

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

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Contribution to the International Discussion

By Marcel

Since I find myself in disagreement with several important points in the document "Introduction du débat international par les camarades belges de la Tendance Majorité" [Introduction to the International Discussion by the Belgian Comrades of the Majority Tendency], I am presenting a document explaining my positions.

I. EUROPE

I support the majority resolution on Europe because I think it offers a correct assessment of the situation and its probable development, outlining perspectives that seem to me to be correct.

I consider the minority's voting against this document as a vote of no confidence in the majority, a lack of confidence that arises from the disastrous policy that the majority has followed in Latin America.

As for the objections the minority has made to the European document ["The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe," International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 5, Nov. 1972], they seem to me to be either limited (although often correct, as in the case of Ireland), based on misunderstandings (as in the case of their opposing workers' control and the sliding scale of wages), or on misinterpretations of the majority's positions (e.g., the decisive historical defeats that might occur in four or five years). Thus, I think that it is wrong to reject the European document as a whole.

I think that the discussion must be carried further on several points by both tendencies.

II. LATIN AMERICA

When we reread the Ninth World Congress Resolution on Latin America, we see that the majority made two errors:

1. On rural guerrilla warfare being the main axis of revolutionary struggles for the coming period.

" . . . civil war will take manifold forms of armed struggle in which the principal axis for a whole period will be rural guerrilla warfare. . . ."

This has been refuted by the urban mass movements in several countries (Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, to mention only a few).

2. On the possibilities for the mass movement developing before a decisive confrontation takes place with the

army. The actual experiences since the Ninth World Congress in Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile demonstrate that the bourgeoisie can be forced to retreat before the mass

movement and offer democratic openings enabling a revolutionary leadership to organize the masses solidly—as well as arm them—before a decisive confrontation takes place. This is what the Bolsheviks did between February and July 1917, when they blocked Kornilov's attempt at a coup d'état.

On these two points a critical balance sheet is needed. That is the least that can be said.

Where do the differences lie?

The essential thing in the discussion on Latin America is to try to locate the real differences.

Is the minority opposed to the very principle of armed struggle, and does it underestimate the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in arming the masses?

The answer to this question can only be "no," when we read in the minority report on the European resolution:

"As in every other aspect of the struggles of the masses, we play a *vanguard* role. We take the initiative *within the masses* on such questions as the formation of strike pickets and workers militias or, in certain situations, guerrilla units to defend the mass struggles of the peasants. We take these initiatives as members of the *mass* organizations, and in the name of the *mass* organizations, even if initially few besides ourselves are involved. The course followed by Hugo Blanco in Peru and the course followed by the Trotskyist leaders of the 1934 teamsters strike in Minneapolis offer instructive examples." [IIDB, Vol. X, No. 3, March 1973, p. 26.]

The minority, thus, is not against the principle of armed struggle, nor against revolutionary Marxists taking initiatives in this area. But perhaps it only sees armed struggle as the culmination of a whole revolutionary process leading to a situation of dual power on the national level. Does the minority preclude all armed struggle until the eve of taking power?

Reading the chapter on armed struggle in Hugo Blanco's book will impel every comrade to answer "no" to this question.

Where, then, do the real differences lie?

We find an element of the answer in the quotation given from the minority report on the European resolution, when it continually stresses that initiatives in arming the masses or in guerrilla warfare must be made by comrades as "members of *mass* organizations, and in the name of these *mass* organizations."

A different position is upheld by the majority when it talks about "armed detachments of the party" (majority

tendency document) and "a minimum application" of armed struggle.

It is true that you have to do some fancy sifting through the majority document to find this. But this is exactly the sort of maneuver contained in all the documents of Ernest Germain. Unlike Livio, he does not argue for guerrilla warfare (either rural or urban) but for "armed struggle." This has two objectives:

1. This shifts the axis of the debate on the Ninth World Congress and without saying so explicitly insinuates that the minority is against "armed struggle."

2. Most importantly, this line of argument comes to the same conclusion as Livio. Armed detachments of the party are needed, as well as "a minimum application" of armed struggle.

What does this lead to? It is clear that if such activity does not lead to arming the masses, it will turn into isolated rural or urban guerrilla warfare, without any organic link with the real mass movement.

The real question is not whether the masses *understand* these armed actions by armed detachments of the party but whether they are ready to *join* in this struggle. In other words, the question—and this is where the difference lies—is *whether this activity by small armed detachments of the party leads to arming the masses.*

The answer can only be "no."

The way to arm the masses is not by exemplary actions external to the mass movement but through the actual experience of the masses under the leadership of revolutionists working in the traditional mass organizations as well as those thrown up by the struggle.

Two complementary quotations, the first from Lenin and the second from Trotsky, demonstrate that this was also their opinion:

"Precisely because a step like the transition to armed street fighting is a 'tough' one and because it is 'inevitable sooner or later,' it can and should be carried out only by a strong revolutionary organization which *directly* leads the movement." (*Complete Works*, VI, p. 262, emphasis in the original.)

"Tasks such as creating a *workers' militia*, *arming the workers*, preparing for a *general strike* will never get off the drawing board as long as the masses do not take up the struggle themselves through bodies that take the lead. Only such action committees born out of the struggle can create a real militia, comprising not thousands but tens of thousands of fighters." ("Front Populaire et Comités d'Action," *La Mouvement Communiste en France*, p. 540.) [See *Writings of Leon Trotsky* (1935-36), p. 58.]

When the revolutionary organization does not "*directly*" lead the movement, the armed actions of "detachments of the party" do not lead to arming the masses but to guerrilla warfare which may or may not be understood by the urban or rural masses. Such guerrilla warfare conducted by our Latin-American sections (which, moreover, are still far from being mass parties) is leading to a situation where, when the masses move, our organizations, because of their guerrilla line, find themselves either physically decapitated or politically disoriented.

These assertions can be backed up by concrete evidence.

Argentina

The PRT-Combatiente [Partido Revolucionario de los

Trabajadores (Combatiente) — Revolutionary Workers Party] has lost a great many cadres, either fallen in combat or imprisoned.

This criticism would be unjustified if these losses were inevitable. But in Argentina there is:

(a) One of the most powerful trade-union movements in the world, which the military dictatorship has not succeeded in destroying. The regime has managed largely to co-opt the trade-union movement, but these unions still have nothing in common with vertical unions of the Spanish type. Plant committees exist in all the factories.

(b) A powerful mass movement.

(c) A major radicalization in the trade-union movement.

Revolutionists had an opportunity to build their organization without isolating themselves from the masses, without exposing themselves to the selective repression that has fallen on the guerrilla groups.

The PRT leadership—in agreement with the majority—made another choice, with the result that the organization now finds itself physically decapitated and politically disoriented at a time when the question of whether or not the workers will break from Peronism is to be decided in reality. These are the real historic stakes in Argentina.

