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RESOLUTION ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

[Adopted by the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party]

The "cultural revolution" constitutes a momentous dividing line in the political evolution of the People's Republic of China. It marks the irreparable shattering of the nucleus of veteran Communists clustered around Mao, which led the Stalinized Chinese Communist party in the civil war, founded the republic, and overturned capitalist rule, and which, since the victory over Chiang Kai-shek, has run the economy, governed the country, and directed the state and party apparatus. The "cultural revolution" tore this nucleus into contending fragments that cannot be put together.

Initiated in September 1965 by the Maoist faction in the Chinese Communist party leadership, it reached its major objective with the expulsion of Liu Shao-chi from the party at the October 13-31, 1968 "enlarged" twelfth plenum of the Central Committee. Liu, the chief of state, Mao's first lieutenant and main interpreter for several decades, his designated heir until the factional struggle broke into the open, was singled out as the central target of attack under such epithets as "the Khrushchev of China," the "first person in a position of authority who has taken the capitalist road," and, finally, as the "enlarged" twelfth plenum put it, "the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi."

Mao has defined the internal struggle which has convulsed China as "in essence a great political revolution under the conditions of socialism made by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie." (Peking Review, No. 43, Oct. 25, 1968.)

This official version bears little resemblance to the truth. The "cultural revolution" is not a "political revolution" for the promotion of workers democracy; it was not made "under the conditions of socialism"; it was not undertaken by the proletariat as the continuation of its struggle against the bourgeoisie. The suggestion that the opposition, which was denied the most elementary rights of proletarian democracy, represented the "Kuomintang reactionaries" is a slander.

The "cultural revolution" represented a phase of sharp public conflict in an interbureaucratic struggle between diver-

gent tendencies in the topmost circles of the Chinese Communist party leadership which eventually affected every sector of Chinese society. It constituted the greatest single crisis experienced by the bureaucratic regime since its establishment.

The Chinese People's Republic has registered major accomplishments and made remarkable advances in many fields since the military victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, especially when measured against the relative stagnation of such colonial countries as India, Indonesia and Brazil where capitalism has not been overthrown. However, the authoritarian methods practiced by the Maoist command have grievously hampered solving the colossal problems of economic, social, political and cultural development confronting so backward a country as China with its huge population.

The period of intensified difficulties goes back to the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period.

The difficulties at home have been aggravated by the deterioration of Peking's international position due to Mao's foreign policy. This policy, in essence, expresses the narrow national interests of the ruling bureaucracy in China. It has oscillated between opportunism and ultraleftism or combinations of both.

One of the worst setbacks was the break with the Soviet Union. While major responsibility for this lies with the bureaucratic rulers in Moscow, who in the late fifties denied the Chinese government access to nuclear weapons and cut off economic aid, the initiative in extending the rift to the governmental level was taken by Peking.

Moreover, Mao's ultimatism alienated the powerful support and sympathy among the people of other workers states and the ranks of other Communist parties which China had at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Mao's unwillingness or incapacity to promulgate a united front with Moscow served to encourage the expansion of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and a mounting military danger for China despite the nuclear deterrents which were developed at staggering cost to the Chinese economy.

In place of consistent development

of the world revolution, which could have brought new socialist allies into being and carried the struggle for socialism into the main strongholds of the capitalist system, Mao followed a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie, as in Pakistan.

This helped prepare for the catastrophe in Indonesia, the worst defeat suffered by the world revolution since Stalin permitted Hitler to come to power without a struggle. The development of the cult of Mao, the glorification of Stalin, and opposition to de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union crippled the defense of the Chinese revolution in other lands, reduced Peking's prestige and influence to abysmal levels, and gravely injured the cause of socialism internationally.

The bankruptcy of this foreign policy became glaringly clear when, after deposing Liu Shao-chi as a "lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism and the Kuomintang reactionaries," Mao offered "peaceful coexistence" to the Nixon administration.

The disasters in foreign affairs heightened the stresses and strains created by the sharpened tensions within Chinese society between the different layers of the peasantry as well as between the peasantry and the state, and between the working class, the student youth, the intellectuals and the bureaucracy in the urban centers. These multiple pressures generated deep differences on domestic and foreign policy in the leadership of the party, government and armed forces. The wisdom of Mao's past decisions and his omniscience came under increasing questioning.

The high officials around Liu apparently sought to close ranks against Mao following the disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward. Liu and his close associates took fright at the appalling consequences of this adventure, counseled retreat, and succeeded in switching over to a more prudent economic course. During this readjustment, the Liu grouping took control of the party apparatus and pushed Mao to one side. Their aim, evidently, was to take this erratic pilot away from the helm and reduce his status to that of a figurehead while utilizing his prestige to lend maximum authority to their decisions and course of action. Thus they assiduously protected his public reputation for infallibility, a policy that facilitated a comeback for Mao.

By 1965 Mao felt that he was in position to break Liu's hold upon the regime and regain his lost supremacy. By exploiting his immense prestige, by maneuvering between the diverse tendencies and cutting them down one after another, by slandering Liu and his men through a relentless prop-

aganda campaign, Mao succeeded in isolating them and eroding their bases of support among the masses, in the party, the army and the provinces and completing their downfall.

Because of the fragmentary, contradictory and unconfirmed nature of the information available, it is difficult and hazardous to attempt a precise delineation of either the evolution or content of these disagreements. The available evidence indicates that a number of oppositional tendencies were involved. The Maoist machine has not permitted their spokesmen -- or they have not dared or cared -- to state their positions or platforms publicly, frankly or fully.

The voluminous Maoist polemics, filled with self-contradictions, present obviously falsified accounts and distorted interpretations of the opinions of their opponents and critics. It is, for example, incredible that the head of state Liu Shao-chi, the mayor of Peking Peng Chen and other Political Bureau members such as Teng Hsiao-peng and Tao Chu (the leading Chinese Communists most publicly identified with the Sino-Soviet clashes), the deposed military leaders, the better-known disgraced Communist intellectuals, and other alleged "renegades, enemy agents or counterrevolutionary revisionists" conspired or aspired to bring back capitalism on behalf of "the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries."

Even though the roots, history and specific character of the differences remain obscure and unverified, the consequences of the conflicts they precipitated are clear. The central leading team has been broken up. A period of uncertainty as to the eventual composition and orientation of China's leadership has now opened. Great new forces have been set in motion.

The factional warfare which burst forth in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy passed beyond the confines of the ruling circles in the middle of 1966 after the showdown in the eleventh Central Committee plenum of early August which adopted the 16-point decision on the "cultural revolution." In their maneuvers, they sought support among layers extending far outside the party. A social upheaval was touched off. This unfolded in successive waves, starting with the mustering of the student youth organized from above in the Red Guards, spreading to the industrial workers in the big cities during December 1966-January 1967, stirring up parts of the peasantry, and seeping into the armed forces.

These interlinked commotions drastically upset the equilibrium of the bureaucratic regime. Despite the present victory of Mao's faction, the turbulent

events have weakened its position and power. It will not be able to regain the prestige and stability enjoyed before Mao launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The internecine struggles and the accompanying Maoist propaganda have served to generate new revolutionary energies within the youth and the vanguard elements among the working masses which will not be easily or quickly subdued.

The real situation in China is quite different from the simplistic interpretations offered by various circles. Mao's supporters, and those who take his propaganda at face value, claim that he is promoting an antibureaucratic political revolution against agents of the class enemy, a revolution which aims at and is effectively realizing a wider democracy for the popular masses.

This flies in the face of obvious facts. The authoritarian manner in which the "cultural revolution" was launched, conducted, guided and concluded; the suppression of dissenters, coupled with the conscienceless deformation of the views of the anti-Mao tendencies; the outrageous cult of Mao; the absence of elections and democratic institutions controlled by the workers and peasants; the role of the army under Lin Piao as ultimate authority -- all testify to the antidemocratic characteristics and direction of the political course taken by the Maoist faction, which has dwindled down to a small core of the old leadership.

Likewise in error are those who view Mao's present position as nothing but a replica of Stalin's tyrannical personal dictatorship. While the bureaucratic ruling castes of the USSR and China have much in common, there are profound differences between the historical situation which enabled Stalin to consolidate his power and the international and domestic context in which Mao advanced the slogan of "seizure of power" by the Red Guards. In China today, the mobilizations of the masses under the impetus of the upheaval, limited and episodic as they have been, have altered the relationship of forces between the bureaucracy and the people to the advantage of the latter. The movement of the masses weakened the bureaucratic regime. This outcome differs from Stalin's rise during the late twenties and early thirties when the masses were crushed and beheaded and fell into a state of unrelieved political passivity which did not appreciably change until after Stalin's death.

The triumph of Mao's faction has by no means eradicated the power of the diversified opposition. Resisters of all sorts remain deeply entrenched in the party, the unions, the army, the universities, the regional committees, the provincial governments, the state apparatus, and in the

countryside.

