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POLITICAL TRENDS AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES  
(Report to the February 1969 Plenum of the National Committee)

By Jack Barnes

I assume comrades have glanced through the statistical forms and charts that are available. One fact that must have caught everyone's eye was that we are gaining in membership. I think this is our largest size since the Cochran split.

By itself that figure is important, but even more important is the fact that recruitment now significantly outstrips all the forms of attrition that the party has faced. A very high percentage, well over 90%, of new recruits are young. Young activists are a growing percentage of the total party membership.

All sorts of other statistics testify to our growth. Since our last plenum, the Militant's press run has increased from 6,500 to 10,000. Merit sales increased more than 60% last year. The print shop is solvent and now does more than \$100,000 business per year, only about 15% of which was non-party business in 1968.

We just completed an election campaign of unprecedented scope and all comrades are aware of its accomplishments. We have a new branch in Portland; we have sent party comrades, including national committee members, to Atlanta and Texas. Party members have helped to form new YSA locals in Providence, Newark, St. Louis, San Diego. The YSA reports that there are 38 YSA locals.

Of key importance for us is not the difference in size between the YSA and SWP, or even the differential in growth (the YSA is growing very rapidly now), but the fact that the party is also beginning to grow. And the deepening radicalization means that the party will grow much more. Given the normal time lag between the growing pace of recruitment to the YSA and the growth of the party, we can anticipate both numerical increase and an increase in the rate of recruitment to the party.

Of course, our growth occurs simultaneously with, and is basically a result of the new radicalization. At this plenum, in preparation for the next convention, we will discuss this radicalization -- its character, features, limits, and the openings it means for us; and especially the changing character of the Socialist Workers Party and our tasks in anticipation of future growth.

This report will outline the thinking of the Political Committee on these problems. We want to project the next steps forward organizationally and plan

the next stage of our expansion. To prepare for the coming convention we want: 1) following the plenum to send out to the party membership a "builder" which will relate the general conclusions we come to at the plenum, along with the statistics about our growth; 2) to begin immediately taking the organizational steps agreed upon here; 3) in the light of the discussion the Political Committee will draft the resolutions for our pre-convention discussion.

Political Trends

In the nine and one half months since our last plenum, which included a presidential election, there have been some shifts in political trends and a deepening of the radicalization, in some areas, but no basic change.

The major basic predicaments facing the American ruling class and the new administration are the same: Vietnam, the Afro-American struggle, and the American manifestations of the international radicalization of a whole new generation; how to get out of Vietnam with a victory, or at least a Korea-type settlement; somehow to try to free resources to change the image or gain moral authority for the ruling class to buy off, co-opt, contain -- whatever words you want to use -- the deepening Afro-American struggle for self-determination and the growing rebellion of the young people in this country. Meanwhile, in the background all the time is the international financial shakiness of the advanced capitalist countries and the growing perspective of harsher international competition among the major industrial capitalist powers.

These three current political crises for the ruling class remain the three central areas of our work, where we increase our influence, and recruit in contest with our main opponents: the struggle against the war; our intervention, propagandistically, in the struggles of the black community; and youth work, primarily through a large fraction of comrades in the YSA.

Afro-American Struggle

In separate reports we have already discussed the political developments in the war and among youth. This report will outline the key trends and changes in the Afro-American struggle since our last plenum.

Nationalist radicalization in the black community has deepened, has spread

to more people and affected a younger layer. The struggle for black control of the black community is changing from an abstract slogan to a concrete program -- in the schools, in the universities, in the unions, in the neighborhoods.

As Malcolm X said: "Today you have a new generation of black people who have come on the scene, who have become disenfranchised with the entire system, who have become disillusioned over the system, and who are ready now and willing to do something about it." I think this is accurate. The black youth are in the forefront of this entire development.

The most important developments have been the black university struggles. They are at a much higher political level than SNCC, for example, ever was, possibly symbolized by the degree to which Malcolm X has been adopted as the hero of this new generation. There's finally a generation catching up with most of Malcolm's basic ideas. To some degree that has affected the army also.

The school struggles, especially in New York around the Ocean-Hill-Brownsville fight for community control, have been one of the key new developments. In New York it affected the entire social fabric of the city, including the labor movement. An important aspect to the settlement, or partial settlement, of the strike was the pressure that some of the black trade union officials brought to bear on the central labor council to end the racist strike -- because of the pressure they themselves felt from the ranks of the heavily black and Puerto Rican unions in this city. This affected the UFT directly and the struggle within that union.

Fourth has been the rise of black caucuses in the union movement. The trade union memorandum passed at the last plenum said: "Rising black power trends in the Afro-American movement imply parallel developments of black caucuses in the unions. Essentially this step will involve self-organization of black workers, determination of their own program and selection of their own leaders. White militants have the duty to support these black workers in exercising these rights and to extend fraternal collaboration to black formations that arise."

Now, nine months later, we have seen the rise of DRUM, FRUM, ELRUM and more to come.

There have been many other signs of militancy among the blacks in the labor movement. One of the most notable was the decision by some black workers at the Tarrytown, N.Y. GM plant to take a holiday on Martin Luther King's birthday, January 15. A few were suspended, so two days later they shut down the entire plant to get

reinstatement.

Not only have black caucuses, the revolutionary union movements in Detroit been important for all the general reasons which we have discussed before; already we can see numerous signs of the concrete propaganda and agitational role these caucuses can play.

One of the best descriptions of the real meaning of the Johnson-Nixon plan to induce private industry to hire the hard-core unemployed in ghetto areas was given by a leader of the Ford Revolutionary Union Movement as reported in the Michigan Chronicle:

The rapid turnover in the hot, hard and heavy jobs held by black men accomplishes two things for the company, according to the black labor leaders. First it gives the company the opportunity to prevent many men from gaining meaningful seniority. This also helps to keep whites, many of whom are prejudiced, in power in the unions because many of the blacks are fired even before they've completed their ninety days on the payroll. Secondly, a high rate of firing means a high rate of hiring. This allows companies to wage their annual hire-the-hard-core programs and get their annual booty from the administration. Such programs, the Ford Revolutionary Union Movement leaders stated, are contrived because of their great public relations value, because they 'get the niggers off the street' in the summer supposedly, and because they usually provide the companies with a mass of willing workers whom circumstances have made too docile, in many cases, to protest conditions.

"The hard-core workers, hired with general federal help -- they are many times either exconvicts, parolees or men who have not worked in years -- get the worst jobs. Men who face jail if they lose their jobs often find themselves doing the work of two men, but they often dare not complain."

