

# Discussion Bulletin

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**SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY**

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40 cents

The articles in this bulletin would normally be placed in an SWP Party Builder. However, since there is no Party Builder series at the present time, they have been submitted to the SWP Discussion Bulletin.

## THE HOUSTON CAMPAIGN TO RAISE THE BRANCH SUSTAINER BASE

by Anne Springer, Houston Branch

In Houston, the financial committee has had considerable success in reversing the problem of a low sustainer base in the branch. By December 1972, the sustainer base had fallen to \$4.50 per comrade per week and the branch had mounted a sustainer debt to the NO of \$1800 and to *The Militant* of \$1200. In the fall, the branch had missed paying the sustainer for two out of three months.

Since December, the sustainer base has risen to almost \$8 per comrade per week. Because of the increased income, we have been able to move into a new headquarters, put in \$1200 in repairs and renovations, and regularly pay our sustainer to the NO as well as \$1700 on our back sustainer debt.

In December the financial committee decided on two basic considerations in reversing the problem with the sustainer base—the countering of a demoralization about finances in the branch and the education of comrades on party financial norms.

In countering the demoralization, the financial committee did two things: (1) carefully organized the finances to prioritize bills, analyze expenses, review the budget so that the branch had confidence that the committee was cognizant of every aspect of the financial situation; (2) set a modest and limited financial projection—the first was a campaign to collect back sustainer debt—so that the branch could experience success in achieving a financial goal.

The education or reeducation of comrades on financial norms is a more complex task. Reports in the branch meetings pointed out that norms of pledges in Houston were very low, and both the financial director and other comrades from the floor gave concrete examples of what a working comrade might be expected to give. Meetings were held with comrades who had recently joined the party to review how our movement was supported through the sustainer contributions and the financial obligations of the branches to the national office. Several leading comrades reevaluated their finances and made substantial pledges to give examples in the branch. Finally, a very strong point was made that every one should have a sustainer.

The success in changing the norms of the branch was perhaps our most significant accomplishment. One comrade, who stated in an individual meeting that he could not raise his sustainer of \$10, doubled it in a month when he saw the kinds of pledges made by other comrades.

Other suggestions that helped us were the following (some of these seem obvious, although they had not always been done in our branch):

1) Regular financial reports—reviewing the budget monthly, but also reports on sustainer increases, projections of expenses, etc. Keep the branch informed about the financial situation.

2) Set limited financial goals which the branch can meet. In the campaign to collect the back debt, the financial director met with comrades who had sizeable debts, published sustainer sheets listing their back debts, and motivated the payment of the back debt in the branch meeting. In the first two months, the sustainer debt was reduced \$400.

One point that has helped us is that we concentrated on one problem area at a time. In the back debt campaign, the basic motivation was to get comrades to find a realistic sustainer and pay that regularly. One result was that comrades paid their back debts, and raised their sustainers, although our focus continued to be back debt repayment for a time.

3) The motivation for raises in sustainer was always a political one. The financial director watches comrades' situations and can approach them for a raise when their financial situation improves. In motivating raises in individual meetings we concentrated on comrades who had adequate sustainers, but who could raise them. The comrade who feels that he/she is doing their part by contributing \$10 a week, may be able to give \$25.

4) Techniques which we used to raise sustainers: Sustainer increase sheets, which listed comrades who raised by amount of raise, were put out every 5-6 weeks. For the first three sheets, the sustainer base rose an average of \$1.00 per comrade per week. Comrades could see where the increased sustainer income was coming from. These supplemented sheets listing pledges ranked by amount, which helped to reinforce norms of increased pledges.

At other branch meetings, slips are passed out listing what comrades owe. One technique which I use at branch meetings is having another comrade collect money while I circulate with the slips for a series of small meetings with comrades. Often because of this reminder, a comrade who is slightly behind will not fall deeper into debt, or a comrade who forgets to pay their sustainer can be reminded to do so.

Another policy which the financial committee instituted is the collection of sustainers throughout the week. This includes collecting at party functions, informal gatherings, etc. The comrade is given a receipt at the next branch meeting.

5) Finally, the branch should always have a financial goal to work toward to motivate sustainer raises. Three new budgets have been projected since January, because the sustainer income so far surpassed the expenses projected in the budget that the branch tended to become relaxed about their financial tasks.

One goal the financial committee projected was meeting the increased rent of a new headquarters and the expenses for remodeling it. Another goal was the payment of the sustainer debt to the NO of \$1800 by the convention. As we will have met both of those by June, in the summer budget the goal was set to pay off *The Militant* debt at \$400 a month. At the same time, we projected raising the organizer's volunteer expenses and increasing the subsidy to the regional committee.

In summary, the financial committee in Houston has used many techniques suggested in Party Builders and written financial reports. However, no technique can substitute for the absolute importance of sustained political motivation and education in the branch, coupled with a well-organized and efficient financial committee. Comrades should see realistic financial goals projected and the realization of these goals should be emphasized by the E. C.

and financial director when they are accomplished. In Houston, the confidence of the branch that it can take on a financial problem and solve it—whether in changing financial norms, meeting its budget or paying off a sustain-

er debt—has given the comrades a commitment and motivation that we expect will result in continued sustainer raises.

June 1973

## ASPECTS OF FINANCING A NEW BRANCH by Bonnie Cady, San Diego Branch

I'd like to point out several experiences we've had and lessons learned in financing the San Diego branch, which may be useful in building new branches.

As the San Diego branch reestablished itself in early fall 1972, we operated on an interim basis (with temporary area heads and assignments), began selling the press and carrying out activities around the national election campaign, and generally had very few expenses. At that time we were not running a local campaign, forums, had no headquarters and no full-time organizer. By November we had someone on full-time and began to talk about setting up regular branch institutions. We established a financial committee and drew up a budget based on our political projections.

A major financial report was given to the branch in December which included the projections of becoming both a political force and a political center in San Diego. That meant opening a headquarters, putting a party organizer on full-time, running a local election campaign in a special election, and moving forward in all areas of work as projected in our tasks and perspectives report. The political necessity of our local projections was explained as well as our national financial responsibilities and how we were going to organize finances to carry out these goals. The main points were to work toward each area breaking even or making a profit, keeping all operating expenses down to a bare minimum, regularizing sustainer payments to consistent weekly payments (a norm had previously been established of paying monthly). We projected a norm for branch sustainers and a sustainer raising campaign that was conducted as a branch campaign, with an energetic beginning, regular reports and a conclusive finish when our projections became a reality. Also discussed was the situation where comrades were voluntarily assigning themselves to full-time political work instead of seeking full-time well paid employment. This cuts across the norm which had to be established if we were to move ahead, that the branch collectively decides what its needs are and who should go on full-time.

Our first tentative budget was based on the absolute bare minimum estimation of operating costs. It included rent, utilities, phone, miscellaneous, supplies, volunteer expenses, N.O. sustainer, postage and organizer's travel. It did not include important things like forums, campaign, sales, socials, banquets, soda and coffee, as these areas were just beginning to be organized and had no budgets. We added up the figures in our budget, divided by the number of comrades and launched a campaign to raise

our average sustainer to \$6.75 per week (from \$4.53). Concretely we had to reach that level in order to get a headquarters and pay the expenses of a branch organizer. Obviously some people would have larger and others smaller sustainers.

Certain local problems included the tight job market and a high number of unemployed comrades, many students, and comrades with fixed incomes (unemployment or alimony). Each comrade was met with and those who missed the report in the branch were given a complete run-down of what it included.

### *Job Fraction*

We have had a continuous unemployment problem here due to the tight job market. In January to alleviate this problem a leading comrade was assigned to work with all unemployed comrades in providing encouragement to those job hunting, coordinating job leads, organizing regular meetings with these comrades, organizing rides to the HRD (unemployment job centers) and within a few months everyone was employed.

Once everyone was employed it was necessary for the financial director to again meet with everyone to reevaluate their situations and their sustainers. Due to our rapidly changing activities—as the branch began to develop—it was necessary to continually review the budgets to see if they were still realistic.

One thing should be considered when first drawing up a budget and that is trying to be as thorough as possible, consulting with everyone, considering all possible operating costs, and then realistically figuring these into a budget. For example, some expenses that we didn't initially foresee included subscriptions to various periodicals for the headquarters and branch (\$40), ordering a set of back bulletins (\$30), and tapes for classes (\$15). It generally just costs money to run a branch, especially when starting from scratch. Initial costs for supplies and equipment will be very high compared to what is budgeted for regular monthly use afterwards. An initial equipment list should include things like chairs, typewriter, mimeo, desks, work or card table (budget in for later tape recorder, fan, microphone and sound system), and these items are generally costly. A headquarters fund should be established for one-time contributions to offset the cost of these items. Ours was approached in a low-key manner during the sustainer raising campaign so as not to detract from the necessity of giving the largest possible sustainer to establish a base for the branch's

financial operations. We used income tax returns as an example of possible sources for these one-time contributions. We collected about \$500 over several months. This cushion of extra money for establishing an operating headquarters is very important; the fact that we were unable to raise more money became a problem for us later. After moving from a small bookstore-office that was rented for a three month period and required very little fixing up (about \$100), we moved into a larger hall that was much more costly (about \$230 for construction, \$600 for equipment, and \$268 for rent deposit). Without a larger cushion of money put away to offset expenses we found ourselves drawing from our bank account and in tight financial shape.

