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REPORT ON TACTICS IN EUROPE

By Pierre Frank

[The following is the outline prepared by Comrade Frank for his report on the "Draft Resolution on our Tactics in Europe" at the Third World Congress Since the Reunification (Ninth World Congress). This resolution is contained in International Information Bulletin No. 7 (May 1969). The congress did not reach this point on the agenda and so it was agreed to continue the discussion on the resolution after the congress, with a conference of the European sections to be held later in the year empowered to act on the question.]

* * *

The discussion we are now taking up on tactics in Europe opened more than two years ago in the European sections. In January 1968 the International Executive Committee also examined this question. This discussion was raised owing to changes in the objective and subjective situation. We have reached a point where this discussion has already cleared up not a few points, where it can be based on sufficiently complete experiences, where it can assume a more general character. The document which we are submitting reached the delegates late. For this reason, but also and above all because the discussion must deeply involve all the sections and especially those most concerned, the United Secretariat has decided to propose that this document not be adopted definitively but be voted on as a basis for discussion, a discussion that will last for several months more and be concluded at a future IEC plenum with expanded participation by the European sections.

I will review only a few points of the document submitted for discussion. I would add that it was inspired as much as possible by experiences we have already undergone and, especially by the experience in France. By the force of events, this experience went the furthest and was the richest in lessons, although of course there is no question of interpreting and applying it mechanically. First a word on the situation created by the new mass upsurge in Europe. It included a new key feature -- it is not only anti-capitalist but for the first time it has an antibureaucratic element as a result of a sufficiently massive antibureaucratic minority current existing within it. Secondly, not to repeat the previous debates at this congress, we will not counterpose building the party to the ways and means of struggle. Both must be developed. A party is necessary but also means for struggle. The present discussion centers on the question of building the party as the political leadership of

the class.

To begin, it is useful to recall our basic conception of the revolutionary party as the political vanguard of the class. What distinguishes us on this point from the sectarians and ultralefts -- who are proliferating now -- is that those among them who think in terms of a party regard it primarily as the product of an ideological weeding-out process. It is clear in our view that the party must have a theoretical foundation and we will not allow this to be compromised. We train our cadres on this basis. Everyone who joins the party must accept these basic principles, although they may have only a general familiarity with them at the start. But a revolutionary party cannot develop only or primarily through a process of gradual growth, through individual recruitment. The party is a collective product of the class struggle. In the last analysis, it can only select its members and gain authority in the class struggle. In countries where there are many organizations, large and small, which reflect the differentiations existing or developing in the class, this requires that the formation of the party be achieved through political operations. In our view, there is nothing perjorative in this term. We have entered into a new situation in Europe. The revival of the class struggle is going to produce uneven political development in the class, differing according to generation, job and social categories, long crystallized political currents, etc...This uneven development will result in political processes of breaks, splits, regroupments, etc. And we must intervene in these processes not simply through propagandistic activity.

Our organizations have been formed up until now essentially by ideological selection and this process will very largely continue for the immediate future. It is, in fact, a prime task to reinforce our sections strongly by this means in the coming months. But if we want to have a correct line on building the party, we must have a broader conception of the problems that are beginning to arise from the development of an extensive new vanguard in order to strengthen the revolutionary Marxist organizations in other ways than through a gradual process. The operations we may have to carry out at the present time are still minimal in scope by comparison with those we will have to map in the future. But it is precisely on the basis of the operations we carry out now that we will make our organizations and more particularly our leaderships more capable of handling the operations to come.

It is from this standpoint that we must consider what has just taken place in France. After May 1968, it was on the order of the day for our organization to change its form so that the revolutionary Marxist vanguard could encompass the most conscious sector of the new vanguard in its ranks, that section of the new vanguard that had drawn the lessons from the battles in which they had participated and which asked only to assimilate these lessons. It was impossible to think that we could construct a revolutionary party through some miracle but we had to get out of the old rut.