On the leadership level, no black radical leadership with national authority has risen. The main national organization which we have discussed that has attempted to build itself is the Black Panther Party. The truth of the matter, however, is that we don't really know too much about the internal evolution of the Black Panther Party.

The Black Panther Party was an advance over SNCC and CORE and the student organizations which came before. It was the first organization to try seriously to organize northern ghetto youth and the first to project the concept of a national organization of these youth and a national organization of cadre. The combination of ruling class repression against the Black

Panther Party and their incapacity to go beyond ultra-left problems in the development of their program, has led to crises in the BPP.

We know that local groups continually arise which don't necessarily recapitulate the history or ideas of the Bay Area leadership or of former Black Panther Party developments. It is clear that new Black Panther Party groups usually try to begin grappling with the problem of program and tactics to learn from the mistakes and problems of the earlier Panther groupings.

It remains essential to unify the black student unions, the caucuses in the labor movement, the united fronts for community control -- to unify them around the transitional program which they themselves are developing in the struggle, that is, a black political party that will fight to unify all these struggles as a single trend. Building such a party will not be an easy job, as we know. The results of the '68 elections and the last nine months show that not much direct organizational progress has been made toward this end. If anything, past experience shows, more than ever before, the role of conscious cadres, and the need for them, in this process.

It's probably been around the new rise of the black nationalist movement that our opponents have failed most miserably. The ultra-lefts and the Socialist Party opposed the struggle for black control in New York; the SP openly lined up with the Shanker bureaucracy. SDS, under the influence of Progressive Labor, has decided that black nationalism, as it displays new evidences of its vanguard role, is reactionary. And the Communist Party hasn't changed its basic approach of opposition to the nationalist movement.

We should note that the CP, perhaps more than any other of our opponents, recognizes the existence and importance of this whole layer of young, militant, black workers. That, possibly more than anything else, may explain the so-called labor orientation which they are projecting for their youth group. It's really not a way to work with Reuther's new formation, or to do much work in the unions; it's probably more of a gimmick to attempt to make contact with, and try to recruit, some of these young black militants in the labor movement.

### The Working Class

While the working class in general has been affected by the general dissatisfaction in society, there is little change from the time of our last plenum, when we adopted the trade union memorandum. The key new element nationally has been the rise of black caucuses in the labor movement and the growing signs of pressure

that black workers and growing numbers of young workers, who are becoming a larger and larger part of the basic work force, are putting on the union bureaucracies.

One of the most significant developments that has occurred, so far as we are concerned directly, is the Richmond oil workers strike. To my knowledge it's the first time in this period that a local union has clearly and unambiguously aligned itself with the student and minority struggles, calling for aid, and offering aid; the union took the initiative in proposing the concept of a solidarity pact. This had a tremendous affect on the students and youth in the Bay Area which we first began noticing by the way the small student and youth papers covered it. Liberation News Service, which covers events of interest to the youth movement, began writing about it, and the Guardian too. We even noticed that the Daily World, which didn't know what was happening, didn't have anyone there, began picking up the dispatches from the Liberation News Service because of the obvious importance of the development.

What the students have been looking toward, what they want, and what they will find eventually -- some sort of struggle relationship with the working class -- has occurred in a small, symbolic way, in one local area. That is very important. Moreover, the enemy is just the kind to launch a combined student-worker struggle against. The enemy is Standard Oil, international imperialism itself: Standard Oil, which has a vicious antilabor history; Standard Oil which has a vicious racist history; Standard Oil which has a vicious international history. Standard Oil furnishes many of the trustees of the universities. Standard Oil, the entire student movement of the world is convinced, is one of the major factors behind the war in Vietnam. Standard Oil ran over and killed a Martinez oil worker, a striker -- they ran over him in a Standard Oil truck. He was a guy on picket duty whose foot got caught, and one of the supervisors waved the Standard Oil truck on. He died two days ago.

In other words, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers local in Richmond has taken the lead in making what is the biggest step forward that we've seen as far as political struggle is concerned. Comrades from the Bay Area will take the floor and explain more about the whole development.

### The Radicalization in the United States

You have probably all noticed that different comrades have used different words to describe the radicalization. Some use the term "radicalization," some "social unrest," some "dissatisfaction," or "growing receptivity of a growing layer," or "a growing thaw from the for-

ties and fifties," etc. I don't think that these are semantic differences, nor a disagreement in analysis, but reflect some of the different and contradictory aspects of the radicalization itself.

Where these "differences" come from, basically, is the world class struggle, not primarily the class struggle in the United States. The young people were originally mobilized around the victories of the colonial revolution abroad, which showed that American imperialism was not omnipotent. The national question at home, the Afro-American struggle, was the second big factor. Victories inspired the youth and repressions outraged them, and no damper could be put on them. The problem has not been an economic gap or a major economic downturn, but the economic, political, social, cultural gap between what is and what growing numbers of people think should be -- the gap between what could be with the current means of production, and what is with the capitalist mode of production.

Our perspectives depend upon how we evaluate American imperialism's capacity to solve its crises. We think American imperialism is in a permanent international crisis; that it cannot either extricate itself from explosions around the world in which it must intervene, nor can it, even if it were to end the Vietnam war somehow, buy off the radicalization which it faces. This radicalization is occurring prior to a general radicalization of the working class. There is growing receptivity, not only among youth, but among other layers of the population as well, to the ideas of the transitional program, to our basic program.

### Tasks

This defines the tasks we face in the coming period:

A. To increase our general propaganda.

1. We put a premium on the types of party institutions and party activities that can reach these radicalizing layers with our general ideas and image as a party and deepen their understanding. Election campaigns are one important example.

2. The expansion of the party press, especially its paper.

3. The expansion of institutions like the branch forums, which deal directly, in a propaganda way, with the problems facing the American people.

B. Planning out the organizational preparation of the party for the coming opportunities: the branches, the institu-

tions, the educational program and propaganda, preparing the finances on a national, regional, and branch level.

We're really in a transitional period of unclear duration in which we are graduating an entire class, to use university terms, from the YSA into the party, prior to a large-scale working class radicalization. We've reached a new stage in our preparation of building the party as a national party, in preparing the physical and geographical expansion of the party. Our job now is not only to recruit, but to assimilate a young party cadre, prepare it in our traditions to be capable -- as a party, not as individuals -- of stepping into the mass openings in the class struggle that will open up.

One of the best examples, in preliminary form, is the Richmond situation. The key thing in the first stages of the struggle was the capacity of the branch as a whole to step in -- all of the components of the party, the comrades involved in student work, the comrades in touch with the Third World liberation movements, the comrades that made contact with the Richmond oil workers local, the comrades involved in the Community Conference, the comrades who organized press conferences and mimeographed press statements in three hours. The entire functioning of the party was decisive in our intervention and participation in that struggle.

