

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>THE 12TH PLENUM OF THE IEC</u>	
1. The 12th Plenum of the IEC (communique)	1
2. Report on The Evolution of the World Situation Since the Third World Congress, and the Policy of the International -- By Pablo	2
3. Discussion on the Report and Summary -- By the Reporter	20
4. Bolivia -- Draft Resolution	24
5. Resolutions and Decisions on: Bolivia, Ceylon, China	27
6. Greetings to Comrades in Indonesia	28
7. Letter of the IEC to Members of the French PCI, Suspended in July 1952, and Resolutions Adopted by the Plenum Regarding the French Section	28

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Communique

THE 12th PLENUM OF THE IEC

(November 1952)

The 12th Plenum of the IEC was held on November 15 to 18. The following questions were on its agenda:

Political report on "The evolution of the international situation since the 11th Plenum of the IEC (June 1952) and the policy of the International."

Report on the Bolivian revolution.

Report on the policy and the activity of a number of European sections of the Fourth International, as well as on the Ceylonese section.

Report on the situation of the French section.

Report on finances and security.

We are publishing in this bulletin motions, resolutions and other documents adopted by the Plenum.

In the unanimous view of all the delegates the Plenum was one of the most important and most constructive in the life of the International in recent years.

It gave all the delegates present the opportunity to observe the progress realized in various countries, which demonstrates a general upward march of our international movement.

On the other hand it permitted a reaffirmation of the ideological cohesion of the International leadership which has become more marked in recent years, as well as the greater understanding of the cadres of our movement on how to work in the real movement of the masses in their respective countries.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

November 1952

REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD SITUATION SINCE
THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS, AND THE POLICY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL

I.

Since the 11th Plenum, the international situation has been marked by important events. On the other hand, from a distance of approximately one year from the Third World Congress it is today possible to draw a balance on the developments which have occurred since then, and to examine to what degree the line which we elaborated in the Congress actually corresponds to the general march of reality.

Of all the aspects of the evolution of the international situation, the one which has become more and more outstanding is the continued aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system, an aggravation which becomes more acute as an objective consequence of the relationship of forces in favor of the revolution.

The sharpening of the crisis of capitalism manifested itself during the past year since the World Congress principally in the spread of the colonial revolutions which is most especially illustrated in the events in Iran, Egypt, the north African colonies, central Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, and the entire rising ferment in several other Latin American countries; in the radicalization and struggles of the masses in a number of important capitalist countries such as England, Germany, Japan, Belgium; in economic crises which have appeared in the capitalist economy despite the intensive armaments program now in process; and in the sharpening of contradictions within the ranks of the Atlantic coalition, to which the opposition of the masses to the war plans, and economic difficulties are powerful factors.

On the other hand despite the difficulties which evolved from the bureaucratic character of that political regime and from their isolation from the rest of the world market, the economic strengthening of the USSR, of China, of the European "peoples democracies" is proceeding at a pace which contrasts in a more and more striking way with the stagnation of the capitalist countries, and also contributes powerfully to the change of the relation of forces in favor of the anti-imperialist camp.

The spread of the colonial revolution is both a consequence and a cause of the disequilibrium of the capitalist system which has been aggravated since the last war.

Since the Third World Congress and more especially since the 11th Plenum we have seen the elections in India, the new victory of Mossadegh in Iran and the rupture of relations with England, the military coup d'etat in Egypt and the abdication of Farouk, the events in Tunisia and Morocco, and the ferment in the colonies of central and south Africa, the new upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the masses of Indonesia, the broadening of the Bolivian revolution, the victory of Ibanez in Chile, the strikes in Uruguay, Peru, Argentina, the accentuation of the armed struggle in Columbia and Venezuela.

In India the national bourgeois party -- the Congress Party -- won an electoral victory, but the decline of its influence among the masses evolving to the left was marked.

