

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

April, 1952

CONTENTS

- | | <u>Page</u> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. THE PROBLEM OF THE SO-CALLED
"REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION" | 1 |
| By Chun Yuan | |
| 2. THE RULE OF THE CHINESE CP
AND THE TASKS OF OUR PARTY | 14 |
| By Lin, Wung, Chi, Tin, Chian, Tao | |

Note: This material is reprinted from the Internal Bulletin of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International for the information of our readers.

Published by the
SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
116 University Place
New York 3, N.Y.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE SO-CALLED "REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION"

(Criticism of "The Thesis on the Errors Committed
by our Party and Their Nature")

By Chun Yuan

Having read Comrade Chao's "Ideological Rearmament" published in the Internal Bulletin No. 8, and his succeeding articles in No. 11, I have the deep feeling that the political opinions in these four articles, which aim at examining and criticizing the party clearly demonstrate one fact: His criticism and condemnation of the party is not based on official documents, nor on the tactics of the party elaborated within a certain space and time, under certain concrete conditions, nor on the real situation of its activities, but on his own imagination today and some vague terminology derived from a certain slogan of our party in the past. Hence his articles are so full of misunderstandings about the policies of our party that they even tend to distortions. Such a performance does not befit such a responsible comrade as Chao. But since we are presented with this performance, and since it may very well cause confusion and ambiguity among some comrades regarding our party's policy and its tradition, and even raise doubts in their minds on the correctness of Trotskyism, we can no longer keep silent. Comrade Ming Ming has already criticized in detail "Ideological Rearmament," and now I shall continue from there to criticize Comrade Chao's "The First Thesis on the Errors Committed by Our Party and Their Nature." In the present article, I am going to lay particular stress on the criticism of Comrade Ma's "Why Should We Call This Civil War a Revolution and the Importance of this Understanding," published in Internal Bulletin No. 14, because the mistakes of these two comrades are closely related, and the position of the latter on this question is even clearer.

A DIAMETRICAL TURN

Before entering into formal criticism, I should like to recount the conditions which caused such a radical political change on the part of Comrades Chao and Ma.

One year before the publication of the so-called "Basis for Discussion on the Program of Action," Comrade Chao and Ma had jointly written an article entitled, "The Significance and Nature of the Victory of the Stalinist Movement in China." In this article which has, generally speaking, fewer errors (to my point of view, although this is not the present opinion of Comrades Chao and Ma), they employed facts and theoretical analysis to demonstrate that ". . . the victory of Mao's party. . . is not the victory of revolution but on the contrary, is the result of the absence of a revolutionary upsurge." At that time, they seemed still more or less able to correctly analyze the problems in line with the traditional conceptions of our party. But today, after only one year, it is none other than these two comrades (supported by a few others, of course) who declare to the whole party in a programmatic document, "The permanent revolution has won the first stage of its victory" and now "the revolution is still developing." This problem of correct analysis and understanding of a revolutionary situation is not only a serious problem, but is a life and death question for a revolutionary party. Then how explain the drastic turn of Comrades Chao and Ma on this question?

Has the situation in China actually undergone a fundamental change within this past year? Have these two comrades really grasped this fundamental change and proposed a "proper" adjustment of the party to the change? But we are told that the Third Chinese Revolution began as far back as October 1947. Therefore, evidently there has not been any fundamental change during the last year. Then it follows that Comrades Chao and Ma had been entirely mistaken in estimating the situation in the past. If this is so, how can they explain the facts and theories employed in proving that Mao's victory was not a revolution? My sole purpose in thus probing the matter to the bottom is an attempt to clarify this question: How have they shifted from the political conceptions of the party to the opposite position, and what are the real causes of this change? In order to avoid any misunderstanding caused by "unjust treatment," it is better to allow "the patient to describe his own condition in the first place." At least, Comrade Chao has declared in advance that he would criticize his own position of the last year. I hope this criticism will be made available as soon as possible.

According to our information, this change of political views has not been generated over a whole year; actually the change occurred only in the past one or two months. It is said that they began their re-consideration of the Chinese question at the end of last year soon after they received the documents from the International, in which the attitude toward the Yugoslav affair has been modified. In January of this year, Comrade Ma was the first to elaborate these new ideas; immediately Comrade Chao agreed with him, but he did not however accept certain points which he believed went too far. In February, the draft program of action was revised and transformed into the present "Basis for Discussion on the Program of Action." Thus they finally completed their turn, and in April this document appeared in the Bulletin unexpectedly, like a bolt from the blue.

We have never known and heard in history of a real Marxist arriving at political positions contrary to that of the past of the Party, and his own past in such a brief space of time. This should be noted and examined closely and seriously by every comrade. And we must also notice that the shift in political position of these comrades from that of the party to that against it came all of a sudden. As far as I know, before the publication of the "Basis for Discussion of the Program of Action," not only did the important responsible cadres here know nothing about it, and several responsible cadres who left the mainland were never consulted for their opinions, but even the highest leadership of the party -- the Central Political Bureau -- also heard nothing of this beforehand. Therefore the publication of these new ideas, taking the shape of the "Basis for Discussion on the Program of Action," is indeed an abrupt political attack against the whole party, not to speak of its absurdity. Due to this sudden assault, a certain amount of confusion has been created among some comrades.

Now I shall proceed step by step with my criticism of the so-called "Five Big Errors" for which Comrade Chao criticized our party.

REAL CONDITIONS OF THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION

Comrade Chao says: "Our party has been wrong in its evaluation and recognition of the events of the last few years, because we have not admitted that there was already a revolutionary situation in

China. . . and the events of these recent years should be interpreted as a revolutionary development. The Third Chinese Revolution has already begun." This is considered as the first among the "five big errors," and according to Comrade Ma, "it is the greatest mistake that has ever occurred in the history of the Chinese Trotskyist movement." And this is also claimed to be the point of departure between the new ideas and the traditional conceptions of the party.

This so-called "revolutionary situation" which it is contended has existed for years and has only now been discovered by Comrades Chao and Ma is in itself shocking enough to us. Why is it so difficult to discover the revolution? Does it exist in reality, or only in the head of these two comrades? In order to facilitate an understanding of this question, we should like to examine the real conditions in China during these past years.

After the end of the Sino-Japanese War, China was indeed in a pre-revolutionary condition. After eight years of Resistance warfare, the rule and material basis of the Kuomintang were greatly weakened, and its administration was characterized by unprecedented corruption and incompetence. Under the threat of rising urban mass movements and the armed forces of the peasantry, it was plunged into a crisis of isolation. On the other hand, the influence of the Communist Party, which had already been considerably increased during the Resistance war, developed with accelerated speed after the surrender of Japanese imperialism, and began to mount, while its political sway was also strengthened along with the expansion of its military power. The growth in the influence of the Communist Party aroused a great many illusions among the huge peasant masses, the urban petty-bourgeoisie, intellectuals and workers. As the herald of a student movement on a national scale, the Kunmin Student Movement, which was based on democratic demands and protests against the Kuomintang reopening the civil war, quickly spread to Shanghai, Chengtu, Chungking, Nanking, Peiping, Tientsin, Hankow, and Canton. In other less important cities, where the students were also influenced and carried along by the current, there existed the same situation. In Shanghai and Chungking, almost simultaneously, a vigorous struggle for improvement of living standards and for the right of organizing trade unions on a broad scale and of a general character was launched. All these facts very clearly indicated that an utterly new and exceptional pre-revolutionary situation already existed after the war. If there had been a subjective revolutionary force -- a revolutionary leadership, with a correct policy, that is to say, one which would link the armed struggle of the peasants with the workers and student movements in the cities into an integrated force, then we could be convinced that it was the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution.

But, in the meantime, the party of Mao, which was leading the armed forces of peasants, and to a certain extent leading the students in the cities, and even in a limited sense, the workers movement, is essentially not a revolutionary party, and was therefore not in the least able to provide a correct leadership and revolutionary policy at that time. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung, the chief leader of the Communist Party, flew to Chungking, to become involved in negotiations from the top. It is just because of this compromising and reactionary policy of the Communist Party that the most favorable conjuncture for transforming the pre-revolutionary situation into revolutionary situa-

tion was lost, and once again, the Kuomintang was saved from its political crisis by the help of the Communist Party. Whatever the outcome today, the opportunist policy of the Communist Party and its effects during 1945-46 will be marked forever in history.

WAS THE CIVIL WAR TRANSFORMED INTO A REAL REVOLUTION IN 1947?

Having secured powerful military aid from American imperialism and taking advantage of the facilities offered by the opportunist policy of Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Kai-shek stretched his hand from Chungking to the "recovered areas" south of the Yangtse River, and then towards North China and Manchuria, and took over the power from the Japanese imperialists and the Soviet bureaucracy. At the same time, with his other hand, he exercised a tight grip on the ever-growing worker and student movements in the cities. At the moment when Chiang's regime was just being stabilized in the "recovered areas," he immediately began to brutally crush the urban mass movements. Due to the absence of a correct revolutionary leadership, the movements were suppressed by the Kuomintang striking blow after blow, until in 1947, generally speaking, the worker and student movements in the great cities were obviously ebbing.