In the election campaigns before us we should draw the lessons of the 1968 Halstead-Boutelle campaign, try to run similar campaigns, and rectify whatever errors there were in that campaign. The important thing is to run the campaigns in the way we all tried to run the Halstead-Boutelle campaign; that is, the campaign of a party which is where the action is, where the revolutionary action is -- whose campaigns are a tool, a part of its overall revolutionary activity.

This approach should be taken in all aspects of the campaigns. In the choice of candidates it means putting a premium on candidates who themselves are active in the mass movement, who have a feel for what's happening, and who can appeal to the forces we are trying to reach. It should be taken in setting the goals of the campaigns -- the goals of recruitment directly to the organization and to the youth. The political line of the campaigns is clear. We've discussed that.

Many of the methods that we applied in the Halstead-Boutelle campaign also have to be thought of for the local campaigns -- especially the scope of the campaigns, as big as possible. One mistake we made in the presidential campaign, time after time, was not overestimating the

openings and our ability to intervene, but systematically tending to underestimate the openings and the rapidity with which they would develop.

Secondly, we should draw the lessons of the rhythm of the '68 campaign, which put a great premium on the early announcement of our campaign. In fact, many of our greatest gains come very early when we use the campaign to get out our general ideas.

Third is understanding the resources it takes to run these kinds of campaigns.

The most important thing to remember is the lesson of the Young Socialists for Halstead and Boutelle, and that the YSA grew from 400 to 800 in a few months.

We want to try and use our state and local campaigns in this light. One of our problems is to take our small numbers and use them in a way to get maximum leverage, to maximize the results we get with the smallest number of people. Our campaigns are one of the key ways to do this, and they become more and more important as the radicalization deepens and there are larger numbers that we want to get our ideas to, and there are more opportunities to probe.

How does this tie in with our branch functioning? What do the branches that are going to be carrying out this work look like?

It's important to look at something which we often take for granted, to take a close look at it, and concentrate on it for a little while: that is, the role of the branch structure -- departments, committees, fractions, executive committees -- and their functioning. It is most important in this period of party expansion to avoid the errors of routinism or negligence in the expansion and leadership of the branch departments. We cannot function, we cannot grow, we cannot reap the party rewards from much of our political work, our outside agitational work, and our youth work, unless we're very conscious of this. We cannot build the party branches and build the party institutions without paying attention to these departments, without having them led by able comrades and understood as politically important, central aspects of our work. If not, we won't build branches, but merely individuals, or circles, or good fractions in some area of work, but not Socialist Workers Party branches that can grow and serve as models for expanding branches.

Some of the most important party departments are those which are a direct part of our expanding propaganda campaign, the sales and sub departments which will carry out our goal of increased circulation and expansion of the Militant. The Militant becomes more and more an organiz-

er for the Trotskyist movement. It gets our propaganda offensive out, it gets our polemics out, it says in a general way to the entire country what lessons we derive from local struggles.

We've got to think out all the implications of the statistics which show that we have a growing number of youth units, of at-large members, and we're going to have a growing number of party branches, that may grow much faster than we may think. They will be organized primarily by the Militant. The Militant takes on a premium value, not only as an educator and propagandist, but as a party organizer. This includes not only what comes out in the Militant but what comes in from the branches to the Militant. The important thing to understand is that this is not a department which a few individuals or a small committee heads up, where individuals are responsible simply to get their per capita share of the subs or do their per capita share of the sales. It's a collective responsibility which, like all important political work, is led adequately and not sloughed off.

It's hard to imagine a comrade saying, for example, "Well, how we intervene in the struggle at San Francisco State is an individual matter. We have some comrades who are pretty good at agitating and they should go on the campus and agitate, while the exec will do other things." It's very easy, however, to slip into that approach to the sales and subs of the Militant. Work that is done by individuals in the party is not basically individual work but work organized and led collectively.

A second important area of work is the bookstore and literature department, which plays a key role in the expansion and use of our press. One of the most striking things that we've noticed has been the expanding rate of sales of our general literature. The branch sales reflect the general Merit increase.

Third is the use of the weekly forum, not as a ritual but as a tool, a propaganda vehicle in this entire process of growth.

Fourth is the expansion of the regional work.

Of course, all these departments tie in directly and intimately with our election campaigns, antiwar work, black work, and the special campaigns and openings that pop up in branches.

The educational committee and structure become more important as more new comrades come into the branch at an accelerated rate.

The organization of the executive committee, its organizer, the branch and

city secretaries, and the other components of the branch leadership, which are systematically underestimated by many young comrades both in their importance and their difficulty, have to be thought about, trained for, and led.

And finally, to take advantage of openings and to be able to do any of this requires the financial organization of the branch.

These departments are not arbitrary, or set up at a time when the party wasn't able to do much outside work, but the central structure of the party necessary to make it possible to use our influence and recruitment to build the party itself. Building this party structure will make it possible to turn our present gains into permanent gains, which is the key task of the young Socialist Workers Party members who are joining in this period. The key task of the party leadership is to assimilate them and inspire them into doing the job.

We should note especially that much of our Afro-American work, our intervention propagandistically into the black community, is done through these institutions. The sales of the paper, subs for the paper, the kind of stories sent in to the paper, the character of the forums, etc. -- these are some of the key modes of intervention we have, given our forces and our composition, into the black struggle itself. And, as with our other tasks, the setting up of a black work fraction or a black fraction cannot substitute for the executive committee understanding and leading this work.

The party ranks, and especially its young activists who make up a bigger and bigger percentage of the party, must feel that these are the key responsibilities, opportunities, and decisions to make.

### The Party and the Youth

The growth in the size of the party and the projected party expansion mean that we should give some thought to the connection between the party and youth work, and the character of party work in this period.

There are three interrelated tasks we have in relation to the new generation coming onto the scene. One is winning the leadership of the radical youth in the spheres of ideology and action, that is, our propaganda work. Second is to build strong Marxist youth organizations fraternally connected with the revolutionary party. The third is to recruit and assimilate new cadres from the youth to replenish the ranks and re-energize the leadership of the party.

The YSA has grown and has been a major source of recruitment to the party.

Both of these trends will continue. If anything, it's possible that the rate of recruitment to the YSA will pick up, and it certainly will remain for a time the major source of recruitment to the Socialist Workers Party. We have already discussed this earlier.