In Iran, Mossadegh is more and more the prisoner of the powerful mass movement which triumphantly returned him to power. His bonapartist regime in a revolutionary situation is due only to the temporizing policy of the Kremlin and the Tudeh Party. The situation is so ripe and favorable in Iran that there can be no doubt that if the Kremlin and Tudeh wanted to push the mass movement to the limit that movement would have all the necessary strength to win a complete victory. The Kremlin is restrained in this action out of fear of provoking imperialism on a crucial point of the international front.

The situation in Egypt, while illustrating the explosive power of the mass movement, remains, as against Iran, relatively more favorable for reaction and imperialism. Naguib's regime is also a bonapartist regime but it is, in relation to the masses less organized and more divided than in Iran, relatively more solid.

The independent strength of the ruling classes in Egypt as well as that of imperialism is moreover incontestably greater than in Iran. However the power of the mass movement is manifested in the fact that Naguib's regime is obliged to proclaim and even to begin reforms which naturally in the final analysis aim only at preserving the present social regime. Nevertheless its revolutionary importance is no less great. Once proclaimed or even timidly begun, the reforms stir the revolutionary activity of the masses and increase the instability of the "social" General's regime.

In Tunisia and Morocco, the struggle of the masses for national independence has reached an acute phase, favored by inter-imperialist antagonisms over this economically and strategically important area. The United States, for strategic reasons, seems to favor, to the disadvantage of its relations with France, a kind of independence for these countries.

In the colonies of central Africa as well as in South Africa, the national movement is still on the ascendancy, undermining the last stable positions of British imperialism in the colonial domain as well as the reign of white supremacy over these countries.

The colonial revolution which has shown such a tumultuous sweep in the Far East with the Chinese victory, the Vietminh war and the Korean war, then pushing into the Near East and Africa, has penetrated into the very heart of Latin America with the Bolivian revolution.

In a separate report we will examine the developments of this revolution and our policy toward it.

The Bolivian events fit into a conjuncture of more general revolutionary upsurge in all of South America. Due to the repercussions of the success of the colonial revolution in Asia and Africa, of inflation, of the trade deficit and of the new price decline of export raw materials, the revolutionary movement of the masses is

unfolding on ascending activity in several countries of the continent and is adumbrating a still more considerable rise in the near future.

Indonesia, the Near East, Africa and South Africa are the theatres where the colonial revolution is now developing. In several countries such as Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Bolivia this revolution is already tending to go beyond the anti-imperialist, democratic level to attain a still higher level.

In the capitalist countries proper the situation is contradictory. In some of them the consequences of the arms program and of the Atlantic policy in general on the living conditions of the masses, and the presence of reactionary governments in power, have called forth positive reactions of the masses as in England (Bevanite successes), in Germany (Trade Union Congress, Fette's defeat), in Belgium (struggle against the extension of military service, the striking electoral success of the Socialists).

In Japan similar conditions have caused an important electoral victory of the two socialist parties, particularly the left SP.

On the other hand, the economic conjuncture evolving toward depression has, in certain countries like France and Italy, fostered a relative inactivity of the masses, a stagnation and even a decline of trade union struggles and of political actions. In addition there is the ineffectual character of present Stalinist policy, especially for France and Italy which we will analyze separately.

General conditions favor a radicalization of the masses, but the peculiar conditions from country to country, especially the oscillations of the economic conjuncture and of the policy of the workers' leadership, tends to stimulate or to restrain the practical militant manifestations of this radicalization.

Despite the stepped up reconversion to an armaments economy, which has been undertaken since the Korean war, the economic situation is not that of a rising economy. On the contrary, especially during this year we have been observing an evolution toward depression and even a minor economic crisis which has taken hold primarily in England, France, Belgium, Italy.

In all these countries production has been stagnating for some time and is even in decline in relation to 1951.

The unfavorable trade deficit has affected several branches of light industry and now affects more important branches, such as automobiles.

In general, all the branches of industry producing articles of individual civilian consumption are more or less affected.

Available markets seem to be saturated, exports are declining. Chronic unemployment and especially partial unemployment have bounded forward particularly in England and France.