When figuring out initial budgets include all possible deposits (rent, utilities, phone, equipment) and then headquarters construction work. Although it is always difficult to estimate what it will cost, careful estimations should be made because this is one area where costs really add up fast. Projections of what kinds of improvements are going to be made should be based on the complete and real financial situation of the branch and not on hoped-for or projected income, and costs must be meticulously watched and kept down. Things to keep in mind when checking potential facilities are ventilation, security, room for expansion of departments and the branch, adequate forum hall, etc. Usual expenses for any hall besides improvement materials include cost of locks for doors and windows, door bell, keys, and possibly bars, shutters, or screens for windows.

Once a budget is drawn up for general operating expenses and headquarters improvements, branch institutions and their financing must be considered. Initiating these areas sometimes requires substantial outlays of money. For example, our bookstore required the following: bank deposit (\$100) and charge for a "fictitious name account" when the bank account is not in the name of the person opening it (\$29), re-sale number deposit (\$100), business license (\$25 and \$5 for address change), building up a stock (although it is usually not necessary to pay in advance for books) and publicity (ads, leaflets, letterheads, etc.). It is helpful to buy large quantities of supplies for all areas as you usually get a break in cost (envelopes, mimeo paper, stencils, etc.). Buying a return stamp with address only is a savings because all areas (bookstore, forum, campaign, YSA, etc.) can use it until they can all afford their own.

Our goal in establishing a strong financial situation was to establish a strong sustainer base. As mentioned, this was difficult at times because of the fluctuating job situation. A second cornerstone of branch finances then became the branch institutions. A good example is sales, which are a high priority for branch activity, with careful organization and high participation have netted the branch between \$80 and \$175 profit for the past few months. Our goal is organizing all areas in a likewise conscientious fashion to maximize both political gains and income.

Our financial situation changed as the branch grew. As we began organizing regular branch institutions we operated on a very small, simple budget. The campaign, for example, was modeled after the Jenness campaign in Atlanta—dynamic—but inexpensive. One problem we ran into in our initial organizing was that heads of different

areas of work paid the costs of financing their area but didn't always ask to be reimbursed. This was very misleading to the branch as it appeared that somehow certain areas of work could operate with no budget, no money and still make a lot of gains. It's also difficult to prepare a branch budget if you don't know what each area is doing financially.

This situation was corrected, but as the different areas expanded and the branch financial situation changed other problems arose.

The lack of a sufficient cushion to offset headquarters expenses combined with the high cost of travel to Oberlin and the need for all comrades to reassess their own financial situations led to a tight money situation in the branch. The first step we took was for each area head to approach their responsibilities as if they were co-financial directors. Comrades often are unfamiliar with organizing the financial side of their work. Each area of work drew up a budget that was approved by the committee, with complete agreement on it, and it became the responsibility of each area to stick to it. Weekly meetings with the financial director and weekly report sheets were used so that a close watch could be kept on the financial workings of each area. Projections were tailored to the realistic financial outlook of the branch as a whole, i.e., in different times it might be possible to project an election campaign costing the branch \$300 over income. Now that just isn't realistic. Close collaboration with the financial director is crucial to keep expenses down and it was necessary to establish that unauthorized spending could not be reimbursed. Many times comrades, well meaningly, take it upon themselves to do things like take several rolls of pictures of campaign activities. But if not authorized to do this, a photography bill of \$3-4 each week can really upset a budget. All areas of work that were not breaking even or making a profit were reexamined and the committees were strengthened by adding comrades or by adding special directors, such as an *ISR* director for the sales committee.

Another consideration at this time was the distance between our branch and national gatherings. The high cost of travel to the Socialist Activists and Educational Conference was considered and in May the financial director and travel director met to discuss each comrade's situation and to see which comrades should be talked to about reorganizing their financial responsibilities to the branch to enable them to attend the convention. Comrades were repeatedly motivated to plan ahead for both travel and sustainers so there would be no personal financial crises prohibiting comrades from attending the convention.

All the preceding measures have turned around what could have been a real problem period for the San Diego branch.

I'd like to list a few local fund-raising techniques we've used. In the first few months of operation it was not possible to organize many of the usual fund-raising activities such as rummage sales. Most comrades had recently moved to San Diego and had already disposed of their excess possessions before moving. Socials had to be well spaced out also because of our small size. But we sought out funds in other ways. A friendly attorney donated the filing fee in our local campaign because there was not time enough for a successful law suit challenging the filing fee. Phone lists were secured and, along with our contact

lists, were used for successful phone fund calling to finance the campaign. All leaflets and publicity going out included coupons that asked for donations. Contributions were received to help build forums, support the campaign, and subscribe to *The Militant*. Outfitting our headquarters was approached in a money-saving manner. Want ads were carefully combed, used business equipment stores

were checked out as well as discount centers, army surplus sales and auctions, and year-end sales of rental stores. We were able to buy things like: desks for \$1 and \$4; complete shelves and racks for our bookstore for \$40; folding chairs for \$2; Samsonite bridge table for \$5; and a \$3 file cabinet.

June 22, 1973

REPORT ON SPRING 1973 SALES CAMPAIGN  
by Sharon Cabaniss, Militant Business Office

In February 1973 *The Militant* launched a sales campaign outlining three main goals:

- "1. To increase the number of copies sold each week.
- "2. To establish full participation of the branch in sales.
- "3. To have each branch current on bundle bills."

When the campaign ended in the first week of June, all of these goals had been met.

1. West established an initial goal of 7,000 weekly street sales. At the end of the campaign weekly sales reached 10,320, which is 265 percent greater than the average weekly sales in 1972.

Branches also greatly increased the *percentage* of their bundles sold. In the 15 weeks of the campaign, branches sold 93,860 papers out of bundles totaling 124,783. That is an average of 75 percent of the bundles sold, compared to the 1972 average of 54 percent. However, the spring campaign percentages ranged from one branch, San Diego, selling 90 percent of their weekly bundle to branches selling under 70 percent (see chart for individual branch breakdown.)

The highest sale of any one week was 1,265 sold by Lower Manhattan. Oakland-Berkeley came in second with 1,133 sold. Twelve branches were able to sell 500 or more at least one week of the campaign. Lower Manhattan also had the highest weekly average sales with 510.

San Diego made its quota the most times, 14 out of 15 weeks; Lower Manhattan was second with 13 weeks; Atlanta, Cleveland, Upper West Side tied for third by making their quotas 11 weeks. All five of these branches also raised their quotas 11 weeks. All five of these branches raised their quotas during the campaign. Every branch made its quota at least twice.

2. Many branches began to establish high participation during the campaign so that by the last issue, 712 comrades in the branches participated, an increase of 30 percent over the 1972 weekly average. Also, participation steadily rose during the campaign, as can be seen by the graph below. Oakland-Berkeley had the largest number participating in any one week, 65, and Boston was second with 62. Lower Manhattan had 55 participating one week, and Chicago and Houston reached 50. However, comparing the *average* participation with the *highest* figure for any one week (see below), there is still room for improvement in this area. Boston had the highest average weekly participation with 50.

Most areas report that new norms were established for comrades to sell at least once a week. One new technique that was widely used was team selling, where many comrades would meet at the hall or at a table and go out to sell in groups. This provided an incentive for comrades to stay out longer, to compare notes while selling and help each other out, and to be part of a team sale even if one individual's sales are low.

Also, many comrades learned new selling techniques so that the per capita sales of those participating showed steady improvement. The average per capita of those selling was 10.6—going from 7.2 for the first issue of the campaign to 14.3 the last issue. The highest per capita achieved by any branch for one issue was 23.2 by

San Diego. San Francisco had the highest *average* per capita of the campaign with 14.6. Although some individuals sold more than 100 in one week, the bulk of sales were spread over the entire sales force.

3. Almost every branch kept current throughout the campaign: 20 in March and June and 19 in April and May. In 1972 the average number of branches current was under 13, and the highest number current for any one month was 17 in October.

Since branches sold a large percentage of their bundles, many made substantial profits. The total profit made by all branches, after payment of the bundle bills, was \$7,584 or almost 50 percent. Lower Manhattan made the largest profit, \$764 in 15 weeks. No branch made less than \$200 profit.

Many branches utilized this profit to pay off their back debts to *The Militant*. The debt in January 1973 was \$11,448. At the end of June, when all the May sales money had been paid into the business office, the debt was down to \$6,472. In January six branches were paid up completely to *The Militant*; at the end of June, 11 were paid in full and several others were within striking distance. (See charts for each branch's financial performance.)

#### *Special Sales*

During the 15 weeks of the sales campaign, there were several significant political developments around which *The Militant* campaigned. The first was around *The Militant's* eye-witness coverage of Wounded Knee. Sales of the first issue about this jumped to 6,814 from the previous week's total of 4,552.

The second special campaign was around the April meat boycott and our program to fight inflation. Sales during that week hit 6,688, and many areas then began regular sales at grocery stores for the first time. This proved to be a good sales location throughout the campaign. During the week of the May 5 consumer protests, sales reached 7,386, the highest up to that time in the campaign.

The biggest selling issue of the campaign was Watergate, where we had the advantage of improved sales as a result of the campaign along with the wide appeal of *The Militant's* analysis of Watergate. Branches reported that with the Watergate coverage they were able to sell to many people who had not been that interested in *The Militant* before—older people, more Blacks and Latinos; and in many places not tried before—department stores, subway stations. Sales around Watergate peaked at 10,320 with the last issue of the campaign.