Bolivia

In Bolivia, under the Barrientos dictatorship, the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario — Revolutionary Workers Party] was making preparations for guerrilla warfare in concert with the Castroist ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional — National Liberation Army]. Although it did not turn to guerrilla struggle, the POR—which proclaimed that it was going to do so—came under the repression exercised against the guerrilla groups. Military work absorbed a very large part of the organization's energies.

As a result of this, the POR was unable to play its full role when the rise of the mass movement began under the Ovando regime.

We raise this question: Is it by chance that the POR has not had a congress or even a Central Committee meeting since 1966? Is it by chance that mass work was neglected? Is it by chance that the newspaper appeared very irregularly? Is it by chance, or is there a contradiction between this and "technical preparation" of armed detachments of the party?

Moscoso himself gives an answer. He demonstrates that the POR persisted in its errors under Ovando: "Under the Ovando regime the party worked in conditions of total clandestinity and found itself completely absorbed in armed work. Since last November, after Torres came to power, we have been able to resume our legal work in the unions but also among the peasants and the students, where we had done very little before."

Here Moscoso contradicts the document of the majority tendency which claims that the POR engaged in mass work to the fullest extent under Ovando.

But the POR persisted in its errors even under the Torres regime. In November 1970, after a semi-insurrection by the masses prevented General Miranda from coming to power, *Combate* [the POR newspaper] ran the headline: "Despite the defeats, the road to national and social liberation is still guerrilla warfare." In this article, one could read: "A general strike cannot lead to workers' power unless at the same time there is a revolutionary army,

and this arises precisely out of the armed struggle itself."

This guerrilla line could only lead to deficiencies in the struggle to win the leadership of the masses. The majority will reply that our comrades nonetheless led three unions and that POR comrades participated in the Popular Assembly as trade-union representatives (the POR as such was not represented). This only demonstrates that great opportunities existed for revolutionists. According to Moscoso himself, much more than this was possible.

But the quotation from *Combate* is instructive on another account. It demonstrates once again that for Moscoso as well as for Livio, what Ernest Germain always discreetly terms an "orientation toward armed struggle" or an "armed-struggle line" means guerrilla warfare.

Furthermore, the document on Bolivia adopted at the last IEC [International Executive Committee of the Fourth International] once again sets such a perspective:

" . . . the culminating stage of the revolution when large masses of workers and peasants mobilize will be preceded by other stages where armed struggle will be the task of sectors or nuclei of the vanguard. Thus the need for this specific form of armed struggle which is guerrilla warfare." [*International Internal Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. X, No. 6, p. 11.]

We state that if the POR repeats the error it made in the Barrientos period and throws itself into guerrilla warfare during a phase of retreat by the movement, it risks being destroyed and disoriented, or having to start from scratch when the masses start to move and it is faced with the need to play its leading role to the full. The "armed-struggle orientation"—in reality the "guerrilla strategy"—stands in contradiction with building the revolutionary party, mass work, and thus with arming the proletariat.

To counter this conclusion, the comrades of the majority raise a question: "Was it necessary to wait for the masses to move under Barrientos? Is it necessary to wait for them to move under Banzer?"

To be sure, revolutionists do not fold their hands in a period of ebb. But the tasks in a time of retreat are different from those when the movement is on the offensive. Trotsky refers to them in *The Third International After Lenin*. In discussing the 1923 defeat in Germany, he says:

" . . . the Opposition persistently repeated that the revolutionary situation was already missed; that sail had to be taken in, in expectation of contrary and unfavorable winds, that it was not the insurrection that was on the agenda, but defensive battles against an enemy which has assumed the offensive—uniting the masses for partial demands, creating points of support in the unions, etc." [p. 250]

You can't call that "waiting." And history demonstrates that it is possible to make gains in conditions even worse than those in Germany after 1923, where the organization is driven completely underground, as the Bolshevik party was and as the POR is now. But Trotsky would have called throwing the revolutionary organization into guerrilla warfare during such a phase, as the IEC proposes to do, by its right name—revolutionary adventurism.

III. A QUESTION OF METHODOLOGY

In the discussion in the Political Bureau, the com-

rades of the majority raised an important question: "Do the standards of party building serve as the measure for determining the political line?" To this question, they answered: "No. The political line must be determined by the objective needs of the class struggle."

This is a strange procedure completely counterposing two dialectically linked elements.

We know that the basis of the Leninist conception of the revolutionary party is the theory of the development of revolutionary consciousness. The task of the revolutionary organization consists in bringing the consciousness of the decisive sectors of the working class into consonance with the objective situation and making them aware of the tasks that flow from this situation. In order to achieve this, the revolutionary organization puts forward a transitional program which it endeavors on all occasions to put into practice.

The task of the revolutionary organization consists of raising the level of consciousness of the working class, and it draws its strength from this process. It is only when this task is accomplished and when the revolutionary organization takes the leadership in action that the objective needs of the class struggle can be met.

Raising political consciousness, strengthening the revolutionary organization, and responding to the objective needs of the class struggle are indissolubly linked.

IV. AGAINST HASTY GENERALIZATIONS. AGAINST FALSE DEBATES.

Both tendencies draw more general conclusions from the differences that have appeared on these points.

The minority considers that there is a crisis in the Fourth International because of "ultraleft or opportunist deviations or a combination of both" on the part of the majority.

The majority considers that important differences with the minority exist on the character of the period (the minority believing that the revolution is on the ebb), on the main tasks before us (the minority having a propagandistic conception of party building), and on the nature of transitional demands (the minority tending to confuse them with immediate ones). Furthermore, the minority is supposed to have a right-opportunist character.

It would be wrong to oppose the tendencies carrying the discussion further to arrive at more general conclusions. It is true that this is sharpening the differences, but to resist it would represent a fundamentally anti-Marxist moralistic attitude. The discussion on the background of the differences and on methodology is important and everyone must participate in it.

But, on the other hand, the generalizations must clarify the discussion. And in order to do that, they must be based on real differences and on definitely established facts. Otherwise, they act as smoke screens obscuring the discussion and diverting it from the real problems.

The so-called debate on "armed struggle" is obviously diverting the discussion from its real subject—guerrilla warfare. The majority's other generalizations are hasty and ill founded. At the present stage of the debate, it still has not been demonstrated that there is any major difference over the period. On Latin America—the principal object of the debate so far—in any case, none has ap-

peared. The differences on Vietnam do not justify concluding that the minority thinks there is a general ebb in the world revolution. Reproaching the minority for a propagandistic conception of party building seems at least exaggerated, when you realize that in its orientation to the antiwar movement the SWP was the first section to make an "interventionist" turn. Moreover, very often we hear the opposite accusation: The American comrades are supposed to have a "tendency to chase after every mass movement." On the conception of the Transitional Program, Joseph Hansen's article in the *International Socialist Review* [October 1971] seemed entirely correct to me.