As against this, however, the army, under Lin Piao, Mao's new heir apparent and chief lieutenant, has gained greatly in political weight. By virtue of its interventions in the conflicts between the contending bureaucratic factions and between the masses in motion and the regime, the army -- at the expense of the leading role of the party -- has become the mainstay of Mao's rulership, the chief arbiter and principle centralizing force in the country. This is one of the most dangerous consequences of the "cultural revolution." However much the military high command has been shaken and its leadership divided over the past period, an ominous pattern has been set for the future.

The "cultural revolution" was prepared and launched by Mao and his liegemen to eliminate the most irritating and persistent critics of his domestic and foreign policy, to give a free hand to his pared-down faction in the top leadership, and, by way of concession to the masses, to curb the worst abuses of the bureaucratic overlords he had himself trained, encouraged and shielded. Having been placed in a minority in the Political Bureau, Mao was obliged to take the risk of bypassing the official cadres of the party and state apparatus where his opponents were entrenched, going over their heads, and mobilizing the students of the universities and high schools as the instrument to initiate his coup d'etat against the majority leadership.

Throughout its course, the Red Guard movement was highly contradictory. Unlike the rebellious student movements in the West, it was initiated from the very summit of the state power. It did not have to engage in a "confrontation" with either the police or the armed forces. It operated in collaboration with them or with their blessing. The approbation of the country's living deity helped direct the energies of the Red Guard movement along the course selected for it, so that even in its rebellion against bureaucratic authority it did not transcend the broad limitations set by the supreme bureaucrat.

The tendency of the Red Guards toward conformism could be observed at first hand in the West when the Chinese students studying abroad were recalled (not to be replaced to this day). Some of these unfortunates went to extraordinary lengths to arrive home as bandaged heroes, victims of either the Western police or the Khrushchevist bureaucracy.

The excursions of roaming bands of youth, numbering in the millions, were fostered and financed by the state, either directly or indirectly. Besides facilitating the development of the Red Guard movement in this way, Mao used even

stronger means to force its pace of growth. The schools were shut down by decree, China's entire educational system being dealt a blow of immense proportions, the effects of which will be felt for a long time to come.

The fact that the Red Guard movement was initiated from above and not by the youth themselves greatly facilitated the efforts of other sectors of the bureaucracy to counter Mao's factional action by setting up Red Guard groups under their own auspices. Since all the groups were formed under the guise of carrying out Mao's directives and Mao's "thought," the confusion was immense. Nevertheless many of the groups became differentiated sufficiently in their interpretations of Mao's doctrines to come to blows and worse.

Where civil strife reached proportions bordering on civil war, whether through excesses of the Red Guards or through their incapacity to actually "seize power" for Mao in areas where opposing forces were strongly entrenched, the army moved in. Thus behind the Red Guard movement stood the army as the final authority, sometimes instigating the bands of youth, at other times restraining them or even reversing what they had done.

It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view the Red Guard movement as merely a pliant instrument of factional politics in the domestic strife that featured the "cultural revolution." The Chinese student youth had many grievances comparable to those of youth in other lands today. These included social discrimination in the selection of the student body, inadequate living quarters, lack of campus autonomy, and scant opportunities after graduation. They resented haughty and uncontrolled bureaucratic authority; they wanted greater democracy; they wanted a political revolution to open the road to socialist democracy; they identified their fate with that of the world revolution.

This explains why Mao had such difficulty retaining control of the Red Guard movement and curbing it once it had served the main purposes he envisioned. The Red Guard movement acquired a logic of its own.

Roaming the countryside on their own, engaging in actions of a violent nature against echelons of the bureaucracy, millions of youth gained in self-confidence and boldness. The most unmanageable of these elements passed beyond the specific objectives set for them by their bureaucratic patrons and even collided with them. Their tendency to move in the direction of critical thought and independent political action was observable in many of the wall posters and mimeographed or printed publications put out by the Red Guards and in some of the "seizures of power" in which they engaged. The movement became so dan-

gerous to Mao's objectives that he finally found it advisable to demobilize the Red Guards and send them back to the classrooms or the countryside for labor.

However, ferment persists among them. The most advanced and revolutionary-minded members of this new generation, who received their political baptism in the "cultural revolution," may later detonate further mass actions against the Chinese bureaucracy as a whole, including the Maoist victors.

Of greater significance than the Red Guard demonstrations was their sequel when the proletarian masses were drawn into the expanding struggle from December 1966 through February 1967. Taking advantage of the splits among the contending factions on top and spurred into action by one or another of them, sectors of the work force began to put forward their own economic and social demands and move along independent lines. This action flared into general strikes in transportation and many plants in Shanghai, Nanking, and other industrial centers.

The movement from below, which in its further development would have threatened the control of the Maoist leadership, was stopped short by combined methods of manipulation and repression. The brevity of the massive strikes does not diminish their historic import. They signaled the end of political apathy among the industrial workers and the resumption of their autonomous action.

The Maoist press depicts the "cultural revolution" as a clear-cut class conflict between staunch defenders of socialism and the proletariat under "the wise leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao," and "a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists" and "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture" in order, when conditions are ripe, to "seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."

Actually, an assortment of political currents holding different views and oriented in various directions have emerged from the disintegration of the formally monolithic bureaucracy and the turmoil of the "cultural revolution." Some of the features of these currents are distinguishable despite the concern of all of them to wear the same uniform of "Mao's Thought."

The two principal groupings vying for supremacy in the party, state apparatus and the army centered around Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. On the fringes of these two groupings stand oppositional tendencies of rightist or leftist color-

tion.

Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is striving for socialist democracy or has a program of revolutionary policies at home and abroad. By Marxist standards, neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other.

As long as Liu's group retained supremacy it practiced the abominable customs of bureaucratic command learned in the school of Stalinism. Its doctrines and practices were indistinguishable from those of the previous period when Mao was in direct control. The pent-up hatred among the youth, the workers and peasants enabled Mao to arouse these forces against the bureaucratic majority without much trouble.

While the Mao faction has issued calls for rebellion and appeals to the initiative of the masses, its deeds do not harmonize with its words. Mao's objective was to regain supremacy for his faction and line in the bureaucracy, not overthrow the bureaucracy. This explains why he followed the Stalinist methods of slander, physical violence and the fostering of cultism in his struggle and strictly limited his appeals to the masses. Whenever and wherever any segment of the people, whether among the youth, the proletariat, the peasantry or the intellectuals, has showed signs of slipping away from domination and direction by Mao to act on its own account, it has been restrained and called to order, sometimes by repressive measures.

The promise held out in section 9 of the original 16-point program in the official declaration of the "cultural revolution," adopted by the August 1966 Central Committee plenum, of "a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune," which would usher in an extensive democracy, sounds like a mockery today. Not only have no free general elections been held, but the very idea is now scoffed at. ("Blind faith in elections is also a form of conservative thinking.")

Instead of instituting an expanded workers democracy on the model of the Paris Commune, Mao has reorganized the bureaucratic regime under the auspices of "the triple alliance," regulated by the army and presided over by that part of the cadres loyal to his faction. The "revolutionary committees" set up during the "cultural revolution" have not been elected by the working masses themselves and kept under their surveillance by measures of democratic control but have been consti-

tuted of individuals handpicked by the authorities.

There have been reports of elements on the left flanks of the contending top factions, both among Mao's followers and among the workers and intellectuals sympathetic to Liu and other disgraced leaders, who have revolutionary ideas and inclinations and who could form the nuclei of a genuinely antibureaucratic opposition. These revolutionists deserve international support. However, under current conditions, it is extremely difficult for such dispersed left Communists to come together, to communicate with one another, to work out a common program, select leaders, and undertake a consistent line of organized activity.

The most ironic aspect of the vaunted Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the damage it has inflicted upon the cultural life of China. The witch-hunt and persecution of intellectuals, the stifling of discussion and the bridling of free inquiry; the closing down of the universities and high schools for almost two years; the demand that all fields of creative and artistic endeavor submit to the arbitrary specifications laid down by state and party authorities; the universal chanting of obligatory phrases to Mao Tse-tung in the style of a primitive religion creates an atmosphere completely inimical to the development of a humanistic culture permeated with the ideals and critical thought of socialist liberation. Cultural creativity and activity must wither under conformism and regimentation of thought where the expression of dissenting views on all issues of concern to the nation are tabooed and penalized.

The grotesque cult of Mao, who has been elevated like Stalin before him to the height of a semicelestial being with powers bordering on the supernatural, is utterly antipathetic to the critical spirit of Marxism and the development of a socialist culture. Some 3.4 billion sets of Chairman Mao's writings and reproductions of his portrait have been issued during the "cultural revolution" and his name is invoked about five million times a day on the air. Ludicrous and repulsive as this is after the lessons of the adulation accorded to Stalin, the deification of Mao serves a practical political function. The reverence for Mao among the masses, serving as an opiate of the people, is an indispensable source of stability for the Chinese bureaucracy. His disappearance from the scene will precipitate a problem of succession more perilous for the present regime than was the death of Stalin for the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Maoists accuse their adversaries of "revisionism." But the very arguments they invoke to justify their current course show that they are even more guilty

than their opponents of blatantly revising a number of the basic tenets of Marxism.