Another sales focus that was just beginning at the end of the campaign was *The Militant's* special coverage of the farmworkers' struggle. Branches report that they found a sympathetic response to our on-the-spot reporting, and sales were particularly high at the support rallies and demonstrations held around the country. At a rally in Coachella Valley, for example, the Los Angeles and San Diego comrades sold 72 issues and distributed another 170 free to strikers.

Local issues were the focal points for special campaigns in some branches. Detroit sold 952 of an issue featuring the anti-STRESS campaign, their highest sale of the spring campaign. Denver sold 575 and San Diego 450 of the issue featuring the attack on the Crusade for Justice in Denver. Lower Manhattan had high sales in the Lower East Side around coverage of the District 1 school board election.

#### *Where Sales Occurred*

*Campus Sales:* Campuses were the single largest source of sales, although these sales varied greatly from branch to branch. For the entire campaign an average of 1,516 were sold on campuses each week (not counting weeks when campuses were totally closed), or 24 percent of the average weekly sales. However, two branches had over 50 percent of their sales on campus: San Diego with 162 weekly or 57 percent; and Cleveland with 148 weekly or 51 percent. These two branches consistently sold at commuter night schools in addition to their daytime fraction sales which were high.

Three other branches had one-third or more of their sales on campus: Detroit 38 percent or 124 weekly; Brooklyn 35 percent or 104 weekly; and Twin Cities 30 percent or 79 weekly.

The highest sales on campus for any one week was by San Diego with 288. Cleveland had the second highest single week's sale with 234, and Brooklyn was third with 219. The charts below show each branch's reported campus sales and the percentage of their total sales that made.

*Work Place Sales:* Houston and Oakland-Berkeley developed a high level of sales at plant gates and pay lines by the end of the campaign, averaging 70-100 weekly. Chicago had been averaging 20-30 workplace sales before the campaign began and continued these. Detroit continued selling 10-12 regularly at an auto plant.

Other branches tried work area sales, often with promising results: Cleveland sold up to 75 at steel plants in one week, and they tried this several times. Atlanta sold at least 200 to strikers at Rich's Department store, 46 of which were sold by the strikers themselves. Houston, Twin Cities, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and San Diego sold to striking teachers or at teachers' meetings and statewide conferences. San Francisco sold to unionists around coverage of the April 28 demonstration. Oakland-Berkeley sold 16-30 weekly to striking oil workers; Washington, D.C. sold 35 at the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists convention; San Francisco sold 42 at a union women's conference; and there were many other single sales like these tried out. Already mentioned were the sales conducted in support of the United Farm Workers Union which are continuing into the summer.

*Black Community Sales:* It is difficult to measure the number sold directly in the Black community by different branches, because such sales overlap with sales reported as at "grocery stores" or "bus stations." However, the following branches do report substantial regular weekly sales, usually on Saturday, in the Black community: Chicago 200-250; Cleveland 150; Detroit 200; Philadelphia 100; and Atlanta 100. In addition, 700 were sold May 26 at various African Liberation Day actions around the country. Branches which report sales in areas fre-

quented by Blacks, Chicanos, and Latinos are: Austin; Denver, Houston, Lower Manhattan, and Washington, D.C. Other branches have not really given specific figures on these types of sales.

*Other Sales Locations:* Many branches relied heavily on sales at bus terminals and airports. Atlanta, for example, regularly sold 100 at the bus terminal there, mainly to Black people. Lower Manhattan's largest single sales spot after campus sales was the Port Authority Bus Terminal where they sold 1,280 out of a total of 7,689 in 15 weeks (their campus sales totaled 1,613). San Francisco and Oakland-Berkeley usually each sold more than 100 weekly at the airport, and Boston and Philadelphia reported a high percentage of their sales at train stations and subway stops.

Many areas sold at downtown locations oriented to or frequented by young people, such as Underground Atlanta, where comrades often sold one-third of their bundle, and Georgetown in Washington, D.C. One other sales location that stands out is the movie *State of Siege* where hundreds of papers were sold in New York City alone. Other branches report high sales there also.

Many other new locations were opened up that did not prove to be a source of exceptionally high sales during the spring but provided a modest number, such as libraries, museums, parks, beaches, rock concerts, street fairs, and Unitarian and liberal-type churches.

In addition, throughout the campaign there were numerous demonstrations and protests where branches had high sales, given the limited number of demonstrators who usually participated: Wounded Knee protests, UFWU solidarity rallies, childcare and cutback protests, anti-inflation demonstrations, women's liberation conferences, and meetings of various radical speakers. The sales campaign helped branches tune into these events since they were always on the lookout for new sales opportunities. Washington, D.C., for example, sold 78 at a protest demonstration by older people against cutbacks.

Although it is impossible to estimate how many people were recruited from sales, we know of at least two concrete cases: In Atlanta a high school student bought a *Militant* at Underground Atlanta and came to the hall the next day to join as an at-large YSA member in Jacksonville, Fla. Another person bought a paper at *State of Siege* in New York and later joined the YSA in Brooklyn. At least three people have indicated an interest in the YSA or bought a *Militant* subscription as a result of buying an issue in the San Francisco airport. *The Militant* got around in other ways also, such as when Dick Gregory encouraged people to buy it at a talk he gave (San Diego sold 100 there and ran out of papers), or when YSAer Marty Goodman was mentioned in the *N.Y. Times* for selling while mayoral candidate Mario Biaggi was campaigning. Also, *The Militant* was on TV stations in New York during coverage of the African Liberation Day actions there (i.e., sales people were filmed).

In addition to new sales locations, many new techniques were developed to aid sales. One of the most important was the concept of team sales mentioned above. Another technique many areas began regularizing was setting aside Saturday as campaign/sales or reach-out day for all comrades to participate in. This was especially fruitful when campaign tables were used. Twin Cities claimed that using a table downtown for dispatching increased



their Saturday sales to 200. Most branches also began setting aside at least one week night for sales blitzes. Thursday night was productive if it was a late-shopping night.

Another technique that was tried in a few areas, but never regularized, was canvassing. Philadelphia canvassed the dorms, and in one night eight comrades sold 21 *Militants* and 21 YSs. Oakland-Berkeley went through Black projects and sold 150 one week. Brooklyn canvassed a housing project and sold 23 in a short time. Austin reported that they tried this method also, tying sales in with publicizing their election campaign.

Rain was a frequent obstacle encountered by many areas which could wipe out an entire selling day. Lower Manhattan used the Port Authority Bus Terminal as a back-up location, and other branches reported that they were also trying to find some indoor locations for bad weather. Indoor campus sales in dorms, between classes, and at libraries and cafeterias are good for this. And

many schools have night classes where sales can be high.

A problem that Philadelphia and Cleveland faced was that they had to do extensive election petitioning in a short period of time during the sales campaign. They at first thought that this would cut into sales, but they were able to keep sales up by assigning some of their best salespeople to sell while most comrades petitioned. San Diego and Houston successfully used this approach when they had to move their headquarters and devote a lot of time to fixing it up.

One weak area of the campaign was in selling subscriptions. Many branches began to place more emphasis on this near the end of the campaign as they began to see the same people buy *The Militant* every week. However, only about 1,100 new introductory subscriptions were sold during the campaign. Twin Cities probably sold the most introductory subscriptions during the campaign with 79. They attribute this to their consistent effort to sell subs, especially from campus literature tables.

--TOTAL SOLD BY BRANCHES DURING SALES CAMPAIGN SPRING 1973

--TOTAL NUMBER OF YSA AND SWP COMRADES PARTICIPATING FROM CENTER LOCALS

--NUMBER SOLD BY THOSE COMRADES PARTICIPATING

<u>Issue Number and Date</u>	<u>Total Sold</u>	<u>Total Participating</u>	<u>Number Sold Per Com- rade Participating</u>
#7 (Feb. 23)	4,027	*	*
#8 (Mar. 2)	4,278	594	7.2
#9 (Mar. 9)	4,365	552	7.9
#10(Mar. 16)	6,467	608	10.6
#11(Mar. 23)	5,811	562	10.3
#12(Mar. 30)	6,064	586	10.3
#13(Apr. 6)	6,348	649	9.8
#14(Apr. 13)	5,692	604	9.4
#15(Apr. 20)	5,465	558	9.8
#16(Apr. 27)	5,630	603	9.3
#17(May 4)	6,247	596	10.5
#18(May 11)	7,232	635	11.4
#19(May 18)	7,265	664	10.9
#20(May 25)	8,584	693	12.4
#21(Jun. 21)	10,172	712	14.3

Total Sold by Branches: 93,860

Total Bundle: 124,783

Percent of Bundle Sold: 75%

Average Weekly Participation: 615

Average Per Capita (of those selling): 10.3

NUMBER SOLD BY BRANCHES: SPRING SALES CAMPAIGN 1973

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Final Quota</u>	<u># Sold Final Issue</u>	<u>Highest Week's Sale</u>	<u>Average Over 15 Weeks</u>	<u>1972 Average Sold</u>
Atlanta	300	469	469	301	120
Austin	150	152	209	163	80
Boston	500	806	845	420	185
Brooklyn	325	533	533	295	125
Chicago	500	514	602	419	230
Cleveland	300	570	570	290	60
Denver	225	345	575	203	130
Detroit	350	363	956	330	280
Houston	500	400	500	414	100
Los Angeles	450	570	570	339	190
Lower Manhattan	500	1,265	1,265	510	90
Oakland/Berkeley	500	1,133	1,133	488	180
Philadelphia	275	297	417	234	130
Portland	200	208	217	155	105
San Diego	250	312	450	282	90
San Francisco	500	602	602	335	205
Seattle	250	325	374	278	95
Twin Cities	350	353	399	263	145
Upper West Side	400	668	668	365	120
Washington DC	<u>250</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>301</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>170</u>
TOTALS	7,075	10,172	11,655	6,308	2,830

During the final week of the campaign branches sold 10,172, which is 359% greater than the 1972 average. Even the branch average sales for the entire 15-week campaign, 6,308, is 223% greater than the 1972 average.