After the war, the economic and political contradictions of Chinese society were more than ever intensified and deepened. These contradictions rendered the class relations, which had already been sharpened to the point of a civil war, even more irreconcilable and intolerable. On the one hand, since the Kuomintang, representing the interests of the bourgeoisie, landlords and the bureaucracy, in order to maintain its rule, could not tolerate the petty-bourgeois peasant land reform policy of the Communist Party, and was even less patient with the maintenance of huge peasant armed forces by the CP, Chiang Kai-shek at once began to mobilize a full-scale civil war, despite opposition from his master, American imperialism, which attempted to dissuade him. He thought that with his preponderant military force, he would be able to exterminate once for all the armed peasant forces led by the CP.

On the other hand, the Communist Party, which more or less reflected the interests of the peasants, discovered that it was entirely impossible to arrive at any compromise with the Kuomintang. In fact, there were only two roads presented before it: to continue this desperate struggle, or to accept the conditions for "cease-fire" (that is to say, to surrender). However, the Communist Party was obliged to choose the former. It was then that the Liberation Army proclaimed "the Agrarian Law" in order to attract the peasants -- the poor peasants in particular -- to participate and to form its main force in the resistance against the offensive of the Kuomintang armies.

These are the real conditions in which the CP in October 1947 proclaimed "The Agrarian Law" and the "declaration" of the "Liberation Army" calling forth overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. But let us see how Comrade Ma interprets these two facts. Comrade Ma says, "Beginning with October 1947, a tremendous upsurge of agrarian revolution was aroused by the call of the Chinese Communists in 'The Agrarian Law' and then the declaration of the 'Liberation Army' for the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Thence the civil war was transformed into a real revolution." For the first time, one of the repre-

representatives of these new conceptions tells us in written form that in October 1947 "the civil war was transformed into a real revolution." In other words, as early as October 1947, through mere proclamation of the Chinese Communists, the Third Chinese Revolution began. This is nonsense. At that time, not only in the areas ruled by the Kuomintang (which was still in control of the largest part of China and especially of big cities) the urban workers and students movement was constantly declining, and tended to passivity. There were no more mass demonstrations, no more revolts, and not even a vigorous student or workers' strike movement.

But we have also never heard of any independent mass movement of the workers in the cities in the areas controlled by the Chinese Communists. In the vast countryside ruled by the CP, besides demanding that the peasants join the Red Army, contribute to its food supplies and engage in purely military activities, such as the transport of military supplies, the Chinese Communists never had the intention to mobilize a general mass movement beyond its military needs, and it would never permit the development of any independent and positive mass movement. On the military plane, the "Liberated Area" was greatly reduced, and many important military posts such as Chang-chia-kow, Yen-an were seized by the Kuomintang armies. We can say, in 1947, that the Chinese Communist Party was in a dangerous and inferior position, while the military victory of the Kuomintang was at its height. Comrade Ma did not base his affirmation on these concrete facts, but only clung to a slogan, a declaration, and declared arbitrarily, "The civil war has developed into a real revolution." If this is not nonsense, what else is it?

Comrade Ma continues to argue, "The mass struggle takes various forms, and the military struggle is one of these forms." This sentence itself is a combination of abstraction and generalization. We Marxists should pose the question like this: under what concrete conditions does the military struggle become a form of mass struggle? In what kind of situation is the military struggle able to perform its real revolutionary role? Only by posing the question in this way can we arrive at a precise and concrete answer. For example, the Resistance war against Japan led by Chiang Kai-shek was a progressive national liberation war from the objective point of view, but instead of mobilizing the masses, Chiang limited himself to purely military means. We did not consider this purely military action as a mass movement, although it was demanded by the masses, and was the result of their demand. It was evidently not a mass movement mainly because there had not been a broad mobilization of the worker and peasant masses to participate in this action, whereas, for instance, in October 1917, the garrisons in Petersburg, by joining the armed revolt of the workers and peasants, could play such a great revolutionary role, and complete the October Revolution together with the workers and peasants. Undoubtedly, this military struggle is a form of mass struggle.

From the above two examples, we may draw three conclusions as follows:

1. When the mass struggle arrives at its Climax, it is forced to take the form of military struggle, but the military struggle is not necessarily a form of mass struggle.

2. Only when the military struggle is joined with and integrated into the workers movement of the cities and the vast peasant movement in the countryside does the military struggle become a form of mass struggle.

3. Only when the military struggle is accompanied by the armed insurrection of the urban working masses can it exert its great revolutionary role.

Viewed from these three conclusions, it is hardly possible to assume that the military struggle of the Chinese CP was a form of mass struggle, and even less plausible to say that in October 1947 this military struggle had become a "real revolution."

DID THE VICTORY OF MAO TSE-TUNG BEGIN THE THIRD CHINESE REVOLUTION?

In the resolution on the Chinese problem adopted by the IEC, April 1950, the International cautiously estimated Mao's victory as the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution. I think that this estimate is wrong.

We have consistently presumed that only through a new victory of the revolution can the bourgeois regime of Kuomintang be overthrown, or at least the fall of this regime must lead to a revolutionary situation. But in reality, the collapse of the Kuomintang regime did not cause the advent of a revolutionary situation nor did the victory of Mao Tse-tung begin the Third Chinese Revolution. How to explain this? About the former part, there will be a detailed explanation in a formal document written by me together with the other comrades. I am going to explain now only why the victory of Mao did not open the Third Chinese Revolution.

In the fall of 1948, the soaring cost of living due to the unprecedented intensification of economic decomposition was rapidly precipitating the urban workers and pauperized masses who were already living in starvation, to the brink of death. In order to survive and no longer to endure the sight of their wives and children starving to death, these urban workers and poor masses summoned up courage and rose to their feet once again amidst the generally declining mass movement in the cities. Despite lack of organization and leadership, they showed their boldness and vigor. Rice plunderings mounted one after another. They reached such an acute point as to become the popular topic of gossip in all the big cities south of Yangtse River. The workers' strikes, though still scattered and disconnected, occurred more frequently and became more and more active. Under the slogan of "No Starvation!", the students also more or less demonstrated that their struggle was still alive.

The CP sweeping over Manchuria, liberating Peiping and Tientsin, and winning a decisive victory in the Wei-Hai Battle greatly encouraged (from the objective point of view) the fighting sentiments of the urban workers, pauperized masses, and the students. The rapid collapse of the Kuomintang Regime had aroused certain illusions towards the CP not only among the students and petty-bourgeois intellectuals, but also among the workers and peasants. This was again a splendid opportunity. Had the Chinese CP adopted a revolutionary program in time and transformed the purely military mobilization into a real revolutionary

mobilization of the workers and peasant masses, that is to say, on the one hand, had it pushed forward the struggle of the urban workers and students and joined it with the armed peasants' offensive against the bourgeoisie, to form a real revolutionary struggle; on the other hand, had it permitted the peasant masses to organize themselves independently, spontaneously, and actively, had it allowed the soldiers to freely elect their own officers, and granted democratic rights to the workers, peasants and soldiers, then, we believe, the victory of Mao would not only have opened the Third Chinese Revolution, but the revolution would have triumphed in China. But the fact is that during the whole period (from the winter of 1948 to the end of 1949) in which Mao's party seized and took over the power from the disintegrated and fleeing Kuomintang, we never saw the urban working masses joining the attack of the peasant armies with an armed revolt, and even in the countryside, we never heard that, before the peasant armies entered the villages, the peasants had taken spontaneous action to expropriate the landlords, and to destroy the Kuomintang regime.

After the Chinese CP gained its first military victory, on the one hand it at once cancelled the decision of expropriating the landlords in order to prevent any independent violent action on the part of the peasants, and in a certain limited sense, to avoid sabotage on the part of the landlords before its rule was stabilized and its control over the peasants in the "New Liberated Area" was absolutely assured. Meanwhile, with its other hand pressing heavily on the urban working masses, it prohibited any independent and spontaneous strikes and demonstrations. The workers and peasants were only granted freedom to sing and glorify "Chairman Mao" and the "Communist Party." Its strict control over freedom of speech and democratic rights in general, its military dictatorship and its heavy taxation even surpassed those of the Kuomintang. Therefore, to my view, Mao's victory has not impelled the mass movement towards the Third Chinese Revolution, but on the contrary, has become a brake on any independent movement of the worker and peasant masses.

The above facts and analysis obviously demonstrate one possibility, which is that the victory of Mao Tse-tung objectively creates a very good opportunity for the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution. But because the Chinese CP lacks a serious revolutionary program, and furthermore, because it is fundamentally afraid of the rise of the real worker and peasant masses, consequently the victory of Mao has in fact not begun the Third Chinese Revolution.

CRITICISM OF SOME EXAMPLES

In order to prove that the events occurring in China in the recent years (since the end of 1947) were a revolution, Comrade Ma has used three examples to illustrate his argument. These three examples are: (1) The First Chinese Revolution; (2) The revolution of 1925-27 in China; (3) The peasant war of 1525 in Germany. I shall now express my opinion and my own point of view with regard to these examples in their original order.

Comrade Ma says, "For instance, in the revolution of 1911, only a few revolutionists and 'New Military League' and some other secret societies participated. The masses were quite ignorant. But everybody admits that it was a revolution." From what Comrade Ma says, it

seems to mean: the common people were ignorant of the revolution in 1911. The working masses did not participate in the struggle. But why do we call it a revolution, whereas we do not admit that the war carried on by Mao Tse-tung was a revolution? I take it for granted that this is the way Comrade Ma poses the question, and according to his opinion, it is the only way to pose the question.