For twenty years in Europe we lived with a workers movement that was largely stagnant. It underwent only fluctuations and variations, which we did not neglect but which were extremely limited. We drew many more political lessons from these episodes than reinforcements. The present situation demands that we show our capacity to utilize these lessons to work boldly with currents that are broader than in the past and more radical in their views and actions. It is on this first point that we must rearm our sections and more especially the leaderships of our sections.

* * *

The main factor in the present situation in the European workers movement is that after twenty years there is a considerable gap -- the like of which has never been seen -- between the traditional workers movement and the young generation, more particularly their vanguard currents in the broadest sense of the term. Although many developments are ripening now in the traditional organizations, the young generations condemn these organizations categorically. This has often led to sweeping conclusions. I am not thinking of conceptions in the style of Marcuse, Sweezy, Fanon, etc.... who have denied the historic mission of the proletariat. These tendencies seem to me on the decline today. I am referring to tendencies which claim to be Marxist but which deviate from Marxism either by sectarianism or ultraleftism -- without forgetting the spontanéists. Until a vanguard of some numerical and social substance emerges from the mass of workers, we will have considerable difficulties with sectarian manifestations. These manifestations will take the form primarily of ultraleftism but in this we will see strange combinations with opportunist, spontanéist, etc., features. We have had a rich experience in this field and it is not about to be concluded.

The most immediate task -- reinforcing our organizations either directly or in a combined way with the formation of a youth organization -- seems now to be accepted by our European sections. This

has occurred not without a certain hesitation but it is now generally accepted. This does not mean that there is a clear understanding everywhere of the new tactic and the steps to take. I will not go into a series of questions related to this task which were discussed in the youth report. I will only deal with more specific points. I will begin with entryism.

It might seem strange that we are still being attacked on this question after giving up this tactic as we practiced it from 1953-54 on. But it is not surprising. All the sectarian and ultraleft currents...who reject the old workers movement cannot use the arguments against us that they employ against the Social Democrats and the Stalinists. Since they subsist largely on bits and pieces of our criticism, they are led to look for what appear to them to be our weak points in order to combat us. In the realm of tactics, entryism was the expression of our search for a link with the workers movement as a whole and this concept is a stumbling block for them. It is also normal that a number of young comrades who have joined our ranks are not perfectly armed on this question. Let me note finally, that the application of this tactic -- which in the history of the workers movement was never applied as we applied it -- was not entirely above reproach. There are, therefore, sufficient reasons for reviewing it -- to say nothing of the fact that the lessons to be drawn from it will be useful for the future operations we will be faced with in the process of building the revolutionary party.

We have indicated the conditions in which we turned toward entryism in the fifties. We have also indicated that in spite of certain errors with regard to perspective which we made when we decided on entryism, this tactic was and proved itself to be the only one possible for a whole period. We indicated, finally, the gains from this tactic, gains primarily of a political nature. These gains represented a considerable achievement in a period when the possibilities of growth for the revolutionary Marxist current were clearly of the most limited sort.

We must also delineate the weaknesses which manifested themselves in the application of this tactic. There was to be sure at certain times and in certain sections a somewhat fatalistic waiting for the development of left tendencies in the old parties. This is what explains why, in certain sections of our movement, misunderstandings arose in regard to the youth movements when they began to appear. This was true more specifically in Germany when these movements broke with the traditional workers party. Sometimes a long period of political quiescence ended

by having a depressive effect and depriving sections of our movement of the necessary flexibility in thought and action. There was a certain slowness in discerning the signs of the development that was to result in the youth becoming radicalized politically outside the organized workers movement.

In this regard, the objective situation in France, combined with the ultra-conservative policy of the French Communist Party [PCF] leadership, made possible the appearance at the end of the fifties, at the time of the Algerian war, of signs of this phenomenon of youth departing from the rate and paths of development of the adults. We highlighted these signs in a pamphlet devoted to explaining the entryist policy, Construire le Parti Révolutionnaire [Build the Revolutionary Party] (see p. 15). We understood that what we considered to be "special" tasks resulted from this situation. We held back then from giving up the entryist policy as we had understood it since 1953. These special tasks that we undertook produced some results for us during the Algerian war, recruitment to the organization in a period when our work in the PCF was beginning to stagnate. The Vietnam war enabled us to make this turn without great difficulties. We did it quite pragmatically, of course, but it could hardly have been otherwise.

