was expressed by the Ninth World Congress's symbolic formulation that the time had come to move from propaganda groups to combat parties; that is, to pose the question of power directly, and not any longer solely on a general propaganda level across reformist obstacles.

At the Ninth World Congress this new situation was concretized in two points: the adoption of armed struggle for Latin America and the break with entryism in Europe (confirmed by the IEC resolution of December 1969). But in many respects this necessary and basic step forward remained uncertain and empirical.

The break with entryism was registered more than determined. It had already become a reality in France, thanks to May 1968. But the balance-sheet on entryism, the cost of the belated or wrongly timed break with it (notably in Italy and Germany), has not been discussed. The consequences of this break for our general orientation (relations with the organized workers movement, electoral tactics, united fronts, governmental slogans, organizational structure) were not sufficiently developed or, above all, generalized.

In the case of Latin America, the resolution left the question even still less clear. If the resolution involved asserting the necessity of directly taking up by beginning armed struggle the military aspect of the class confrontation that the Cuban revolution had placed on the agenda, that was in fact a necessary condition for a revolutionary orientation, but in 1969, after many defeats, it was not a sufficient condition. If on the other hand the resolution involved a more precise orientation consistent with that practiced by the PRT, then it was erroneous in its details. The crucial problems of the relations among party building, military work, and mass work were not discussed with the strict attention to detail that their complexity demands. Thus, in a September 1970 polemic

with Comrade Hansen, Livio replied: "Guerrilla warfare is one of the methods of struggle to utilize in a given context to aid the building or strengthening of the party. Has Comrade Hansen ever thought of counterposing party-building to, for example, a general strike?" But the problem is precisely that engaging in armed struggle affects all the processes of party building, while the general strike is the opening for its total activity. It is in this sense that launching armed struggle raises the problem of party building under specific conditions.

Finally, at the very time that the talk was of transforming the sections into combat parties, the international center did not advance beyond its makeshift functioning and remained a propaganda center. The qualitative development of international leadership is not a simple problem of will, but a political problem that is very difficult to resolve. On this point we ourselves bear very heavy responsibilities that we will have to meet in the future by contributing to forging a structure of theoretical development and practical intervention for the International that is worthy of the International's high ambitions.

The Character of the Self-Criticism That Must Be Made

1. Its Political Sense

It is clear that such a self-criticism calls into question neither the objective nor the role of the Ninth World Congress, nor the general framework of our orientation in Latin America. The break with entryism—or more exactly the theoretical explanation of the break—was the precondition for allowing our European sections to turn toward the new process of radicalization going on *in the new period opening up*. The resolution on Latin America essentially pointed out the new responsibilities incumbent upon our sections, including in the area of armed struggle, in the context analyzed in various documents. It was a matter of taking up the *political and organizational transformation* of our International. The debate at the Ninth World Congress—which is still going on today—involved the counterposition of two basic methods of party building. Certainly, the turn was made somewhat pragmatically and with certain limitations. But there was a qualitative difference between Europe and Latin America. In fact, although a synthesized analytical framework for our orientation in Europe was not developed until 1972, this orientation had been applied in life and developed theoretically by various sections effectively rooted in the socioeconomic reality. As regards Latin America things were and are different. Our Latin American sections are clearly much weaker, the number of cadres capable of independent political theoretical elaboration is lower. Hence, the analysis of the conditions and forms of armed struggle could not but be more general and therefore could not but suffer from many weaknesses and errors.

2. On the Responsibilities of the Leaderships

The political turn taken at the Ninth World Congress

involved a deep shake-up in the functioning of the International and its leadership, which had to continue theoretical elaboration, assure close cooperation, and aid in orienting the sections. Because of the very fact that this transformation affected national sections first of all, it was left largely to the national leaderships to carry it through. *Here we must proceed to a critique of the role that we (in Wallonia) have played.*

We have assigned a certain number of members to international work. We have set up functioning commissions, notably on Latin America. But all this has not amounted to the leadership of the Wallonian section *collectively* taking up the task of building the International. Not because of lack of interest or political understanding. But because, as a result of our own deficiencies and limitations, we were not up to *simultaneously* taking on the tasks of building our section and of collectively assimilating the problems involved in building the International. That is certainly difficult to do, and while we could have done somewhat better (which would have allowed for cutting short some delays), it is nonetheless quite unlikely that we would have been able to overcome the contradiction completely.

But all this has meant that the members assigned to the International were left to carry on their work individually and empirically, in an atomized way. And it has also meant the failure to construct an international center stronger than it was before.

Here again, we have had the *will* to create such a center, but we did not succeed.

It is *in this context* that the criticism we must make of the United Secretariat (of which we of course were a part) must be understood. In relation to the PRT, the leadership of the International had an attitude that must be called opportunist. That is what explains the fact that the discussion with the Santucho leadership was not opened in time. That is what explains the underestimation of the political importance of the 1970 splits in the PRT. That, along with our deficiencies in theoretical elaboration at the time, is what explains the "haziness" of the Latin America resolution, that is, the fact that *several strategies* could be recognized within it, the PRT(C)'s strategy being one.

This opportunism had many causes: organizational weakness, limits and errors of theoretical elaboration, breaking up of leaderships, geographical dispersion, traditions of functioning behind the scenes, etc. But still it must be characterized as such.

3. Our Tasks

In this situation, two interrelated tasks are incumbent upon us in the immediate period ahead:

- To clarify our political frame of reference in relation to armed struggle in Latin America in order to sweep aside all the "imprecisions" of the Ninth World Congress and to allow for the continuation of elaboration.

- To better take up our responsibilities in the construction of a real international center in order finally to go beyond the previous manner of functioning.

December 1973

Platform of the Against the Stream Tendency of the Walloon Section

[The following platform has been translated from the internal discussion bulletin of the Walloon section.]

* * *

I. The comrades who have signed below have joined together after having discussed the political reasons that make it impossible for them to affiliate with either of the two international tendencies formed following the December 1972 International Executive Committee meeting.

The debate carried out in the Fourth International over the last four years leads to the following conclusions:

a. The IEC majority bases the perspectives and tasks of revolutionary Marxists on a mechanistic analysis of the period, on an analysis that stakes almost everything one-sidedly on a deepening of the aspects of the crisis of the imperialist system, on the "irrepressible rise" of struggles in the three sectors of the world revolution; on an analysis that idealizes the character and political function of the "new broad vanguards"; all of which finally leads to an underestimation of the specific tasks of building a revolutionary Marxist workers party with mass influence.

b. In the process of making certain principled and abstract criticisms of the majority's political line, the LTF (Leninist-Trotskyist Faction) avoids a series of fundamental problems that revolutionary Marxists must integrate into their strategy; this is the case for the question of workers self-defense and preparation by the vanguard for armed struggle.

II. Given these circumstances, the comrades who have signed below refuse to accept the way the debate has been organized since the Ninth World Congress; they also refuse to accept any responsibility for either the dead end to which it has led the Fourth International, or for the split dynamic it involves. It should be acknowledged that the Fourth International is composed of tendencies proposing different orientations that do not go beyond the framework of revolutionary Marxism, which in our opinion is the framework in which the two present tendencies are situated. Only the political education of the cadres and the

membership, along with the application of the Bolshevik tradition of democratic centralism, will permit the political homogenization of the members and sections of the Fourth International that is indispensable to its functioning and transformation.

III. Given the poor conditions for preparation of the world congress—and in spite of them—the comrades who have signed below have decided that it is absolutely necessary to form an organized tendency and to refuse to accept being limited to written contributions to a debate that would thus remain a monopoly of the two international tendencies. For these comrades, the Tenth World Congress is only a first step toward the formation of a third international tendency—a tendency for which the objective need is already clearly felt, and for which the initial nuclei already exist.

IV. The Against the Stream Tendency is based on the general line of the following documents:

— "Against the Stream," by Krasno, Reiner, and Lemalouf [see page 12 of this bulletin];

— "Forward with the Building of a Third Tendency in the Fourth International," by Duman and Lesage [not yet translated];

— The November 18' Frankfurt "Communique." [*IIDB* Vol. X, No. 24].

In our opinion, there are other documents that in large part parallel the theses set forth by the Against the Stream Tendency:

— The counterresolution on Latin America by the Compass Tendency in the German section [*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 22];

— The amendments to the European document by the same comrades [*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 25];

— "New Vanguards or Building the Revolutionary Party," a contribution to the debate by Comrades Eleonor, La-sueur, Nemo, Roc, and Varlet [not yet translated].

Signers: Lemalouf, Lesage, Dumas, Reiner, Krasno, Letourneau, Maria, J.R., Decampe, Manuel, Rosa.

December 1973

Against the Stream: A Contribution to the International Debate

By Krasno, Reiner and Lemalouf

[The following article has been translated from the November 1973 issue of the internal discussion bulletin of the Walloon section.]

* * *

Break the Silence

(1) We are in the midst of a paradox: the overwhelming majority of the strongest section of the International stands mute in a debate that has rocked the world Trotskyist movement for four years. Although the political and organizational situation in the International is becoming extremely serious (*a split process is developing*), and although the Tenth World Congress is only two months away, this section is characterized by *general lack of political development* on all the fundamental questions that will be taken up and resolved. If the situation is not *radically* changed, this section as a whole will come to a decision in a context of tremendous confusion, total irresponsibility, and tail-endism.

(2) The responsibility for this situation falls in large part on our national leadership which, from 1969 to 1973, remained silent about what was at stake in the world congress, made no serious effort to educate and inform the section, passively stood by during a very clear process of a national and "chauvinist" narrowing of the internal debate—and thus greatly contributed to *disarming* the organization on the question of the problems in the International and the profound crisis they entailed.

(3) The militants who have signed this document have spent months waiting in vain for that silence to be broken. Today they take on the weighty responsibility of opening this debate, trying—to the extent of their forces—to make up for the deficiencies of the national leadership. There are times when one can no longer remain silent, when one must not remain silent! For us, this moment has come.

(4) We have access only to incomplete information and to documents that are already quite dated. Alarming rumors have spread, rumors that are difficult to verify but nonetheless indicate a vaguely defined political climate that is extremely detrimental to the development of a real debate. This, however, is the climate that has existed for four years and remains, in essence, our sole approach to the world debate.

We are determined to break with this way of doing things.

(5) Although the Walloon section remained isolated from the International by this smoke screen, our national leaders and our representatives in the International nonetheless pursued a *very clear* political orientation within the majority of the International—without the organization ever

debating it or even being informed about it. In politics, the worst possible thing is to be trusting; the essence of a revolutionary party is organized distrust! Today we have decided to reject the notion of blank checks, of delegations that aren't subject to any control.

(6) This practice on the part of the national leadership of the section has not only promoted a lack of political development on the international questions; it has also partially contributed—with the tacit (?) agreement of the leadership of the international majority—to *weakening the International as a whole*.

(7) The aim of this document is to demonstrate this, as well as to show the *political* reasons behind these practices. We will take up only two elements in the present situation in the International, elements that illustrate the way we have done things: the Walloon section in the international debate over the last four years; and Latin America. These are the two balance sheets that it is today possible to come to a decision on—*because they are concrete*.

PART ONE: The Walloon Section in the World Debate

I. The Organization in the International Debate Over the Last Four Years

(1) A split process is developing:

The international debate has entered a new phase. After the recent convention of the Socialist Workers Party, the minority decided to form an "open faction" and to prepare for the possibility of a *world split*. The minority cited the prior existence of a "*secret faction*" of the majority and published a document of the latter (the Barzman letter, in *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 31, No. 27, June 1973). The crisis in the International is accelerating rapidly only two months before the world congress. Internationally and nationally, a "split process" is continuing and deepening in our movement: *factions, splits, expulsions, and voluntary departures of entire sections are increasing*. This has been the case, for example, in Spain, Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, etc.

These developments stand in sharp contrast with the general notion the Belgian militants had of a mythical centralized International with a recognized leadership, etc. This image of the International is the one we received ready-made over the years. Today this image has fallen

to pieces, revealing a reality that is much more concrete and, above all, a *world crisis*, a crisis being reflected not only politically and ideologically but also organizationally. WHAT'S LEFT OF THE INTERNATIONAL IS TODAY IN DANGER.

(2) A new image of the International:

This global reality of a *splintered* International became apparent only bit by bit, in installments, through reading an internal document or an article in our press, or in the course of a discussion with national leaders. The majority of the comrades are not yet aware of this reality; they are still on a level of triumphalist iconography. The formation of an "open faction" by the minority and the reasons that seem to justify it have not even been officially reported in the organization, although the faction has already been in existence for four months! But little by little the pieces of the puzzle are fitting together, and a dramatic political and organizational landscape has appeared. Four years of insufficient political education and insufficient information in the section had not prepared the membership for such a discovery. It's a stiff blow for those who are determined to see things as they really are. But seeing them isn't enough. They must be understood. We must be armed, trained, and educated. It's clear that we haven't been. The members then hoped that the national leadership, the international leaders, would finally enter the fray and explain, develop, and lay out the perspectives. But nothing happened. Three or four months is no longer sufficient to make up for a delay of four years.