Finally the discussion over which is the main danger, right opportunism or ultraleftism, seems to me to be a false and dangerous debate, inasmuch as it threatens to blind both tendencies to perils within their own current. In fact, both dangers exist. While the majority's arguments concerning the Canadian section seem convincing, the threat of ultraleftism definitely exists in the majority tendency. Enough has been said on Latin America. But besides this the English section has certainly set out on an ultraleft course. The proof of this is the following quotation concerning the general strike where these comrades raise the strategic objective of revolutionists as an argument for opposing any intermediate aim: "The aim of such a decisive clash as a General Strike cannot be posed as some reform. Even if the strike should start round more limited aims it is the task of *revolutionaries*

to attempt to turn this into a decisive struggle for *power* — not to pose its aim as some gain *within* the bourgeois state." ["The Left and the Tory Government," by Alan Jones, *Red Mole*, March 3, 1973.] Other examples can be given, such as the ultraleft tendency that has appeared in the Ligue Communiste, the tendency represented by Jebracq.

On the other hand, I do not think, contrary to the minority, that these ultraleft tendencies are reflected in the European document.

On this point, my conclusion is that an international leadership must remain on guard against both dangers, against left as well as right opportunism. To the extent that the tendencies engage in a debate over which is the "main danger," there is a threat that this will not be done. That is the danger.

V. CONCLUSION

My position is, thus, intermediary between the two tendencies. Since I consider that the differences on Europe are not so basic as the ones on Latin America, I think that the latter remains the principal issue at stake in the world congress. It is, therefore, essentially on Latin America that I will carry on a discussion in the Belgian section.

As for general conclusions and methodology, I defer my answer until the discussion is further advanced, among other things, on Europe.

April 17, 1973

Why We Have Joined the International Majority Tendency

By Mintoff and Sonja

As the authors of the declaration "Why we joined the IMT" we wish to stress the very limited purpose of the text, which was and is not intended to be a contribution to the international discussion, but was written for the sole purpose of informing the membership of the GIM of our step. Therefore its character is very different from that of the other declaration, which tries to outline a third position independent of both the majority and minority tendencies, whereas we confined ourselves to quoting one example (Vietnam solidarity) to illustrate what, in our opinion, is one of the central issues in the present debate, and otherwise referring the reader to the relevant tendency documents. Thus we would ask you not to publish the declaration in the International Internal Discussion Bulletin unless this clarification is added, especially since we intend to submit a contribution explicitly taking up the arguments of the "Why we did not sign. . ." declaration in the coming weeks.

* * *

Although it is perfectly "normal" in the functioning of a democratic-centralist organization, the formal creation of tendencies always signals the existence of deep differences of opinion that involve more than practical matters. Thus the differences between the two tendencies in the Fourth International transcend episodic controversies and touch on nearly all the problems of party-building today, not just in one or a few countries but on all continents. Is the orientation of the International Majority towards armed struggle in Latin America a concession to the ultralefts, the currents among radical youth that glorify guerrilla war, as the Minority ("Leninist-Trotskyist") Tendency maintains? Has this concession to the ultra-left currents been extended "geographically and programatically" to the European document, as is maintained in the declaration of the Minority? Does the Majority neglect systematic mass mobilization on the basis of the method of the Transitional Program in favor of illusory attempts to find a shortcut to power through ultraleft adventurism?

These are a few of the questions that have been raised by the Minority Tendency's polemic. The only Leninist method of resolving such differences is through broad, democratic discussion of all positions, in all sections and, all branches of the International. As for the membership of the German section, it has been at a great disadvantage in this respect compared to the English-speaking sections because, with few exceptions (and these concern contributions that appeared some time ago and that deal solely with Latin America) most of the documents of this discussion have not been available in German up till now, and therefore only a few comrades have been able to note the real scope and essence of the differences.

The first necessary step to change this situation is the distribution of all documents of the International debate among the members of the GIM in German. A whole number of contributions of both tendencies will shortly

be available. But as we see it, this alone will not be sufficient to lead the German section out of its role as passive observer in this extremely important debate. In order to really be able to assimilate the lessons of the discussion, and profit from it for the GIM's own discussion of strategy, *the active participation of German comrades* in the debate is absolutely necessary. This, in turn, is of course only meaningful if the disputed questions have real relevance for the present-day situation of the German section. If it were "only" a question of this or that alleged mistake of a Latin American section, then the discussion in the GIM would become the exclusive concern of "specialists." We agree with the Minority Tendency on one point, however, that their position on armed struggle in Latin America cannot be looked upon separately from their conception of the character of the Transitional Program and conversely that the method employed by the author of the European document is of course the basis of the majority position.

In the belief that the present international debate is of greatest importance for the GIM as well, and that the active participation of German comrades is the best precondition in the GIM for carrying out intensive preparatory discussion for the Tenth World Congress, the undersigned members of the Political Bureau have joined the Majority Tendency.

We have taken this step against the advice of the other members of the Political Bureau. They felt that the entrance of members of the GIM leadership into one of the existing tendencies was premature in the present situation, did not correspond to the state of the discussion in the German section, and would provoke the formation of countertendencies that were unjustified precisely because of the relatively underdeveloped state of the discussion. We don't think that this is a convincing argument. As we have said above, we believe that, on the contrary, it is precisely the formation (even in embryonic state) of such tendencies in the GIM oriented around the international debate that can prevent the German section from languishing on the periphery of the political life of the International and that such tendencies can only enrich the discussion—e. g., about applying the European document to German conditions.

But behind the reluctance of the other Political Bureau comrades there stands more than such practical considerations. Behind it stands the rejection of the Latin America policy of the Majority, which they reject with very much the same arguments as those employed by the Minority, although they declare themselves in agreement with the Majority "on all other questions." Thus they are attempting to separate the Latin America debate from the other points of contention. Unfortunately, these comrades have not yet laid out their position on armed struggle in Latin America in a positive manner. We agree with them in many of the criticisms they have expressed orally: we too consider, for instance, the political orientation of the PRT-Combatiente, the Argentine section, to be a devia-

tion from Trotskyism (and, naturally, from the orientation on Latin America decided on at the Ninth World Congress.)

