

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

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APRIL 1973

Resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores
(PRT (Combatiente) – Revolutionary Workers Party)

Plus Resolutions of the Subsequent Meetings of the Central Committee and Executive Committee

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Resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores [PRT (Combatiente) -- Revolutionary Workers Party]

Plus resolutions of the subsequent meetings
of the Central Committee and Executive Committee

Introduction

On July 19-20, 1970, the Fifth Congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores [PRT—Revolutionary Workers Party] met clandestinely. Since its Fourth Congress in March 1968, the party had gone through difficult vicissitudes in its efforts to transform itself into a proletarian and combat party. Between November 1969 and July 1970 these vicissitudes took the form of a profound crisis, a product of the open outbreak of the class struggle within the party. This process culminated precisely at the time of the Fifth Congress, which marked a fundamental turn in the life of the organization.

The protagonists at this important meeting were compañeros representing party cells scattered in different parts of the country. The Fifth Congress was characterized by the firm determination to assume the complex and varied tasks belonging to the process of revolutionary war that our country and our people were beginning to go through. It was also characterized by its good social composition and by the serious, responsible, enthusiastic, and thorough discussion that ended by defining the party's line with precision. In this way it illuminated the long and victorious road ahead by correctly applying the general principles of the science of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of the Ar-

gentine revolution.

The pamphlet that we now offer to the working-class vanguard and revolutionary intellectuals contains as its basic material the resolutions of our party's Fifth Congress. In publishing this, we settle a revolutionary debt—the excessive delay in bringing out these materials. Although mimeographed copies and an incomplete and technically very poor printed edition were issued, their circulation was limited. The present complete edition, with the inclusion of some of the subsequent resolutions of the party and the program of the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People] constitutes material that adequately puts forth the general line of our organization.

The fundamental importance of the party's guiding role emerges clearly from an analysis of this material, which shows the conscious character of the activities developed by our organization and the discussion and continual elaboration of our line. The few months' experience we have lived through since the Fifth Congress has enabled us to test in daily activities and understand more clearly the correction of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the role of the party in a process of revolutionary war, a concept that we are striving to apply consistently, conscious of the fact that it constitutes one of our fundamental contributions toward solving the problems of the Argentine and Latin American revolution.

July 1971

The Class Struggle Inside the Party

The following analysis of the class struggle inside the party utilizes by way of reference a draft resolution, presented by the Central Committee as a self-criticism in con-voking the Fifth Congress. It was presented by Candela, Polo, Bernardo, Alonso and Matias last April. This document was one of the first official expositions of the centrists. In spite of its basic character—its misrepresentations and grave violations of underground security—it is worth replying to inasmuch as it voices some of the main arguments used by the centrists in the internal struggle.

Because of its centrist structure, which does not consist of an objective analysis, a revolutionary critique, a contribution to the party's line, the document constitutes a factional indictment with a class content directed against the party's morale. Its intention is to confuse the weakest sectors through misrepresentations, exaggerations, and lies. The first step in a critique of this document is necessarily an analysis of the class struggle inside the party, a recapitulation of the party's internal situation, the context of the social forces represented by the contending groups in which the document was written. Naturally, the centrist theoreticians, owing to their new critical pre-occupation, are not at all interested in delving into this vital question. We, however, with a greater interest in making a revolutionary proletarian party out of our organization, have been doing this since the time of Morenoism and we insist on it once again, conscious that the fundamental importance of this fight rests in the party being able to emerge from it immunized against the Morenoist virus, the main form through which the petty bourgeoisie has entered our party in order to act negatively within it as an agent of the classes hostile to the socialist revolution.

The Marxist theory of the revolutionary party teaches that such an organization is at all times exposed to manifestations of the class struggle within it. This is inevitable in its first stage, the period of the organization's birth; it is very probable in the period of formation and growth; it is even possible for this struggle to reappear in a fully developed revolutionary party. As long as capitalism continues to exist in the world, as long as the class struggle goes on in society, every revolutionary party will have to endure the influence of pressures from the classes in combat. This can remain latent, hidden, developing in a subterranean way, finding partial solutions through the exercise of criticism and self-criticism; or it can explode, becoming manifest with the emergence of tendencies as happened in our party.

The class struggle inside the party corresponds to the class struggle in society at large. The exacerbation of class antagonisms, the ripening of the situation, sharpen the class struggle inside the party. Distinct tendencies become clear and the denouement is prepared which—if it results in victory for the proletarian wing—will accelerate the full development of the revolutionary proletarian party, placing it in position to play its leading and creative role.

The class struggle within the party is of fundamental importance because the victory of the proletariat in this internal fight points toward resolving one of the fun-

damental problems of every revolution: (a) The creation by the proletariat and revolutionary intelligentsia of the revolutionary party, the main and decisive tool that can make possible the future triumph of the revolution. (b) The adoption of a correct line for a specific period of time.

The manifestations of the class struggle cause grave disturbances in the party and are usually extremely sharp and intense. We all recall Lenin's historic battles within the Russian Social Democracy. The Chinese Communist Party also underwent fierce fights and important break-ups. In the case of these two parties there were many irreversible divisions and splits. The Vietnamese Communist Party, on the other hand, wound up its internal struggles by unifying the bulk of the three preexisting parties, thanks to the political authority of Ho Chi Minh and the proletarian standards of the vast majority of the leading Vietnamese cadres. The agency transmitting bourgeois and petty-bourgeois concepts and methods into revolutionary organizations is principally the revolutionary intelligentsia, composed of elements coming from these classes. The proletarian foundation of a revolutionary party consists of its worker cadres and militants. As Lenin explained, both of these elements are indispensable to the party since it represents the fusion of the worker vanguard with revolutionary theory. Until it attains full theoretical ability in the course of revolutionary struggle, the worker vanguard needs the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois revolutionary intelligentsia. But this fusion, this uniting of workers and intellectuals, must be realized as a reciprocal heightening of levels within the party—the vanguard workers raising their understanding of theory, and the revolutionary intellectuals raising their level by adopting the proletarian point of view, characteristics, and methods.

Those intellectuals who do not exercise self-criticism to correct and improve themselves retain their class limitations. They become a petty-bourgeois or bourgeois virus, go on to form tendencies when the class struggle sharpens, turning into agents of the class enemy within the revolutionary party.

The same thing happens with those workers who adopt petty-bourgeois and bourgeois characteristics, methods, and points of view, or who become bureaucratized.

Every unproletarianized revolutionary intellectual, every petty-bourgeoisified or bureaucratized revolutionary worker, can correctly orient himself in the course of the internal struggle, can understand and correct his mistakes through exercising criticism and self-criticism. This has occurred in history, particularly the cases of Leon Trotsky, Lunacharsky, and other Russian revolutionists. Their extreme individualistic tendencies, intellectual pedantry, and other petty-bourgeois limitations kept them outside the proletarian current for years. But their revolutionary consistency, their contact with the worker masses, brought them back into the proletarian wing at a later stage. Once they understood their past mistakes and the causes of them and had sincerely criticized themselves, they could be readmitted into the party, being counted from then on among the staunchest of revolutionaries.

Having made these points, which, even though they

are far from having exhausted the subject of class struggle inside the party, will help us orient ourselves and understand our party's prehistory and the stage it is now going through, we can proceed to recapitulate our party's past.

For twenty years a sect vegetated in the workers movement. It appeared under various names that can be summed up in "Morenoism," after its leader, N. Moreno. It emerged from bourgeois intellectual groups that claimed to be Trotskyist (Quebracho, Justo, and Company). At its birth it was characterized by the correct approach of going to the masses as the first step in building a revolutionary party. Because of the extreme youthfulness of its cadres, their distance from Leninist theory and method (which were difficult to come by in that period and appeared unattractive because of Stalinist propaganda), and the natural egocentricity to be found in all youthful forces, the Moreno group succumbed from the beginning to the enormous pressure of the massive movement for union organization that swept the country at the time (1944-45), giving it the spontanéist, syndicalist stamp it has never lost. This, its most outstanding characteristic, led it to develop on the basis of concepts and methods alien and hostile to Marxism-Leninism that even to this day exercise a harmful influence on the vanguard and in our party up to this Fifth Congress.

According to the Morenoist strategy, the revolutionary process will begin with a triumphant strike, or a series of triumphant strikes (an upsurge), which, followed by a general strike, will end with a mass insurrection, the victory of which at the least possible cost and with the guarantee of a profound revolution requires the leadership of a revolutionary proletarian party. It assumes that the masses will spontaneously orient toward the program of the party and accept its leadership. Also, that the bourgeoisie's armed forces will be shattered at the first onslaught of the masses and that the process leading to the victory of the revolution will be rapid and bloodless. It dreams of an "antiseptic" revolution, without this horrible ingredient of dead and wounded, triumphing because of political skill. For this strategy, the Russian revolution (October) was the example to be followed, but with fewer deaths and without the civil war that followed it. The Chinese revolution, along with its leadership, was condemned because of its high cost in human lives. This ingenuous and aristocratic pretension fogged the party's vision for years. It is the cause of the total lack of fighting spirit, of the allergic reaction to the most minimum risks, characteristic of the majority of leaders who came out of Morenoism. In like manner, according to this strategy, the unions in Argentina are the most important instruments for gathering together and leading the masses (like the Russian soviets). It holds that a handful of large factories could play the fundamental role of motor force and leadership of the revolution, thereby making it possible for a tiny party to climb to the top of this proletariat, and, via the mass union organizations (CGT), exercise its leadership throughout the country. On the basis of this strategy came the tactic of concentrating forces in the union organizations, especially in the large factories, where the party had to stay, burying itself, in expectation of the coming upsurges of the general strike and victorious insurrection. From this it followed that the main obligation of the leader-

ship was to maintain the party, "preserve" it, without understanding that to detain it, to preserve it, means death. This explains the reason for the enormous baneful conservatism that spread like a poison gas or soporific through the party, destroying its initiativeness, reducing its goals to ridiculous dimensions, transforming its activity into insignificant peddling, replacing the lion's roar of revolutionists with timid, sporadic cat meows. The Morenoist strategy gave rise to the timid mentality that sees great risks in everything, retreats before dangers, views the smallest positive step forward as an adventure, and, magnifying the blows received, does not seek to fight back and is overwhelmed by them. As we know, this mentality is characteristic of the majority of the leaders with a Morenoist background. The entire party must write in letters of fire the revolutionary principle that capitalism cannot be destroyed without "audacity and more audacity," that one of the most essential characteristics of a revolutionist is his decisiveness, that a revolutionist is a man of action.

The fetishism about the comisiones internas and cuerpos de delegados [steering committees and delegate committees in the plants] as a natural working-class vanguard also derives from the Morenoist syndicalist concept, the concept that the main party activity should be in the struggle for immediate demands in the factory, and that leading the proletariat means holding a majority in the comisiones internas and cuerpos de delegados and from there orienting the "concrete" or "structural class struggle," that is, union struggles for wages and conditions. In order to achieve this, the activists necessarily had to hide the fact that they were revolutionists. In accordance with Morenoist criteria, union activity would have the effect of making the activists the tacticians, the "officers" of the class struggle.

Every union conflict became the axis of work for the whole party and its success was a matter of honor. On the other hand, revolutionary propaganda and agitation were called "propagandism." This term was coined by Morenoism to place the label of "erroneous" on all political activity not connected with "concrete" syndicalism.

To try to bring Marxist concepts, socialism, to the masses was considered to be superstructural activity and therefore of secondary importance when it was not considered a "provocation." Clearly this tactic could have no other effect than to keep Morenoism at the tail (sometimes the arm) of the union bureaucracy. And the only way they differentiated themselves (by demanding a higher wage increase) was by marching behind the bureaucrats, protesting and shaking their fists. It is also clear that by abstaining from the independent activity required of a party, the axis of which is agitation among the masses, Morenoism cut off any quantitative or qualitative growth.

This strategy and tactics, and the methods flowing from them, instead of linking up Morenoism with the masses (an objective that was sincerely sought) paradoxically took the group further away. Its composition became more and more petty-bourgeois up to the period just before the unification of FRIP [Frente Revolucionario Indoamericano Popular — Indian American Revolutionary Popular Front] and Palabra Obrera when it became almost totally petty-bourgeois. This was bound to happen because syndicalism and spontanéism correspond to that

social class's point of view when, influenced by the working-class struggle, and/or attracted to Marxism, it takes up an elementary workerist outlook, idolizing the most visible aspects of the class struggle. This same isolation from the working class resulted in the indiscriminate and formal proletarianization that we all know about. Parallel with its petty-bourgeoisification, the Morenoist sect, now lacking vitality, underwent a process of bureaucratization (about the time of the split with Bengochea) with the rise to leadership positions of men without training or hardening who had the typical characteristics of functionaries on the make.

We believe we have said enough to remind the party of the fundamental aspects and social character of Morenoism. Let us now turn to the history of the party to locate the initial point of the organization's transformation, the origins of the Leninist and proletarian wing which by penetrating the petty-bourgeois and already senile body of Morenoism, began by revitalizing it so as to immediately initiate a transformation to overcome it through a dialectical process whose motor force was the internal class struggle as expressed in the antagonistic¹ petty-bourgeois-proletarian contradiction. The result of this process was to provide the Argentine socialist revolution with a new Leninist and proletarian victory and thereby a substantial, possibly definitive, step toward transforming the PRT into the proletarian Marxist-Leninist organization that will lead the revolutionary struggle in our country.

In the winter of 1963 a united front agreement was signed by Palabra Obrera (represented by N. Moreno) and the FRIP (represented by five of its members). The ideological basis of this agreement was acceptance of Marxism; its political base was the perspective of building a revolutionary working-class party. The agreement was facilitated by the fact that both groups had a similar point of view concerning armed struggle—considered to be the only road to taking power—namely, that it was first necessary to build a small revolutionary party. This agreement corresponded to the situation that existed at the time when the vanguard was debating how to begin the armed struggle, and putschist currents abounded. Palabra Obrera had recently suffered a split in this direction (the Bengochea group).

However, two large differences remained, which it was agreed would be settled in the following months: (a) Relations with Peronism. Palabra Obrera took a Peronist position in accordance with the tactic of entryism while the FRIP considered this to be incorrect. This difference was immediately resolved with the abandonment of entryism. (b) Relations with the Fourth International and Trotskyism. Palabra Obrera claimed to be Trotskyist and belonged to the Fourth International, while the FRIP was not in agreement with this. The difference was resolved more than a year later by a majority vote at a plenum of the Central Committee for full incorporation in the International.

The FRIP we have been talking about was a small petty-bourgeois group with a populist ideology formed in 1961. Thanks to the mass work it had undertaken in Santiago and Tucumán among the sugar and lumber workers and in the slum areas, it had been progressively assimilating the methods and concepts of Marxism.

At the time of the united front with Palabra Obrera it continued to be a petty-bourgeois current whose basic merit lay in its orientation toward mass work.

A short time after signing the agreement and in compliance with one of its clauses, the FRIP-Palabra Obrera front began joint work in Tucumán based on the previous work of both groups. This activity centered around an orientation toward the sugar workers and constituted the beginnings of the party's Leninist and proletarian wing. Since 1961 the sugar workers had in fact been going through a stage of great mobilizations and energetic struggles provoked by the profound crisis in the sugar industry. This struggle transformed them into the vanguard beyond question of the Argentine working class. And thanks to our party's strength, this vanguard began among other things to transcend the trade-union level and move into the political arena. It was in this period that a group of workers entered the party who, at the same time they were being formed into Marxist revolutionists, brought into the organization a working-class point of view, proletarian methods and characteristics (hardness, decisiveness, energy, close ties with the masses). They had a decisive influence on the revolutionary intellectuals who were undergoing training with them; and their class influence predominated in the party's Tucumán section, converting it into a proletarian sector. This process, decisive for the party's future, carried with it the seeds of the internal class battle. As long as the bourgeoisie maintained its domination through a parliamentary bourgeois-democratic regime, this contradiction remained incipient,² breaking out with all its intensity when the bourgeoisie had to resort to the Onganía military dictatorship and use open violence against the masses as the chief method of continuing its antiworking class and antipopular offensive. Thus, it was within the framework of developing a party line to meet the new stage initiated by the June 1966 coup that the class struggle had to become manifest in an open form inside the PRT itself.³

Toward the end of 1966 the working-class ranks of the Tucumán section began to raise the need to take up armed struggle. The compañeros who made this proposal had gone through several years of peaceful struggle, principally of a trade-union nature. They had led important working-class mobilizations, finally suffering a brutal setback in this field despite having begun to use increasingly violent methods.

Thus the proposal for armed struggle was not brought into the PRT by revolutionary students and intellectuals influenced by the revolutionary experience of other countries. It arose from the direct experience of the Argentine working masses and was brought into the party by their vanguard, which had already traveled the road of peaceful struggle that began with ordinary strikes, participation in elections, proceeded to factory occupations with the taking of hostages, then turned to violent street demonstrations, until—when Onganía took power—all possibility for legal work was ended and this vanguard oriented correctly toward revolutionary war.⁴

Many recollections of these struggles come to mind at present and we decided to mention an anecdote by way of example: January 12, 1967. As a part of the National Sugar-workers Struggle Plan, the FOTIA [Federación

Obrera Tucumana de la Industria Azucarera] called four meetings in some small cities in the province's interior. Bella Vista was one of them. The workers in San Pedro, San José, Amelia, Bella Vista and Santa Lucía were supposed to gather there. At that time our party led the San José union and in this way took part in the meetings. The government had already amply demonstrated its new methods and it banned the meetings. The San José workers rode forty-five kilometers to Bella Vista via side roads they had previously reconnoitered. Groups from Santa Lucía walked the twenty kilometers to the meeting site. This had to be done because the police patrolled the roads to block the workers. By 1 p.m. there were about 200 workers in Bella Vista. The majority were from San José and Santa Lucía and they waited near the union headquarters for the meeting scheduled for 5 p.m. Some forty police, members of the Provincial Infantry Guard, who came from San Miguel de Tucumán, were quartered in the police station four blocks away. An incident . . . [line missing] . . . holding a leader from San José in order to provoke the workers. Within a few moments the battle began. Led by some 100 activists from San José, the workers used slingshots and three or four of the twenty Molotov cocktails they had on hand. The police began with tear gas, aiming it against the union headquarters. Later, forcefully driven away, they used 45-caliber pistols. The confrontation lasted half an hour and resulted in the retreat of the soldiers, who abandoned the area and took refuge in the police station, leaving the town in the hands of the workers. (At 5 p.m. the meeting took place with about 1,000 workers present and the only worker that had been arrested was set free immediately.) Among the workers, one was killed and three wounded. Hilda Guerrero de Molina, the heroic and valiant fighter from Tucumán, became a symbol and an example. Two of the wounded had been shot and one beaten with a club. Eight police were wounded by sticks and stones, three being hospitalized. The following day at the San José sugar mill, the atmosphere among the workers was one of satisfaction with the energetic attitude that had been displayed, and they repeatedly proposed to the party activists the necessity of taking up arms, getting machine guns, and beginning a fight to the death against the dictatorship.⁵

It was at this time, in January 1967, that the leadership of the Tucumán section orally presented a formal proposal to the national leadership to adopt a policy of armed struggle centered around a rural guerrilla front in Tucumán. The majority of the leaders of the Center and the Right, who were more papist than the Pope, at first opposed this line. But since Moreno accepted it, even taking on the job of preparing the first document concerning it, the others also agreed to adopt it. Moreno did not reject the guerrilla line in theory, but instead of conceiving it as the beginning of a prolonged revolutionary guerrilla war, he considered it to be a form of pressure within the framework of the spontanéist strategic conception we have already spoken about. And above all, he was not disposed to champion the guerrilla line.

Throughout 1967, while the Leninist current was gradually adopting a correct view of the revolutionary war, the class struggle began to manifest itself inside the party. The sharpening of the social contradictions in the country

had a positive effect on the party, helping the proletarian pressure emanating from the Tucumán section, with its class outlook, to be felt throughout the party as a whole. Party members and workers cadres in different regions took more activist positions. And some of the revolutionary intellectuals, especially the young members and cadres, led what was called "the ideological revolution in the party," which was nothing other than the ideological side of the party's proletarianization.

With accurate insight, Moreno realized that an irreversible process was beginning, one leading directly away from Morenoism. But, blinded by worry and fear, he forced a split, engaging in all kinds of maneuvers—one of the results of which was that many politically and ideologically Morenoist elements joined the Leninist and proletarian sector for the time being.

This first stage of the class struggle inside the party ended with Moreno and his group splitting away. Disavowing the party's official bodies, they broke with the party, usurped its name, and returned to their petty-bourgeois syndicalism.

This victory freed the party from its heavy Morenoist ballast and brought it solidly together under the banner of revolutionary war. In the resulting enthusiasm the party was able to immediately embark on the first practical steps toward preparing for war, and for a short time the class struggle inside the party was covered over. In a brief period, two or three months after the Fourth Congress, the struggle broke out again, manifesting itself in the persistence of Morenoism in the party leadership, which began to be a problem in the provincial regions and zones (mainly Córdoba and Chaco). This struggle developed in a subterranean way in the months that followed, being confined to confrontations among top-level leaders without the knowledge or participation of the party rank and file. The record of these events is contained in various letters and documents elaborated in the course of the internal struggle which we do not consider it necessary to reproduce here.

But it is necessary to quote a self-criticism made by Compañero Carlos to the Congress. He said: "Many compañeros have criticized me for not having gone to the rank and file at the first signs of the internal struggle in the top leadership. At first, I thought this criticism was unjustified, inasmuch as a struggle against Morenoism as a political current had continued to be carried on, one of the expressions of it being the Central Committee's March resolutions. And I thought it was correct not to react to the different signs of resistance to the party line inasmuch as they were formulated very unclearly and that it would not be proper to launch such an important discussion in the party without clear evidence. But later, analyzing the situation better at the insistence of the compañeros, I realized that there had been several occasions when Morenoism could and should have been denounced before the rank and file. I also understood that on these occasions I had acted under the influence of the cliquist spirit in which we had become accustomed to working instead of immediately going before the party and calling upon it to exercise revolutionary vigilance over the leadership and to participate fully in the internal struggle from the moment it first appeared. This disarmed the ranks and the cadres and made possible the tempo-

rary predominance of Morenoism (December to February) which lasted until Mariano's letter, the first reaction of the Leninist wing. While taking into account that responsibility has to be fixed, we also point out that the ranks and the cadres have their responsibilities. For even though they reacted to some of the signs (for example, the article on the CGT of the Argentines, revolutionary groupings, etc.), they did not do so energetically enough to develop the contradictions. It should be made clear that the ranks reacted to the degree made possible by the method the leadership was using."