(3) The publication of the documents: an alibi!

Those who hold political responsibility for this state of affairs will reply that the documents exist, that they have been distributed in the organization. Which documents, exactly, have been distributed?

An initial series of documents has been published. It consisted of an enormous collection of material in two installments, a total of 137 pages reproducing nearly all the documents written on Latin America between 1969 and 1972. Three years of debate had taken place in the International, and the very form in which this compilation was presented discouraged the overwhelming majority of members. No debate was organized from the center around these documents, and no series of educationals was initiated at that time. This collection of documents was distributed without any recommendations on the part of the leaderships, without the slightest indication of a selection that might permit a profitable reading program.

The introduction to these two volumes of documents, written by Riel on March 8, 1972, pledged that regional and national cadre schools would be organized for the fall of 1972. It also indicated that a detailed bibliography on the political situation in Latin America would be provided. Both of these things have remained dead letters. The only effort that was made took place *before* these documents were published: this consisted of the winter 1971 cadre schools. And to the best of our knowledge, the transcript from them was not made available to the rank and file, nor was it made available centrally by the national and regional leaderships.

The second document in this series (*Documentation Internationale*) appeared seven months later! After that, thirteen more issues were published up to June of this year. Once again, and despite the regularity with which the

later documents appeared, *no concrete initiative* was taken to arouse interest in the debate. In July 1973—that is, four months ago—62 documents were not available in French! (Cf. *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 31, No. 27, July 1973, for the list of unpublished, untranslated, and out-of-print documents.) They were available in English.

Recently, at the beginning of October, a dozen or so new bulletins were dropped in the members' laps. Another deluge of similar proportions is in preparation (?), and two months remain for reading, discussing, and assimilating this incredible avalanche of literature and coming to a decision on it. We should note in passing that it's only quite recently that we have learned of some documents from 1968 ("The Only Road," *Documents et Informations de Sociologie*, No. 3, May 1973), and that *nothing* serious has come from the center in the way of providing a framework and an orientation for a debate on these documents. This is an edifying example of how *formal democracy can be used as an alibi for internal democracy*. Of course it's true that some documents have been published (and that a dozen more are still to appear). But this has taken place under such conditions and in an atmosphere of such disinterest (which the national leadership has never tried to do anything about), and with delays of as much as four or five years, that there has been no significant progress since the Ninth World Congress insofar as the political education of the section about the International and its debates is concerned.

Documents are not the same thing as a debate. They are no more than the statutory minimum. A minimum, moreover, that has not even been fulfilled by the Walloon section. A democratic debate is a debate over documents, but this means that the documents should be available *at the time desired*, that there should be only a *minimal* time lag between the debate and the documents that provide a transcription of it, expand on it, and add to it. Without this there's no real debate, simply a written commentary on a discussion that's already out of date and whose terms have evolved significantly. *At most a member of the Belgian section can inform himself about the debate: he can't participate in it!* The present situation of the Walloon section in relation to the discussion—even if only in relation to the discussion on Europe—illustrates this point particularly well. Two new tendencies exist right now on the continent—in Germany (Compass) and in Italy (Revolutionary Marxist). We still know nothing about them officially; we have never seen their contributions.

The formation of the minority's "open faction," its political platform, and the reasons that led to it represent *a turn* in the world debate. Perhaps in a few years we will have an opportunity to learn about it through the official channels. In the meantime, following the debate requires a crystal ball.

The concrete balance sheet of the leaderships on the following points is thus particularly negative:

- (a) the partial publication of documents;
 - (b) the enormous delay in the appearance and distribution of the documents;
 - (c) the near-total absence of a framework and orientation in the debate.
- (4) The role of the press:

The lack of democratic internal debate, the lack of in-

formation, educationals, and discussion on what the International *really* is and on the differences in it have not been without their consequences. Politics detests a vacuum! It was necessary to fill in this vacuum by various means. The image of the International formed in this way has only a distant relationship to reality. Knowledge is never just there for the taking; it can only be acquired through a democratic debate of opposing views and through practical verification. In the absence of this, we have come up with a notion of the International that is partial, biased, superficial and, in the last analysis, *false*.

Our press played a role in this process that cannot be ignored. It bears a large share of the responsibility in this regard. Obviously, its role is not to assure the internal debate or the internal education of the section on the question of the International. The press does not say everything. It has a very propagandistic, *one-sided point of view* on international questions in general. Quite naturally, its positions are those of the international majority, and we don't necessarily raise any criticisms on this point. But up until very recently there was nowhere else that it was possible to learn of another point of view and to gain access to full information on a development. Since there was no internal forum for these questions, *the public press in its various forms* (*La Gauche*, the magazines, the pamphlets) was the sole *written* source for our knowledge of the International. Even if this press had only provided us with correct, though limited, elements, it would not have been able to replace an internal forum and a debate between opposing points of view. There are two very distinct functions involved here, and one cannot be superimposed on the other. The following are three examples of the use of the organization's public press as a substitute for internal education: the 1969 Bolivia campaign, the Argentine question, and the Spanish question.

(a) The Bolivian campaign of October 1969:

We are not concerned with reconsidering after the fact whether or not it was correct to carry out such a campaign for financial and political support for the struggle of the POR. But by referring to this campaign, to the way in which it was carried out, to its preparation and the way it developed, we would like to call attention to the insufficient information given to the section and to the illusions that this campaign created as to the real political situation and the forces represented by our Bolivian comrades. We didn't educate our organization through this campaign; we mis-educated it!

In a propaganda broadsheet entitled "For Bolivia!" written by the French (supplement to *Rouge*, No. 37, November 1969), we read:

"The insoluble crisis of the regime (whether it be a General Ovando or another) (sic) along with Bolivia's location at the heart of the continent, make this country both the weakest link in the imperialist domination of Latin America as well as a strategic position for the development of the revolution on a continental scale. This is why Che installed the general staff of his army in Bolivia. His assassination cannot for long hold back a new outbreak of armed struggle. The ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional—National Liberation Army (Guevara's guerrilla organization)], under the command of Inti Peredo and the POR (led by Hugo Gonzales Moscoso), remaining faithful to the path laid down by Che's initial guerrilla struggle, has picked up the torch."

Likewise, in *Rouge* No. 33 we read:

"The comrades of the ELN and the POR have taken the path of building the Revolutionary Army."

And in *Rouge* No. 37:

"This blow by the repressive forces is not fatal; it cuts deeply into reserves of arms and materiel that have been patiently accumulated over two years."

Or again in the broadsheet that has already been cited:

"The POR, which has taken part in all the great revolutionary struggles of the Bolivian people, has attained a substantial implantation in the mines during its long history."

Let's analyze these details more closely:

In February 1972, the United Secretariat decided to send two members—one for the majority and one for the minority—to Argentina and Bolivia to report jointly on the real situation of our sections in these two countries (one of the two comrades was, by the way, a member of the French section). This "Report on Bolivia and Argentina" by Sabado and Enero was published only in English (*SWP Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 5 in 1972). It states the following:

"The POR did not hold a convention after the 1965-66 period, nor did its formal Central Committee meet. Although it differentiated itself from the ELN, *there tended to be some confusion over the exact differences*. This was compounded by the fact that—unlike the ELN—the POR, after it adopted the line of guerrilla warfare, did not carry it out in practice. . . ." [p. 4. Emphasis added.]

"The POR has apparently suffered difficulties due to both repression and internal problems over the past six years. At the time the organization made its turn toward guerrilla warfare, that is, in 1965-66, a significant number of comrades left. (We learned about this only in 1972.) *It appears that the majority of the Central Committee opposed the guerrilla-warfare line and left the organization. . . .* The result was that in the period between 1967 and the creation of the Torres regime in 1970, the POR was weakened, because of the repression, *to the point that for a while it did not exist as a structured organization.* [Emphasis added. pp. 3-4.]

"The lack of political clarity within the POR helped to increase the attractiveness of the ELN to the ranks of the POR. By way of example, some comrades informed us that all except two of the POR comrades who visited Cuba quit the Fourth International and joined the ELN" [p. 4].

The comparison between the position taken by the French newspaper *Rouge* and the reality of the situation as it appears in the Sabado and Enero report is striking. In our opinion, there's no need to develop any further points about the role played by the Bolivian campaign, or about our press as a *substitute* for internal education.

(b) The Argentine question:

The official section in Argentina, as everyone knows, is the PRT (Combatiente). We have learned recently that there is another group in sympathy with the Fourth International, a group known as the PST. In fact, in 1968 the PRT split into two tendencies, the PRT (Combatiente) and the PRT (La Verdad). The PST emerged out of the latter at the end of 1972. The world congress decided to recognize the PRT (Combatiente) as the official section,

on the sole basis of its numerical size, and declared the PRT (La Verdad) a sympathizing group of the Fourth International in Argentina.

Since 1969, our press has published *no news* on the activities of the PST. There has, on the other hand, been an abundance of written material on the PRT (Combatiente). (Cf., for example, the French newspaper *Rouge* Nos. 105, 116, 127, 144, 150, 151, 152, 153, etc.) Thus, to take one example, the March 15, 1970, issue of *Rouge*, the newspaper put out by our French comrades, devoted two prominent pages to the San Nicolas ambush carried out by the ERP, a hold-up in which 121 million pesos was liberated. Likewise, under the headline "The guerrilla's boldest coup" (*Rouge*, No. 144, February 12, 1972), they report the liberation of 402 million pesos. On the other hand, in January 1973 in the same San Nicolas region, the PSA-PST led a strike involving *armed self-defense*. In the opinion of the comrades of the PSA-PST, this strike had national importance. (Cf. *Bulletin de Sociologie Internationale*, No. 3, June 1973.) The French newspaper *Rouge* did not publish a single line on this affair. We were informed about it in an internal document six months later in an article by Nahuel Moreno in that same *Bulletin de Sociologie*. We should note the fact that this article was intended for the *public press* of the International.

On March 21, 1972, the ERP kidnapped Sallustro. The French newspaper *Rouge* reported this event at some length (Nos. 150, 151, 152, 153). Through their press, their organization lent its support to this action (No. 153): "Sallustro kidnapping promotes a rise in struggles."

Under the headline "The Revolutionary Army of the People kidnaps the president of FIAT in order to support workers struggles," the French Comrade Toussaint wrote (No. 150):

"The example of the PRT and the ERP should serve as a lesson to those in France who recently tried to use the kidnapping form of struggle at the wrong time (the Nogrette affair)."

Again in No. 153, the French comrades expressed their support for the ERP and FAR's assassination of the torturer Sanchez. This is not the place to criticize these positions taken by the French comrades in *Rouge*, even if they are in fact open to criticism.

Let's simply note the fact that the International was far from being unanimous on the question. Nonetheless, there was no internal material permitting us to form an opinion on the position adopted by the French comrades in *Rouge*, and on the opposing position adopted by other sections, notably the SWP. On the other hand, in November 1972 the SWP published No. 5 in the *International Information Bulletin* series, of which the following is a summary of the contents (*our translation!*):

— Report on Bolivia and Argentina, by Sabado and Enero

— Additional Material on Bolivia:

● Manifesto of the Frente Revolucionario Anti-Imperialista (FRA)

- United Secretariat Statement (on the FRA)
- Resolution by the POR (Combate) on the FRA
- Translation of a Resolution from Bolivia

— Additional Material on Argentina:

● Revolutionists and the Democratization of the Coun-

try (Editorial from *El Combatiente*, May 1972)

- Manifesto of the PSA
- Basis of Unification of the PSA-PRT (La Verdad)
- Armed Struggle is the Only Road to the Liberation of Argentina: Santucho, PRT(C)
- Answers to Five Questions: Santucho, PRT(C)
- Additional Material on the Sallustro Kidnapping
- Statement of the SWP Political Committee
- Statement of the LSA/LSO, Canadian section of the Fourth International
- Argentina: Increasing Support for Armed Struggle in Working Class (*Red Mole*, newspaper of the English section)

● Press Release Issued by the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Italian section of the Fourth International) April 1972

● Class Struggle and Armed Struggle in Argentina (*La Gauche*, newspaper of the Belgian section of the Fourth International) April 1972

● Statement from *Was Tun*, newspaper of the German section of the Fourth International, April 1972

● Excerpts from the United Secretariat Minutes on the Sallustro Affair

● Statement by Ghulam, Livio, Petersen, Pierre, Sandor, and Walter on the Sallustro Affair

● Editorial from *Avanzada Socialista* (PST) March 1972.

