

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

No. 1 in 1972

March 1972

WHOM SHOULD WE SUPPORT IN THE PRESENT CHINESE REVOLUTION?

— Another Discussion —

by Hajime Osada

(Published as a fraternal courtesy
to the United Secretariat of the
Fourth International)

20 cents

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

Page 2 :

was blank in the
original bulletin

- Marty

Feb 2014

WHOM SHOULD WE SUPPORT IN THE PRESENT CHINESE REVOLUTION?

— Another Discussion —

by Hajime Osada

I believe that it is still worthwhile to offer another discussion paper on the Chinese Cultural Revolution at this late date more than a year after the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International.

At first sight, it seems that our worldwide discussion on the Chinese Cultural Revolution is divided into two main tendencies called provisionally "the majority" versus "the minority." For the world congress adopted the draft resolution proposed by the majority of the United Secretariat with a few modifications. Tracing back further, as you know well, the adopted draft is in fact not an original document but the product of amendments, which were several and significant, of the original draft presented by the minority of the United Secretariat.¹ Thus the original draft and the major draft resolution adopted are called respectively the minority draft and the majority one.

Comrade Joseph Hansen wrote a paper criticizing the majority draft in favor of the minority one.² Later he offered another report paper in which he surveys the internal debate in the world Trotskyist movement since the 1950s, focusing particularly on the nature of the regime controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and also on the Third Chinese Revolution.³ We may include Comrade Hansen's opinion in the minority view on the Cultural Revolution.

We know of other discussions by Comrade Peng Shu-tse and Comrade Kyoji Nishi opposing the majority draft.⁴ In the beginning of the debate it seemed to me that they were on the side of the minority. But the development of the debate on China showed that they disagree with the position of the minority on some significant issues, although there can still be seen common views between them in many respects. So, I think we had better deal with Comrades Peng and Nishi as a third position on China, and accordingly we can divide our worldwide discussion into three main tendencies, not two. Comrade Peng also made a classification into three tendencies concerning the question of whom we should support,⁵ which problem will be later referred to as the central one of the Cultural Revolution.

From the side of the majority, as far as I know, we are given five papers and one book contributed by Comrades Livio Maitan and Ernest Germain and, with some reservations, Fernand Charlier,⁶ as well as the majority draft.

I. Social Origins of the Cultural Revolution

The following analysis might appear self-contradictory, as though here it supports the majority view and there the other, but the very situation in the degenerated Chinese workers state has developed with a kind of dynamic dialectics. The collapse of the Chinese economy after the Great Leap Forward policy in 1958 gave rise to the first genuine internal split of the ruling machines of the party and governmental bureaucracy in the internal and

external (Sino-Soviet) conflicts. Since then, coupled with the Kremlin's criminal peaceful coexistence policy, those splits had increased in bitterness and sharpness and at last burst out. This was the background of the Cultural Revolution.

I think the objective method of the majority, by which it emphasizes the economic and foreign environments around the CCP leadership, loses its balance and becomes excessive when it comes to explaining the origins of the Cultural Revolution. The first notable feature of the majority document and Comrade Maitan's report to the last world congress seems to be that they look for the sources of the Chinese economic crisis of the early 1960s (which was the fundamental cause of the Cultural Revolution) in the six contradictions between the underdeveloped level of productive forces and the level of wants of the Chinese people.⁷ These contradictions are mainly physical and technological. Though important, they are too general because they prevail not only in all workers states but also in all underdeveloped countries. The majority group seems to me to underestimate the fact that the economic crisis was drastically aggravated by Mao's wrong and adventurous Great Leap Forward policy in 1958, on which in 1960 Comrade Peng made an analysis and criticism with almost complete correctness.⁸

The following argument of the majority document reads:

Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership.⁹

Clearly, here we can notice not only something of the super-objectivist view which sees only physical conditions, but also even somewhat of a defence of Mao's bureaucratic leadership. Together with Comrade Hansen, I cannot help asking if anybody, including Lenin and Trotsky, would have adopted the same adventurous policy as Mao's in the face of the same crisis as the Chinese economic one. Comrade Hansen adds five other contradictions between the bureaucracy and the working people, contrasting them with the majority's emphasis on physical contradictions.¹⁰ Comrades Peng and Nishi also criticize correctly the objectivist aspect of the majority's standpoint.

Another feature of the majority view, including Comrade Maitan's report, is that they attribute Mao's adventurous domestic and foreign policies mostly to outside pressures. For example, when they say:

The reversal of the Maoist leadership to a policy of "self-reliance" and large-scale economic autarky and self-sufficiency is only a rationalization of the consequences of the Kremlin's blockade and the tremendous burden imposed on China by the need to develop its own nuclear weapons, given the refusal of the Soviet bureaucracy to assist it in this field.¹¹

they are overstating their case. Of course, I do not intend to reject the right of the Chinese government to make its own policy and develop its own nuclear weapons. But if the preceding statement should be correct, Trotsky would have been mistaken in criticizing Stalin's "socialism in one country," his autarkic super-industrialization and his forced collectivization in agriculture in the late 1920s and after. Mao's autarkic policy is of course related to his foreign policy, on which the majority view may be called an embellishment of Mao, according to Charlier.¹² We shall refer to this again later.

After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, for which Mao was blamed, though not explicitly, and forced to withdraw from the first leadership, Liu Shao-chi reorganized the People's Communes by lowering the basic accounting unit to the level of the production brigade (old advanced production cooperatives), and by allowing individual farms and free sale of farmers' crops. Ironically, it was this adjustment policy that later produced a newly sharpened antagonism among two main classes—on the one hand, the higher staffs of management in plants, firms and governmental administration and the rich peasant stratum enjoying something of a NEP policy opened by Liu, and on the other hand, urban youths and masses and depressed peasants who could not find jobs after graduation or after their exodus from poor rural villages. As Comrade Charlier indicates very correctly, the latter lower classes comprehend a profound hatred against the bureaucracy represented at that time by Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and P'eng Chen. I believe that nothing other than this hatred prepared the underlying conditions that led to the Cultural Revolution. And Mao exploited it cleverly in order to mobilize the unsatisfied masses against his rivals in the leadership.

In spite of its correct acknowledgment of the above-mentioned social antagonisms, the majority view has another weakness in addition to its underestimation of Mao's responsibility for stirring up those antagonisms. If I may dare to say so, it, perhaps unconsciously, falls into the trap of identifying the class interest of the lower classes with Mao's own ambitions on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's intention was the Stalinist policy of cutting off parts of his own bureaucracy in order to divert the hatred and attacks of the lower masses from himself.

Originally it was Mao who prudently prepared this false identification and presented it to the Chinese and the world. Furthermore, the scale of mass mobilization by which Mao practiced his cutting policy during the Cultural Revolution transcended that in all purges carried out by other Stalinists including Stalin himself. He who had been forced to take a step backward during the early 1960s succeeded in altering the structure of power in China and in seizing back the dominant leadership role by destroying the CCP apparatus, especially on the provincial level, the National Federation of Chinese Workers' Unions and some important parts of governmental organizations. At last, after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, he is now establishing the new Party which leaves exclusive control to himself. He has already expelled the rebelling youth from legal political activity by force of the PLA.