The important thing to note is not so much what has happened in the YSA, but what has changed and will change even more in the Socialist Workers Party. The party branches that are going to carry out our political and organizational perspectives are very different than the branches of even a few years ago. You don't need to look at the statistics -- at least the people in this room don't -- just look back at the branches five or ten years ago to see the differences.

The internal composition of the branches has changed markedly to include a growing percentage of active forces, young people with the perspective of a lifetime as Bolsheviks before them, and who are open to being assimilated into the Socialist Workers Party. In the branches this change is reflected in the growing numbers of young activists who are members of the party but not the YSA -- that growing layer of young party activists who have graduated from the YSA but who are active and make up a growing percentage of the branches. This change coincides with the need to expand the scope and regularity of branch functioning.

It is this fact that dictates the changes we project in branch functioning and a certain shift in the relationship between the YSA and the Socialist Workers Party.

It is as important to understand what the Political Committee is not saying as what it is saying. If misunderstood or applied mechanically these changes could lead to a disaster. We are not saying that there is a decrease in the importance of YSA work. Quite the contrary. What we are saying is that there are changing objective possibilities for the Socialist Workers Party itself, internally and externally, that will continue to deepen and accelerate. Not only is this the key for building the SWP, but what the party does in this sphere will make possible the greatest growth of the Young Socialist Alliance -- the development of the party institutions, its geographical expansion, its activities, its political leadership, and the model in the young adult community that it sets is the greatest thing it gives to the YSA, outside of that large fraction of party members that function inside of the YSA.

We are not choosing between two alternative extremes. That is, we have no intention of "eating our seed corn." We aren't impatient with the objective period, with the contradictions of the



openings in this mass movement, whereby we see a radicalization prior to the opening of significant political work in the union movement. We are not for any artificial and mechanical mass graduations from the YSA, decrease in YSA fractions, or a subtle shift in quality or quantity of the young people who are assigned to YSA work. But neither are we interested in foundering on the rocks of "YSA-ism," that is, not seeing clearly the key possibilities and importance of party expansion. If we do not, then any accomplishment of the YSA, in an area, in a branch, on a campus, simply founders because of the lag of party development.

We are not projecting a new "turn." There has been a gradual process occurring over a long time in which the party is growing and becoming a young party, a party of young activists who are graduating from the YSA. The recruitment and attrition ratio and the rate of growth of the YSA shows us what is right around the corner for the Socialist Workers Party.

It's easy to slip into errors in branch functioning because of the period we've been through, what I will call the period of "total activist overlap," when it was damned hard to find a very large group of activists in a branch who were not concurrently members of the YSA. The overwhelming bulk, in some branches over ninety percent, of those people who had the energy necessary to be activists, were activists in the YSA assigned to YSA work, building the YSA. Now there is a growing percentage of party activists in the branches who have graduated from the YSA or will graduate from the YSA in the future and have a lifetime perspective before them as revolutionists in the Socialist Workers Party. This is the most important asset of the Trotskyist movement.

In the period of total activist overlap there were sometimes two different kinds of problems which faced us. One was the possibility of the entire development of the YSA being stunted by "mom-ism" applied to YSA-SWP relationships. The simple fact is that the YSA can develop most fruitfully when it can not only make its own progress, but make some of its own mistakes. There is a temptation to forget that; there is a temptation to overadvise, to over-gobble-up, and to hover around the YSA. This really shows an absence of a perspective for and a consciousness of the entire responsibility of party functioning in the branches.

The second problem that can arise in a period of total activist overlap is the warping of the party's development itself, especially the sense of the entire party membership that it is a factor that makes its decisions and moves forward as a party in fruitful areas of work.

Routinism, inadequate inspiration, and even demoralization of the young party activists can develop if somehow they feel that their decisions and their functioning are not crucial to the progress of the revolutionary party. One of the worst things that can happen is when YSAers reach that age when it is time to leave the YSA it seems to them like taking a fish out of water and throwing it on a beach. This is not and was not basically a weakness in individuals, but a period in the life of the party where party perspectives of active work were inadequate. That is what has changed and must be changed more.

Just as party Political Committee meetings or National Committee plenums or conventions don't begin with its youth perspectives, even if youth work is the key, neither do the branches' discussions on tasks and perspectives. The branches discuss the campaigns of the party, the political trends in the country and in the area, the important political avenues of intervention, the organization and advancement and expansion of the party departments and its regional and national responsibilities. After thinking out these political factors, the question of the YSA and the size of the YSA fraction that the party has then dictates certain physical limits to the work that can be done. It's very important to see it that way.

Minutes from four different branches in the past year included a sentence something like this: "The central task of the party in this period is to build the YSA, and the entire report and discussion should reflect this." That's false. The central task of the YSA is to build the YSA. The central task of the party is to build the party. One of the ways to build the party is the assignment of a significant fraction in the YSA. But the task of the party is to build the party itself, and in so doing it will build not only the party, but will also make possible the greatest growth of the YSA.

We don't project any change in the rate of expansion or importance of the Young Socialist Alliance or any change at all in the political, fraternal, and organizational relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance. But the change that we can foresee and must prepare for is a change in growth, opportunities and functioning of the Socialist Workers Party branches themselves.

#### Party Expansion

Comrades must be inspired and given the perspective to see that party building work in all aspects is major political work. There are some concrete organizational proposals to consider in carrying

out this entire perspective.

The first area is the expansion of the party itself, the expansion of branch regional work. One aspect of our growth has been the development of constellations of Young Socialist chapters and at-large units around the main branches of the Socialist Workers Party. This work of keeping contact, touring, aiding these areas has to be done in collaboration with the YSA in each area, but it's one of the key political tasks that the party must oversee and insure is done. This is the path to new branches of the party in the coming period. The financial and political responsibility for regional work must be seen by the branch leaderships as a key task.

This is different from the task of starting new locals of the YSA or sending forces to start new branches of the SWP, which is a job for the national office, one of the tasks that is very carefully planned in a centralized way in our party. But regional collaboration between the party branches and YSA units nearby is a responsibility of growing political importance for the branches. Since the election campaign there is no party branch in the country that doesn't have around it a constellation of at-large youth members, small youth locals, or a few at-large members of the movement.

The second area of expansion is into new geographic areas of the country to establish branches of the party. As comrades know, we have sent comrades to Atlanta, Texas, Portland, and a short time before that to Seattle. These are all places, the first places, where we intend to establish new party branches and reach out to new areas of the country. These are areas which developed themselves and functioned to some degree during the election campaign, developed youth sections, showed the most promise, and were the most important geographically. Now that we've gone through the initial stage of helping them get the lay of the land, we must put some major reinforcements into these areas so they can function as party branches.