Taking only the branches' average sales for the entire campaign, 5 more than doubled their 1972 average (Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Brooklyn, Oakland/Berkeley); 3 increased sales by 3 times more (San Diego, Seattle, Upper West Side); 2 increased by 4 times (Cleveland and Houston); and Lower Manhattan increased by 5 times. All others came close to doubling their sales or increasing them by 50%.

BRANCH BUNDLES AND NUMBER SOLD: SPRING SALES CAMPAIGN 1973

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Total Bundle</u>	<u>Total Sold</u>	<u>Percentage Sold</u>	<u>1972 Per- cent Sold</u>
Atlanta	5,325	4,509	85%	52%
Austin	2,950	2,442	83%	57%
Boston	9,050	6,302	70%	50%
Brooklyn	6,715	4,420	66%	56%
Chicago	7,350	6,282	85%	67%
Cleveland	5,300	4,353	82%	29%
Denver	4,000	3,040	76%	44%
Detroit	6,550	4,952	76%	65%
Houston	8,975	6,215	69%	47%
Los Angeles	7,550	5,084	67%	64%
Lower Manhattan	9,182	7,646	83%	48%
Oakland/Berkeley	9,330	7,323	78%	55%
Philadelphia	5,134	3,514	68%	51%
Portland	3,500	2,325	66%	65%
San Diego	4,675	4,227	90%	50%
San Francisco	7,970	5,019	63%	56%
Seattle	4,250	3,416	80%	60%
Twin Cities	5,800	3,946	68%	55%
Upper West Side	7,022	5,481	78%	53%
Washington DC	<u>4,155</u>	<u>3,364</u>	81%	56%
TOTALS	124,783	93,860		

Branches averaged 76% of their bundles sold. They have to sell almost 51% to break even on the bundle. Therefore, they averaged a profit of 50%.

In 1972 branches averaged 54% sold, for a profit of less than 4%.

BRANCH DEBTS TO THE MILITANT

<u>Branch</u>	<u>June Debt</u>	<u>January Debt</u>	<u>Total Debt Repayment</u>
Atlanta	\$154	\$854	\$700
Austin	\$5	\$305	\$300
Boston	-0-	\$302	\$302
Brooklyn	-0-	\$690	\$690
Chicago	\$1,947	\$2,492	\$545
Cleveland	-0-	\$509	\$509
Denver	\$933	\$1,113	\$180
Detroit	\$1,303	\$1,309	\$6
Houston	\$910	\$1,240	\$330
Los Angeles	-0-	-0-	---
Lower Manhattan	-0-	-0-	---
Oakland/Berkeley	\$94	\$800	\$706
Philadelphia	-0-	\$237	\$237
Portland	\$773	\$786	\$13
San Diego	-0-	\$94	\$94
San Francisco	-0-	-0-	---
Seattle	\$354	\$717	\$363
Twin Cities	-0-	-0-	---
Upper West Side	-0-	-0-	---
Washington DC	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>---</u>
Total	\$6,472	\$11,448	\$4,975

In six months, the debt declined by 43%.

BRANCH PROFIT MADE DURING 15 WEEKS OF SPRING SALES CAMPAIGN 1973

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Total Billed</u>	<u>Total \$ Taken In</u>	<u>Total Profit</u>
Atlanta	\$671	\$1,127	\$456
Austin	\$369	\$611	\$242
Boston	\$1,136	\$1,576	\$440
Brooklyn	\$839	\$1,105	\$266
Chicago	\$925	\$1,571	\$646
Cleveland	\$722	\$1,088	\$366
Denver	\$500	\$760	\$260
Detroit	\$913	\$1,238	\$325
Houston	\$1,146	\$1,554	\$408
Los Angeles	\$941	\$1,271	\$330
Lower Manhattan	\$1,148	\$1,912	\$764
Oakland/Berkeley	\$1,171	\$1,831	\$660
Philadelphia	\$649	\$879	\$230
Portland	\$438	\$581	\$143
San Diego	\$584	\$1,057	\$473
San Francisco	\$1,025	\$1,255	\$230
Seattle	\$531	\$854	\$323
Twin Cities	\$725	\$987	\$262
Upper West Side	\$879	\$1,370	\$491
Washington	<u>\$572</u>	<u>\$841</u>	<u>\$269</u>
TOTALS	\$15,884	\$23,468	\$7,584 (\$506 per week)

PARTICIPATION IN SALES CAMPAIGN BY INDIVIDUALS SPRING 1973

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Each Branch's Highest Week of Campaign</u>	<u>Participation: Last Issue of Campaign</u>	<u>Average Partic- ipation</u>	<u>1972 Average Partic- ipation</u>
Atlanta	34	34	29	25
Austin	24	19	19	16
Boston	62	60	50	48
Brooklyn	48	40	37	33
Chicago	50	50	43	38
Cleveland	32	32	22	17
Denver	39	39	31	27
Detroit	42	30	31	35
Houston	50	32	33	27
Los Angeles	45	35	31	33
Lower Manhattan	55	55	40	19
Oakland/Berkeley	65	61	47	43
Philadelphia	29	23	22	23
Portland	30	25	23	21
San Diego	26	24	21	20
San Francisco	34	34	24	25
Seattle	25	21	22	22
Twin Cities	28	25	24	29
Upper West Side	51	49	39	27
Washington DC	<u>27</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>23</u>
TOTALS	796	712	608	551

The highest week of campaign figures indicate the single highest week's participation for each branch.

The last issue of campaign figures are for the number of comrades selling issue #21 (dated June 1).

The average participation for the entire sales campaign was 10% greater than the average participation in 1972. Participation increased over the duration of the campaign so that by the last week it was 30% greater than the 1972 average.

NUMBER SOLD BY COMRADES PARTICIPATING IN SALES: SPRING SALES

CAMPAIGN 1973 (Part 2)

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Average Per Capita</u>	<u>Highest Per Capita of Any One Week of Campaign</u>
Atlanta	10.7	13.8
Austin	8.5	12.9
Boston	7.8	13.6
Brooklyn	8.1	13.3
Chicago	10.2	18.6
Cleveland	12.0	17.8
Denver	6.6	18.5
Detroit	10.7	22.8
Houston	13.4	21.9
Los Angeles	11.3	16.3
Lower Manhattan	12.6	23.0
Oakland/Berkeley	10.7	18.6
Philadelphia	11.1	19.0
Portland	7.3	10.0
San Diego	14.3	23.2
San Francisco	14.6	21.3
Seattle	10.8	15.6
Twin Cities	11.0	14.3
Upper West Side	9.5	13.6
Washington DC	11.0	13.4

Average for Branches: 10.6

Average of Highest: 13.8

In the first week of the sales campaign, only two branches sold more than 10 per comrade selling per week. By the last issue, comrades in 17 branches were selling more than 10 each. Of these, one sold over 20 per capita and five others sold over 15 per capita.

The increase in the per capita sales was generally attributed to the growing ability of individual comrades to sell more papers as they got involved in the campaign. Although there were spectacular high sales people for different issues, the general trend was for increasing participation coupled with increasing numbers sold by each comrade.




WEEKLY CAMPUS SALES BY BRANCHES DURING SPRING SALES CAMPAIGN, 1973


<u>Branch</u>	<u>Highest Campus Sale of Any One Week</u>	<u>Average Wkly Campus Sale</u>	<u>Percent of Average Week's Total</u>
Atlanta	93	51	17%
Austin	97	42	26%
Boston	96	59	14%
Brooklyn	219	104	35%
Chicago	97	53	13%
Cleveland	234	148	51%
Denver	70	44	22%
Detroit	199	124	38%
Houston	100	53	13%
Los Angeles	150	76	22%
Lower Manhattan	144	92	18%
Oakland/Berkeley	183	107	22%
Philadelphia	98	49	21%
Portland	58	36	23%
San Diego	288	162	57%
San Francisco	184	80	24%
Seattle	103	54	19%
Twin Cities	177	79	30%
Upper West Side	87	53	15%
Washington DC	95	50	22%

The average percent sold on campus in any one week was 24%.

NUMBER OF COMRADES SELLING  
(branch and center locals)



TOTAL WEEKLY NUMBER SOLD



DATE OF ISSUE 2/23 3/2 3/9 3/16 3/23 3/30 4/6 4/13 4/20 4/27 5/4 5/11 5/18 5/25 6/1

## OAKLAND-BERKELEY 1973 SPRING SALES REPORT

by Carl Finamore, Oakland-Berkeley Branch

The goals in the Oakland-Berkeley branch were: (1) to sell 500 *Militants* consistently; (2) to increase participation to more than 80 percent of the branch; and (3) to remain current on *Militant* bills. We successfully accomplished each of these tasks, and this report will indicate some of the highlights of the spring sales campaign in our area.

When we started the campaign, the branch was selling 150 *Militants* weekly with the participation of 20 comrades and with no established sales committee. Our first plan was to lay out a program which would be realistic in its pace and concrete in its goals. To accomplish this a sales committee was constructed which included several party executive committee members.