In the United States itself, production has been levelling off for some time despite very high arms production (\$8 billion quarterly)

and exports are declining. Agriculture has also stagnated. In the colonial and semi-colonial countries which are producers of raw materials, the boom which occurred immediately after the Korean war is giving way to trading deficits and to the lowering of prices.

The causes of this stagnation are complex. There is first of all the fact that capitalist economy between 1946 and 1950 attained and even surpassed its pre-war production and filled the solvent demand created by the war without succeeding in enlarging its markets.

On the contrary, the available markets are more restricted than ever as the result of the appearance of new workers' states, of the industrialization of several colonial and semi-colonial countries, of the instability which prevails in other of these countries and of the expansion of American imperialism.

If up to now armament production has been able to retard the crisis in the United States (thanks to the exceptional scope of the program in that country) it has however acted in an opposite way in other capitalist countries by lowering rather than augmenting the buying power of the masses.

Finally, there has been the reappearance on the world market of German and Japanese competition, which naturally works to the disadvantage of the other capitalist countries, particularly England and France.

The entirety of these conditions determines the present conjuncture and even the minor economic crisis which characterizes the present situation in England, France, Belgium and particularly in Italy. What are the probable perspectives of development of the economic picture?

The importance of this question is inescapable and is closely connected with the perspectives of evolution of the international political situation in general. Will the present stagnation degenerate into a major economic crisis, or will it give way to a new rise of capitalist production?

In our opinion, given the fact that the armament program has still not assumed its full scope either in the United States or especially in the other capitalist countries, there is a real possibility of avoiding a major economic crisis in the immediate period and of diverting the swollen productive forces in some capitalist countries (United States itself, Germany and Japan) toward the armament sector of the economy.

It is probable that the turn in the economic situation toward depression, which is one of the causes of the aggravation of frictions within the Atlantic alliance, will impose the necessity on the American leaders of new arrangements within this alliance, financing in one way or another a greater part of the armament program of each capitalist country than they do now. On the other hand, the rearmament of Germany and of Japan may appear to the capitalist leaders of these countries, as well as the leaders of other countries which suffer more and more from the competition of these two powers (as is

already the case for England which has been won over to the principle of German rearmament and, it is expected, to that of Japan) as the best way to channelize the economic dynamism of Germany and Japan.

Such a perspective could, let us repeat, prevent the present stagnation from degenerating into a major crisis, but does not seem to be capable of producing any sensational new boom comparable to the one which followed the Korean war, and this includes the United States as well.

Capitalist production thus runs the risk of maintaining itself at a level close to stagnation, artificially and painfully propped up by the war economy, but after a certain period it will in any case have to confront the danger of a major economic crisis.

When the United States economy begins to exhaust the stimulating effects of rearmament, the threat of a world economic crisis in the whole of capitalist economy will become a very immediate fact.

These economic perspectives join those of political development and are interconnected with them.

Especially since last summer, the Atlantic alliance has experienced an important crisis. Under the pressure of the movement of the masses in opposition to the war plans aroused by increased economic difficulties, various sectors of the European bourgeoisie have called into question not the principle of the Atlantic alliance but the arrangements within this alliance. Their grievances are of an economic and political type. First of all, there is a kind of common front of all the European bourgeoisies toward the United States in demanding the solution of economic relations between Europe and America on a more "healthy basis than at present."

Having recognized that Europe's dollar deficit in reality hides the organic disequilibrium of trade between the two parties with their different economic structure and potentialities, the European bourgeoisies are dreaming about a triangular system of exchange through the inclusion of the colonial countries and dependent countries. Required for this would be to have the United States agree to giving them a gift of new markets by investing sufficient capital in the so-called "under-developed" countries so that the latter can buy from the other European countries instead of directly from the U.S.

The unworkable character of such a project is obvious when one takes into consideration the paucity and the constant shrinkage of such markets, and on the other hand the illusory hope of seeing the United States help make these markets work for the needs and profits of European industry.

But what is significant about this proposal is that a "solution" is still sought not outside of the United States, and even less against it, but in another form of "aid" from the U.S.