In the Walloon section, the Sallustro affair was simply treated as an every-day affair. The least one can say is that in the International, this wasn't exactly the case. We knew nothing about this until quite recently . . .

In a recent issue of the French newspaper *Rouge* (No. 222, September 28, 1973), an article on Perón's statement about the ERP and on the repression our comrades had suffered emphasizes the importance of building solidarity. In the article, we read:

"Solidarity with the ERP and all its tendencies (Combatiente, Red Faction), which we support just as we did during the period of military dictatorship."

Through this sentence we learned in a roundabout way that the ERP had split into several tendencies and that our solidarity was not being limited to one or another. This position was and remains perfectly correct. There is no doubt that few comrades will have noticed the detail about the factions of the ERP. Nonetheless, it had a certain importance. In fact, at the moment that article was written, the PRT (Combatiente) and the ERP had publicly and violently broken with the International. At that period, several factions of the PRT (Combatiente) and the ERP had already existed for some time; one of them, the Red Faction, still claimed affiliation with the International. The existence of this faction was also revealed surreptitiously, this time in a communiqué of solidarity published last August by the French comrades (*Rouge*, No. 217). Apart from reading tea leaves, there's no way of making heads or tails out of this.

Additional examples could be given at one's leisure. Our press plays an *extremely peculiar* role in the international debate. It's only recently that we've been able to see where this use of the public press is leading: *factionalism*.

(c) The Spanish question:

In December 1972 a split took place in the LCR, the sympathizing section of the Fourth International in Spain.

In *Bulletin de Sociologie Internationale*, No. 2 (May 1973), the French Comrade Robs in four pages quickly disposes of a split that divided the LCR into two parts of equal size. The debate that led to this split had already lasted for a year (since January 1972), and several documents had already been written by each of the two tendencies: "Encrucijada" and "En Marcha." En Marcha is affiliated with the majority tendency in the International, Encrucijada with the minority tendency. **BOTH OF THEM THEREFORE REMAIN IN THE INTERNATIONAL.** *BSI*, No. 2 (May 1973), contains three documents by the En Marcha Tendency:

—"Contribution of the En Marcha Tendency to the Debate on Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" (December 1972);

—"Resolution on Intervention into the Organized Workers Movement" (December 1972);

—"Resolution Adopted at the Second Congress of the LCR En Marcha" (December 1972).

This issue of the *BSI* contains *no document* by the Encrucijada Tendency. The French Comrade Robs explains in a note that there is no Encrucijada document because none had arrived by the date at which the *BSI* was to go to press. It seems that six months later the document in question still has not arrived! And there's something more serious. In issue No. 7/8 of *Quatrième Internationale* (May-August 1973), the material on Spain consists of a single document, the En Marcha document entitled "Resolution on Building the LCR, the Spanish Section of the Fourth International." *Quatrième Internationale*, one may recall, is a *public organ* of the IEC. Some Encrucijada documents were, however, in the hands of the International. *Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 1, April 1973, included in its contents:

—"The Latest Discussions and Their International Significance," by the Encrucijada Tendency (October 1972).

—"Building the LCR, Spanish Section of the Fourth International," by the En Marcha Tendency (October 1972).

These two documents, admittedly documents that predate by three months those published in the *BSI* in French, were printed *jointly* in English in the (SWP) *Internal Information Bulletin*. We salute the efforts made by the editors of *BSI* No. 2 to present the debate "while it's still hot" for a change. Nonetheless, we are still waiting for an Encrucijada document, even if it's a little "lukewarm."

(5) An unhealthy atmosphere:

There's another element that no trace exists of in writing, an element that has played a part (and still does) in forming the Walloon organization's collective consciousness of the international debate. We mean the sarcastic cracks, the corridor gossip, etc., that have created a vague atmosphere of contempt for the international minority in general and the American section in particular. It's a common occurrence to hear the SWP spoken of as a "rightist" organization, or as a "Lambertist" or even "reformist" organization. We think that everyone will agree that this climate exists. We look forward to seeing these hasty (!) statements backed up by *written* political analyses based on the orientation of the American section and the minority sections. *We are not taking up a defense of the minority positions.* We simply demand that the debate—if it is to take place at all—be honest and aboveboard,

and that it put an end to these impressionistic practices, ready-made ideas, hasty comparisons, and facile, apolitical arguments (of the following sort: The Americans are not organized in cells; this means they don't follow Bolshevik organizational criteria). What we are interested in is coming to grips *politically* with the positions of the minority, hearing their explanations and fighting them, if necessary, on the basis of what they say rather than on what someone says they said, on the basis of what they are rather than on the basis of what someone has led us to believe they are.

It is unnecessary to point out that Comrade Nahuel Moreno has a very poor reputation here. He is reproached for a number of political mistakes, for a past tainted with errors and opportunism, etc. Unfortunately, however, errors, opportunism, and political mistakes are not limited to a few comrades or to a particular current in the International. The history of the world Trotskyist movement is full of errors of this type. A democratic debate is not enhanced by comrades' biographies!

These methods belong to a current in the workers movement we definitively broke with thirty-five years ago. A democratic debate cannot be carried out on this basis; only the positions defended by the comrades *today* are of interest to us.

We can draw three additional conclusions from the above:

(a) For four years education, full information on new developments, and the debate in the International have remained completely foreign to the Walloon section.

(b) Insofar as these points are concerned, this section's press has played the role of an inadequate substitute, a substitute that has created a false image of the International and its sections.

(c) Political debate has been advantageously replaced by a stalling tactic that has created and sustained an atmosphere of contempt that is not based on any serious political argument.

Are these facts in accordance with what has been set down in section 5 (under the heading of publications) in the statutes now in force?

"(25) The United Secretariat is assigned the responsibility of editing and publishing an official organ in the name of the International Executive Committee. The official organ will publish the main programmatic documents and resolutions of the world congresses, the International Executive Committee and the United Secretariat. National sections are duty bound to translate this material where necessary and see that it is published and circulated in their own countries.

"(26) The United Secretariat is assigned the responsibility of also regularly publishing an Internal Bulletin. In discussion periods preceding world congresses, the Internal Bulletin must appear with the greatest possible frequency in order to make all the contributions and main discussion articles available to the membership in time to assure that each tendency or different political position is presented at least once." [*International Information Bulletin*, January 1969, p. 9.]

And section 7, point 29?

"All members are entitled to complete, honest and impartial information on the problems and activities of the International, especially on questions under debate among the leaders of the International and the national sections."

[*Ibid.*, p. 10.]

(6) We are not yet participants in the International.

After a short fight over principles and at the price of a split, the first national congress of our organization engaged our section in building the International. This congress called for recognition of the organization as the official section. In that period, we stated that it was *vitally* important to not dissociate building the party from building the International. Thus, in 1969, we were ready to assume our responsibilities, our full place in the International, and to carry out concretely this important decision made by the first congress. We were also well aware of the scope of the task that this involved. Against the minority, which was opposed to affiliation, we correctly explained that by entering the International we would *qualitatively transform* it. Since then, however, we have in fact behaved like an organization whose activities and debates *extend no further than their national context*. There are two objective reasons that explain this phenomenon, but they do not justify it. The innumerable tasks that arose from May 1968, along with our accelerated growth and all that this meant in the way of new responsibilities of a practical nature, provided a substantial basis for narrowing the internal debate along strictly national and "chauvinistic" lines. It's clear that we went through this process without ever (as we have seen) trying to call a halt to this natural tendency, to go beyond it, to become *concretely* and *consciously* the Walloon section of the International. Nonetheless, *it was possible* to have done so; the means existed. When necessary, we know how to educate and inform, debate and reach a decision. One of the important things distinguishing us from the rest of the workers organizations and the far left is the fact that we publish documents at the appropriate times in order to promote and provide a framework for debate. In preparing for the national congress we have been able to publish something in the neighborhood of forty bulletins. Thus, arguments about technical resources cannot be accepted on this point. Clearly, it's a *political* deficiency that's involved. We have international commissions that function as the right arm of the United Secretariat. The national leadership includes people who are involved in international work on a full-time basis; it also includes members of the United Secretariat. These comrades have carried out important activities in the International over the last four years and, above all, have taken *quite clear* positions on all the points under debate. The following question is therefore posed: What was this activity and *what were those positions*? And *why* hasn't the organization been a participant in this?

II. The Belgian Leadership in the International Debate

(1) The section in the Ninth World Congress:

In 1969, the first congress of the organization came to a decision on only one point in regard to the International. It was, however, a point of the highest importance—the organization's affiliation to the International. There had been no special congress devoted to

preparing for the world congress itself. The organization was just emerging from a rather lengthy period of internal debate, and an eventual extension of the discussions could quite conceivably have served as an appreciable obstacle to our practical intervention. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the fact that in that period the organization would have been incapable of taking up the Ninth World Congress debates in a serious way. Thus, our delegation participated in that congress without the benefit of any in-depth discussion in our organization. At the Ninth World Congress, our comrades voted unanimously with the majority, including on the most controversial resolution—the one on our orientation in Latin America. We are not calling into question either the circumstances of the vote or the vote itself. There is no doubt that the delegation acted in a principled manner and according to its deep convictions. Furthermore, it is probable that in 1969 the section would have unanimously favored supporting this resolution.

(2) The international work of the Belgian members of the International Executive Committee:

After the Ninth World Congress the normal course of events would have been to inform the organization of the debates that had taken place there, to indicate the substance of the disagreements that divided the majority and the minority at that time, and to explain the positions taken by the Belgian delegation—with the aim of making this the basis for instituting a *genuine process of internal education* on the International. None of this took place. We became aware of the resolutions passed at the Ninth World Congress some months later (indeed, years later for some comrades) from reading *Quatrième Internationale*—a publication which, it should be pointed out, has never inspired any great interest among our ranks. *Internationalist consciousness has never yet arisen through "spontaneous generation."* The concrete manifestation of this consciousness requires an extensive process of internal education, a process that was never undertaken.

After the Ninth World Congress, several members of the section were given important international responsibilities. Nonetheless, the tradition of silence inaugurated in 1969 continued over the next four years—to the point that most of the time these comrades' activities and the positions they took were and still remain unknown to the organization. Regular reports of the United Secretariat proceedings and the votes of our comrades have never been published in French. It has only been in the course of this year that some of the documents passed by the International Executive Committee in preparation for the world congress have been published in the Walloon section. In order to learn what positions the Belgian comrades in the international leadership took and how they voted we had to go to the internal documents published in English for the United Secretariat by the SWP—we had no other recourse. In this way we learned that the Belgian comrades have always supported the majority positions—in the United Secretariat and the International Executive Committee as well as in the practical activity on an international level. We learned at the same time that these comrades constituted the cutting edge of the international majority. For example, there was an exchange of correspondence between six members of the United Secretariat and the leadership of the PRT (Com-

batiente). In the course of the correspondence, the Argentine comrades made very serious charges of factionalism against certain comrades in the French section. *Documentation Internationale* No. 8 (April 1973) contains the first letter from the six United Secretariat comrades as well as these comrades' reply to the PRT (Combatiante) letter that made the charges we have mentioned. [*IIDB*, Vol. X, No. 7] However, the PRT (Combatiante)'s reply—which was alluded to in the second United Secretariat letter, and which contained the charges—has not been published. At the December 1972 International Executive Committee meeting, our comrades voted for the two resolutions Livio presented on Bolivia and Argentina, resolutions that today are considered to have been outpaced to a very large extent by events—and for a good reason, since the PRT (Combatiante) has left the International. At this meeting the French comrades joined the majority tendency on the basis of their agreement with the general line of the document ("In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International") by Ernest Germain, the theses on "Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe," and the resolution on Bolivia mentioned above.

All the Belgian comrades voted *against* postponing the world congress, which was then scheduled to be held in early autumn 1973. The resolution presented by Walter against postponement stated:

"The right decision to take in that respect should be:

"a) To guarantee the publication of all the backlog of material in French in the coming weeks. This is a special responsibility for the majority caucus, which will insure this without reservations or delay.

"b) To make sure that the sections' congresses be held at a date sufficiently close to the world congress that an adequate discussion of the available material can take place in the ranks." (Emphasis added)

As we mentioned above, in July 1973—that is, seven months later—sixty-two documents were still unavailable in French, and only a month remained for publishing them!