The class struggle in the party surfaced abruptly with the repression in Tucumán during the months of October and November 1969. The nucleus of this struggle was the antagonistic petty-bourgeois-proletarian contradiction and the struggle to consolidate the party as a revolutionary proletarian organization that had definitively overcome its petty-bourgeois past. The repression cost the party the life of one militant, the arrest of seven activists, one contact and four nonparty elements, the capture of some arms, and raids on several houses. "Morenoism" considered these events the "Tucumán disaster" and they provided the pretext for attempting to turn the party away from revolutionary war.

Criticism of the Fourth Congress

The draft resolution begins by pointing out: "That the depth of this party crisis had its historic origin in the opportunistic character of our party from 1955 to 1968, since during this entire period it failed to make an analysis of our country's structure and of the character of our revolution, of a strategy for power, of a program, of organizational methodology and tactics, and of a correct military policy. During this entire period the party used the positivist method of bourgeois social science, beginning with the empirical recognition of the dominant political forces and the establishment of an opportunist policy of bowing before this force without a program, strategy, and tactics of its own. As a consequence it followed an opportunist policy in relation to Peronism from 1955 to 1964, the period of "entryism" in the Peronist movement; in relation to Castroism in 1960 and 1962, the period of the Castroist united front; in relation to the union organizations and the most backward masses from 1963 to 1968, the syndicalist period."⁶

We can already begin to see how these compañeros have not yet understood the path traveled by our organization, although the party's irreversible reawakening forces them to look back to the Morenoist period, whose bad habits we are now finally overcoming. Both the Center and the Right have systematically refused to accept the critical characterization of Morenoism as a clearly distinct type of petty-bourgeois and bureaucratic current. If this critical and concise characterization came to be included in some documents, such as "El Único Camino" [The Only Road] and the March 1969 Central Committee resolutions, it was only because of the strong determination of the proletarian wing which put these characteristics down in writing and forced their inclusion. But for the Morenoists of the Center and the Right this was a dead letter, just a formal concession to "militarism."

Once the political struggle began, the Right, the Center and the Left took form. Initially, right and center Morenoism remained united in the shape of a right wing and they pressed their offensive for abandonment of the line of the Fourth Congress and burial of the proletarian wing, which they thought would be easily accomplished. They did not expect the reaction from the party, which forced them to clearly define themselves inside the grouping and to take on a battle that had not entered into their calculations.

The Right preferred to unmask itself frankly and return completely to Morenoism. For all practical purposes they abandoned the party. The Center, on the other hand, after a period of vacillation, accepted struggling within the framework of a strategic concept of revolutionary war. The obvious political weakness of this position led them to base their arguments on misrepresentations and lies. They adopted the petty-bourgeois attitude of sowing confusion, provoking doubt, obstructing daily activities under pretext of the need to "study."

This is the context in which the document of self-criticism we have mentioned was presented. We are now in position to proceed to an analysis of it.

Nevertheless, they never agreed with these characterizations and therefore never sought to give up Morenoist conceptions and methods.

Furthermore, when the proletarian wing, from the rank and file to the leadership, insisted on a struggle against these hangovers, the Right and the Center indignantly opposed them.

If the leadership attacked Morenoism it was considered "ideological terrorism." If documents in the same vein came in from the ranks a furious counterattack was mounted, as happened with a memorandum prepared by the Córdoba section at the beginning of 1969. (This memorandum was rejected as being disrespectful, was not answered, and the request by Córdoba that it be published internally was denied.) Now, when there is no other recourse left but to look back to the past, they acknowledge some of the main characteristics of Morenoism, but carefully avoid mentioning it by name. They do not point out its social character and they try to reduce it to a simple "opportunist character" produced by the lack of a correct line. An exemplary analysis of thirteen years of the party's life!

After washing their hands of the party's history with this critical paragraph and acknowledging that the Fourth Congress was a great step forward in the life of our party,⁸ far from analyzing the class forces that gave rise to this transformation and the class resistance that had to be overcome, which would be in keeping with the Marxist method, they utilize the scientific, idealist methodology belonging to bourgeois sociology and Morenoism. They seek for the cause of the leadership crisis we went through in theoretical mistakes and later claim that a foquista tendency appeared, which insofar as it can be made out in the tangled skein of misrepresentations and lies is represented by someone like Carlos, the source of all evils

and errors, who gradually imposed his foquista concept by taking advantage of political and military level and the absence of half of the executive committee. . . .⁸ The author of this draft resolution is mistaken. He should have written an analysis of the real political facts. Instead he let his imagination run away with him and, in spite of his fancy terminology, it is not hard to see in this draft resolution a mediocre adventure story with its heroes and villains.

As we said, the author of the draft points out the obvious: the Fourth Congress was no more than the beginning and only a beginning. Many problems remained to be solved on the road that had been opened up to transforming the PRT. We do not have at hand resolutions specifying and putting them in order, but it seems to us that the draft does not do so either. It includes points that have been satisfactorily treated, such as: No. 3 ("Character of our revolution, based on an analysis of the unequal and combined development of capitalism in the country and in each region");⁹ No. 5, (fundamental characteristics of the current stage of our revolution and the stage of building the party and its military force);¹⁰ and the first part of No. 7, ("Policy for the working class and its different sectors")¹⁰ But it leaves out what appears to be essential—the struggle against Morenoist bad habits and the continued existence of Morenoism, above all, in the party leadership.

In the absence of any constructive, revolutionary, critical objective, the draft's condescending observations are tendentious, unsubstantiated, fallacious allegations that only need to be refuted by us.

The draft says: (1) In the resolution on the national situation the second resolution says: "Armed struggle must be initiated immediately in the form of self-defense of the working-class movement throughout the entire country, taking on the self-defense of militants and activists as well as reprisals against agents of the employers, the bureaucracy and the government. So the Fourth Congress underestimated independent military activity in the cities and condemned armed struggle to the mere role of self-defense of a basically syndicalist character."¹⁰ A truly infantile misrepresentation. In the first place because it is clear that the same written text calls for self-defense throughout the country. It is incomprehensible how the author is able to draw the conclusion from a quotation that calls for self-defense throughout the country that it reduces armed struggle in the cities to the mere role of union self-defense. In the second place, because the Fourth Congress document clearly proposed independent military activity in all the cities. One quotation is sufficient to demonstrate this: "For all these reasons, for a period of several years our strategy for creating a revolutionary army in the countryside and to form hundreds of armed detachments of the workers and people to operate in the cities, (a) to support mass mobilizations, and (b) to carry out independent military actions. This is our basic tactic which must be subordinated to that strategy."¹¹ In the third place, because the tactical plans from the beginning proposed the preparation of independent military units to function in the cities, laying out their size, objectives, etc. This was done to such a degree that the first military units set up by the party were urban units. In the same way, plans for training and shaping the

leaders took urban as well as rural needs into account.

It is possible that the Fourth Congress documents did not use the term "urban guerrilla war." Similarly we do not find this term in the writings of Che, Giap, or Mao, simply because the classics never differentiated between urban and rural guerrilla groups, and in speaking of guerrillas it was understood to mean rural groups. In Cuba, the urban fighters were called the "underground"; in Venezuela, "tactical combat units" and in Vietnam there are similar names (see Burchett). The activity of Black revolutionists in the United States and of the Tupamaros in Uruguay gave rise to the term we now use regularly and with a precise meaning. In addition, the entire party recognizes the clear distinction made between urban guerrillas and self-defense of the masses, aware that the guerrilla units in the cities were following a tactic relatively independent of the daily shifts in the class struggle. That is, they work out tactical plans independent of the immediate struggle of the masses. These consist of actions aimed at obtaining arms, publicizing the name and the line of our military forces, and harrying the enemy. In contrast to this, self-defense was a question for the party as a whole, for its unspecialized cells, and it consisted of all kinds of violent actions directly linked to the daily struggle of the masses.

The draft continues: (2) In the same resolution in point No. 3, it says: "Within a short time we must prepare a guerrilla group in the North for the next, inevitable period, provoked by the repression in the cities, by the situation as a whole in the North, and the strategic need to build the embryo of the revolutionary army." "So the Congress committed a voluntarist deviation by deciding on a 'short time,' without bearing in mind the Marxist principle that armed struggle is not a matter of setting dates but of the political development of the class struggle and of the party's forces."¹² This appears to be a joke. Nobody denies that the question of armed struggle is not one of setting dates, and neither does the resolution that is quoted. The entire party knows that the decision to prepare for a guerrilla struggle in the North resulted from a profound political analysis of the country that was adopted precisely by the Fourth Congress. But it is also the job of every Leninist party, disposed not only to prescribe solutions but also to carry them out in practice, to decide on the timing and pacing of the line it adopts. We can mention more than one historic episode concerning "voluntarists," or someone who did not "take into account the Marxist principle that armed struggle is not a matter of setting dates." In September and October of 1917, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in repeated letters to the party leadership and later in person insistently raised the immediate need to organize the armed insurrection; he pointed out that even a few days delay could prove fatal and give the bourgeoisie a chance to reestablish itself. The same happened in our case. We broke with Moreno because he stood in the way of immediate application of the line of revolutionary war; and we were conscious of the fact that if we permitted the bourgeoisie to experiment indefinitely with the desperate solution represented by the Onganía takeover, which gave us the opportunity to initiate armed resistance under very favorable conditions, the enemy could ultimately find another way out and make the possibility of revolution

in our country more difficult for years to come.

The draft continues: (3) Point No. 4 says: "In the North our politics must still be subordinated to our military strategy, and in the rest of the country our military activity must be subordinated to the party's political penetration of the mass movement in the form of self-defense." "With this resolution the Congress committed a militarist error in the North by not taking into account the Marxist principle repeatedly expressed by Giap, according to which at the beginning of armed struggle military activity is always and everywhere subordinated to the political penetration of the party in the mass movement. And it committed a rightist, conservative error by repeating that military activity in the cities must be reduced to self-defense, opposing independent military activity."¹³ In contrast to the previous observations this one contains a grain of truth. In an erroneous formulation is to be found a correct thought. What this paragraph sought to say, as can be gathered from the Fourth Congress document as a whole, is that since the first stage in the North, the axis of the party's political approach to the masses has been the war and that other aspects of revolutionary activity (economic and political demands, propaganda and agitation, etc.) had to be subordinated to

and brought into conjunction with its needs and objectives. Whereas in the rest of the country violent and peaceful mobilizations for economic and political demands would be primary in our political approach to the masses, military activity constituting a complementary and secondary aspect. This formulation corresponded to a realistic Marxist analysis of the unequal development of Argentina's prerevolutionary situation in which revolutionary war is an immediate problem, a necessity and a justified preoccupation for the impoverished masses in the North, while in the rest of the country, principally in Greater Buenos Aires and other areas, relatively stable economically and not so hard hit by the crisis, revolutionary war was considered an immediate way out only by the working-class vanguard and the revolutionary intelligentsia. The masses as a whole in these areas tended toward resistance and other similar forms of opposition and struggle, although incorporating increasingly violent methods with these forms. Anyone who honestly reads the document understands this. The authors of the draft self-criticism seized on this gem in their polemical zeal and deliberately misrepresented it in order to "demonstrate" the origins of "militarism" to the party.

Self-Criticism, Military Conception, Etc.

The "draft self-criticism" then goes on to raise self-criticisms. Let's see what it says: "The first self-criticism to be made before the party is by the Central Committee for having had a superficial and irresponsible attitude in not calling the attention of the entire party to the omissions and mistakes of the Fourth Congress. It also criticizes itself for not having seriously faced up to developing the policies necessary to overcome these mistakes and omissions and for having spread its irresponsible political attitude throughout the whole party, claiming that the Fourth Congress had solved all the problems."¹⁴ The leaders of the Center have a very poor memory. They forget that in March 1969, the Central Committee adopted a set of resolutions on tactics and organization with an introduction stating: "An essential part of the preparation for the war is to shape the party organizationally to take on the new tasks, sinking roots into the mass movement, training the party's cadres, increasing efficiency in all tasks. For various reasons, the most important being the reformist-syndicalist, petty-bourgeois heritage of Morenoism, our party was fated to suffer from some very weighty limitations in the field of organization and tactics. It is necessary to overcome these limitations in order to achieve satisfactory results for the objectives we have singled out. This task, this necessary surmounting, can be defined generally as abandonment of the syndicalist methodology of the past and the impregnation of the party as a whole with Leninist tactics and organizational methods.

"Our party is a robust child reaching the age of puberty. It has put aside the reformist-syndicalist game and is moving, even though timidly, toward a totally new experience—revolutionary fusion with the masses in the only way possible—the initiation and development of

revolutionary war. But it so happens that this boy, which is our party today, was reared like an adult, a child prodigy who knows and has experienced everything. And today it must throw itself into the torrent of life and the torrent of revolution in order to grow up there and become a man. Today when its body, its arms, legs, and heart are ready to plunge into the torrent, they are held back, misdirected, and restricted by its head which has not yet fully worked out its orientation, which continues to believe in the seriousness of its games, is not resigned to giving them up and accepting the new reality, the necessity of self-reform, of avidly learning everything that is new, so that it can move and direct its whole body with sureness to master the torrent and the new situation.

"We must be conscious of the reality of our party, of its lack of maturity and its youthfulness—conscious of the considerable defects and limitations that we have to overcome. With regard to the latter, we consider it very useful to record some of the most notorious of these defects and limitations.

"Let's begin with self-sufficiency, an unjustified self-sufficiency, an absolute lack of any notion whatsoever of our own smallness, a ridiculous overestimation of ourselves and of the leader. There were compañeros in the party (and not a few of them) who thought Moreno was a greater genius than Lenin, not to mention the empiricists, Mao, Ho and Fidel. And all this without the least justification—unless we consider it a defect of childhood—since Moreno was always the same as he is today, the same charlatan, the same faker, and a living example of political and personal nothingness." "We shall attempt to define the methodology of the past. This is necessary so that all the compañeros will recall it, compare the

advances that have been made, and become increasingly more thoroughly conscious of the limitations we must make efforts to overcome.

"Work was classified as structural and superstructural. The first was considered basic; in reality it consisted of a narrow syndicalism to which all the tasks that a revolutionary party must really carry out were subordinated.

"The mass work of a team—unless it was student work—consisted of the following: visiting all the factories in the area, 'combing' them in search of some way of making contacts along trade-union lines. They talked with the workers about the most inconsequential problems, seeking to encourage, develop, or create a union struggle. It was the tactic of 'fighting with your gloves on.' Not a word about the government, a few attacks against the union bureaucracy, taking special care that the workers did not suspect us of Marxism, Communism, 'those weird things.' When a delegate or member of a comisión interna was won over or when an important conflict was 'hooked,' we took the great leap: 'The struggle against the employers and the bureaucracy.' Not a word about the government, less about the capitalist system and, of course, less than nothing about socialism.

"This was 90 to 99 percent of a team's activity and this crude syndicalism, denominated 'structural work' (?), was considered to be the only truly revolutionary work. To talk about socialism and to paint slogans on walls, was considered 'propaganda' work. Public meetings or any other independent party activity? It was not even dreamed of.

"Today, when the party is rapidly approaching a new stage, we must definitively do away with these restrictions. This is the objective outlined by the present resolutions on tactics and organization. We must not forget, however, that in order to apply them the way they should be applied, we need increasingly capable and trained Leninist cadres and leaders."

It is natural that the Morenoists would forget these resolutions as easily as they concealed them. It is natural that they would likewise endeavor to make out that the real problem of the party was not the errors and omissions of the Fourth Congress but something prior to it—the existence of petty-bourgeois, bureaucratic Morenoism. The proletarian wing always fought openly against it and efficiently enough so that the party was able to smother with relative ease the present attempt to resurrect Morenoism.

The Morenoists of the Center and Right should criticize themselves for having formally approved and blindly resisted the efforts of the proletarian wing in this and in other areas. It is not by accident that even now they are trying to liquidate Leninist conquests like these resolutions by means of a false and diversionist self-criticism.

To know a plant a bud is enough. It would tire and distract the comrades too much to continue with a detailed criticism of the centrist argumentation. The greater part of the following paragraphs dealing with the life of the party from the Fourth Congress until now were answered in advance in the letter of February 24, which the centrists pretend to be unaware of. Other aspects can easily be refuted by the cadres and militants who actively participated in this period of party life. Nevertheless, it

is in our interest to single out from the draft the following items for critical attention. (1) Point 9 on page 5 says: "In the terrain of internal theoretical struggle, so necessary to purge the party, this Central Committee permitted one section of the opportunist Right to present a document in October attacking all the fundamental positions of the party, which was not submitted to the ranks nor answered as it should have been."

Further on: "This confused, contradictory, opportunist document was not answered by the Central Committee because of their natural foquista underestimation of the theoretical struggle and because foquistas and opportunists of the Right held in common their irresponsible adventurism, since the document of the Right proposed with great acclaim that preparations be speeded up in the countryside."¹⁵ B., P., and A. are deliberately lying. They were present at the Executive Committee meeting held at the *beginning of November* 1969 (the Central Committee knew about the document at the end of October), when members of the Leninist wing declared that the document of the Right should be used to open the discussion, and that it would be answered in the debate, and, at their request, it was decided to send it to the ranks with some secondary changes that I. asked be incorporated.

In addition, the said document was mentioned in M.'s letter of February 24 and it was proposed that the whole party ask for copies.

If it was not rejected in the Central Committee it was because the Right, under the influence of strong criticism they received in previous conversations, did not advance it. If it did not reach the ranks it was exclusively the fault of B., P., and A. who constituted the Secretariat at that time and did not carry out the Executive Committee's resolution.

(2) The draft self-criticism demonstrates the idealist, bureaucratic, paternalistic, and self-sufficient view of the centrist leaders to confine the internal struggle to the leadership level. For them the ranks played no role, did not participate in this struggle. Thus, they closed their eyes to the very evident, palpable reality explicitly pointed out by us in the March 1969 Central Committee meeting, that the party's rank and file was and is the main agent for transforming our party into a proletarian and Leninist organization. And not only that. The sole references to the party's activists and cadres contained in the draft reveal the deep petty-bourgeois contempt, the intellectualoid hostility of these gentlemen toward the rank and file and for the party. They say: "When that Central Committee met there were approximately X militants in the North, the majority of them workers, whose characteristics and method of work have been shown since October. X in Córdoba, of whom X are workers . . ." (the listing goes on). "Let us see what kind of party it was that the Central Committee decided to send into revolutionary war within five months. Altogether we have far fewer than X members, including all those who could be considered as such, and out of them not even half come close to what a professional revolutionary activist should be. Except for the North, the different zones have almost no workers."¹⁶ (3) The draft contains serious violations of underground norms, almost bordering on informing. What does this mean? What reason is there

to reveal military operational plans that should be guarded with the utmost secrecy? The time has come for them to end their unsubstantial and irresponsible chatter, to weigh their words and absolutely desist from continuing to reveal secret organizational matters. (4) The "military" arguments of the draft deserve special mention as the height of elementary ignorance, intellectualism, and shameless charlatanism disguised as erudition. Here is a quotation: "According to the Chinese and Vietnamese conception, guerrilla warfare emerges from a process of organizing the rural proletariat and poor peasantry into hundreds of self-defense groups that function under the strictest clandestinity, moving among the masses 'like fish in water.' The party can go on to the second stage consisting of 'regular guerrilla warfare,' that is, the creation of mobile detachments outside the process of production, only when it has developed among the masses, is in command of self-defense groups linked to the population and battle-hardened in hundreds of actions, when the repression already forces it to go over to higher forms of action, and it can do so because it has the support of the masses and the necessary experience and fire power. Foquismo, on the other hand, does not carry out this preliminary groundwork of a political nature, or the organization of armed nuclei. And it claims to be able to create everything 'from the top down' with a foco of X men, exactly as this Central Committee tried to. The X-man unit approved by the Central Committee in October constituted another mistake of a specifically military nature. In face of the modern counter guerrilla techniques being used by the Latin American armies, able to move around with many powerfully armed units, the smallest being a platoon, a guerrilla unit of X men would be permanently condemned to hiding out and in practice would not be able to carry out annihilating actions, except in rare instances. Only larger units that can count on organized popular support for logistics, that can mobilize numerous self-defense groups as a supporting force and that have as much fire power as a powerfully armed column, can carry out annihilating military actions.

"Because they lacked these conditions, Che's guerrilla group, the Guatemalan group of Cesar Montes, the Peruvian MIR and the ELN, etc., were wiped out. The Venezuelan and Colombian groups managed to survive by dissolving entire fronts and regrouping their forces into what they called 'strategic columns.' That is the military reason why, at the time of this self-criticism, the only remaining foquistas in Latin America are the members of this Central Committee."¹⁷ Almost as many mistakes as paragraphs. It is not true that the Chinese and Vietnamese conception is that the guerrilla struggle comes out of hundreds of self-defense groups moving among the masses. For them as for us, the guerrilla struggle flows from the struggle of the masses when they have exhausted other less effective forms of struggle and decide to take up armed struggle. It is precisely the guerrilla who moves among the masses like a fish in water. It is pure intellectualism to claim that self-defense groups must be trained in hundreds of actions as a preliminary step to becoming guerrilla groups. Except for Colombia, in no country in the world, in any revolutionary war in history, have guerrilla groups begun in this way.