The principal difficulties on the political plane have grown out of the attitude taken by France toward the European army and its differences with Germany on the question of the Saar. The part of

the French bourgeoisie which is concerned with the exploitation of the Saar and of the north African colonies (among other reasons so as to use these as bases against the German economic dynamism) is reacting violently against the irresistible march of Germany in outclassing France within the Atlantic alliance, and the encouragement which the United States is lavishing on Bonn as well as on the Tunisian and Moroccan leaders who are calling for the independence of their countries.

But the limits of this reaction are fixed by the fact that the French bourgeoisie has no other "alternative" policy, and in the last analysis it cannot do without American financial assistance nor retire to a "neutralist" position outside of the Atlantic alliance. It would in that case, besides its international isolation, run the risk of arousing a fundamental support by the United States to Germany as well as to the North African leaders' struggle for the independence of their countries.

In reality the French bourgeoisie can only periodically bargain to improve its position within the Atlantic alliance, resorting if absolutely necessary to blackmail, without however having any hope of fundamentally altering its present inferior position. This position corresponds to its economic weight in general.

The antagonisms within the counter-revolutionary alliance of the capitalist countries which have always existed were well-known and apparent. Their relative aggravation, inevitable in the stage of the new relations established between the European capitalist countries and the United States and the difficulties resulting from the preparations of the new war, were to be foreseen.

But to conclude from that, as for example Stalin has done in his article in the Bolshevik, that there is a probability of an armed inter-imperialist conflict rather than a conflict by the alliance of the capitalist countries against the USSR and China, the "Peoples Democracies," is something else again.

Can one reasonably foresee a war between any capitalist countries, or any form of alliance of capitalist countries against the United States?

For this is what is in reality envisaged as an eventuality in Stalin's article, and not a clash between two particular capitalist countries, France and Germany for example. (Even such a limited war is practically excluded under present conditions.)

It is really not necessary to spend any time on this point to conclude that such an eventuality is in the sphere of pure fantasy and that such an enterprise would in reality be the work of a gang of madmen having lost all contact with reality and amusing themselves in the grotesque farce of "inner destruction" of the capitalists under the sharp eyes of "the genial father of the peoples" in a form imagined (or hoped) by this subtle mind.

In reality it is far-fetched to think that Stalin actually believes this extravagant statement. It can only be explained, as we will have occasion to emphasize later on in this report, that his primary concern is to allay the fear of a war of the imperialist

coalition against the USSR, a fear which prevails in certain sections of the Soviet population, to sound an optimistic note, to deliberately exaggerate the disagreements and the difficulties in the opposing camp, in a word to serve the purpose of internal consumption. In the second place, it is meant to bend the present policy of the Communist parties in the direction of greater attention to the disagreements and the difficulties which are observable in certain capitalist countries and in order to exploit them.

On the other hand, this declaration by Stalin was not the central theme of any of the speeches of the Congress, and his own closing speech at the Congress in reality put the accent on another idea: that of the bourgeoisie having become definitively "anti-national":

"Formerly the bourgeoisie was considered the head of the nation, it championed the rights and independence of the nation, placing them 'above everything.' Now, not a trace remains of the 'national principle.' Now the bourgeoisie sells the rights and independence of the nation for dollars."

In what sense does the worsening of the capitalist crisis which we are now observing determine the general policy of the bourgeoisie at present? Does it postpone the war or bring it closer?

The answer to this question depends on the section of the bourgeoisie that one has in mind: the European or the American. The former, except for a conscious nucleus which knows that the relationship of forces is evolving to the disadvantage of capitalism, prefers to temporize for a certain period, to prepare better militarily and to more thoroughly consolidate its control over the masses. On the other hand it is racked by a deepgoing defeatist spirit which it has not succeeded in overcoming.

So far as the American bourgeoisie is concerned, it must be understood that its orientation toward war in a relatively brief period is the result both of its consciousness of the general relationship of forces which becomes more unfavorable with time, and of its relative present strength based on an already advanced progress of its armaments program.