We, however, clearly take our position with the Majority on a question that, in our opinion, constitutes the essence of the international controversy: Does the building of a Leninist party, whether in Western Europe or Latin America, merely mean patient propagandizing around transitional demands, or is not the task of the revolutionist above all to go beyond this propaganda, to undertake organized initiatives that show the masses and especially the vanguard *in practice* the answers to the concrete problems they face at a given time? Assuming that the answer to this question is affirmative—and if one supports the European document, it must be affirmative—another question naturally arises: is the problem of armed confrontation with the bourgeois state *concretely* posed for the insurgent masses in most of the countries of Latin America at the present time, i.e., do they face repression with every upswing in the mass movement or not, and, if so, what position should the sections of the Fourth International take on this question? Isn't it the duty of these sections in such situations as the Torres episode in Bolivia or under the Allende regime in Chile to go beyond a propagandistic dissemination of the general truth that in the last analysis capitalism must be toppled by force? Isn't their duty to begin to organize the workers and peasants in various forms, depending on their strength, for armed action, including rural guerrilla warfare?

Those who, like the "Leninist-Trotskyist tendency" call this orientation a concession to ultraleftism are themselves making concessions to the reformist illusions of a section of the Latin American labor movement. Those who claim that armed struggle is not on the order of the day in Latin America because the mass movement has not attained the level of maturity that alone can justify armed struggle, that therefore propagandizing around transitional demands in the mass movement must be the sole priority of the Trotskyist movement, fall victim to the reformist illusion that relatively prolonged phases of bourgeois democracy are possible that will offer the conditions for a continuous organic development of the mass movement—a supposition that is directly contradicted by a Marxist analysis of the explosive state of class antagonisms that has been reached in Latin America.

But this is not all. The thesis that underlies the Minority's criticism—that the subjective consciousness of the Bolivian and Argentinian masses is not ripe for armed struggle and that an armed struggle orientation will only isolate us from the mass movement points to another difference of opinion that is organically related to the disagreement on Latin America: the Minority's conception that transitional demands must always take their point of departure from the subjective consciousness of the masses and have as their goal raising the consciousness of the masses to a higher level. We, however, are of the opinion that it is rather the objective *tasks* of the moment and the *concretely posed problems* from which the transitional method takes its point of departure. It is the revolutionary-Marxist solutions to the problems and tasks that must be formulated in demands and slogans that are understandable to the masses at their given

level of consciousness. The subordination of the revolutionary goal to the "biggest possible mass mobilization" will sooner or later take its revenge in the form of an absence of mass mobilization itself when the conjunctural situation changes—precisely because the stabilization of the *political* base was neglected.

An instructive example of this is afforded by the Vietnam solidarity movement. With the central demand "Out Now" the U.S. antiwar movement, strongly influenced by the SWP (the core of the international Minority), succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of thousands, even millions against the U.S. intervention in Indochina. This demand was without a doubt completely correct. The European solidarity movement continually made this demand central to its mobilizations as well. However, European revolutionists at the same time advanced the slogan "Victory to the NLF" or something similar in the mass movement, a slogan that, as Comrade Waters correctly noted, is not a demand directed towards anyone, but rather a declaration of solidarity aimed at raising the consciousness of the masses participating in the solidarity actions beyond the level of mere moral protest. The American comrades have criticized this, maintaining that the slogan "Victory to the NLF" excluded thousands of pacifists and similar people from the movement and thereby reduced its impact. Well, the European demonstrations were often mass demonstrations of tens of thousands anyway—but the decisive point is what happened *when the signing of the cease-fire accords and the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces had largely removed the "moralist-pacifist" base for the mass mobilizations. The Vietnamese revolution naturally continued and further solidarity actions were necessary.* But when the symbol of the South Vietnam puppet regime, President Thieu, visited the USA in April of this year, there were only sorry crowds of a few hundred anti-imperialist demonstrators to meet him—even in the largest cities: 300 in San Francisco, 200 in San Diego, 120 (!) in Washington, D.C. in front of the White House, 300 in New York. . . . (all figures are from *Intercontinental Press*). In Europe, by contrast, there were tens of thousands in Italy and more than 6,000 in Bonn! The simple explanation for this is that in the period of spontaneous mass mobilizations—of pure *protest*—the European solidarity movement and particularly the sections of the Fourth International intervening in it, in contrast to the SWP, did not neglect to introduce into the spontaneous movement an element of consciousness that was not present at first—the consciousness of *unconditional solidarity with the Indochinese revolutionists* and was thereby able at least minimally to immunize the masses against Nixon's tactical maneuvers.

In the framework of this declaration we cannot go more deeply into the theoretical differences between the Minority Tendency and the Majority. The Majority document "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International" goes into them in detail, and we hope that we ourselves will be able to make contributions in the further course of the discussion. What we wished to make clear here by illustration is the fundamental difference in method between the two tendencies: the propagandistic approach of the Minority, which idealizes the mass movement, versus the method of pushing the mass movement forward through independent initiatives by revolutionists. This is

the difference that explains the different positions in the Latin America debate, not any "Guevarist," "Castroist," or "ultraleft" current in the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Such illusions must be cleared away. As members of the Majority Tendency we see our principal task as representing and applying the *real* positions of our tendency, including criticisms of *real* ultraleft deviations (ERP), in the GIM. To this end we will organize the speedy trans-

lation and distribution of its documents (naturally under the supervision of the entire national leadership), write contributions ourselves, and organize internal discussions in the GIM with representatives of our tendency. We invite every comrade and every branch of the organization that wishes to discuss the Majority position to call upon us.

May 10, 1973

Mintoff, Sonja

Why We Did Not Sign the International Majority's Tendency Declaration

By Karl, Nico, Albert, Heinrich, Emanuel,
Hartmut, Karew, Juan, Oskar, Richard, Werner, and Oliver

On behalf of the authors of the declaration "Why We Did Not Sign the International Majority's Tendency Declaration" we submit this statement to the international discussion and the leading bodies of the Fourth International.

We wish to stress again the limited purpose of this statement, which is not a document presenting our whole view of the Latin American debate and our analysis of the events in Bolivia and Argentina. A more detailed contribution will be worked out by us during this summer.

We ask you to submit our declaration to both the organized tendencies, the members of the leading bodies of the International, the sections of the International and its sympathizing organizations, where this is technically possible, at least to European ones.

We reaffirm by this way our readiness to discuss these issues with both international tendencies.

Above this we take special interest in contacts and discussions with those comrades inside the sections and sympathizing organizations who in other questions more or less share the positions of the international majority, but are opposed to important aspects of its Latin American orientation.

With this letter we kindly ask the leaderships of the sections and sympathizing organizations, especially in Europe, to make this our wish known to its membership and to allow those comrades, who are interested in contact and discussion with us about this subject to write to us on a regular basis.

For contacts with us, the authors of the above mentioned declaration, the following address should be used: Herward Achterberg, D-6000 Frankfurt, Lersnerstrasse 14, Phone 0611-598397.