We Marxists comprehend the problem of revolution in the same way as we comprehend other important social problems. We must observe time, space, the inter-relationship and development of the events, and all the other concrete conditions at that time. This is the basic method of examining and understanding a certain problem, and is the concrete way to comprehend a revolution.

A social revolution not only requires objective conditions for its maturity, but also a brewing period for the subjective factor of its ideology. We all know that the revolution of 1911 erupted under the direct leadership and influence of the ideology of "San Min Chu I" of Sun Yat-sen, and this "San Min Chu I" truly represented the ideology and interests of the bourgeoisie. Though this revolution did not seriously solve any of the democratic tasks of the Chinese bourgeoisie (agrarian problem, national independence and unification), yet it overthrew an absolute monarchy which ruled over China for two thousand years and opened the road for the establishment of a bourgeois regime in China. It is true that the revolution was carried out chiefly by the secret societies and the native soldiers of the "New Army" that leaned to military actions, composed of various elements, without fixed class consciousness. But, undeniably, this revolution already had a progressive class at its head -- the bourgeoisie was its dynamic force. It is only due to the weakness and incompetence of this class that this revolution did not depend on and mobilize the masses. In the meantime, the working class, both in numbers and in class consciousness, was still in an infantile stage, so that it was far from able to play a positive and decisive role in this first revolution. Yet we cannot deny that it was a revolution even without the participation of the proletariat.

Since 1911, the Chinese working class underwent a period of rapid growth from 1914 to 1918, an ideological armament through the October Revolution of 1917, the experiences and lessons of the great revolution of 1925-27, and the eight years national liberation war against the Japanese imperialism. Yet at the beginning of the Third Chinese "revolution" (October 1947), not only did it not participate in the struggle, but was even ignorant of what happened! In the first victory of the "Third Chinese Revolution," the Chinese proletariat remained "entirely impassive," and as "the revolution develops," it does not even play any positive and independent role! And the strangest thing is: from the beginning of the real revolution up to the present period in which "the revolution is still developing," there have passed five years. In this long course of revolutionary development, the Chinese proletariat is still able to maintain its coldness and passivity! Comrades! Is this what they call the Third Chinese Revolution?

Now, I should like to ask: first, since the revolution of 1911 was under the direct ideological leadership and influence of the bourgeoisie -- the revolutionary dynamic at that time -- then what class character does the ideological leadership in the revolution beginning

with the year 1947 have? The principal dynamic force of this revolution should be the proletariat, but it is unexcited. Secondly, the first Chinese revolution overthrew an absolute monarchy and led to the establishment of a new bourgeois regime. But when Mao Tse-tung overthrew Chiang Kai-shek regime, did he also destroy the bourgeois state? Thirdly, what class interests does the Mao regime represent? I hope the comrade who employed the example of the revolution in 1911 can answer these questions.

Regarding the second example, Comrade Ma says: "To judge from the purely numerical point of view of mass mobilization, this revolution is more formally organized than the Second Chinese Revolution, because the masses organized by the latter were no more than ten millions, while this time, before the "People's Liberation Army" traversed the Yantse River, there were already hundreds of millions of peasants organized to distribute the lands." According to him, the mass movement in this "revolution" is broader than that in the Second Chinese Revolution, because the latter only organized about ten millions while the former has organized hundreds of millions to distribute the land even before the south bank of the Yangtse was liberated. If we recall in earnest the mass movement in the period of the Second Chinese Revolution, and compare it with the peasant war led by Mao Tse-tung, it will be clear how superficial and general is the argument made by Comrade Ma.

First of all, the great revolution was opened in 1925 with a united general strike of workers, students, and merchants in Shanghai, who, inspired by the May 31 incident, launched a violent fight against the imperialist oppression. While, as we were told, the present so-called "revolution" was started merely with an "Agrarian Law" proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung and a declaration of the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek regime published by the People's Liberation Army. In the second place, the anti-imperialist united general strike in Shanghai rapidly developed into an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, and spread to all the great cities while the appeal and the declaration of Mao Tse-tung did not at all receive the response and support from the working masses in the great cities, even in the cities controlled by the Chinese CP. Thirdly, in the course of the Second Revolution, the workers in Shanghai launched three armed revolts to welcome the revolutionary armies, and there were numerous strikes, big and small. In the south, the workers of Kwantung and Hongkong also initiated the famous Kwangtung-Hongkong Joint Strike. Besides these, there were great anti-imperialist and anti-militarist movements of workers and students in other big cities. But in this "revolution" which is said to be "more formally organized" and to consist of broader mass movements, the workers in the great cities not only have not carried out a single armed insurrection to welcome the offensive of the "People's Liberation Army," but there was not even a joint strike on a grand scale. More concretely, there was no positive independent movement.

Fourthly, in the whole process of the 1925-27 revolution, from the beginning to its defeat, the Chinese working class was always the main force, the active standard-bearer of the revolution. While in the "formal revolution" opening in October 1947, after gaining the first stage of its victory, up to today when "the revolution is still in development," the working class has never played any positive role, and has always taken the position of an onlooker.

Fifthly, in the Second Chinese Revolution, tens of thousands of the peasants in the south organized themselves spontaneously and actively, expropriated the land of the landlords (even including some kulaks), and distributed it equally among the poor peasants with their own strength and according to their own will. To borrow the words of Comrades Chao and Ma before their radical turn, that is, "in the epoch of the Second Chinese Revolution, the peasants rose here and there, organized the Peasant's Committee, expelled the landlords, and distributed the land." But this kind of phenomenon "has not yet appeared today, and it is so rare that not even the most boastful propaganda organization can find enough examples to exploit." Mao's party is absolutely against positive action and any initiative in organizing the peasants, and utterly forbids the peasants to expropriate the landlords on their own, and in fact, it openly protects the land of the rich peasants and the industry and commerce operated by the landlords. Only in the areas where it has maintained a complete control, through its administrative decrees, and by brake-like methods, it "mobilizes" the peasant masses to undertake a "rational struggle" against the landlords.

Sixthly, the Second Chinese Revolution was the result of the rise of the working class leading the peasant masses, and the urban worker's movement and the peasant movement were correlated and interdependent. But, Mao Tse-tung never thought of initiating an urban workers' movement, and even towards the peasants in the countryside, its "mobilization" was limited to a purely military means. Consequently, the military struggle of the Chinese CP has always been isolated, that is, cut off from the urban workers' struggles.

From the above examples, we can draw three important conclusions: (1) Comrade Ma posed the questions only in accord with superficial phenomena, not according to the real content of events. This is a complete violation of the Marxist method. (2) Comrade Ma has placed the peasant movement organized automatically and actively by tens of thousands of peasants in the revolution of 1925-27 on the same plane with the purely military peasant war led by Mao's party today. This is completely contrary to the facts. (3) Comrade Ma deliberately neglected the significance of the absence of the workers' participation in this event, and avoided mentioning the workers' role in the revolution of 1925-27. This is not permitted a Marxist. Perhaps Comrade Ma will reply: "We should not deny the nature of things because of certain distorted appearances," because, whatever the methods employed, the Chinese CP has actually distributed the land of the landlords to the peasants. At first glance, this reasoning is really unchallengeable. Even a fool will recognize this fact, and a sectarian dare not deny its progressive significance. Indeed, such is the fact, and it is progressive at the present moment. Only an idiot will deny it. But this fact, this progressiveness does not equal a revolution, since it is achieved not by revolutionary means, but by reformist methods. A revolutionist should call things by their right names.

The third example of Comrade Ma is a consummation of distortion and misrepresentation. He says: "Engels did not hesitate to call the peasant war of 1525 in Germany a revolution, why then can we not call the present peasant war led by Mao Tse-tung the Third Chinese Revolution?" It is true that Engels did call the German peasant war a revolution, but in other places, he called it a peasant revolt or a peasant war. The entire spirit of his work defined it as a peasant war, and

his book is even entitled, "The Peasant War In Germany." Either from the traditional viewpoint of Marxism, or according to the nature of that war, it remained a peasant war. Engels sometimes called it a revolution simply in the sense of its broad and progressive significance, and not in the sense of a political or social revolution. Comrade Ma should not forget that his so-called "Third Chinese Revolution" is not in the framework meant by Engels who understood much better than Comrade Ma that, without the participation or leadership of an advanced class, no action can be called a revolution.

Comrade Ma insists further: "Engels more than once compared the revolution of 1525 with that of 1848. Why can we not do the same and compare it with that of the present?" Yes, Engels actually did make this kind of comparison, yet he never identified the one with the other, and promptly pointed out that in essence the two revolutions differed from each other. If Comrade Ma still persists, "despite their difference in significance and in essence that they are still called revolutions," this only shows how blindly and vaguely he abuses and plays with terms. It furthermore indicates how much he is neglecting the facts and ignoring the Marxist theory and method. He puts the German peasant war in the 16th Century, the German bourgeois revolution in the 19th Century along with the "Third Chinese Revolution" in the middle of this century all on the same plane of "revolution," without regard to their historical background or their diverse character. He effects this absurdity only by abandoning the facts and the Marxist method.

WHY IS IT CALLED A PEASANT WAR?