The committee had sufficient political weight to project a vigorous campaign tone and was large enough to achieve a high degree of organization. The sales committee, together with the executive committee, carried the responsibility for creating a consciousness which made it possible to expand sales. A strong sales committee was our first consideration.

The relationship of each sales area to our political work was explained to the branch. This concept of using the paper as an intervener in the political arenas established *The Militant* as an important part of the party's work.

The spring sales drive made its biggest step forward when the branch's understanding of this concept had its first test.

A demonstration was called for April 28 by some Bay Area trade unionists against the high cost of living and inflation. The SWP waged a campaign to build this action, and *The Militant* was the major way the party did this. Most of our forces were assigned to getting out our analysis through sales of *The Militant*. During the week of April 28 the branch sold 618 papers, the highest number up to that point. It was a valuable effort which laid the basis for expanding sales during periods of increased mass activity. It was only possible because a very deliberate division of labor was made which reflected emphasis on party members selling the press.

Organizing a sales schedule which offered a variety of times and locations meant that it was realistic to involve more than 80 percent of the branch in sales. Periodic innovations in the sales schedule gave comrades a chance to fit sales into even the heaviest schedule and also gave the party an opportunity to experiment with and try out new areas such as plant gate sales.

### *Plant Gate sales*

We began plant gate sales in conjunction with our effort to build the April 28 demonstration. We found organizing plant sales required the full-time attention of a member of the sales committee even after regular sales teams had been established. Car pools were organized to pick comrades up at home in the morning and drop them off at bus stops convenient for work. Adapting to various schedule changes meant we had to pay a sig-

nificant amount of attention to this area.

These sales have been very productive additions to the sales schedule and accounted for over 70 papers sold weekly during the spring. We are now selling at two bus depots, two steel plants, three auto plants, two electrical plants, the post office, three oil and chemical plants, one appliance factory, a trade school, one glass works, and one office complex. Over 20 comrades participate weekly in these morning sales.

We have found it is important to establish regularity. Selling for a period of four to five weeks consecutively identifies us as a serious tendency and results in higher sales. However, with only a few exceptions, no individual plant-gate sale produces bulk sales. One exception is the oil and chemical works where a team of two comrades sells over 25 papers at one shift. This good response was prepared by our regular sales at the Shell Oil strike meetings during the spring.

Plant-gate sales have also given the party a source of information on activities in the shops and unions involved. Over 20 comrades participate because it was explained as a politically important new area of sales and was organized to avoid any comrade being late for work.

Other areas which were successful components of the sales campaign are described below:

1. Airport—Two teams sold 75 *Militants* each week. These *Militants* were carried all over the world by the very nature of this sales location. In addition, since it was found to be the easiest place to sell bulk numbers of papers, it provided good experience for new sellers.

2. Black and Chicano communities—Coverage in *The Militant* of African Liberation Day and on the farmworkers struggle gave us the opportunity to establish regular sales in these communities. We have received a good response selling the paper door-to-door in housing projects.

3. Campuses —Sales rose from 25 *Militants* a week at Cal Berkeley to 100-150 *Militants* and *Young Socialists* with little change in fraction size. We consider this area to be perhaps the most successful of the whole campaign. The YSA put a major emphasis on Cal fraction sales. The YSA sales director was a member of the Cal fraction with the sole responsibility for establishing these sales. This heavy emphasis by the YSA prepared the groundwork for the essential organizational handling of the campaign in the fraction.

Sales were not left to the individual comrades in the fraction alone. Teams were organized for specific times with charts in the YSA campus office listing the team members and the sales objectives for the week. The leadership in the fraction collectively took responsibility for the sales campaign. Pressure to sell began to appear, which flowed from the determination and commitment of the whole fraction. The increase in sales by the fraction was accomplished by efficiently organizing the amount of time available, not by cutting back any other area of work. The relationship of the press to the political work of the YSA and SWP at Cal, combined with a high

degree of organization, was the answer.

Below are the areas of sales for the spring campaign and the average number of *Militants* sold:

Cal	100
Airport	70
Plants	70
Supermarkets	70
Demonstrations and community sales	60
Other campuses	30
Miscellaneous	60
total	500

#### *Branch Participation*

Setting a political tone laid the basis for the organizational aspect of sales.

The executive committees of the YSA and SWP led the sales campaign throughout the spring. If the sales committee saw a bad trend developing, it was immediately brought to the attention of the executive committees. This part of the campaign resulted in 50-60 comrades selling. The responsibility of selling 500 *Militants* was not put on the shoulders of four or five supersellers but on the whole branch. We made it clear that we were not going to mobilize the branch or expect good sellers to sell the bulk of the quota. Our approach from the beginning was based on selling 500 by getting 50-60 comrades to sell. We began the campaign by projecting selling 150 the first week and raising it by 50 each week until reaching 500. This made it clear to the branch that we were going to proceed at a pace that would allow comrades time to work themselves into the sales schedule. The whole thrust of the effort was to get the branch as a collective political unit to sell more, not to get the ten or so comrades who sell well to sell more. This was repeatedly made clear in the weekly sales reports.

Every branch member was spoken to individually by a member of the sales committee to try to work out, in a flexible and patient manner, convenient sales times. We were very firm on insisting that selling is a party norm and that we should strive for selling twice a week.

The Oakland-Berkeley branch never mobilized to meet its quota of 500 even when the branch sold 1,153 out of a bundle of 1,200 in the last week of the campaign. Only four or five comrades sell over 20 *Militants* a week.

The sales chart listed below indicates the pace of the campaign: # papers sold

	Month
1,770	March
1,971	April
2,193	May
1,153	1st week of June
7,084	

This means we can anticipate greater increases in the fall if we organize to preserve the gains made up to this point. We decided not to allow our sales to drop during the summer.

#### *Summer Sales*

We have had to develop a somewhat different sales schedule which reflects the summer period. Evenings are going to be taken up by preconvention discussion and summer school, so we have decided on some changes which may be helpful when entering similar periods in the future:

1. We are moving to expand early morning sales at plant gates.

2. We will maintain campus sales in the mornings and afternoons by utilizing comrades with days off or evening work shifts.

3. We have instituted after-work and before-dinner sales at bus stations, downtown corners, and shopping centers. These are relatively brief sales by comrades on the way home from work.

4. On Tuesday and Thursday evenings we plan no party internal functions, and an emphasis is made on these evenings to organize three or four teams of sellers.

5. We expect over 20 comrades to sell on Saturday which will be our biggest sales day.

The sales committee has been expanded to handle the larger problems of organizing a sales schedule which is integrated into a busy summer period.

The sales breakdown projected for the summer is listed below:

Plant Gate sales	125
Saturday	160
Tuesday and Thursday evenings	50
Day teams to campuses	70
Friday after work	25
One airport team	40
Miscellaneous	30
total	500

We have just projected this plan to the branch so we cannot report on its outcome except to say that 27 comrades have signed up to sell on the first Saturday, while we only projected 21. Comrades on the sales committee are assigned to each sales category so that the committee remains in day-to-day touch with the number of sales, and through continual personal contact can report on the number of *Militants* individual comrades have in their possession.

#### *Sales Committee*

The sales committee as a whole met regularly, with various members of the committee meeting twice a week. The emphasis of the committee was on personal contact with branch members. The schedule of every comrade was known by the committee, and comrades were called and reminded of their sales if necessary.

The branch sold 500 papers a week through sales directly organized by the sales committee. The committee didn't rely on individual comrades selling on their own, though this began to happen as a direct result of organized sales achieving regularity. By directly organizing sales that could account for 500, we were able to assure the sale of 500 every week and know of problems in advance.

#### *Militant Finances*

The branch debt to *The Militant* on March 1 was \$691.26. It was reduced by the end of the campaign to \$93.96, which we project totally eliminating by the convention. The profit of \$597.30 made through sales was accredited to the back debt.

Because of our stated aim to pay back the debt and to remain current on present bills, the branch began to look upon *Militants* as branch monty. By not letting

any comrade take more than seven *Militants* unless they were certain of selling them or returning them in time to be sold by others, we were able to sell over 500 papers with a bundle of 600-650. Phone calls by committee members in the middle of the week to check on progress of sales served as a good reminder to get unsold papers into the hall. Branch sales reports which indicated the financial standing of *The Militant* helped establish the idea that *Militants* are branch money.

#### *Branch reports*

Branch reports reflected our attempt to give the branch time to work out problems so that we could arrive at selling 500 as a norm without mobilizations or extraordinary effort. Weak areas of the campaign were discussed in a positive way.

Normally the reports lasted five to seven minutes. They kept the branch aware of the highlights of the previous week nationally and locally with emphasis on the present week. Reports maintained the political tone of the cam-

paign by describing the successful uses of sales in our political work.

Correction of minor problems were handled outside the report. The report stressed what we wanted to do with the paper, where we were headed, and how we were going to get there. We placed a lot of emphasis on the organization of sales and outlined the areas that needed most attention by the branch.

We noticed that listing individual member sales on a chart was helpful, and in the summer we are adding a chart listing comrades who sell regularly at plant gates and who participate on Saturday sales.

The important element in selling or not selling our quota was always stated in reports to be the participation of 50-60 comrades. In this way the collective example of the branch encouraged all comrades to sell.

The experience of the Oakland-Berkeley effort confirms the importance of maintaining a strong sales committee with leading members of the branch assigned even after sales begin moving in a good direction.