* * *

1. On the Establishment of the International Majority Tendency in the German Section

At the December 1972 IEC plenum, two tendencies were formed—one representing a majority of the United Secretariat—grouped around Ernest, Livio, and Pierre—the other, a minority of the United Secretariat—grouped around comrades of the SWP and the LSA/LSO.

A number of leading members of national sections and sympathizing organizations responded affirmatively to the call of the IEC majority to form a tendency, expressing their support in the following statement: "We respond to the call launched by 19 comrades of the December 1972 IEC and we decide to constitute a tendency on the basis of the general line of the document 'In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International.' (Note: by Ernest.) We consider that the theses on the construction

of revolutionary parties in Europe, as well as the resolution on Bolivia, adopted by the last IEC in December 1972, which correspond to that general line, likewise constitute part of the political basis of the tendency. The tendency will elaborate other documents to be submitted to a vote at the Tenth World Congress (Fourth Congress Since Reunification), particularly on Argentina, on the basis of the general line adopted at the last IEC."

This declaration of tendency has since been signed by the following GIM comrades: Georg (IEC), Sonja (PB, CC), Mintoff (PB, CC). These circumstances require us to explain why we did not likewise join the International Majority. To this end, we offer the organization an appropriately brief reply.

We do not deny that *internationally* the discussion had reached a stage ripe for forming these two international tendencies. At the same time, we must take note of the fact that the GIM has lagged lamentably behind in this international debate, since the discussion here has as yet by no means been conducted in a proper or structured manner—a circumstance which is not the fault of the international bodies but rather of the GIM itself and its national bodies. Under these conditions, for comrades in the leadership of our organization to join the international majority was rather artificial. For the internal development of the GIM it would certainly have been better if this tendency had been established in the context of a discussion within this organization. This tendency has been formed in the GIM at a time when the documents upon which it is based are known to very few comrades and thus this step and our reaction to it are scarcely comprehensible to the ranks.

Despite the reservation we have outlined here, on a political basis we of course approve the step these comrades have taken in joining one of the international tendencies. This stems from our acceptance of the character of the Fourth International as the nucleus of a world party, which means that it is something qualitatively more than a federation of national organizations. At the same time, we approve of this step as a possible attempt by these comrades to stimulate the process of forming opinions within the GIM. We approve of it in complete confidence that these comrades will make allowance for the concrete conditions governing the discussion in the GIM, that they will make use of their international backing, their contacts and information, in a democratic fashion for the benefit of the entire organization. We have complete confidence, moreover, that in conducting this debate within the GIM they will give especial consideration to the fact that up to now the International Minority has not been represented.

We declare our readiness to discuss the disputed ques-

tions freely and openly with these comrades, and with the International Majority and Minority as well. It is our goal to resolve these differences within the GIM and not let them become factionally hardened. It is our intention not to let these differences on the question of Latin America interfere with collaborating and cooperating with these comrades on other disputed questions within the GIM.

2. Fatal Alternatives

It would be fatal if the current international debate were to be presented to the GIM as though the only choice was between the international majority and all of its positions en bloc and the international minority and all its positions—or even more crudely, between the SWP and the Ligue Communiste or Ernest Mandel.

The International Majority and its representatives in the GIM will have to accept the fact that there are comrades who find themselves in agreement with the Majority on most theoretical and practical-political questions, but who, however, are opposed to retaining the present orientation for Latin America.

It is legitimate, of course, for the International Majority to express explicit agreement with the European document in their declaration of tendency, especially since the International Minority voted *against* this document in the IEC.

But we wish to caution the comrades of the Majority in the GIM against elevating the European document to the central point in forming their tendency. We are firmly convinced that agreement with the European document is considerably broader in the GIM than agreement with the positions of the International Majority as a whole.

We would caution against bringing more and more questions in, going beyond the situation in Latin America, to widen the basis of this tendency. This method would not correspond (a) to the actual course of the international debate, whose focus is clearly the Latin-American orientation of the Ninth World Congress, a debate which is too important to be buried under a welter of other controversial subjects, and (b) to our work in Latin America and the fate of our sections there, for which this orientation is no mere pawn in maneuvers for winning majorities at congresses but quite literally a matter of life and death. (We agree with Livio that this debate must be geared to the needs of our work in Latin America and not to the demands of internal tendency struggles.)

We will not allow ourselves to be put in a position of having to agree with all the positions of the International Majority en bloc or else renounce our previous views. It is understandable that for tactical purposes the comrades would want to achieve the *broadest* possible majority by broadening the themes, but this could just as easily cause the opposite of the desired effect. Besides this has a logic that implicitly confirms the argument of the International Minority, which the Majority has rejected, that the European document is an extension of the Latin American strategy by other means.

Therefore, we are going to insist somewhat stubbornly on centering this debate on our Latin America strategy, and we are not going to be prepared to "substitute" a discussion of the LSA position on Quebec or various adaptations of the Transitional Program. Even if you are of the opinion that the Latin America strategy may

not be viewed in isolation from the overall positions of the Majority, that makes it all the more imperative to scrutinize the soundness of this strategy, if necessary, right down to its last details.

Another fatal alternative would be to conduct the debate around the dubious question: "What is your position on armed struggle?" We proceed from the assumption that this does not need to be debated and that for every comrade in the Fourth International the necessity of armed struggle is self-evident.

We do not see the slightest grounds for the notion that the comrades of the International Minority take another view. In view of the overt violence of the whole capitalist society in the USA we consider it absurd to think that the comrades of the SWP believe in the possibility of a "peaceful road to socialism."

If it is only a question of affirming the necessity of armed struggle, the World Congress document of 1969 and the present discussion would be superfluous—unless one were of the opinion that the Fourth International had become politically so degenerate that it needed to make such a general reaffirmation of armed struggle.

What was decided on and what is at issue here is rural (and, according to more recent modifications also urban) guerrilla warfare as a strategy (!) for all of Latin America for an extended period ("rural guerrilla warfare for a prolonged period on a continental scale.") The Tenth World Congress will have to evaluate and decide anew upon this "strategic orientation."

3. On the History of the Debate

What is striking about the course of the debate so far is that the analysis of the *objective* factors retreats further and further behind the presentation of the subjective, behind personal debates and factional gossip. Without identifying ourselves with the content of the Minority documents, we are of the opinion that so far only the International Minority has contributed a comprehensive analysis of the experience with the orientation of 1969 in Latin America, and that those documents of the Majority known to us so far can often be characterized less as honest balance sheets than as defensive and sometimes hair-splitting reactions to the documents of the Minority.

Clearly, what comes up short in this kind of debate is clarification of the facts, the establishment of the concrete relationship between the application of the Ninth World Congress strategy and the actual dynamics of the revolutionary process in Latin America.