In order to illustrate the way the French comrades have acted in the International, we urge the Walloon comrades to read the documents and the resolution on the Domingo affair (*IIDB* Reprint, *Discussion on Latin America* [1968-1972], pp. 167-79). Even more serious is the quite recent Barzman affair (*SWP Discussion Bulletin*, No. 27, June 1973, p. 3). The SWP considers this document as irrefutable evidence of factional activity on the part of the majority. Certain French comrades in the International are implicated by name in the Barzman letter. The authenticity of this letter has apparently not been challenged by anyone, yet it still hasn't been published in French. We hope that it will be and, above all, that the comrades who have been implicated in the affair will reply in unambiguous terms to the accusations that have been brought against them.

As may be noted, there is a striking contrast between the eloquence and activity of the Belgian comrades on the level of international leadership on the one hand, and the strange silence they retreat to in our section. It is an undeniable fact that these comrades never took the opportunity presented by a congress or a national conference to familiarize the organization as a whole with the internation-

al activities and the positions they had taken on international question. Like it or not, and despite our *resolute opposition to any federalist concept of the International*, the agreement with the majority positions expressed by the Belgian comrades and their activities in this sphere are interpreted as representing the opinion of the organization *as a whole*. The numerical and political weight of our section is *decisive* in the International. We have acquired this power almost exclusively through our national activity but our influence has gone far beyond this framework without our organization itself ever having gained any real control over it. We represent today one of the most advanced (if not the most advanced) experiences in revolutionary Marxism on a world scale. *Our prestige greatly exceeds that of the international leadership itself. We should be very clearly aware of what we represent (despite ourselves, up to the present) internationally in order to get a precise idea of what is meant by the way in which the Belgian comrades' positions are used in the international debate. To confuse these positions with those of the entire organization is simply mystification until we reach a point at which internal debate becomes a reality. This confusion is widespread, however. We quote from our German comrades in the GIM:*

"2 Fatal Alternatives

"It would be fatal if the current international debate were to be presented to the GIM as though the only choice was between the international majority and all of its positions en bloc and the international minority and all its positions—or even more crudely, between the SWP and the Ligue Communiste or Ernest Mandel." (*IIDB*, Vol. 10, No. 11, July 1973, "Why We Did Not Sign the International Majority's Tendency Declaration," p. 13. Emphasis added.)

There you have the way in which the world debate is conceived of today. There you have the result of four years of uncontrolled activity on the part of our comrades in the International. We don't know whether or not the SWP would accept as valid the startling shortened version of the choice in the International. For our part, we are convinced that it in no way corresponds with reality.

It's not the Walloon section that is annoyed against the international minority. At most it's a few dozen of its leaders . . . and of course Ernest Mandel.

(3) What is at stake:

And yet, as we have noted, it was possible to prepare the entire section in this debate. It is true that if we had *really* taken our place alongside the majority, we would have represented the *overwhelming majority*, the decisive element. But it is no less true that this would have involved certain dangers. Opening a real debate in the section might have given rise to a number of critical currents, the discussion might have divided the organization itself—and not necessarily (here we agree with the German comrades) along the lines of the positions taken by one or another tendency. Allowing the free play of internal democracy involves certain dangers for a leadership. Taking into account the very compelling specific weight of the organization, it's easy to foresee the possible consequences a full internal debate could have had in our organization. The internal relationship of forces in the International could have been *qualitatively* changed. We come to the heart of the problem here: *The lack of internal debate*

in the section has a very specific function: its aim is to preserve the present relationship of forces between the majority and the minority, a relationship that could be turned upside down by the development of disagreements in the French section.

We do not have a formal and purist concept of internal democracy. We don't think that the way in which it is used is actually independent of the political positions it is organized around. We think there are profound political reasons why the political leadership of the organization, along with the majority of the International, has not organized an internal debate around the problems of the International. *The leadership of the organization is afraid of these debates.* First of all because its positions are weak in regard to an essential axis of its activity over the last four years: Latin America.

On the other hand, because it considers the rank and file incapable of carrying out this debate.

We unconditionally reject the second element. We think we have sufficiently demonstrated how the national leadership bears responsibility for this, if indeed it's actually true.

But another argument has come up, at least verbally (we are looking forward to the political documents). Some comrades are ready to *sacrifice everything* to prevent the minority from becoming the majority and thus taking over the leadership of the International.

To justify this position, some have not hesitated to state that the minority tendency has become "an objective obstacle to the development of a revolutionary Marxist vanguard," and that it is possible to view the world split as a "historical perspective" and as a "measure of Bolshevikization." *This perspective has already been put into practice in Spain.* This is what happens when you exploit an atmosphere that is tending toward and already suggests a world split. We strongly reaffirm here that we will not stand for a suicidal undertaking of this sort unless someone demonstrates to us beforehand where, when, and how the international minority has definitively and irreparably broken with revolutionary Marxism. Our concept of the International as it exists in its present stage is that it necessarily reflects the uneven and combined development of the revolution on a world scale, and that the presence of various currents within it is therefore a historical inevitability. To break today with the international minority would confine us to a Europe-centered understanding of the problems. For all these reasons, a politically unjustified split seems to us to be a liquidationist enterprise and a disaster of historical proportions.

This was apparently the position of the French Comrade Jebrac when he wrote sometime between November 1972 and January 1973 ("The Axes of the International Debate," in *SWP Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 3 in 1973):

"V. The Outlook for the Tenth Congress:

"1. The multiplication of situations where there are two organizations claiming affinity with the International (Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Australia, Canada, Spain) should make us clearly conscious of the danger of a split hidden in this dynamic. We should understand it to be better able to fight it, since we are all conscious of the seriousness of such a split in the midst of a period of internation-

al expansion of our movement. This expansion itself risks increasing the difficulties by making the recognition of each new section, and many have applied, the stake in a political battle. This is why the development of the international discussion, its organization through the form of tendencies, the maturing of the respective positions, should enable the discussion to be balanced and its dynamic controlled." [page 23]

PART TWO: Latin America: A Necessary Balance Sheet

I. The Specific Place of Latin America in the World Debate

Since 1969, the year in which the differences over Latin America became crystallized, the debate has expanded a great deal. It has gone from "Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" to the Vietnamese revolutions, passing through the Middle East, China, nationalism, etc. It's only now that these debates are beginning to become formalized. The case of Latin America is different, for several reasons:

(a) First of all, this debate is four years old. The respective theoretical positions have had time to develop and to be presented.

(b) Second, a specific orientation was tested in practice, and we believe that a more or less exhaustive balance sheet is possible today.

(c) Finally, at the 1969 congress, a special place was assigned to this sector of the world revolution. At that time we hoped to make some important and quite rapid gains. Comrade Livio even drew a very concrete conclusion: ". . . it is necessary to understand and to explain that at the present stage the International will be built around Bolivia." ("An Insufficient Document," in *IIDB Reprint Discussion on Latin America [1968-1972]*, p. 16.)

We think that for these three fundamental reasons the highest priority should be given to drawing a balance sheet on the 1969 orientation on Latin America.

Given the present conditions of the debate in our organization, we don't think it will be possible to go beyond this initial balance sheet. Naturally we have some ideas on the other questions under discussion today, but we don't pretend to be capable of organizing them in a coherent fashion or in a way sufficient for providing the basis for counterproposals.

It should be noted that the United Secretariat agreed unanimously that the Tenth World Congress would be devoted to three fundamental points:

- (1) A balance sheet on Latin America;
- (2) Building a revolutionary party in Europe;
- (3) Building the International; the statutes of the International.

Insofar as point 3 is concerned, we think that the first section of this document at the very least permits an understanding of certain phenomena that appeared in our organization but concern the *entire* International; it also

makes clear how we view these phenomena.

As for point 2, only the majority document, which is still not very well known in the organization, proposes an overall orientation. The minority comrades have been content with presenting a critique of the document. We feel that it will be difficult to make any progress in this discussion unless the national sections contribute to it concretely in the form of detailed balance sheets of their activities and practical contributions. Some German comrades (Compass) and Italian comrades (Revolutionary Marxists) have already taken steps in this regard. We reserve the right to express our point of view in the matter when the proper time comes.

II. The Ninth World Congress Orientation on Latin America

(1) The Ninth World Congress reached *general agreement on the analysis of the period* that began with the big revolutionary mobilizations of 1968. We had really entered a new period of radicalization on a world scale. There was also *general agreement on the tasks* of the International within this context: to break the isolation of revolutionary Marxism in respect to mass struggles, to leave behind the exclusively propagandistic terrain Trotskyism had been restricted to, to lay the basis for building genuine revolutionary parties rooted in significant sectors of the working class, and to struggle here and now for the political leadership of the working class.

(2) The Ninth World Congress resolution on Latin America represented an effort in this direction in that it broke with the one-sidedness of theoretical commentaries and proposed concrete solutions to the organizations of the International on the continent. This effort was greatly hindered, however, by the specific content of the resolution, which was based on a series of incorrect assessments that were rather quickly revealed as such.

The concrete orientations proposed for the Latin American revolutionary Marxist organizations were as a whole based on a general analysis of objective conditions on a continental scale. This analysis was centered around the following fundamental elements: in the general context of the Latin American countries' increasing economic and political dependence on imperialism, the impact of the Cuban revolution, the assimilation by the masses of its great political lessons, the existence of the first workers state in Latin America, and the clear-sightedness of the Communist leadership has inaugurated a period in which "the perspective for permanent revolution" is no longer simply a historical tendency but rather the reality of this stage of the class struggle. The era of permanent revolution has already begun *in a direct and immediate way* in Latin America (Latin American resolution, section IV, point 11, "Criteria and Lines of a Revolutionary Strategy").

Logically, this also meant that:

"In Latin America, the polemic between the advocates of the 'democratic' and 'peaceful' road and the advocates of the revolutionary road has been entirely outmoded. . . ." (section IV, point 15).

The fact that permanent revolution had already become

a concrete reality in Latin America also signified that illusions in the revolutionary capacities of the so-called "national" bourgeoisie, in theories of revolution by stages, and in multi-class strategies could scarcely be said to exist any longer. Furthermore, it meant that the leading role of the working class in the revolutionary process was understood by everyone as a problem that had already been resolved. Whether or not the working class was to be associated with each of the phases of the revolutionary process was a matter of little importance:

"In fact, in most of the countries the most probable variant is that for a rather long period the peasants will have to bear the main weight of the struggle and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie in considerable measure will provide the cadres of the movement. This means that the leading role of the proletariat can be exercised under diverse forms: either by the wage workers (industrial workers, miners or agricultural workers) participating at the head of revolutionary struggles, which will doubtless be the case in only a minority of Latin American countries; or indirectly, the leadership of these struggles being in the hands of organizations, tendencies, or cadres issuing from the workers movement; or in the historic sense of the term, by means of the program and theories issuing from Marxism."

Only "the completion of the revolution into a socialist revolution is in any case inconceivable without the mobilization and very broad participation of the proletariat" (Latin American resolution, point 13).

Given a situation like this, a situation in which permanent revolution is an immediate reality:

"Technical preparation cannot be conceived merely as one of the aspects of the revolutionary work, *but* as the fundamental aspect on a continental scale, and one of the fundamental aspects in countries where the minimum conditions have not yet been met." (Point 15. Emphasis added.)

What's involved here is deducing from the specific conditions of Latin America the most adequate *military form* for definitively destroying the bourgeois state. And from this flows the definition of rural guerrilla warfare as "the principal axis of the armed struggle for a whole period."

It's clear that once you accept the basic axiom that permanent revolution is no longer merely valid on a historical scale but has become an "immediate and direct" reality because the masses have assimilated it, the task of the revolutionary Marxist vanguards is reduced to *concluding militarily* a process that has in large part already begun. From there, the problem of the relationship between the form of military activity—rural guerrilla warfare in this instance—and the masses is reduced to a problem of "linking up," and this more in terms of military effectiveness in the face of repression than in terms of political education on the military problems.

". . . guerrilla warfare can in fact stimulate a revolutionary dynamic, even if at the start the attempt may seem to have come from abroad or to be unilateral (which was the case with Che's Bolivian guerrilla movement). But in any case it must be realized that without the active sympathy, the protection, and the solidarity of certain sectors of the masses, the chance for consolidating and strengthening the guerrilla nuclei diminish to the extreme and the political repercussions which the armed action

is striving to provoke dwindle." [Latin American resolution, pp. 7-8.]

We could argue from now until doomsday over the question of the most adequate forms of military initiatives in a political situation like the one described in the resolution.

The problem obviously lies elsewhere. In 1969, on the Latin American continent as a whole, were permanent revolution and prolonged continental civil war conjuncturally imminent? (point 10)

In regard to this thorny point, we should note the incorrect evaluation of four factors in the Ninth World Congress resolution:

(1) The overestimation of the real impact of the Cuban revolution and of the assimilation by the masses of its great political lessons, notably on the permanent character of the Latin American revolution and on the revolution's armed and violent character.