(1) In countries that have overthrown the bourgeoisie and abolished private ownership of the means of production, they assert that capitalism can be restored by gradual and peaceful processes through machinations and false policies of one or another tendency in the leadership of the Communist parties. This discards or disregards the Marxist theory of the state which asserts that such fundamental changes cannot be accomplished either gradually or peacefully.

(2) They identify the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution with capitalist restoration. In doing this, the Maoists lapse into an extreme voluntarism, enormously exaggerating the social weight of ideology. Mao locates the chief cause of the danger of bureaucratic degeneration and capitalist restoration, not in the material foundations of the socio-economic order, but in the realm of ideology. He proclaims that if revisionism is not rooted out on the theoretical, scientific, artistic and literary levels, it will inevitably lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marxists have never believed that the ideas of those reactionary classes which have lost economic and political power as the result of a social revolution are capable of gradually changing the class nature and structure of the state. A colossal counterrevolution of this kind could occur only through a civil war between the former possessing classes and the toiling masses in which the masses were crushed; or through the hypothetical generation of a new bourgeoisie which became strong enough economically to launch a civil war and topple the workers state. This has not happened, and it is far from happening, not only in China but in other workers states whose leaderships are at odds with Peking, whatever the incipient tendencies may be in these countries in the direction of capitalism.

(3) No less voluntaristic is the Maoist belief that incessant appeals to the spirit of sacrifice, the idealism and enthusiasm of the toiling masses can in and of themselves suffice to surmount the immensely difficult problems arising from the inadequate development of the productive forces in China during the transition from capitalism to socialism.

(4) In defiance of the historical lessons drawn by Lenin in State and Revolution, the Maoists proclaim that in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the class struggle is bound to intensify and not diminish, and can even go on for hundreds of years. This "theory" serves to justify intensifications of the role of the state as a repressive instru-

ment. The state, instead of withering away under socialism as Engels forecast, will endure for an indefinite period, if Mao is correct. Thus a "theoretical" excuse is provided for the worst bureaucratic excesses and abuses of power.

(5) The strategy of world revolution expounded by Mao and Lin Piao extols the insurrectionary movements of the peasantry in the backward colonial areas and systematically underrates or dismisses the key role which the industrial working class in the advanced countries must play in overthrowing the power of imperialism and helping to create the new socialist society.

The "cultural revolution" has given widespread currency to the idea that a workers state can become subjected to deformation and degeneration after the conquest of power, an idea that was previously propagated only by the world Trotskyist movement. Coming after the antibureaucratic campaigns in Yugoslavia and Cuba, the Maoist propaganda on this point, distorted though it is, has focused attention upon one of the most crucial problems confronting a victorious socialist revolution: how to protect and promote workers democracy.

The need for a political revolution where state power has been usurped by a bureaucracy and all avenues of democratic control have been closed to the masses has been made clearer and more understandable to broad sections of the international Communist movement and the revolutionary vanguard. This lesson has been reinforced by the abrupt and brutal halting of the drive toward democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet occupation.

If the "cultural revolution" has helped popularize and win acceptance of the notion of political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states, its course and outcome under the tutelage of Mao Tse-tung demonstrates that the methods pursued by his faction lead to the opposite result. It is impossible to eradicate bureaucracy by bureaucratic means. The "cultural revolution" has ended in the constriction of democracy and the fortification of the positions of one faction of the bureaucracy against its rivals rather than the expansion and deepening of decision-making powers by the masses.

There is no other road for effective struggle against the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution and the authoritarian regimes it spawns than the program outlined by Lenin and Trotsky; that is, the consolidation and institutionalization of workers power on the basis of democratically elected councils, the widest proletarian democracy, the right of various socialist tendencies and parties to exist legally within that constitutional frame-



work, the limitation and progressive abolition of inequality in remuneration, the management of the economy by the workers themselves, the planned development of the productive forces, and the international extension of the revolution, above all, to the centers of imperialism.

\* \* \*

The position of the Fourth International on the Chinese revolution, which has been set forth in numerous documents and declarations in recent years, can be summarized as follows:

The Fourth International has been a firm supporter of the socialist revolution in China from its beginning. Its partisans within China and throughout the world stand for the unconditional defense of the People's Republic of China against military attack by U.S. imperialism or any of its vassal states.

The Fourth International holds the Kremlin leadership primarily responsible for the Sino-Soviet split, condemns its vengeful withdrawal of economic aid from China, and its continued diplomatic deals with Washington, Paris, New Delhi and other bourgeois governments against the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, the Fourth International criticizes the ultrasectarian attitude and bitter-end factionalism exhibited by Peking in its relations with other workers states that do not fully endorse its policies. Especially harmful has been its stubborn refusal to propose or participate in joint action with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries against U.S. intervention in Vietnam because of political disagreements with them.

While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the opportunism of the Chinese Communist leadership. In seeking to gain influence in the colonial world, Peking uses a language that is strongly anti-imperialist. It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces as well as countries like Tanzania, thus helping to create an image far to the left of Moscow. Nevertheless, Peking's basic policy, as reiterated many times by its leaders and voiced once again upon the inauguration of the Nixon administration, has been "peaceful coexistence" with U.S. imperialism. Out of narrow nationalistic considerations and in line with its doctrine that the revolution must first pass through a bourgeois stage before it can

reach the socialist stage, Peking counsels and countenances support to bourgeois governments in Indonesia, Pakistan and other countries instead of mobilizing the masses for uncompromising struggle against the neocolonial regimes.

The conduct of the Chinese Communist party leadership since it came to power proves that it has not shaken off its Stalinist heritage. These nationalistic-minded bureaucrats do not hesitate to subordinate the welfare of the Chinese masses and the interests of the international revolution and socialism to the protection and promotion of their own power and privileges.

The same features mark the policies and behavior of the Maoist groups that have appeared in numerous countries since the Sino-Soviet split. They mix adventurism with opportunism. They have shown themselves incapable of critical or independent thought along Marxist lines. As a result, most of them display little internal cohesion and tend generally to splinter into warring fragments.

In a few areas newly radicalized youth have mistaken the verbal militancy and activism of the Maoist groups as representing Marxist-Leninism in contrast to the cowardly reformism of the Social Democrats and the opportunism of Moscow and its followers. With experience this initial impression soon fades in most instances. Almost ten years after the Sino-Soviet dispute began, the Maoists have still proved incapable of creating a sizeable youth movement in any country outside of China or providing substantial or lasting programmatic inspiration to the leaderships of the new generation of rebel youth advancing into the political arena on an international scale.

The experience of the "cultural revolution" offers fresh evidence that the crystallized bureaucratic caste headed by Mao cannot be reformed. It will have to be removed from power by the new vanguard of genuine revolutionaries now in the process of formation in China who will come to the head of the aroused and organized masses in the subsequent development of an authentic antibureaucratic revolution. Such a resurgent independent movement will break the grip of the bureaucracy over China's economic, political and cultural life and really expand and consolidate the workers democracy which the "cultural revolution" promised in its propaganda but lamentably failed to deliver.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

[Adopted by majority of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International for consideration at the next world congress.]

The "cultural revolution" constitutes a momentous dividing line in the political evolution of the People's Republic of China. It marks the irreparable shattering of the nucleus of veteran Communists clustered around Mao, which led the Chinese Communist party in the civil war, founded the republic, and overturned capitalist rule, and which, since the victory over Chiang Kai-shek, has run the economy, governed the country, and directed the state and party apparatus. The "cultural revolution" tore this nucleus into contending fragments that cannot be put together.

Initiated in September 1965 by the Maoist faction in the Chinese Communist party leadership, it reached its major objective with the expulsion of Liu Shao-chi from the party at the October 13-31, 1968 "enlarged" twelfth plenum of the Central Committee. Liu, the chief of state, Mao's first lieutenant and main interpreter for several decades, his designated heir until the factional struggle broke into the open, was singled out as the central target of attack under such epithets as "the Khrushchev of China," the "first person in a position of authority who has taken the capitalist road," and, finally, as the "enlarged" twelfth plenum put it, "the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi."

Mao has defined the internal struggle which has convulsed China as "in essence a great political revolution under the conditions of socialism made by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie." (Peking Review, No. 43, Oct. 25, 1968.)

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The "cultural revolution" represented a phase of sharp public conflict in an interbureaucratic struggle between divergent tendencies in the topmost circles of the Chinese Communist party leadership

which eventually affected every sector of Chinese society. It constituted the greatest single crisis experienced by the bureaucratic regime since its establishment and expresses an important weakening of that bureaucratic regime, both as the result of its inner contradictions and of a widespread mobilization of the masses.

The sharpness of the innerbureaucratic struggle in China, and the large-scale intervention of the masses in that struggle, can only be understood against the background of objective contradictions and problems which accumulated, since the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, a growing trend of conflicts in Chinese society and a growing discontent among the Chinese masses.

The Chinese People's Republic has registered major accomplishments and made remarkable advances in many fields since the military victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, especially when measured against the relative stagnation of such colonial countries as India, Indonesia and Brazil where capitalism has not been overthrown. However, the colossal problems of economic, social, political and cultural development confronting so backward a country as China, with its huge population, were far from having been solved, and the authoritarian methods practiced by the Maoist leadership have in addition seriously hampered the working out of such solutions.