The radical appearance of Mao's measures comes partly

from the fact that he had been in the minority of the CCP since 1959. Our majority speaks ambiguously about this fact. But in the last analysis, in Mao's plans the Cultural Revolution was an indispensable measure to prepare the Chinese youths and working people for the complete achievement of adventurous economic policies such as the dispersion over the countryside of urban industrial plants, working people and graduated youths, and the adoption of the half-worker, half-peasant system, the half-working, half-studying school system, the half-peasant, half-doctor system, and so on. These policies had been adopted only partially under Liu Shao-chi's leadership, though Liu and other cadres showed some resistance against Mao's pressure for them. They are in appearance very radical, and in part they are valuable. But Mao's faction tells us they can solve at a stroke the confrontation between the city and the countryside. Apart from this Maoist gospel, these policies are in fact an unqualified challenge to the urban masses, in view of the enormous disguised unemployment in rural areas. Though they can be said to reflect the extreme economic crisis, they are much more forced, regressive and ruthless measures than the wasteful exploitation of human labor in the gigantic irrigation works and the building of backyard blast-furnaces in villages during the Great Leap Forward. So it is not too much to say that they are unprecedented experimental answers which may even be called "extermination of the working class" as contrasted with Stalin's famous old "extermination of rich peasants" policy in the late 1920s for the problem of imbalance between city and country.

In the first place, these policies are Mao's unique answer to the enormous pressure from surplus population and from underemployment of the huge number of graduates from colleges and high schools due to the mass education which itself is a progressive accomplishment of the new China. Secondly, by means of the above policies Mao's government tries to release itself from the burdensome duty of supplying food for its urban people. Thirdly, by the adoption of the half-peasant, half-workers system it attempts to exempt itself from the obligation of paying a large sum of retirement pensions and other benefits which were to be received by millions of those workers, officials and soldiers who leave their services. And last, it contemplates compensating for the deficiency of capital by curtailing the people's consumption. If Mao's plan to ruralize the whole land of China should be realized completely, contrary to Mao's promise of communism, China would regress back into a purely agricultural country, the type of country which is most apt to be affected by the free market and is the most dangerous hotbed of capitalism.

Thus, Mao's "communism" on which his economic policies are based means the leaping over and arbitrary destruction of the division of labor by administrative measures and the forced downward equalization of various social strata and sectors. It means anti-urbanization, anti-industrialism, and anti-intellectualism. Though of course we aim at the eventual wearing away of the division of labor, the arbitrary rejection of it without consideration of the underdeveloped level of the productive forces in present-day China (that is, pure, national Maoism apart from the "Maoism" seen in the advanced countries) stands for the extreme pole of Stalinist "socialism in one

country" and in direct opposition to Trotskyism.

Therefore, we should never identify the class interest of the Chinese masses with Mao's social aims.¹³ Much less should we consider sufficient the majority's judgment that "the 'cultural revolution' consists objectively of an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction [that is, a genuine political revolution—H. Osada] from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a *reform of the bureaucracy*." (Emphasis added.) Far from "a reform of bureaucracy," the Mao faction intends to further deepen bureaucratic control over China.

Meanwhile, the minority and the third viewpoint adopted by Comrades Peng and Nishi, especially the latter, miss the new serious contradictions that arose towards 1965 after the adoption of the "Economic Adjustment" policy by the Liu leadership, because they are still preoccupied with emphasizing the dissatisfaction of the Chinese masses around 1960 with the adverse consequences of the Great Leap advocated by Mao. In particular, Comrade Peng's support for Liu Shao-chi stems from his, though conditional, support for Liu's adjustment policy, which in the beginning had been a necessary retreat but which later lost its efficacy. Such a dialectic process had already been experienced in the 1920s during the Soviet NEP. Comrade Peng fails to appreciate these dialectics when he continues his support of Liu in the middle of the 1960s.

According to Comrade Hansen, the majority document and the minority one "both agree that the 'Cultural Revolution' represented an intrabureaucratic struggle."¹⁴ I cannot agree, however. An intrabureaucratic struggle is a struggle by proxy, a substitute for the class struggle. We must analyze how the latter is reflected by the former. The former often constitutes the first phase of class conflicts in the workers states under Stalinist Bonapartism. But the process of the class struggle marching forward breaks through this phase and sooner or later leads to a genuine political revolution or counterrevolution. In early 1967 the Cultural Revolution also clearly passed over the limitations of an inner struggle between agents substituting for conflicting classes and exploded into the stage of a *genuine but abortive political revolution from below*. Therefore, we should locate more clearly the true heroes of the grand tragic opera of the Cultural Revolution in the various anti-Mao Red Guards and Rebel Groups.

By the way, Mao and Lin falsely describe the Cultural Revolution as a class struggle in which the revolutionary proletarian masses recaptured power from "a handful of bourgeois persons in power" and call themselves the representatives of the masses of people. Their identification of the class struggle with the inner struggle in the bureaucratic leadership and of the class interest of the rebelling youths with their own aims is naturally completely false. Nevertheless, the class struggle version has a much stronger attractiveness to youth than the intrabureaucratic struggle version.¹⁵ From here has stemmed, I believe, the inclination towards Mao among youth in China and in the world. We should not ignore this factor in estimating the influence of Maoism in the world youth movement.

In the first stage, from November 1965 to the end of 1966, the Cultural Revolution proceeded on the course planned by Mao. Beginning with the Mao faction's ac-

cusations against writers and historians such as Wu Han, Teng T'o, Liao Mo-sha, T'ien Han and Chien Po-tsan in June 1966, it took over the Peking City Party Committee and the Jen-min Jih-pao, Peking Broadcasting Bureau and New China News Agency by force, all of which had been ruled by the CCP majority under Liu Shao-chi and P'eng Chen. Then were purged those such as P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking City, Lu T'ing-i and Chou Yang, director and vice-director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, and Lu P'ing, president of Peking University. From June to the Eleventh CCP Central Committee Plenum, after the Mao-Lin faction overcame the resistance by the Liu faction who sent work teams, they recaptured the leadership in the party center. With the first one-million mass meeting of Red Guards in August, the period until the end of 1966 was characterized by radical struggles of Red Guards composed of young students deliberately mobilized by the Mao-Lin faction all over the country, and especially in Peking where they were invited and urged to rebel against rival party cadres such as Liu and T'eng. The struggle by those Red Guards was limited to the so-called superstructure such as streets or squares.

However, as soon as Jen-min Jih-pao called for expansion of the Cultural Revolution into the "sub-structure," for example farms and industrial plants, the control held by Mao faded out. The various kinds of urban youths and workers organized themselves voluntarily into Rebel Groups and attacked the party and government apparatuses on the local level in order to satisfy their own various class interests such as a guaranteed income and other welfare, the solution of temporary employment, work by contract and apprenticeship with sharply differential wages, and the return to the city from the countryside and reinstatement in jobs in the cities, demands which had all been repressed before. They paralysed the apparatuses successfully. Clearly in this second stage there took place explosions of political revolution, though abortive, local and spontaneous, such as the so-called "Shanghai Commune" and other "Communes" in other provinces. But all the "Communes" ended in failure because of repeated internal battles among various Rebel Groups and Red Guards' organizations and because of the sudden shift in the attitude of the Mao faction to the policy of suppression of these "Communes" by means of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In their place, the Mao faction recommended building "Revolutionary Committees" as local authorities with a "triple alliance" among old party cadres, leaders of the PLA and representatives of the various Rebel and Red Guard groups that were fighting each other.

After the Wuhan incident in August 1967, the Mao faction completely shifted its own position to the side of the PLA, which put down the rebelling youths in favor of "security and order," helping the return to power of the expelled old cadres and managing by itself even production activities in industrial plants and village farms. Mao could not help purging secretly even Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Lin Chieh, Mu Hsin and Ch'i Pen-yu—prominent leaders in the Central Cultural Revolution Groups of the CCP which had been the *de facto* final leadership before. Thus, for a long time until spring 1969, the Mao-Lin faction succeeded in gradually organizing new power organs of Revolutionary Committees in all the provinces, special cities under the direct control of the central gov-

ernment, and autonomous districts. It not only crushed the network of the old bureaucracy connected with Liu and T'eng but also smashed the resistance of anti-Mao young radicals and declared them illegitimate. After that, it opened the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969.