(2) The overestimation of the political and theoretical capabilities of the Cuban leadership (see the footnote in section III of the Latin American resolution):

"The danger of bureaucratization is not excluded. Objective factors favor such a development despite the conscious antibureaucratic campaign by a leadership which over a decade has given many proofs of its capacity." This overestimation is conveyed clearly in point 21:

"Integration into the historic revolutionary current represented by the Cuban revolution and the OLAS, which involves, regardless of the forms, working as an integral part of the OLAS."

(3) The underestimation of the capacities for mobilization of the working class and the urban layers, and the overestimation of the level of consciousness and combativity of the peasantry — two errors very clearly inherited from Castroist and Guevaraist empiricism.

(4) The hasty and undifferentiated generalization from the specific conditions in just a few countries of Latin America to the continent as a whole. The supposition that the era of permanent revolution has become an immediate and direct factor in Latin America automatically signifies its geographic extension on a continental scale and in a very short time, despite the enormous disparity between the objective conditions in each country.

What is the source of these errors? We believe they stem from an incorrect interpretation of the 1969 "turn" and its application to Latin America. To break with the strictly propagandistic nature of revolutionary Marxism in Latin America and to integrate ourselves as the eventual leadership of the mass movement automatically posed the eventual problem of our relationship with the Cuban leadership, which enjoyed an enormous prestige on the continent (this doesn't mean, however, that the lessons of the Cuban revolution had been assimilated by the masses), and which seemed to be orienting toward continuing the continental revolution through OLAS. We understand that it was still difficult in 1968 to criticize the empiricism of the Cuban leadership while at the same time expressing our unconditional solidarity with the first workers state in Latin America. We solved this difficulty by *justifying* our orientation toward rural guerrilla warfare (which the Cuban leadership was still calling for) by a doomsday analysis of the political situation in Latin America, which we said was entering the era of permanent revolution in a "direct and immediate" way.

Today it is possible to concretely verify these errors and their organizational consequences. Nevertheless, we think that the International had the means to avoid them in 1969, and that this has become more true each day from 1970 to 1973.

III. Evaluation of the Latin American Political Situation from 1969 to 1973

Since 1968 the political situation in Latin America was characterized by a very powerful revival of the *urban* class struggle—in Mexico, in particular—whereas guerrilla warfare had encountered a series of tragic setbacks in Peru in 1965, in Bolivia in 1967, in Guatemala, etc. The guerrilla units that succeeded in becoming stabilized were still unable to qualitatively transform the relationship of forces between the classes. This was the case in Venezuela, for example. The years 1969-70 provided confirmation of this underlying tendency: Argentina witnessed the Cordobazo, Bolivia went through a reformist military experience as well as a very broad mobilization and radicalization of the urban masses. In Chile, the Popular Unity victory rapidly created a prerevolutionary crisis whose principal characteristics fit the famous "classical" model of the October Revolution. More recently, Argentina has experienced a relatively democratic opening with the fall of Lanusse and the return of Perón.

In the same period, the Cuban leadership carried out a turn to *the right*, forming closer and closer ties with the Soviet bureaucracy, abandoning the OLAS project, recognizing overtly reactionary military regimes as in Peru, and supporting Salvador Allende's reformist experiment in Chile. In the domestic arena, the process of the bureaucratization of the Cuban state deepened in accordance with the concessions Fidel Castro made to Soviet blackmail. The famous debate on whether the transition to socialism would be peaceful or armed, a debate we had swept away with the wrong end of the broom in point 15 of the 1969 resolution, returned with force in regard to the Chilean question. The Cuban leadership, which we thought had been completely convinced by its own experience, showed excessive reserve when it came to saying anything about the pacifist strategy of the Popular Unity. The concept of prolonged civil war on a continental scale was not verified in practice, a consequence of the weakness of the organizations that made this one of their strategic axes. A whole series of Latin American countries have escaped a revolutionary process largely entered into elsewhere at certain periods; this has been the case in Brazil, that giant of Latin America, and in all of Central America.

In those areas where rural guerrilla warfare was being carried out by our comrades, it has been abandoned in favor of urban guerrilla warfare. The permanent revolution that we considered an "immediate and direct" reality in 1969 has not experienced any victorious developments. On the contrary, the Latin American workers movement has been dealt some very stiff blows in Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia—at times under conditions of dramatic political and military disarmament. In Argentina, despite objective conditions favoring the development of prerevolutionary crises, it's clear that the overwhelming majority of the workers movement has not yet been broken away from the

influence of the bourgeois Peronist leadership, which still has enormous prestige among the masses.

After this rapid survey of the situation, one can say quite objectively that the elements that formed the basis of the 1969 orientation toward guerrilla warfare have shown themselves to be inadequate and have not served to strengthen our Latin American sections—quite the contrary—and that they have been even less helpful in assuring a victorious outcome for the revolution in a single country on this continent (it should be recalled that the majority comrades were very optimistic on this point).

IV. Our Sections from 1969 to 1973

(1) Bolivia:

The POR had adopted an orientation toward guerrilla warfare in 1965-66, well before the Ninth World Congress. It then split, and the majority of the Central Committee left the organization in 1967. What was left of our Bolivian section then began to make overtures toward the ELN, but without having clarified beforehand its political position in regard to Guevarism.

Other comrades left the POR to join the ELN. The POR had adopted the guerrilla warfare line but, unlike the ELN, never put it into practice. The POR didn't undergo a process of real growth except under the Ovando government and, after October 1970, under the Torres government.

Ambiguity seemed to reign, however, over what constituted the criteria for party membership. In this period, a period in which the POR attempted to form armed groups, some militants who were integrated did not consider themselves Trotskyists and were not in programmatic agreement with the party. All of this information is contained in the Sabado and Enero report on Bolivia and Argentina (*SWP Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 5 in 1972).

In his document "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International," Comrade Germain devotes a large section to the Bolivian question, and in particular to the positions taken by our comrades under the Torres regime.

Comrade Germain writes:

"Comrade Gonzales, drawing the conclusion from the failure of the reformists and the centrists to arm the workers and from the weaknesses of our party which couldn't all by itself compensate the failures of most of the other working class parties, indeed predicted that under these conditions Torres' defeat was the more likely variant. Events have proved him to be right, alas."

And further on:

"But it is completely misleading to present things as if the POR (*Combate*) refused to conceive the possibility of a struggle for power under the more favorable conditions of the Torres regime, i.e., 'preferred' in a certain sense the dictatorship which would open up the road for 'extended guerrilla warfare' . . .

"The POR (*Combate*) did everything it could to prepare the workers for the fight against the impending coup" (*IIDB*, Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 9).

In an article that appeared in *Rouge* No. 114, Comrade Moscoso answers some questions from Jean-Pierre Beauvais. The article is datelined April 1971, five months before the Banzer coup.

In response to Beauvais's last question—"In the present situation what activities is the POR carrying on and what perspectives is it following?"—Moscoso said:

"In the present context, the party's work follows two main lines. On the one hand, we are striving to link ourselves with the masses and, over and above this, increase our forces. On the other, *we are preparing internally for future confrontations*, as a revolutionary party must do in a situation such as we have analyzed, and in line with the *developments that we expect to occur*."

The last paragraph of the interview returns to these "future confrontations."

"In the present unstable situation we look on everything as temporary. The repression that is to come will signal the start of a *new stage of armed struggle on a scale previously unknown here*. This armed struggle will be a highly diversified one and will encompass the various sectors of the Bolivian population, from the minters to the peasants and including the students. . . . *Fundamentally it is this stage we are preparing for by trying to take full advantage of the opportunities offered us by the present situation*." [Reprinted in *Intercontinental Press*, June 14, 1971, pp. 544-545. Emphasis added.]

It's quite apparent that five months before the decisive confrontation in August 1971, Comrade Moscoso felt there was no chance for resistance to the Banzer coup.

Contrary to what Comrade Germain says, after reading Moscoso's replies to Beauvais, it seems clear that in Moscoso's opinion the period following the rightist coup would present possibilities for initiatives that would be *qualitatively superior* to those experienced under the Torres regime. Moscoso speaks of "armed struggle on a scale previously unknown here."

In fact, it has to be admitted that the POR "preferred," to use Comrade Germain's term, "the dictatorship which would open up the road for 'extended guerrilla warfare'." We don't criticize the POR for not having taken seriously the possibility of a revolutionary victory in August 1971. If it felt a defeat was ahead, its duty was to announce this and to prepare for a retreat under the best possible conditions. But it should not have turned the defeat into a "signal" of coming victories, nor should it have sowed illusions about a *broadening* of revolutionary perspectives after the battle of August 1971. For the POR, the period during which Torres governed held *less interest* than the period that was to follow!

This is the result of a series of errors, errors Comrade Germain doesn't want to own up to. On the meaning of the Torres regime, for example, Comrade Germain writes:

"When General Torres took power under conditions of rapid development of mass mobilisations and activity, this expressed undoubtedly a temporary retreat of the right-wing forces in the army who had tried to take power under General Miranda. The rise of the mass movement had divided the army. The main task for the ruling class was now to gain some time in order to reunify the army. During this 'democratic interlude,' the mass movement was to be held in check by some concessions. Torres was to fulfill that function, till the army was ready to strike its blow." ("In Defence of Leninism," p. 6.)

We read in an issue of *Combate*, the newspaper of the POR:

"It wasn't the masses who were victorious during the political and military crisis of October. The victory of General Torres is instead actually a defeat for the revolutionary masses, and a victory for the army as the party of the bourgeoisie. The crisis of October has shown the limitations of direct action by the masses."

We have here at least two different analyses of the political meaning of the Torres government. Comrade Germain writes:

"The Bolivian section of the *Fourth International*, which had begun to prepare its cadres for armed struggle during the period of the Barrientos dictatorship, and had centered its orientation toward guerrilla warfare under that dictatorship, *understood the necessity of making a turn as soon as the Ovando dictatorship allowed a semi-legal margin for working class activities.*" (*Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.)

In the same *Combate* editorial, i.e., after 1970 and after Torres had come to power, we read:

"But the interesting thing is that those who are demanding a change in methods were never for the guerrilla warfare line but had always fought against it. And if they stand up today and magnify the Teoponte setbacks in order to justify a change in methods, it's because guerrilla warfare has become a factor, has become a part of the consciousness of the people, and has become transformed into something supported by the masses. *Guerrilla warfare as a means of conquering power has become a force that is paving the way for the struggles of tomorrow.*"

In another issue of *Combate*, published during the same period, the headline on the front page reads as follows:

"DESPITE SETBACKS, GUERRILLA WARFARE REMAINS THE ROAD TO NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION."

Therefore, if in fact a turn did take place on the question of guerrilla warfare (rural or urban), it certainly didn't occur under the Ovando regime, but only after the crisis of October 1970. Comrade Germain is mistaken on this point. For us, what distinguishes the use of the POR made of the semilegal margin for activity provided by Ovando and Torres is the fact that even if they exploited it organizationally, they nonetheless pursued their political orientation toward guerrilla warfare (we are in complete agreement here with Marcel's criticism of Ernest Germain's document "In Defence of Leninism. . . ." on the Bolivian question—*IIDB*, Vol. 10, No. 11, July 1973, "Contribution to the International Discussion").

On the question of the Popular Assembly, Comrade Germain writes ("In Defence of Leninism," p. 13):

"In the beginning of 1971, the POR centered its political line on the three demands quoted above: democratic elections of local rank-and-file assemblies of the toiling masses so as to transform the Popular Assembly into a real soviet, immediate arming of the workers and poor peasants; extension of the revolution to the countryside through the implementation of a concrete and detailed programme, published by the Party."

However, in April 1971, that is, four months after the "beginning" of 1971, Comrade Moscoso told Jean-Pierre Beauvais in *Rouge* No. 144:

"The left wing [of the People's Assembly], to which the POR belongs, has developed the idea that the People's Assembly should be a body that would discuss national

problems and solutions for them but would leave the power in the hands of the mass organizations (unions and popular militia or people's army)."

And later in the interview:

"The POR comrades in the People's Assembly, whether they represent the party directly or some union, hold no illusions. They are using the People's Assembly as a forum, as a platform. That is all." (*Intercontinental Press*, June 14, 1971, p. 545.)

Comrade Germain will have to admit that this does not exactly convey a desire to transform the Popular Assembly into a "real soviet." On the basis of the four points taken up above, we can see quite clearly the contrast between Comrade Germain's arguments and what the orientation and activity of our Bolivian comrades really was during the 1970-71 crisis. From this, we can draw the following conclusions:

(1) The POR made an incorrect analysis of the democratic interlude represented by General Torres; this period was analyzed as being less favorable for revolutionary struggles than the period that was to follow.