The main contradictions which the People's Republic of China had to face during the last decade were the following ones:

- (a) The contradiction between the rate of growth of the economy, which was still too low, and the rate of growth of the population, which threatened to bring to a near standstill the annual rate of growth per capita real consumption.
- (b) The contradiction between the objective necessity to socialize the surplus product of agriculture, for purposes of accelerated economic and industrial development, and the political need to achieve this socialization with the approval of the majority of the peasantry.
- (c) The contradiction between the objective necessity to interest materially the bulk of the poor and middle peasantry in increasing agricultural production, and the inevitable tendency to increased inequality and private accumulation which results from these "material incentives."
- (d) The contradiction between the

general low level of consumption of the mass of the people and the increasing bureaucratic privileges appropriated by the ruling strata in the fifties, and even the early sixties, under conditions of great hardship for the mass of the population.

(e) The contradiction between the objective needs for accelerated industrialization created by the Kremlin's sudden and brutal economic blockade of China.

(f) The contradiction between the rapid expansion of literacy and the increase in general level of education of the Chinese youth at the one hand, and the still relatively low number of skilled jobs available in China.

All these contradictions have been intensified by the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the second phase of the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period. They created an explosive situation in the country, in which a process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses became possible. In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured. The "cultural revolution" constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy.

Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership. Others were greatly sharpened by the autocratic and paternalistic nature of that leadership. All were heavily increased by the sudden isolation into which the People's Republic of China was precipitated in the late fifties, by the Kremlin's sudden suppression of all economic and military assistance to China.

This criminal act by the Soviet bureaucracy, extending to state level the factional struggle between that bureaucracy and the Chinese CP inside the world Communist movement, was a stab in the back of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people, at the very moment when they were confronted with near-famine at home and increased aggressive pressure from U.S. imperialism abroad. It lies at the door of the Kremlin the historic responsibility for breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the advantages which imperialism could draw from this breakup.

The leadership of the Chinese CP, educated in the Stalinist school, has always accepted the theory of "building socialism in one country." However, in the fifties, the importance of the help

which the other workers states could give to the economic growth and the military defense of the P.R. of China, made the dangerous implications of that theory inside China less important than in the USSR in the late twenties and the thirties (its international implications detrimental to world revolution continued to manifest themselves even then). The reversal of the Maoist leadership to a policy of "self-reliance" and large-scale economic autarchy and self-sufficiency is only a rationalization of the consequences of the Kremlin's blockade and the tremendous burden imposed on China by the need to develop its own nuclear weapons, given the refusal of the Soviet bureaucracy to assist it on this field.

The more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, on several important questions, brought it nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism (an analysis confirmed in 1968 by Peking's attitude, in contrast to the Kremlin's towards the May revolution in France, the prerevolutionary struggles in India, the Mexican students' struggles and the rising political revolution in the CSSR leading to the Warsaw Pact countries' occupation of Czechoslovakia), reflects both the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy towards the P.R. of China, and the objective impact of the rising tide of world revolution on the Chinese masses.

It is however also true that the bureaucratic character of the Mao faction has added to the international isolation of the P.R. of China and increased the contradictions and political conflicts inside the CP of China.

Although Peking maintained its resolution to defend the USSR against imperialism and the Kremlin failed to reiterate similar assurances to the P.R. of China, Mao failed to promote a consistent policy of anti-imperialist united front in Vietnam, thereby harming the defense of the Vietnamese revolution and the political influence of the CP of China in the world Communist movement.

In place of consistent development of the world revolution, which could have brought new socialist allies into being and carried the struggle for socialism into the main strongholds of the capitalist system, Mao followed in several countries a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie, as in Pakistan.

This helped prepare for the catastrophe in Indonesia, the worst defeat suffered by the world revolution since Stalin permitted Hitler to come to power without a struggle. The development of the cult of Mao, the glorification of Stalin, and

opposition to de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union crippled the defense of the Chinese revolution in other lands, reduced Peking's prestige and influence, and gravely injured the cause of socialism internationally.

It can even not be excluded that a change of line of U.S. imperialism towards China would lead to a significant modification of revolutionary militancy advised by the Chinese leadership to its followers abroad -- a normalization of relations at state level with the USA being in itself of course not reprehensible.

The setbacks in foreign affairs heightened the stresses and strains created by the sharpened tensions within Chinese society between the different layers of the peasantry as well as between the peasantry and the state, and between the working class, the student youth, the intellectuals and the bureaucracy in the urban centers. These multiple pressures generated deep differences on domestic and foreign policy in the leadership of the party, government and armed forces. The wisdom of Mao's past decisions and his omniscience came under increasing questioning.

Because of the fragmentary, contradictory and unconfirmed nature of the information available, it is difficult and hazardous to attempt a precise delineation of either the evolution or content of the disagreements inside the leadership of the CP of China. The available evidence indicates that a number of oppositional tendencies were involved. The Maoist machine has not permitted their spokesmen -- or they have not dared or cared -- to state their positions or platforms publicly, frankly or fully.

The voluminous Maoist polemics, filled with self-contradictions, present obviously falsified accounts and distorted interpretations of the opinions of their opponents and critics. It is, for example, incredible that the head of state Liu Shao-chi, the mayor of Peking Peng Chen and other Political Bureau members such as Teng Hsiao-peng and Tao Chu (the leading Chinese Communists most publicly identified with the Sino-Soviet clashes), the deposed military leaders, the better-known disgraced Communist intellectuals, and other alleged "renegades, enemy agents or counterrevolutionary revisionists" conspired or aspired to bring back capitalism on behalf of "the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries."

Even though the roots, history and specific character of the differences remain obscure and unverified, the consequences of the conflicts they precipitated are clear. The central leading team has been broken up. A period of uncertainty as to the eventual composition and orien-

tation of China's leadership has now opened. Great new forces have been set in motion.

The high officials around Liu apparently sought to close ranks against Mao following the disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward. Liu and his close associates took fright at the appalling consequences of this adventure, counseled retreat, and succeeded in switching over to a more prudent economic course. During this readjustment, the Liu grouping took control of the party apparatus and pushed Mao to one side. Their aim, evidently, was to take him away from the helm and reduce his status to that of a figure-head while utilizing his prestige to lend maximum authority to their decisions and course of action. Thus they assiduously protected his public reputation for infallibility, a policy that facilitated a comeback for Mao.

By 1965 Mao felt that he was in position to break Liu's hold upon the regime and regain his lost supremacy. By exploiting his immense prestige, by maneuvering between the diverse tendencies and cutting them down one after another, by slandering Liu and his men through a relentless propaganda campaign, Mao succeeded in isolating them and eroding their bases of support among the masses, in the party, the army and the provinces and completing their downfall.

The objective basis of this success lies in Mao's capacity to mobilize larger masses, especially of the youth, and to exploit the hatred which had been accumulated in the people against the bureaucracy as a whole. The Liu faction was paralyzed by sticking to the bureaucratic rules and by its inability to question the Mao myth, which it had itself largely contributed to create.

The factional warfare which burst forth in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy passed beyond the confines of the ruling circles in the middle of 1966 after the showdown in the eleventh Central Committee plenum of early August which adopted the 16-point decision on the "cultural revolution." In their maneuvers, they sought support among layers extending far outside the party. A social upheaval was touched off. This unfolded in successive waves, starting with the mustering of the student youth organized from above in the Red Guards, spreading to the industrial workers in the big cities during December 1966-January 1967, stirring up parts of the peasantry, and seeping into the armed forces.

These interlinked commotions drastically upset the equilibrium of the bureaucratic regime. Despite the present victory of Mao's faction, the turbulent events have weakened its position and

power. It will not be able to regain the prestige and stability enjoyed before Mao launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The internecine struggles and the accompanying Maoist propaganda have served to generate new revolutionary energies within the youth and the vanguard elements among the working masses which will not be easily or quickly subdued.

The real situation in China is quite different from the simplistic interpretations offered by various circles. Mao's supporters, and those who take his propaganda at face value, claim that he is promoting an antibureaucratic political revolution against agents of the class enemy, a revolution which aims at and is effectively realizing a wider democracy for the popular masses.

This flies in the face of obvious facts. The authoritarian manner in which the "cultural revolution" was launched, conducted, guided and concluded; the suppression of dissenters, coupled with the conscienceless deformation of the views of the anti-Mao tendencies; the outrageous cult of Mao; the absence of elections and democratic institutions controlled by the workers and peasants; the increased authority of the army under Lin Piao -- all testify to the bureaucratic characteristics and direction of the political course taken by the Maoist faction, which has dwindled down to a small core of the old leadership.