We know that whenever new opportunities develop for the party to expand into new areas and to form new branches, the same openings for the party exist everywhere and it's just that time when you can doubly use every new person recruited in an established branch. But we can't let provincialism override our national objectives. We must expand into those areas of the country where we've had no influence or no sections for entire periods of time -- both for objective reasons, and vis a vis our opponents.

We propose to make a national decision that the large branches, and the large, central YSA units connected with those branches, release several active com-

rades to be sent to these major areas so we can take the next step forward in the geographical expansion of the party and build new branches.

The second area of expansion is press and publications. The main thing we want to do is increase the size and quality of the Militant, to head toward what Comrade Cannon spoke about in Letters from Prison, toward that "big weekly" of the socialist movement. Once again, this is a branch leadership responsibility. One of the central things to avoid in a period like this is the temptation to drift into a situation where new openings and activities rise rapidly, but sales and subscriptions to our press don't increase with the same rhythm. If our size and influence are increasing but the party press is not, that is a sign that something's wrong. If so, then it's not merely the party press that's not increasing, but the opportunity to use the new openings to build the party itself.

We have two proposals, one on sales, and one on subscriptions to the paper. Now that winter is almost over, we want to return to the level of sales that we reached following the May-June French campaign. Remember that the May-June French campaign was utilized by the branches to raise the normal branch bundles of the Militant. In no branch, following the May-June campaign, did the bundle go down to the rate prior to May-June. What we want to do now is take that level and build up from there. Implementing this proposal, and motivating its political importance will be the collective leadership responsibility of the branches.

Secondly, on subscriptions. To a certain degree, our last few sub drives have not really been sub drives. The subscription quotas were not of such a scale that made it necessary to mobilize the branches for a special campaign activity week after week. They really were an attempt to set a national goal to get the subscriptions that we should normally be getting in our work anyway. Now we prefer to take the same approach to subscriptions that we have in the financial area, that is, to move toward a normal, regular goal of subscriptions rather than project a sub drive as a separate campaign.

We would like to project a very very modest goal in per capita figures -- a goal for every branch, of one sub per person per month. This may sound terribly low, even embarrassing. But if we do this, it will mean about the same total of new subscribers in the next six months as in our last sub drive. In addition, there will be the subs that the YSA obtains through its combined YS-Militant sub campaign.

All of the foregoing implies, of

course, that we must have a planned and balanced expansion of the national office and the national departments. Our perspectives for organizational and political growth are tied integrally together with the growth of the party departments.

It's not just funds that are necessary to expand the national departments. It's the cadre of the party. It is a myth to think that there are individuals who can be easily released from a branch because they're not that valuable there, but will be valuable in the expansion of responsibilities we have here at the center. That type of person does not exist. The qualities that make a valuable branch leader are just the qualities we need in the national departments, the identical qualities.

In other words, if we plan to move ahead and expand we must raise the funds and release the comrades to do the work. The requisite expansion in the national departments and the national office means the decision to release and assign comrades to the work. There's only one place where we can find these comrades, and that's from the party. There's no place else in the world.

Of course we must expand the national office itself, as we've done a little already, and institute a growing division of labor. Comrades probably can tell that we've expanded the staff of the national office to handle the finances of the party, to increase the transcripts and reprints sent out. I know they're still not adequate. We're proposing steps forward on that level to increase educational material, the tapes, etc. as a part of this balanced expansion.

The most important expansion in the national office is in its contact with the field, both because of the needs of the branches and the field, and because of the need for the national office to be attuned with what is going on. We must first have regional contact, regular personal contact with the regions, and regular organizational contact with the branches and the branch leaderships themselves. This is the only way that the national office can be on top of the development of the party. It's also one of the best ways that the branch leadership can periodically discuss with the national office to carry out their function as the national leadership of the party.

This is true for the YSA, too, which does not need less field work, but more. But the YSA's field work is less than ever a substitute for the party itself doing national field work and having a staff large enough so that national office comrades can spend a lot more time in the branches themselves.

Now the finances to make all this possible. The party has entirely adopted a system of monthly sustainers from the branches to the national office which is now the basic budget underpinning of the national functioning. If those branches who have not yet reached the goal of \$15 per capita per month continue to reach toward it, and those that have hit it don't make the assumption that that figure is a maximum, then there is no more need for the internal party fund drives that we've had in the past. We have eliminated the need for what were really not fund drives, but the regular, twice-a-year internal fund campaigns which we had for all those years. By going over to the sustainer system, with all the branches responsible for a quota of a \$15 per capita per month we are free to raise money through the Militant when a special occasion arises. The regular sustaining contribution to the party by the members would not be through special fund drives, but through regular monthly sustainers.

We've reached that goal as long as we keep two points in mind and don't slip back -- there can also be regression as opposed to progression. One is the continued striving by the branches to hit the \$15 goal, and second is to remember that as the party grows the sustainer must grow to maintain the \$15 per member per capita. The entire idea was geared to the concept of a growing party with the possibility of a growing periphery. The per capita sustaining system, and the possibility of appealing to the non-party readership of the Militant on special occasions will be the normal way of financing the party's budget.

The main thing to do next is close the gap between the branches that are at \$15 or near it, and those that have lagged behind. The branches that are now lagging behind in the per capita sustainers are branches which, over the last year, have sent in substantial total sums to the party in the form of the fund drive or other ways. It should be very easy for them to raise their per capita sustainers, now that we are not going to have another internal fund drive.

If we make reasonable progress, in the next six months, toward the \$15 per capita figure, our monthly deficit will decrease from \$3600 to \$2000. And if the party continues to expand, and if the party branches continue to pay the debts they owe the national office, that \$2000 itself will be almost eliminated.

It is important for the branches as well as the national office to notice that there is a basic change in the fund-raising possibilities for the party, almost a qualitative change. The young people who are joining and the periphery around the

party in this period are people who often have significant financial resources. One of the results of the post-World War II prosperity in the United States is that many youth who are attracted to the movement have significant resources that can be used to sustain the party's activity.

Secondly, we have reached the stage when we can appeal through the Militant to a growing periphery. This was shown by our last fund drive, which was launched as a public drive on the 40th anniversary of the Militant. We raised \$1650 from over 100 non-party people who responded directly to the public appeals in the Militant, plus two \$1000 life-time members of the 40th anniversary club, and part of another. So it's safe to say that over \$4000 was raised from non-party people. This means, speaking with due caution, that if we had had no fund drive, but simply launched a fund appeal for the 40th anniversary of the Militant, we might have raised that amount of money.

We must absorb this lesson about our changing financial possibilities, in the branches as well as the national office. What we must do in the branches is create a group of young people who understand not only the importance of finances, but the growing possibilities of raising funds -- not through gimmicks or special sales and fund-raising events, but by approaching individuals for resources for the party.