(2) This analysis engendered a series of hesitations as to the *tasks* of the POR between October 1970 and August 1971, especially on the question of whether guerrilla warfare should remain the fundamental orientation, on the question of what the Popular Assembly represented and what should be done with it, etc.

It seems to us that on the basis of these conclusions it's possible to draw a balance sheet of the orientation and activities of the POR, at least from 1969 to 1971 (insofar as the later period of 1971-73 is concerned, the period in which the POR participated in the FRA [Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista—Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Front], we think that this is of *secondary* importance in relation to the period Bolivia went through under Torres; the Torres period presented enormous objective possibilities—if not for victory, at least for a significant step forward on the part of our section).

The orientation toward guerrilla warfare adopted by the POR in 1965-67 and reaffirmed in 1969 by the Ninth World Congress resolution was followed until after October 1970 at the very least, and was never called into question in practice. The POR found itself out on a limb when the big urban struggles broke out in Bolivia. If it carried out a "turn" toward mass struggles, it did so much later. This meant that it was unable to make up in a few months for a delay of several years, that it wasn't strong enough to regain significant influence in the masses and that, in consequence, it was unable to impose its solution to the Bolivian crisis when faced with the Bolivian CP, the POR Lora, etc., who succeeded in increasing the obstacles to its entry into the Popular Assembly. Under these conditions, it's quite natural that the Bolivian section would be very pessimistic about the masses' capacity to resist the August 1971 coup and that they would consider—as far back as April 1971—a victory for the right wing as an accomplished fact!

The problem of the slogans our Bolivian comrades put forward on the need for immediate arming of the masses takes on an abstract character here since the weakness of their forces prevented them from imposing this necessity on the workers movement as a whole. This

is confirmed in the extreme by the fact that the POR was incapable even of organizing a minimum of self-defense for its very own organization and was caught unprepared at the moment of the coup ("Report on Bolivia and Argentina," by Sabado and Enero, in *Internal Information Bulletin* No. 5 in 1972, p. 4.)

This *totally negative* balance sheet of one of the oldest sections in the International, a section that was unable to come to grips with the conditions of a prerevolutionary crisis and strengthen itself in the process, is in our opinion a superb illustration of how the 1969 orientation *politically disarmed* one of our organizations in Latin America.

The revolutionary process of 1970-71 in Bolivia didn't fit into the framework projected by the POR comrades, who were trying to apply the 1969 orientation. They analyzed this period as some sort of an accident that did not necessarily call their general line into question. Quite the contrary. For them it especially underscored the defeat of the tactic of the insurrectional general strike and the "limitations of direct action by the masses." The logic of this position is unshakable: it led the POR to dramatically underestimate the revolutionary possibilities of the October 1970-August 1971 period in favor of the "prolonged continental revolutionary war" that was to come afterwards, on a scale never previously attained.

(2) Argentina:

The Argentine question in the International was recently brought to a provisional conclusion by the startling break of the PRT (Combatiente) and the ERP from our movement. We think this is a rather logical consequence of the sum total of fundamental disagreements that have stood between the PRT (Combatiente) and revolutionary Marxism since 1967.

This split, coming on top of the appreciable weakening of the POR after August 1971, leaves the International seriously weakened on the entire Latin American continent. These two organizations, the PRT (Combatiente) and the POR (Combate), were *the only ones* to put the 1969 orientation into practice. The PRT (Combatiente), like the POR (Combate) moreover, had made this choice several years earlier. This was the question (immediate application of guerrilla warfare) that split the PRT into two factions in 1967—the Combatiente faction and the La Verdad faction. Since 1968, the year of its Fourth Congress, the PRT (Combatiente) has defined itself in relation to the world Trotskyist movement and has clearly stated its orientation toward guerrilla warfare. At first, from 1967 to 1969, this orientation was toward rural guerrilla warfare. Because of the extremely violent repression to which it was subjected, the PRT (Combatiente) lost a whole series of political cadres, in particular those comrades "considering themselves strong supporters of Trotskyism." (Sabado and Enero, p. 5.)

The Ninth World Congress had to decide which faction—the PRT (Combatiente) or the PRT (Verdad)—would become the official section of the International. The congress decided to use a *numerical criterion*. The faction that held a majority at the last Central Committee meeting of the PRT before the split was to be recognized as the official section. It was solely on this basis that the Combatiente faction was recognized—and not

on the basis of its political agreement with the 1969 orientation on Latin America. At the Ninth World Congress, Comrade Moreno spoke *against* recognizing the PRT (Combatiente) because of the theses passed by a majority vote of this organization in 1968. ("The Only Road," *International Information Bulletin*, No. 4 in 1972) Comrade Moreno felt that these theses revealed *profound programmatic disagreements with revolutionary Marxism*. Comrade Livio, on the other hand, spoke *in favor* of the PRT (Combatiente), stating that the document "The Only Road" no longer represented the official point of view of the PRT (Combatiente). The PRT (Combatiente) is nonetheless presenting this document as a political contribution in preparation for the Tenth World Congress, stating that it still constitutes the official line of the PRT (Combatiente)! In fact, this document—which is now available within the Walloon organization, and which only a small minority of the delegates to the Ninth World Congress had any knowledge of—contains the basic programmatic disagreements between the PRT and the International. Comrade Sandor ("The PRT," *BSI* No. 3, June 1973) characterizes the dominant ideology in the PRT as "Castroist-Maoist-Trotskyist." More specifically, the PRT (Combatiente) comrades believe that the highest expression of Marxism is today represented by Castroism, inasmuch as it represents a higher synthesis of the two great currents stemming from Leninism—Trotskyism and Maoism. A whole series of concrete positions flow from this concept. We will summarize the most important ones:

(A) The Chinese CP is a Marxist-Leninist CP, and the leadership surrounding Mao is a Leninist leadership. It is therefore unnecessary to build a revolutionary Marxist section in China, and the perspective for a political revolution there is openly counterrevolutionary.

(B) The Cuban CP is characterized in the same way. However, the PRT (Combatiente) criticizes the support the Cuban CP gave to the Peruvian regime.

(C) The Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia was justified! This wasn't the position of the PRT (Combatiente) in 1968, but the Argentine section of the Fourth International changed its position following the support Castro gave to this initiative on the part of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

(D) A new International (the Fifth) must be formed. It should include the CPs of China, Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania, as well as the Tupamaros, the Chilean MIR, etc. We should not try to build sections of the Fourth International in any of these countries.

(E) The political line of the Tupamaros in the Uruguayan elections, i.e., their support of the Broad Front, was correct. Comrade Hansen's criticism on this stems from an ultraleft position.

There can be no doubt that such a series of disagreements on *the very foundations* for the existence of the Fourth International posed a problem in integrating the PRT in 1969. As far as we are concerned, it constitutes a *question of principle*. The plurality of revolutionary Marxist currents should not be confused with complete ideological *heterogeneity* that goes so far as to call into question the very existence of the Fourth International. It seems that in breaking with the Fourth International, the PRT understood this more quickly than we did. None-

theless, the PRT (Combatiente) put the Ninth World Congress resolution into practice. It very quickly became clear that carrying out urban guerrilla warfare contradicted working in the mass movement, especially in the trade unions. This contradiction became sharper as new possibilities for work in the mass movement opened up with the preparation for the elections that were to bring Peronism to power. The PRT (Combatiente) thus did not succeed in stabilizing an organized current in the trade unions, despite the genuine prestige won by its audacity and courage.

It was impossible for the PRT (Combatiente) to appear in public, and this obviously entailed a profound incapacity to organize under its banners the sectors of the masses who were seeking political leadership.

At its Fifth Congress the PRT (Combatiente) decided to build a revolutionary army, the ERP, which did not encompass forces qualitatively broader than the party itself. The PRT (Combatiente) justified the existence of the ERP through its analysis of the level attained by the class struggle in Argentina which, according to them, now and henceforth had entered a period of open civil war.

The PRT (Combatiente) put forward the following slogan for the recent elections: "Down With the Electoral Farce, For Revolutionary War."

It can hardly be claimed that the elections that led to Campora's victory and Lanusse's defeat were simply an electoral farce. The candidate of the dictatorship that organized the elections received less than 2 percent of the votes. The Peronists received 60 percent. Unless you say that there's no difference between Lanusse and Peron, you can't speak seriously of an "electoral farce." This slogan has a precise meaning. In the last analysis, all elections organized by a bourgeois regime are a farce. Nonetheless, we don't employ this characterization for all elections of this sort. For us, an electoral farce means that the elections will not lead to any change, even in form, of the regime in power, and serve as a democratic cover, usually for external consumption, for an open dictatorship. An example of this is the phony elections in South Vietnam, elections organized by a puppet government. An electoral farce can also be spoken of when *a significant sector of the masses* has understood the illusory character of bourgeois elections, which means that another perspective is already credible. From all the evidence, this was not the case in Argentina. The aim of the elections was to carry out a peaceful transition of power from the dictatorship to the Peronists. The recent elections in Argentina simply revealed a series of fundamental problems that are today posed for revolutionists in that country. The elections demonstrated in a rather spectacular fashion what enormous influence Peronism still has (even though it's torn apart internally and is socially and politically heterogeneous) on the Argentine masses and the working class in particular. The political situation in Argentina is characterized by the very unequal level of development reached by combativity on the one hand and revolutionary consciousness on the other. It's correct to analyze the Cordobazos as localized insurrectional phenomena, and to pose in relation to them the problem of the military organization of the working class and that of the emergence

of military cadres from the masses. But by the same token, we must never dissociate this task (which is in fact a task for Argentine revolutionaries) from the fundamental political problem of generally raising the level of the consciousness of the masses (which in this case means the vital necessity of their breaking with Peronism or any other form of bourgeois leadership). Methodologically, revolutionary Marxists put political considerations above military considerations in their order of priorities. In an actual situation, the order can become reversed: military tasks can be posed concretely before the political tasks of the vanguard have been resolved. This is a real problem, and we are not trying to cover it over. But its complexity doesn't permit a simplistic, one-sided, and crude answer either. One of the preconditions that determines the possibility of resolving this contradiction in time is the continuing effort the revolutionary Marxist vanguard must make to root itself in the working class, to become one with it. On the whole we agree with Comrade Germain's criticisms of the activity and theories of the PRT (Combatiente) on military questions and on its insufficient intervention into the mass movement. The PRT (Combatiente)'s lack of clarity and their simplistic political line have led to militaristic and substitutionist deviations (their concept of the ERP, for example). Comrade Jebrac wrote (section 3, point 3 in the document "The Axes of the International Debate," in *SWP Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 3 in 1973):

"These imprecisions are fraught with consequences. True, the PRT's ideological eclecticism can be criticized. But, it is not an ideological confusion that is totally independent of the PRT's practice. On the contrary, the PRT's borrowing, from the Chinese experience, of the schema of prolonged war giving rise to a mass people's army fosters looking ideologically to centrism and Maoism. And remaining loyal to the chosen strategic schema in return risks encouraging questionable practical choices such as a reorienting toward rural guerrilla warfare."

Comrade Jebrac is right once again on this point. He also explained that armed struggle was no longer *a sufficient dividing line* between reformists and revolutionaries. In our opinion, there was never a period in the history of the workers movement when it was sufficient! There are many points on which the PRT (Combatiente) has a rightist line today, a line that goes so far as to adopt a strategy of stages to the revolution and to seek alliances with bourgeois organizations.

What then remains of the PRT experience that can be considered positive? Comrade Sandor finds only one reason for justifying a partial criticism of the Argentine section: the prestige of the PRT (Combatiente) stemming from the technical prowess it has attained. We think that this prestige—which no one would deny is great—is an insufficient argument for drawing a positive balance sheet of our section. In reality, there's a qualitative leap between the prestige and courage of a revolutionary vanguard and its capacity to *organize* sectors, even limited sectors, of the masses. And the PRT (Combatiente) has not been able to make this leap. The prestige of the Tupamaros is certainly greater, internationally at least, yet we don't think anyone in the International would agree on this sole basis to a process of integrating this organization into the world

Trotskyist movement. The majority's self-criticism on the Argentine question is clearly *insufficient* and above all lagged quite a bit behind the reality, even at the time it was presented in December 1972. Balance sheets must go all the way. Half measures, delicately nuanced statements, yes-butts, etc., only add to the confusion.