Likewise in error are those who view Mao's present position as nothing but a replica of Stalin's tyrannical personal dictatorship. While the bureaucratic ruling castes of the USSR and China have much in common, there are profound differences between the historical situation which enabled Stalin to consolidate his power and the international and domestic context in which Mao advanced the slogan of "seizure of power" by the Red Guards. In China today, the mobilizations of the masses under the impetus of the upheaval, limited as they have been, have altered the relationship of forces between the bureaucracy and the people to the advantage of the latter. The movement of the masses weakened the bureaucratic regime. This outcome differs from Stalin's rise during the late twenties and early thirties when the masses were crushed and beheaded and fell into a state of unrelieved political passivity which did not appreciably change until after Stalin's death.

The triumph of Mao's faction has by no means eradicated the power of the diversified opposition. Resisters of all sorts remain deeply entrenched in the party, the unions, the army, the universities, the regional committees, the provincial governments, the state apparatus, and in the countryside.

As against this, however, the army, under Lin Piao, Mao's new heir apparent and chief lieutenant, has gained greatly in political weight. By virtue of its interventions in the conflicts between the contending bureaucratic factions and between the masses in motion and the regime, the army -- at the expense of the leading role of the party -- has become the mainstay of Mao's rulership, the chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country. This is one of the most dangerous consequences of the "cultural revolution." However, Mao tends to reduce again this great weight gained by the army during the previous period, by putting the emphasis on the reconstruction of the party as the mainstay of the regime and the necessity of a single central leadership for all power apparatuses.

The "cultural revolution" was prepared and launched by Mao and his liegemen to eliminate the most irritating and persistent critics of his domestic and foreign policy, to give a free hand to his pared-down faction in the top leadership, and, by way of concession to the masses, to curb the worst abuses of the bureaucratic overlords he had himself trained, encouraged and shielded. Having been placed in a minority in the Political Bureau, Mao took the risk of bypassing the official cadres of the party and state apparatus where his opponents were entrenched, going over their heads, and mobilizing the students of the universities and high schools as the instrument to re-establish his control over the country.

Throughout its course, the Red Guard movement was highly contradictory. Unlike the rebellious student movements in the West, it was initiated from the very summit of state power. It did not have to engage in a "confrontation" with either the police or the armed forces except in its initial stage.

The fact that the Red Guard movement was initiated from above and not by the youth themselves greatly facilitated the efforts of other sectors of the bureaucracy to counter Mao's factional action by setting up Red Guard groups under their own auspices. Since all the groups were formed under the guise of carrying out Mao's directives and Mao's "thought," it was difficult for broader masses to understand their political differences. Nevertheless many of the groups became differentiated sufficiently in their interpretations of Mao's doctrines to come to blows and worse.

Where civil strife reached proportions bordering on civil war, whether through differences among the Red Guards or through their incapacity to actually "seize power" for Mao in areas where opposing forces were strongly entrenched,

the army moved in. Thus behind the Red Guard movement stood the army as the final authority, sometimes manipulating the bands of youth, at other times restraining them or even reversing what they had done.

It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view the Red Guard movement as merely a pliant instrument of factional politics in the domestic strife that featured the "cultural revolution." The Chinese student youth had many grievances comparable to those of youth in other lands today. These included social discrimination in the selection of the student body, inadequate living quarters, lack of campus autonomy, and scant opportunities after graduation. They resented haughty and uncontrolled bureaucratic authority; they wanted greater democracy; they wanted a political revolution to open the road to socialist democracy; they identified their fate with that of the world revolution.

This explains why Mao had such difficulty retaining control of the Red Guard movement and curbing it once it had served the main purposes he envisioned. The Red Guard movement acquired a logic of its own.

Roaming the countryside on their own, engaging in actions of a violent nature against echelons of the bureaucracy, millions of youth gained in self-confidence and boldness. The most unmanageable of these elements passed beyond the specific objectives set for them by their bureaucratic patrons and even collided with them. Their tendency to move in the direction of critical thought and independent political action was observable in many of the wall posters and mimeographed or printed publications put out by the Red Guards and in some of the "seizures of power" in which they engaged. The movement became so dangerous to Mao's objectives that he finally found it advisable to demobilize the Red Guards and send them back to the classrooms or the countryside for labor.

However, ferment persists among them. The most advanced and revolutionary-minded members of this new generation, who received their political baptism in the "cultural revolution," may later detonate further mass actions against the Chinese bureaucracy as a whole, including the Maoist victors.

Of greater significance than the Red Guard demonstrations was their sequel when the proletarian masses were drawn into the expanding struggle from December 1966 through February 1967. Taking advantage of the splits among the contending factions on top and spurred into action by one or another of them, sectors of the work force began to put forward their own economic and social demands and move along independent lines. This action flared into general strikes in transportation and many plants in Shanghai, Nanking, and

other industrial centers.

The movement from below, which in its further development would have threatened the control of the Maoist leadership, was stopped short by Maoist methods of manipulation and repression. The brevity of the massive strikes does not diminish their historic import. They signaled the end of political apathy among the industrial workers and the resumption of their autonomous action.

The two principal groupings vying for supremacy in the party, state apparatus and the army centered around Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. On the fringes of these two groupings stand oppositional tendencies of rightist or leftist coloration.

Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is actually striving for socialist democracy or has a program of genuine revolutionary policies at home and abroad. By Marxist standards, neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other.

As long as Liu's group retained supremacy it practiced the abominable customs of bureaucratic command learned in the school of Stalinism. Its doctrines and practices were indistinguishable from those of the previous period when Mao was in direct control. The pent-up hatred among the youth, the workers and peasants enabled Mao to arouse these forces against the bureaucratic majority without much trouble.

While the Mao faction has issued calls for rebellion and appeals to the initiative of the masses, its deeds do not harmonize with its words. Mao's objective was to regain supremacy for his faction and line in the bureaucracy, not overthrow the bureaucracy. This explains why he followed the Stalinist methods of slander, physical violence and the fostering of cultism in his struggle and strictly limited his appeals to the masses. Whenever and wherever any segment of the people, whether among the youth, the proletariat, the peasantry or the intellectuals, has showed signs of slipping away from domination and direction by Mao to act on its own account, it has been restrained and called to order, sometimes by repressive measures.

The promise held out in section 9 of the original 16-point program in the official declaration of the "cultural revolution," adopted by the August 1966 Central Committee plenum, of "a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Com-

mune," which would usher in an extensive democracy, sounds like a mockery today. Not only have no such elections been held but the very idea is now scoffed at. ("Blind faith in elections is also a form of conservative thinking.")

Instead of instituting an expanded workers democracy on the model of the Paris Commune, Mao has reorganized the bureaucratic regime under the auspices of "the triple alliance," regulated by the army and presided over by that part of the cadres loyal to his faction. The "revolutionary committees" set up during the "cultural revolution" have not been elected by the working masses themselves and kept under their surveillance by measures of democratic control but have been constituted by compromise between contending factions under the supervision of the Mao-Lin Piao hard core.

There have been reports of elements on the left flanks of the contending top factions, both among Mao's followers and among the workers and intellectuals sympathetic to Liu and other disgraced leaders, who have revolutionary ideas and inclinations and who could form the nuclei of a genuinely antibureaucratic opposition. These revolutionists deserve international support. However, under current conditions, it is extremely difficult for such dispersed left Communists to come together, to communicate with one another, to work out a common program, select leaders, and undertake a consistent line of organized activity.

The Maoists accuse their adversaries of "revisionism." But the very arguments they invoke to justify their current course show that they are as guilty as their opponents of blatantly revising a number of the basic tenets of Marxism.

(1) In countries that have overthrown the bourgeoisie and abolished private ownership of the means of production, they assert that capitalism can be restored by gradual and peaceful processes through machinations and false policies of one or another tendency in the leadership of the Communist parties. This discards or disregards the Marxist theory of the state which asserts that such fundamental changes cannot be accomplished either gradually or peacefully.

(2) They identify the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution with capitalist restoration. In doing this, the Maoists lapse into an extreme voluntarism, enormously exaggerating the social weight of ideology. Mao locates the chief cause of the danger of bureaucratic degeneration and capitalist restoration, not in the material foundations of the socio-economic order, but in the realm of ideology. He proclaims that if revisionism is not rooted out on the theoretical, scientific,

artistic and literary levels, it will inevitably lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marxists have never believed that the ideas of those reactionary classes which have lost economic and political power as the result of a social revolution are capable of gradually changing the class nature and structure of the state. A colossal counterrevolution of this kind could occur only through a civil war between the former possessing classes and the toiling masses in which the masses were crushed; or through the hypothetical generation of a new bourgeoisie which became strong enough economically to launch a civil war and topple the workers state. This has not happened, and it is far from happening, not only in China but in other workers states whose leaderships are at odds with Peking, whatever the incipient tendencies may be in these countries in the direction of capitalism.

(3) No less voluntaristic is the Maoist belief that incessant appeals to the spirit of sacrifice, the idealism and enthusiasm of the toiling masses can in and of themselves suffice to surmount the immensely difficult problems arising from the inadequate development of the productive forces in China during the transition from capitalism to socialism.

(4) In defiance of the historical lessons drawn by Lenin in State and Revolution, the Maoists proclaim that in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the class struggle is bound to intensify and not diminish, and can even go on for hundreds of years. This "theory" serves to justify intensifications of the role of the state as a repressive instrument. The state, instead of withering away under socialism as Engels forecast, will endure for an indefinite period, if Mao is correct. Thus a "theoretical" excuse is provided for the worst bureaucratic excesses and abuses of power.