As one of the poorly informed sections (even if by its own fault), what the GIM needs most of all are documents that rise above the polemical duel and clarify the issues, that lay out in an objective manner the development of our sections in following this line, their positions and splits, documents that indicate the real relationship of forces on the left in these countries and in the workers movement, etc. (The publication of the PRT-ERP documents in the "International Internal Discussion Bulletin" was an initial important step in this direction.)¹

4. General Reservations on the Latin American Line

This position statement can in no sense substitute for

a document on the Latin American discussion. Such a text can only be worked out in the course of the elaboration in the international debate and the development of the discussion in the GIM. As the discussion in our section gets under way, moreover, there may well be contributions and documents reflecting differences among the "non-signers" of the Majority declaration. We intend to present here only a rather small list of objections that serve as a common denominator.

(a) Guerrilla warfare as a strategy: Forms of work and struggle such as distributing leaflets, demonstrations, strikes, campaigns, use of arms, etc., do not in themselves constitute a strategy but rather are means to the end of carrying out a given strategy, even if in specific situations they can take on strategic functions. But to attempt to prescribe the use of one particular method for a whole continent and for a long period ("rural guerrilla warfare for a prolonged period on a continental scale") is, to say the least, dubious. Naturally, "armed struggle" in its most general sense, is also a strategy, in that it is a part of the strategy of the revolutionary seizure of power, just as the strike as a revolutionary mass strike is part of the strategy for revolutionary seizure of power; and in this general sense it is just as important for Germany as for Bolivia and is thus useless as a designation for a specific strategy for Latin America. Quite obviously what is in question here is not completing the process of the revolutionary seizure of power through the use of armed struggle in all Latin America but rather no more than creating the elementary subjective preconditions for this. And in this sense it is impossible, in our opinion, to proclaim guerrilla struggle as the general strategy in Latin America: at most it is possible only to assign it a tactical value.

(b) Background of the 1969 World Congress line.

In the International Majority there have coexisted from the beginning two different principal motivations for this line, which, however, never have been clearly expressed in the (joint) documents: that of Livio, most clearly expressed in "An insufficient letter": rural guerrilla war as the possible means for a quick breakthrough, for a short cut to the seizure of power, to the early establishment of the first workers state in which our influence has played a decisive role ("The rest will follow"). Livio's point of departure is primarily an *offensive* one; and on the other hand, that of Ernest: The repression under the dictatorships in Latin America is so great that every wave of workers and mass struggles will always be drowned in blood; rural guerrilla warfare as a strategy for survival of the revolutionists, in order to secure a sound base of operations vis-à-vis the repressive apparatus. Hence, the starting point here is primarily *defensive*.

The experiences since 1969 (which are not conclusive) have tended to refute both lines of argument more than to bear them out.

Both revolutionary opportunities in this period (Bolivia and Chile) were the result of the power of mass struggle of the "traditional" subject of revolution, the working class. In neither instance did guerrilla struggle play a role worth mentioning. In Bolivia precisely the application of the World Congress line led to a situation where our section (POR-Combate) was unable to utilize this great revolu-

tionary opportunity. Chile, fortunately, was from the very beginning exempted from the "continental" guerrilla "strategy" (here, in the last few months, a promising regroupment of our forces has taken place).

The dictatorships have without exception proven themselves more capable of liquidating the rural and urban guerrillas (Guatemala, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia) than the "traditional" struggles (Bolivia, Argentina). One has to search for what remains of this kind of armed struggle in Latin America today. It has been demonstrated that the military relationship of forces between modern army and repressive apparatus on the one hand and the more or less isolated guerrilla troops on the other is too unfavorable to the latter for it to survive.

If anyone should choose to counter with the argument that the ERP has stepped up its activity in recent weeks, you would have to take account of the ambiguous character of the period of transition between the election and Cámpora's taking office.

On the other hand, the crushing of class struggles in important instances (Argentina, Bolivia) has *not* led to the result that was claimed to be inevitable; on the contrary, the possibility of broad, and to some extent, even legal trade union and political work can no longer be disputed.

A total defeat and atomization of the Bolivian working class after the Banzer coup was not prevented by guerrillas, but rather by the capacity of resistance of the working class, which was able to maintain a certain balance of forces and initiate a new offensive.

(c) Conditions of armed struggle.

Armed struggle must fulfill a specific function in historically specific situations. These flow from a concrete context of mass consciousness and mass activity. This is different from saying that it is only justified when the masses themselves are taking up arms, which is too narrow a formula.

In any case, as a general "method of revolutionary education" for the masses, armed struggle is unsuitable; it makes them passive observers of heroic actions, and tends to demoralize them through the ultimate failure of such actions. You cannot prepare the masses for armed struggle simply by starting one up yourself. The ability to prepare the masses for armed struggle is inseparably linked to the weight of the subjective factor, that is to say, to the building of the party. When an organization that is still very weak takes up an isolated rural or urban guerrilla struggle, it cannot at the same time go forward with the building of the party: it is compelled to concentrate its weak forces essentially on the guerrilla struggle, if it wants to take it seriously. The repression largely eliminates its general opportunities for work, the legal ones in any case; its organizational ties to the workers movement are cut off, etc.

This process in turn rebounds on the organization itself: its political orientation, membership criteria, its social composition, the composition of its leadership. That can lead, in the event of certain military successes, to moving away from the revolutionary-Marxist program and to military deviations (PRT/ERP), and, in the opposite event, to decimated ranks that are unable to play a significant role either in armed struggle or work among workers.

In our opinion, even given all of the differences between individual countries, the classical concept of military work from the time of the Comintern—the parallel apparatus—

corresponds more closely to the demands and conditions.

This means that the military aspect is interrelated with party building, that military measures are coordinated with the political struggle and the mass work of the party; the party retains the initiative in combining both sides (and does not merely play the part of an armed defense guard whenever a militant workers struggle develops). Educating the masses as to the necessity of armed struggle therefore follows the rhythms of their own struggles. The primacy of political work and security of the party are maintained.

What is decisive in the last analysis, of course, is not the military concept, but correct politics. *False politics*, of course, even with a correct military conception, leads to defeat (the Reval uprising, Hamburg uprising).

(d) Effects on our sections.

The attempt to apply the line of the Ninth World Congress led, in our opinion, wherever it was undertaken—in Bolivia and Argentina—to political defeats for the Fourth International and hindered our taking advantage of many objective opportunities.

The PRT/ERP has become an overwhelmingly military organization. Its conception of a connection with mass work ("base committees") necessarily remained on paper. Its military actions consist of kidnappings and ambushes. A dynamic leading to the fusion of this activity with the workers struggles and party building can be neither observed nor inferred. Its Trotskyist foundation is overlaid with Maoist, Guevarist and generally centrist theories. The gun is in command of its politics. Its political insufficiency was demonstrated anew on the occasion of the elections ("Neither elections nor coup d'etat—revolution!"). In this constellation, splits were inevitable. A strong section, not split by a guerrilla orientation could have played a significant role in the powerful upsurge of class struggle that preceded the electoral maneuvers and the return of Perón.