I do not think that the so-called agreement between the majority and minority documents can be treated as simply as Comrade Hansen does. For both documents, in fact, are united not only in considering the Cultural Revolution as an intrabureaucratic struggle but also in perceiving the role of the rebel youth movement as the third character in the grand opera of the Cultural Revolution. Both say, on the one hand,

The "cultural revolution" represented a phase of sharp public conflict in an interbureaucratic struggle between divergent tendencies in the topmost circles of the Chinese Communist party leadership.¹⁶

And, on the other hand they correctly admit that

The factional warfare which burst forth in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy passed beyond the confines of the ruling circles in the middle of 1966 after the showdown in the eleventh Central Committee plenum of early August. . . . It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view the Red Guard movement as merely a pliant instrument of factional politics in the domestic strife that featured the "cultural revolution." . . . The Red Guard movement acquired a logic of its own.¹⁷

If I am to choose among the debaters on the nature of the Cultural Revolution I would like to agree with the two documents rather than with Comrade Hansen, because he sees only one aspect of the Cultural Revolution. It goes without saying that neither Comrade Peng nor Comrade Nishi finds any significance other than the divergent groups in the bureaucratic leadership; they consider the Red Guards mere puppets of the Mao faction.

Nevertheless, I cannot help insisting that even the two documents are somewhat inconsistent and incomplete, as they both contain a dualistic logic seen in their statements quoted above. However important they consider the various Red Guards and Rebel Groups, they do not seem to go beyond regarding these movements as objects of mobilization by the Mao faction. At most they (especially the majority document) notice that the balance of power shifted between the bureaucratic government and the Chinese masses in favor of the latter in the process of the Cultural Revolution. In the last analysis, both the majority and the minority documents overestimate the degree of dependence of the Chinese young radicals on the Mao faction, though Comrades Peng and Nishi overestimate it even more. Here we might detect a faint shade of Maoist illusion which identifies the Mao faction with the radical people. All these viewpoints are more or less insufficient for a clear and correct perception of the explosive antagonism which lies between any faction of the bureaucracy and the workers and young people, and for a true explanation of the latter's determined, resolute positions at that time.

Comrade Hansen concludes with some pleasure that it has come to the point where "we differ on the degree of mobilization and perhaps the degree to which the bu-

reaucracy was weakened by the mobilization."¹⁸ I consider that the problem in our debate does not come from such a quantitative difference in our views on China but from a qualitative difference in appreciating or failing to appreciate the gulf among the different social strata in the Chinese workers state.

III. Whom Should We Support?

From the above shortcoming appears a mistaken identification of the rebelling masses with either faction in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, some of us make the mistake of separating the inner struggle among the bureaucrats from the social class struggle in China.

The minority document, and particularly Comrade Hansen, support neither Mao-Lin nor Liu Shao-chi. This position is the purest logical result of the "intrabureaucratic struggle" theory referred to in the above section. Though quite correct, it is too abstract, too negative to give any concrete transitional programme of the political revolution to the vast fighting masses in Mainland China.

Comrade Peng gives the most positive support to Liu Shao-chi. It is noteworthy that Comrades Hansen and Charlier criticize Comrade Peng's support of Liu only indirectly in their criticisms of Comrades Tormey and Nishi, respectively. While he has reservations about Comrade Peng's position as far as his support of Liu is concerned, Comrade Nishi supports an anonymous opposition among the CCP in general because of his disagreement with the policy of giving support to nobody. Yet he directs his heaviest fire against the Mao faction.

As Comrade Hansen correctly indicates, Liu Shao-chi did not represent the most radical trend. He did not even organize a faction with a declared programme in opposition to Mao.¹⁹ I cannot believe that it was only because of their semi-imprisonment that Liu and other top officials could not defend themselves nor offer their own thoughts directly in front of the masses, even with illegitimate media. I suppose that it is because they were also enslaved by and unable to resist the cult of Mao. They had already been put into a position of fundamental weakness by the fact that they had been forced to try to eliminate Mao's influence by the promotion of the cult of Mao. After all, even at this time, we cannot tell whether there is any possibility of political independence of so-called progressive and rationalist bureaucrats in the degenerated workers states.

Next, concerning the majority document, while it accepts the minority's affirmation that they support neither Mao nor Liu, it makes some amendments which Comrade Hansen criticizes. According to him, though it supports neither Mao nor Liu, it *de facto* implies offering critical support to Mao.²⁰ This point I shall examine later, particularly in regard to Mao's foreign policies.

As for me, I wish to maintain my previous supposition that there was an attempted political revolution in early 1967. Hence I make a claim to support those Rebel Groups and Red Guards who took part in the political revolution. They struggled against both the Mao-Lin leadership and the regional commanders of the PLA. Since then they have been driven into illegal underground activity, and they are now abandoning both their imaginary cult of Mao and their illusions about Chiang Ching, Madam Mao.

In relation to the point about political revolution, the state of our debate is rather poor. In amending the minority document, the majority one reads, "conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured."²¹ Even this statement is too insufficient to describe the situation in those days when the attempted political revolution had exploded, though it failed. Yet Comrade Hansen welcomes this amendment, interpreting it as a sign of the adoption of the "calling for a political revolution."²² What abstract and lukewarm words for a summons to revolution! In company with the minority document Comrade Hansen considers the rebel youth movement as follows:

. . . it was inspired and fostered by the government, and partly financed by the government . . . they were backed by the army . . . brought to a halt rather rapidly, and retired from the scene as if they were responsive to orders from above. That isn't a characteristic of a real rebel youth movement.²³

Comrade Nishi speaks more bitterly. He thinks it something analogous to the mobilizations by Hitler's fascists of the petty bourgeoisie or to mass mobilizations in the Indonesian counterrevolution of 1965.²⁴ It is in the first stage of the Cultural Revolution that there appeared such Red Guards as Comrades Hansen and Nishi describe. Certainly they were organized and guided by political officers from the PLA.

Nevertheless, as already mentioned, toward January 1967 a new kind of youth movement entered the scene. They were independent and revolutionary, though immature, in reacting to Mao's appeal for a rebellion and in defending themselves from the attacks of some of the Red Guards. Yet as soon as they destroyed the local units of political power, Rebel Groups and Red Guards began fighting each other in the process of seizure of local power in January or February of 1967. And furthermore, they were coerced by the local army units and sooner or later became hostile to Mao's leadership in spite of the illusive cult of Mao. It is certain that they lacked independent political consciousness and their own national leadership with a political programme. This was inevitable in view of the fact that they had been brought up in the fanatic cult of Mao. Thus, it could be said that without a politically consistent programme and independent leadership the political rebellions were destined to be defeated and that there could not occur another political revolution in China. But we should pay attention to the fact that a political revolution started on the above-mentioned path. We must admit that there was no vanguard of this political revolution other than those young rebels.

We know of the existence of various revolutionary vanguards such as the "May Seventeenth Military Group" which said, "Down with Chou En-lai, anti-revolutionist!" and the Sheng Wu Lien (Great Proletarian Revolutionary Federation in Hunan province) which stood for the striking down of the new Revolutionary Committees which were the results of compromises, and was declared illegal by the Mao leadership. We should support them. And we should strive to help them proceed toward the formation of the true political party by achieving national unity among various rebel youth groups fighting today against the Chinese bureaucracy.