All of these tasks that we have been talking about, while they've been directed to the National Committee, are also the

responsibility of the comrades who are here as party branch organizers. These are the key tests, the key responsibilities, of the party leadership in the coming period.

As I said earlier, the main thing we wanted to talk about was the challenge to recruit and assimilate into the party a whole new layer. There's no question about recruitment. Even if we make some errors or lag behind in some area, we'll recruit. The real test before us is the assimilation of the young layer of recruits into the traditions and functioning of the party. We have very good material. The basic material we have was not won away from another political organization, was not trained in the school of Shachtmanism or social democracy, but young forces we have won directly to the banner of the Socialist Workers Party itself. We have first crack at them.

Our convention will take place on Labor Day, on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party, the anniversary of the beginning in this country of the traditions of Leninism, our tradition. We hope to take advantage of this next six months and the progress we project to hold a convention of active party workers who will make the decisions for the next step in the building of the party, their party, and will prepare to take advantage of all the openings that we are sure to have.

[Editor's note: the general line of this report was approved by the plenum.]

BRANCH USE OF THE MILITANT AND ISR

An Explanation of the Militant Charts

The following charts are studies of the performance of the branches in sales of Militant single copies and subscriptions on a per capita basis. The membership figures used were those from Jan. 31, 1969, since branch membership figures were not available for each month. While it is likely that the branches grew during this period, we assume that the growth was proportional, and thus the figures are fair for a comparative study of the branches.

The chart on the new subscriptions sold by each branch shows a 13 month period, from January 1968 through January 1969. The high peaks reflect the recent sub drive in November and December. We want to establish the norm of one subscription per branch member to be the quota for each branch each month. You will notice from the charts that several branches were able to achieve this goal during a number of months last year.

The chart showing the number of current subscriptions per capita in the branch area was based on the figures as of the end of February, when the great bulk of subscriptions from the recent sub drive will have expired. The subscription

figures include both the subscriptions in the city listed, and those in the area considered part of the branch's regional responsibility.

The per capita branch sales of the Militant are shown on several charts. The line graph shows the number of copies sold by each comrade in a week, charted on a monthly basis. The highest peaks are the sales during June and July around the French events. You'll notice that though the bundle sizes dropped following that period, in most areas they remained higher than the pre-French sales, even now that winter has set in.

The bar chart of the average weekly Militant sales per member from May till now is a comparative study of the average weekly per capita sales for the whole period, including the French campaign bundles. The other bar graph shows the period since the French campaign. It is significant to note here that the average bundle for many of the branches is only slightly lower for this period than when the French bundles were included, and for several branches the number of copies sold per week has actually risen since the June bundles.

Additional Facts about the Militant

Current Militant circulation, based on February 21 issue:

Domestic subs	2972
Expiring subs	2000
Foreign subs	377
Domestic bundles	3453
Foreign bundles	570
Bound volumes, office	<u>428</u>
Press run	9800

On the evolution of the press run:

The last two months before we left our previous printer, the average press run a week was 6500. During the French campaign in June the run was 20,000 per week. In July the average press run was 16,000. Since then the run has leveled off at an average of 10,275. During the early fall the branch bundles were large, but our sub base was smaller. As we increased the number of subs during the sub drive, winter weather caused the branches to lower their bundle sizes, so the press run has remained relatively constant since August.

On subscription renewals:

During the period from March through November 1968, 33% of all the regular subscriptions (\$1 introductory offer or longer term subs) were renewed, and 14% of the YS-Militant combination subscriptions were renewed, for an overall renewal rate of 24%.

In December 1968, which was the first month of the large number of expirations from the recent election campaign sub drive, 988 subscriptions expired, and 15% of these were renewed. 12% of the YS combo subs were renewed and 25% of the regular subs.

These figures compare favorably with the two previous sub drives in 1966 and 1967. In 1967 we had a selective sub drive for a total goal of 1375 subs (contrasted to 3500 subs sold in 1968). 15% of the special 50-cent subs were renewed, and the overall renewal rate for the period was 26%.

In 1966 we sold 2360 subscriptions, with a renewal of 9% of the 50-cent subs, and an overall renewal rate of 17% for

the period.

Subscriptions sent in on their own:

There has been a significant increase in the number of people who have been sending in subscriptions on their

own. During the first three weeks of February, we have received 20 to 25 new subscriptions directly from the mail each week. This is about four times what we were receiving a year ago. This is a reflection of the increased sales of single copies and a heightened interest in our ideas.



PER CAPITA BRANCH MILITANT BUNDLES AS OF APRIL 18 ISSUE

Branch	Per Capita Bundle
Philadelphia	12.0
Chicago	9.4
Seattle	9.1
Detroit	6.1
Berkeley	5.8
Cleveland	5.6
Boston	5.3
Minneapolis	4.0
San Francisco	3.1
New York	2.9
Los Angeles	2.7
Portland	1.7
San Diego	0


YSA LOCALS AND AT-LARGERS MILITANT BUNDLES AS OF APRIL 18 ISSUE

Local	Bundle
Logan, Utah	150
Atlanta, Ga.	60
Bloomington, Ind.	60
DeKalb, Ill.	60
Austin, Texas	50
Madison, Wisc.	50
Newark, N.J.	50
Phoenix, Arizona	50
St. Louis, Mo.	50
Antioch, Ohio	40
Ypsilanti-Ann Arbor, Mich.	40
Champaign, Ill.	35
Albany, N.Y.	30
Columbus, Ohio	30
Kent, Ohio	30
East Lansing, Mich.	25
San Diego, Calif.	25
Peoria, Ill.	20
Tallahassee, Fla.	20
Chapel Hill, N.C.	15
Norman, Okla.	15
Oshkosh, Wisc.	15
Stevens Point, Wisc.	15
Beckley, W. Va.	10
Brunswick, Maine	10
Irvington, N.Y.	10
Providence, R.I.	10
Sacramento, Calif.	10
New Haven, Conn.	7
Houston, Texas	5
Washington, D.C.	5
Binghamton, N.Y.	2

NUMBER OF NEW SUBSCRIPTIONS PER BRANCH MEMBER PER MONTH, JANUARY 1968 THROUGH JANUARY 1969. (Branch membership based on Jan. 31, 1969 figures.)



# Number of Current Militant Subscriptions Divided by Branch Membership



\*This figure is not the total domestic subs.