The American bourgeoisie is impregnated with quite a different spirit than the European bourgeoisie. Besides its feeling of material strength, its relations with the masses of the country are more secure than in European capitalist countries. The triumphal election of Eisenhower, candidate of the most reactionary section of the American bourgeoisie, supported by the most reactionary forces in the country, is significant in this connection. It will influence the direction of American policy in the sense of a greater firmness and decisiveness in the counter-revolutionary crusade. In the internal sphere it will call forth a sharpening of the witch hunt and of the McCarthyite climate in general.

The communist movement of that country is threatened with being soon thrust into complete illegality.

Eisenhower's victory will widen the scope of the war economy in the United States and the influence of militarism over the whole life

of the country. In the sphere of foreign policy, while remaining within the framework of the Atlantic alliance, it is threatening to upset the present stalemate in Korea in favor of a more decisive military action which could degenerate into an open conflict with China. (Use of atomic weapons in Korea, bombardment of Manchuria.) It will stimulate and foster the aggressiveness of the reactionary forces in all capitalist countries.

Contrariwise, Eisenhower's probably greater inflexibility than that of the Democratic administration could cause more serious frictions with certain parts and governments of the European bourgeoisie.

The scope of Eisenhower's electoral victory in any case creates the most favorable conjuncture which the American bourgeoisie could hope for to precipitate the kind of counter-revolutionary war it is preparing. This victory is evidence of the broadest reactionary polarization which the monopolist leaders and the militarist clique of the United States could hope for under present international conditions. They have succeeded in harnessing a large part of the nation behind the chariot of their reactionary policy which openly declares its intention of fighting "atheist communism."

On the other hand, rearmament in the United States has already made important progress, and from now to the middle of 1953 will have attained a very high level. On their side, the progress of rearmament of European capitalist countries in the same period will not be negligible.

The disturbing economic perspectives which we have already analyzed, and the difficulties within the Atlantic alliance, are being superimposed on this fundamental trend.

Under the entirety of these conditions, a very long postponement of the counter-revolutionary war may appear to the American bourgeoisie as not assuring any better chance of victory. On the contrary, an important postponement can lead to a disintegration of Eisenhower's present social basis, precipitate the economic crisis, accentuate the frictions and the antagonisms within the capitalist world.

The optimum of the relationship of forces from the point of view of the bourgeoisie may appear as occurring in this period opened by Eisenhower's presidency and beginning with the time that armament production reaches a higher plane than at present.

Beginning with around the middle of next year, we will enter into this critical period when the war will be possible, that is when every threat of serious deterioration in the present situation of capitalism may precipitate military action by American imperialism.

But a worsening of the international situation is even possible before then in the event if, as we have already stated, the war in Korea (which neither of the adversaries desires to terminate at the present time by merely an armistice, the prisoners' question in any case being only a pretext) spreads into a conflict with China.

These considerations provide a gauge of the great gravity of international perspectives, and of the critical character of the period we will soon enter.

To better meet these events, our policy should keep this in mind in all spheres, naturally including the organizational sphere.

Now we turn to the situation in the non-capitalist countries -- the USSR, China, the European "Peoples Democracies." We find the main feature to be their economic development which is proceeding at an incomparably more rapid pace than that of any capitalist country in the past; this is the case despite the brake on this economic development by the bureaucratic regimes and the role of the Soviet bureaucracy in particular, in the USSR itself and in the other non-capitalist states which it influences.

A factor of international historic importance which should be grasped is especially that of the dynamism of the development of China which for two years has been continuing at a stride of 15-20% increase of its industrial production (i.e., and at a more significant pace than any capitalist country in the past, and even the USSR in its NEP period prior to the 5-year plans).

If international conditions permit, (the extension of the present "peace" for example), this development continued over 5 to 10 years would not only definitively seal the fate of Asia but of the entire world by decisively changing the relationship of forces to the disadvantage of imperialism.