It is impossible to write about our section in Argentina without mentioning, briefly at least, a few elements that should be entered in the balance sheet of the Moreno organization, the PST of today (formerly the PRT-La Verdad). Information about this group is skimpy and difficult to verify . . . There is one thing, however, that now seems to be admitted: the fact that this organization has made extremely rapid progress over the last few months in its efforts at trade-union implantation. The PST of today seems to be an organization that is quite powerful numerically (the party has about 60 provincial locals), and includes a significant part of the working-class leaders who have broken with Peronism. The majority criticizes the PST for having an opportunistic orientation toward the elections and Peronism, for having sacrificed a great deal in order to be able to reappear legally — politically (an electoral platform calling for a workers front) as well as organizationally (unification with the Coral faction, temporary dissolution into the Socialist Party of Argentina, concessions over the party press and the publication of *Avanzada Socialista*, etc.). The PST comrades say these measures are tactically justified, and they categorically reject any accusation of electoral opportunism. They state that they have consistently taken the recent struggles of the Argentine proletariat as the basis for carrying out their electoral campaign. The article by Nahuel Moreno (*BSI*, No. 3, June 1973, p. 24, "The San Nicolas Strike and the PSA-PST Campaign") seems to bear this out [*The Militant*, March 9, 1973].

On the other hand, the comrades of the PST state that they have accumulated a significant amount of experience in organizing the self-defense of workers struggles. In this regard, they cite another important example: the strike at the Chocon hydraulic works, which put up military resistance to the intervention of the army. But they make clear that for the PST the central task is still to *break*, at least partially, the *hegemony of Peronism over the trade-union movement*. This is the direction they gave to their electoral campaign, which they say they carried out on a class platform, independent of the bourgeois leaderships. The discussion on the PST must be carried out in a *nonsectarian* way. It is indissolubly linked to the balance sheet of the International in Argentina.

When the PRT (Combatiente) broke with the International, a small faction of the organization and the ERP, the Red Faction, rejected this break and was expelled from the PRT (Combatiente) and the ERP (Combatiente). The Red Faction denounced its expulsion and the break with the International as undemocratic measures and demanded both its reintegration and a thorough discussion on the International. Their demand was refused. It seems today that the split has become definitive. On this point as well there is a great lack of information. But the Red Faction has kept the designation ERP (Combatiente), which would seem to indicate that it's still following the national orientation put forward by the [PRT] Fifth Congress. To what

extent has the Red Faction lanced the abscess of the PRT (Combatiente)'s ideological eclecticism and political oversimplification? It's important to know this. The PRT (Red Faction) and the PST both state they are prepared to become the official section in Argentina. If there is a political battle on this point, it's even more important to keep from repeating the errors of 1969!

Conclusion

We have tried to show how the 1969 resolution on Latin America was based on a false orientation stemming from incorrect generalizations and erroneous assessments of objective and subjective factors. We have tried to base these criticisms on balance sheets, admittedly rapid ones, of the two sections that went the furthest in applying the line of the Ninth World Congress, in carrying out guerrilla warfare. In our view, these balance sheets are generally negative. The Ninth World Congress orientation did not arm our Latin American sections, it weakened them. We quote Comrade Jebrac ("The Axes of the International Debate"):

"The adoption of a resolution on Latin America involving an orientation of armed struggle marked a decided *turning point in the International toward the struggling vanguards that empirically arose in the wake of Castroism*. Such an orientation is justified from an objective viewpoint by an analysis of the form of domination that imperialism holds over the continent. But it is *also justified by the subjective need to re-root the Trotskyist movement in the real vanguards of the struggle*, following the heavy liability bequeathed by Posadas and Latin American Trotskyism." (Our emphasis.)

This is more or less the explanation we give for the 1969 orientation, stated differently: it was difficult for the Fourth International to define itself clearly on account of a history in Latin America that was tainted in respect to centrism and to the empiricism of Cuban leadership. As to the objective conditions Jebrac speaks of, four years of political crisis in Latin America have been sufficient to show that they should have been approached with infinite caution. They have largely contradicted our predictions (Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, etc.).

As for the subjective aspect—has there really been a reinsertion of the Trotskyist movement in the "new vanguards"? We don't think so, especially in view of the fact that these "new vanguards" have experienced different fates, depending on the country. The Chilean MIR abandoned armed struggle for several years, and it still seems to be hesitant over the forms armed struggle should take today. The Tupamaros have been hit hard by the repression, because they are isolated. This has kept them from playing a role in the recent crisis in Uruguay. The PRT (Combatiente) has moved away from Trotskyism. Douglas Bravo has, on the contrary, moved away from Castroism, but by himself.

We have not been able to carry out the "turn" Jebrac has defined in either Argentina or Bolivia. This raises doubts about the interpretation Jebrac has given to the 1969 "turn." Did going beyond exclusively propagandistic work in Latin America mean an adaptation to Castroism, because it carried in its wake the "new vanguards in strug-

gle"? For if we have been able to put up with programmatic differences of this sort with the PRT for six years (1967-73), is this any different than adapting to a current that is in fact moving farther away from revolutionary Marxism rather than coming closer to it?

We have outlined clearly how a doomsday analysis has been made in order to justify the choice of guerrilla warfare as the principal axis of intervention by revolutionary Marxists in Latin America. This analysis has been partially abandoned in favor of another political factor already contained in the 1969 resolution, a factor that provided a different justification for resorting to armed struggle once the mass movements began to develop. The resolution explained, in effect, that the Latin American political regimes were "in nowise ready to allow such a mass revolutionary movement to organize" and would resort to extremely violent repression right from the start—with the direct or indirect aid of American imperialism. This does in fact correspond with the political reality of certain states on the continent (Brazil; Mexico, to a lesser extent; Bolivia; Guatemala; and recently, unfortunately, Chile and Uruguay). The problem that's posed here *should not be underestimated*, as the comrades of the international minority have a tendency to do. But this is a long way from prolonged continental civil war. Our Latin American sections, like all our organizations, must provide themselves with the means for their physical preservation, their organizational self-defense, when they intervene under conditions of strict or partial clandestinity. And they must also provide themselves the means for intervening publicly—under conditions of maximum security—through *armed propaganda*. At a higher stage they must be prepared to propose to the sectors of the masses that they lead the political and organizational elements of a massive self-defense of their mobilizations. This is only a brief sketch of these points, but it ought to permit us to pose the military problems in direct relationship with the political problems and the organizational level we have attained in each concrete case. In this way we can go beyond a general and abstract debate over armed struggle and whether it's a strategy or tactic.

At the next world congress, Latin America will again be at the center of our debates. We declare ourselves resolutely in favor of a reorientation of our Latin American sections, a reorientation based on an analysis of the relationship of forces in Latin America, which have been modified quite significantly by events in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Argentina. A critical political reevaluation of the Cuban leadership, as well as a demarcation between ourselves and this current, are equally necessary.

We should guard ourselves against hasty generalizations and dangerously "elliptical" formulations. Our errors are costly. This is the price the International has to pay in order to be able to aspire one day to assuming its historical responsibilities. In this sense, our Latin American experience will not have been futile and useless.

Theses

(1) On the first point we brought up—that is, internal democracy and the Walloon section in the world debate over the last four years—the balance sheet is negative.

- Internal education has been seriously neglected;
- Information on the life of other sections and their debates has not been made available;
- Information on the debates and resolutions of the leadership of the International has been neglected;
- The section has not been involved in the political work of building the International;
- Up until the present, the International debate has failed to materialize;
- The international commissions and their work have never been subject to review.

The national leadership has failed to carry out these specific tasks.

(2) All this has created a difficult and unhealthy atmosphere in our ranks that must be eliminated as soon as possible. But above all this has permitted and fostered a rapid depoliticization of the comrades and the imposition of narrow national blinders on our internal political life.

(3) At the same time, the Walloon militants in the International have been playing a growing role in the International's life and debates (its commissions, the United Secretariat, the International Executive Committee). Whether it was intended or not, this decisively engaged the section in the ranks of the international majority, without the organization as a whole being concerned with or even informed of the process.

(4) The simultaneous existence and the direct overlapping of these elements permitted the development of maneuvers and undemocratic practices that greatly promoted the crisis of the world Trotskyist movement.

(5) The orientation of the Fourth International in Latin America and the activities of our sections have arrived at a critical point where an open and aboveboard debate have become an imperative necessity.

(6) The balance sheet of the sections that applied the line of the Ninth World Congress is more than negative: the first one quit the International, the other was incapable of exploiting the possibilities of a revolutionary situation.

(7) The 1969 resolution on Latin America represents an adaptation to Castroism.

(8) It is thus extremely important to draw an overall balance sheet so that we can reach an understanding of our errors and as a consequence of them, modify our line on Latin America.

(9) This balance sheet has specific implications as to the leaderships, implications that cannot be ignored.

(10) To date, the international majority has refused to draw this balance sheet; instead, it has taken refuge in a "critical ratification" of the line of the Ninth World Congress.

(11) Instead of correcting these internal practices (which have occurred in the Walloon section in particular) and moving ahead on the path of building the International, the national and international leadership has stuck to them.

(12) The present turn of the International toward increasingly active participation in struggles in different countries, and at times even toward the leadership of these struggles, requires a veritable internal revolution insofar as these practices are concerned.

(13) Our present responsibilities also imply that we should be capable of drawing the lessons of our victories (and of our setbacks as well). Only a genuine balance sheet on Latin America will permit us to determine a correct political line, not only in Latin America but in the oth-

er sectors of the world revolution as well.

(14) When confronted with the attack by the minority, an attack based on the empirical verification of the criticisms formulated by this current, the majority reacted as a bloc.

(15) In order to deal with the minority, the majority suppressed the internal debate so that its critics would be presented with a united front.

(16) The logic of this position can only lead to a deepening of the differences and to a crisis.

(17) The majority's chances of insulating themselves from a real debate are increased by the passivity of the "majority of the majority"—the Walloon section.

(18) This passivity thus takes on a political function in the debate: it's aimed at retaining the entire weight of the Walloon section on the majority side.

(19) The opening of a real debate must allow us to assess and then censure the present leadership.

(20) This entails a process of politically redefining and restructuring a majority that will not necessarily follow the present dividing lines.

(21) Blocking this process can only lead to internal sectarianism in the International and its sections.

(22) From now on, this sectarianism must be fought by initiating a real debate and by rejecting the present division into two currents, which is leading toward a split.

(23) The resolution of this crisis must be based on the thesis of the most advanced political experiences of our current and on its political homogenization.

(24) In several countries, political leaderships capable of overcoming the present crisis have appeared.

(25) The section has a key role to play in this process, provided that it breaks with its tail-endism and its present practices.

(26) In this context, a split takes on the appearance of a suicidal and liquidationist undertaking that in no way corresponds to the reality of our current's development at the present time.

(27) Today, the rank and file of the Walloon section represent the means for making these corrections.

(28) This debate can and must permit us to make progress along the path of transforming the Fourth International.

(29) But in order to carry out this debate we must overcome the hindrances we have called attention to.

(30) This is the struggle that we invite the comrades who agree with us to join!

November 5, 1973

Krasno
Reiner
Lemalouf

On "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe"

By the Japan Revolutionary Communist League

[The following document expresses the position adopted by the Seventh National Congress of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International, held November 23-25, 1973. The translation was prepared by the Japanese comrades.]

* * *

1. We support the general characterization of the political situation in capitalist Europe, i.e., the operation of a tendency toward prerevolutionary or revolutionary crises and its implications, as presented in "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe." The most important element in this connection is the fact that the working classes are objectively on the offensive. It is therefore correct for the European document to pose the tasks of building the revolutionary parties in connection with the coming possibility of such crises.

2. Considering that the offensive developments of the working-class mass struggles can pose the question of partial and national dual power situations in practice in the present political situation of the European capitalist countries, we support the aim of the European document to arm the European sections and sympathizing groups there on the question of dual power struggles.

Today, the questions of workers' control, factory committees and workers' self-defense are necessarily being posed in practice as a result of the whole development of the trade-union movement, working-class parties and the European capitalist economy, at least, since World War II. The objective immediacy of workers' control, factory committees and workers' self-defense in the daily struggles of the working class reflects the deepening contradictions between the serious politico-economic decline of the West European imperialist countries as a result of World War II and the postwar rebuilding and maintenance of the bourgeois democracies (e.g., the reformism of the working-class parties and trade unions). It is a concrete expression of the objectively offensive position taken by the working class in face of the ruling bourgeoisie which is pointed out in the European document.

The comrades of the IEC minority (the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction) fail to understand and see this precise historical character of the relationship of classes in capitalist Europe.