By the way, Comrade Nishi thinks, with Comrade Peng, that the new vanguard will come out of the struggle against the purge of the "opposition" in general.²⁵ The tone of this prognosis seems rather weak because it is unable to perceive the severe and complicated developments of the Chinese youths' consciousness. I approve of Comrade Charlier's expectation that the new revolutionary vanguard in China will come from the extreme left of the Red Guards.²⁶

IV. After the Cultural Revolution

One of the important issues in our debate is the question of how we should evaluate the present China since the CCP Ninth Congress (April 1969), which we can consider as marking the end of the Cultural Revolution. According to the minority view, Mao had scored such a crushing victory that he decided to hold the party congress to ratify it.²⁷ The minority document reads:

The "cultural revolution" has ended in . . . the fortification of the positions of one faction of the bureaucracy against its rivals rather than the expansion and deepening of decision-making powers by the masses.²⁸

Given the present situation in China, I think that the minority document goes overboard here. I fear that its view is a somewhat superficial and defeatist one that fails to understand the fundamental and constitutional weaknesses in the "triple alliance," the present form of political power in China. The majority document, on the other hand, correctly writes that this is a "compromise between the Maoist faction and parts of the old majority [Liu Shao-chi] faction."²⁹ Nevertheless, Comrade Charlier goes overboard off the other side when he states that the essential result of the Cultural Revolution was to weaken the bureaucracy and to permit much more independent activity of the masses than before.³⁰

Today, on the surface, the restoration of order is going on. New party committees are reported being formed on the provincial level. Rumor has it that the new National Peoples Congress will be held soon. The Chinese National Federation of Workers Unions was reported to be restored.

In the new Party Constitution, whose draft was decided by the twelfth plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee of October 1968 and which was adopted at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, party democracy was decreased and centralization of decision-making power was furthered. It watered down the new party membership by providing for broad recommendation by leaders in the place of election. It strengthened the power of the Party chairman and vice-chairman and the Political Bureau at the cost of that of the Central Committee and of the CC secretary. The new Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China, whose draft was adopted at the second plenum of the Ninth CCP Central Committee, also will deprive the Chinese working people of any kind of democracy, even that which had been assured before the Cultural Revolution. In it the systematization of the personality cult reaches a peak by declaring Mao Tse-tung the supreme sovereign of the Chinese state and designating Lin Piao as his successor. The National Peoples Congress, which will still be called the highest decision-making organ, will lose important parts of its former authority

because it will be placed under the control of the CCP and lose even its legislative power. And the position of state chairman, which it was to elect, will be abolished according to the new Constitution.

But in spite of his seeming victory, Mao is more and more forced to rely on the PLA. So, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, which had already been weakened, has retired further from the scene. Even Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-juan have become less and less radical or less prominent. Before the Ninth CCP Congress was opened, all the provincial Revolutionary Committees had been completely dominated by the military regional commanders. And it was the military who convened and dominated the provincial party congresses of late 1968 in order to choose their representatives to the party congresses which were said to have been attended by party members functioning within the framework of the Revolutionary Committees. Army officers formed forty per cent of the members of the CCP Central Committee and the candidate members newly elected at the party congress. Of the twenty-five members of the Political Bureau, that is, the top political power of China, twelve are top officers of the PLA.

Clearly the present China is still under the control of the PLA. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the governmental ministries had been controlled by the CCP. After the Cultural Revolution, final control was transferred to the Military Control Committee, where it remains now. Even Mao's prestige is said to be gradually declining. Instead, Lin's top military officers and regional PLA commanders and Chou's top officials of the State Council advance together to the forefront of political leadership, standing for a return to production and order from the condition of rebellion.

Nevertheless, this does not at all mean that the Chinese leadership is stable. New cooperation among new and old party members and the military commanders had been accompanied by new antagonisms and frictions in the army-party relations on the provincial level and even in the central leadership in Peking. There have been conflicts between military leaders and the Revolutionary Committees of which they are sometimes members. For instance, large open fights took place in Shansi Province in June-July 1969. Owing to these conflicts, the central leadership cannot exercise dominant control over the provinces. Furthermore, we must take notice of a growing tendency towards regionalism among the local military leaders, which makes it more difficult for Peking to establish its control over the extensive provinces.

Thus, the removal of the major opponents—Liu Shao-chi and his fellows—was achieved in more than two years of turmoil only at the cost of creating a new, regionally based and militarily dominated power structure which proved increasingly difficult to manipulate.³¹

The present process of building provincial party committees that is reported should be considered as a reflection of the weakness of the Chinese bureaucracy rather than of its vigor. The reason why the establishment of provincial party committees comes so late might be the persistence of the above-mentioned antagonisms and tensions. Here we can also see signs of the weakened power of Mao's leadership over the Chinese working people.

It goes without saying that the CCP leadership has begun bitterly forcing the Chinese working people, especially the youth, under the pretext of preparation for a

possible war against the USA and USSR, to accept Mao's policies such as the half-worker, half-peasant system, and the self-sufficiency of each province by dispersion of industrial plants, and the "Hsia-Fang" or "sending down" of workers and youth including former Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, and the construction of very small-scale plants self-financed by each Peoples Commune. The number of youths who have been sent down is reported to be twenty million. I have heard from two French scholars who visited Hong Kong that many corpses of young boys and girls were drifting in Hong Kong Bay in late 1970—they were drowned in their flight trying to swim across the bay from the Kwantung coast. I suspect they were a part of those youths who were compelled to come back illegally to the cities from the country villages and frontier regions where they had been sent down in the Hsia Fang movement willingly or by force. They had often been treated as a nuisance in the Peoples Communes because of overpopulation, or else they had not been able to accommodate themselves to the insufficient diet and atlas-like burdensome labor over the sterile lands of the frontier.

Thus, today we can predict that there are ripening new possibilities of great political clashes between the Maoist leadership dominated by the coalition of Lin and Chou on the one hand and ultraleft radical youth movements which express the anger of the Chinese masses on the other hand.

V. On Mao's Radicalism in Foreign Policy

In our views of Mao's radical attitudes we differ among ourselves. Let me examine this problem particularly in relation to Mao's foreign policies.

One kind of amendments made by the majority to the minority document are omissions, complements, and corrections which soften the degree of severity of condemnation and criticism shown by the minority document. For example, the "Stalinist Chinese Communist Party" and the "crystallized bureaucratic caste" are respectively supplanted by the simple terms "Chinese Communist Party" and "bureaucracy." Such words as "narrow national interest" and "ultimatism" of the foreign policy followed by the Mao leadership are omitted. The words "more aggressive diplomatic policy" and "opportunism" are respectively changed into "more militant line" and "bureaucratic centrism."³² These changes made by the majority are terminological ones, consequently the arguments for and against them tend to lack concrete substance.

Conversely, the points on which both agree in their estimates of the nature of Mao's policies are many more than we might expect. Both find "oscillation between opportunism and ultra-leftism" and "collaboration with the colonial bourgeoisie" in Mao's foreign policies. The majority agrees that the Chinese have an "unwillingness or incapacity to promulgate a united front with Moscow" as the minority affirms.³³ Moreover, both agreed at the last world congress that Moscow bears the main responsibility and Peking the secondary responsibility for the Sino-Soviet border conflicts.

By the way, concerning the effects on real culture of Mao-Lin's Cultural Revolution, both estimations are now almost completely consonant. In other words, both find the problem in the "grotesque cult of Mao" and of Stalin.