After the above criticism, I believe that the theory of "revolution" of Comrades Chao and Ma, which is utterly contrary to Marxism and reality, is generally refuted. So it is by no means justifiable to call this event a revolution, but rather it is quite relevant to call it by its correct name, a peasant war.

I have sufficient facts as a basis for this statement that this is only a victorious peasant war.

1. The army under the lead of Mao Tse-tung is by birth, composition and upbringing an army originating from the villages, and has for a long period of time remained in the countryside.
2. The struggle unleashed against Chiang's regime has been entirely dependent on this peasant army as its major force, and from beginning to end, it has never stepped beyond the boundary of purely military operations.
3. Through the whole course of this peasant war, its political vacillations and its lack of a definite position are all due to its peasant nature.
4. It has more or less reflected and represented certain peasant interests.
5. It has no close relationship with the urban workers' and students' movement.

For this kind of war carried on by the peasant troops under these conditions, there is no better name than a "peasant war." No matter how idealized this is under the pen of Comrades Chao and Ma, it can by no means hide its original features.

Comrade Ma says: "To consider this revolution as a peasant war is to commit a two-fold mistake." In this respect, he gives two reasons: (1) Although this movement under the Chinese CP was dependent on the peasants as its major force, . . . yet, in the years after the war, there have been succeeding explosions of mass struggles." In other words, the armed struggles of the Chinese CP were not isolated in the post-war period. It was accompanied by the rise and fall of the workers' and students' movements in the cities. (2) "A pure peasant war, when it develops into a vast movement embracing the whole nation, can be called a revolution." That is to say, the armed struggle has developed into a vast movement, arriving at a national level, and so it is a revolution.

On this question, it is not we, but rather Comrade Ma himself, who has committed a "two-fold mistake." His first reason is completely out of accord with the facts. The fact is that, in 1947, owing to the suppressions by the Kuomintang, the workers' and students' movement mounting in the cities after the war, was constantly on the decline; while in October of the same year, the armed offensive of the CCP had just begun. It was when the urban mass movement was at the bottom of its decline that the armed force of the Chinese CP was at the height of its growth (from the winter of 1948 to the end of 1949). So it is erroneous for Comrade Ma to artificially link together two struggles of different periods. Besides, the armed struggle led by the Chinese CP, from beginning to end, has never attempted to join itself with the urban mass movement. Even if by chance the urban struggles had occurred during the same time of the armed struggle, we firmly declare, under the Chinese Communist leadership, the two struggles could never have been fused into an integrated revolutionary movement. But here Comrade Ma has not only arbitrarily linked together the armed struggles of the CCP with the urban mass movement of a different time sequence, but he has assumed that these two struggles are correlated. This is evidently a falsification of historical facts to justify his own argument. It is fallacious as well as stupid.

His second reason is even more incomprehensible. First of all, we should ask whether the so-called "vast nation-wide movement" refers to the extension of the peasant war onto a national scale, or the peasant war was already enlarged into a broad and universal movement in all the cities and villages of the whole country? If it refers to the former, the armed struggle of the CCP really attained a national scale, but as it was not a universal mass movement, it was not a revolution. If it refers to the latter, this situation never actually existed.

Perhaps Comrade Ma is still not convinced, because he would insist on the subjective belief that "the event happening in China is a progressive mass movement which has overthrown the old regime by the violence from below upward." Here we discover another characteristic of Comrade Ma, that is, he never ceases to emphasize the facts, and blame the party and comrades for ignoring the facts, while he himself is constantly effacing the facts. From the sentence cited above, there are already three noteworthy points evinced:

1. He ambiguously and generally identifies the peasant armed forces under the Chinese Communist leadership with a universal mass movement.

2. He identifies the military force of the armed peasants with the revolutionary violence of a huge mass.

3. He identifies the military occupation and the "taking over" of the power with the overthrow of an old regime by the revolutionary actions of the masses.

All these are consequences of his disregard of the facts.

That the transfer of power is not due to revolutionary violence but to purely military force is a fact which no one is able to deny. If Comrade Ma has not yet understood the difference between pure military force and the revolutionary violence of the masses, we should like to remind him of the violent actions exhibited in October 1917 in Russia and 1925 in China, lest he should become too perplexed.

Since the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime was not achieved by the violence of vast masses, but only by purely military force, naturally it could not be, and in fact was not, a thorough overturn by the rank and file from below. Only when the workers, peasants and the toiling masses rise in a stormy insurrection from below to thoroughly sweep away all the old relationships, can we call that a real rank and file action. But we have repeatedly pointed out that the workers have never been set into motion, the peasants have been frustrated by great limitations, the old order of things was taken over and maintained, and in some regions even remained intact. Then where is this rank and file action from below?

Although it is a peasant war, we nevertheless admit its progressive significance. Not only do we recognize it, we come to its support positively and resolutely just because it is progressive.

In what does this progressive significance consist? It is lodged in the correct consciousness and demand of the peasants to participate in the war, in its overthrow of the reactionary Kuomintang regime, and in its anti-imperialist campaign and in its agrarian reform.

In order to support it positively, we should stand firmly on the side of the peasants in resisting and attacking the reactionary offensive of the Kuomintang. We must always be in the forefront of all struggles favoring the complete destruction of the Kuomintang regime, including the military struggle under the leadership of the CCP. We should engage ourselves in common actions with it, and in the course of these struggles, expose the halfway character of the CCP, and try to change its compromising policy. Yet we should not limit ourselves merely to progressive reforms. We should support the movement, and eventually extend it into a real immense revolutionary struggle of the masses. Only a complete destruction of the Kuomintang regime by means of this struggle "from below up" will be able to open the road to the Third Chinese Revolution. This conception of the peasant war has run like a red thread from Trotsky down to us.

If this correct attitude on our part toward the peasant war led by Mao's party continues to be considered by Comrade Ma as "prejudiced," "negligent" and "abstentionist," that would be a real scandal for our party.

THE RULE OF THE CHINESE CP AND THE TASKS OF OUR PARTY

By Six Chinese Comrades: Lin, Wang, Chi, Tin, Chian, Tao

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VICTORY OF THE PEASANT WAR

1. The bloody rule of Chiang Kai-shek was definitely overthrown, and the power fell into the hands of the Chinese CP. This transfer of power did not result from the direct intervention of the huge masses of workers and peasants, independently and actively participating in the conflict, but from the purely military victory of the peasant armed forces under the leadership of the Chinese CP. So we must have a clear understanding of the events taking place in recent years; and a situation created by purely military action is not identical with a revolutionary situation. The overturn of the former political power does not mean the collapse of the old regime; the victory of the Chinese CP is not equivalent to the victory of the workers and peasants.

2. The working class, the indispensable dynamic of the revolution, has never exercised any decisive or even positive role on the whole course of events, and even when the army of the CP was approaching the gates of the cities, it still remained in silence. The mood of the workers was indifferent, and their ideology obscure; their actions were disconnected and their condition of life miserable. They waited passively for the armed forces from the countryside to "liberate" them. (This was for a long time the advice of the Chinese CP.) The workers, in the midst of their despair, however, still held certain illusions about the military victory of the Chinese CP, and yet were generally cast in doubt and confusion. They had not yet achieved confidence in their own strength to liberate themselves, nor were they convinced that the people would liberate them.

The only force which has succeeded in directly overthrowing the old regime is the peasant army. This army was brought up in the ebb-tide of the peasant movement after the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution, and from the very beginning, it was under the control of the Chinese CP. On the one hand, the Chinese CP relied entirely on the revolutionary potential of the peasants to sustain its armed struggle; on the other hand, it constantly checked by bureaucratic methods all the independent actions of the hungry peasants demanding land, curbed the free development of the peasant struggle, and twisted it into a military struggle absolutely under its control, because, had the peasant struggle been permitted a free development, it would have immediately outstripped the military struggle of the Chinese CP, and would no longer have been controlled. This is the reason why the peasant has never been able to rise independently and positively to form an overwhelming mass movement, and it is due to the same reason that the military struggle led by the Chinese CP is evidently not a universal peasant movement.

The course of events has equally proven that the armed struggle of the peasants has never been linked with the workers' struggle in the cities. The Chinese CP has isolated the workers from the peasants instead of allying the one with the other. Only under certain conjunctures when the working class and its struggle were considered useful

by the CP were they employed as servitors, or as window-dressing, or as a weight in a deal with the bourgeois Kuomintang; or they were fastened behind the peasants' war vehicles to make a grand show, or to furnish the ornament on the Gate of Celestial Peace of Peiping.

3. The Chinese CP in power today has insisted over and over again upon cooperating with the bourgeoisie, and pledged its support to Chiang Kai-shek, and attempted to organize a coalition government with him. Only at the time when Chiang, in the face of the sharpening of the class struggle in the country would not even accept the submissive reliance of Mao Tse-tung and launched a grave attack on the CP, was the CP then forced to hastily change its attitude. First it published its "May 4th Directives," to complete its policy of reducing rents and interests, and then it called for the overthrow of Chiang's regime, and proclaimed the "Land Law," in order to gain the support of the peasants, to remedy its military incompetency, and to proceed with the seizure of power. Therefore, in the evolution from support of the Chinese CP for Chiang's regime to its overthrow of the same regime, it was rather the latter which broke with the former than vice versa. Therefore it would be better to say that under the military attack of the Kuomintang, the Chinese CP was empirically obliged to give up its capitulationist policy rather than to consider that it was subjected to the pressure of the masses to carry out its deliberately conceived "revolutionary" policy.