In Bolivia in the pre-Torres period, our section tried vainly to initiate rural guerrilla war. This—pending a further examination of the facts—led to their being largely isolated from the class struggle during the decisive phase of the rise of the revolution and their failing to play a role in the crucial stages of the revolutionary process, even though the situation urgently required an alternative revolutionary class leadership; and such a party, if it had been integrated into this process, would have had great opportunities. At the same time, the relationship of forces within the left shifted to a considerable extent against us (and not least of all to the advantage of Lora). Our party was already gearing itself for the "defeat" of the revolution (in order, then, as the letter from Moscoso printed in the October 1971 *Was Tun* says, to take up the guerrilla war for which they had been preparing for so long), at a time when what had to be done was to struggle for victory.

In view of this outcome, it is getting off into secondary questions to discuss whether they advanced the correct slogan in this or that situation or the vicissitudes of their acceptance into the Asamblea Popular, etc. What is decisive is why they got into a situation where all of this was fundamentally irrelevant to the course of things, why for example, they had to appeal for admittance to the Asamblea Popular only after everyone else was already represented.

We shouldn't try to pretty up these facts by belittling the *significance* of the revolutionary events themselves, or concocting hairsplitting theories to rationalize such actions, as for example: The POR-Combate was *right* not to participate in the Comando Politico of the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana—Bolivian Workers Federation, the united front formation that preceded the Asamblea Popular] because, as a result of the participation of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement], the latter was a "popular front."²

The results of the Latin-American orientation adopted at the Ninth World Congress show that it does not conform to the needs of a proletarian class line; it has separated our sections from the class struggle and has not furthered the process of party building. This, moreover, has occurred not during a lull but during an upsurge in the class struggle that went all the way to a revolutionary crisis. The Tenth World Congress should reexamine this line and establish one enabling our parties to carry out their tasks and seize the opportunities in a new revolutionary upsurge.

5. Our Responsibility

The German section shares equally in the responsibility for the guerrilla strategy of the Ninth World Congress, and we are prepared, for our part, to accept that responsibility. This orientation certainly is not the product of a conspiracy nor is it the work of a "chief architect," but rather it is the result of a concrete and positive development which the world revolution and thus, fortunately, the Fourth International also passed through.

It is indeed not for nothing that there are so many quotations from comrades Joe Hansen, Moreno, and others that fit so well into the Latin American line of the present majority.

The Cuban revolution, the Vietnamese revolution, May '68 in France, these were landmarks of an upsurge of world revolution so stormy, which thrust forward the reality of revolution so tangibly, that a living revolutionary movement could not but cast about for the stoutest club with which to lay capitalism to rest.

One has to try to think back to what it was like in that period and to recall why OLAS, why Che Guevara, why Vietnam made such a gigantic impression, that *anything* seemed possible.

The Fourth International as a whole takes credit for the successes of the last few years; it must likewise bear collective responsibility for the mistakes and defeats which were unavoidable after such a period.

At the same time, at any rate, it is our opinion that the necessary rectifications must be made with a certain timeliness; otherwise the course of events will accomplish this task in spite of us and there will be nothing left to correct.

May 10, 1973

Karl (PB, CC); Nico (PB, CC); Albert (PB, CC); Heinrich (PB, CC); Emanuel (CC); Hartmut, Speyer (CC); Karew, Hamburg (CC); Juan, Heidelberg (CC); Oskar, Heidelberg (CC); Richard, Hgen (CC); Werner, MA (CC); Oliver, Gottingen (ZK).

Supplementary Statements:

Karew: I consider the details of point 4 to be insufficiently worked out, in particular the blanket statements in item (b) concerning the guerrilla experiences. Perhaps a short formulation would have been more meaningful. I therefore support point 4 in its main thesis but not in its specific statements.

Hartmut: I agree with the general line of this statement without being able to take a position on every detail. I consider it necessary that a third voice finally make itself heard between the Majority and the Minority in the present discussion—a voice which, without sharing the position of the Minority on other questions, criticizes the guerrilla strategy of the Majority on Latin America. The intent of my signature is to try to prevent this international debate from becoming dangerously overheated.

1. Note by Karl: In this context, I believe that the policy of the International in disseminating information should be criticized, even though it is partially understandable for security reasons. My impression is that information is frequently passed out according to the demands of the tendency struggle (and is withdrawn or contradicted as necessary); that information—whether coincidentally or internationally—has been disseminated privately (comrades who happened to take a trip to Paris have often been better informed than the official leaderships); that in the debate on Latin America comrades and sections can be divided into two classes—the informed and the uninformed—and that in discussions at the international level or with comrades from the International the uninformed are left to wonder in amazement at the rabbits the experts of the two tendencies alternately pull out of their hats. Subordinating the debate to tactical considerations is necessarily at the cost of clarity. When, for example, at the December 1972 IEC representatives of the International Majority time and time again centered their con-

tributions on the person, past, vacillations and idiosyncracies of a single comrade (Moreno), this could only be described—with all due respect to the role of the individual in history—as a diversionary maneuver.

2. Note by Karl: According to this line of reasoning the "Comando Politico" of the ADGB (Allgemein-deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund—German Trade-Union Federation) when the Kapp putsch was defeated by a general strike would also have been a "popular front," because represented in it, alongside the "yellow" unions (Hirsch-Dunckersche), was even the arch-bourgeois Democratic party. What an astounding rationalization after the fact for the ultraleft position held at the time by the USP (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei—Independent Social Democratic party), which consisted of rejecting the ADGB's slogan of a workers government based on the trade unions which was advanced through this "popular front."

Declaration of Internationalist Tendency

Chicago, Illinois
May 27, 1973

The Political Committee
Socialist Workers Party
14 Charles Lane
New York, N. Y. 10014

Dear Comrades:

We submit this Declaration of the Internationalist Tendency for publication in both the International Discussion Bulletins and the Discussion Bulletin of the Socialist Workers Party.

The below listed comrades announce the formation of the Internationalist Tendency in the Socialist Workers Party. This tendency reflects the political and organizational evolution, growth and maturing of the tendency formed by Massey, Shaffer and Smith on January 19, 1973.

The Internationalist Tendency, in the interest of the building of a "Leninist-Trotskyist" Fourth International not only in words but in deeds, expresses its basic agreement with the general line of the December 3, 1972, Statement of the 19 IEC Members, and addendum; the Draft Thesis "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" adopted by the IEC; and the further elaboration and clarification of this line contained in the document "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International."