Furthermore, at our world congress the following ideas of the minority were adopted: "the damage inflicted on cultural life" which the "conformism and regimentation of thought" and the closure of all Chinese universities and high schools produced; and a critique of the Stalinist version of "Proletarian Art."³⁴

Now, the remaining and more important divergences are very delicate. You see, the minority document focuses on the Stalinist core concealed under the radical policies and actions of the Maoist red apple. It says the Peking's basic foreign policy is peaceful coexistence with U. S. imperialism. But it underestimates the objective effects which Mao-Lin's radical line has on the world youth movement. It considers that the material aid to guerrilla forces in anticolonial struggles only helps "to create an image far to the left of Moscow."³⁵ Only an image?! This view tends to be a little too aloof and dogmatic.

The majority document takes note particularly of the objective fact that the Sino-Soviet dispute and the policy of the Chinese government led by Mao has deepened the world class struggle and accelerated the radicalization of youth movements on a worldwide scale, though it also criticizes the "socialism in one country" and "two-stage revolution" theories in the Mao-Lin line.

Thus, the disagreement between the two views on Chinese foreign policy comes from a difference in whether the accent should be placed on the intentions or on the actual effects of Maoist policy. Therefore, I believe that the debate among us on Mao's policies during the Cultural Revolution springs more from the diversity in our estimations of the present worldwide radicalization than from diversity in our understanding of the real intentions of the Chinese leadership. If my inference is correct, the harmonizing of our views of the Cultural Revolution is possible simultaneously with the solution of the debate which we are now carrying on about how to evaluate youth movements and what kind of organizational policies we should offer to the radicalizing youth in today's world.

Let me advance some further ideas, even though provisional, to aid our discussion of Maoist radicalism. My previous argument in Section I might seem to emphasize internal factors too much in explaining the Cultural Revolution, but this was not my intention. I would like to insist that Mao's behavior is determined not only by internal objective difficulties and foreign pressures as the majority tells, but also by Mao's own ideas which are, in turn, formed in his struggles against rival policy-makers and the Chinese masses. In trying to evaluate external factors, we must examine in particular the interaction between the Cultural Revolution and the Vietnam war. After all, it could be mainly the impact of the Vietnam war that has opened the way to radicalization of world youth and changed the world political structure in favor of world revolution.

Since the Cuban Revolution in 1960, the relative peace and stability of the world was broken above all in the underdeveloped, ex-colonial world. The neutral and conciliatory Bonapartist leaderships such as in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Ghana, and the Congo were largely exhausted or replaced, though events did not uniformly develop to the advantage of revolution. The most intense struggles focused on Southeast Asia, especially South Vietnam where the fall of the puppet government,

taken together with China's new nuclear capability, was feared by Washington as the beginning of a possible chain reaction in the Indochina Peninsula and Far East.

U. S. bombing of North Vietnam and the Indonesian counterrevolution were clearly attempts to counterattack the newly rising world revolution, and to strengthen the military and political containment by Washington of the Chinese workers state, the existence of which, with its nuclear weapons, represents the most important base of the Asian revolution. It is clear that Washington's maneuvers caused the inner antagonisms in the Chinese leadership to explode into the open clashes of the Cultural Revolution. But it would be incorrect to view Mao's foreign policies as genuinely revolutionary and satisfactory help to North Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam.

In February 1965 Premier Kosygin and military leaders of the Soviet Union, who experienced the beginning of the U. S. bombing in the midst of their visit to Hanoi, went to Peking to enter into negotiations with Mao and proposed united action to aid North Vietnam. Even though the Soviet bureaucrats were forced to make this proposal by the pressure of increasing struggles rather than by a reconsideration of their peaceful coexistence policy, the proposed Sino-Soviet joint action was absolutely necessary for the defense of North Vietnam and the victory of the NLF. In spite of this necessity, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai vetoed the proposal. Moreover, there is even some evidence that right before the bombing of North Vietnam they had indicated to Washington their hope of mitigating tensions with the U. S. and their intention to not send Chinese troops to Vietnam. On the other hand, Liu Shao-chi and P'eng Chen representing the majority of the CCP were carrying on a nationwide campaign preparing for a possible state of war and hoping for a tie-up between China and the U. S. S. R.

It is natural that this fundamental disagreement appeared most sharply in the form of antagonisms within the PLA. Lo Jui-ch'ing, one of the majority of the CCP, wrote an article commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over fascist Germany in *Red Flag* in May 1965, in which he made a tacit denial of the Maoist theory of protracted war, favoring a positive offensive instead, and an implied proposal of restoring the alliance with the Soviet Union. But at last the Mao-Lin faction in the PLA seemed to gain supremacy over the Liu-Lo faction. This was indicated by Lin Piao's notorious article entitled "Long Live the Victory of People's War" in which he recommended applying the Maoist way of struggle, which is to encircle the cities by building struggle bases in the countryside, to the world revolution. Though the theory of "people's war" is not wrong in general, Lin Piao's object in writing this article was that he would avoid a Sino-American war in spite of his harsh attacks against the U. S. A. in principle. Mao and Lin's strategy was to struggle against two giant enemies—the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R.—with the stress on the anti-Soviet struggle, which was the opposite of the Liu-Lo strategy emphasizing the anti-American struggle through some kind of cooperation with the Soviet Union. This Mao-Lin strategy is based on the Shachtman-type theory that the Soviet Union and East European workers states are all state-capitalist or social-imperialist. Thus, Mao-Lin urged the North Korean government, the Japan Communist Party and other Communist parties in East-

ern Asia to rouse themselves to armed struggles as a substitute for any form of Chinese war with the U. S. A. in order to help North Vietnam and the NLF, even one as limited as the battle in the Formosa Straits where Peking did not increase the number of less than five hundred cannonballs per month shot at Quemoy Island. Of course this hypocritical request alienated those Communist parties from Peking.

It is difficult to estimate the opportunities that a Sino-American confrontation in those days would have brought to the world revolution. But it is obvious that, however much more radical than Soviet Stalinists the Mao-Lin faction might have seemed, they deepened the danger to the Vietnamese revolution by giving preference to their confrontation with the Soviet bureaucracy at the sacrifice of military and political defense of the Vietnamese struggle which should have had priority over all other diplomatic policies, as Comrade Yoshichi Sakai wrote in 1968.³⁶ They left the Vietnamese revolution isolated, and even advised the Vietnamese militants to be self-reliant (that is, to reject Soviet aid) and to reduce the scale of their struggle by withdrawing to base districts. Clearly these Chinese attitudes could be called sectarian.

Returning to our debate, Comrade Germain in criticizing Comrade Charlier, and in return Comrade Charlier in criticizing Comrade Nishi, both overlook the serious difficulties suffered by North Vietnam and the NLF in 1965 as a result of Mao's refusal of Sino-Soviet united action, though the Vietnamese bravely fought on in spite of these difficulties and largely overcame them. Whether Comrade Nishi is correct or not in making an analogy between Mao's refusal and Stalin-Thaelman ultimatism, I believe that the real intention of his analogy is to correctly emphasize the overwhelming necessity of united action. Comrade Charlier overlooks this point in his 1970 paper, and for this reason I prefer his other paper presented in 1969, according to which the majority underestimates the imperative necessity of united action and the harm done by the Mao faction's refusal of it. Back in June 1967, in calling for a united front of the Sino-Soviet and other workers states in Asia to aid the Vietnamese revolution, Japanese Trotskyists said that we should demand of the Soviet Union unconditional arms aid to North Vietnam, while we simultaneously opposed the peaceful coexistence policy followed by the Kremlin.³⁷ And of course, the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International has requested united action of the Sino-Soviet and other workers states on the Vietnamese war.³⁸

Nevertheless, the majority document, together with Comrades Germain (1969) and Charlier (1970), fails to emphasize Mao's counterrevolutionary refusal of united action, however revisionist the Kremlin or Liu Shao-chi might have been. While it puts emphasis on Mao's objective role rather than his real intentions, as far as the Sino-Soviet dispute is concerned, it stresses the revisionist nature of the Kremlin's intentions when it comes to the Soviet proposal of united action to aid Vietnam. This latter stress is very similar to the reasons the Mao leadership gave for its refusal. Particularly Comrade Germain's arguments in replying to Comrade Charlier sound to me as if he mistakes for satisfactory aid the quality and quantity of the separate aid which was offered by China and the Soviet Union at last in 1967, mainly under the

impulse of the rising Vietnamese revolution.