Owing to its very nature, the Chinese CP did not desert the bourgeoisie even after its overthrow of Chiang's regime, but on the contrary, it is still courting the so-called national bourgeoisie. Under the mask of delusive revolutionary terminologies, it tries its best to protect bourgeois property relations and seeks alliance with the representatives of the bourgeoisie, such as the infamous hangman of the workers and peasants, Li Chi-sun, who has now become one of the bigwigs of the new regime. Thus this regime is determined at the very beginning to serve less the interest of the working class than that of the bourgeoisie.

4. After the end of the war, the mass movement rising in the great cities actually constituted a pre-revolutionary situation. Had there been a mass revolutionary party to carry out a genuine revolutionary policy, it would have been possible to transform this situation into a revolution. But the Chinese CP, the only party which could play a decisive role, was completely attached to opportunism, and thwarted the coming of the revolution with its shifting policies. Beginning with the latter half of 1947, the mass movement, especially the workers' movement, was already on the downward slope. Although the urban mass struggle experienced a comparative revival in 1948 as the consequence of the general economic disintegration of the Kuomintang regime, and the fall of Chiang Kai-shek should have objectively afforded the opportunity to open the road of the Third Chinese Revolution; nevertheless, the policy of the Chinese CP and its ascent to power have strangled this mass struggle in the first flush of its revival, and blocked the possible opening of the revolution. So, in fact, the victory of Mao Tse-tung has not begun the Third Chinese Revolution.

5. Nor has Mao's victory brought to China a democratic period. The worker and peasant masses are put under extremely rigorous military control, deprived of freedom of speech and freedom of action. The

"mass movement" mobilized in accord with the need of the new regime is, as a rule, purely functional and bureaucratized. The will of the government has been substituted for the will of the masses, and their field of activities is circumscribed. The execution of decrees from above has replaced the rank and file mass struggle; bureaucratic methods have stifled the initiative of the masses; the so-called "follow the line of the masses" policy does not aim at strengthening relation with the workers and peasants or heeding the opinions of the masses, but reinforcement of control over them, and effective elimination of their independent expressions. The working class being hailed as the "master of the country" does not signify that it has become the leading class in the country. This sort of exaltation is merely meant to shut their mouths, to hold back their struggle, and to bring about more sacrifices of class interests on their part.

6. The victory of the peasant army led by the Chinese CP is not a revolution, yet is a historical advance of considerable importance.

We should admit that the overthrow of the old regime is a progressive action. It closed the period of twenty years of reactionary and sanguinary rule of the Kuomintang, representative of the interests of the landlord-bourgeoisie, and the tool of imperialism.

The victory of Mao has destroyed the equilibrium in the Far East. It has given an impetus to the national liberation movement of the colonial countries and invigorated their anti-imperialist struggle.

But we must point out that what the history of China requires is not merely the overturn of Chiang's power and some progressive reforms, even of certain or considerable extent. What it needs is a revolutionary upheaval in order to completely break the fetters of imperialism, to struggle for national independence, to thoroughly solve the agrarian problem, and to succeed in the completion of all democratic tasks in China and link it with a socialist perspective. Only then will it be able at last to liberate the productive forces. But this solution can be reached only in the fulfillment of the proletarian dictatorship established by the workers leading the peasant masses. Now, in today's China, the leadership of Mao is preventing precisely the rise of the worker and peasant force. Here rests the key point of the immediate crisis of Chinese society. While we firmly support all the progressive actions of the Chinese CP, we should at the same time expose without reserve its criminal role in retarding the real revolution.

We must also reject all the petty bourgeois, pessimistic revisionism appearing in our party under the pressure of the victory of the Chinese CP. These people confusedly identify the struggle under the Chinese Communist leadership opening in October 1947 with the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution, the military victory of Mao Tse-tung with the first stage of the victory of the permanent revolution, and they deem the ever-increasing exploitation of the workers' and peasants' democracy by the Bonapartist military dictatorship as the development of the revolutionary situation. They ascribe to the political line of the party its inability to play a role in the events. This kind of heresy which substitutes hysteria for persistence and subjective imagination for the objective reality should be repudiated by Marxists without mercy.

THE VICTORY IS THE COMBINATION OF SPECIFIC HISTORICAL FACTORS

7. The fact that the peasant armed forces led by the Chinese Communists could alone overthrow the former regime is the result only of a combination of certain exceptional historical factors.

In this backward nation, the vast impoverished countryside, under the triple harness of the landlords, bourgeoisie and imperialism, has been for a long time sinking into the abyss of bankruptcy. The great revolution of 1925-27 should have been able to deliver it from this prostration. Yet, the defeat of the revolution, and the counter-revolutionary military dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek has deepened its bankruptcy ever more. The overwhelming burden imposed by the devastation of the eight-year resistance war and the economic decomposition of the postwar Kuomintang regime has further brought it to the brink of ruin. The preponderant peasant population has become ever more hungry for land, and has been impelled by this hunger to struggle universally and steadily. Here lies the ever-sharpening class contradiction which has existed for a long period in the Chinese countryside, and this contradiction has been embodied in the enormous potentiality of the peasants' resistance against the old regime. These class contradictions and potentiality afforded the peasant armed struggle an objective basis.

8. On the present political arena, the peasantry, despite its tremendous power and overwhelming numbers, could, by its very nature, attempt the overthrow of an old regime by its movement and purely military struggle alone only under the following condition: the two big urban classes -- the bourgeoisie and the proletariat -- are in a state of impotency. Where either of these two powers is still active, the peasant struggle would necessarily be under the lead of the working class, or else be constricted by the bourgeoisie. During 1925-27, the peasantry exercised a great revolutionary role simply because it followed the struggle of the proletariat. After the defeat of the revolution, the proletariat withdrew from the political stage, while the bourgeois rule, which had secured relative and temporary stability due to the help of imperialism, dealt heavy blows on the isolated peasant struggle and almost reduced it to ruin. Today the fact that the peasant army is able to trample upon the former regime with its ostentatious superiority to all the classes is not only because of the impotency of the proletariat but because of the extreme decay of the bourgeoisie which is no longer able to maintain its power.

By its blood ties, the Chinese bourgeoisie, from its origin, was intimately bound to feudal influence and imperialism, and disassociated from the masses. Consequently, it is destined to be unable to create an independent capitalist perspective in China or find a solid basis for its rule. After eight years of the resistance war, its power further disintegrated to an unprecedented degree. The extreme weakening of its material bases, the precipitate bankruptcy of the civilian economy, the utter corruption of the administration, the dissolution of its military organization, the general discontent of the masses, and the centrifugal tendencies and rivalries within the ruling circles -- all these revealed the inability of bourgeois rule to sustain itself. Even a master like American imperialism was short of means to rescue its instrument from its blind alley, to help it to resist the attack of the peasant army. The petty-bourgeois peasants have exploited precise-

ly this excellent conjuncture of the complete rottenness of the bourgeoisie and the impossibility of direct interference on the part of imperialism, to mount to power by pure armed force.

At the same time, under the prolonged massacre and persecution of the tyrannical military dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, plus the sufferings caused by the oscillations of the Chinese CP, the Chinese working class which emerged from the tragic defeat of the second revolution has never recovered its confidence, its militancy and unity for the past two decades. Though it had experienced the beginning of its revival after the war, when it had not yet had sufficient time to conquer the weaknesses in ideology and action, which were the heritage from the long period of white terror, it was again confronted with suppression on the part of the Kuomintang, and was once again betrayed by the fraudulent leadership of the Chinese CP. Until the time of the victory of the peasant army, the workers were still indifferent. It is simply for this reason that the peasantry could ride on it, and even become the master of the country.

9. The innate defect of the peasantry is its backwardness and lack of unity. But after the defeat of the Second Revolution, the Chinese CP which retreated to the countryside, swiftly converted itself into a peasant party amidst the ebbing of the revolution in the countryside, became the leadership of the peasant struggle, drove the scattered peasant revolts into the orbit of its military struggle, and crystallized its power. Those intellectuals coming from the great cities or returning from Moscow, with their higher education, became the leaders and cadres in the different ranks of the peasant army, and relatively made up for the backwardness and ignorance of the peasants. In the long period of its vigorous guerrilla fighting, this army had been equipped with the rich experience of armed struggle. Afterwards, with the aid of the Soviet Union, it took over a large amount of heavy weapons in Manchuria from Japanese imperialism. With these superior conditions in its strategy and preparations for an offensive, it was able in the later military development to turn guerrilla war into regular warfare, and occupy the cities.

10. The events of recent years reflect not only the intensifying of the class contradictions represented by the Kuomintang and the Chinese CP, but also the heightening of the conflict between America and the Soviet Union on the international plane. When Mao formally declared the overthrow of Chiang, it was just the moment for the turn in the foreign policy of the Soviet bureaucracy. Although it is not correct to say that the Chinese CP has simply followed the command of the Kremlin, nevertheless its policy has always accommodated itself to the diplomatic interests of the latter. Just because of this relationship, the Chinese CP was able to take advantage of the conflict between American imperialism and the Soviet Union, and to render that imperialism powerless to send military support directly to Chiang's regime. Besides, by using Marxist-Leninist label and the authority of the October Revolution, it has won support from certain layers of the radical petty bourgeoisie in the cities. All these factors, in addition to the above-mentioned major factors -- the unprecedented rottenness of the bourgeois rule and the inability of a direct intervention on the part of the imperialism -- contributed to the full possibility of the victory of a peasant army.