Giap had no combat experience before he became head

of the Armed Propaganda Detachment of thirty-three men that started the revolutionary war in Vietnam. Fidel and his men (some of them) only had the Moncada experience behind them, and as a whole, they had never belonged to anything resembling a self-defense group. Yon Sosa was a military career man and not one of his men came out of self-defense groups, or anything of the kind. Nothing similar to this occurred in China, or in Korea, or in Cyprus, or in Yugoslavia, or in South Vietnam, or in Venezuela either. It was only in Colombia that the Communist Party managed for a time to evade the necessity of founding guerrilla groups and held arming of the peasants within the limits of self-defense, with lamentable results. What cannot be substituted for in initiating a rural guerrilla struggle is a revolutionary party with sufficient roots among the masses of the region to supply men, assure information, part of the provisions, to do political work among the masses, as well as provide operational support. The centrists, with their unshakeable love for small business operations, have divided the first of the three famous stages of revolutionary war (1) guerrilla war or strategic defense, (2) balance of forces, (3) strategic offensive (with conventional warfare predominant in the last two stages), into two ministages: (1) self-defense, (2) regular guerrilla war. It is frankly ridiculous to think that foquismo is based on the size of the unit that begins the fight. The question of foquismo or revolutionary war is a problem of policy, not of the number of combatants. If there is an attempt to begin the struggle only on the basis of geography, avoiding contact with the population and trying to confront the enemy with solely the military force available to the group; if the need for a revolutionary party is ignored then a foquista deviation is involved. If on the other hand, it is clearly understood that the fundamental strength of the guerrillas lies in the population's support, geography being only auxiliary; if the strongest possible links with the masses are maintained; if a correct political approach to the masses is adhered to; if military activity is oriented with the masses kept in mind; if it is understood that the main thing is the party—guaranteeing its leadership of the guerrillas and determinedly working to build it and develop it—then we have a Leninist line for revolutionary war. The question of numbers depends on the concrete situation, on the characteristics of the zone, on the immediate political reality, the party's forces, the disposition of the enemy forces, and tactical considerations of a military nature. The next paragraph in the quotation refers precisely to questions of military tactics. Frankly, we still do not know what to think of the author of those paragraphs. Have you forgotten, *compañero*, that the main weapon of the guerrilla group is its mobility, its logistic independence? That what characterizes guerrillas militarily, offering it the possibility of triumphing, is to "hit and run," to strike and disappear? To the modern tactics of counter guerrilla fighting we must respond with the old guerrilla weapons: mobility, support of the population, technical efficiency and high morale. We are not going to be drawn into a debate about numbers because that means meeting you at your level, where the norm is irresponsible divulging of figures and practical plans, which we have already criticized. We definitely will touch upon your historical examples, which even the greatest charlatan of the "leftists"

would hesitate to use with such unscrupulousness. First, the most well-known, Che's guerrilla front. Che, with thirty-five men to start with, won more than ten battles, seized 200 enemy weapons, successfully moved around a totally unknown area for nine months with a handful of combatants without the least support from the population and pursued by more than 3,000 men. Although he was overcome, it was not at all because of any military error. On the contrary, militarily it was a veritable epic. As we all know, his defeat was due to the hostility of the population which wound up informing on his movements and positions to the bourgeois army. Concerning Guatemala, we do not have inside information about the liquidation of Montes. We do know that this front suffered severe problems of leadership and line. On the other hand, we must remind you that Yon Sosa's guerrillas controlled a peasant zone without any of the military conditions you have listed. The MIR guerrillas do not serve as an example either. Divided into three fronts, they went under because of the fatal military mistake of accepting a posi-

tional war against an immensely superior army. That is to say, their military mistake was to forget that mobility is the essential guerrilla weapon. As for the Peruvian ELN, we do not have enough information about this experience, but we believe their case was similar to that of the MIR, inasmuch as they stationed themselves in a very small zone and were surrounded. Colombia and Venezuela are a different matter. The strategic columns were a result of the struggle's development. It is clear that when a guerrilla group succeeds in obtaining a firm foothold in the population, creating effective support bases, it should immediately go on to the formation of columns, companies, battalions with heavy weapons, so it can effectively carry on the war. This is also the experience of the ELN in Columbia, which has successfully fought until recently with forty or fifty men. Stop inventing foquismo, gentlemen! Stop attempting to theoretically justify your growing distance from the line of the Fourth Congress. If you are not prepared to share with the party the risks of its line, say so frankly — don't invent "military" excuses.

Strength and Social Composition of the Current Tendencies

For six months before the party crisis erupted, the party had been taking positions. We are in position to offer an approximate statistical¹⁹ report of the strength and social composition of the different tendencies, zone by zone, section by section. In the total we will also include the corresponding figures for the Central Committee. For security reasons we will use the following percentage method: In each zone or section which we number 1 through 11, percentages are worked out based on the number of worker and nonworker members respectively. Totals include percentages of the entire party membership. (See table.)

This is the statistical reflection of the strength and social composition of the three tendencies. In it we can very clearly see the class character of each. In the same manner the figures show that the present crisis is a crisis of leadership since the greatest equilibrium and tension between forces is found in the Central Committee. The predominantly bureaucratic character of the Right (half of its members are members of the Central Committee) shows up unmistakably. The predominantly petty-bourgeois character of the Center which is shown by the fact that its ranks include only 0.31% of the workers in the party, while the Leninist tendency, including 76% of the party has 97% of its workers—that is to say, nearly the entire worker membership.

We have purposefully left aside one important question concerning the class struggle in a revolutionary party in order to touch upon it now. It concerns the criterion of truth which a Marxist must use to objectively orient himself in this struggle. The centrist theoreticians claim to be Marxists and they make much of the need for a scientific analysis of all questions. They go on and on about this need. The party crisis is the immediate field in which they should put into practice this preoccupation

with science. We have already seen how they have neglected Marxism and class analysis in their studies of internal tendencies, party history and the present crisis. We shall now see how they go on to ignore another principled question in determining the truth or the falsity of the present party positions: the criterion of truth in the Marxist theory of knowledge. We have already given our scientific interpretation of the internal class struggle;

	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Center</i>	<i>Right</i>
(Figures represent percentages.)				
1. Worker	—	85	—	15
Nonworker	—	30	70	—
2. Worker	—	—	—	—
Nonworker	—	30	70	—
3. Worker	—	—	—	—
Nonworker	60	—	40	—
4. Worker	—	100	—	—
Nonworker	—	65	35	—
5. Worker	—	100	—	—
Nonworker	—	100	—	—
6. Worker	—	82	12	—
Nonworker	—	94	6	—
7. Worker	—	100	—	—
Nonworker	—	100	—	—
8. Worker	—	100	—	—
Nonworker	—	100	—	—
9. Worker	—	100	—	—
Nonworker	—	80	20	—
10. Worker	—	100	—	—
Nonworker	—	80	20	—
11. Worker	—	90.5	—	9.5
Nonworker	9.5	28.5	24	19
Central Committee Worker	25	50	—	25
Nonworker	6.2	37.2	31	24.8
Total	6.5	76.70	12.71	3.72

now we shall put forward our scientific evaluation of the truth or falsity of the internal positions, using the clear practical criterion of truth. Instead of abstract chatter and constant doubts, the centrist theoreticians ought to counterpose other clear, straightforward and convincing criteria to ours. Since they do not have and will not be able to find these criteria, they continue to threaten a "Marxist analysis" while formally applying scientific and subjectivist methodology, opposed to dialectical materialism, in all the questions before us. As we know, "In practice man must prove the truth, i. e., the reality and power, the 'this-sidedness' of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."²⁰

Marx was saying here that the truth or falsity of all thought is tested in confrontation with practice. This Marxist principle is completely valid and applicable in the instance of a party's internal struggle. Any theoretician or militant of a revolutionary party can be mistaken, can be victim of a subjectivist outlook that brings him in all honesty to make mistakes that limit his understanding of the situation. If the theoretician or militant is a Marxist, he will hasten to use a practical test of the truth to confirm the correctness of his point of view, with the intention of exercising self-criticism if he is mistaken. The practical test of truth in determining the proletarian cor-

rection and content of a line inside a revolutionary party, especially when the class struggle in it has openly surfaced, is the orientation of the worker ranks in this struggle. This is what Lenin taught in "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back." This is what Trotsky taught in his analysis of the struggle in the Socialist Workers Party (see *In Defense of Marxism*). This is what Mao taught in his works on the Cultural Revolution. Instead of continuing in an error, deepening it, accentuating its petty-bourgeois aspects, and taking refuge in pedantry and self-importance, these people should force themselves to look objectively at the real situation, adopt a healthy proletarian standard, give up their negative characteristics, and be ready to listen to and observe the party's working-class militants in a self-critical spirit. If they are capable of sincerely undertaking this task, they will save our organization from splits, they will prove to be useful in the future, occupy a place in the vanguard of our proletarian party, center their personal contribution on preparing for war, and they will rise notably as revolutionists.

If, on the other hand, they persist in their errors, accentuating their petty-bourgeois characteristics, refusing to listen to the working-class militants, they will without fail end by breaking with the party.

Where Is Centrism Headed?

There are two possibilities, two roads between which the centrists can choose in the present situation: to save their "personality," their self-love, their "prestige," they can break discipline and leave the party before or during the congress, thus managing to do the greatest possible harm; or, they can admit the possibility of being wrong, lend an ear to the opinions of the working-class base, accept the resolutions of the majority and clearly show their willingness to be reintegrated into the new party, doing their utmost to liquidate all the bad habits of Morenoism.

The adoption of one or the other of these positions will be the objective criterion by which the party can determine if class limitations hold preeminence in the individuals in the Center, defining them as a crystallized petty-bourgeois current hostile to revolutionary war, or if a proletarian criterion wins among them.

The reports reaching us from the party indicate that the Center is a clearly defined, split-oriented and anti-party tendency. The latest activities of these compañeros are becoming increasingly consistent, showing more and more clearly a general orientation to disown all the positions adopted at the Fourth Congress, diverting the debate from the essential points through the petty-bourgeois method already dealt with of placing everything in doubt up to the possibility of knowledge itself and bringing up an infinity of minor questions, "stories not worth a farthing," most of them false. Even if true, they do not enlarge on the strategic and tactical questions, but would involve only practical corrections.

In this way, evading a serious treatment, a Marxist polemic on the central items of interest to the organization (the party crisis and other matters relating to the

proletarianization of the party and preparations for war) while at the same time unleashing an infernal confusion about secondary matters of a merely practical nature, they play their petty-bourgeois role of sowing disorientation, doubt, fear, insecurity. Whether this dynamic develops and is borne out will depend fundamentally upon the internal evolution of the centrist group. But the tactic the party uses with regard to them will play an important auxiliary role. The tactical principle that should guide our attitude toward the centrists is the one that Mao summed up so well in his expression, "To cure the sick, kill the sickness." That is, we must unanimously and continually attack the disease of "petty-bourgeois Morenoism" that the Center elements are suffering from. We must use our firmness and intransigence to the utmost to demonstrate the central questions to them, and the need to avoid weakening the party which is preparing itself to go forward. We have to make them see how a splitting attitude on their part objectively aids our enemies, and that even if they are right, something that will be determined by the future evolution of events, their place is in the party, which they can serve by exercising constructive criticism. This general tactic is based on activity, firmly requiring the centrists to carry out their assignments and to respect party discipline. All lack of discipline must go. The following criteria must be established with regard to the centrists: (a) Avoid violent attitudes of a personal nature. (b) Prevent impediments to activity, firmly requiring the centrists to carry out their assignments and respect party discipline. Every violation of discipline must be noted as a matter of record and communicated to the party, without . . . tight agreements that safeguard party unity.* (d) Propose that the rank and

file members of the Center—after careful selection—be assigned to periods of activity in worker teams. (e) Show by exemplary Leninist respect for constructive opinions a willingness to listen, thus assuring the centrists that our party is not and never will be a Stalinist apparatus. (f) Speed up preparations for the Fifth Congress and hold it as soon as possible. This is a fundamental aspect. It is necessary to put an end to the indecisiveness and ambiguity that is obstructing and distracting the party. We can not lose another day carrying out our tasks of preparation. This is why we need a congress right away to resolve the party crisis and enable us to throw ourselves fully into the struggles that await us. Nearly the entire party has already taken a position. If we are not able to draw up the thorough documents that are necessary, mainly for addressing the vanguard of the masses, we can substitute for them with a group of clear resolutions. The settling of the party crisis is an organizational problem.

Let's give it a speedy solution in the Fifth Congress.

Comrades: The party has undergone almost seven months of open internal struggle. The Congress has put an end to this experience and our party has come out of it strengthened and purged. The experience that we

have just undergone should be engraved in fire in the party's memory, and from here on we must remain constantly alert to prevent and to root out any reappearance of the poisonous weed of petty-bourgeois, bureaucratic Morenoism by exercising criticism, self-criticism, and proletarian vigilance. In the same way we must prevent and nip in the bud any other new form through which the class enemies might gain entrance into the party. This is not the last time we will have these problems. We must not despair or feel discouraged if, in spite of everything, they show up again.

But we have to come out of this crisis completely on the alert and well armed to prevent a repetition in the future. We have learned how to deal with it. This is precisely through increasing proletarianization of the party, a constant rise in the percentage of workers in the organization, the active and conscious participation of the rank and file and the cadres. The most strict intransigence in face of any type of deviation. The constant exercise of criticism and self-criticism. The closest relationship with the masses. The serious study of Marxism-Leninism. An increasing degree of effectiveness in carrying out the line and the tasks.

Resolutions on Dynamics and Relations of Our Revolutionary War

Character of the Revolutionary War

In correspondence with the characteristics we have noted the revolution will take on in our country, we can define our war as a revolutionary civil war which from the beginning, given the semicolonial character of our country, will be around anti-imperialist slogans. The revolutionary civil war will proceed to transform itself into a national anti-imperialist war both because we will be fighting against the bourgeoisie as well as an invading enemy, and because the battle will be waged by the workers and the popular sectors as a whole. At that moment the slogans we raise will tend to neutralize the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie, and even sectors of the repressive forces; at that point our war will assume a patriotic significance. While it is necessary to point out the lines along which our war will develop, it should be clear that it will always be led by the proletariat and that it will remain essentially a revolutionary civil war throughout the entire process.

In this sense, we can say that the revolutionary civil war has begun in our country, developed by sectors of the vanguard. The working-class vanguard, sections of the proletariat and popular sectors will take it up, until finally it will become a struggle led by the working-class vanguard, the working class and the popular masses against the bourgeoisie and imperialism.

For many of the reasons already explained in "El Unico Camino . . ." ["The Only Road"], our war will be a prolonged one.

Our party should not for one moment forget the Viet-

namese experience which shows us that in the current stage of the world revolution it is impossible to take and hold power in a single country in isolation. Power can only be taken and held in the context of the worldwide crisis of imperialism.

From this it follows that our revolutionary war will assume a continentwide, international character.

For all the reasons presented above, the Revolutionary Army has to start off small, going from the most simple to the most complex actions, seeking to achieve firm links with the masses, seriously toughening up our forces and educating our armed detachments in a multitude of actions.

Dynamics of the Revolutionary War

When we take into account that the vanguard sector of the working class is made up of the industrial proletariat, concentrated in Tucumán, Córdoba, Rosario and Buenos Aires, and that the vanguard is increasingly sympathetic to revolutionary positions and, as a whole, is inspired by deep hate for the dictatorship, then we must conclude that these are the regions where armed struggle will basically take shape, both in its rural and urban form. This overall situation is developing in particular ways in each region, and the level of radicalization in the vanguard and the working class likewise differs. Within this context the sugar workers continue to hold their vanguard position, although as a result of the widening economic and social crisis, there is less of a gap today between them and the rest of the workers.

These particular regional situations affect the ways in

which the armed struggle will develop. For example, in Tucumán the vanguard sector is made up of sugar workers who are directly linked to the rural proletariat and through them, to the poor peasantry. Added to Tucumán's geography, these facts mean that the strategic axis of armed struggle in this area will pass through the initial forms of rural guerrilla warfare. Prior to the rural struggle, there will be a phase of tactical and operational actions in urban and suburban warfare. But these will become secondary once the strategic level (rural guerrilla warfare) has been reached. For particular reasons it is impossible to organize strategic military units in the city of Tucumán, and risky to form military operational units. In the area of urban warfare we can foresee activity by tactical military units in Tucumán, completely subordinated to operational and strategic needs of the countryside.

The fundamental task will clearly be taken up in building logistics apparatuses: recruiting, intelligence, communications and liaison, provisioning, etc. Most armed actions will be oriented towards defending these apparatuses (for example, protecting the guerrillas' channels of communication and guarding fugitives hiding in the city, as well as shops, clandestine hospitals, etc.), and toward playing a role in agitation among the masses. But this does not rule out actions that divert the enemy and back up guerrilla war, such as sabotage, the destruction of communications channels, liquidating oppressors, and harassing units that have been pulled back for rest or which are being kept on base.

In the other three regions the armed struggle will be urban and suburban; and the military actions, as well as the party's armed wing, will develop on tactical, operative and strategical levels. Moreover, the armed forces in these areas will carry out military and logistical tasks aimed at strengthening armed struggle in rural zones. During this first stage these tasks will be confined to Tucumán, but later they will be extended to the entire North until they link up geographically with areas in the vicinity of urban regions, like Córdoba and Rosario (Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, Chaco, Formosa, northern Santa Fe, etc.).

Countryside/City Relationship

The method of pigeonholing reality into subjective schemas is something common to the entire left wing here and everywhere. On the basis of such plans "strategies" are drawn up in which reality has all the dynamism of a slab of concrete, with the dialectics existing only in the minds of the framers. We are no exception. Ridding ourselves of these habits means taking a big step toward the revolution, and we believe that our party is taking that step; but vestiges of such schematism remain. The well-worn problem of the city-countryside relationship is an aspect that we still have to clarify within the party. With the right wing expelled, and the centrists isolated and on the way out, the party we now have represents the consolidation of the proletariat and combative sectors and the end result of the battle that has been waged since the Fourth Congress against Morenoist excrescences. But the party that we represent today was not a spontaneous development but the product of a process whose advances

and errors make up our subjective reality. This is how the countryside-city question, instead of being realistically analyzed for what it is—the dialectical interrelationship between two aspects of the same situation—has been transformed into a contradiction with two antagonistic poles.

It was probably the centrists playing down of the rural side of the struggle that served as a cover for their non-proletarian fear of fighting. For this purpose they resorted to vague theoretical phrase-mongering around the tail-ending notion that the crisis "had shifted" to the urban centers. This was one of the elements that contributed to increasing confusion and causing touchiness in the party.

The oversimplification of two important experiences in revolutionary warfare—the Chinese and Cuban—together with a lack, or at times, deliberate concealment of information, has created situations like the one we are now dealing with within the continental revolutionary movement. It is not worthwhile in this work to specify (although we will have to in others) the most vulgar distortions of the Chinese and Cuban experiences. Instead we will attempt to focus in on our reality, adapting the experience of the world proletariat struggle to it (rather than the reverse procedure of trying to make our situation fit in with other patterns). Moreover, for understandable reasons resulting from lack of communication, we have only been able to partially examine the new contributions of the South Vietnamese comrades.

The Fourth Congress pointed out that Argentina as a whole was in a prerevolutionary situation. Reality confirmed this day by day and today we are witnessing something even more concrete: the revolutionary civil war has begun. Given this reality, it is useless for us to begin discussing in what geographic area we are going to initiate a war that already began more than a year ago and in which we are already involved up to our necks. Likewise, we do not need to discuss where the party will begin fighting when more than half the party is already underground and *fighting*, not to mention a great number of comrades who have been imprisoned and tortured. This fact can not be ignored by the party.

The problem that faces us is the following: In the first place, why is the party's military activity unevenly developed and what has to be done to get the fight going *everywhere*? In the second place, what kind of military structure is suited in each region where the party has a foothold, to our real strength and the social conditions? And lastly, how do we coordinate all the party's military activity so as to overcome the present unevenness *and involve the entire party in the war*?

Just as it is difficult to conceive of a revolutionary militant separated from the masses or from political work, in a war situation we cannot have party activists or sections of the party not involved in waging the war on the level that is realistic in their region or area of work. A combat party is distinguished precisely by the fact that it fights: And in an Argentina at war, political activity is fundamentally armed activity. Therefore in those places where the party is active among the masses, members must promote military actions. They must fight, form the army through practicing armed struggle. Anyone who does not fight does not exist politically. Our revolutionary

war will not be and is not (as it has already begun) a regional war. It is a national war, a popular war of the masses that will develop wherever there are masses, adapting itself to the concrete forms demanded by each region.

We can predict that the revolutionary war will be based on two main military elements—armed struggle in the countryside, first assuming the characteristics of guerrilla warfare and then taking the form of popular movements; and armed struggle in the large cities, beginning with expropriations and resistance, will go over to operations of annihilating the enemy. That can be said for the particular; in general, both processes lead to a struggle to wear down the enemy's forces (moral, human, and material, in this order), breaking their offensive power in the countryside by forcing them to disperse their strength and by bottling them up in the cities. This will further be achieved by mobilizing the masses and involving all of the popular sectors in the war. Strategic military units will have to be created in the countryside as in the city, furnished with enough firepower and supplies to wage battles designed to annihilate the enemy. This will culminate in a general urban insurrection as medium-sized cities near the rural operational zone are surrounded and liberated. Both processes are concurrent, interrelated and inseparable.

Another fundamental example of this countryside-city interrelationship is given by the crucial support that the guerrilla group receives during the initial stage from urban combat organizations. This means not only logistical support, although that is obviously very important, but the help of operational units in urban areas whose actions compel the regime to keep important sectors of the repressive forces concentrated in these areas. This process, which we consider of vital importance, has not been fully analyzed. As an example of its importance we point to two concrete cases. In Brazil the spread of urban operations has forced the repressive forces to station 40,000 of its best counterinsurgency troops (paratroopers, marines, etc.) in the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo-Belo Horizonte area. In our country, large police contingents are already tied down in the big cities (Córdoba, Rosario, Buenos Aires) and the probability that they will be used in anti-guerrilla operations is slight.

Finally, we believe that the party will have to find a practical solution to the very concrete problem it faces when all the conditions exist in the region (which from the standpoint of the development of the mass struggle, the party's strength and prestige, and the terrain, constitutes the weakest link of bourgeois rule) but the party has still not been able to achieve the fundamental task of getting the war going, which would enable us to make a leap in improving the quality of the party and its prestige in the eyes of the masses and the other revolutionary forces.