Anyhow, by shutting themselves up in domestic struggles with an antiforeign spirit and by weakening the Chinese military potential by many suspensions of traffic and inner military troubles, the Maoists harmed the Vietnamese revolution during the Cultural Revolution. And they lost their international influence not only in diplomatic relations with other governments but also in political relations with other more or less militant nationalist or socialist parties for about three years since 1966. Even Hanoi was disillusioned with the domestic struggles of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and viewed it very coolly. We can see the clearest example of the loss of Chinese influence in the fact that in the spring of 1968 Hanoi began peace talks in Paris with the U. S. A. in spite of the objections of Peking. (Of course, the peace talks of North Vietnam might be admitted to be one effective means made use of in carrying through the war and revolution, especially by giving them an independent voice on the international diplomatic and political stage.)

As it apparently secured its own control after the Cultural Revolution, the Mao leadership returned its foreign policy line to the *de facto* "San-Ho-I-Shao" line (which means making peace with "imperialists," with reactionaries, and with "modern revisionists" and reducing aid to other peoples in their revolts either to replace a government with another sympathetic to communism or to gain independence) followed under Liu Shao-chi's leadership before the Cultural Revolution. In the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee of the CCP in August-September 1970, the policy of peaceful coexistence was adopted in accordance with the adoption for the first time of a resolution requesting membership for the People's Republic of China and expulsion of the Nationalist government from the United Nations. And they now emphasize a broad united front against U. S. imperialism and Japanese militarism and have moved back their denunciation of Moscow to second place, although they maintain their definition of the U. S. S. R. and Eastern European workers states as "social imperialist." Liu Shao-chi's theory of "the middle area," which calls for helping neutral and peaceful nationalist governments in underdeveloped countries and even in developed countries, was restored in practice. These new foreign policies may be called "the Liu Shao-chi line without Liu Shao-chi."

I believe this turn of foreign policy came about primarily because of the Sino-Soviet border battles in 1969 which almost reached the brink of full-scale war. Mao-Lin's wrong emphasis on the anti-Soviet struggle based on a Shachtman-type theory had developed its own logic until it faced a wall over which it threatened to nullify the very existence of not only People's China but also of other workers states. Moreover, Mao and Lin were forced to acknowledge the overwhelming predominance in military power of the Soviet Union over China. But another motive of the turn to a more moderate foreign policy was the apparent victory of the Mao-Lin faction over the Liu Shao-chi group.

From the above analysis we may arrive at some conclusions. Particularly when we evaluate Chinese foreign policies, we must apply the common rule that, as war is a continuation of politics in a different form, so foreign policy is a continuation of internal politics. Mao's radical changes in foreign policy, which respectively ac-

corded with the adoption of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, should be seen as means of creating foreign tensions which were used in order to win himself a domestic victory against other bureaucrats as well as against the revolution from below. The international effects of these foreign policies were secondary to Mao. (In 1969 Comrade Charlier thought so too.³⁹) We must note that the Chinese Maoists have never aimed at fighting a real war with either of the two superpowers of U.S. imperialism and the Soviet Union, whatever radical and militant words they have spoken against both of them. Their radicalism has mainly taken the form of gigantic mass mobilizations and demonstrations, of speeches to mass meetings, of international propaganda urging people around the world to fight, of moral aid to pro-Peking parties in former colonial countries (sometimes with a little material aid thrown in), and of diplomatic pressures on foreign nationalist or bourgeois missions. On the other hand, they have stopped acting radical in diplomatic relations with foreign governments after the Cultural Revolution ended. They have not organized any international revolutionary organization either, not even an organization like the OLAS which Castro sponsored. They lack an international strategy in which various revolutionary forces are combined, led and united organically and systematically. This is because the "socialism in one country" policy lies behind their radicalism, leading them to adhere to cold authoritarian realism and to embrace extraordinary cynicism toward genuine internationalism. In the Vietnam war the criminal nature of their policy is most obvious.

On account of these characteristics, Chinese Maoist radicalism tends to be propagated to other countries in the form of external shock rather than leadership. It is this shock that our majority notes as objective consequences for radicalized youth movements in the world. Though we must not and do not ignore the powerful influence of this shock and propagation, we must also be aware that imported Maoist radicalism has its own motive and its own logic resulting from the revolutionary upsurge in the importing countries. For instance, in India, when the Indian Communist Party, pro-Moscow, united with the Gandhi Bonapartist government, and even the left ICP, the ICP(M), repressed the peasants' armed land occupation which it led at first, the Naxalites with an underground organization began terrorist activities, advocating people's war in Indian villages. Accordingly, we should separate Chinese Maoism, the original Maoism, from imported Maoist tendencies which borrow Mao's words and theories but arise spontaneously and follow their own course.

We may divide Maoist tendencies into the ones in underdeveloped countries and the ones in advanced capitalist countries. Maoist radicalism in the highest stage of capitalism stems from the productive relations which lag behind the overripe productive forces. Here we may admit that some things called utopian by Karl Marx, things which could be realized only after building a socialist society, are becoming less and less utopian, at least for the upper classes. Thus, the radical Maoist demand for immediate removal of division of labor, which is not a popular demand in underdeveloped China, has a certain appeal in highly industrialized countries. We cannot ignore this contrast. To such a degree there are disproportions in

our world. Therefore, we can say that Maoism in advanced industrial societies may be more appropriate than Maoism in China. But even the Maoists in advanced industrial societies are trying to jump over the necessary historical stage of building a socialist political power with economic planning, and thus they often appear to be close to anarchists.

Probably Maoists in other countries than China, if they were in China, would belong to the rebelling youth groups. No doubt some of them would find themselves contending with Mao and his bureaucratic leadership. However, in China or in any country, since they have not mastered Marxism-Leninism-Trotskyism, most of them are poorly armed, lacking consistent programs and systematic party organizations. They fail to perceive the necessity of an international revolutionary organization to struggle against the world imperialist system and against the bureaucracies in the workers states.

In short, Mao's radicalism, as well as the people's war theory, has its appeal in its challenge to the existing state of the world in which the White House and the Kremlin are trying to freeze the present arrangement by which each of them enjoys economic and military predominance over other capitalist or workers states. Mao's centrifugal influence threatens to decompose this status quo. But Mao's radicalism ends here. He cannot give any leadership to the rising disturbances in the world which he helps to provoke. Because the Mao-Lin theory of people's war is in practice not a war of the people, by the people, and for the people, but a war of Mao, by the people, for Mao, who embodies the national interest of China.

In speaking and acting for the Chinese national interest rather than for the interests of the world revolution, Mao and Lin are following the theory, popular among bourgeois political scientists in international relations, of the three-person game. According to the theory, international politics can be likened to a game in which three players (Washington, Moscow, and Peking) compete with each other, each trying to win as much as possible for himself. In such a game, once two of the three players act in concert they can expect to make huge gains at the expense of the third player. So, each player rationally tries to make a coalition with another player, and above all, to prevent the other players from uniting against him. There are many ramifications of this type of game theory, depending on the assumptions made about the resources of each player, the rules of the game, and the amount of information they have about each others' plans, but all of the ramifications of this popular bourgeois theory ignore completely the difference in social systems among the USA, USSR, and China. In fact, it is a postulate of the theory that all the players in the international game play basically the same way regardless of their domestic systems.