THE CLASS BASIS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE NEW REGIME

11. Since the Chinese CP conquered power only by means of a purely military offensive and seizure of power, and peaceful occupation, and not through the revolutionary violence of the masses, it has not been able to thoroughly crush the old state apparatus. The whole process of its military victory shows that the peasant army, after having destroyed the resistance of the old ruling power, immediately became the chief instrument of oppression in this country, still remaining in a state of "minority rule." The top-ranking bureaucrats of this new regime have taken the place of the old bureaucracy, and have encroached on the various ranks of state institutions, becoming the head of this new government. The transfer of the old state apparatus, no matter whether through surrender or fight, was realized by means of a peaceful "taking over." The administrative institutions, after the "taking over," were however only reorganized by removing some top functionaries; there were not a few organizations being reduced or enlarged in order to adapt themselves to the new rule, but this is merely like repairing worn-out shoes. In some regions, such as the provinces of Sinkiang and Yun-nan, the old apparatus was taken over intact. The capitulated armies were re-regimented. Under the unified direction of the new bureaucracy, these were taken over and reorganized, or newly created institutions were immediately employed to maintain the former bourgeois order. As a consequence, though the old apparatus has been more or less changed in appearance, its character remains the same, while its function is, on the contrary, greatly strengthened.

But for all that, the class basis of the new regime is entirely different from that of the old. Since it was built up in the midst of the victory of the peasant armed forces, it will necessarily rely on these armed forces as its major support; since the power has fallen into the hands of the Chinese CP which has degenerated into a peasant party, it has nevertheless advanced certain social reforms, and has therefore gained support from the urban and village petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasants. So this new regime is obviously based on the peasants and urban petty-bourgeoisie. The inborn frailty of this regime doomed it forever to lack of independence.

12. This lack of independent spirit of the new regime is most manifest in its inability to create new relations of production. It surrenders to the old social system, and compromises with the bourgeoisie. At the moment of its entering the cities, the Chinese CP made a special announcement of the non-violation of private property, and took all measures for the protection of bourgeois interests. Parallel to this compromising attitude towards the bourgeoisie is its habitual line of excluding the working class from the control and superintendence over production, and its attempts to paralyze by all means the struggle of the workers, to force them to bear continued exploitation by the capitalists. Consequently, despite the fact that the petty-bourgeois peasant party has substituted for the rule of the bourgeois party, this regime is still in the service of the bourgeoisie, and hence it still remains a bourgeois regime.

13. Notwithstanding that the character of the new regime remains in the bourgeois category, a Marxist should not disregard the change in class relations resulting from the events of recent years. This change is of great importance. The downfall of the Kuomintang regime

has stripped the Chinese bourgeoisie of its political support, and greatly weakened its strength; the bureaucratic capitalists, the most powerful sector of the big bourgeoisie, has been wiped away; the political influence of imperialism in China has suffered serious blows. The working class is suddenly unexpectedly elevated to "master" in name, and has gained some meager improvements, but in reality, it has paid with the greatest sacrifice of its political rights, whereas its class position is not promoted at all.

In the countryside, in the regions which have undergone land reform, the landlords have already been liquidated over the course of time. The middle farmers for a time had a rapid growth, and the poor peasants were on the other hand reduced. In the "old areas," the new kulaks have taken birth, while in the "New Areas" the old kulaks still exist. (In the regions where the land reform has not yet begun, although the struggles for reducing rents and interests and against local autocrats and secret agents are still being carried on, the fundamental class relationship has not been altered.) The outcome of the change of these class relations very clearly reveals the form of rule to be necessarily adopted by the new regime.

After this new regime weakened the bourgeoisie, and freed itself from the superintendence of the peasant and worker masses, when all the other classes appeared to be unable to play a decisive role, on the basis of the urban and village petty-bourgeoisie, the Chinese CP has created a somewhat neutral Bonapartist military dictatorship, overshadowing all the existing classes. This power is entirely held in the hands of the newly formed bureaucracy which sustains itself by the huge peasant army, police, and secret agents. The elements which constitute the trunk of this new bureaucracy are the cadres and leaders of the party brought up in a long period of military struggle. Under the bayonet of this "military control," the working class is forced to accept a great intensification of labor and ever more barbarous exploitation. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is obliged to submit temporarily to the restrictions placed on their political influence.

The resolution of the conference of the enlarged central committee of our party, held on January 17, 1950, already affirmed: "The rule of the Chinese CP is a sheer Bonapartist military dictatorship based on the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie, and relying on the peasant armed force." Subsequent events have further sufficiently justified this assertion. We must however distinguish between our conception and that which put the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie on an equal basis and consider the new regime as the coalition between the big bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie. But we must also firmly reject the absurdity of conceiving the new regime as established on a "worker and peasant basis."

THE POLICY OF THE NEW REGIME AND THE DEADLOCK OF SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS

14. We can see more clearly and concretely from the domestic and foreign policy of the new regime that through the double-faced policy of oppression and reformism it is absolutely impossible to solve all the immediate fundamental revolutionary tasks in China, nor is it able to adopt any effective method to untie the intense social contradictions facing it. At most, it can only moderate them for the moment.

On the national question, the policy of the new regime is a half-way policy. Although the regime has driven out the political influence of imperialism on the mainland, yet it has not confiscated the imperialist properties in China which everyone knows are the economic fetters on the Chinese people, and it has never declared the annulment of all the unequal treaties which have been employed to oppress and plunder the Chinese people. Nor has it ever claimed to restore all the settlements and concessions, "the hallmark of the humiliation of the country." On the contrary, it has attempted again and again to enter the United Nations, that gathering of freebooters. These facts demonstrate that the regime still maintains an attitude of compromise toward imperialism.

At present, the new regime is engaged in a vigorous campaign of "protesting against American aid to Korea." It has proceeded with anti-imperialist measures, such as the freezing of the American governmental and private deposits in China, and control over the American properties. This has indeed considerable progressive significance in the objective sense. Despite the campaign being a purely military action under the command of Mao Tse-tung, and no matter how the Stalinist party prevents the workers and peasants of China and Korea from organizing independently in the fight, the fact that it stands on a position of anti-imperialist struggle of the colonial people in Asia has dealt a serious blow to the audacious aggression of the American imperialism, which until now has upheld the Korean people from complete slavery. We Marxists must resolutely support this anti-imperialist campaign. However we should point out that from the point of view of the motives, methods and aims of the anti-American campaign, the new regime is evidently not interested in any thoroughgoing realization of the historical tasks of national independence, or in helping the Korean people to achieve genuine emancipation. Only when its illusion to achieve compromise was crushed by the direct or indirect blockade and raids of the American imperialism did it bring forth this great anti-imperialist agitation campaign in accordance with the diplomatic interests of Moscow. It was also when American imperialism had first frozen the Chinese deposits in the U.S. that it took revenge by applying the same method; and it is only when the aggressive American army was approaching the Chinese borders that it rose hurriedly to defense, to send its armies "against American aid to Korea." So all these actions are still half-way and compromising.

As toward the British and other imperialists, it is trying its best to seek for conciliation, and maintains its diplomatic and commercial relations with the British imperialism by its acquiescence in continuing the concessions in Kowloon and Hongkong. With this kind of policy, it has obtained certain political independence from imperialism, but even this political independence is very fragile, and therefore far from attaining real national independence.

On the other hand, the nation suffers another frustration from the Kremlin, which attempts to place China under its disposal through its control over the Chinese CP. The Kremlin retains its privileges in Manchuria, the concessions of Dairen and Port Arthur which are to be restored to China according to the Mao-Stalin agreement. That they are not immediately restored is already quite unreasonable, yet even the actual return in the future still remains a question. Even if they are restored to China, the fact that the Kremlin would not generously give

up its control over the two bases (Dairen and Port Arthur), and the unequal trade provisions are the most remarkable expressions of the avidity of the Kremlin in China. In order to assure genuine independence for China, it is necessary not only to completely break away from imperialism, but also to become free from the restraints imposed by the Kremlin. However, the new regime has openly declared itself "to lean on one side," that is, to submit to the selfish intentions of Stalin's bureaucracy, and to subordinate the interest of national emancipation to the privileged interests of the latter. This is utterly in violation of the will and aspirations of the Chinese workers and peasants. The evils and greed of the Soviet bureaucracy have already aroused great indignation among the Chinese masses.

With regard to the minority nationalities in the country, although the new regime has granted them "regional autonomy," it has openly robbed them of their self-determination, and it still travels in the old track of "Great-Hanism," because a Bonapartist rule can never adopt a revolutionary national policy. The only thing it can do towards the minority nationalities is to inherit and to perpetuate the policy of oppression in the past.