Revolutionary war, popular war, is based on two fundamental concepts: progressive growth beginning with small actions and the involvement of the masses through a dialectical process. Nothing illustrates its character better than these two concepts. Each stage of this process shows that they are interrelated and that the intensity and extent of the war are directly related to involving increasingly broad sectors of the masses in their dynam-

ics. The military objective of the struggle is secondary to the political objectives. What is sought in every armed action is to mobilize and educate the masses, organizing and involving them in the struggle and, if our forces permit, defending them when the enemy attacks.

Proletarian military science recognizes three levels—the tactical, operational, and strategic. In contrast to bourgeois military science, these levels are related only in a rather loose way. What is decisive is the political content and the effect of these actions in developing the process. For example, a unit of five or six fighters in the revolutionary army (which by its numbers and firepower objectively constitutes a tactical military unit) is carrying out a strategically important action when it expropriates a large sum of money, liberates heavy arms, or attacks a repressive body. A guerrilla detachment of barely fifteen or twenty fighters is playing a strategic role, when operating in a certain zone, they are able to force two to three thousand repressive forces to disperse, circle, comb, and take up patrols and guard duty, without even having to fight them. This undermines the morale of the troops and destroys their capacity to fight. Although this detachment is only an operational unit by our scales, because of its number and firepower it is barely the smallest tactical unit on the scale of a classical army.

This relationship of forces comes about as a result of the political side of the war, but if we were to let ourselves be guided only by military criteria, the situation could arise where a guerrilla detachment could be defeated in a head-on confrontation with a squad or unit of the repressive army because of the technical superiority of the enemy. In the same way, the wiping out of a patrol of the repressive army, a minor feat during a conventional war, becomes national news during revolutionary war, and once learned by the masses, moves them and mobilizes them; and the blow dealt to the enemy's prestige is out of all proportion to his miniscule human and material losses. On the material side, the terms are reversed qualitatively for the guerrilla army. A loss of fifteen FAL rifles does not materially affect the repressor army, since this may represent only one ten-thousandth of its firepower, but for the guerrilla army capturing these weapons may mean a hundred percent increase in firepower.

We have another interesting example in the ability of urban commandos, composed in the first stage of a few dozen fighters, to tie down tens of thousands of enemy soldiers and police.

But within these three levels there are also grades of quantitative growth and rise that not only mark the progression from one level to the next, but also determine the number and the rate of increase of actions on a given level. These quantitative advances influence the scope of the process and the continuous development of this progression in which the concepts of growing from small to large actions and involving the masses in the war become interrelated, bringing about a change in the relationship of forces. For example, during the early stages a guerrilla column of thirty to forty fighters is a strategic military unit similar to a brigade in the city; but in the final stages of the war at the moment of general insurrection and liberation when the cities are surrounded, each one of the strategic military units of the revolution

numbers several thousand fighters. The first strategical military unit of the Vietnamese People's Army was a propaganda detachment of about forty men. Ten years later, four divisions with auxiliary forces took part in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, on the level of an operational action that had strategic political and military results. They totaled about 80,000 men.

The people's war does not allow itself to be confined by schemas, all the traditional patterns are shattered by its revolutionary methods. We have seen how the classical relationships—numbers, firepower, strategy and tactics—are transformed; but there is still another element we have to think about, as not developing it leads to lack of understanding and error. It concerns the problem of destroying the enemy.

The classical concept of annihilating the enemy was very clearly expressed in bourgeois military science by Clausewitz. His phrase, "Blood is the price of victory" implies that the enemy will be destroyed only through bloody confrontation between contenders and by using all available arms. For the classics, then, annihilation means killing or capturing the enemy forces; but modern military science and proletarian military science to a greater extent, have gone beyond this concept of physical annihilation. A military force can be destroyed not only through confrontation; it is evident that it is quite pos-

sible to destroy such forces by wearing them down through smaller scale harassing actions, or by isolating them through cutting off their supply line. But we maintain that annihilating them by political means is still more effective than by the aforementioned methods. During revolutionary war the objective is not to physically destroy all of the enemy forces. At most we might want to destroy some of the leading cadres because, taken as a whole, the ranks of the enemy are made up in their majority of recruits who are from the same class background as our own forces. The objective is to destroy the enemy's morale through political-military actions and to paralyze them by robbing them of their operational capacity, either through tying them down or through forcing them to disperse their forces. Thus we can say: *Troops that don't fight are as good as not there.*

This does not mean that during revolutionary civil war there is no confrontation of forces, physical destruction of the enemy or use of massive means of destruction, but we maintain that these features take on a secondary importance by comparison with politics and ideology. These are the weapons that enable us, changing the classical meaning of destroying the enemy, to concentrate all the power of the masses in the war and to apply our revolutionary proletarian concept of annihilating the enemy on all fronts and with different types of military units.

Resolution on Work in the Mass Movement and the Union Movement

Whereas:

Marxist-Leninists must simultaneously employ all forms of struggle (ideological, economic, political, military), being able at each stage of the class struggle to recognize which predominates over the others and to what extent.

The current stage of the class struggle, defined by our party as one of preparing for war, is marked by pre-revolutionary conditions coinciding with a rise in spontaneous economic struggles by the workers.

The extremely favorable conditions for beginning armed struggle are themselves limited by the weakness of our party and its meager influence among the proletariat, the extent to which the working class in the country as a whole lags behind the most advanced sectors, and the powerful syndicalist and nationalist hangovers that persist in these most advanced sectors.

Propaganda and political agitation among the masses constitutes the basic tool in this preparatory stage for advancing the proletariat and the popular sectors toward realizing the necessity for revolutionary war against the regime. This must be combined with an ideological struggle against bourgeois nationalism, populism, and reformism, as well as self-defense on a large scale and armed propaganda, spreading and generalizing of the economic struggle, and building the party.

The participation of revolutionaries in the economic struggle must take the form of linking up with the more backward layers of the proletariat, mobilizing the entire proletariat against the regime and helping to deepen the penetration of agitation and political propaganda into the working class. The economic struggle must not be considered as opposed to the political one, rather as a lower level of the proletariat's struggle that we as revolutionaries must harness to achieve our strategic objectives, while constantly trying to raise each one of its phases to a political level.

To this end the party must provide itself with a clear political program in order to participate in mass movements, in particular, in the proletariat's union struggles, in the student movement, and in other sectors that we regard as allies of the proletariat.

In our mass line for the workers' movement, our basic orientation of political agitation and developing the party must be combined with defending the living standard of the masses and paying great attention to immediate demands, taking into account the fundamental features of the present situation (disastrous drop in the standard of living, political oppression, a semimilitary regime in the plants, the dictatorship's attempt to bring the union movement completely under state control, indiscriminate political repression, etc.).

The revolutionary leadership of the party is the only guarantee for a union movement that is at the same time faced with a dictatorship and strategically involved in a revolutionary war.

Be it resolved that:

1. The basic task for revolutionaries is propaganda and political agitation among the masses and building and expanding the party. Consequently, each section and branch, every team and each party activist must be closely linked to the masses, with the central thought in mind of audaciously building the party, putting its name, its line, the concept of revolutionary war before the broadest possible sectors through energetic propaganda and revolutionary agitation.

2. In its daily activity among the masses the party should pay great attention to all immediate demands, whether economic, political, cultural, etc. Each party activist must win the affection and respect of the masses, not only to be able to point out the revolutionary road, but to be in position to stand up to all kinds of injustices and setbacks as well. The aim is not only to denounce oppression and exploitation, explaining them from a revolutionary political point of view, but to organize the masses to struggle directly against these injustices.

3. The construction of the broadest and least clandestine possible mass organizations that will struggle for immediate demands (unions, factory commissions, class groupings, community commissions, etc.) and the struggle for the leadership of the existing organizations—all are necessary to the party's strategy in order to strengthen its influence on the more backward layers of the proletariat, broaden and generalize the economic struggle, and smooth the way for the broad masses to understand revolutionary socialism. This task is closely linked to developing the party's organization in the working class and subordinate to it, and in no way can it be neglected.

4. In view of the dictatorship's policy of subjecting the unions to state control, clandestine channels are, or will be, needed for conducting the economic struggle.

Our party must inspire and encourage the spread of broad class-struggle formations and factory resistance commissions wherever the conditions are favorable for extending and generalizing the proletariat's struggles, making sure that this does not detract from the revolutionary political activity of the party but promotes it in the broadest sense.

This should not exclude defending the legal rights of unions and fighting to win back for the working class those that have already become half incorporated into the state, although at this stage it will be a secondary objective.

5. The party must steadfastly and consistently struggle for the leadership of the antidictatorial trade-union movement, avoiding falling either into sectarianism or into opportunism, between which we oscillated constantly in the syndicalist stage of the organization that we have definitively put behind us.

Founding Resolution of the Revolutionary Army of the People

Whereas:

In the process of revolutionary war that has begun in our country, our party has begun to fight with the aim of disrupting the armed forces of the regime in order to create the conditions for the victorious insurrection of the proletariat and the popular sectors.

The armed forces of the regime can only be defeated by confronting them with a revolutionary army that by its very nature gives the revolutionary military forces a character distinct from that of the party, as the personnel involved must be recruited as much from outside as from inside the party.

Constituting a revolutionary army under the present conditions (our party's weakness, the nonexistence of a workers state on our borders, the absence of large armed forces) will be a prolonged political, social, technical and military process that will unfold "beginning on a small scale and growing to a large one."

For a whole long period our revolutionary war will assume the forms of urban and rural guerrilla warfare, extending to different cities and zones in the countryside with local operational radiuses. On the basis of extending these radiuses politically and militarily, it will be able to move from a war of movement in the countryside to building important strategic units in the cities.

The Armed Forces will have a working-class and popular character and will be under the firm leadership of the party, constantly maintaining the functioning of its cells and the political and ideological education of its cadres.

The Vietnamese experience recommends the principle of "leadership by the executive committee of the party and the responsibility for the unit chiefs. This guarantees that the principle of collective leadership will be applied and moreover, draws on the knowledge of the masses, further strengthens unity and internal structure, coordinates the different aspects of work in the army, achieving unity of action and thought." (Giap)

The other basic principle of revolutionary war that our military force should apply is carrying out military operations in accordance with a political mass line, that is, actions aimed at mobilizing the masses and gaining their direct or indirect participation in the war.

The Fifth Congress of the PRT resolves:

1. To found the Revolutionary Army of the People [ERP] and give it a banner.

2. To consider the Revolutionary Army of the People and its different armed detachments as the party's military instruments for carrying out its political line in the current stage of the class struggle and as the embryo of the future revolutionary workers and people's army.

3. To build a Revolutionary Army of the People involving all elements prepared to fight against the military dictatorship and imperialism (and who accept the army's program), making a very careful and necessary selection of recruits, based on the criteria of security,

determination, courage, morale and proletarian hatred of the dictatorship.

4. Recruitment to units of the Revolutionary Army of the People will be supervised by party cells, party leaders, military leaders and political commissars, who will take charge of guarding against any deterioration of morale, discipline, and social composition of the units, or any weakening of the leading role of the party.

5. During the first stage of the revolutionary war, the ERP will be composed of the following forces: (a) Urban units represented by armed commandos organized by the party and by armed commandos outside the party who accept the discipline of the ERP. In the latter a leading party cell must be immediately formed. (b) Suburban units formed in the same way. (c) Rural guerrilla units.

6. The primary military task of the base cells of the party will be to assure that a mass political line is carried out by the ERP. They will help to achieve this by maintaining close contact with the army, transmitting information and relaying the spirit of the masses to the army in order to enable it to mobilize the masses by armed propaganda operations. They will also carry out resistance and intelligence: (a) In line with the needs and possibilities of their mass front; and (b) as auxiliaries of the ERP. In this latter case they will receive directives and orientation from the branch and section executive committees or from the executive committee of the party.

7. The Central Committee and executive committee of the party will make up the collective leadership conducting the war. It will appoint the national military secretary, the military leaders of the various units, the respective political commissioners and the military committee of the party. In the countryside, these military leaders will make up the branch and section executive committees of the party. On all levels the cells of the party that are in the army will assure that the military directives coming from the Central Committee and the executive committee are steadfastly and correctly applied.

8. Groups and individuals from outside the party who join the ERP will do so under the condition that they accept the party's military leadership and the political commissioners it designates.

9. *Intermediate organizations.* In addition, the People's Armed Commandos form part of the ERP: These are the organizations that the party and the Revolutionary Army [ERP] create from the active resistance of the masses. Their actions continue to increase from a small to a large scale with a minimal level of organization. They are organized to function with the maximum initiative and with the following objectives: To defend the immediate struggle of the masses, to give impetus to the class struggle, and to provide tactical support as well as a means of weeding out potential recruits to the Revolutionary Army [ERP]. Forming such units is of the greatest importance, because this will introduce armed struggle into the masses.

Resolution on the Relationship Between the Party and the Army

1. "For what reason has our army, though still young, already an extremely glorious history, scored resounding feats of arms and made a major contribution to the success of our people's revolutionary endeavor? Because it is a people's army, led by our Party. The Party's leadership is the decisive factor of all the successes of our army."

". . . is a people's army, the army of the toiling people, essentially, of the workers and peasants, and led by the Party of the working class."

"The most fundamental principle in the building of our army is to put it under the Party's leadership, to ceaselessly strengthen the Party's leadership of the army. The Party is the founder, organizer and educator of the army." (*People's War People's Army*, Giap, pages 100-101, 104, Bantam paperback, 1968.)

The quotation from Giap, which corresponds to the conception of the Red Army expressed by Lenin and Trotsky, and by Mao Tse-tung in the case of China, clearly puts forth the Marxist view of the revolutionary army and its relationship to the party. According to Marxism, the army and the party are two different organizations with separate and complementary tasks. The army is the armed wing and the military force of the working class and popular sectors, and is the instrument of the revolutionary masses in the armed struggle against the bourgeois army. The party, on the other hand, is a wholly proletarian organization and on a qualitatively higher level, that is built as the revolutionary political leadership of the entire people, in all fields of struggle, both in the military as well as in the economic and political fields, etc.

2. The crisis of Marxism in Europe and Latin America, whose scope and causes do not have a place in this analysis, gave rise to a militarist conception completely foreign to Marxism. Debray was its theoretician. This conception, which was based on making virtues out of the deficiencies and particularities of the Cuban experience, holds that the revolutionary party is constituted by the guerrilla group and that it is the guerrillas who should lead the political struggle.

The Cubans waged the war without a Marxist party. In the course of the hostilities the leadership embraced Marxism, and only after the triumph of the revolution went on to form the party. Because of this, during the war the rebel army fought together with petty-bourgeois and bourgeois political currents and it was necessary to make them comply with the army's revolutionary objectives. From this experience Debray draws the conclusion that it is always the army that must lead the party, because the mountains are proletarian and the lowlands are bourgeois.

This militarist conception has greatly harmed the Latin American revolutionary movement, among other things because it has been of magnificent service to reformists, offering them a pretext for using "Marxist" arguments against armed struggle.

Aside from not having any immediate practical mean-

ing and causing confusion in the organization, the point of view that the party and army are one, which is in the same family as Debrayism, contains the two-sided danger of a sectarian and opportunistic line. It is sectarian because by equating the party and the army, it would tend towards a strict selection of fighters, making it impossible for us to take in non-Marxist elements. This approach is opportunistic because it would bring people into the party who are good fighters but politically immature. Our short experience has shown us that by maintaining clarity on this question and explaining it clearly to all, we can achieve a better defined relationship with new fighting elements. Our experience also tells us that they will quickly learn that fighting is not all there is to it but that the political line is the most important thing in revolutionary war, that "the party commands the gun," and, seeing this, they will evolve politically to take a place in the party.

3. At the March 1969 Central Committee meeting our party adopted and began to apply the Marxist view of this question. The Rosario and Córdoba sections that applied this in the firmest and most consistent way have achieved highly satisfactory results. So, we have seen a demonstration of how to succeed in involving in actions all those elements that are prepared to take up arms against the regime, whatever their degree of political maturity, while at the same time, channeling these people into the revolutionary war on the basis of the party's line and maintaining, and even raising the quality of the party organization. It is vitally important and a matter of principle in fact to persevere in the course adopted at the March 1969 Central Committee plenum. It is essential that we steadfastly and uncompromisingly uphold and apply the Marxist approach to the question before us, not only for immediate practical reasons but also because of a problem in educating the party.

4. Now that we have clarified the difference between the party and the army, let us go on to the fundamental question of the relationship between both organizations. We are referring to the party's leadership of the army and the means of assuring this. Such leadership must be effective on all levels. At the base of the pyramid, this can be achieved through the combat cells that form the leading nucleus of these units. On the command level, this task is carried out by the military leaders and the party's military committee, which are appointed and supervised by the party's Central Committee and executive committee and form the leading nucleus of the general staffs of the armed forces. The leading bodies of the armed forces—the general staffs—can also involve elements from outside the party on the condition that their number does not surpass 20 percent of the members of each. Finally, the system of placing political commissars in all units of the armed forces will guarantee that the army is politically educated and that a mass political line is applied in military operations.

Resolution on Democratic Centralism in the Army

I. As Comrade Giap very clearly explains (cf. *People's War. People's Army*, page 82ff) two elements make for correct functioning of the revolutionary military organization, both of which correspond to democratic centralism in the party. The first is real internal democracy, which consists of applying the following principles: (a) political democracy, periodic assemblies, to involve all the fighters and cadres in discussing the various problems of the army; (b) military democracy, which requires, insofar as conditions permit, informing the entire units in advance of the plans of an operation in order to promote initiative and contributions; (c) economic democracy, establishing a system of "open books," to allow the fighters and cadres to take part in, and supervise administration. The second element is "the strictest and most widely accepted of disciplines." A revolutionary army "has to be very highly centralized and disciplined in order to guarantee unity of will and action, which are indispensable for preserving its forces and annihilating the enemy." Finally, Giap warns of the danger of two deviations. One, which comes from the influence of bourgeois ideology, overstresses discipline and "seeks to lead the troops by issuing commands and meting out punishments." Another, reflecting petty-bourgeois ideology, tends toward disintegration and "dispersionism." It gives little impor-

tance to discipline, tries to avoid supervision, and pays insufficient attention to orders received.

II. Our party is dragging along false tendencies that are being unconsciously transmitted to the military units, where they cause even greater harm. We need on the one hand to do away with the method of arbitrary commands and, on the other, to accustom ourselves to giving and obeying orders. We have to constantly consolidate internal democracy, proletarian political education, and establish discipline based on understanding. We must cast off individualism and shyness and appreciate military discipline by learning to give and take orders. The functioning of the party's military units has been harmed by sloppiness in both aspects. In general our leaders have lacked firmness of command and our activists readiness to obey.

III. Therefore we must strive to apply correctly the principles of democratic centralism in the army:

(A) For democracy involving all the fighters in the task of building the army, in keeping a check on finances, and, insofar as possible, in discussing the plans of operations.

(B) For iron discipline in the army, for correct and just exercise of command by the leaders and strict and efficient compliance by subordinates.

Memorandum on the International

Introduction

The Central Committee charged me with preparing this memorandum which consists merely of an exposition of the point of view I developed at the Fifth Congress with regard to the International. This is not a systematic work, and it lacks the necessary precision in its historical references. This is owing to the fact that Central Committee was interested in speeding up the presentation of the point of view expressed at the Congress, which it considers in general to be correct, so that the party would be clear as to its position on the International, aware that the necessary systematic work is now a secondary task that must not be permitted to divert us.

1. Marxist Internationalism

Since Marx and Engels, Marxism has viewed the anti-capitalist struggle and the socialist revolution from an internationalist point of view. Marx said that the socialist revolution is national in form and international in content, and that the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie is an international struggle. In accordance with this principle, Marx and Engels were responsible for fashioning the revolutionary party of that period into an international organization (first the International Workmen's Association, and then a series of subsequent organizations up to the Second International of Engels).

Lenin and the Bolsheviks completely shared this point of view and were members of the Second International despite its great limitations and the reformist character it acquired after the death of Engels under the leadership of the Germans and Austrians (Kautsky and Adler among others). Faced with the International's betrayal in the European interimperialist war, the Bolsheviks along with a handful of revolutionists (the Zimmerwaldian left), broke with the Second International. After the victory of the Russian revolution, the Third International was formed with its headquarters in Moscow. Through its first four congresses and its activity and guidance, this revolutionary International advanced the world revolutionary movement considerably. It fostered the formation of revolutionary Communist parties in many countries; and the International, with wise moves despite some errors, played a direct role in the European revolution of that period. This short period, opening with the founding of the International in 1918 and lasting until shortly before Lenin's death in 1923 came closest to the Marxist conception of an international party. When Lenin was living, the Third International centralized the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat against capitalism practically and was also able to bring some popular sectors opposed to imperialism (peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries) into close alliance with the proletariat's struggle. (We are referring mainly to the national anticolonialist movement of the Asian peoples.)

But after a transitional period in which the Third International came to play a centrist role, maintaining a general line of developing the world revolution with grave reformist, and populist deviations arising from national interests of the USSR being placed above those of the world revolution, Stalinism caused the degeneration of the International, subordinating it to the immediate national interests of the Soviet Union, and consequently transforming it into an obstacle to the international revolution until it was dissolved as part of a postwar agreement with Churchill and Roosevelt.

This experience, the memory of the last years of the Stalinist international, must have been one of the most important factors that led the Asian revolutionists—who through their development of revolutionary war had become transformed into the vanguard of the world revolution (Vietnamese, Chinese, and Koreans)—to draw the conclusion that an International was not necessary. They believed instead that an International constitutes an obstruction to the revolutionary struggle in each country, and that it must expressly establish nonintervention, the absolute independence of each national party, as a principle and convert internationalism organizationally into exchange of experiences and moral and material support.