In the present game the first player, the USA, is the strongest. Now, a theorem derived from game theory says that neither of the other players especially wants to ally with the strongest player because he will find himself the junior partner and will get a bad break when it comes to division of the spoils of victory. So there is a tendency for the two weaker players to unite against the strongest player, and here we have a nifty explanation for the fact that the USSR and China tend to be most strongly against the USA. But the theory also says that

if the strongest player is willing to offer a good enough deal to one of the other players, he can lure him over to his side, since all players are acting only for themselves and there is nothing sacred about any particular coalition. Thus, China must constantly be alert to the possibility that the USSR will be bought off by the USA, and vice-versa. This is why China is constantly accusing Moscow of collaboration with Washington, and Moscow counters with similar accusations against Peking. The three-person game is more complicated and tricky than the two-person game played in the 1950s, requiring the most cynical and rational calculation of self interest and strategies. Mao and Lin, like the bureaucrats in the Kremlin, have been guilty of playing this game instead of acting in the spirit of communist internationalism, and have thus provided verification for the theories of bourgeois political scientists.

However, we Marxists know that such bourgeois theories are not the last word on international politics. Behind the Machiavellian game among three persons lies a fundamental and irreconcilable struggle, the class struggle, which manifests itself in the form of socialist and nationalist revolutions against the world imperialist system and in the form of political revolutions in the degenerated workers states. Furthermore, all these revolutions take the form of a permanent revolution in both the dimensions of time and space. The strongest player in the present three-person game bears a commitment to protect the world capitalist system. The other two players represent the working class, even if not very accurately at times, and the workers are objectively hostile to the imperialist system. The fact that two of the three players in this game are workers states gives a significant advantage to the forces of revolution, if only this advantage is made use of. We cannot and must not presuppose that the Sino-Soviet confrontation is permanent. Nor that the revolutionary forces in the world are so weak and so much controlled by the superpowers that the international system of the three-person game will always prevail arbitrarily. The Vietnamese people are successfully fighting, mostly by themselves, against U.S. imperialism, and they are pressing not only the other two superpowers but also other revolutionary movements to join together against this common enemy. Meanwhile, revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe and Western Europe threaten to blow the lid off the Kremlin's pet plan for an all-European security which would ratify the present division of Europe into two spheres of influence belonging to Washington and Moscow. If a revolution such as the May revolution of France, or the Czechoslovakian revolution of 1968, or the Chinese political revolution of 1967, would gain a victory, it would strike down one of the supporting columns of the existing framework on which the international game of three superpowers is based.

Clearly the bourgeois theory of the international political game, which the Mao leadership has been playing, forgets that the more the international class struggle intensifies and the more desperate the American response becomes, the stronger the pressure for cooperation between Moscow and Peking. In this connection, it is noteworthy that as soon as U.S. forces and their South Vietnamese puppet troops invaded Laos and extended the war over the whole land of Indochina, Moscow and Pe-

king increased their economic and military aid to revolutionary Vietnam. Chinese leadership went as far as mobilizing troops to the Sino-Indochinese border, and Hanoi even indicated the possibility that Chinese troops might enter the Indochina war. According to an AFP-Jiji correspondent reporting from Moscow on March 1, a certain important Indochinese person said that lately Moscow and Peking have begun to gradually fall into step with each other on account of the Indochina war, which has up until now been used as a football in a game between Moscow and Peking. Here we can find at least a sign that the present foreign policy of Mao, Lin, and Chou is becoming nearer to Liu and Lo's strategy. At the same time, China seems to be trying to take measures to neutralize advanced capitalist countries such as Japan and to cause a rift between them and the U.S. government. This is another side of the Liu line. Probably the Chinese leaders still hope to avoid sending their own regular army into Indochina and will exhaust all other alternatives before doing this.

We should now call for united Sino-Soviet actions against U.S. imperialism and its South Vietnam government troops, including a limited field war and a counterattack against U.S. bombing planes by antiaircraft and missiles. Since South Vietnam government troops under U.S. air support invaded Laos, the Indochina war has changed from a guerrilla war to a regular war, in which North Vietnam's army has been successfully using heavy weapons such as antiaircraft guns and missiles, heavy artillery, and tank corps. With proper support from the workers states, they could be even more successful.

Before we must fear the push of the button which brings the annihilation of nuclear war, there are many stages of revolutionary war to be fought. We have to try as many stages of revolutionary struggle as necessary, because only the world socialist revolution can provide the final guarantee against the nuclear threat. Our duty is that "we struggle for establishing by force our new world order against the present world anarchy without any dominant hegemony"⁴⁰ and replace the present game played by the superpowers with a socialist world order that does not play games with the lives of the world's people.

VI. Conclusion

The majority's approach is in some places vague and theoretically inconsistent, though it reflects in a sophisticated way the complexities of the facts about China. The strength of their position comes from their friendly approach to and eager readiness to find the sources of radicalization of Chinese youth. The majority as well as the other comrades all have a common slogan of calling for a political revolution in the present China, but only as a very general and abstract aim, lacking in concrete programme and tactics. Thus, I cannot but conclude that the resolution on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the majority draft adopted at the last world congress, is only temporary.

I think the approach to the developments of the Cultural Revolution taken by the minority document (including Comrade Hansen's papers) and Comrades Peng and Nishi in their third viewpoint are too static. Comrade Hansen takes the Mao-Lin leadership to be "Stalin-

ist Bonapartism" which should be the object of a political revolution, and makes this point more clearly than the majority document. It seems to me that this wholly correct judgment is unfortunately less the result of concrete historical analysis of the complex facts of China which dynamically interact with each other than it is the result of documented analysis of Trotsky's terminology about Soviet Stalinism and of historical analogy likening modern China to the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule.

Comrade Hansen asks whether the Chinese leadership is (a) "bureaucratic centrism" or (b) "bureaucratic Bonapartism" and whether it should be called merely (c) "bureaucratic" or (d) "a crystallized bureaucratic caste."⁴¹ The majority prefers to call the present CCP leadership (a) bureaucratic centrism and (c) bureaucratic. Conversely, the other comrades including Hansen and Nishi prefer terms (b) and (d). According to Comrades Hansen and Peng, when Trotsky used the term (a) bureaucratic centrism in his letter entitled "What Next?" written in 1928 and added as an appendix to *The Third International After Lenin*, he intended to expose not only Stalin's zigzag policy between opportunist and adventurist lines (which aspect our majority takes notice of) but also the political system which might still be improved and in which we need not yet undertake a political revolution. And in 1935 Trotsky is said to have applied the term (b) bureaucratic Bonapartism to the Stalin leadership in his well-known paper "The Soviet Union Today" to indicate that it should be overthrown by a political revolution. Term (d) can be understood as one which indicates even more clearly the necessity of a political revolution. And term (a) is the one which does not call for a political revolution.

I do not intend to disagree with these distinctions between definitions, but I must say that this method of interpreting Trotsky's terminology is too rigid. For I question the retrospective judgment that it was not necessary to call for a political revolution in the Soviet Union in 1928 because Trotsky did not call for one until 1935. After all, Trotsky himself admitted in 1935 that the Thermidorian reaction had started already in 1924. I believe that Trotsky's reflections suggest that it would have been better to have called for a political revolution in 1928, calling for unconditional defense of the Soviet workers state at the same time. Nor do I think that this conclusion rejects the correctness of the program and policies which Trotsky and the Left Opposition fought for. And I must add that I disagree with the Shachtman-type left-centrists who have treated their state capitalism theory and the Trotskyist view of political revolution without discrimination.