15. On the agrarian problem, its policy is equally half-way. The Chinese CP has never had a coherent or thorough policy on the land reform. Only when it faced an unfavorable or difficult situation and was in need of support has it conceded to a limited extent to the pressure of peasants' demand for land, and to take measures on land reform. Though the extent of land reform varies in proportion with the different circumstances in which the Chinese CP found itself, yet this kind of land reform has helped the Chinese CP to pass over its difficulties. If the relatively more thoroughgoing land reform proceeded in the most isolated and hopeless situation of the "Kiang-si Period," enabling the Chinese CP to withstand five sieges of the Kuo-mintang and preserve itself from ruin, then the half-way reform carried out in the "Old Areas" under the unfavorable conditions of 1947 undoubtedly resulted in the rapid growth of its army and its final victory, and even this far less sufficient land reform carried on recently in the "New Areas" has considerably stabilized its rule in the countryside of these regions.

During the interval between the land reform in the "Old Areas" and that in the "New Areas," when the new regime had not yet secured a firm standing, in its fear of failing to control the upsurge of a real peasant movement on the one hand, and its attempt to get greater understanding from the bourgeoisie and to attenuate the resistance of the former power in the countryside on the other hand, it had for a time decreed the interruption of the land reform. But afterwards the agrarian problem became the most crucial in the new areas, especially in the south, where it is more difficult than anywhere else to effect a compromise with the peasants' demand for land. The general instability in the countryside rose to threaten the rural domination of the new regime. Meanwhile, the blockade set up by imperialism caused a dwindling in industrial production and confusion in the social and economic life of the country, and thus pushed for the opening of an internal market. All these factors impelled the new regime to start with land reform in the new areas. Moreover, the subsequent "anti-American aid to Korea" campaign, which demanded more and more material resources and man power from the vast countryside of the New Areas, further accelerated the execution of land reform in these regions.

It is undeniable that the land reform prior to and after the establishment of the new regime is the greatest in Chinese history. But because of the deep-rooted fear of the Chinese CP against the masses, the carrying out of land reform, from beginning to end, has been held under its rigorous control, without any respect for the will of the masses. There has never been even one area where the distribution of land was executed by a spontaneous uprising of the peasant masses. However, not everywhere does the practice of land reform conform with the subjective intentions of the regime. In certain districts, in the course of the land reform, the action of the peasants often went beyond the limits set by the new regime. But this kind of "extreme" action has been immediately held back by suppression or force.

The whole process of land reform is carried on entirely on the basis of capitalist private ownership. It has merely turned the private ownership of the landlords into the small-scale ownership of the peasants. After the appropriation of the land, the right of private possession is legalized by the new government. The free purchase and renting of the land is granted; the economy of the rich peasants and industrial and commercial enterprises of the landlords are strongly fortified by the protection of the state. Since this land reform has not succeeded in a real nationalized distribution, and the poor peasants are short of aid from the state, the repolarization of the rural population and the recentralization of the land will be the inevitable consequence (in the Old as well as the New Areas). Only in the difference of time and extent is land reform in the New Areas worse than in the Old Areas.

In the Old Areas, the former landlords and kulaks were liquidated; the poor peasants were allotted their patches of land; the number of middle peasants has for a time greatly increased. By the encouragement of "thrift and prosperity," the new kulaks have experienced a rapid growth, and this growth has once again caused a polarization among the middle peasants. The village cadres of the Chinese CP, often by taking advantage of their position and function in the execution of the land reform, have obtained more of the land and the better kinds of land. They have thus become the most influential group in the countryside. In the New Areas, this half-way land reform and the process of the repolarization of the layers of peasantry has been repeated; the only difference lies in the preservation of the former kulaks and the less quantity of land allocated to the poor peasants. The greatest portion of rural private capital falls in the hands of the kulaks, and most of the village administrations are also under the control of the middle and the rich peasants. In some places, they even fall in the hands of the lackeys of the landlords or the knaves. These facts prove that the farther the new regime approaches the south, the more it is in conciliation with capitalist influence in the countryside, and the more narrow is the alteration in class relations, thus it is more and more subdued to the merciless disposition of capitalist laws. Therefore, this new regime can never relieve the poverty-stricken countryside of China. Only a genuine proletarian regime, standing on entirely new relations of production, will be able to solve once and for all, the agrarian problem, and thus open a socialist road for rural production.

16. On the general democratic problems, in order to cover up its naked Bonapartist military dictatorship, the new regime is obliged to put on a democratic cloak. It endows the people verbally with certain

meager democracy which has only face value. But compared with the loss of fundamental democratic rights, these superficial and meager promises have no weight at all in relation to the interests of the people. They serve only to expose the despotism of the new regime.

The most brutal piece-work wages have been substituted for fundamental democratic rights; and more than ten hours of work a day has replaced the eight-hour work day; compulsory arbitration or outright suppression has replaced the right of strikes. In the state enterprises, bureaucratic control over production has taken the place of the workers' administration; in the private sector, the final decision of the owner or manager has replaced the direct superintendence of the workers. Freedom of speech, of publication, assembly, organization, of bodily security, etc. are practically suppressed, and even the trade unions which aim at securing for the workers an improvement of living standards have become machines for simply encouraging a rise in production and executing governmental orders. What the people need is not this kind of garnished yet meager democracy, but real, most fundamental democratic rights which the new regime will never grant.

17. Since the new regime is incapable of completely solving the above-mentioned democratic tasks, and since it still offers protection to private property, it is certainly unable to free the productive forces from the restrictions it suffered from property relations. The problem facing the Chinese economy is not a problem of capitalist construction, that is, not the question of developing the productive forces already freed from its fetters, but remains one of how to break from the old relations of production and the exterior barriers in order to develop the productive forces. Bereft of political influence and privileges in China, the economic influence of imperialism, which had exercised direct control over the Chinese economic life is also temporarily weakened; yet the economic blockade headed by American imperialism has gravely affected China, cut it from the economic unity with the world, and reduced the supply of raw materials and techniques in industrial production as well as curtailing its foreign trade. On the one hand, the inadequate land reform has halted agricultural production to the stage of operation on a small-farmers' scale; on the other hand, it has resulted in the development of a kulak economy and the reconcentration of land. Though the rural market experienced a moment of expansion in the first period after land reform, nevertheless, due to the reconcentration of land, it is once again shrinking. In the cities, the policy of protecting private enterprise and low wages, and the overwhelming burden of state expenses have brought the working class and the common people universal impoverishment and a deplorable lowering of purchasing power. It is thus impossible to open a broad market within the country for commodities, and to benefit industry. At the same time, the depression in industry in turn hinders the development of rural production by compelling the peasants to reduce the market prices of their products in order to be able to afford industrial commodities, and finally results in the terrible "scissors" to the detriment of economic revival in the countryside, and brings a new crisis of decline for the whole national economy. Those "statized" enterprises, reputed to be socialist, exercise control over the main stream of the whole national economy through various state and private corporations, partnerships, and even through individual capital. This control has only furthered the close linking of capital with the state apparatus. Production in the state sector, operated under capitalist

laws, can neither be separated from private capital with which it shares the whole surplus product of society, nor is it able to disentangle itself from the blind control of the commodity market. On the contrary, it has brought about a brutal bureaucratic damage to production. Hence it can never bring to Chinese economy a well-planned and harmonious development, to deliver the country from the impasse of ruin.

18. Under this compromising and half-way reformist policy, the new regime is naturally unable to solve the profound contradictions which have already occurred or are going to happen.

a. The economic basis taken over from the Kuomintang by the Chinese CP is one which has suffered a long period of war, unprecedented destruction and decline. The social reforms under way can only relatively and to a limited degree render a better turn of the national economy, but it is certainly very difficult for these reforms to achieve a fundamental improvement. The administrative expenses of the enormous state apparatus, the shortage of resources (especially industrial raw materials) caused by the economic blockade of American imperialism, the failure to raise production, the burden of increased armaments due to the threat of war crisis, and particularly the waste of enormous military funds in the recent "anti-American aid to Korea" campaign, all these have considerably lessened the effect of the reform, and the new regime will be drawn deeper into the economic impasse. Under this condition, as long as there is no outside aid, it will inevitably sink, unable to get sufficient aid from the Soviet Union, for it to compromise with and ask help from the American and British imperialists would be its ruin.

b. In order to cover the enormous military and administrative expenses and to prevent the economy from a rapid decline, the new regime will necessarily have to stand on the side of the new bureaucracy and the capitalists, to cast a heavy burden on the working class, to force them to intensify their labor and lower their wages in the name of the raising of production. Consequently, the conflict between the regime and the private capitalists on the one hand, and the workers on the other, will be accentuated along with the deterioration of the national economy.

c. Under the inadequate agrarian policy, all the old contradictions in the areas which have not yet undergone the land reform are preserved, while in the Old Areas and the New Areas, the new contradictions will inevitably cause an explosion between the old and the new kulaks and the poor peasants. At the same time, parallel with the ever-swelling burden imposed on the peasants, the dissatisfaction and opposition of the peasants against the new regime will surely be universalized.

d. The urban craftsmen, traders and shopmen and other poor people also share a part of the evils of the economic difficulties through their contributions to taxes, duties, and other compulsory obligations. They will be more and more impoverished, sinking deeper and deeper in the pit of afflictions, and grow ever more resentful of the regime.