Our point of view is that since the Leninist experience of the Third International, the need for an international revolutionary party that can centralize the struggle against capitalism and imperialism on a world scale has become clearer than ever. This need is more compelling each day because of the prevailing characteristics of the period we are living in. Capitalism is solidly centralized under the aegis of yankee imperialism. In some areas (South-east Asia) a revolutionary struggle is developing that is international in form and content, which the different anticapitalist and anti-imperialist revolutionary processes that are unfolding in every country, region and continent are notorious for their reciprocal influence. The kind of revolutionary International we advocate, besides unifying and centralizing the world revolutionary struggle, is also of vital importance in building socialism. As Lenin explained, the struggle against capitalism does not end with the victory of the revolution or the seizure of power in a given country, instead it continues against the vestiges of capitalism, against "the force of custom and petty production that is produced and reproduced daily under capitalism."

This struggle, whose hard road and difficulties Lenin predicted in 1920, has shown that the experience of the workers states was truly titanic. An International designated as revolutionary plays an outstanding role during the so-called period of transition from capitalism to socialism, centralizing on an international level the struggle for the construction of socialism in transition to the future communist society. Finally, it is a political obligation for every proletarian revolutionist, for every Leninist party, to remain active, to maintain international political

activity, participating in a direct or indirect way in the revolutionary experiences of different countries, maintaining an international outlook of the struggle for socialism in a practical way. This will immediately result in a better understanding of the national tasks, in increased efficiency on the part of the leadership of the revolutionary struggle, thanks to the assimilation of international experience, which is always richer, more complete, and more diverse.

These objectives, these revolutionary needs, firmly attach us as a fundamental matter of principle to the internationalist concept held by Marx and Lenin. This position, which we defend, was supported and developed in the most difficult days by Trotsky and the Fourth International he founded in 1938. As part of his struggle against Stalinism, Leon Trotsky upheld the Marxist-Leninist banner of revolutionary internationalism, the banner we have inherited, which is maintained by the Fourth International and which we must raise and openly unfurl as a guide to proletarian revolutionists.

In recent years, the Cuban leadership brought to the revolutionary movement a practical, exemplary internationalism symbolized by the example of Comandante Guevara, a practical internationalism that we highly esteem and that we must try to imitate. The Cubans likewise attempted to found international revolutionary organizations (Tricontinental and OLAS), although for different reasons, they did not achieve results similar to those of the Leninist international.

2. The Present Situation in the International Revolutionary Movement

Today, the concrete situation faced by every revolutionary organization like ours, which understands the need of loyalty to the internationalist principles of Marx and Lenin, is the following:

On the one hand, on the extreme right, we find the revisionism headed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which includes the Communist parties of the European workers states with the sole exception of Albania, and the Moscow-oriented Communist parties in almost every country of the world. This current, which is a direct product of reformist Stalinist bureaucratism, has abandoned the revolutionary struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Objectively, the European socialist countries and the USSR are in antagonistic contradiction to capitalism. Moreover, the line of the revisionist bureaucracy in power, which they call "peaceful coexistence" and which in reality seeks conciliation, the division of the world, being based in a suicidal and utopian, idealist belief that socialism will eventually be established by the mere weight of its example, has been creating favorable conditions for capitalism, stimulating its aggressiveness and emboldening it to such a degree that it has become a weight, a reactionary influence, within the workers states themselves, deepening their degeneration, finding channels to reintroduce capitalism, and opening up the possibility for capitalist restoration, as is shown by the present situation in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland and mainly Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, the Communist and workers parties in the revolutionary workers states—the Chinese Com-

munist Party, the Cuban Communist Party, Albanian Workers Party, Vietnam Workers Party, and Korean Communist Party—are the revolutionary currents that are advancing a revolutionary line and actually fighting or on the verge of it in close relation with one of these parties. These parties have developed and are continuing to develop, to various degrees, the most implacable and determined revolutionary struggle against capitalism and imperialism. They constitute the real vanguard of the world revolutionary movement, and it clearly follows that a revolutionary International that centralizes the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle on a world scale is possible only on the basis of these parties. But such an international is not feasible for the time being because of the express position of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean and Albanian parties, holding that the organization of a new International is not necessary but prejudicial, and because of the insurmountable difficulties encountered by the leadership in concretizing in organization terms the consistent internationalism referred to above.

Finally, another real aspect of this period is the existence of the Trotskyist movement and other internationalist revolutionary currents within the capitalist countries, which, while not lining up with the two sectors already mentioned, are striving to apply Marxism in a creative way to the concrete situation in their country, fighting arms in hand; and in their process of revolutionary maturation they are beginning to redeem the internationalist banner of Marxism-Leninism under the exceptional inspiration of the thought and action of Comandante Guevara.

It is thus evident that for an organization like ours, there is no alternative but to struggle firmly for the construction of a new revolutionary International. And to succeed in this struggle, it is more than ever necessary to win the respect of the layers of the revolutionary workers sectors by means of the fullest and firmest development of revolutionary war in our country and by establishing the closest ties with Latin American and world revolutionary movements.

3. The Fourth International

It is necessary to make clear that the Trotskyist movement includes heterogeneous sectors. From counterrevolutionary adventurers who prostitute its banner to consistent revolutionists. The resurgence of Trotskyism following the death of Stalin in the USSR became polarized in the Fourth International to which we belong with the result that almost all of the adventurist and counterrevolutionary groups that called themselves Trotskyist were left on the outside. Recognition of Stalin's negative side by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself dramatically confirmed the healthy and correct roots of the Trotskyist movement and favored the development of two simultaneous processes: (a) the reunification of the major part of the Trotskyist movement, at that time very atomized, weakened, and discredited, which was concretized at the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International in 1963. (b) The revitalization of Trotskyism by the dual means of a new and broader prestige that made possible the entrance of revolutionary youth in its ranks, and also to a change in the axis of the strug-

gle from one that confronted and denounced Stalinism — a sterile axis that led to mistakes and sectarianism and castrated the movement — to the contemporary revolutionary problematic. This provided us with an understanding of the Cuban revolutionary process, the opening to revolutionary war in theory and practice, and reconsideration of the character of the Asian revolutions.

Some compañeros, who are opposed to our adherence to the Fourth International, argue that it is a discredited bureaucratic organization that instead of facilitating the revolutionary struggle obstructs it because of the resistance aroused by our adherence to it both on the international level and in the workers vanguard front in our country. Let us examine these questions: In the first place, it is necessary to be clear on the fact that the Fourth International actually has great limitations and a scarcely redeemable tradition.

We can summarize it by saying that the historic task of keeping Leninist internationalism alive, of preserving and developing the theory and practice of the permanent revolution, had to be carried out, under conditions of the absolute sway of Stalinism, by small circles of revolutionary intellectuals whose genuine isolation from the proletarian vanguard and the masses — in spite of considerable efforts to penetrate them — prevented them from becoming proletarianized and gave the Trotskyist movement a petty-bourgeois character. This reality determined that the Fourth International's contribution to the revolutionary movement became limited to the not at all negligible safekeeping of essential aspects of Marxism-Leninism that had been abandoned and trampled underfoot by Stalinism. But far from playing an important practical revolutionary role, it stumbled into reformist and ultraleftist views on many occasions and served as a refuge for all kinds of counterrevolutionary adventurers, a consequence and at the same time, cause, of the isolation we mentioned.

Moreover, the process of renovation and development we referred to, which is showing considerable vigor, necessarily implies a transformation of the International and its parties in a proletarian direction. It implies a radical change in its social composition, progressive abandonment of its still dominant petty-bourgeois characteristics, and a full and key participation in different national revolutions. The future of the Trotskyist movement depends on the capacity of the International and its national parties to assimilate this transformation and consciously and methodically carry it out. To summarize, to the negative aspects of the Fourth International, which we have to recognize and understand critically, we must counterpose the real and determining fact that the International is renewing itself, is stirring with life, and heading toward a rich process of revolutionary transformation, a process in which we are participants and proponents.

It is necessary to reiterate, so as to leave no room for error, exaggerations or false illusions, the realistic point of view I upheld at the congress, that we do not believe in the possibility of the Fourth International becoming converted into the international revolutionary party, the need of which we uphold. We believe that this is now historically impossible, and that the role of the International, granting the favorable supposition that it becomes converted into a proletarian revolutionary or-

ganization, should be to seek to construct a new Revolutionary International modeled after the Leninist Third International and based on the Vietnamese, Chinese, Cuban, Korean, and Albanian parties.

In the second place, it is necessary to make clear that in spite of its grave errors and limitations, the International is not really so discredited. On the contrary, thanks to the orientation of revolutionary war adopted by part of the International, it actually has the sympathy of important sectors of the world revolutionary vanguard and enjoys excellent relationships with them. The party has to be aware of the fact that almost all of our international contacts, including those in Latin America, have been established and consolidated by the International, mainly by the International Secretariat, the French Communist League and the Bolivian POR. As for the workers vanguard in our country, it is false, as we have experienced in practice, that Trotskyism is rejected. In general, we can say that the masses scarcely know about it and, except among the Codovilists, the McCarthyite anti-Trotskyist propaganda of the Argentine Communist Party has not taken hold in any sector of the vanguard. In addition, the Argentine revolutionary vanguard as a whole has sufficient political maturity to be able to distinguish between the different sectors of the left. And our party, which does not hide its membership in the Fourth International, has been able to make itself known and respected as a revolutionary combat organization adhering ideologically to Marxism-Leninism. It is publicly asserting our adherence to the theory of permanent revolution and the Trotskyist analysis of the Soviet bureaucracy, as well as our enthusiastic approval of the theory of revolutionary war developed by Mao Tse-tung, Giap, etc.

4. Conclusion

Our party ratifies its adherence to the Fourth International, conscious of its importance, its necessity, and its limitations. What guides us is not a deification of the International, but a critical appraisal of it and a principled internationalist conviction, as well as an appreciation of the importance of the need for an active international political life to participate in the Argentine revolution more correctly. We ratify our adherence, conscious at the same time that we must not hold any illusions in the Fourth International being able to convert itself into the world revolutionary leadership that we consider necessary.

We ratify our adherence with the intention of contributing to the proletarianization of the International, to its revolutionary transformation, and struggling to orient it toward the formation of a new international revolutionary party based on the Chinese, Cuban, Korean, Vietnamese, and Albanian parties, and on the sister organizations struggling in a revolutionary way in every country against capitalism and imperialism.

This should not obstruct, but on the contrary, facilitate, the establishment of the closest relationship with non-Trotskyist revolutionary currents throughout the world, especially with the combat organizations in Latin America. Alongside them and on the basis of a significant development of our war, we will succeed in being heard by all of the Communist parties in the revolutionary

workers states.

A final point. The fact that we are compelled to adopt consistent Marxist, and thereby critical, positions in relation to the international revolutionary movement should not cause us to succumb to pedantry and self-sufficiency. On the contrary, we should take into account the preceding positions as working hypotheses for our organization, necessarily limited and subject to further verification. We must understand that we can speak from a critical position only by judging these conceptions and/or

others that are more advanced when we find ourselves leading the revolutionary war in practice. Therefore, we must adopt a humble and respectful attitude, although no less critical and alert because of this, towards those revolutionary parties that have played and continue to play a revolutionary role. The worst that could happen to us would be to fall into the Morenoist charlatanism of feeling we have the right to give advice to everyone, instead of quietly carrying out our revolutionary tasks.

— Miguel

Statutes of the Revolutionary Workers Party

Section I. *Membership.*

Article 1. Members include party activists and candidates. A party activist is a person who is devoted in mind and body to the revolutionary struggle, and whose central daily activity is to build the party, armed struggle, and to take other steps toward the Revolution.

Article 2. A party member must fulfill the following obligations:

- (a) Participate in a regular unit of the party.
- (b) Attend meetings on time.
- (c) Carry out the daily work assigned by his regular unit.
- (d) Punctually pay the monthly dues set by the leadership of the party, which are not to exceed one day's wages.
- (e) Faithfully carry out the party's line, and the decisions of his unit and leading party bodies.

Article 3. Members have the following rights:

- (a) To take part in deciding the party's line and to offer their opinions and experiences according to the principles of democratic centralism.
- (b) To form factions or tendencies within the party to defend their positions during pre-congress discussion periods.
- (c) Make written contributions to the Internal Discussion Bulletin.
- (d) Elect or be elected to leadership positions.

Article 4. A candidate to the party is any *compañero* who has been introduced by a party member and approved by the member's cell within such a period as it shall determine. A candidate has voice but no vote at meetings and is expected to fulfill the obligations of members. When he has satisfactorily completed his assignments, demonstrating revolutionary capacity and attitude, the cell will grant him membership status, reviewable by the section and national leaderships of the party.

Article 5. A party sympathizer is any *compañero* who faithfully upholds the party line in his workplace, makes a regular financial contribution, and collaborates with the organization although not attending meetings, does consistent party work in one of the branches of the party. He has none of the rights and obligations of members.

Article 6. Party members should:

- (a) Study and actively apply Marxism-Leninism in a living way.
- (b) Prepare themselves and be ready to fight at any moment.
- (c) Establish close ties with the masses, working, living, and struggling with them.
- (d) Make no criticisms of the party to nonparty members or behind the backs of the *compañeros*.
- (e) Make courageous use of self-criticism in contributing to strengthening and building the party.
- (f) Have good moral conduct.
- (g) Be discreet and not give information to other comrades that could threaten the security of the party.

Section II. *Cells.*

Article 7. The party's basic unit is the cell. It is composed of from three to six comrades and is organized to meet the needs of coordinating the daily work of party members in carrying out the party's political line and organizational decisions. It should meet at least once a week.

Article 8. The cell leadership includes one political leader and one military leader elected by a majority vote of the body. The political leader is the liaison with the regional leadership. He leads discussion and political education, sees that the party's correct political line is carried out and organizes the cell's political work. The military leader draws up training plans and leads the carrying out of military plans.

Article 9. The growth of the organization will occur in the form of a pyramid from the bottom up. New recruitment will mean the formation of new teams that will be completely self-contained from the start.

Article 10. There are three categories of cells: basic, technical, and combat.

Article 11. The basic cells are the units in which all party members and candidate members not directly and exclusively involved in technical or military assignments are organized. They are the organs through which the party acts in mass organizations, workers' fronts, the working class, neighborhood groups, etc. They carry out the party's political line, propagandize and agitate around the party's positions, recruit members and sympathizers. They are also combat organs insofar as they engage in resistance or self-defense and give logistic support. They should raise their military level through training, carrying out small actions, etc., with the aim of transforming themselves into breeding grounds for fighters.

Article 12. Technical cells are involved in one or more of these tasks: shop work, arms, laboratory work, documents, printing, intelligence, etc. Because of their importance, they are completely self-contained and their nucleus should include experienced party activists. They may work with sympathizers or nonparty elements, as necessitated by technical reasons, after a careful examination of the security aspects.

Article 13. The combat cells constitute party nuclei in each unit of the Revolutionary People's Army. They are completely self-contained.

Article 14. The party's base organizations should keep the red banner of Marxism-Leninism flying, give political priority to the proletarian policy, and put into full practice the method of integrating theory and revolutionary war. They should also forge close ties with the masses, and especially with the working class, practice criticism and self-criticism, and be prepared to combat nonproletarian positions and right and left opportunism.

Article 15. The main tasks of the party's cells are:

(a) To lead its members and the masses on the road of revolutionary war and to apply Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in a living way.

(b) To prepare themselves continuously for combat and to educate party members and the masses in the spirit of revolutionary war and the struggle against right and left opportunism and lead them in a resolute struggle against the class enemy.

(c) To propagate and carry out the party's political line through energetic agitation and political education, carry out decisions and all tasks assigned by the party and the Revolutionary Army of the People. To prepare themselves continuously and be ready to fight at any moment.

(d) To establish close ties with the masses, learn from them, always paying attention to their opinions and desires and wage an active ideological struggle inside the party in order to maintain a vigorous internal life.

(e) To recruit new members, observe party discipline, constantly firm up the party's organizations, throw out false ideas hanging over from the past and assimilate new ideas so as to keep the party ranks pure.

(f) To lead modest and prudent lives, work hard, avoid petty-bourgeois pedantry, be on guard against petty-bour-

geois prejudices about the supposed inability of women comrades to achieve the highest standards of party work, be courageous but not foolhardy, inspire respect, be truly the first and best in everything, live in harmony, share all problems, and be affectionate to all party comrades as well as to the masses. Only in this way will the party be able to lead the working class and popular sectors to victory in the revolutionary war.

(g) Be respectful and fraternal to those who hold religious beliefs or other ideologies but are struggling against the same enemy, always attempting to involve them in tasks we agree on.

Section III. *Fronts and Branches.*

Article 16. When two or more cells are involved in the same area of work (printing, geographical area, university, branch of production, profession, etc.), they constitute a front (for example, cells comprised of students constitute a Student Front). The cells in a front should be self-contained, establishing necessary coordination through periodic contacts between the leaders of each cell.

Article 17. A party branch is a geographic unit comprising a minimum of three and a maximum of six teams or cells. They are directly under the national and regional leaderships.

Article 18. The branches are under the leadership of an Area Committee of up to six members, having its own political and military leaders. The branches hold periodic plenums, depending on security conditions, with one representative for every three members or fraction thereof. Biannually the plenums elect the branch leadership and discuss the application of the party line in the branch.

Section IV. *Regional.*

Article 19. The Region is the leading party body on a provincial level, always representing a minimum of three branches. It is the most important party organization after the national party as a whole, and therefore has a certain autonomy and an organizational structure similar to that of the party.

Article 20. The Regions are under the leadership of a Regional Committee of six members, headed by a political and a military leader elected by the executive committee. Depending on security conditions, the Regions will hold periodic plenums with one representative for every six members or fraction of three. These plenums annually elect most of the regional leadership (the political and military leaders are elected by the Executive Committee) and discuss the application of the party line in the Region.

Section V. *Military Force.*

Article 21. The Revolutionary Army of the People and its armed detachments constitute the party's military force. It is the obligation of each party member to struggle to build the Revolutionary Army of the People and be attentive to consolidating the leading role of the party within it through constant political education and maintaining the complete dominance of proletarian ideology.

Article 22. The fundamental body for exercising the party's leading role in the Revolutionary Army of the People is the combat cell, which should be organized as a basic unit.

Article 23. The system of Political Commissars will be instituted in base units and leadership organs. The Political Commissars will take charge of political edu-

cation in their units, as well as application of a mass political line for military activity, and will be the secretaries of the combat cells or respective party organizations.

Article 24. The Revolutionary Army of the People will be under the leadership of a Military Committee of the party, chosen by the Executive Committee, and responsible to that body and the Central Committee for correctly carrying out military instructions.

Section VI. *National Leadership.*

Article 25. The national leadership bodies of the party are: National Congress, Central Committee, Executive Committee, Political Bureau and Military Committee.

Section VII. *National Congress.*

Article 26. The National Congress is the highest leadership body of the party. It meets every three years, providing conditions are favorable for security, with one delegate elected for every seven members or fraction of five in the cells and/or regional plenums of the branches. Its purposes are to: (a) Decide the party's political and military line until the next Congress; (b) Evaluate what was carried out by the Central Committee elected at the previous Congress; (c) Elect the Central Committee.

Article 27. The pre-congress period will open six months prior to the holding of the Congress. During that period party members have the authority to organize tendencies and factions to stimulate discussion in the party and to defend their positions. Pre-congress discussion should be carried on in a constructive, serious, and proletarian manner.

Section VIII. *Central Committee.*

Article 28. The Central Committee is composed of eighteen full members and seven alternates and is elected by the Congress. It functions as the highest party organ between congresses and usually meets every six months and whenever necessary for special reasons and at a suitable time decided by the Executive Committee or a third of its members. The tasks of the Central Committee are: (a) To evaluate the activity of the party and the Executive Committee; (b) To develop party policy on all questions within the guidelines set by the Congress; (c) To elect the Executive Committee.

Article 29. Under exceptional circumstances the Central Committee can convene an Expanded Central Committee with the participation of delegates from the Regional Committees, the number to be determined by the Executive Committee or the Central Committee itself.

Article 30. If a serious situation arises threatening the functioning of the party, the regional committees or the Central Committee can seek the opinion of the ranks by means of a plebiscite. The Regional Congresses may also be approached for their decision.

Section IX. *Executive Organs.*

Article 31. The Executive Committee is composed of eleven members elected by the Central Committee. It is the highest body of the party between the election of Central Committees. It usually meets every month and, under special circumstances, when requested by four of its members.

The tasks of the Executive Committee are:

(a) To lead the party in its practical work, faithfully implementing the political and military decisions of the Congress and the Central Committee.

(b) To provide leadership in areas of press, finances, cadre schools and organizing the party.

(c) To prepare the agendas and the resolutions to be discussed by the Central Committee and the Congress and to take charge of organization and security for the meetings of these bodies.

(d) To appoint the Political Bureau and the Military Committee of the party as well as the Military leaders and Political Commissars of the Revolutionary Army of the People.

Article 32. The Political Bureau is composed of five members elected by the Executive Committee. It oversees the daily operations of the press, propaganda, and agitation, finances, organization, classes, union work, etc. It should meet on a weekly basis.

Article 33. The Military Committee is composed of five members elected by the Executive Committee and constitutes the leading nucleus of the General Staff of the Revolutionary Army of the People. Its tasks include:

(a) Carrying out the military decisions of the Executive Committee, Central Committee and the Congress.

(b) Leading the Revolutionary Army of the People in accordance with the party's military line.

(c) Upholding the party's leading role in the Revolutionary Army of the People by means of political education, keeping a check on the social composition of the ranks and cadres and applying a mass political line.

Section X. *Democratic Centralism.*

Article 34. The party's internal system is democratic centralism, characterized as follows:

(a) Democratic participation of the entire party in drawing up the line on all levels; constant supervision by the ranks of administrative, financial, and other such matters; fraternal and equal relationships among all party members.

(b) Subordination of the minority to the majority and of the ranks to the leadership in applying decisions that have been adopted; observance of the strictest politically conscious discipline in carrying out tasks; the method of education and persuasion, fraternal and self-criticism constituting the foundation for this discipline.

Section XI. *Party Tribunal.*

Article 35. The Party Tribunal is the party organ charged with handling questions of proletarian and party morality. It administers revolutionary justice in cases of treason, informing, desertion, and other counterrevolutionary crimes, whether they are committed by members or elements outside the organization.