I do not want to rehash history all over again; I only hope to draw the historical lessons which Trotsky gave us from the struggles that finally cost him his life. We are getting to the point when we may form this kind of historical reexamination with a background of transitional workers states existing for more than fifty years. It might not be necessary to repeat all of Trotsky's footsteps which included some roundabout ones such as his changes of ideas about the Soviet Thermidor, because history does not simply repeat itself. Rather, we should respect the direction of the development of Trotsky's thought and not be afraid to emphasize historical events that happened after his death. The process of history

shows us that the centrist path tends to be so firmly rooted in the workers states that it has excluded both the counterrevolution which Trotsky greatly feared and the reforms without revolution that Trotsky once thought possible. Centrism and its zigzag course are the fundamental nature of the bureaucracy in the degenerated workers states up to now, and the means by which the bureaucracy holds firmly the nationalized industries and economic planning functions which are the sources of its ruling power. History also shows that there is little possibility either for the bureaucracy to reform itself or for it to be reformed without another revolution, so the prognoses of various former Trotskyists, including some in our own organization like Michel Pablo and Arne Swabeck, can be put to rest. Thus, we should not be so dogmatic about definitions like (a) but should form clearer judgments about present historical cases. For example, we should clarify our analysis of the nature of the present Cuban workers state and our tasks in regard to it, although this may be difficult.

Turning to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, we should recognize the fact that Mao and the Maoists (of course they are not necessarily homogenous) did partially destroy their bureaucratic system, even though only temporarily, and that this fact has radical influence on the world's youth. Nevertheless, the minority comrades and Comrades Peng and Nishi fix their gaze only on Mao's ultimate intentions, more precisely on his Stalinist characteristics. But since we have no very reliable information about Mao, we don't know whether his real intention was to undermine the bureaucracy or strengthen it.

The static approach to the Cultural Revolution taken by the minority comrades, and by Comrades Peng and Nishi, more or less pervades their evaluation of the Third Chinese Revolution as a whole, though it seems to me that Comrade Hansen later changed slightly his former views of the Third Chinese Revolution and the role of Mao's CCP leadership of it in his paper "The Origins of the Differences on China." There he clearly acknowledged a disparity between the facts of history and the following theoretical postulates of orthodox Trotskyism:

1. The peasantry as a class cannot lead a revolutionary struggle through to a successful conclusion.
2. This can be achieved only by the proletariat.
3. The proletariat cannot do it except by organizing a revolutionary Marxist party.
4. Stalinism does not represent revolutionary Marxism; in essence it is counterrevolutionary.
5. Stalinism represents a temporary retrogression in the first workers' state; the advance of the revolution will doom it and it will not reappear.⁴²

Comrade Hansen himself correctly explains this disparity by referring to the four main results of the Second World War: (1) the victory of the Soviet Union; (2) the weakening of world capitalism as a whole; (3) the resulting temporary strengthening of Stalinism; and (4) an upsurge of revolutionary struggles in both the imperialist centers and the colonial areas.⁴³ In short, according to him the victory won by the Chinese peasant armies led by the CCP was made possible by the international context. Of course I go along with his explanation although I hope to discuss this issue further in the future.

Anyhow, I believe that Comrade Hansen is quite correct in saying that we are at the starting point of fruitful international discussions on China and that we must study the origin of the Third Chinese Revolution and the role played by the CCP Maoists. And in concluding this paper, I would like to agree with Comrade Hansen that "the establishment of a series of workers states as the consequence of successful revolutions has greatly strengthened the world revolution and its perspectives. This means a growing tendency internationally toward a revolutionary

pattern that comes much closer to the classic norm in which the proletariat moves into the foreground. Evidence of this is to be seen in the shifting of the axis of revolutionary struggles in the backward countries from the countryside to the cities. The events in France in May-June 1968 showed what explosive potential now exists in the imperialist centers of the West. The ghetto uprisings in the United States and the upsurge among the student youth internationally have offered further corroboration of the trend."⁴⁴

NOTES

1. Both the majority and minority draft resolutions were published in *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1969, arranged in parallel columns to facilitate following the suggested changes.

2. J. Hansen, "The Differences between the Two Documents on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" in *Ibid.*

3. J. Hansen, "The Origin of the Differences on China," *International Information Bulletin*, No. 5, June 1970.

4. If I may be allowed to choose one paper from the many texts by Peng, see S. Peng, "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle inside the CCP," *Internal Bulletin*, Vol. 1968, No. 1; K. Nishi, "A Criticism of the United Secretariat Majority Draft Resolution on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" *I. I. B.*, No. 1, March 1970.

5. Peng, *op. cit.*

6. L. Maitan, "The Report to the Congress on the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution'"; L. Maitan, *Partito Esercito e masse nella crisi cinese*, Rome, 1969; E. Germain, "The Cultural Revolution," *International Socialist Review*, July-Aug. 1968; E. Germain, "An Unacceptable Amendment," *I. I. B.* No. 8, May 1969; F. Charlier, "An Amendment to the Draft Resolution on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" *Ibid.*; F. Charlier, "Criticism of a Criticism," *I. I. B.* No. 7, Sept. 1970.

7. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.* pp. 2-3

8. S. Peng, "A Criticism of the Various Views Supporting the Chinese Rural People's Communes—What Our Attitude Should Be," *Discussion Bulletin*, Jan. 1960.

9. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, p. 3

10. *Ibid.*, p. 20

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4

12. Charlier, *I. I. B.*, May 1969, p. 2

13. Cf. H. Osada, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution—Its Results and Perspectives," (in Japanese) in *On the Chinese Cultural Revolution—Criticisms and Analyses* (edited by the members of the Japanese section of the Fourth International, 1969)

14. Hansen, *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, p. 37. See also Hansen, *I. I. B.*, June 1970, p. 20.

15. But at last the Mao leadership finished off the Red Guards and Rebel Youths by sending "Worker-Peasant Mao Tse-tung Thought Propagation Teams" to all schools and colleges, and these teams suppressed youths and students.

16. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, p. 1

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 9

18. *Ibid.*, p. 37

19. Hansen, *I. I. B.*, June 1970, p. 24

20. *SWP D. B.*, *loc. cit.*

21. *Ibid.*, p. 3

22. *Ibid.*, p. 21

23. *Ibid.*, p. 27

24. Nishi, *op. cit.*, p. 3
25. *Ibid.*, p. 9
26. Charlier, *I. I. B.*, No. 7, Sept. 1970, p. 17
27. *SWP D. B.*, p. 29
28. *Ibid.*, p. 14
29. *Loc. cit.*
30. Charlier, *op. cit.*, p. 16
31. Chien Yu-shen, *China's Fading Revolution*, 1970 (Center of Contemporary Chinese Studies, Hong Kong), pp. 223-226.
32. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2 and 5
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 4
34. *Ibid.*, p. 12 and see also the Resolution on the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the Ninth World Congress.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 15
36. Yoshichi Sakai, in Nos. 3 and 5 (March and May 1968) of *Fourth International* (the Japanese language theoretical organ of the Japanese section of the Fourth International)
37. Cf. National Committee of the Internationalist Group of the Socialist Youth League, *The Bulletin of the Secretariat*, No. 8 (in Japanese)
38. For instance, see its announcements in February 1968.
39. Cf. *I. I. B.*, May 1969, p. 2
40. Sakai, in the *Fourth International* (in Japanese), No. 4, April 1968.
41. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32
42. *I. I. B.*, June 1970, p. 27
43. *Ibid.*, p. 29
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35