### SPRING SALES CAMPAIGN REPORT TO THE LOWER MANHATTAN BRANCH by Ron Wolin, Lower Manhattan Branch, June 11, 1973

On January 8, well before the start of the national sales campaign, the Lower Manhattan branch began its own campaign to reorganize sales. At that time we outlined our major objectives as follows:

1. To lay a strong foundation for February and the reopening of campuses.
2. To establish a sales committee with party and YSA participation; to be an operating sales committee for the first time.
3. To stress the political motivation of our sales. To see sales as an extension of our political work, such as in District 1, in the preparation for the electoral campaign and in all our activities.
4. To achieve full branch participation.
5. To establish regular off-campus sales and go back to places time and again. We wanted to develop as many off-campus locations as possible so that we would become an integral part of the political activities of Lower Manhattan. We wanted to use our sales as a method testing new locations.
6. To be able to cover all political and special events in our area.
7. Wherever possible, to probe trade union and workplace locations.
8. To increase our bundle size and actual sales above that of fall 1972.

There are some comparative figures below giving the sales in the fall of 1972 and the beginning of 1973. During that time our maximum sales were 628 in October. Following that we went down quite a lot, and our average sales were 100 or less per week when we started our campaign.

#### *Gains of the Campaign*

First, we integrated sales fully into the political perspec-

tives of the branch, setting new and solid sales norms and establishing our political presence in many locations we had never tried before. We were involved in the out-reach campaign that we projected, particularly in the Lower East Side area and in the West Village.

At the start of the sales campaign, the cease-fire and the Supreme Court decision on abortion had just occurred. We were thinking out what we were going to do in the mass movements and in other activities. In this context the sales campaign, both for the party as a whole and for our branch, was a tremendous success and of great political importance. It taught a lot of comrades how to sell the press and defend our ideas and program on the streets, talking with all kinds of people around specific issues. We taught comrades that you can sell *The Militant* in alienated New York City to masses of working people, Black people, Spanish-speaking people. We came across more Black and Spanish-speaking people at department stores and supermarkets than we ever had, and we found a real acceptance of *The Militant*.

We were also able to set up a functioning sales committee, which was one of our major goals in this campaign. The committee included the SWP sales director, YSA sales director, and at least two other people.

We experimented with a number of new street locations — developed them, regularized sales there, and consequently built off-campus sales. At the beginning of our campaign we were quite dependent on campus sales as our major focus. If we were going to substantially increase sales, we had to go to off-campus locations. We looked for locations that extended our political work that had political importance to our branch.

When *The Militant* had special issues and campaigns, such as around Watergate or inflation, we chose sales locations we thought would not only maximize our sales,

but also get those issues to the people we wanted to reach. To take one example: In the months of February and March we had no sales at department stores. In April we had 13, but in May and the first issue in June, when we were first concentrating on the inflation question and Watergate, we had 946 sales at Mays Department Store alone. And we found that the majority of those sales were to Blacks and Latinos, particularly Black middle-aged women.

The total figure for campus sales during the campaign was 1,613, and off-campus locations was 6,076. So you can see that off-campus sales really became a factor. The Port Authority Bus Terminal was the single strongest location of the entire campaign with 1,280 sales. We became an established factor at Key Foods, where we sold 517 by going back time and time again, even though people sometimes sold less than 10. At another supermarket in the District 3 (City Council District) area we sold 284 issues. Those sales occurred throughout the campaign and gave us an opportunity to talk about the meat boycott, high prices, and our program to fight inflation.

We also took advantage of a location that developed during the course of the campaign—*State of Siege*, a film at which we were able to sell extremely well, particularly around our support for the Argentine political prisoners and coverage of events in Latin America. We sold 408 papers there. On other street sales, we sold 632 papers. We didn't depend on the bookstore and *Militant* forums to do our selling, although we maintained good sales at the bookstore. (In the previous period, we had 80-85 percent of our sales at the bookstore, forums, and internal political activities.)

We covered the political activities and meetings in our area intensively. At District 1 and the Coalition for Education meetings we had sales totaling 147. The activists got to know *The Militant*, read *The Militant*, and became very familiar with our ideas as well as our work in the Lower East Side.

At Wounded Knee demonstrations we sold 110 papers, and 514 at other political events. We were at just about every important political event that occurred, even if we didn't expect to sell huge numbers of papers. In each month of the campaign there were 20 or 30 outside political meetings besides major demonstrations, that we covered. It showed up in the total sales, as well as the importance of being there and introducing people to our ideas.

We started integrating the electoral and sales campaigns by sending out three or four tables on a regular basis with campaign material, literature, and *Militants*, particularly on Saturdays. We'll be continuing with that, and we have a base because we've been in these particular areas selling. On Saturday, for example, when I was over in the Village area, just a block away from where we had our campaign meeting the week before, two or three people asked me if we were going to have a meeting there that day. I said, "No, not today, but we'll be back."

These high sales occurred during the same time that the YSA was organizing a very ambitious sales campaign for the *Young Socialist*. In February we sold 328 YSs; in March, 397; in April, 687; in May, 445 so far, with 120 still outstanding.

A profit on *Militant* sales was made every month. For the 15 weeks of the campaign the grand total was \$771.50.

We set excellent sales norms for the first time and achieved our highest participation ever. We learned that heavy sales followed and correlated with high participation on a regular basis. For instance, during the first issue of the campaign in February we had 41 people participate, in March we had 64 different people, in April 64, and in May and the first issue of June—when we really went all out and hit our highest sales—we sold 3,383 copies and 75 different people participated!

During the campaign we learned from what some other branches were doing successfully and established Thursday night as a sales blitz, especially at places like Mays since it's a late shopping night and there are a lot of working people there, mainly Black and Puerto Rican.

We were also able to regularly sell a large part of the weekly goal (and in the last few weeks of the campaign just about all of it) by Monday night. In other words, we got a good fast start on sales, and many times we were able to increase our bundle during the week.

### *ISR Sales*

One of the points I don't want to forget is the *ISR*. Our situation there was not as successful. We did increase our bundle size in March to 115 and in April and May to 100 each. Our sales, however, dropped slightly throughout the period—77 in March, 66 in April, and 55 in May; and we had a slight loss in each of these months. Looking at the summary of sales by location of the *ISR* (see below), it can be seen that we are still depending on the bookstore for the bulk of our sales. We started some campus selling with 26 sold during the spring, but haven't tapped our potential there by a long shot.

We're going to have to think through each issue of the *ISR* in more detail than we have up to now. We should consider norms for the campus fractions starting in the fall, and work out ways specific articles in the magazine can be used to generate sales at appropriate meetings.

I'll give three examples to prove this worked when we did it. When we had an issue stressing the Vietnam Accords, we went to antiwar actions and meetings and sold 10. We went to women's liberation meetings two months in a row, when we had articles about women, and sold 15. And at two or three different SSEU strike meetings, we sold 14 to union members around the article on the welfare situation. These are just some of the ways of using the *ISR* politically, the way we've been using *The Militant*.

### *Team Sales*

Team selling was one of the key things we learned from this campaign. Team sales clearly outpaced individual sales. The experience of almost everybody who's been selling on a regular basis is that when you go out alone you take a few papers and you go to a location either at lunchtime or another time, and it's easy to get demoralized. It's hard to get that first sale going. You break through a lot quicker when you're working with other comrades and when you're setting it up so that nobody can get past that area without having to speak to one of our people. The increase in sales was enormous whenever we used this approach.

### *Sales Goal*

We learned how to use a sales goal during this campaign. A lot of branches approach this in different ways. Our approach was to build on success. We started with a goal of 325. Then we had four weeks at 350, before we went to a 400 sales goal. What we did was to project building on the success of hitting that sales goal and exceeding it on a regular basis before we increased it again. By the time we went up to a goal of 450 we had clearly started going well over 500 sales, and when our goal was 500, why we were in the stratosphere!

Back in January we had projected a 400 to 500 goal a week by the end of the campaign, but we weren't sure we'd make it. We became a lot surer as we went along.

Another thing we learned is that it's a good idea to have a sales goal even if you're not in a campaign. It gives us something absolutely concrete to shoot for, different from the bundle. Obviously we want to keep the gap between sales and the bundle size as small as possible so that we can maintain the highest possible profit. But it's not the bundle size, it's having that goal that is important. In the middle of the week at the sales committee meeting, we can check our progress against the goal and other comrades can also find out where we stand. If necessary, an extra special push can still be made for the rest of the week. Our experience is that the sales goal approach works and we suggest it be maintained on a reg-

ular basis.

### *Summer Projections*

This summer a good deal of priority is going to be on our preconvention discussion and the class series. We're suggesting that Saturday be continued as a major political activity day for the branch for both sales and the campaign. The Thursday night blitz should be maintained as an important sales time. Comrades should participate in the sales before the Wednesday night class, and we can do some light selling on Tuesday night and some pre-forum sales on Friday. Now it sounds like that's a lot, but it's fewer times and locations than we projected during the campaign.

The 7,689 total we sold in 15 weeks is itself over the national sales projections for any one week. It was a lot of papers, and it was a lot of money to handle. It was important to the branch financially, but it was more important politically. It was not accomplished by a group of three or four or five or eight people selling either. There are 23 people on the top 20 list (because a few people tied in the figures), and that group sold 4,503 papers or about 58 percent of all the sales of the campaign. The rest of the sales were made by everybody else. In the final analysis the reason we went over the top is because we got the full participation of the branch and YSA local comrades.