It must be emphasized for those who dispute the basis of entryism that even among the youth the radicalization first began to find expression in the youth organizations attached to the traditional parties (this holds true for France, Germany, Italy, and also for other countries).

Above and beyond these general observations, in which we should also stress a sometimes undue inertia in entryist work, we must draw the lesson that it is not sufficient to base ourselves on a general tactic which we consider to be correct for the workers movement as a whole. We must also be able to grasp the importance of turning toward certain sectors which, while of a special or marginal character, offer the potential for more immediate results.

Above and beyond these general considerations, there are other lessons to be drawn from the entryist period. For my part, this experience showed, among other things, the following: First of all, not all comrades are capable of fruitful work inside other organizations. Some persons, who understand the tactic very well theoretically, are not shaped politically to practice it. They lack the reflexes which this work demands day by day. Finally, I think that even for a relatively long-term tactic we should have limited the time in which any comrade was engaged in it and assured a turn-

over among those carrying it out. In the long run, this tactic has a very depressing effect on an individual practicing it.

In the draft resolution, it is mentioned that we must struggle for uniting the Trotskyist movement into the International. The question is far from being posed in the same terms for all countries and we must not carry this to a ridiculous extreme. Nor is this something which imposes a specific task with immediate objectives. When we made proposals to the Voix Ouvrière comrades in May 1968, which resulted in an agreement for unity in action, we did this with the perspective that someday something more than joint activity might come of it. But we did not think that situations which have very profound causes could be resolved in a few days. There is no question of eliminating the polemics that are necessary, especially with regard to the Healy and Lambert organizations, some of whose positions are scandalous. But the fact that organizations claim to be Trotskyist, that at least to some extent their thinking follows general Trotskyist criteria, must be taken into consideration in an epoch when events can provoke rapid modifications in the political thinking of some.

We insist also on the necessity of a political and practical struggle to win hegemony in the vanguard. For years we were faced with crystallized groups whose members were well up on the differences of the past, etc.... When we waged polemics on this or that occasion, they were partly ritualistic. At most we brought up to date arguments that were known to all those who followed them. Today, there is no country not marked by the greatest diversity in the vanguard. This situation reflects the fact that the youth have not found in action one pole of attraction sufficiently stronger than all the others. As it has already been said, this situation will not fade away rapidly. But this does not mean that it must be passively endured. Ideological struggle will not be decisive in itself but it is indispensable. Such struggle is a necessity first of all to consolidate our organizations and educate our militants, and, secondly, to prepare the way for the further stages in building the revolutionary party, when we will inevitably again be confronted with some of the currents now contending within the vanguard. In this struggle, ideological argument must be combined with action and not solely within a national framework.

* * *

I come now to what I think is the most delicate part in our new tactic to formulate and put into practice. It is the part which concerns our activity aim-

ed at the old formations, at the organized workers movement. The turn toward the young vanguard is being made in more or less all the sections. Except for a few areas of resistance, this is primarily a question of clarification, of understanding, and adaptation to local conditions. If there are debates and even differences in certain sections, it would be useful to have the discussion bring these out. But in making a turn, above all the sort of turn we are making, where after long difficult years we see possibilities for reaping very significant gains with respect to our size, there is the danger of exaggerating the turn and losing sight of the overall picture.

Winning the most advanced strata of youth must not result in cutting us off from the working class. In that case, the present gains would threaten to prove sterile. We must not make this turn in an indiscriminate way; because tomorrow's convulsions will have an ever-increasing effect on the organized workers movement. It would be illusory to think that a revolutionary party could be formed without extremely profound crises occurring in the old mass organizations. If we might have doubts about the dangers that would be involved in a tactic discounting these organizations and holding that they could no longer contribute anything, I need only recall the speech Comrade Illario made at the last plenum and the political disarray into which he has fallen. His position in regard to the old movement does not by itself explain this disarray but it has contributed to it.