In addition, the Internationalist Tendency will submit a counterresolution on the international questions in opposition to the line of the present leadership of the Socialist Workers Party, as well as a political resolution extending the method of the Draft Thesis "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" to the United States.

The Minority Tendency reflects a right opportunist danger to the development of the Fourth International because of its abandonment of the methodology of the Transitional Program in practice and its abstention from involvement in the struggles of the working class, and counterposes an abstract and sterile conception of party building. This conception sees a growth of the party taking place as a result of socialist propaganda for recruitment, on the one hand, and calls to action on a minimal basis,

on the other. It fails to advance a transitional approach and tactical solutions for the more advanced layers in struggle. It presents party building as separate or apart from the needs of the living class struggle including the methods of armed struggle under specific circumstances. This is a repudiation of the Leninist strategy for the seizure of state power and the smashing of the bourgeois state, which requires the party leading the masses in the military as well as the political arena.

We call on all SWP members to support the general line of the International Majority Tendency and to reject the counterline of the SWP and the International Minority Tendency.

Comradely,
The Internationalist Tendency
Bill Massey — National Co-Ordinator
(Chicago)

For:

Bruce Clark — Boston
John Montello — Boston

John Barzman — Chicago
Don Smith — Chicago

David Rossi — Houston
John Shaffer — Houston
Ted Stacy — Houston

Hedda Garza — Lower Manhattan

Patrick Quinn — Madison

Jeff Meissner — Minneapolis

John Chairet — Oakland-Berkeley

Robin Block — Philadelphia

Chris Marat — Washington, D. C.

Copy to: United Secretariat
International Majority Tendency

Statement of Support to the International Majority Tendency

Dear Comrades:

Since the inception of the 1973 preconvention discussion a number of members of the Socialist Workers Party have declared political support to the International Majority Tendency in the party's internal bulletin. We wish to add our names to that list and also to state the primary reasons for our adherence to the general line of the International Majority Tendency; additionally, we will indicate several areas where we are not at this time in total agreement.

1) We do not accept the SWP leadership's claim that the schism in the United Secretariat of the Fourth International concerns advocates of Guevarism as opposed to orthodox supporters of Leninist party building. Instead, the division rotates around the most fundamental issues for all Leninists and Trotskyists: the character of the Transitional Program and the necessity of raising the political consciousness of the masses; the importance of initiatives in action and reaching the vanguard elements with overtly revolutionary propaganda; the primacy of a proletarian orientation, especially in the advanced capitalist countries; elections as a revolutionary weapon; democratic centralism and the nature of the International; Permanent Revolution and national liberation struggles.

May 1968 was the decisive turning point in the development of the Fourth International since the 1963 reunification. Subsequent to that historic crossroads it became clear that the SWP leadership was moving in the direction of becoming the right wing of the world movement, and the European parties the left wing. While the SWP leadership interpreted the aborted French revolution as a reaffirmation of their intercontinental-wide student strategy, the European comrades absorbed the true lessons: the importance of being able to challenge the Stalinists and reformists inside the workers movement. Despite hesitations and disagreements on certain formulations and historical questions, we stand squarely behind the document "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe," which represents an authentic affirmation of the proletarian tasks awaiting Trotskyism — as opposed to the SWP leadership's counterstrategy of minimalist demands and a petty-bourgeois orientation.

The so-called "Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency" represents an unprincipled combination out to challenge the leadership of the Fourth International for organizational control. One component of this combination includes the full political support of the SWP/LSA with their petty-bourgeois/minimalist perspective; and Moreno — one time guerrillaist and neo-Maoist. Also, unfortunately associated with this amalgam are Hugo Blanco, who penetrated mass organizations and developed armed struggle for defense of workers and peasants; and Comrade Peng, whose "Return to the Road of Trotskyism" argues the case for a thoroughgoing proletarianization of parties in advanced capitalist countries.

2) While we also support the general line of Ernest Germain's "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the

Fourth International," we wish to clarify before the SWP and International as a whole that we hold some differences, such as the following:

a) *Argentina*: It must unfortunately be acknowledged that Comrade Germain is all too correct when he observes that in Argentina there is a most favorable objective situation and a number of self-proclaimed Trotskyists, but no genuine Leninist-Trotskyist current. The ERP/PRT, no matter how admirable, is not Trotskyist in either theory or practice. The Moreno/Coral combination, on the other hand, lacks the willingness to advance the struggle beyond the legal channels and conforms to the classical definition of centrism — revolutionary in words, reformist in deeds. It should also be stated that under the concrete circumstances it was absolutely correct and necessary for revolutionaries to have entered into and participated in the 1973 Argentine elections — providing the elections *were used* to advance a *revolutionary transitional program*. This would include a call for the formation of workers councils, a workers militia and a workers government, while also a denunciation of the capitalist dictatorship and an exposition of its phony elections. In our opinion this was neither the spirit nor the letter of the PST campaign.

b) *Bolivia*: We agree with Comrade Germain's statement that — to say the least — there were incorrect formulations in the 9th World Congress Resolution on Latin America. However, despite certain errors of the POR-Gonzalez it manifested no deep-seated tendencies toward adventurism (like that of the ERP) nor toward opportunism (like that of the PST). The International Majority Tendency is 100 percent correct in their insistence that a revolutionary party undertake the task of educating the workers in action on the necessity of armed struggle. Although under the Barrientos regime the POR-Gonzalez turned mistakenly away from mass work, they did ultimately intervene fully in the urban mass struggles and they emerged from the battle unquestionably the only participant with a correct analysis and program — not only in words but in deeds. Nevertheless, we are in opposition to the sections of Livio Maitan's December 2 resolution, "Bolivia — Results and Perspectives," which explicitly give priority to the military side of the activities of the POR-Gonzalez in the next stage. Maitan clearly reaffirms those mistaken formulations in regard to a continental-wide strategy of guerrilla warfare.

c) We do not have full agreement with all of Comrade Germain's analysis of the political situation on the North American continent or with all his statements on SWP policy in the United States. This especially pertains to the party's orientation, and its confusion of the ideology of Black and Chicano nationalism with the national liberation struggles themselves.

d) There remain several additional issues in dispute within the world Trotskyist movement which are not presently incorporated into the Tendency Declaration of the International Majority as a basis of support. These include the nature of Stalinism, the struggle for women's liberation as opposed to feminist ideology, the correct slogans for the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, etc. We

will state our attitude on these matters at the appropriate time.

* * *

Representatives of the Tendency now formed around this "Statement of Support to the International Majority

Tendency" in SWP branches on the West Coast are:

Oakland/Berkeley: Ralph Levitt/Celia Stodola

Los Angeles: Judy Shane/Ron Warren

San Francisco: Jeff Beneke/Garth Chojnowski

June 10, 1973