AVERAGE WEEKLY MILITANT SALES PER BRANCH MEMBER  
August, 1968 through February 21, 1969


Branch	Weekly Bundle
Chicago	[REDACTED]
Philadelphia	[REDACTED]
Detroit	[REDACTED]
Seattle	[REDACTED]
Berkeley	[REDACTED]
Boston	[REDACTED]
Cleveland	[REDACTED]
Portland	[REDACTED]
San Francisco	[REDACTED]
Los Angeles	[REDACTED]
Minneapolis	[REDACTED]
New York	[REDACTED]
San Diego	[REDACTED]
Nationally	[REDACTED]

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Copies sold per branch member

ISR Domestic Circulation Trend  
 Winter, 1961 through Jan.-Feb., 1969

(During this period, the foreign  
 circulation remained relatively  
 constant:  
 subs - 220 to 290  
 bundles - 680 to 741)



\*Note: These figures are drawn from reports on the bundles mailed, and thus do not include the bundles for the NY bookstore and newsstands.

- Winter 61
- Spring 61
- Summer 61
- Fall 61
- Winter 62
- Spring 62
- Summer 62
- Fall 62
- Winter 63
- Spring 63
- Summer 63
- Fall 63
- Winter 64
- Spring 64
- Summer 64
- Fall 64
- Winter 65
- Spring 65
- Summer 65
- Fall 65
- Winter 66
- Spring 66
- Summer 66
- Fall 66
- Winter 67
- Spring 67
- Summer 67
- Fall 67
- Winter 68
- Spring 68
- Summer 68
- Fall 68
- Winter 69

Current ISR Circulation

Branch	Subscriptions	Bundles
Berkeley	21	35
Boston	43	80
Chicago	95	95
Cleveland	45	20
Detroit	55	50
Los Angeles	77	60
Minneapolis	40	45
New York	195	100
Philadelphia	56	50
Portland	9	none
San Diego	6	none
San Francisco	30	20
Seattle	6	10
Other Areas	181	452
Total - domestic	859	1017
Canada	75	234
Other Foreign	216	527
Total Circulation	1150	1778

ISR Articles Which Were Later Published in Pamphlets

No. of Pages	Article
12	Program of Polish Opposition -- January-February, 1967 (article reset)
48	Malcolm X on Afro-American History -- March-April, 1967
21	Theories of History -- May-June, 1967
9	Malcolm X, Black Nationalism and Socialism -- July-August, 1967
28	Myths about Malcolm X -- September-October, 1967
17	Case for an Independent Black Political Party -- January-February, 1968
48	May, 1968: First Phase of French Socialist Revolution -- September-October, 1968
16	Workers under Neo-Capitalism -- November-December, 1968
24	Can American Workers Make a Socialist Revolution -- January-February, 1969
223 total pages -- 28% of ISR reprinted in pamphlets	

Information about Intercontinental Press

Current Circulation

U.S.	287	Bundles	183
Mexico	16	Newsstand	15
Canada	53	England bundle	<u>300</u>
Latin America	11		498
Europe	29		
Asia	15		
Africa	1	Totals	
Foreign general (sent by regular mail so not differentiated)	71	Subscriptions	507
Special	<u>24</u>	Bundles, newsstand	498
	507	Files, etc.	<u>295</u>
		Total	1,300

COPY

Debs Hall  
Detroit, Mich.  
Feb. 13, 1969

Dear Jack,

For the four month period from August through November, our bundle was 400 except for the last three weeks in November when it was lowered to 300. During these four months we sold on the average 239 papers a week, 63 of them at plant gates. Plant gate sales are 26.5% of the sales each week.

When we hit the plant breaks right two people can sell 50 Militants in an hour on the average. Jefferson Assembly plant sales are faster. Two people can sell 50 papers in 45 minutes.

Sales at high schools are slow so we don't do it very much. Catching kids as they go into school, one person usually sells under five. At Wayne State University one person can sell on the average of 10 an hour.

Five comrades do a large part of all the factory gate sales. Especially in the bad weather when we don't go out in the mornings but only in the afternoons, only people who don't work during the day can go out on sales. During the French campaign and summer most of the branch participated.

Our best customers are young black

workers, but we sell to some old black workers too. We sell to one or two white workers each time we go out. They vary in age. We have had very little baiting from white workers and I have never heard of any name calling from any black workers. We don't get into many conversations with customers because they are usually in a hurry to get in or out of the plant. We have steady customers who have their money ready as soon as they see us. One worker did come up to the hall as a result of the sales and asked to join the Militant. Several others have asked about meetings.

As far as branch perspectives, we hope to continue sales at the plant gates during the winter on a somewhat limited basis due to weather and man-power problems, but expand them even more than last summer and fall in the spring. We are projecting doing some campaigning for mayor (leafleting, posters, rallies) at plant gates as soon as the campaign gets under way.

This week we will be passing out Malcolm X memorial forum leaflets and selling the Malcolm issue of the YS at plant gates. (Two of us sold 20 YS's at Dodge Main in an hour with the article about DRUM in it.) One additional thing, the paper sells much better when it has pictures of the Panthers or something like that on the front page.

Comradely,  
s/Helen Schiff  
Militant Sales

[The following statistics are based on figures given to the National Office by branch organizers during the February 1969 plenum and by branch treasurers since the plenum. The "Other" category includes the Portland and Allentown branches as well as all at-large members.]

BRANCH FUNCTIONING SUMMARIES

I. MEMBERSHIP

1. No. recruited since last plenum (5/68)	2. No. dropped since last plenum										3. No. "3rd world" members in branch	4. Percent of branch in YSA		
	Boston	Chicago	Cleveland	Detroit	Los Angeles	New York	Oakland-Berkeley	Philadelphia	San Diego	San Francisco			Seattle	Twin Cities
8	6	2	7	1	12	13	6	0	4	3	6	0	0	69
0	2	2	3	3	0	2	0	0	1	1	4	0	0	17
0	0	1	1	4	4	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	15
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
0	0	1	1	4	6	6	0	2	2	0	1	1	1	24
26%	54%	42%	58%	19%	32%	52%	73%	0	40%	67%	32%	29%		38%

II. BRANCH FINANCES

1. Monthly per-capita sustainer pledged to branch as of 2/69	Boston	13.57	2. Monthly per-capita pledge to N.O. as of 4/1/69	8.42	3. Percent of branch sustainer sent to N.O.	67%	4. Branch debts (as of 2/69)	a. Militant	118.	b. Merit	429.	c. N.O. crdt.	302.	Total	245.
	Chicago	31.69		15.00		47%		179.	759.		731.		1669.		
	Cleveland	27.50	14.51	55%	42.			401.	298.	1571.	11.	2014.			
	Detroit	27.83	11.29	44%	53.			298.	500.	11.	362.				
	Los Angeles	19.53	15.00	71%	74.			500.	74.	14.	588.				
	New York	21.03	14.60	71%	88.			603.	88.	771.	1462.				
	Oakland-Berkeley	19.49	8.33	42%	328.			1236.	328.	1113.	2677.				
	Philadelphia	20.58	9.62	47%	66.			770.	66.	584.	1420.				
	San Diego		5.25		5.			0	5.	5.	10.				
	San Francisco	16.04	10.00	61%	640.			1047.	640.	617.	2304.				
	Seattle	20.83	10.00	48%	95.			780.	95.	114.	989.				
	Twin Cities	22.59	11.08	50%	105.			86.	105.	460.	651.				
	Other				11.			195.	11.	89.	295.				
	Total	20.68	11.59	60%	1804.			7104.	1804.	5778.	14,686.				