3. The appearance of the newly radicalized youth, mainly the young workers, and their active militancy as a layer, which is conceived as "a new vanguard of mass propor-

tions" (*International Information Bulletin*, No. 5 in 1972, p. 13) in the European document, is one of the most concrete expressions of the deepening contradictions of neo-imperialist Europe and the objectively offensive position taken by the working class in face of the bourgeoisie.

To base ourselves upon the "new vanguard of mass proportions" in the mass struggles against the bourgeoisie and its state power and the political fights with the traditional reformist organizations is a concrete expression of our efforts and initiatives to conform to the political orientation of the working class, which is in the offensive position, in the existing political situation and the mass movements. We therefore support the IEC majority tendency on the question of the "new vanguard of mass proportions."

4. It is correct to base ourselves upon the "new vanguard of mass proportions" in our building of revolutionary parties in capitalist Europe. We support the position of the European document that the central task is to intervene among the radicalizing young workers at the present stage of our party building.

The difference between the IEC majority tendency and the minority (Leninist-Trotskyist Faction) on the question of the interrelations between the young workers and students at the present stage of the youth radicalization as a whole results from their disagreements on how to appraise the appearance of radicalized young workers and what is to be done in relation to the present situation of the youth radicalization. We appraise the active radicalization of young workers as a new and very positive stage of the "youth radicalization," and, in our opinion, it gives us the practical possibility of carrying out a politically qualitative reorganization of the radicalized youth as a whole in our favor. That represents a shift from the first centrist and spontaneist stage of youth radicalization when students were its motive force to the next stage where we have a real chance to reorganize the radicalized youth under our proletarian politico-organizational hegemony. It is therefore correct to say that it is the main task of the capitalist European sections and sympathizing groups to develop the organizational activities among the young workers.

5. On the above points, we support the European against the criticisms by the IEC minority (L-T Faction). At the same time we criticize the European document on the following points.

6. In the first section of the European document ("The Change in the Objective and Subjective Conditions for Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe Since 1967") the programmatic position of the permanent revolution for all Europe should be explicitly indicated, that is, the perspective of the Socialist United States of Europe.

Needless to say, we support the analyses of the first chapter in themselves. However, the first part of the European document limits itself to an analysis of the problems of the European capitalist crises as tendencies or trends which are common to all the European capitalist countries, and it does so on a "continental scale," delineating their common aspects, tendencies or trends. However, the first section does not give a unified or synthesized "continental" perspective to the European capitalist crises, based on pointing out the major contradictions and weaknesses of the neo-imperialist European politico-economic structure as a historical and organic totality composed of the various countries, and analyzing the degree and perspective of the ongoing politico-economic crises as a whole. The European document says that a crisis is approaching in each country of capitalist Europe and that the situation is ripening for the proletariat to have a serious confrontation with the bourgeois state power in each of the capitalist European countries. But there is no indication nor suggestion in the document about the contradictions, crises and perspectives at the level of "continental scale" of neo-imperialist Western Europe with the Common Market as its central organism.

The European document says almost nothing about the fundamental problems confronting neo-imperialist Western Europe as a historically combined complex, at the critical stage it faces, in relation to U.S. imperialism (politico-militarily and economically), with the Soviet Union and the East European workers' states, or with the colonial world of Arab, Africa, Latin America and Asia, or as regards the internal military, political and economic problems of capitalist Europe, such as the question of the Common Market, the problems of the capitalist peripheries of Europe (Greece, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, etc.). Therefore the document does not pose the question of what are the common or "continental-scale" political tasks facing the capitalist European proletariat as an independent and politically unified international working class in regard to its basic programmatic perspective of the whole European Socialist United States at the present stage of the capitalist European crises. So, the European document remains on a "mosaic" level and fails to pose the fundamental form of revolutionary struggles which is common to each of the countries, and embraces the national struggles for state power in each country. In the European document the struggles of the capitalist European proletariat are not unified in their political perspective on the "European scale," but unified only at the level of tactics or "strategy" that should be followed in each country.

7. In our opinion, the European document should be explicit on the fundamental character of our capitalist European sections as a politically unified international vanguard of the capitalist European proletariat, and the document should present fundamental indications in regard to

the unified political tasks of the sections on a European scale.

In our view, the organization to be formed has to be based upon a unified and historical political objective, and the necessity of an International should also be based upon a unified international program. The necessity of our International as a continental-scale unit in capitalist Europe should be, first of all, based upon the European proletarian revolution as a combined and permanent revolution with the single political perspective of the European Socialist United States as its fundamental program. Our International will be able to be built firmly in capitalist Europe only if it is based upon a European-wide program as a concrete part of the world revolution and its political perspective.

The European document does not present our International in capitalist Europe as based upon the single political perspective of the European revolution, so that the international tasks (such as the defense of the workers' states and solidarity with the anti-bureaucratic struggles, solidarity with the fights of colonial peoples, capitalist European workers' struggles and immigrant workers) are put forward as part of our general internationalist duties or as practical needs in each country, in the European document. The fight for the defense of the workers' states against the imperialist international military power, the active solidarity in defense of the anti-bureaucratic struggles in the East European workers' states and the Soviet Union, the support for the liberation struggles in the colonial world, the international defense of the mass struggles in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, etc., the fight for proletarian unity with the immigrant workers—these tasks are not posed as a part of the essential tasks for the European revolution as an integral part of the world revolution. Therefore these tasks are not integrated programmatically into the fundamental perspective for the realization of the European Socialist United States. And thus the call for the European Socialist United States will remain on the purely propagandist level for our European sections.

8. The European document should be explicitly clear on the overall meaning of the program for party building and the method of the Transitional Program (1938). The European documents presents the building of the sections as revolutionary organizations centered around the national formation of dual-power organs of the masses. But a national section should from the very beginning be built as a revolutionary party aiming at the destruction of the ruling state power and establishing a revolutionary dictatorship as its fundamental objective.

The true worth of a revolutionary party will be decisively tested under just such a situation of revolutionary mass upheaval leading to a national dual power situation. Firstly, the revolutionary proletarian organization should not be swallowed up nor dissolved by the very upheaval of the masses, and it should assert its independent capacity to keep its own national political unity and identity as a vanguard organization for the seizure of state power in the unfolding revolutionary situation. The central question here will be how revolutionary and thoroughgoing the party program is and how firm and solid the

party's internal political cohesion is in implementing the revolutionary party program. Lenin's program of the workers-peasants' revolutionary dictatorship was melted away by the upheaval of the February revolution; the Bolshevik party was forced to carry out a new political orientation as a revolutionary party through Lenin's April Theses.

Secondly, the party must prove its political capacity to carry out effective struggles against the traditional reformist influences over the vast proletarian masses and to win and unite an effective majority of the proletariat for the political task of seizing state power, through the extraordinary developments of mass movements liberated by the revolutionary upheaval itself, or through national dual power organs of the exploited masses themselves. A real political fight and confrontation between the reformist organizations and a revolutionary vanguard party over the effective majority of the working class will be opened by the revolutionary upheaval of proletarian masses itself or through the very formation of a proletarian national dual power organ, and a revolutionary vanguard party and its cadres should be formed and prepared for such a situation and such a political confrontation with the reformist organizations. The decisive wall between a revolutionary upheaval of proletarian masses and the seizure of state power, the wall between a situation of national dual power and the seizure of state power—is essentially the *political* wall of bourgeois reformism, which will never be broken down simply by some technical, tactical, organizational means or methods. It is only by *essentially political* means and methods around a system of transitional demands for the proletariat and the lower petty bourgeoisie along with the concrete governmental slogan and proletarian united front tactics applied to the real situation that a revolutionary vanguard party can intervene and prepare a situation of national dual power leading to an open civil war and a victory of the armed uprising.

9. The European document has a major weakness of above mentioned point (No. 8). As is clear from section 10 of the second chapter ("Our Central Political Tasks"), the document centers the tasks of European sections on the formation of the proletarian national dual power organ at the height of a revolutionary upheaval of mass struggles, and it also centers the tactics of European sections upon the tactics of partial dual power and embryonic dual power, such as factory committees, workers' control and workers' self-defense, during the present preparatory period. And, here, the European document in fact ignores the question of party program as a fundamental problem of party building and the problem of the Transitional Program.

This neglect of the fundamental party program and the method of the Transitional Program as a system can possibly produce a situation where our sections in capitalist Europe are completely disarmed politically just at the moment when a revolutionary upheaval of the masses has exploded or when a national dual power situation has been realized. The European document leaves room for empiricism on the decisive point of how to organize the proletarian masses politically for the seizure of state power and in the area of united front tactics. The very

fight for the formation of a national dual power organ of the proletariat cannot be carried out without setting forth a system of transitional demands, tactics of dual power struggles (workers' control, factory committees, workers' self-defense, etc.), and concrete application of the united front tactic.

10. The neglect of the problems of party program as a fundamental question of the revolution and its party building and the method of one-sided concentration on political tasks around the formation of a national dual power organ necessarily open up room for political empiricism on tactics and the presentation of concrete tasks in the present preparatory period. The problems of immigrant workers and women inside the proletariat of capitalist Europe, the peasant question, the question of intellectual workers, problems of education, health, social security and other social services, the problems of governmental foreign and military policy and the army, national questions, etc.—all these are not presented in a unified and synthesized way as problems of a party program and a system of transitional demands in the European document. All these are not posed in the document as unified political tasks in a proletarian fight for destruction of the ruling state power and for its own revolutionary state power. The tactics and tasks in it are systematized only in regard to the formation of the national proletarian dual power organ. Therefore, it gives too much scope for political empiricism in direct relation with the basic principles of Marxism and the general duties of the proletariat in the fields of the demands originating from various aspects of the life of the proletariat, the demands posed by the various oppressed social layers, and the problems of governmental foreign and military policy. These political tasks tend to be posed issue by issue in an empirical way and are not synthesized as component parts of a proletarian political fight for state power.

11. Thus, in the European document, the concept of the party is reduced to a functional organizational means for the formation of a proletarian national dual power organ, and the document is very vague on the concept of a revolutionary vanguard party, which should be firmly organized under its own program for a revolution and which should lead the proletariat to the seizure of state power through the combined method of the Transitional Program. It is not explicitly clear on the fundamental concept that a revolutionary vanguard party organized under its program for a revolution has to unite an effective majority of the proletariat for the political aim of the seizure of state power through a system of transitional demands and united front tactics and carry out a consistent political fight to win the oppressed layers of the petty bourgeoisie as active allies for the proletarian fight.

Therefore we must say that the European document has serious weaknesses on the systematic method of a party program, a combined method of party building and the Transitional Program.

12. We demand:

(i) That the European document, in its second section on "Concrete Forms and Content of the Revolutionary Perspectives in Capitalist Europe," should be explicitly

clear on the decisive importance of a politically independent national existence of a revolutionary vanguard party firmly organized under its party program in a prerevolutionary or revolutionary situation;

(ii) and also on the decisive importance of the political fight of the revolutionary vanguard party, armed with a system of transitional demands, a governmental slogan and united front tactics, against the reformist organizations and for the effort to win an effective majority of the proletariat for the seizure of state power, in a prerevolutionary or revolutionary situation;

(iii) that the document should make clear, in regard to section 9 ("The Inadequacies of the Objective Factor") and 10 ("Our Central Political Tasks"), the fact that the party's consistent and systematic interventions in various struggles of the proletariat and oppressed social layers, and all the partial political struggles utilizing a system of transitional demands and proletarian united front tactics, are to prepare the political capacity of the revolutionary vanguard organization and the proletarian vanguard for the political fight against the reformist organizations and to win the effective majority of the proletariat for the seizure of state power;

(iv) that the fourth chapter ("The Type of Organization Most Suited to the Present Capabilities of Revolutionaries in Capitalist Europe") of the document should have another section which would insist on the fundamental importance of the elaboration of a party program and a system of transitional demands for the building of a na-

tional section, and which should instruct each European section to start the elaboration of its party program around a system of transitional demands.

13. With regard to Chapter 3, section 11 ("Three Tactics"), we have a different opinion on the entry tactics based upon the Third World Congress than either the document or the IEC minority (L-T Faction), although we agree with the European document on the character of the present stage of party building through the building of independent revolutionary political organizations based upon the radicalized young active militants, mainly young workers.

14. We ask the world congress to decide that a document, which draws up a balance-sheet of the historical decline of European imperialism after the late 1930s, its neo-imperialist reorganization through and after the World War II, and the historical developments of the situation in European capitalism after World War II, and which will pose problems of the contemporary European revolution and the fundamental perspectives of European Socialist United States, should be drafted for the eleventh (fifth since reunification) World Congress discussion. The draft document should be a direct continuation of L.T.'s historical work up to 1940, and should be elaborated as a joint project of the United Secretariat and the sections and sympathizing groups in capitalist Europe.