(5) The strategy of world revolution expounded by Mao and Lin Piao extols the insurrectionary movements of the peasantry in the backward colonial areas and systematically underrates or dismisses the key role which the industrial working class in the advanced countries must play in overthrowing the power of imperialism and helping to create the new socialist society.

The "cultural revolution" has given widespread currency to the idea that a workers state can become subjected to deformation and degeneration after the conquest of power, an idea that was previously propagated only by the world Trotskyist movement. Coming after the antibureaucratic campaigns in Yugoslavia and Cuba, the Maoist propaganda on this point, distorted though it is, has focused atten-

tion upon one of the most crucial problems confronting a victorious socialist revolution: how to protect and promote workers democracy.

The need for a political revolution where state power has been usurped by a bureaucracy and all avenues of democratic control have been closed to the masses has been made clearer and more understandable to broad sections of the international Communist movement and the revolutionary vanguard. This lesson has been reinforced by the abrupt and brutal halting of the drive toward democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet occupation.

If the "cultural revolution" has helped popularize and win acceptance of the notion of political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states, its course and outcome under the tutelage of Mao Tse-tung demonstrates that the methods pursued by his faction lead to the opposite result. It is impossible to eradicate bureaucracy by bureaucratic means. The "cultural revolution" has ended in an attempt to stop the mass movement and to restore a new form of bureaucratic rule, under the guise of the "triple alliance," instead of the rule of the old party and state bureaucracy which had, in its majority, supported Liu. This "triple alliance" is in reality a compromise between the Maoist faction and parts of the old majority faction, compromise initiated when the masses started to intervene autonomously into the struggle and thereby threatened the whole bureaucratic rule.

There is no other road for effective struggle against the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution and the authoritarian regimes it spawns than the program outlined by Lenin and Trotsky; that is, the consolidation and institutionalization of workers power on the basis of democratically elected councils, the widest proletarian democracy, the right of various socialist tendencies and parties to exist legally within that constitutional framework, the limitation and progressive abolition of inequality in remuneration, the management of the economy by the workers themselves, the planned development of the productive forces, and the international extension of the revolution, above all, to the centers of imperialism.

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The position of the Fourth International on the Chinese revolution, which has been set forth in numerous documents and declarations in recent years, can be summarized as follows:

The Fourth International has been a firm supporter of the socialist revolution in China from its beginning. Its partisans within China and throughout the world stand for the unconditional defense of the

People's Republic of China against military attack by U.S. imperialism or any of its vassal states.

The Fourth International holds the Kremlin leadership primarily responsible for the Sino-Soviet split, condemns its vengeful withdrawal of economic aid from China, and its continued diplomatic deals with Washington, Paris, New Delhi and other bourgeois governments against the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, the Fourth International criticizes the ultrasectarian attitude and bitter-end factionalism exhibited by Peking in its relations with other workers states that do not fully endorse its policies. Especially harmful has been its stubborn refusal to propose or participate in joint action with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries against U.S. intervention in Vietnam because of political disagreements with them, although some practical agreements on military assistance to Vietnam were finally concluded.

While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often advocates a more militant line to its followers abroad than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the bureaucratic centrism of the Chinese Communist leadership. In seeking to gain influence in the colonial world, Peking uses a language that is strongly anti-imperialist. It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces. This has not only created an image far to the left of Moscow but also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa. Likewise, the sharp campaign which Peking unleashed against the right-wing opportunist line of the CP's following Moscow's lead, and against some key features of the bureaucratic rule in Eastern Europe, has objectively contributed to deepen the world crisis of Stalinism and to facilitate the upsurge of a new youth vanguard the world over. Inside that youth vanguard the general sympathy for China and Maoist criticism of the Kremlin's revisionism remains deep, even if extreme organizational sectarianism and political infantilism have prevented the orthodox Maoists from stabilizing important youth organizations anywhere.

On the other hand, Peking's basic policy has continued to imply support to whatever bourgeois government in a semi-colonial country happens to diplomatically collaborate with China (yesterday Indonesia, today Pakistan and Tanzania), which leads to disastrous results for the revolutionary class struggle in these countries.

The conduct of the Chinese Communist party leadership since it came to power



proves that it has not shaken off its Stalinist heritage. These bureaucrats do not hesitate to subordinate the welfare of the Chinese masses and the interests of the international revolution and socialism to the protection and promotion of their own power and privileges.

The same features mark the policies and behavior of the Maoist groups that have appeared in numerous countries since the Sino-Soviet split. They mix adventurism with opportunism. They have shown themselves incapable of critical or independent thought along Marxist lines. As a result, most of them display little internal cohesion and tend generally to

splinter into warring fragments.

The experience of the "cultural revolution" offers fresh evidence that also in China, the bureaucracy cannot be removed by reforms. It will have to be removed from power by the new vanguard of genuine revolutionaries now in the process of formation in China who will come to the head of the aroused and organized masses in the subsequent development of an authentic antibureaucratic revolution. Such a resurgent independent movement will break the grip of the bureaucracy over China's economic, political and cultural life and really expand and consolidate the workers democracy which the "cultural revolution" promised in its propaganda but lamentably failed to deliver.

RETURN TO THE ROAD OF TROTSKYISM

By Peng Shu-tse

I.

Guerrilla Warfare and the Transitional Program -- Castroism or Trotskyism

In February 1968, at a meeting of the IEC, the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare in Latin America were formally proposed for discussion in preparation for a World Congress resolution. At this meeting I made a sharp criticism of guerrilla warfare as a revolutionary strategy for the backward countries and pointed out that such a strategy was in direct contradiction to the Transitional Program of the Fourth International. Nevertheless, I was in a minority of one at this meeting.

Since the above mentioned IEC meeting, the proguerrilla-war tendency has become even stronger and more resolute. Guerrilla warfare is no longer confined just to Latin America, but is now projected for many countries of Asia, the Middle East and Africa as is evident from the draft resolution, "The New Rise of the World Revolution." The section of this resolution entitled "Problems of the Resurgent Colonial Revolution" outlines the general perspective of guerrilla warfare for such countries as Laos, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia, as well as numerous countries in both the Middle East and Africa. Nor are Greece and Spain, two European countries, excluded from this same perspective. In other words, this resolution clearly projects guerrilla warfare as the revolutionary strategy for almost all the backward -- and even some semibackward -- countries, hence, the Transitional Program for these backward countries has either been discarded or completely forgotten.

Neither in the many articles appearing in our international press advocating and supporting guerrilla warfare (by comrades Maitan, Moscoso, etc.) nor in the draft resolution mentioned above has the Transitional Program been openly and frankly declared to be no longer of any use. At the same time, however, one cannot find any mention of the Transitional Program for the backward countries. That is to say, the comrades have consciously or unconsciously discarded the Transitional Program and have replaced it with the strategy of guerrilla warfare. Even the resolution, "The New Rise of the World Revolution," never calls attention to the decisive significance of the Transitional Program for the backward countries. The Transitional Program is only referred to once. In relation to certain shortcomings of the Cuban line, the resolution says that "still lacking is a revolutionary Marxist appreciation of the need for a transitional program for the city masses...." (P. 29) That the author limited the transitional

program to "the city masses" proves that he either does not understand the decisive significance of the Transitional Program for the backward countries or has forgotten it. The Transitional Program is not limited to just the city masses. "The central task of the colonial and semi-colonial countries is the agrarian revolution, i.e., liquidation of feudal heritages, and national independence, i.e., the overthrow of the imperialist yoke." (The Transitional Program.)

The above poses a very fundamental question for the comrades of the Fourth International: Should we continue to carry out the traditional and fundamental programmatic line of the International -- the Transitional Program -- or should we adapt the new strategy of guerrilla warfare?

To answer the above question we should first define the nature of guerrilla warfare. As is evident, the present "theory" of guerrilla warfare is taken from the Cuban experience. Comrade Moscoso, the leader of the Bolivian section, wrote, "In the prevailing conditions in Latin America, the results achieved by the guerrillas in Cuba can be realized in any country. Therefore, I say that guerrilla warfare is incontrovertibly the road which revolutionaries must take to liberate their peoples from capitalist and imperialist exploitation." ("Lessons of the Cuban Revolution" by Hugo González Moscoso, International Socialist Review, March-April 1968, p. 11.) The ideas of Comrade Moscoso are a direct reflection of the ideas contained in the OIAS General Declaration. (See International Socialist Review, November-December 1967.)

What then is the Cuban experience? As everybody knows, Castro and several others, after having trained as guerrillas in Mexico, stole surreptitiously to Cuba and launched a guerrilla struggle in the countryside. After many months of struggle, the guerrilla movement increased its power throughout the country, finally driving out Batista and taking over the government. The agrarian revolution, national independence, and the nationalization of the property of both foreign and native capitalists were then eventually and empirically achieved. This seemingly simple and "short-cut" road to revolution has attracted many people to the idea of duplicating the Cuban experience in their own country. Castro himself advocates the Cuban experience as the model to be followed. "We are absolutely convinced that, in the long run, there is only one solution, as expressed in the Resolution: guerrilla warfare in Latin America." (Fidel Castro, "Speech to OIAS Conference,"

ISR, Nov.-Dec. 1967, p. 28.)