I will not insist here on the necessity of a strong campaign of open work under the banner of the Fourth International not only among the youth but also throughout the working class and in the factories. I want to deal with the work aimed at the old parties and also in the old parties, whose importance, far from diminishing, will tend to increase but with forms and with a perspective different from the past.

There is a first point which presents no difficulties. This concerns comrades, more or less numerous, depending on the country, who have won trade-union positions in their factories through their rank-and-file work. Most often they hold a membership card in the party which is in the majority in the working class of their countries. Without this card, under present conditions, it would be difficult for them to occupy trade-union posts. In these cases, membership in the old parties must be considered a formality. Of course, we must seek to transform the situation in the unions also and win recognition of tendencies in the unions, of the right of minorities, etc. This is, in fact, a problem of crucial importance which, in prac-

tice, was not resolved by the Communist parties and the Communist International even in their best period. In fact, they stumbled over this problem in the revolutionary upsurge following the first world war. No revolution up to now has triumphed in a country where the working class was strongly organized into unions over a long period. We cannot, in my opinion, hope to win the unions -- i.e., their apparatus -- by legal means any more than we can the bourgeois state. We must win bastions among the ranks and at certain levels in the unions, bastions which are indispensable bases for outflanking the apparatuses in struggles. I will not go deeply in this discussion. I think that at least there is a wide measure of agreement among us on the importance of having positions in the unions at the rank-and-file level, in the factories. And we are also all agreed that however attractive the idea of counterposing "revolutionary" bodies (revolutionary unions, committees, action committees) to the reformist unions may be to young workers disgusted by the practices of the unions, we must not ever, no matter what the cost, make any concessions to such tendencies. In order to stay in the unions you must know how to "dissemble and lie." Only incorrigible ultraleftists can dispute this teaching of Lenin which referred explicitly to the unions.

Now, what is to be said about work in the old parties? First of all, no rule can be valid for all the parties. One cannot, for example, apply the same rule to the British Labour Party as to the PCF. Even if today the Labour Party is experiencing numerous defections and if scarcely any activity can be carried out within it, we can be sure that when a crisis breaks out it will take very different forms there than in the PCF -- if only because of the position the unions occupy in the Labour Party.

We make a strong distinction between entryist work and the work we are carrying on at present which might be more correctly called fraction work, or given some other designation to mark the difference clearly. In the past, for entryist work we oriented ourselves in accordance with the developments inside the parties, which of course reflected developments within the class but in an indirect way. We did so because we could not do a great deal of work on them from the outside, either through propaganda or, still less, through action. At the present time the dynamics of the class struggle is our primary criterion in this work. For the moment, this is broader than its direct repercussions in the old parties. It is tending to generate forces external to these parties which make it possible to bring pressure to bear on these parties and provoke differentiations within them. In the present conditions, nothing

would be more dangerous than to leave the field open to sectarian currents, to let them become a pole of attraction for the most advanced militants in the old parties. We must certainly not get ourselves expelled from these parties for no good reason. But we should not fear expulsions nor allow confused elements to polarize the inevitable crises in the old parties for their own benefit. There can be no question of giving recipes. It is up to the sections to be able to adapt their orientation concretely to the specific conditions of their countries.

For the moment, the apparatuses of the old parties are still holding up. And a problem which arises for us in certain countries is that of centrist formations, whether they already exist like the PSU in France, PSIUP in Italy, or tendencies in that direction. We have had a long experience with centrist formations on the margins of the big parties. We may have to carry on work within them. But experience has shown us that such organizations, whose size and social composition are not really promising, which are distinguished neither by the quantity of their activists nor the quality of their program, serve as bridges toward Marxism for very few militants. In general, they block the development of many militants. These organizations are most often led by pseudorevolutionary politicians who have no intention of transforming their organizations into revolutionary formations. We do not, then, encourage the formation of such organizations, which complicate the political scene.