e. The major prop of the new regime is the huge army composed of several millions. This army is directly subject to Mao's strict con-

trol and ideological instructions. The soldiers lead a better material life than the poor peasants, and their families have profited by the land reform, so this army has better discipline and morale, and is bold on the battlefield. Even though the increasing corruption and despotism of the military bureaucracy will affect its morale, and the coming financial difficulties will lead to the lowering of the living standard of the soldiers, it is still not easy to dissolve this army, because these factors are not quite sufficient yet to provoke its indignation towards the new regime or toward partial revolts. Its fate will eventually be linked with that of the regime, and will be determined by the evolution of the decisive class struggle at home and abroad. The coming Chinese revolution of the workers and peasants, however, will in the beginning suffer blows from this army, but in its revolutionary upheaval it will be able to finally win the support of the peasants in uniform, who will rise in rebellion and break away from Mao's regime, dissolving the regime from within. Or else it will be crushed by the victory of imperialism in a future world war.

f. The economic deadlock and all these grave contradictions in the urban centers and the countryside will inevitably be reflected inside the coalition government, and help the parties and the "democratic individuals" representing the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie to take advantage of the critical situation to rejoin imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, to clash with and even to split from the Chinese CP.

g. All these contradictions will also be interwoven in the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On the one hand, with a new world war impending, the Kremlin will make a further attempt to by all means strengthen its control over the Chinese CP and the country. On the other hand, by its preponderant superiority on the international plane, American imperialism through British imperialism and other capitalist countries, Chiang's regime in Formosa, and all the possible passageways within China, will affect the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements and all the politicians of the "democratic factions," and turn them into its "Fifth Column."

THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CHINESE SITUATION

19. However, the new regime can never solve these old and new contradictions encircling it. With growing tension in both the internal and external situation, all these contradictions will surely be aggravated. Either the future war or a revolution will bring ruin to this regime. Hence this regime is completely of a transitory character.

There are only two alternative perspectives before China:

First, in the next period, if the rule of the Chinese CP is shaken by the profound contradictions within itself, or by the direct stimulus of the international proletarian revolution, the Chinese working class will then have an opportunity to lift up its head. In close alliance with the peasant struggle, and under the correct leadership of a revolutionary party, it would be able to overthrow the Bonapartist rule of the Chinese CP, establish the proletarian dictatorship, realize the ultimate solution of the democratic tasks, and march on towards socialism. This is the perspective of the Third Chinese Revolution.

In a second alternative, the bourgeoisie, with direct support of imperialism, could overthrow the regime of the Chinese CP by military force, and restore their sanguinary rule. This is the perspective of the restoration of the bourgeois power. But, in view of the present situation, this perspective would be possible only in the event of the Third World War.

20. The class basis of the new regime and its objective condition determine its policy to suppress both the right and the left to maintain its rule. The keener the class contradictions both in the country and abroad, the stronger the suppression. The regime will never consciously seek its basis among the proletariat, mobilize the worker and peasant masses, grant class democracy, and "transform the country into a workers' state," because to do so, the masses would first of all abolish the Bonapartist rule of this regime. It is equally impossible to depend on the bourgeoisie as its class basis, "to reorganize the government and readjust all the political and social measures in accordance with the will of the bourgeoisie, to allow the bourgeoisie to return to power by peaceful means," since the bourgeoisie has been enfeebled to such extent that it will never be able to restore its rule without armed support from the imperialists. On the other hand, the acute conflict between American imperialism and the Soviet Union, the interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy and that of the petty-bourgeois peasant class-basis of the Chinese CP will not permit the regime to reorganize the government to the satisfaction of the bourgeoisie, and to restore its rule by peaceful means.

Neither the proletarian dictatorship nor the restoration of bourgeois rule can be attained by peaceful means; the former can be achieved only by revolution, and the latter by bloody wars.

21. The whole policy of the new regime reveals that it is blindly pushing the country into a Third World War. If the proletariat does not rise in time to put an end to its rule, China will inevitably find itself in a new catastrophe. In the event of a future war, despite the possibility of the restoration of the Chinese bourgeois power, owing to the inevitable death of world capitalism and the eventual explosion of world revolution, it will be more possible than ever for the Chinese proletariat to bring to an end the rule of Mao Tse-tung by revolution, and to terminate the world war by joining the main current of the world revolution.

22. But, the optimistic aspect of a revolution in China does not suggest a broad highway. The development of coming events must go through a zigzag path. The Chinese Revolutionary Communist Party, before it can lead the proletariat to power, must closely watch the evolution of the relationship between the new regime and the Kremlin. On the part of the latter, in view of the ever intensifying international situation, above all through its bitter experiences in Yugoslavia, the Kremlin will be more anxious and even more cautious in exerting its control over China. As for Mao, due to the fact that his influence has earned him considerable independence in the course of his growth, he has displayed a certain nationalistic color. The plunder of industrial equipment in Manchuria by the Kremlin has already stirred up deep resentment among the common people against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, American imperialism will infiltrate into China through all possible cracks to irritate and sting. Consequently, a

more serious centrifugal tendency in relation to the Kremlin will be generated within the party. Yet, we must note that since China has not experienced a workers' and peasants' revolution, the transition to a workers' and peasants' power (as in the case of Yugoslavia), will differ in the case of a split in Chinese Stalinism from that in Yugoslavia.

We must also pay close attention to the following fact that, as a result of the sharpening of class struggle in the country and the broadening of the split in international Stalinism, Mao's party will surely be led to a polarization between the right and the left. Our party should strive our best to help the Chinese CP to break from the Kremlin, to encourage the leftward development of this party.

THE TACTICS OF OUR PARTY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

23. In this new situation of the rule of the Chinese CP, the most urgent task of our party is to engage in a resolute and relentless struggle against the Bonapartist military dictatorship of the Chinese CP and its line of "New Democracy." We must try every possibility to recover our places in the various spheres of social life, and to broaden our contacts with the masses, to lead the working class to the Third Chinese Revolution.

In view of the present revolutionary situation, the most practical work of the revolutionists is to explain to the toiling masses that the Chinese CP won the power not because of the correctness of its policy, but the absence of organization and leadership of the working class; that the new regime does not represent the interests of workers and peasants, but those of the bourgeoisie; what the workers and peasants need is not limited to some progressive reforms, but a revolution of fundamental change. By this explanation, we would enable the workers to extricate themselves from the fraud of "New Democracy," to recover their self-confidence and vitality, to join up with the peasants in common action, to traverse the experiences of daily struggle in the field of political struggle, from the general democratic struggle toward the socialist struggle for power. At the same time, we must explain to the peasants that the new regime has not satisfied and can never satisfy their demand for land; they must carry on a fight for a thorough solution of the land problem and only accompanied by the class struggle of the working class can the victory of this fight be assured; only the working class is their reliable ally and leader.

To stand alongside of the masses in the struggle against the military dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung, we must first of all fight for all fundamental democratic rights, i.e., complete freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, strike, residence, thinking, etc., the right of the masses to express freely their opinions, to organize and to rise to action.

If the working class is recognized not in words but in fact as the "master" of the country, we must appeal for the annulment of the ten-hour work day and the piece-work wage system, and demand the establishment of an eight-hour work day to allow time for the workers to enter into political activities. We demand the revocation of the bureaucratic supervision of the manager or military advisers in the state factories, and the direct control of the capitalists in the private factories; we call for the immediate organization of factory com-

mittees by the workers themselves who will superintend and directly control production.

We demand a full-scale and complete agrarian reform, the nationalization and prohibition of free purchase of land. We object to the protection of both the new and old kulaks. We claim that the state should offer to the poorest peasant all practical aids, such as low interest loans, etc. We demand the nullification of all impositions and extortions, and the realization of the simple land tax.

We demand the abolishment of all the unequal treaties, the restoration of all lost territories, the confiscation of all the imperialist properties in China. We call for a fight against all avaricious attempts and privileges of the Kremlin, to complete real national independence. We appeal for the self-determination for the minority nationalities.

All these struggles should be focused in a central slogan: Call at once for a universally elected and wholly authorized national assembly, in place of the present "Political Consultative Conference" (entirely designated by the parties or factions), or the coming "People's Representative Conference." Under the Bonapartist rule, this slogan will have more important agitative significance.

Meanwhile, we must call for the organizing of workers, peasants, and soldiers' soviets, to supplement the slogan of a national assembly -- in the course of the agrarian reform, the slogan of organizing soviets will have more real significance, that is, to counterbalance and to expose the undemocratic and hypocritical workers' and peasants' committees, to prepare for the transformation of present military dictatorship, the so-called "People's Government," into a workers' and peasants' government.

24. Only by leading off from this program of action the workers and peasants will then be able to disentangle themselves from the delusive "New Democracy," and the oppression of the present military dictatorship, to be consolidated in the march toward the real revolutionary road. We firmly believe that despite its increasing camouflages and sweet promises, this transitory regime, in its incompetency to accomplish the pressing historical tasks, the failure to solve the profound social contradictions, will not be able to save its rule in the long run. The heavy responsibility of attaining genuine national independence and solution of all the problems of the workers and peasants naturally falls on the shoulders of the Chinese RCP. It is this party alone which has a correct revolutionary program, and only this program can lead the workers and peasants to conquer power through a violent revolution, to build up a proletarian dictatorship, and to proceed immediately to socialism.

Today, our small and weak organization is suffering unprecedented persecutions. Lying before us is a period of hardships and afflictions. We must redouble our fighting perseverance to sail on against the counter-current.

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