FINAL SALES REPORT--LOWER MANHATTAN BRANCH

SALES CAMPAIGN--2/23 - 6/1/73

I. MILITANT

A. Breakdown of Sales

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Sales Goal</u>	<u>Bundle Size</u>	<u>Copies Sold</u>
2/23-#7	325	440	371
3/2 -#8	325	400	307
3/9 -#9	325	400	325
3/16-#10	325	550	515
3/23-#11	325	400	389
3/30-#12	350	500	388
4/6 -#13	350	525	357
4/13-#14	350	500	369
4/20-#15	350	525	375
4/27-#16	400	550	410
5/4 -#17	400	500	377
5/11-#18	400	625	528
5/18-#19	450	650	584
5/25-#20	500	1,191	1,129
6/1 -#21	<u>500</u>	<u>1,450</u>	<u>1,265</u>
TOTALS	5,675	9,206	7,689

B. Finances

	<u>2/23</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>6/1</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Total \$ taken in	\$92.75	\$481.00	\$377.75	\$654.50	\$316.25	\$1,922.25
Break-even point	<u>55.00</u>	<u>281.25</u>	<u>262.50</u>	<u>370.75</u>	<u>181.25</u>	<u>1,150.75</u>
PROFIT	\$37.75	\$199.75	\$115.25	\$283.75	\$135.00	<u>\$771.50</u>

C. Comparative Figures

<u>Month</u>	<u>Bundle</u>	<u>Copies Sold</u>	<u>Profit or Loss</u>
Sep. '72	1,000	614	(+) \$28.50
Oct. '72	1,200	628	(+) 4.74
Nov. '72	1,125	418	(-) 36.16
Dec. '72	750	401	(+) 6.50

D. Participation of Comrades      2/23      March      April      May & 6/1

LM SWP	30	44	42	44
Non-pty. YSA	11	19	15	18
West.St.	—	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTALS	41	64	64	75



## II. ISR

### A. Breakdown of Sales

<u>Month</u>	<u>Bundle Size</u>	<u>Copies Sold</u>
March	115	77
April	100	66
May	<u>100</u>	<u>55</u>
	315	198

### B. Finances

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>
\$ taken in	\$38.50	\$33.00	\$27.50
Break-even pt.	<u>40.25</u>	<u>35.00</u>	<u>35.00</u>
LOSS	(-)\$1.75	(-)\$2.00	(-)\$7.50

### C. Summary of Sales by Location

<u>Location</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Bookstore	34	30	31	95
Campus	14	9	3	26
Forums	10	3	6	14
A/W Events	10	4		14
W/L Events	8	7		15
Pt. Authority	1	5		6
St. Sales		3		3
SSEU Mtgs.		5	9	14
May 5 Demo.			3	3
Socialist Weekend			<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	77	66	55	198

### D. Participation of Comrades

L M SWP	10	12	7
Non-pty. YSA	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	12	16	9

## III. YOUNG SOCIALIST

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Bundle</u>	<u>Copies Sold</u>	<u>% Sold</u>	<u>PROFIT</u>	<u># Comrades Participating</u>
Feb.	400	318	82%	\$26.55	40
Mar.	450	397	88%	43.00	33
Apr.	775	687	88%	72.87	43
May	700	445*		20.75**	

\*120 copies still outstanding. Many will be sold.

\*\*Profit on 415 sales only.

E. Summary of Sales by Location

<u>Location</u>	<u>2/23</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May &amp; 6/1</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
<b>CAMPUS</b>					
Hunter	54	193	120	190	557
NYU	42	153	84	78	354
Queens	36	155	74	50	275
Richmond	40	76	37	104	257
NYC Night schools		75	12	32	119
Regional	7	16	6	3	26
High schools	<u>2</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>29</u>
Sub-totals	175	638	333	467	<u>1,613</u>
<b>OFF-CAMPUS</b>					
Pt. Authority	50	269	128	833	1,280
Key Food	26	110	215	166	517
Finast		110	143	31	284
Other mkts.		12	23	8	43
May's			13	946	959
Other dept. st.			8	61	69
"St. of Siege"			61	347	408
Street Sales	7	193	181	252	632
Bookstore	49	153	117	211	530
Milit. Forum	8	77	10	20	115
Dist 1/Coal. Ed.	22	24	54	47	147
West St. cdes			73	309	382
Wounded Knee Mtgs.		110			110
ALD Demo				60	60
Other Pol Events	30	217	152	115	514
Miscellaneous	<u>4</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>26</u>
Sub-totals	196	1,286	1,178	3,416	<u>6,076</u>

F. Top 20 Salespeople in Campaign

1. Ron.....647	12. Andy B.....117
2. Richard.....580	13. Mark.....112
3. Joel.....354	14. Eva.....107
4. Jim K.....315	15. Jean.....98
5. Carl.....296	16. Phyllis.....93
6. Andy N.....210	17. Debby.....91
7. Norbert.....202	18. Sara.....90
8. Linda.....195	19. Judith L.....86
9. Dick G.....189	John R.....86
10. Mary S.....167	Margie K-M.....86
Ed B.....167	20. Dan C.....79
11. Lanie.....146	
	TOTAL <u>4,503</u>

NOTE: Total sales for campaign were 7,689. Sales of top 20 salespeople of 4,503 represents about 58% of all sales in campaign.

## HOW TO ORGANIZE A SUB DRIVE

by Debby Woodroffe, Lower Manhattan Branch, Fall 1972

### *Goals of the Subscription Drives*

As well as being educators and organizers of those already in the YSA and SWP, *The Militant* and *International Socialist Review* also attract new people to our ideas, offer a program of action to combative elements in society, and popularize both socialism and the names of the YSA and SWP. The subscription drives are vehicles for continually establishing and re-establishing a far-reaching audience for our ideas. But not only are the sub drives important to our movement nationally. If well organized and carefully thought out, they can be real branch-building activities. This means that instead of simply accepting a quota and pledging to make it by any means necessary, branches should formulate an entire strategy of how the sub drive fits into other branch activities and how it can maximize concrete political gains on the local level.

### *Basic Strategy*

Sub drives are branch-building activities that must be carried out in a way that never disrupts the continuity of branch functioning. Being a prioritized area of work doesn't have to mean detrimentally overshadowing all else. Basic strategy for the sub drive should aim to avoid at all costs the last-minute crisis organizing. Try instead to get the majority of subs right in the city where the branch is located. If sub getting is integrated into all other areas of work, and if the branch executive committee is vigilant and makes sure the sub drive never slips behind schedule, this can be done.

As is often said, an early start pays off. It is psychologically important to be able to announce that the branch has a solid base of subs, perhaps 100, to build on the day the drive formally opens. If campuses open before the sub drive, it is entirely realistic to have accumulated this many. Otherwise, as long as sub drive reports are given early, individual comrades can be encouraged to sell subs early to contacts, co-workers, etc. Everyone knows at least one person they can sell a sub to whom they deal with regularly, and they should be asked to do it at this point.

As soon as the drive formally begins, a strategy for getting the bulk of the subs early in the drive should be laid out to the branch and local. We always say we want to do this, but it must be concretized. A good rule of thumb is to aim towards having two-thirds of the quota by halfway through the drive. If the branch actually does this, it can assume it will make its quota and can consider raising it. If this goal is not met, the branch knows in plenty of time to avoid panic that the drive will be in trouble unless things are reversed. There are other reasons for selling most of the subs early in the drive. If it's a fall drive subscribers will get more coverage of socialist election campaigns. If it's spring, they'll get more issues while they are on campus and in a position to make contact with our fractions. The earlier in the drive a person is sold a sub, the higher the probability of their running into us again while we are selling, and of our finding out if they are interested in being drawn into the activities they've been reading about.

There are many alternative ways of organizing participation in the structured sub teams that bring in most of the subs. One method that seems logical is to encourage a norm that everyone participates at least once a week in a sub team, and then a sign-up sheet is circulated that has a sales slot for every evening and/or day. Such an approach aims to make it easy for busy comrades to sub when it is most convenient, and should guarantee high participation. In reality, it never seems to work out. It is too diffuse an approach and prevents a campaign spirit from developing. Comrades like to sell on nights when there are lots of people streaming in and out of the hall doing the same thing and reporting their results.

The best solution seems to be to have two sub-getting nights a week, with the understanding that each comrade should aim to participate in at least one. If YSA meetings are held Sunday afternoons, Sunday nights are perfect. A fund-raising send-off dinner can be held in between. The other should be a week-night. The executive committee should be vigilant about seeing that this night is kept clear of meetings. Such a strategy enables comrades to know ahead of time which night they must reserve, and means that the sub total will take two big strides ahead each week. If participation in these two nights is high each week, a full mobilization of all comrades should not be necessary.

Since we are always very busy, many comrades may tend to prioritize their own area of activity over weekly participation in sub drives. In some cases this may be unavoidable, but comrades should understand that this is a decision to be made in consultation with the organizer.

You can also expect that if the branch successfully makes its goal of being well over the 50 percent mark by halfway through, there will be a relaxation in participation. Comrades will feel the sub drive is already won and as much as over. There may be a few very slow weeks. Plot out in concrete figures what the weekly quotas will be pushed up to if comrades relax for even a short time. To do so negates all the advantages of getting ahead.

At this point special all-day Sunday teams to the region may be necessary both to get ahead again and because the dorms in the city may be exhausted. But rather than being viewed as the backbone of the drive, the regional subgetting should be regarded as an extra catch-up measure that allows us to go on with the steady work of getting most subs in the slower-moving city area.

About 10 days before the end of the drive, take a look at individual totals. Call up everyone who has not sold any subs and ask them to pledge to get at least a couple from friends before the end of the drive. Explain what a victory it would be to have 100 percent participation from the branch.