Despite Castro's and others' absolute conviction in guerrilla warfare, one must, nevertheless, pose the following question: Can the experience of the Cuban revolution be repeated throughout Latin America, or, as Comrade Moscoso maintained, can "the results achieved by the guerrillas in Cuba...be realized in any country"? In my opinion, one must answer this question in the negative.

First one must understand that the victory of the Cuban guerrilla struggle is mainly due to the failure of American imperialism to intervene. Since the victory of the Cuban revolution, however, and especially since Cuba has become a workers' state, American imperialism has fundamentally changed its policy. It has not only helped all the reactionary governments in Latin America against the people, but has also directly intervened in the affairs of these governments and has even sent troops to suppress revolutionary movements, as in the Dominican Republic. In those countries where guerrilla warfare broke out, American imperialism was responsible for arming and training special forces to deal with these movements, and the tragic defeat of Guevara is only proof of this change in policy by American imperialism and its effectiveness. The decline and defeats of other guerrilla movements as in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, etc. are also the result of American imperialism's direct intervention. These facts should be taken into serious consideration by all those who advocate and support the strategy of guerrilla warfare, and from them clear and unavoidable lessons should be learned.

If one evaluates the strategy of guerrilla warfare from the fundamental and historical principles of Marxism, Leninism, and Trotskyism, this "new" strategy is even more thoroughly exposed. According to Lenin a revolution must base itself upon the worker and peasant masses, and the first task is the building of a revolutionary party which prepares the masses for the revolution. In the event of a revolutionary situation the party then takes as its fundamental task the preparing of the masses for the armed seizure of power. If on the other hand a revolutionary situation does not exist, any organization for immediate armed struggle can only lead to a disastrous defeat. This was, in fact, the strategy and result of Stalin's adventurous policies which he imposed upon the Chinese CP after the defeat of the second Chinese revolution. As is well known, Trotsky very seriously attacked Stalin for his adventurous policies at the time as can be seen in many articles, especially in "The Chinese Question after the Sixth Congress." (Problems of the Chinese Revolution, Trotsky.)

At present in Latin America, on the whole, there not only does not exist any revolutionary situation, but many countries have suffered serious setbacks in the development of the revolutionary process -- Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, etc. To propose the strategy of guerrilla warfare under these conditions is to propose an adventurous policy similar to Stalin's after the second Chinese revolution, and such a strategy can only lead to similar disastrous results.

To avoid the disastrous results of the guerrilla warfare strategy and to prepare the victory of the revolution in Latin America, it is necessary to project a transitional program which should contain, among others, demands for: agrarian reform; national independence; freedom of press, speech, assembly, strike, etc.; and a "Constituent Assembly with full powers, elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage." (Problems of the Chinese Revolution, p. 189.) It is only through such a transitional program that we can reorganize and mobilize the masses against the military and oligarchic dictatorships and American imperialism. Only through such an organization of the masses can we approach the necessary armed struggle for power.

Perhaps some comrades will object to the above strategy by saying, as they have already said, that "there is no possibility of a reformist period of legal struggles..." "Therefore the perspective opened for the Bolivian people is one of direct struggle.... This struggle can only be undertaken by armed means -- by guerrilla warfare in the countryside, the mines, and the cities.... All others [perspectives] are utopian and can only lead to the defeat of the masses...." ("New Revolutionary Ferment in Bolivia," Intercontinental Press, Vol. 6, No. 22, p. 546.) Such a position is, however, only a repetition of the position taken by the Chinese CP under Stalin's leadership in the 30's. Trotsky characterized the CCP's policies at that time as being adventurous and without perspective, and history has more than proved Trotsky's criticism correct. "Following the inevitable collapse of the Canton uprising, the Comintern took the road of guerrilla warfare and peasant soviets with complete passivity on the part of the industrial proletariat. Landing thus in a blind alley, the Comintern took advantage of the Sino-Japanese War to liquidate 'Soviet China' with a stroke of the pen, subordinating not only the peasant 'Red Army' but also the so-called 'Communist' Party to the identical Kuomintang, i.e., the bourgeoisie." (The Transitional Program.) The world revolution has paid a most heavy price for the experience of Stalin's adventurism. We must understand this experience and its lessons not only for Bolivia, but also for Latin America and the world as a whole.

Some of the comrades might ask, "But

didn't the Chinese CP conquer power later on in 1949 with the strategy of guerrilla warfare?" The taking of power in 1949 by the CCP, however, was in no way a result of the guerrilla war strategy itself, but rather, a result of the exceptional historical circumstances created as a result of the Japanese invasion of China and World War II. First of all the Soviet Union's occupation of Manchuria, the most industrialized part of China, dealt a heavy blow to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, and the modern weapons which the Red Army obtained from disarming the Japanese were used to arm the Fourth Army of the CCP commanded by Lin Piao. Most important also was the inability of U.S. imperialism to intervene. U.S. imperialism even cut off aid to Chiang Kai-shek's regime many months before its defeat. (This is, in fact, one of the major reasons for the defeat.) (On how the CCP was able to take power, I have explained in detail in my "Report on the Chinese Situation," published in Feb. 1952, by the SWP in the International Information Bulletin.)

Neither can Vietnam be used to justify the strategy of guerrilla warfare. In fact, what is involved in the Vietnamese struggle is not a guerrilla war, but in reality, a limited war between American imperialism and the workers' states. In spite of the insufficient amount of aid given to the Vietnamese by the workers' states, especially by the Soviet Union and China, it has only been this aid which has permitted the Vietnamese to continue their struggle. Neither is Vietnam's geographical position a negligible factor, in that it allows the Vietnamese to receive directly from the workers' states the all-important aid. The geographical position, however, of such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia, Bolivia, etc., poses insurmountable obstacles in this regard. To call for the creation of "two, three, or many Vietnams" is utopian. Such a slogan cannot only not be realized in reality, but it completely obscures the origins and nature of the present conflict in Vietnam.

To avoid any possible confusion between our criticism of guerrilla warfare and that of the Stalinists in Latin America, we should briefly point out that we do not reject guerrilla warfare as do the Stalinists in order to justify a peaceful road to socialism or to justify a bloc with the liberal national bourgeoisie, but rather, we reject guerrilla warfare as an adventurist strategy which is opposed to our traditional program.

We do not reject guerrilla warfare as a tactic, but rather as a strategy. Definitely, when the situation in any country matures to the point that we must immediately prepare the masses for armed insurrection to seize power, guerrilla warfare by the peasants might be a most use-

ful tactic.

Nobody can reject revising the Transitional Program in principle. As Marxists we do not regard our program as a dogma. If there is a new reality which can be proven both theoretically and factually by the comrades, then without question, we must make all the necessary changes in the Transitional Program to adapt it to the new reality. But, we are and must be against any unprincipled revision of -- and especially any underhanded attempt to revise -- our traditionally accepted program. If the comrades think that part (or even all) of the Transitional Program is no longer valid or should be replaced by something else, then they should openly and frankly present their ideas to the International to be discussed and then accepted or rejected by the International.

Since the victory of the Cuban revolution, Castroism has had an influence upon certain radical elements, not only in Latin America, but also elsewhere throughout the world. The influence of Castroism has even made its way into the Fourth International. The adoption of the strategy of guerrilla warfare by sections in Latin America and even by the International leadership is a direct reflection of the Castroist influence upon the International. This situation raises the logical question of the relationship and differences between Castroism and Trotskyism. While our movement has given much praise to the Cuban leadership, it has never made any serious criticism of this leadership. Castro, on the other hand, has maliciously attacked and slandered Trotskyism (at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference).

Trotskyism is not only the direct continuation of Marxism, but also the inheritor of the traditions of Bolshevism. In addition, Trotskyism represents the development of the theory of the permanent revolution, as well as a Marxist analysis of the phenomenon of a degenerated workers' state. Comrade Trotsky was also the first to concretely analyze the phenomenon of fascism and to draw the necessary conclusions from the serious defeats suffered by the world working-class movement in the 1920's and '30's. All of this is concretized and summarized in the basic programmatic document of our movement -- the Transitional Program.

Castroism, on the other hand, has made no theoretical contribution to Marxism. Castro's program is merely one of action based upon his own experiences in the Cuban revolution, i.e., guerrilla warfare. It is clear that Castro does not understand some of the basic tenets of Marxism or some of the most important lessons and experiences of the world working-class movement, such as the Bolshevik revolution, the struggle between Trotsky and

Stalin, etc. This lack of understanding is expressed practically in Castro's politics by the lack of any democratic-centralist party in Cuba itself, by the lack of any democratic government in Cuba based upon workers' and peasants' soviets, by the support of a guerrilla war strategy in Latin America, etc. We, of course, support the Cuban workers' state against imperialism like other workers' states, and we can on certain specific issues even give critical support to the Cuban leadership against this or that tendency, such as, giving critical support to their attack on Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful road to socialism. On the other hand, we must thoroughly criticize all the Cuban leadership's weaknesses. We must criticize such things as their support of the guerrilla war strategy, pointing out that this is not an alternative strategy to the peaceful-road-to-socialism strategy advocated by the Stalinists, but that objectively in the long run, the strategy of guerrilla warfare will only help the opportunism of the Stalinists as well as American imperialism.