Article 36. The Executive Committee will write the rules and regulations for the Party Tribunal, and submit them to the Central Committee which will ratify them and appoint the Tribunal's members. Until such time the Executive Committee will act as the Party Tribunal, appointing special joint commissions in branches and Regions where there are serious moral infractions or counterrevolutionary crimes to be judged.

Section XII. *Cooptations and Meetings.*

Article 37. Every party leadership organ has the right to coopt up to 40 percent of its members in order to improve its work on the basis of a 75 percent vote of its members.

Article 38. The security of every meeting of the different party organs should be strictly guaranteed, using legal

means when possible, or by organizing to defend them in the opposite case.

Article 39. A quorum for the bodies listed in the statutes will consist of half the members plus one. Any decision or change in an earlier decision can be passed by a majority of one of the members present.

Section XIII. *General Considerations.*

Article 40. These statutes and the resolutions of the congresses can be changed by a decision of three-fourths of the Central Committee or three-fourths of the party's members pending ratification at the next congress.

Program of the Revolutionary Army of the People

For the national and social liberation of our country we propose:

1. *In the political sphere.*

(a) To sever, make public, and expose the pacts that bind us to the USA and other foreign powers.

(b) To establish a system of Social Democracy, a Revolutionary People's Government led by the working class.

(c) To bring political criminals, usurpers of power, etc., to trial.

(d) Full participation by the people as a whole in the government through their mass organizations.

2. *In the economic sphere.*

(a) Severance of agreements with the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Bank for Development and every other organization of imperialist control and penetration.

(b) Expropriation without compensation and nationalization of all companies controlled by imperialist capital and of the national capitalist interests that support them.

(c) Nationalization of banking and credit.

(d) Nationalization of foreign trade.

(e) Agrarian reform.

(f) Worker-state administration of all the nationalized companies.

3. *In the social sphere.*

(a) Urban reform. Expropriation of all rented housing owned by the big capitalists to be handed over to the

tenants.

(b) A campaign to spread literacy to the entire people, extending the years of compulsory secondary education, and opening the universities to the people through extensive scholarship programs.

(c) Elimination of unemployment and the reopening of factories closed during the last ten years by capitalist interests to the detriment of workers and cities.

(d) Decent wages, pensions and retirement pay that will eliminate the people's poverty.

(e) Total freedom of religion.

4. *In the military sphere.*

(a) Dissolve the bourgeois army, police, and all other repressive bodies and replace them by the Revolutionary Army of the People and People's Armed Militias, that is, by the armed people.

(b) Every soldier or state worker who leaves the repressive bodies has a place fighting in the people's military forces.

Argentiniens: The Revolutionary People's Army calls on all patriots to fulfill their responsibilities, to take their posts in our revolutionary war of the People, in this second War of Independence. General San Martín and Comandante Guevara are our finest examples. The task of the hour is to follow and emulate their thought and action and that of our past and present heroes and martyrs.

WIN OR DIE FOR ARGENTINA!

Draft Program of the Revolutionary Workers Party

A. In the final and decisive stage of the advance of the world revolution, our country finds itself in the position of a semicolony of Yankee imperialism that has attained a certain degree of capitalist development. Economically uneven, politically uniform, Argentina is suffering from a chronic structural crisis in which the proletariat is the basic driving force of the revolution and the urban petty-bourgeoisie and poor peasantry of the North are its main allies.

1. The world revolution has entered the final and decisive stage of its development, characterized by:

(a) The growth of the revolutionary war against imperialism and the native bourgeoisies in the dependent countries, with this struggle constituting the central axis of the world revolution and with the Vietnamese people constituting its fighting vanguard.

(b) Advances in building socialism and participation in and active encouragement of the world revolution by the workers states: China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and Albania.

(c) Secondarily, the progress of popular struggles in the advanced capitalist countries against the imperialist wars and for democracy and the rights of the working class and exploited minorities (principally the North American Blacks).

(d) The concentration of bourgeois power in the hands of a smaller number of imperialist monopolies, closely tied to their respective states; and the transformation of the USA into the political and military police force of the world counterrevolution, resulting in:

I. The impossibility of interimperialist wars, which constitutes a favorable conjuncture for revolutionary struggles.

II. The direct or indirect intervention of imperialism in all revolutionary wars and struggles.

(e) The contradictory and negative role played by the degenerated workers states, headed by the Soviet Union, resulting from:

I. Their conciliationist policy that permits imperialism to use nuclear blackmail and continue its counterrevolutionary escalation.

II. The distortion imposed on the revolutionary processes by the Communist parties that follow their line.

III. The contradictory development of socialist construction, opening up the possibility for a return to capitalism in some of these states, particularly Yugoslavia.

IV. The incipient growth within them of the struggle for workers democracy.

2. Latin America constitutes the second most important area, after Asia, in the development of revolutionary war in the dependent countries; the development of this struggle being characterized by:

(a) The exhaustion of the experience of reformist struggle and the resulting development of people's struggles, especially of their armed vanguards, against imperialism and the native bourgeoisie.

(b) The consolidation of workers' democracy and the

relative step forward in socialist construction in Cuba.

(c) The irreversible sharpening of the contradictions of the capitalist system throughout the continent, because of increased exploitation and the advance of popular struggles.

3. Argentina has achieved a relative degree of distorted capitalist development in the context of mainly Yankee imperialist domination. This process is characterized by:

(a) The formation of medium industry and some small-scale heavy industry. These are tied primarily to the domestic market and secondarily to the world market, and almost totally under the control of American, and to a lesser extent, European monopoly capital. They are subordinated to the foreign capitalists' plans and interests.

(b) Stagnation and crisis in light industry, mainly in the big regional processing industries, caused by the contradictions generated by monopoly control of the national market (the sugar industry in Tucumán; cotton, tannin, and forestry in the Chaco; the vineyards in San Juan and to a lesser extent in Mendoza; yerba mate in Misiones, etc.).

(c) The unevenness of this capitalist development in the various zones of the country, with the concentration spreading out from the periphery to the center, leaving isolated areas of development in the interior. As a result, in certain areas the country's chronic structural crisis has reached an acute and irreversible phase, especially in Tucumán, with a similar trend in other regions, notably Córdoba.

(d) The stagnation in agricultural and cattle production, which has oriented toward the domestic market and remained virtually frozen since 1930, throwing into crisis sectors linked to the regional processing industries.

(e) Lack of development in the mining industry and monopoly control of energy and fuels.

4. Since 1930 and particularly since 1955, the relative and dependent capitalist development of our country has brought about profound changes in class relationships, characterized by the following features:

(a) The formation of a strong, highly concentrated industrial proletariat, constituting the exploited class with the greatest weight in Argentine society.

(b) The formation of a modern petty bourgeoisie composed mainly of salaried workers, whose numbers are very large and whose broadest layers have a low standard of living similar to that of the working class.

(c) Chronic—and in recent years, growing—impoverishment of the rural proletariat and the poor peasantry, who are numerically important in the North.

(d) The strengthening of foreign imperialist domination by a growing and nearly complete takeover of the country's domestic economy by monopoly capital, in particular Yankee capital, through control of banking, finance capital, and industrial investment.

(e) The conversion of the traditional landholding oligarchy into a modern financial, industrial, and agricul-

tural big bourgeoisie closely tied to imperialism and the armed forces. As a minor partner, this bourgeoisie shares in the control of the national economy.

(f) The formation, particularly in recent years, of a broad underemployed and unemployed layer living around the cities and in the countryside, which constitutes an oppressed and oppositional sector.

5. These class relationships were expressed on June 28, 1969, by the liquidation of formal bourgeois democracy, the installation of a military dictatorship serving the interests of the monopolies, and increasing totalitarian control of the national life—repressive legislation, transformation of the unions remaining in the framework of bourgeois legality into semistate agencies, and in general military-police control of all of Argentine society.

6. The working class has a great tradition of economic struggle. This has been in the framework of legal unions and under the influence of bourgeois ideology but without parliamentarist tendencies. In recent years the sharpening of contradictions in the Argentine economy and society has produced a process of ideological revolution in this class, characterized by the search for, and incipient formation of, illegal and semilegal organizational forms, and the growing use of violent methods of struggle. The workers have progressively moved away from bourgeois ideology and become increasingly open to the ideological concepts of their own class.

7. The process of ideological revolution took a qualitative leap forward in May 1969 as shown by:

(a) The beginning of revolutionary war by armed sectors of the workers and popular vanguard.

(b) The growth of spontaneous struggles in the workers and popular movement.

8. The lowest layers of the petty bourgeoisie, mainly urban salaried workers, are undergoing a process of growing pauperization, throwing them into conflict with the regime and impelling them toward the proletarian camp. Because of the independent role played by the student movement in the process of production, it is the most dynamic expression of the tendencies of this sector.

9. The rural proletariat and the poor peasantry in the North have absolutely no way out within the context of the system and are being driven relentlessly toward the revolutionary camp. In the Northwest, these sectors have a long tradition of struggling side by side with the sugar workers, who for years have been the most combative and conscious sector of the industrial proletariat.

10. The growth of the means of communication and the centralizing of the bourgeoisie's political and military power tend to give a uniformity to the course of politics on the national level that combines with the uneven development of the economy and society.

B. By revolutionary war against the regime, the Revolutionary Workers' Party is fighting for the establishment of a revolutionary workers and people's government in order to carry through the anti-imperialist and socialist revolution the country needs.

1. By the tasks it has to accomplish, our revolution is anti-imperialist and socialist, that is permanent. The reasons for this are as follows:

(a) Imperialist penetration is the principal cause of the distorted development and chronic crisis of our economy

and the suffering of our people; it is the plunderer of our riches and the main obstacle to our independent growth.

(b) This imperialist domination is nothing more than the highest stage of the capitalist system, which no longer has room for anything but a minority of superdeveloped capitalist centers and a large majority of dependent countries. Maintaining this relationship, as well as the search for, and preservation of, new markets has become a matter of life and death for the system.

(c) It is the dependent countries such as ours that almost by themselves have to bear the weight of the crisis of the world capitalist system, and this is leading to an explosive rise of economic, political, and social unrest within them.

(d) In this process the imperialist monopolies find their main ally and defender in the national bourgeoisies, which are incapable of maintaining themselves by their own means. In the bourgeois context, there is no way out for such elements except by stepping up the exploitation and plundering of the workers, drowning their protest demonstrations in blood; and engaging in intermonopoly warfare and piratical competition.

(e) Owing to the nature of the relative capitalist development achieved by our country, the primary contradiction in our society is between the working class and the people as a whole on one side, and a minority of national capitalists and foreigners on the other.

(f) Therefore, our struggle is aimed at *sweeping away imperialist domination and demolishing the capitalist system that oppresses us*, destroying not only its state machinery and international mechanisms, but its entire system of economic, social and political domination, as well.

(g) The only way to do this is by abolishing private ownership of the means of production, banking and commerce, embarking on the road toward the socialization of our economy. That is, beginning the construction of the socialist society through a process of permanent revolution.

2. Ours is a workers and popular revolution in its class content, because:

(a) Owing to its role and weight in our society and because it is the direct victim of capitalist exploitation, the proletariat is the vanguard class of our revolution.

(b) Only the leadership and control of the working class, through the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat (or, workers' democracy), will assure the permanent character of our revolution, the defeat of the enemy classes, the liquidation of bourgeois interests and pressures, and a consistent advance in building socialism.

(c) The proletariat's main allies are the urban petty bourgeoisie throughout the country and the poor peasantry in the North. These forces do not have a direct interest in the establishment of socialism but they do have in the accomplishment of the democratic tasks and in overcoming the economic dislocation to which they are subjected and which they are incapable of confronting alone.

3. The only road to seizing power is through a prolonged revolutionary war against the regime. The reasons for this are the following:

(a) The irreversible and irreconcilable nature of the class struggle; the role of the state and the bourgeois army,

which by resorting to counterrevolutionary violence, compel the people to respond by armed struggle; the role played by Yankee imperialism as the police force of world counterrevolution.

(b) The exhausting of the reformist experience by the popular masses, who consequently can only continue their struggle in the form of a civil war of the working class and the popular sectors against the oppressors through building the Revolutionary Army of the People.

(c) This civil war will be transformed at the moment of foreign intervention, into a national anti-imperialist war, linking up with the war that is developing in the rest of the colonized countries.

(d) In the first stage, we will conduct this war against an enemy that is more powerful than the fighting vanguard of the people.

(e) Imperialism must be fought in a worldwide confrontation with the strategic objective of destroying it. We can achieve this only by conceiving our war as part of the process of continental and worldwide revolutionary war.

4. Our revolution is part of the Latin-American and world revolution, and is therefore international in content and national in form, because:

(a) The revolutionary process is generated by, and developed on the basis of our social reality, and thus has specific national characteristics.

(b) As it develops, our revolutionary process will more and more assume a regional and continental character until, owing to common military objectives and strategic needs, it ceases to recognize boundaries and interlocks with the world revolution.

(c) From the Latin-American standpoint, our revolutionary war is the legitimate historical continuation of the war of independence led by San Martín, Bolívar, and Martí.

5. The Revolutionary Workers Party undertakes to propel, lead, and channel the Argentine revolutionary process. Our main objectives being:

(a) To lead and propel the revolutionary war against the regime, in the process of its development creating the *Revolutionary Army of the Argentine People*.

(b) To organize in its ranks the fighting vanguard of the revolution, which is composed of workers and revolutionary intellectuals, training them to be the leaders and inspirers of the people's struggle against oppression.

(c) To win the people to the struggle to the death against imperialism and capitalism, until they impose a Revolutionary Workers and People's Government and embark on the road of our anti-imperialist and socialist revolution.

(d) To assure that the proletariat's interests are defended by upholding the ideology of the working class — Marxism-Leninism.

(e) To participate in and develop the spontaneous struggles of the working class and popular sectors, raising the class consciousness of the workers, helping to organize them, and clarifying the tasks and objectives of their struggles.

(f) To promote alliances on different levels in order to accomplish joint tasks in the anti-imperialist, democratic, and/or revolutionary struggle, always keeping up an uncompromising defense of the interests and political inde-

pendence of the proletariat.

(g) Carrying out joint political and military actions uniting the various Latin-American fighting organizations and developing mutual aid among the countries.

C. *The revolutionary workers and people's government that we are fighting to achieve will usher in a new stage in the life of the nation, establishing workers democracy, ending imperialist domination, and initiating the struggle that will destroy the capitalist system and lead to the construction of socialism.*

1. The new workers democracy will be based on a system of councils of workers and people's deputies elected by a direct vote and subject to recall at any time. These councils will organize and direct the economic, social, and political life of the country on the local, provincial, and national levels, as well as controlling foreign relations.

2. This new workers democracy, that will lead toward the total destruction of the state apparatus, will be based on arming the people, eliminating the standing professional army and police, along with replacing them by workers and popular revolutionary defense militias and, temporarily, by a well-organized people's army for defense against foreign invasion until imperialism is defeated on a world scale.

3. The first measure taken by this government will be to abrogate all the political and military pacts that bind us to imperialism.

4. It will disavow the foreign debt and end ties with the International Monetary Fund and all economic organizations controlled by imperialism.

5. It will expropriate all imperialist property.

6. It will expropriate heavy industry remaining in the hands of national capital.

7. The national state will run the enterprises already mentioned, basically, steel, petroleum companies, petrochemicals, packing houses, mining, transportation, communications, public services, etc., machine and machine-tool manufacturing, etc.

8. It will nationalize banking, insurance, and all financial operations.

9. It will nationalize foreign trade, adopting a policy of trading with every country in the world, especially the socialist states.

10. It will nationalize domestic wholesale trade.

11. It will expropriate and nationalize the properties of the big landholders, both absentees and others, and organize tillage and husbandry, developing an intensive production of meats, cereals and derivatives.

12. It will expropriate and nationalize large sugar, tobacco and yerba mate plantations, large vineyards and lumber works.

13. It will gradually expropriate medium industrial and rural property owners, paying them compensation and allowing them to remain at the head of their enterprise only if they have not taken part in the repression against the people.

14. It will respect the rights of small property owners, encouraging them to organize in cooperatives, to which it will provide all necessary technical aid.

15. It will plan the economic activity of the country on a socialist basis so as to assure that its potential is developed in the interests of the people and the world

revolution. It will develop the country's technical infrastructure, carrying out the public works necessary for its advancement, especially in backward regions.

16. It will completely solve the housing problem in a way suited to the interests of the people, ending all real-estate speculation for once and for all.

17. It will socialize medicine and its subsidiary fields, nationalize the medical laboratories and build hospitals and clinics, especially in the interior.

18. It will reorganize education on all levels, harnessing it to the needs of the people and of national development, making it compulsory as far as the secondary level and opening up the universities to the entire people according to their ability and aptitude.

D. *Until a revolutionary workers and popular government is won, the Revolutionary Workers' Party will wage an uncompromising struggle to defend the basic rights of the working class and of the people as a whole, trying to wrest as many gains as possible from the capitalist regime through the direct struggle of the masses.*

1. Repeal of repressive legislation, especially the death penalty, martial law, the anti-Communist law and the one on oral verdicts in subversion cases.

2. Restoration of democratic freedoms and individual

rights, especially freedom of association, organization, press, and the right to form unions.

3. Full observance of the right to strike and the repeal of all restrictive regulations.

4. Setting a minimum sliding scale of wages that guarantees a decent level of existence, with periodic readjustments by the parity commissions, which must be restored and allowed to function.

5. Ending all types of state interference in the union movement.

6. Drawing up and putting into practice a plan for building homes to be handed over to the popular sectors and paid for by them in payments not to exceed 10 percent of their salary.

7. No private control of hospital administration, guaranteed free quality medical treatment for everyone. Construction of hospitals and clinics. Control of the price and quality of medicines.

8. Reorganization of curricula on all three levels, so as to make them serve the nation; restoration of secular and free primary instruction and opening secondary education and the universities to the sons of workers, through a system of scholarships and student social labor.

Resolutions of the October 1970 Central Committee Plenum

The Situation in the Country

After Levingston's maneuvers, which aroused populist illusions among the bourgeois politicians, especially the Peronists, the military dictatorship has settled into continuing the policy of the Onganía regime. Various signs—the appointment of populist governors such as Bas and Imbaud, the overtures of Gilardi Novaro to the traditional politicians, rumors of the return of Perón and of Evita's body—had deceived the bourgeois politicians, the national bourgeoisie, and its most faithful representatives, the trade-union bureaucracy.

Today these illusions have been momentarily dispelled by the clear positions taken by Lanusse and by Levingston himself, when they announced a five-year delay in elections and imposed extremely rigid eligibility requirements for participation by the politicians.

Meanwhile the dictatorship's economic policy is bearing down harder and harder on the masses, creating an intolerable situation for the working class and the popular sectors as a whole. The spectacular and constant rise in the cost of living, the practice of freezing wages, the recession in the packing-house industry, and the failure of the wheat harvest have all been loaded onto the backs of the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, the poor peasantry, as well as sectors of the middle bourgeoisie. Especially hard hit have been urban masses in the large cities.

Within this framework, the present situation between the government and the classes can be summarized as follows:

1. The military dictatorship finds itself as isolated as it has ever been in its most difficult moments. Incapable of solving any of its problems, and unable to strengthen its social base, it is flailing about, a prisoner of its own contradictions. If it tries to garner populist support and considers seeking some kind of agreement with the bourgeois parties and the trade-union bureaucracy, it gets its ears boxed by the monopolist sectors and the Commanders in Chief; it then has to give up all attempts to win a [non] military base of support and gets insults and threats from the bureaucrats and bourgeois politicians. At the same time, its economic policy brings repudiation and hatred from the people.

As was exposed by Minister Moyano Llerena, the dictatorship lacks a definite economic policy, or in clearer terms, in the context of its persistent offensive against the standard of living of the workers and people, it is wavering between different bourgeois alternatives, none of which can offer a way out of the economic crisis. Now it has opted for a version of *desarrollismo* [promoting industrial development] which if we are to believe the words of Minister Ferrer, will attempt to resuscitate the economy through huge public-works projects. Nevertheless, this new line foreshadows new problems for the working class and

popular sectors. Such massive investments would exhaust the state's liquid reserves and lead to the wages of government workers and employees lagging still further behind the cost of living. As for this being a possible solution, at most it can be a poor palliative.

Levingston spoke recently about building up a strong monopoly capitalist sector, a "national" big bourgeoisie. This seems to represent a new attempt on the part of the government, this time apparently a more serious one, to find a structural solution for overcoming the economy's stagnation and paving the way for a phase of development and significant economic growth that would stave off the revolutionary crisis. While such a possibility cannot be ruled out historically, it is still premature and the unfolding of revolutionary war will block it.

Despondency is rife in the Armed Forces and their hangers on. They have just "exposed" Onganía as unfit, and immediately they find themselves at odds with his replacements. Totaling up the results, they find that they have failed to solve a single problem. It irritates them to see the vitality of Peronism. In fifteen years they have not been able to stamp it out. And now they realize that they are almost certainly going to have to turn to their old enemy to save capitalism. They are disturbed to see the start of the first activity by an armed vanguard and the spread of socialist ideas among the masses. They are unable to absorb the unexpected hard blows dealt by the victory of the Unidad Popular in Chile and the installation of Allende as president, the survival of the nationalist government in Peru, the crisis in Uruguay, and the defeat of their pupil Miranda by the Bolivian nationalist officers, themselves cornered by the revolutionary mobilization of the masses.

We can therefore conclude that Levingston's dictatorship is the direct continuation of Onganía's rule, ruling only by virtue of the support of the Armed Forces. It is on the basis of a temporary agreement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have withdrawn their endorsement of the president.

On the other hand, the Armed Forces are being subjected to heavy pressures, which foreshadow future crises. The impossibility of capitalist solutions for our country, the evolution of the situation in the neighboring states, and the beginning of revolutionary war in Argentina are factors promoting the growth of anti-imperialist and socialist currents among the layers of young commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the Armed Forces.