We have spoken of the formation of revolutionary youth organizations. They must be considered a bridge toward us through the experiences undergone by these youth, only a small number of whom have been organized before. But we must also be conscious of the fact that without the proper intervention on our part, such organizations, too, can engender centrist formations which obstruct the struggle for a revolutionary party.

With regard to centrism, we must say a few words more concerning a problem which does not arise today but which we cannot exclude as a possibility in the future. We cannot predict the form that the crisis of the old parties will take and we cannot exclude the possibility that at a given moment centrist organizations will emerge from them which will be distinguished from the ones existing today by a working-class social composition and deeper roots in the working class. If that happened, we would have to face tactical problems much more complex than today's. We need not speculate on problems which have not yet arisen but we must be conscious of the manifold possibilities of a developing

situation which will produce problems without precedent or parallel in the past.

I will end this short report by dealing with what seems to me to be the fundamental question. One of the essential features of the new situation in Europe is that it will be marked more than ever in the past by abrupt turns. There are tasks which must be carried out from day to day but we must be ever more ready to adapt very rapidly to such turns. This has and will have consequences also for building the party. For the moment the immediate task is to reinforce our sections as appreciably as possible. At the moment no sections face a problem like that being experienced now in France. But the French situation is not destined to remain exceptional. We must be absolutely sure of what we have long said -- there are situations in which the role of the subjective factor is decisive over brief periods. This is true not only for the seizure of power by a revolutionary party. It is true also for making leaps forward to a revolutionary formation on the road to building the party.

No one dreams of encouraging adventurist maneuvers in this area. But our movement is weighed down by the weight of long years when only minimal gains could be envisaged. What is important to understand clearly is that from now on we can make gains the like of which we have never made before. And we must gird ourselves to make them. This is the fundamental aspect of the new situation in which for the first time in our history a new vanguard of mass dimensions is developing. While the conditions vary from country to country, they are moving in the same direction. For the first time, it depends primarily and above all on us to organize this vanguard under our banner. This will depend in a general way not on our ideas but on more specific interventions in the given circumstances. By such interventions we can make the first breakthroughs that will enable our movement to emerge as a major force. In Europe enormous contradictions have accumulated for the reformist and Stalinist leaderships. These contradictions are coming to a head. Our movement has great possibilities ahead of it through a succession of actions, opportunities for which circumstances will open up for us. It is not only for strong recruitment in the immediate future that we must rearm ourselves. We must clearly begin by carrying out what has been called a "primitive accumulation of cadres" in the immediate future. But we must do so with the perspective of broad political operations aimed at building a revolutionary party. It is in this perspective that we must rearm our movement.

MINORITY REPORT TO THE WORLD CONGRESS

By Peng Shu-tse

Comrades:

First of all I should like to point to the fact that it has been almost three and a half years since the eruption of the so-called "Cultural Revolution." The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which just opened in Peking, formally marks the end of this movement. However, at this point -- the end of the "Cultural Revolution" -- the International finds itself still in the beginning stages of a discussion on this most important event. I feel profoundly that such a situation is a disgrace to the International. It is clear that the International's concern over the Chinese events is by no means to provide a guide to action but merely the leisurely production of documents and resolutions for the International's archives. Every comrade in the International should be on guard against such a procedure in the International's future work.

In addition, the document on China was only adopted by the United Secretariat one month before the congress, and I did not receive this document until three weeks before the congress. Naturally, the comrades living outside of Europe would most likely have received this document even later, if they received it at all before the congress. Hence, it was impossible for the rank and file or, for that matter, the leaderships of the sections, to have any serious discussion on the basis of this document. All the resolutions submitted by the United Secretariat, particularly on such important questions as China, should be prepared and sent to the comrades at least six months before a world congress, otherwise there can be no fruitful discussion in the International. The truth is that only one resolution appeared anywhere near six months before the congress, while all the others appeared only during a six-week period preceding the congress, and some were only made available at the congress itself. It is evident that the cadres of each section were not able to discuss the world congress resolutions. Such a situation demonstrates a most serious weakness of the International's leadership which must be corrected in the future.