### *Where to Sell Subs*

Since we want to develop real campus bases for the YSA, it follows that we'll want to sell most of our subs in this milieu. The importance of contacting new students as soon as they arrive on campus cannot be overstated.

Most people entering college today view it as an arena where they will get to be politically active—without the clamp on their rights to free speech they experienced in high school. If talked to immediately, many students will view signing that *Militant* or *International Socialist Review* sub blank much like taking out a membership card in the youth radicalization. They think it is something they are expected to do, as part of their initiation into college. On alienating urban campuses this freshness rapidly fades, however.

The most politically advantageous subs are those sold on campuses where we have fractions. Spirited, mini-sub drives should take place on each of these. Think what it can mean to our work to have a base of 100-200-300 students reading every week about things we are organizing and being exposed to the interpretation of events we are putting forth. Most importantly, these are subs we can follow up on later and use to recruit. Each campus fraction should take on a quota. Whereas quotas taken on by mass work fractions are rarely real because comrades are in other fractions as well, the campus quotas should be adhered to. The major task of the YSA sub drive director should be to oversee campus subscription sales and stay in constant touch with campus fraction heads.

It is also important to take advantage of branch events. It can be assumed that every person who comes to hear a socialist speaker or to look at our bookstore is interested in the exchange of radical ideas and can be sold a sub. The forum chair should assume this in making the pitch. Also, suggest to the forum committee that they buy a sub for each forum guest speaker.

Subscription/campaign tables, set up in parts of the city where we have had a good response petitioning and selling, are worthwhile for Saturday afternoons. To locate opportunities, get comrades in the habit of bringing in leaflets for rallies or debates sponsored by groups in which we don't participate. Watch listings for radical films. Although it may seem that these should bring in lots of subs, unless we can sell from a table, this is rarely true. Comrades should be encouraged to view subbing at this type of movement event as experimental, as a probe, so they are not demoralized if none are sold. It should be made clear, too, that single issue sales is a form of sub-getting. The number of subscriptions sent in through the mail as a result is quite high, especially if a sub blank has been stapled inside.

Again, the two most consistent sources of subs (and those with the greatest short-term value to the branch) are ones from the campuses where we have fractions, and those coming from branch functions. If forums are large, they are a big arena for sub getting.

#### *Reports to the Branch*

The weekly report to the branch should do several things. It should spell out where the branch stands in terms of its quota, and what this will mean for the week ahead. A particularly good sale of the past week, perhaps at a new place you want comrades to return to this week, should be reported, with recognition given to the comrades who sold large numbers or participated many times. The political motivation of the sub drive should be repeated.

The overall thrust of the report each week, however, should be to convey where the branch stands, where it

must go in the next week, how it can get there, and what that will mean in concrete political gains if this is done.

Spirited discussion after the report helps a lot. Comrades who have sold subs in particularly ingenious ways (i.e., one comrade sold a sub over the phone to a McGovern campaigner who called to ask him to come into their headquarters to work for McGovern) should be encouraged ahead of time to speak, as should comrades who have come up with a particularly effective sales pitch.

If the political motivation in the report is thorough and credible, a generalized sub-consciousness will result. Not only comrades assigned to sell will have it on their mind. This can result in about 20-30 subs coming in each week from comrades who have sold them in their daily activities as a result of just being alert to opportunities.

#### *How to Sell Subs*

One of the first sub drive reports can contain a skit on sub-getting techniques. A possible format is to act out three or four "how *not* to sell" scenarios—i.e., the mechanical approach, the defeatist—and then demonstrate a model sales pitch. It can be followed by questions and a general pooling of experience on effective techniques. Armed with such a discussion, comrades will feel far more confident about going out and selling.

It is also good to, each week, take up one frequently encountered sales dilemma and lay out a strategy for dealing with it. For example, the most often reported obstacle to making a sub sale seems to be the "Well, that sounds like a good deal, but I think I'll just buy this one, and if I like it, I'll send the blank in later." Although people have every right to do this (and many really do send it in), a good 75 percent can be persuaded to abandon their caution and subscribe right away. The sub getter should point out to the hesitator that the sub offer is meant exactly for people like him or her—people who are generally interested in keeping up with the different movements for change, but who aren't sure whether they want to make a big financial investment in a radical paper they haven't seen before. This offer allows them to get it for a short time and decide what they think. Stress that if they are interested in the war, feminism, the Black struggle, campus free speech fights, etc., they already know they're going to be interested in the paper, so there's really no need to buy just one issue. Point out how little \$1 is spread over 12 weeks. Tell them that they were ready to spend a quarter for one issue, whereas for another 75 cents, they could have another 11 issues. Above all, remember that people who give you this type of argument have already been convinced they should get the paper. They are just squirming around for ways out because this society makes people afraid of making a commitment to anything. So it just takes a few well-reasoned arguments, and basic friendliness on your part, to swing this sort of person over.

The second frequently-encountered argument is, "I don't need another publication. I just subscribed to *Time*, the *Village Voice* or whatever." In this case, your only hope is to get *The Militant* into their hands. Get them paging through it so they see that it is not interchangeable with other publications. Explain who writes for *The Militant*, and how this gives a real first-hand approach to reporting. Point to a specific article you know the other publi-

cations did not cover, and explain that they will miss knowing about this type of thing unless they subscribe to *The Militant*. Remember that often people who say they don't have time to read a paper every week can be convinced to buy the *ISR*.

In addition to being armed with concrete arguments for every scenario they are likely to meet, comrades should have in their arsenal a few general tips. First, learn to intuit when it is time to regreet (i.e., when a person has firmly made up their mind and no argument will be effective), and when it will be worthwhile to try a few more approaches. Secondly, comrades should never think they are conning a person if they attempt to convince them to change their mind about getting a sub. If you feel you are manipulating someone, your pitch will take on an apologetic tone, as if you think you are putting something over on people. Thirdly, never take anything that happens personally! Keep on plugging away, and tell yourself that the more subs you sell, the more people like that will be a minority in society.

The key, of course, is persistence. We talk to tens of thousands more people every sub drive than actually subscribe. Yet the people who say "no" today may well subscribe when asked a second time, so nothing is wasted. And since the more people asked, the more subs sold, time is important. Comrades will run into dozens of people who are eager to talk to us. Comrades must remember that *The Militant* is the best recruiter of us all, and to spend hours with one person is to ultimately cut down our recruitment, because you don't get to sell as many subs that way. Encourage them to invite the person to a forum, or take their name for the regional organizer if it's too far away.

### Charts

Three basic charts are essential. First, and prominently placed, should be the thermometer chart. It is a good idea to divide the chart down the middle, having one side for *Militants* and the other for *ISRs*. Since a thermometer chart only shows roughly where the total stands, it is a good idea to keep tear sheets directly underneath it that give the exact totals. These must be kept up on a daily basis if you expect comrades to watch them.

Secondly, there should be an individual total tally chart. It is important that *ISR* subs be counted equally in an individual's total. One way of doing it is to enter a person's *Militant* subs in black, and *ISR* in red magic marker, or whatever. Then you know, too, which comrades maintain a ten to one ratio. A "Top Ten" chart can go under this. Hopefully, this chart should change its composition all the time—with a constant flow of traffic on and off it. It is the object of much excitement in the branch if kept up to date.

Finally, there should be a participation chart. This should list the name of each comrade who is expected to get subs and a space for each week of the sub drive.

This chart is mainly for the information of the executive committee so it can be determined who is participating regularly and who needs to be spoken to. It further serves to prod comrades who are not selling regularly. And it gives recognition to those who go out faithfully but are not able to sell a large number of subs. Every executive committee member should have perfect participation.

### How to Keep Good Records

The bookkeeping must be well organized or chaos can result. There should be a metal sub box (locked) displayed prominently. Letter-size envelopes should be piled up right next to it. Typed (or mimeographed) on them should be spaces for the salesperson's name, # *Militant* subs included, # *ISR* subs, money included, and place and date where the subs were sold. At the end of each day, the sub drive directors should open the box and take out the envelopes. Check the subs, being sure they are zip-coded and that all the money is there. Count up the day's subs and add them onto the total tear sheets. Also bring the individual totals up to date. Put a check mark on the envelopes, indicating you have logged those subs in, and put them in a secure place. At the end of the week (or twice a week or whatever), empty all the envelopes and send the subs to *The Militant* business

You will be left with the envelopes in which comrades turn in their subs. On a sheet of paper, type up an entry for each sub you received—putting down who sold it and where it was obtained. These weekly tally sheets will tell you at the end how many subs were gotten in what locations. They also give you a way of checking when comrades tell you their totals are listed wrongly. Thus, the subs for the day are logged once a day (at the end), and the tally sheets are done once a week. Standardizing it this way minimizes confusion.

The other important records are those kept of dormitories. This is extremely important for city campuses where we want to reach every single person. Before the drive starts, visit the dorms you plan to cover and scout them out. Type logistical information on a sheet for comrades to have. Also try to give them the room number of a contact who lives in that dorm and suggest they get him or her to sell, too. List on the sheet every room we want to cover. As comrades eliminate a room either by selling a sub or being rejected, they should cross out the number. If people ask us to return later, write that in, as well as any difficulties encountered. Consolidate these sheets at the end of the day and type up a new one listing the rooms that are now left and any new tips. Xerox these to have ready for the next team. This retyping and xeroxing is tedious but more efficient than master sheets, etc. Comrades must be strongly persuaded to fill in these sheets. Returning to the same room over and over, wastes time and energy.