## II.

### Toward the Working Class

In the past period the International, on the whole, has found itself working in and recruiting from primarily petty-bourgeois strata, especially the student movement. To a great degree, of course, this area of work was determined by the objective conditions; nevertheless, our past work in and orientation to the working class had not been what it should have been. Therefore, the reorientation toward and integration into the working class is the most urgent task facing our movement today.

Perhaps some of the comrades would object to the call for such a reorientation of our movement, by saying that our orientation toward the working class has always been understood if not explicitly stated. But the concrete reality of our movement will not support such an objection. We have only to look at the sections in the most industrialized countries of the world, as in Western Europe, to discover that in none of these sections do we have any real basis in the working class. The comrades in these sections come mainly from outside the working class and still remain outside the working class. If such a situation is permitted to continue for any length of time, these sections cannot but degenerate.

Of course, our past work in such areas as the student movement has brought us many valuable cadres as well as allowed us to expand our influence by participating in and leading important struggles. But we must realize, that a movement such as the student movement is not and cannot

be a constant or stable phenomenon, and that this movement does not constitute (and cannot even be considered as) a basis for building a revolutionary (mass) party. The only basis on which we can consider building a revolutionary (mass) party is the working class. The student movement must be considered secondary and subordinate to this orientation.

Our orientation toward the working class must, above all, be concretely based on our work in the trade unions. The trade unions not only represent tens of millions of organized workers, but also one of the fundamental elements of the actual class struggle. The most unfortunate reality is, however, that in the past period the trade unions have not only been dominated by but completely controlled by the different reformist and even pro-imperialist leaderships. One cannot propose any real perspective of building a mass revolutionary party which can take the road to power, without first having struggled against and to a "certain" degree discredited the present leaderships in the trade unions. "It is impossible to capture political power (and the attempt to capture it should not be made) until this struggle [against the opportunist leaderships of the trade unions] has reached a certain stage." ("Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder", Lenin, Chapter VI.)

The central and most important part of the struggle against the present reformist leaderships can only be carried out by consistent work in the trade unions themselves. Of course, this work is very difficult and will pose for our movement its most difficult (as well as most important) tactical problems and considerations. But regardless of how difficult this work may be made for us by the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic trade union leaderships, "we must be able to withstand all this, to agree to any sacrifice, and even -- if need be -- to resort to all sorts of stratagems, artifices, illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on Communist work within them at all costs." (Ibid.)

Therefore, it is mandatory that the coming World Congress take this question into serious consideration and propose a concrete orientation to and plan for work in the trade unions and the working class as a whole. Only with such a concrete plan of orientation toward the working class can we envisage the construction of a mass revolutionary party capable of taking power. There is no other road.

## III.

### What We Should Learn from the Algerian Events

Boumédiène's coup d'état in June

1965 not only marked the turning point in the revolutionary movement in Algeria, but also marked a setback for the revolutionary movement throughout the Middle East and Africa as a whole. This coup also represented a heavy blow for the Fourth International and its political position, not only because of the direct involvement and participation in the Algerian events on the part of several sections -- France, Algeria, etc. -- but also because one of the International's leaders, Michel Pablo, participated in Ben Bella's government. As a result, we must accept as much of the responsibility as anybody for the serious setback. For this reason, it is mandatory that we examine this setback and our own responsibility for it, in order to draw certain conclusions and lessons from the Algerian events. It was for the above reason that I asked the Second Congress after reunification (Dec. 1965) to discuss formally the Algerian events. But no formal discussion took place. Again at a meeting of the IEC in February 1968, I proposed the Algerian events be officially placed on the agenda of the coming World Congress and a formal position taken. At this meeting both comrades Livio Maitan and Sirio Di Giuliomaria objected to the proposal, although the majority at the meeting accepted it. Nevertheless, the objection by comrades Livio and Sirio to such an important discussion represents a most serious weakness of not wanting to discuss the mistakes committed by the International leadership. We must remind the comrades that the attitude toward our own mistakes (especially those on the magnitude of the Algerian events) is one of the fundamental tests of a revolutionary party. As Lenin pointed out, even "a little mistake can always be turned into a monstrous one if it is persisted in, if profound reasons are given for it, and if it is driven to its 'logical conclusion.'" (Ibid., Chapter V.)

The most important lessons should be drawn from the International's mistakes in relation to the Algerian events. One of the most important mistakes was the failure of the International to seriously criticize Ben Bella's government as well as the failure to propose any revolutionary program for the Algerian masses in order to advance their struggle. On the contrary, the International and the International leadership in their many articles, gave much praise to the FLN leadership, especially to Ben Bella and even Boumédiène.

In the pre-reunification discussion in the International Committee, I made a criticism of the sectarian position held by the SLL leadership on the Evian agreement, in which I outlined a basic program for all revolutionaries concerned with Algeria. "To resolve this contradiction, [between continued French economic and military interests and Algerian indepen-

dence] all revolutionaries in Algeria should unite behind the hard-won political independence as the starting point for a Marxist program to mobilize all the working masses and poor peasants for further struggle. The program should include, in my opinion, the withdrawal of all French military forces, the cancellation of all French economic concessions in Algeria, a thorough agrarian reform, the nationalization of all the basic means of production, democratic rights for workers and peasants and the establishment of workers', farmers', and soldiers' councils and a workers' and farmers' government. All revolutionaries in Algeria should engage in the struggle to realize this program so as to bring Algeria into the path of socialism. This should be the line we ought to take in Algeria. This should also be the norm for criticizing all measures taken by the Ben Bella government and also the platform on which to rally all revolutionaries in Algeria to form a Marxist party to carry on the struggle." ("Where is Healy Taking the Socialist Labour League? -- A Dangerous Sectarian Tendency," SWP International Information Bulletin, May 1963 -- I, p. 18.)

The mistakes committed by the International, as mentioned above, represent an adaptation to a petty-bourgeois leadership. Such an adaptation is not accidental or without precedent. The International, in the past, has displayed a tendency to adapt to reformist bureaucrats and the radical petty bourgeoisie. The International's past position on the so-called self-reform of the bureaucratic leaderships in the workers' states and of certain Communist parties, the International's opportunist attitude toward Tito in the late 40's and early 50's, as well as toward Mao's regime -- which continues even today -- the International's tail-ending Bevan in England in the 50's, and its past and present uncritical position toward Castro and the Cuban regime, is only a part of the historical precedent for the International's opportunist adaptation to the Ben Bella government.

Such adaptationism has nothing whatsoever to do with Marxism. The historical record of Marx's, Engels', Lenin's, and Trotsky's militant struggles against all petty-bourgeois leaderships in the working-class movement is clear enough. One only needs to point to Marx's serious criticisms of such people as Blanqui and Lassalle. If, however, these militants were active today, it is hard to believe that the International would take a similar critical stance. Or one can point to Trotsky's scathing criticism of the centrist POUM for a more recent example. One cannot doubt the general revolutionary character of people like Blanqui or leaders of the POUM like Nin, but this did not change their objective political rôle or keep Marxists from seriously criticiz-

ing their political position. On the contrary, such people were all the more criticized in order to try to win them or their followers to a revolutionary Marxist position.

Recognizing our mistakes on the Algerian events, openly admitting them, and correcting them, is even more important in light of the International's record of many similar mistakes in the past. We must draw important lessons from the Algerian experience and apply these lessons to our present attitude toward the NLF in Vietnam, Castro, Mao, etc. In this way the lessons of the Algerian experience can (and must) play a most important rôle in the building of a revolutionary International.

#### Conclusion

Replacing the Transitional Program with the strategy of guerrilla warfare, neglecting the most serious work in the working class and its traditional class-struggle organizations, i.e., the trade unions, and continuing to adapt ourselves to different petty-bourgeois currents and leaderships, cannot only not build an International, but will lead our movement into a blind alley. The above represents

a deviation from Trotskyism, and it is the most urgent task and duty of the coming World Congress to consider seriously these questions by taking a formal stand on them in order to return to the road of Trotskyism.

March 5, 1969

P.S. The comrades will please understand that the above document was delayed as much as possible in the hope of receiving the pertinent draft resolutions for the coming congress. But alas, it was not possible to delay any longer, and therefore, the above document was written with only the draft resolution, "The New Rise of the World Revolution," at hand. In the last few days, we have received the draft resolution on Latin America. Time does not permit us to deal specifically with this draft resolution, nevertheless, it does not necessitate any change in the above criticisms. On the contrary, this draft resolution makes the above criticisms -- especially on guerrilla warfare -- all the more pointed. We also regret not having been able to utilize for the above document the other draft resolutions on China, Western Europe, Algeria, etc., which, to date, still remain unavailable.

March 12, 1969