Since the so-called "Cultural Revolution" has been terminated, the resolution presented to the congress is already out of date. Nevertheless, I by no means want to reject a discussion on the basis of the United Secretariat resolution, since it contains many mistaken ideas and contradictions on such problems as the nature of the CCP and its regime, the causes, aims and development of Mao's

"Cultural Revolution," the differences between the Mao and Liu factions and their origins as well as social basis, and the meaning and significance of the Chinese events. All of these problems have yet to be discussed seriously in the International, and it is for this reason that after three years of the "Cultural Revolution" the International is unable to arrive at a common interpretation of the Chinese events, and even finds itself in a state of intolerable confusion on these problems, and committing big mistakes relative to the Chinese question. In order to arrive at a common and clear interpretation of the Chinese events as well as to correct our past mistakes and avoid future ones, the International must launch a thorough and serious discussion on China. Otherwise more serious, irreparable, and even disastrous mistakes are in store for the International and its sections.

As for the draft resolution adopted by the majority of the United Secretariat, I will limit my remarks to several important points, since I have already expressed my opinion in the written discussion in such documents as my letter of March 1967 to the IEC and my article, "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle Inside the CCP," of November 19, 1967.

1. The draft resolution of the United Secretariat majority is based upon a draft resolution submitted by the Political Committee of the SWP. However, we find many important ideas were removed by the United Secretariat majority from the original draft, while many new and mistaken ideas were added. For example, in the first paragraph of the original document the United Secretariat removed the word "Stalinized" from the phrase, "which led the Stalinized Chinese Communist Party in the civil war." This, combined with the refusal of the United Secretariat majority in their resolution to characterize the CCP as Stalinist clearly demonstrates that the majority of the United Secretariat does not regard the CCP even today as a Stalinist party.

This attitude of the majority of the United Secretariat has its historical origins at the Third World Congress in 1951. At that congress there were three main tendencies on the Chinese question. One tendency was represented by Pablo, who considered the CCP to be a revolutionary Marxist party inasmuch as it had taken power against Stalin's own personal advice. My position was, on the contrary, that the CCP remained a Stalinist party in spite of its taking power, since it did so only because it took militant ac-

tion against the serious attack launched by Chiang Kai-shek; and this action was approved by Stalin. The third tendency was represented by Comrade Germain who considered that the CCP had become a left-centrist party upon gaining power.

Owing to the differences among the leaders of the International on the nature of the CCP, logical differences followed as to the nature of the CCP's regime. Pablo, considering the CCP to be a revolutionary Marxist party, held that the regime constituted a dictatorship of the proletariat. Pablo's ideas were later developed more concretely. In the Quatrième Internationale of November 1958 one can find the following sentence in the article "Uninterrupted Revolution in China," by Jean Paul Martin. "The administrative committees of the communes are in reality 'popular town councils,' soviets." From this it can be seen that Pablo considered the regime of the CCP logically to be a dictatorship of the proletariat based on "'popular town councils,' soviets." Of course, today everybody knows that Pablo himself has done a flip-flop on the Chinese question and now considers the Chinese regime to be even worse than Stalin's regime.

The SWP in 1955 took the position that the CCP was a Stalinist party and its regime a bureaucratic dictatorship, and therefore advocated political revolution (see "The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath," Discussion Bulletin A-31, October 1955). At approximately the same time, I too arrived at the conclusion that the CCP regime represented a bureaucratic dictatorship, and hence, agreed with the conclusion of political revolution. The position of the present majority of the United Secretariat on the nature of the CCP remains consistent with Pablo's original analysis; and up to now it has not decided on the nature of the CCP's regime. The majority draft resolution only states that there is a bureaucracy in China; it avoids defining the CCP's regime as a bureaucratic dictatorship. In spite of this, however, the United Secretariat majority resolution proposes political revolution. Here we can clearly see a fundamental contradiction in the resolution. A bureaucracy existed in the Soviet Union even under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. But we would not expect the majority of the United Secretariat to try to justify a position of calling for a political revolution to overthrow the Soviet regime headed by Lenin and Trotsky merely because a bureaucracy existed.