2. Imperialism and monopoly capital support the Military Dictatorship without reservation.

3. The middle and "national" bourgeoisie, their parties, and the union bureaucracy are once again in the opposition now that Levingston has rejected their abject offers of collaboration. They are making efforts to build an opposition Bourgeois Front, which, before appealing for popular support, is seeking the approval of imperialism and a sector of the army in an effort to find an electoral solution offering a foolproof recipe for saving

capitalism and eliminating violence. Naturally in this attempt they are trying to mobilize sectors of the workers and the popular strata in order to lend a certain seriousness to their proposals. But they are extremely timid in their approach and anxious to avoid energetic struggles. Nothing reveals this more clearly than the Peronist meeting on October 17 in Córdoba. The bourgeois politicians and bureaucrats organized an "orderly" meeting, which was distinguished by an attack on the left-wing youth by the bureaucracy. They were denounced from the podium as "Castroite infiltrators." The organizers tried to make a peaceful showing, offered their solution to the imperialists and the army, and strove to make a public demonstration of their staunch opposition to revolutionary violence and communism.

The nature of this Bourgeois Front requires us to take a position firmly and clearly independent of it. We must expose the treacherous and counterrevolutionary content of their line and counterpose our line of revolutionary war. The weak position of the bourgeois politicians and bureaucrats, their long succession of betrayals, and the correctness of the line we offer as an alternative gives us a significant advantage. And we must exploit this by resolutely confronting electoral tactics and coups and propagating the strategy and tactics of revolutionary war in every way possible. These are excellent opportunities for putting revolutionary Marxist positions before the masses.

4. The petty bourgeoisie is going through an important period of radicalization. Under unrelenting assault from the dictatorship and the system, suffering economic difficulties almost as great as the working class, they harbor a brooding hatred of the regime, which they demonstrate by supporting the working class in its mobilizations and by providing fighters and activists for the revolutionary organizations. Out of this class arise disorienting tendencies, taking two forms: (a) the line of the petty-bourgeois Marxist parties and groups such as the CP, PSIN, *La Verdad*, *Política Obrera*, etc. Lacking a revolutionary line, these formations fall in behind the bourgeois politicians, following in their train with calls for a Constituent Assembly and other such electoralist slogans and opposing the line of revolutionary war, which they disingenuously insist on equating with foquism. (b) Refusing to align with any party or forming "groups." (c) Right opportunist and militarist pressures showing up in the armed vanguard and which openly manifested themselves in our party.

5. The working class continues to resist the Dictatorship. The massiveness of the work stoppages of October 9 and October 22 is a clear indication of the mood of the masses—suppressed hate, pent-up rage, total repudiation of the dictatorship. Various objective factors indicate that we are faced with an especially explosive conjuncture. The spectacular rise in the cost of living is bearing down brutally on the entire working class and the popular sectors; there is nothing more graphic than the consumer statistics from Buenos Aires published by bourgeois newspapers showing a 30 percent reduction in consumption during the last month; the meager wheat harvest, which according to estimates will show at least a 30 percent drop, and the crisis in cattle raising that has already caused the temporary shutdown of Swift de La Plata

(Rosario, Berisso). This critical state of the economy, which is dealing hard blows to the popular masses, combines with the government's isolation and the spirit of the masses to form a critical situation. The country is once again a powder keg ready to explode with the first spark. We should prepare ourselves for this possibility, be on the alert, and organize our small forces to act in an orderly and effective manner in the mass mobilizations that may develop. It is clear that if they occur, all the chances will be on the side of the revolutionary forces. We will have an absolute advantage vis-à-vis the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties that harbor illusions about the coup-makers and their elections.

6. The process of development of the revolutionary war is continuing its present stage of sustained rise. We can confirm that since the beginning of the year this feature has not changed, a fact that is highly promising. We can also point to an (unplanned) rate of activity of one major national action per month and a series of small actions occurring on a daily basis. As is logical, all of this has had a very sharp impact on the country as a whole, to such an extent that no one is unaware anymore that there is a war going on. This by no means signifies that the whole of the society feels actively involved in the process, either in favor of it or against it, but it does mean that the effects of the war are impinging more and more on the daily life of the population, especially in the major urban centers and in many cases in less populous centers. As regards active participation, the process continues to be a confrontation between vanguards—the revolutionary vanguard and what we might call the "reactionary vanguard."

On the basis of this situation; previous reports from the areas, leadership, and editorial staffs; and, following the lines laid down by the Fourth and Fifth Congresses, the Central Committee of the party has formulated a political-military plan embracing the three fundamental problems at the moment—Mass Work, Planning Military Operations, and Building the Party and the Army.

First Military Operational Plan

Under the present conditions, all plans should be based on our concrete reality and not on our subjective desires. Our present stage of growth presents us with two main tasks—*armed propaganda and creating an efficient, sound military structure*. This involves obtaining money, arms, and training the whole party militarily. The main point of our armed propaganda is to popularize the name and program of the army by armed actions that have a big national impact and continuity. No matter how large an isolated action may be, if it does not fit into the context of similar actions occurring at a certain rate in three or four regions of the country, it will be meaningless, since our name would be mixed up with that of five or six other groups.

In creating a military structure, we consider that the following tasks take priority: (a) obtaining funds and arms; (b) forging the combat readiness of the military cells and the party as a whole for military actions and resistance. We stress the usefulness of disarming as many isolated police as possible. Along with bringing in necessary arms, such actions make it possible to give the com-

pañeros some training and have a political impact on the repressive forces. Every cell should carry out such actions.

This is the framework of our first Operational Plan, which is to be developed in the coming months. It will include the following actions:

1. A series of actions, including expropriating money, capturing arms, seizing towns, freeing prisoners, and kidnappings. These are to be carried out in succession at different points in the country. At present we cannot predict in what order.

2. This campaign will include continual minor acts of resistance carried out by all the cells. The most important of these are actions involving seizing and distributing food.

3. In the course of demonstrations and mass mobilizations, the military cells of the army will carry out parallel military actions designed to coincide with the mobilizations and to complement them.

4. A fundamental point for realizing the proper political benefit from this plan is to take advantage of the propaganda value of the actions. This involves working up and carrying out an intelligent plan for publicizing every specific action, as well as the name and program of the Army. We have to weigh the political pros and cons of every action, carefully avoiding actions of a dubious value, and always selecting the most clearly popular type of operations. We must prepare good communiqués—sober, strictly truthful ones and with a clear political content in accordance with the guidelines of the Army's program. We have to produce our own propaganda materials, painted slogans, megaphones [?] leaflets, etc. This is very important to make people notice the physical proximity of our military force, to realize that the fighters are nearby, that anyone in their midst might be a guerrilla, and that our force is not an isolated vanguard. As a general guideline, we can point out that excellent armed propaganda will be assured to the extent that the compañeros who plan actions, draw up communiqués, produce leaflets, and do other such tasks keep their eyes fixed on the masses, taking precise note of their reactions and state of mind.

5. The tactical recommendations of this plan are as follows:

(a) Assure the maximum success by carefully planning actions. Gamble as little as possible, thinking ahead about the turns things may take. Keep down the risks of every operation, carefully safeguarding the rest of the organization. *In actions, every detail is vital.*

(b) Act with decisiveness, audacity, and coolness. Timidity, doubt, nervousness, etc. are the worst enemies of success and multiply the risks inherent in combat.

(c) In the face of difficulties, conduct yourself heroically. Be prepared to kill or to die. In our revolutionary morale, the basis of our heroism, lies in our fundamental superiority in combat. Heroic behavior stirs the imagination of the masses, arousing admiration, winning solidarity, and inspiring emulation.

The Party and the Army

The third fundamental aspect of our present Political-Military Plan is correctly solving the problems of building a proletarian Party and Army.

The basic perspective that must be advanced is to accelerate the process of transforming the party into a truly proletarian combat organization. This will be achieved by stepping up the successes we have already attained in the process of proletarianization: placing activists and cadres in production, increasing our relations with the masses. In this, three regions can serve as examples. In one, students, cultural workers, and members of the military cells have already gone, or are about to go, to live in working-class neighborhoods, establishing a political relationship with the population. In another, almost all the cadres, including the leadership, have taken places in production. In the third, a process of purging and tightening up the ranks is in progress, with members being strictly required to fulfill the statutory requirements. Our members must increasingly become the best of the vanguard, and we must keep raising our qualifications until we have achieved a homogeneous proletarian party of professional revolutionists. Another means of achieving this is by increasing our military activity, making all the cells operational as well as getting the military cells to step up their operational capacity and the basic cells to take on more advanced operations than small expropriations, going on to disarming police, seizing and distributing food, etc. Success will be accomplished by applying a clear mass line in such actions.

At the same time, we must overcome our present limitations in the following key fields:

- (a) Publications.
- (b) Agitation and Propaganda.
- (c) Cadre Schools.
- (d) Military Training.

The objectives of our First Political-Military Plan are to achieve a balanced development of the Army and the Party, building the army—its operational capacity and its mass influence—in the fullest and most effective way at the same as accomplishing quantitative and qualitative growth in the party and expanding its influence.

On Discipline in the Army

In Point No. 3, Subsection (b), the resolutions of the Fifth Congress on democratic centralism in the army set down the requirement "For iron discipline in the army, for correct and efficient exercise of command by the leaders and strict and efficient compliance by subordinates."

In a revolutionary army, discipline, which is so important for the effective functioning of military units, is based on consciousness, on the revolutionary political and moral preparation of the combatants. This does not do away with the need for resorting in exceptional instances to measures that help to fortify it. Such measures must be applied in all cases where irresponsibility, negligence, lack of cool-headedness, etc., result in grave errors or failings that impair the efficient operation of the units.

Cases of dishonesty, willful sabotage, or treason fall outside the sphere of the disciplinary measures that are the subject of this resolution and should be dealt with before the Tribunal of Revolutionary Justice established by Article 35 of the Statutes.

In line with the aforesaid, the Central Committee resolves:

1. Discipline in the military cells of the party and the

military units of the army will be self-discipline based on the consciousness, on the revolutionary political and moral preparation of the combatants.

2. In exceptional cases, disciplinary measures consisting of arrest and other sanctions will be resorted to. Such measures will be applied in all cases where irresponsibility, negligence, nervousness, etc. result in grave errors or lapses that impair the effective functioning of units.

3. These sanctions will be applied even-handedly by the military leader of the cell or unit. In case of abuses, the persons affected have the right, after completing the punishment meted out, to appeal to the Regional Committees and to the Central Committee of the Party.

Resolution on Morale When Facing the Enemy

Our party has still not precisely defined what the attitude of party workers or fighters should be if they fall into the hands of the enemy. Worse still, the only time this question was discussed, which was in the January 1969 meeting of the Executive Committee, the prevailing notion was that no one can hold out against torture. Likewise, the erroneous Algerian system of allowing captives to confess twenty-four hours after their arrest is well known in the party and has never been critically refuted.

Therefore, we must make it perfectly clear that activists or fighters belonging to our party and our military force *never sing, never give information to the police that could*

be used against the organization. This does not mean that the strictest security measures should not be employed or that preventive measures should not be taken in the event of arrests. It is always possible that a captive will surrender to the enemy. But anyone who does so will be considered a traitor and dealt with as such. The revolutionary workers movement has always acted in accordance with this principle.

In line with the aforesaid, the Central Committee resolves:

1. Party members and combatants in the army *never give the enemy information harmful to the organization.* Anyone who does this will be considered a *traitor* and dealt with as such.

2. The above norm must not lessen the permanent application of the strictest security measures and the permanent utilization of strong conspiratorial methods.

On Financial Norms

Needing to establish clear financial norms that can contribute to the sound functioning of the party, the Central Committee resolves:

1. The party's normal expenditures will be covered by the dues of members and sympathizers and the proceeds of mass work.

2. Deficits impairing good functioning will be covered by funds from expropriations.

3. In case of need, party organs can resort to borrowing from the funds acquired by expropriations.

Resolutions of the March 1971 Executive Committee Meeting

National Situation

1. The International Context

Our country is experiencing a prerevolutionary situation that comes in a particularly favorable international context. The arrogant and all-powerful Yankee imperialism of yesteryear has been reduced to impotence by the development of the world revolution, by the significant advances of the workers' states, especially those in Asia, by the tumultuous advance of the revolution in Southeast Asia, the rising wave of antibureaucratic feeling on the part of the masses in the East European workers' states, the unrelenting struggle of the working class and the popular sectors in the colonial and semicolonial countries, and the increasing stirrings of the masses in the imperialist centers, both in capitalist Europe and the United States. This is why in the continent it reserves to itself, the United States has had to resign itself to standing by, livid with rage, and watch the emergence of a socialist-tinged people's government in Chile. In the same way, it finds itself prevented from intervening openly in Peru and Bolivia despite the disturbing process going on in these countries, where the pressure of the masses has forced the bourgeoisie, through its military castes, to resort to a last desperate remedy—setting up populist governments whose mission is to brake and derail the revolutionary struggle by means of secondary concessions.

This worldwide struggle of the popular masses, led by the revolutionary proletariat and by the various Marxist-Leninist parties, and in particular the heroic and exemplary struggle of the Vietnamese people—who have forced the imperialists to concentrate the bulk and the best of their military power in Vietnam, is the most important ally, the solid backer of the Argentine and Latin-American revolutionists in their fight.

The establishment of a people's government in Chile, which shares a 3,000 kilometer frontier with our country, provides a friendly border, an important politico-military necessity, previously lacking, for our revolutionary war.

Despite the recent defeats and the relative setback of the armed vanguard in all the Latin-American countries—with the honorable exception of Uruguay, the revolutionary war has established its legitimacy on this continent, and ever widening sectors of the working class and the people are turning to this road and preparing the way for the coming qualitative leap of the continental revolution, the tumultuous rise of the second Vietnam predicted by Che.

2. The National Situation—Levingston, Faithful Continuer of the Onganía Regime

The Levingston government has shown itself to be the faithful continuer of the policy of the Onganía regime. As is noted in *El Combatiente* ("Nacionalismo de vidriera," [showcase nationalism] No. 52), the government's ostentatious pronouncements about "nationalizing the economy" are pure demagoguery. The reality is the opposite. The concrete measures of the dictatorship tend to strengthen imperialist domination and reinforce the process of monopolization, the central drive of economic policy under Onganía. The most recent example is the handling of the meat problem. After shifting the burden of this crisis onto the backs of the workers, the regime is now taking advantage of it to mount an assault on another sector of the petty bourgeoisie. Faced with market difficulties cutting into their profits, the monopolies resorted, without provoking any response from the dictatorship, to a temporary shutdown of the packing houses, a classical way of making the workers pay for the crisis. This development was not even deemed worthy of attention by a government that, a few days ago, after months of shutdowns, months of hunger and poverty for the workers, started taking up the meat problem in order to "save the industry." One of the points of the government's "solution" is to encourage the packing houses to eliminate the middleman by setting up meat supermarkets. We know what this means. For a brief period, the supermarkets will cut prices, driving retailers to the wall. Then, when they have won control of the market, they will fix prices to suit themselves.

In a nutshell, the dictatorship's reaction to the crisis in the meat industry has been to take the typical measures designed to bail out the monopolies and promote their interests—permitting a temporary shutdown, granting liberal credits and increasing their margin of profit in marketing, that is subsidizing the monopolies by starving the workers, pauperizing the retailers, and driving up the price of the product for consumers.

After all the playing around with populist gimmicks in its first months, it has become clear that the sole line of the dictatorship toward the mass movement is repression. It is continuing to build up its strength in this area, increasing the numbers of the police, raising their salaries, and reequipping them; training and equipping the Armed Forces for counterinsurgency warfare and riot control, planning and trying out dragnet operations in the cities, organizing MANO [a counterrevolutionary terror organization], etc.

But there is a substantial distinction between the repression under Onganía and the present. The difference arises from the situation of the masses. Under the Onganía regime, the working-class movement experienced a pronounced ebb. Thrown off balance by the violent repression of a dictatorship that in the twinkling of an eye had gotten an iron grip on the situation, it retreated. Starting with the Córdoba uprising, there has been a sustained rise of the masses. Now that they have become used to the new situation, they have reformed their ranks and are taking up the struggle everywhere, aiming not only to resist the offensive of the government and the employers but to win back their former gains. In the face of this upsurge, the dictatorship has found itself impotent and had to resign itself simply to containing the struggling workers and people by surrounding them with a wall of repression, not daring to intervene decisively to crush them as it was accustomed to doing under Onganía. The fact is that the dictatorship has learned to respect the masses. The government knows that violent repression will get a violent response and direct the people's hatred of the dictatorship into more active and energetic channels.

Widening Possibilities for Legal and Semilegal Struggle

This phenomenon of a growing mobilization of the laboring and popular strata and the dictatorship's inability to repress it has opened up new possibilities for legal and semilegal struggles by the masses and the vanguard. At a time when the workers in the factories are raising their heads, engaging in struggles, and winning some economic victories, new working-class and popular strata are going onto the streets to raise their own demands. The telephone workers, civil-service, municipal, Fatum employees, etc., are mobilizing, along with the students. The wave of strikes is rising. In the poor neighborhoods, the masses are trying to organize and fight. But no real neighborhood movements have arisen because of the braking and controlling role played by the reformist CP and the government organs. That the poor peasantry is not remaining outside this process is shown by the extensive mobilization in the Chaco, in which 5,000 peasants marched from Sáenz Peña to Resistencia. This awakening of the masses throughout the country—who were shaken from their apathy by the Córdoba uprising, by the great struggles in Rosario and Tucumán, and heartened by the growing activity of the armed vanguard, which is part of the same phenomenon—is bringing disorientation and crisis into the enemy camp. Unable to find any way to deal effectively with the new situation, the repressive forces are venting their hysteria against the people, earning only hatred and repudiation and generating a renewed will to struggle in the masses. The government is stumbling from pillar to post, with one "incompetent" functionary coming on the heels of another. The perspectives for a coup are increasing.

This situation, the impetuosity of the masses and the crisis and disorientation of the dictatorship, is being reflected in widening possibilities for legal and semilegal struggles. For the first time since the establishment of the dictatorship, opportunities are opening up for winning partial successes in economic struggles, successes that will have a cumulative effect in stimulating more and more

struggles. This will favor a widening of the mass movement and the masses taking the offensive where the workers are best organized and led. It will help to bring in sectors that up till now have shown little dynamism. The strike wave is spreading; the bureaucracy is losing control of the movement. A broad dynamic vanguard is arising that is eager for a revolutionary orientation and ready to take the struggle into its own hands, to take its battle stations with revolutionary determination. This gigantic process, impossible today for the enemy to control, requires our party's special attention. We must move audaciously to exploit every opportunity to develop our organization by legal and semilegal means, to widen its influence, to bring our program, our slogans, and our banner to the broadest possible masses.

Levingston on a Tightwire

Nine months after his rise to power, the proconsul Levingston's days are numbered. The mobilization of the workers and people has proved uncontrollable; and as usual the bourgeois army in its blindness is attributing every failure to this or that personality, in this case the current dictator. With the abortion of its absurd demagogic maneuver of "popular governors," Levingston's government has plunged into a crisis. In nine months, the Levingston team has not been able to come up with any political plan whatever. The Joint Chiefs have grown impatient and, while making sure to safeguard their own immediate interests, have left the proconsul to his fate and to his wits. This is the prelude to a coup. The masses have nothing to hope for from such a change, and as for our party it needs only reaffirm the clear position it took toward the replacement of Onganía. We have no part in palace coups. We know that they mean absolutely nothing. We are familiar with the way the dictatorship maintains its continuity, and we know that we must avoid falling into any electoralist traps. As on the previous occasion, we raise the proper slogan—No Coups and No Elections, Develop the Revolutionary War!

. . . [line missing] of the unions—traditional channels in our country—which in most plants are controlled by bureaucrats who have sold out to the government and the bosses, or have been taken over directly by government interveners. In Córdoba, Buenos Aires, and Chocón successes have been achieved in one way or another in winning back some unions. The greatest of these have been in Córdoba, where the results have been excellent. In the present situation of expanding legal and semilegal opportunities, there is a perspective for generalizing this trend of winning back unions, making them into channels for economic struggles and politicalizing them, as is happening in the case of Córdoba. We all realize that this singularly positive development involves a danger of syndicalism—reformism on the political level and adventurism on the trade-union level, the two sides of the same coin. The way to block both, to achieve a firm antidictatorial line in the unions, is by involving and building our party, through armed activity by the ERP in the factories and in coordination with trade-union struggles, by founding cells of our party in the factories and other places of work, and by increasing recruitment of

factory workers into the ERP.

The Mass Movement

With the military dictatorship nearing the end of its fifth year, the standard of living of the masses has dropped steadily, exceeding the most pessimistic estimates. Ever wider sectors of the working class and the people have seen their sufferings multiplied and felt their hatred of the dictatorship grow. To them it is impossible for this situation to continue, and they have shown their determination to fight in the explosive mobilizations in Córdoba, Rosario, and Tucumán. After these outbursts, the masses have been looking for a way of waging the fight in a more sustained way. In the case of the workers, they find the way impeded by the state takeover . . . [line missing].

The recuperation, the resurgence of the trade-union movement, will offer exceptional opportunities for checkmating the bourgeoisie, mobilizing the broadest masses of the workers and the popular strata and strengthening Party work, as well as for stepping up the activity of the ERP. Of course such a possibility depends directly on the development of the revolutionary war, on fortifying the armed vanguard with a mass orientation and intensifying economic struggles. Nor does this mean that we have any illusions about winning the leadership of the legal CGT. It should be clear that the chances for winning the trade unions to the revolutionary struggle are closely tied to consolidating a strong Marxist-Leninist party and that if this comes about it will be achieved essentially in semi-legal and underground conditions in a direct confrontation with the dictatorship, as part of the revolutionary war, with all that this implies. But we must take note of the tendencies of the masses to channel their struggles through the trade unions so as to be perfectly prepared, participate fully in this process, and struggle to take the lead and set a course toward socialism and revolutionary war. At the same time, this will help to bring the working-class vanguard to revolutionary theory and accelerate the process of proletarianizing our Party and Army.

The starting point for achieving full involvement and a leading role on the factory and trade-union front is to consolidate the cells of the party that are already working there, forming ERP units in the factories; and to deploy our forces effectively, giving priority to this sector.

Simultaneously with the mass process we are analyzing, the armed struggle has taken a qualitative leap. From its origins last year, the actions have multiplied. And most important: By applying a consistent mass line in its operations, the ERP, which was founded in July by our party, has managed to reach the masses, breaking the isolation of the armed vanguard, an achievement of decisive importance.