III. BRANCH FUNCTIONING (page 1)

	Boston	Chicago	Cleveland	Detroit	Los Angeles	New York	Oakland-Berkeley	Philadelphia	San Diego	San Francisco	Seattle	Twin Cities
1. Regularity of branch meetings	biw	wkly	wkly	wkly	wkly	wkly	wkly	wkly	1 or 2 mth	irr	wkly	wkly
2. Regularity of forums	wkly	wkly	monthly	wkly	wkly	wkly	wkly	wkly	none	wkly	biw	wkly
3. Branch assignments												
a. Education committee	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
b. Antiwar steering com. or director	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes
c. Sales director	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
d. Sub director	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
e. Forum comm. or director	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
f. Militant correspondent	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes
g. Black fraction	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	no	no			no	no
h. Black work fraction	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes	yes
i. Person in charge of regional work	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	yes	no		no	no
j. Social comm. or director	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	no	no			no	no
k. Bookstore comm. or director	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes

III. BRANCH FUNCTIONING (page 2)

4. Branch bookstore		Boston	Chicago	Cleveland	Detroit	Los Angeles	New York	Oakland-Berkeley	Philadelphia	San Diego	San Francisco	Seattle	Twin Cities
a. Storefront?	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes
b. App. average no. hours open per week			35	2	60	25-30	60	80	irreg	--	40		20
5. Education													
a. No. classes currently going on		4	3	1	6	4	10		0			1	3
b. YSA contact class	yes	yes			yes	yes		yes	no			yes	yes
c. YSA new member class	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no			yes	yes
d. Other YSA classes	yes	yes					yes	yes	no				
e. SWP new member class	no			yes	yes				no				yes
f. Other SWP classes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no		yes		yes
g. Regular branch educationals	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes

III. BRANCH FUNCTIONING (page 2)

6. No. comrades full-time for branch		7. Regularity in sending in branch minutes		8. Regularity in sending in exec minutes		9. Regularity in sending in monthly financial reports	
Boston	2	2	reg	reg	reg	none all 1968	irr
Chicago	2	1 1/2	reg	reg	reg	irr	reg
Cleveland	1/2	0	reg	reg	reg	reg	reg
Detroit	1 1/2	1	usfly reg	reg	reg	reg	reg
Los Angeles	1	1	none rec'd	reg	reg	reg since 12/68	reg
New York	5	3	reg	reg	reg	reg	reg
Oakland-Berkeley	2		reg	reg	reg	reg since 9/68	reg
Philadelphia	1	1	reg	reg	reg	reg since 12/68	reg
San Diego	0	0	reg/late	none	reg	reg	reg
San Francisco	9	2	reg	reg	reg	reg	reg
Seattle	0		irr	irr	irr	none	irr
Twin Cities	1	1	irr	irr	irr	reg	reg

b. No. of these sustained by the branch

2 (1 is temp)

anti-war direc Cuba tour (temp)

org cam-paign direc

org city sec bkstr direc cmpgn direc candi-date

org bkstr direc

IV. 1969 ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

1. Date of municipal elections	2. Major posts being contended for	3. No. candidates branch is running	4. Posts party candidates running for	5. Date party campaign began (or will begin)
none	Boston	---		
none	Chicago	---		
11/69	Cleveland	1	mayor	April
9/69	Detroit	1	mayor com- mon coun- cil	Mar
4/69	Los Angeles	2	mayor bd of ed	Jan
11/69	New York	5	mayor con- trol- ler pres, city cncil boro pres cncil- man at large	Feb
4/69	Oakland-Berkeley	3	city cncil schl direc	Jan
11/69	Philadelphia	4	cntrlr DA judges	Mar
	San Diego			
11/69	San Francisco	not de- cided	brd of super- vsrs	not de- cided
11/69	Seattle	1	mayor	April
4/69	Twin Cities	3	mayor schl bd aldr- man	Feb
Atlanta	Other Party Campaigns			

RESULTS OF NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP SURVEY

Figures are based on survey returns from the branches received by the National Office by March 31, 1969, amounting to 70% of the total membership. Percentages have been rounded off.

Age group	AGE			
	Party as whole Percentage	NC members and alternates* Percentage	Full-timers** Percentage	Branch exec. members Percentage
under 20	3	0	0	0
20-25	33	0	19	40
26-30	23	23	52	31
31-35	7	3	6	3
36-40	8	23	2	7
41-50***	10	23	11	11
51-60***	9	17	6	5
over 60	6	10	4	4

\* The NC category does not include advisory members.

\*\* The full-time category includes comrades who are on full time assignment for branches or national departments.

\*\*\* Note that the 41-50 and 51-60 categories are each ten year spans as opposed to the others which are five year spans.

DURATION OF MEMBERSHIP

Percent of current members who joined within indicated years.

Years	Percent
1936 or before	6
1937-1939	5
1940-1949	9
1950-1959	10
1960-Feb. 1969	70

Percent of current members who joined during or since the year indicated (for example, 55 % of the current members joined in 1964 or since then, since the 1963 convention).

Year	Percent
1969	5
1968	20
1967	32
1966	41
1965	48
1964	55
1963	58
1962	64
1961	68
1960	70

FORMAL EDUCATION

Amount of formal education completed	Percent
Grammar school or less (7th grade)	2
High school only (including high school graduates)	25
Some college but less than four years	35
Four years college or more	40

(Thus, 75% have had at least some college education.)

SEX

	Percent
Male	63
Female	37

PARTY-YSA INFORMATION

Of members currently in party:

63% were in YSA before they joined party

20% are now graduates of YSA (joined YSA first, then party, then graduated from YSA)

Of current members who joined party 1960-69:

87% came through the YSA (were members of YSA first)

UNION MEMBERSHIP

35% are currently members of unions