2. It is worth examining several of the additions made by the majority of the United Secretariat, such as those singling out "the main contradictions" of China -- a,b,c,d,e,f, -- as well as the conclusions drawn by the United Secretar-

iat majority from these contradictions. In point "a," for example, the resolution says: "The contradiction between the rate of growth of the economy...and the rate of growth of the population..." This "contradiction" is a very common phenomenon in almost all the backward countries; but it has no direct connection with the "Cultural Revolution." In point "d" we read, "The contradiction between the general low level of consumption of the mass of the people and the increasing bureaucratic privileges..." This, too, is a common phenomenon existing in all the workers states ruled by Stalinist parties; but it has no direct connection with the "Cultural Revolution". The other four "contradictions" under the letters b,c,e, and f are also abstract and scholastic. Nevertheless, the authors of the United Secretariat majority resolution use these contradictions to draw the following conclusions:

"All these contradictions have been intensified by the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the second phase of the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period. They created an explosive situation in the country, in which a process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses became possible. In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured. The 'Cultural Revolution' constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy."

This conclusion contains three very important factual errors.

a) A "process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses" did take place during "the hundred flowers bloom and hundred schools of thought contend" movement in 1957, a prime example of which was the revolt by the 3,000 high-school students in Han Yan (near Hankow). This movement developed to the point of threatening the CCP's regime. Mao was obliged to suppress the movement after this revolt in order to check the revolutionary tendency of the masses.

The serious famine of 1959-61 (not "near-famine") created by the Great Leap Forward (in reality by the People's Communes policy) of course "created an explosive situation in the country." But the reforms carried out under the leadership of Liu Shao-chi after 1960 such as putting an end to the Great Leap Forward, modifying the People's Communes policy by allowing the peasants to have their own plot of land, restoring the free market in the countryside, etc., and making concessions to those people working in the cul-

tural and educational fields, appeased to a great extent the discontent of the masses and ameliorated the danger faced by the bureaucracy. That is, "a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy" was diverted.

b) The "Cultural Revolution" launched by Mao in no way "constituted objectively an attempt...to divert the social forces...from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy." The "Cultural Revolution" was, on the contrary, an attempt by the Mao faction to oust Liu and his followers in order to safeguard Mao's own personal dictatorship. This is a self-evident fact which everybody understands except the authors of the majority document.

c) To say that "the 'Cultural Revolution' constituted objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy," is to say that the Mao faction represents a reformist tendency, i.e., a progressive tendency in relation to the other sectors of the bureaucracy. Then why doesn't the resolution give Mao's faction critical support against the other sectors of the bureaucracy? Is this not an important contradiction? The real reason, it would seem, why the resolution gives Mao's faction a reformist label, i.e., progressive label, is to cover up its reactionary essence.

3. The draft resolution states that "By Marxist standards, neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other." This paragraph is a repetition of the position expressed in the "Discussion Resolution" of the IEC meeting in March 1967. I have already listed five differences between Mao's and Liu's factions which prove the latter to be the more progressive (see "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle Inside the CCP," November 19, 1967). Here I will not repeat those points, but will ask the comrades to take special note of the following two facts:

a) In regard to the "de-Stalinization" movement in the Soviet Union, Liu's faction gave it support as is clearly demonstrated by Teng Hsiao-ping's report to the Eighth Congress of the CCP which I have quoted in my article (*ibid.*, pages 5-6). On the other hand, Mao's faction took a very strong position against "de-Stalinization." The following question should be answered by the authors of the majority resolution: Is there absolutely no difference between the positions of the two factions on the question of "de-