Developing out of a buildup in armed propaganda, operations of some scope are beginning to be undertaken and we can see a trend starting toward larger military units, for the moment on the order of companies. Our experience is confirming that consistent application of the line of the Fifth Congress is leading to the involvement of new social sectors in the armed struggle, to winning the active support of the entire exploited people,

and to the emergence of a respectable military force.

In this regard, we cannot fail to take account of the fact that sustained growth will be made significantly more difficult by an escalating response from the repressive forces, which will increase their efforts and perfect their methods. In order to block this threat we must strengthen our ties with the masses and adopt strict security measures, substantially improve our methods of work, root out all liberalism, reinforce the cells politically and morally, constantly increase their effectiveness, and zealously apply strict security measures.

Our Tasks

In this situation, the operations of our party are shifting into a different context. The execution of the resolutions of the Fifth Congress and, in particular, the successful implementation of the First Operational Military Plan, worked out by the CC, has presented our organization with a new situation. We have begun to win "the hearts and minds" of important sectors of the masses. Our prestige is great and we have exceptional chances for winning hegemony within the worker, student, and popular vanguard. The immediate objective the Party must set its sights on is precisely winning such hegemony, translating the prestige of the ERP into organizational and practical gains. This will open up for us the possibility of playing a real leading role in the class struggle in this country, of firmly orienting the vanguard sectors in carrying out the proletarian line of revolutionary war, and putting ourselves before the people as a new option, a revolutionary option that has been lacking in this country since 1938.

How are we to achieve this? Extending and deepening the work of the Party and the Army among the masses, constantly strengthening the cells and regions, and concretizing the new operational plan voted by this CC—these are the pillars on which we will base our growth, the steps we must resolutely take in order to win hegemony and channel the activity of ever broader contingents of workers and vanguard intellectuals.

Extending and deepening the work of the Party and the Army among the masses will be achieved by pushing the trend toward proletarianization, toward living and working among the masses, quantitatively and qualitatively advancing our propaganda and agitation, increasing the publication of propaganda, spreading socialist literature and the line of our organization broadly among the masses, increasing agitational actions (leaflet distributions and painting slogans) periodically carrying out agitational actions in the neighborhoods and in the downtown areas, in the cities and in the countryside, learning to take the leadership of spontaneous demonstrations and organize demonstrations for specific demands as well as political demonstrations, pushing the mass line of armed propaganda. Another factor in achieving success will be paying adequate attention to the immediate problems of the masses, participating in, and trying to lead economic struggles in order to raise the level of their objectives and accelerate the politicalization of the strikers and those who are fighting on the streets for their demands.

Constant strengthening of the cells and regions will undoubtedly be the mainspring of the Party's progress in fulfilling its formidable tasks and responsibilities. Nothing can be done unless we have strong and homogeneous cells made up of professional revolutionists; of compañeros devoted in mind and body to revolutionary struggle; of politically, militarily, and morally prepared elements. Strong, disciplined, homogeneous cells dedicated to struggle and to study will be the elementary schools in which our Party will forge thousands of revolutionists, the irreplaceable general staff of the Argentinian revolution.

The achievement of the new Operational Plan will constitute a qualitative leap in the life of the organization and, at the same time that raises our prestige, it will create more difficult problems for the enemy, sharpening his internal contradictions. It will represent a new and resolute step in building up the military strength of the powerful Revolutionary Army of the People that is destined to back up the coming victorious insurrection of the working class and people.

Compañeros, we must resolutely set to work, each assuming his own responsibilities, and firmly take up the tasks that have been laid out.

Resolutions of the April 1971 Executive Committee Meeting

Party Propaganda and Education

The advance of the masses throughout the country (exemplified most outstandingly at the moment in Córdoba) poses the need anew for paying much more attention to one of the central features pointed up by our Fourth and Fifth Congresses—propaganda and political agitation.

The Leninist definition, let's remember, was that propaganda is the art of teaching many ideas to a few and agitation is the art of teaching few ideas to many.

In other words, propaganda is explaining to the working-class and popular vanguard all the central problems of the revolution in a profound and clear way. Agitation is explaining to the masses as a whole or broad sectors of them the basic questions in a thorough and simple way.

In order to do this we must develop a certain number of organs and permanent and semipermanent means at the national and local level, also taking into account the following aspects:

(a) Propaganda work must be carried on jointly by the Party, which addresses itself fundamentally to the proletarian vanguard fighting for proletarian hegemony; and the Army, which addresses itself to the masses as a whole, fighting to build the Army of the People and

to involve all the oppressed in the revolutionary war.

This should not be interpreted to mean that propaganda is the task of the Party and agitation of the Army. Both must carry on agitation and propaganda, but with the Party putting its stress on propaganda and the Army on agitation.

(b) In the area of propaganda and agitation a contradiction arises between centralization and decentralization. The indicated way for resolving this is by trying to centralize propaganda (at the national or local level) and decentralize agitation (in the various theaters, areas, and teams).

Party Propaganda

The Party has a national propaganda organ *El Combatiente*. In the first months after the Congress there was a very great deficiency in the issues of this organ. Subsequently (in the last three issues) the content of the periodical has been improving, to judge from a cross section of opinions coming from cadres, activists, and contacts. Moreover, the National Propaganda Commission has promised to bring it out on a regular biweekly schedule starting with this issue.

Nonetheless, it is still necessary to greatly improve our organ in order to meet all the needs imposed by the rev-

olutionary process. In order to achieve this, the collaboration of the entire Party is needed in the task.

The first thing we must do in this regard is to reeducate the members on working with the paper, which is not always utilized to the full extent of its possibilities. The indicated methods are the following:

(a) Every team must discuss the paper as soon as they receive it, later circulating their suggestions and criticisms through the Internal Bulletin. In conjunction with this, they must discuss the *whole* paper politically with the readers, with every one of them, soliciting their opinions, suggestions, and criticisms also. In this way, all of the needs that the paper must meet will emerge in a living way, from reality itself, and become known to the editors. On the other hand, the *compañeros* themselves and even the readers will be encouraged to write articles or plans for articles.

(b) This discussion and political work must be coordinated and directed by the regional leaderships, with regional teams being freed from all other assignments in order to carry out this task, which is as important as direct work among the masses or armed action.

Party Agitation

It is recommended that each region periodically publish leaflets or semipropagandistic foldouts for its whole sphere of activity. In conjunction with this, great attention should be paid in the areas, fronts, and teams to permanent agitation through leaflets, local foldouts, and factory and neighborhood bulletins.

This last activity above all takes on a great importance. In every major industrial center and in every major residential concentration of workers that we can penetrate with bulletins signed by the party and projecting the party's line on the basis of the immediate problems of the factory, union, or neighborhood in question, we must undertake to publish such bulletins regularly.

The Army's Agitation and Propaganda

Some time ago, it was voted to have regional Army bulletins but this has not yet been put into effect. Publishing such bulletins is a task of great importance that the Army's regional organizations must immediately take up.

In the eyes of large sections of the people the armed actions of the ERP have put us in the lead of the guerrilla organizations. We must capitalize on this prestige by developing the Army's political work.

In order to develop this work in a Leninist way, it is essential to provide a backbone by means of the Army's own agitational and propaganda organ. This should be published for the masses as a whole and come out regularly at least every two weeks. As the local bulletins are developed, we can take on the task of publishing a more propagandistic central organ (more propagandistic that is in putting forward the Army's program), which would appear less frequently.

Organizing Agitation and Propaganda

It is clear for anyone who approaches organizational problems from a Leninist standpoint that all these tasks we require of the Party and Army's agitation and propaganda work cannot fail to conflict unless we set up standing propaganda committees in all the regions, preferably with full-time *compañeros* assigned to them.

Up to now propaganda has been approached as a secondary, routine matter, something to be taken care of by some *compañeros* in the moments of spare time left them by their mass work or military activities. We must realize that propaganda is as important as other tasks, and that the activists assigned to it will not be "wasted." Moreover, these teams will have their areas of mass and military work, as the National Propaganda Commission determines, but devote the lion's share of their activity to propaganda.

Parallel to this the necessary measures must be taken to assure that every front of work (at least every important front) has its own propaganda apparatus to publish agitational and propaganda materials, above all factory and neighborhood bulletins.

The National Situation

The military coup that ousted Levingston ushered in the final stage of the military dictatorship. The adventure undertaken by the military officers in 1966 is coming to its conclusion in the midst of the most profound crisis. In its almost five years of life, the military government has proved incapable of stabilizing the bourgeois economy, and its promonopoly measures have won it not only the hatred of the workers and the people but have also brought constant frictions with other sectors of the bourgeoisie.

The popular explosion in Córdoba gave the coup de grâce to the deteriorating image of the dictatorship. The workers and popular mobilization of March 15 had some special characteristics. There was the unmistakable sympathy shown by the masses for the armed movements, the existence of class-struggle leaderships in important unions, the disrepute of the bureaucracy and its evident inability to canalize the popular protest into peaceful roads. Another characteristic, perhaps the most important, of this second Córdoba uprising was the growing activity of the armed vanguard, which linked up with this process and saw the masses adopt its emblems as their own. The possibility that the proletariat could turn massively in the near future to revolutionary war under the leadership of this vanguard forced the Armed Forces to stage the coup that liquidated Levingston's policy, which was only a continuation of the Onganía regime, in order to seek a new solution.

The military dictatorship's abrupt replacement of the helmsman, the new one being Lanusse, marks a retreat for the regime. Checkmated by the massive explosions of protest from the working class and the people and by the development of revolutionary war, the dictatorship is retreating and beginning to make concessions. Along with this a new picture is opening up in the process of popular struggles.

Looking at the events from this vantage point, we can make some estimates about the possible future orientation of the military government. Various concrete signs show unmistakably that the government is setting the stage for an electoral farce. Among these are the rehabilitation of the political parties; the appointment of Mor Roig as minister of the interior; and the statements of the politicians who, on the government's invitation, have had talks with him. Conscious of its lack of prestige and showing its fear of the advance of revolutionary war, the dictatorship finds itself forced to make deals with politicians that only yesterday it repudiated, and together with them it is going to try an electoral solution, in an attempt to put a brake on the mobilization of the masses and isolate the armed vanguard from them. They are trying to make the scope of this maneuver as broad as possible, as can be gathered from the rumors that the CP is certain to be invited to participate in the political talks with Mor Roig. Lanusse will even try to reach an agreement with Perón himself. The basis of the deal will be to form a broad political movement uniting the Peronists and the Radicals, in exchange for Perón's return. An article developing this project and pointing to such a deal as the basis for institutional normalization appeared in the Yankee publication, the *New York Times*. The functionaries of the Press Secretariat promptly translated the article and distributed it immediately to all the journalists in the Casa de Gobierno. Clearly they did so because the article fitted in with the main lines of Lanusse's policy. The obvious beneficiary of such an operation would be the La Hora del Pueblo movement, where an alliance of the bourgeoisie could be concretized under the benevolent aegis of imperialism, allowing the officers to return to their barracks and assuring the stability of the regime by the populist façade of this movement.

However, it would be illusory to think that the bourgeoisie as a whole accepts this plan and is going to carry it out without conflicts. The latest statements by Onganía are an alarm signal. Onganía is not speaking for himself. Behind his opinions is the thinking of sectors of the Armed Forces that do not go along with Lanusse's electoral perspective and the plans for a return of Perón. This indicates that the process of normalization will not be free of conflicts, which, as a result of interbourgeois frictions, may interfere with its development.

All these efforts by the bourgeoisie must not lead us to believe that if the electoral process actually takes place that the masses will unfailingly be caught up in it, enabling the bourgeois government to consolidate itself and operate in relative tranquillity. The crisis of the dictatorship is also the crisis of the bourgeoisie, which is incapable of solving a single one of the great problems of the masses. Liberalization on the political level cannot by itself offer a solution to starvation wages, superexploitation, chronic poverty, and underdevelopment of the country. The measures taken by the bourgeoisie to patch up one evil will only expose another. This is shown by a recent development. Lifting the negotiating ceiling of the parity commissions, an act that offers the possibility for higher wages than foreseen, has already touched off speculations about more inflation. On the other hand, this same liberalization will spur the struggle of the masses

for their demands. The picture that is shaping up then promises tumultuous activity by the masses and highly favorable conditions for the development of a revolutionary organization.

In our case this perspective is made even more favorable by the brilliant possibilities opened up for us among the masses by the fact that so far we have applied the correct policy, especially in the field of military activity. For a whole series of reasons—the successful completion of the first operational plan; the outstanding role played by our militants in the workers and popular struggles, especially in Córdoba; the close ties with the masses that have been forged throughout the country; and the political and military tempering of our members—we can look forward to the present stage of the political process being marked by substantial growth of our Party and Army. In order to make this possibility a reality and take the maximum advantage of all the favorable conditions that present themselves, all militants must throw themselves boldly into mass work, expanding our contacts with the masses, creating new party cells and support commando teams for the ERP, organizing the masses where they are and doing extensive, sustained propaganda and agitational work. We need to be persistent in carrying out our propaganda tasks, expanding the means at our command through developing influence in bourgeois publications and through mass editions of classical Marxist literature. Our party must make a serious effort to take full advantage of all legal opportunities. We should make clear, however, that none of these tasks must in any way affect the clandestine organization of the party and the army, which must be maintained at all cost. Quite the contrary, if we are able to utilize it properly, this period of relative legality will reinforce our underground structure by increasing our ties with the masses, by buttressing our political relationship with them, which is the basis of all genuine clandestine activity.

One point where a correct use of the legal opportunities could bring satisfactory results is on the question of the prisoners. We must strain all our efforts to form committees to support or defend the prisoners, or join those already formed, and through them give impetus to a campaign for the release of the political prisoners. In this we must try to achieve the broadest possible popular participation, promoting demonstrations, rallies, etc. Such activity would offer unsuspected political opportunities, because through legal or semilegal avenues, it would open up a broad field of work in sectors of the population that it has not always been easy for us to reach.

The question of the party's attitude toward the elections merits a separate paragraph. The test of a party's maturity, its capacity to become a real mass leadership able to respond to any eventuality, is whether or not it can find an adequate theoretical answer to such problems as they arise without departing from a consistent principled position. Ignoring the elections, taking a passive attitude toward them is no answer. It is true that our strategy is to smash the elections, to show that they are a farce, to expose their dishonest bourgeois character. We will do this by advancing unceasingly our political and military activity, maintaining our clandestine apparatus and fulfilling all the stages laid out in our general strategy. But we must also combine this activity with

taking advantage of the legal opportunities offered by the electoral process. The way to turn the electoral farce into a failure is to be found in the real situation facing us at this moment. We might use one of two methods—boycotting the election or participating in it. But, as Lenin said: "No social democrat who stands on the ground of Marxism decides to resort to a boycott on the basis of how reactionary this or that institution is but rather on the basis of special conditions in the struggle . . ."

In certain circumstances, such as in a period of turbulent mass mobilization, when the militancy of the masses is on a high level and they retain their determination to struggle without any major sectors being tempted by the electoral mirage, an active boycott of elections can be a correct tactic. But this should always be when it is possible to achieve militant participation by the masses, when the mass struggle can be channeled behind this objective.

However, we must not exclude the possibility of participating in elections when these conditions do not obtain, that is, when the boycott tactic cannot be based on a real mass mobilization of the working class and the people, when there is not a high level of mass militancy. In this regard, the possibility may exist in some sectors of running slates of workers candidates with a class-struggle program. Since the bourgeoisie cannot tolerate such a situation, this would force them to expose the dishonesty of their so-called free elections open to all. This possibility seems the most remote. But it must be stressed because there is a danger in the present situation of an ultraleft deviation of tending to reject the whole electoral process in an abstract way, without taking into account the concrete situation of the masses, which must serve as our best barometer for determining our position.

Through a serious and close study of the concrete situations in each locality, we will be able to make the best decision.

This whole perspective in no wise affects carrying out our strategic line. Quite the contrary, more than ever it is necessary to increase the quantity and quality of our military actions, improving the operational capacity of the ERP and putting into practice the plans we have adopted as the opportunities arise. This growing and sustained military activity will contribute in an important degree to wrecking the electoral farce, regardless of which tactic is chosen, participation or boycott.

Along with this, of necessity, there must be no modification whatsoever in the party's clandestine organization. We must persevere firmly in the task of strengthening clandestine organizational forms, not forgetting for a second that we are at war, no matter whether the elections take place or not, and that therefore maintaining the underground apparatus is and will continue to be a vital matter for the organization.

All these subordinate aspects converge in the central task in this stage, building the Party and the Army. All our advantages—the mood of the masses, the prestige our Army has won among them, the ties we have achieved with the working class and popular sectors, the experience we have won in our battles, combined with the opportunities offered by a situation of relative legality

—must be utilized to the fullest in this stage for the tasks of building the Party and the Army. The perspectives are brilliant, and if we throw ourselves boldly and resolutely into the task of organizing and politicalizing the masses at the same time as carrying out our second Military Operational Plan, in the space of a few months we will be able to increase considerably the forces of the Army and the Party. This will also require intense political education partywise, enabling us to train new cadres or strengthen those we already have so that they will be able to meet the demands we will have to make on them. In expanding considerably the ranks of the Party and the Army we are going to need a large number of cadres in order to make effective use of the new recruits. In order to meet this need, the work of the cadre school now functioning must be strengthened. Likewise, it is essential to get a military cadre school going as soon as possible. Together with persisting in our policy of proletarianizing the Party and the Army, this will enable us to attract important nuclei of workers, who will be the means of assuring the construction of a firm proletarian Party and a revolutionary Army.

Specific Points on the Party and Army

Following the correct line laid down by the Fifth Congress and the November CC, our party has thrown itself into combat and mass work. Many questions have occurred to cadres and activists in their attempts to apply these resolutions correctly. We will try to answer some of them.

Party and Army: The distinction between the Party and the Army as separate organs and the relationship between them was not made clear enough in two areas in the resolutions of the congress. (1) The composition of the membership in both organizations; (2) how the various types of cells should function.

In fact, on the first question, the type of members of the organization, a conceptual error slipped in of making a distinction between party militants and fighters in the army, tending to draw a sharp line between the two. This has been corrected in practice and we must make it clear that every member of the Party is also a fighter in the Army, regardless of the front to which he is assigned. All members of the Party must undergo military training and be prepared to transfer from a mass to a military front when the organization requires it.

In the army there are also nonparty fighters who function in the cells without belonging to the PRT.

In this respect, moreover, we must also correct the false theory that some compañeros have that you have to enter the Party through the Army, a point of view that overlooks the importance of political and economic struggle, which is also a source of experience and training qualifying persons to join the Party. Naturally, once such elements coming from economic struggles have joined, for example, they will receive the proper training inside the organization and fight as members of the ERP.

Let us look now at the second point, that is, the functioning of the various types of cells. The party at present has mass cells, military cells, and apparatus cells. The main task of the mass cells is to penetrate the mass

front for which they are responsible (the factory, neighborhood, student milieu, etc.). This is what they will devote most of their efforts to. At the same time they will train themselves militarily and carry out military actions, with the specification that these actions will be small scale (seizing and distributing food and goods, disarming police and soldiers, etc.) and the cells will try to carry them out in a way that contributes to their work in the respective mass fronts.

The military cells for their part engage in fighting as their principal task, and they will devote their main efforts to this; naturally they will carry out larger-scale actions. At the same time, each military cell is responsible for contacts and is assigned to a mass front (neighborhood, factory, etc.), which it must look after as a complementary assignment. The other area of mass work for these cells is our own military force, the ERP, which must absolutely be kept under the leadership of the Party.

Finally the apparatus cells (publishing, etc.) have as their central task the efficient execution of their assignment, maintaining a high level and quality of publishing for instance. They also fight, because as we have already said no member of the organization is exempt from participating in military action but must carry out small-scale actions (seizures, disarmings, etc.) and seek by means of these expropriations to acquire the things they

need to carry out their tasks effectively. These cells likewise work with mass fronts.

Resolutions on the Revolutionary Tasks in Bolivia and Argentina

Applying in practice the Marxist-Leninist internationalist conception personified in an exemplary way by Comandante Guevara, the CC of the PRT, Argentinian section of the Fourth International, in the presence of delegates from the International Secretariat and the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian section of the Fourth International, resolves:

(1) To propose fraternally sharing with our sister section, the Bolivian POR, all the political, military, organizational, and practical tasks of developing the revolutionary war in Bolivia and Argentina against our common enemy—Yankee imperialism, the Argentine military dictatorship, and the Bolivian militarists.

(2) On the basis of this common effort, to struggle to unite, within the Latin-American process of revolutionary war, all the armed vanguard of the continent in building a common military force able to bring into reality the second Vietnam foreseen by Che, a struggle that would lead to the victory of socialism on this continent.

FOOTNOTES

1. Antagonistic within the party.

2. Showing itself in a muted and partial form, like the CGT-party relationship. (The growing proletarian current opposed the Morenoist slogan for a CGT-workers party.)

3. The party adopted this name at its first congress (1965).

4. It is important to know these facts so as to put into its proper place the attempt by the centrists to trace the origin of the Leninist wing to Bengochea's group and, by doing this, saddle us with his putschist position.

5. This conclusion was spreading generally at the time among the sugar workers and broad sectors of the working-class vanguard throughout the entire country.

6. Draft self-criticism resolution, p. 1.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

11. *The Only Road*, p. 61.

12. [The footnote was not included in the published text, probably because of a printer's error. — Translator.]

13. [This footnote, too, is missing. — Tr.]

14. Draft self-criticism.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

16. Draft self-criticism, p. 9. (For security reasons we have replaced the figures by "X.")

17. Draft self-criticism, p. 9.

18. [No footnote indicated. — Tr.]

19. These statistics were prepared in June, before the Fifth Congress. Later, the relationship of forces became more favorable for the Leninist wing with the incorporation of those who were undecided and other compañeros. Finally, after the actual split had occurred in the Center, 95 percent of the worker members and 85 percent of the total membership remained in the party.

20. Karl Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach."

*[Point "c" is missing in the published document. — Tr.]