Stalinization"? The majority comrades of the United Secretariat must give us a clear answer to this question.

b) I have cited many sources which prove that Liu Shao-chi and especially Peng Teh-huai were opposed to Mao's Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policy. Peng's opposition can clearly be seen from his letter to Mao dated July 13, 1959. (Published in the Fatherland Magazine, March 1968 in Hong Kong.) In this letter, Peng said that the Great Leap Forward had been executed in such a rush that all proportion in economic development had been destroyed, and had resulted in huge waste (2,000,000,000 Chinese dollars). He claimed that "the People's Communes were set up too early which made for the setback in agricultural productivity." Peng said that the origin of the mistakes was due to "petty-bourgeois fanaticism." He also said, "In the opinion of some comrades putting politics in command can replace all other laws. They forget that it is impossible to replace economic laws with politics..." Therefore, he demanded that the party "correct the leftist tendency."

While the ideas in Peng's letter are generally correct, Mao attacked him in a vicious way, saying that "Peng Teh-huai is an ambitious person. He deliberately wants to split the party...organizing their clique in order to build their own opportunist party." He also accused Peng of trying "to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat."

In other words, the position expressed by Peng Teh-huai on the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policy was generally correct, and without doubt, much more progressive than Mao's. Therefore, we must ask the comrades, especially the comrades of the United Secretariat, to reconsider their position with regard to the differences between the two factions, in order that we might reach a correct political position on China for the International and the Chinese section.

4. The draft resolution says:

"In seeking to gain influence in the colonial world, Peking uses a language that is strongly anti-imperialist. It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces. This has not only created an image far to the left of Moscow but also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa."

The ideas expressed in the above quotation are in complete opposition to the idea of political revolution in China. If Peking's political position and action have "objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the

world," why does the resolution not give the Peking regime critical support instead of advocating political revolution to overthrow it? The position taken by the authors of the draft resolution is clearly a contradictory one.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the main author of the majority document, Comrade Livio. I must frankly state that Comrade Livio does not have the capacity to write a resolution on China. For one thing, he knows very little about the Chinese situation and seems to know hardly anything about the evolution of events in China since the CCP took power in 1949. It is necessary to understand that the Chinese situation and its problems are very complicated and the most difficult in the world to understand, especially for westerners. Trotsky himself recognized this fact and took a very serious attitude toward the Chinese question. He even asked Radek, the president of Sun Yat-sen university, to pay special attention to the Chinese question. Radek, who undertook a serious study of the Chinese question, had a number of the Chinese students help him collect material on the economy, sociology, and history of China. The work of Radek was very useful in helping Trotsky to understand the concrete situation. But Comrade Livio has never seriously studied the Chinese situation and its

problems. It is evident that he bases his opinions on certain documents or articles appearing in the Chinese press (those that are translated) and on some of the material found in the western press combined with suppositions from his own imagination and narrow prejudices. The result is that the documents drafted by him not only contain many mistakes in fact, but also many contradictory ideas.

One of the worst things, however, is that Comrade Livio never asked the Chinese section to express its opinions on the "Cultural Revolution," and didn't even consult with me before preparing the document on China. Such an attitude toward national sections can only be compared to that which existed in the Comintern under the control of Stalin. It should also be pointed out that I have made many criticisms on the Chinese documents written by Comrade Livio, such as the statement adopted by the United Secretariat in November 1966, and the discussion resolution adopted by the plenum of the IEC, March 1967. But to date, Comrade Livio has made no reply to those criticisms or attempted to clarify his position in regard to them. One can only conclude from this that Comrade Livio has deliberately avoided discussing the differences. This reflects such arrogance on his part as to make him politically irresponsible.

CORRECTION

A typographical error should be corrected in the article by E. Germain, "An Unacceptable Amendment," in issue No. 8 (May 1969) of the International Information Bulletin. In the next to the last paragraph on Page 8, a sentence reads: "It is a question of a bureaucratic centralist leadership."

This should read: "It is a question of a bureaucratic centrism leadership."