In effect, in 5 to 10 years the coalition of the USSR, China, Peoples' Democracies could have a total economic production approximating that of combined imperialism.

One cannot say as much for the development of Yugoslavia. Having been obliged to channelize the largest part of its own resources, or those provided by the imperialists, into military expenditures, and to constantly give ground to political and economic interference by the imperialists, the Tito government in reality has disorganized and curbed the planned development of that country's economy. Its dependence on imperialist aid and on the international capitalist market has only increased.

The Congress of the Russian CP was unquestionably a particularly important event so far as the real situation of the USSR is concerned, and to a certain degree also the present intentions of the international policy of Soviet bureaucracy.

In the documents which preceded the congress, in the speeches which were made there, in the very fact of its convocation, and the way also in which the leaderships of the Communist parties throughout the world then interpreted its significance, we have material of the first order, for the first time in several years, which throws a certain direct light especially on the situation in the USSR.

In the peculiar, Byzantine world of ritual ossification which was long ago established by the Soviet bureaucracy in the USSR and in

the international workers' movement which it influences, where everything is misrepresented and where the real problems which it has to confront and its real intentions are hidden in a great confusion of words, phrases, contradictory reasoning without direct relation to the problem and the aim, a patient work of analysis and of critical comparison is necessary to discern real motives, real intentions.

The starting point for this study must be the conviction that nothing is accidental in the undertakings of the bureaucracy and that its real problems and intentions are to be found camouflaged in one way or another in its actions and its documents. It is possible from this point of view to discern several conclusions from a serious critical analysis of the documents on the work of the Russian CP Congress.

Above all the Congress was called for internal reasons and concerned itself primarily with questions of an internal nature.

Fundamentally, by means of this Congress, sounding a note of optimism and of confidence in the strength of the USSR, the Soviet bureaucracy attempted to get a better hold on the party and, through it, contact with the Soviet masses in view of the internal situation in the USSR and the international evolution toward war. The essence of all the preparatory documents for the Congress, Stalin's article, as well as the speeches made there, had this purpose.

The Soviet bureaucracy, within the framework of this general objective, wanted to realize the following special aims:

a. Answer the criticism of the masses directed at the bureaucratism of the regime.

b. Answer the criticism of the most developed circles and the problems which these circles are posing in observing the crying gulf which still exists between Soviet reality and the declarations of the bureaucracy on the "socialist (character) of the regime in process of going over to communism."

c. To demonstrate before foreign capitalist opinion, particularly that of Europe, the strength of the USSR and to confront it with the choice of war, which would precipitate the "end of capitalism," or "peace" and profitable trade with countries of the Soviet alliance.

d. To encourage the leaderships of the Communist parties, who feel isolated in capitalist countries, by outlining to them the "early" perspective of the world triumph of "socialism."

That the Soviet bureaucracy really convened the Congress for general reasons of an internal nature which we have already indicated, emerges clearly from the content of Stalin's article and the speeches made at the Congress as well as from the official commentaries of the Stalinist press after the Congress.

The axis of Stalin's article is on the economic and social problems resulting from "the gradual passage from socialism to communism" in the USSR. He tries to justify as a "socialist" reality

the existing economic and social reality of the USSR, where commodity production subsists, as well as money, the law of value and the state; and he tries to reply to the critics and to the problems posed in this regard by the more and more numerous advanced circles in the USSR who consciously understand these contradictions. He attempts to put over this justification by outlining for the first time with much insistence the perspective of another stage to which the USSR is now "tending," "the communist stage," when these remnants, including the state, will disappear.

The section which deals with the collective farms and their integration in the sphere of the stratified and planned economy, envisaged in the near future, reflects real problems posed by the advanced objective development of Soviet economy today. Naturally we leave aside the way in which these ideas are developed in the article, the style, the "discoveries," how Stalin with his usual disingenuousness distorts or revises ideas put forward in this connection by Marx and Lenin. We will deal with the "theoretical" pretensions of Stalin's article in a detailed study in the next issue of Quatrieme Internationale.

The essential part of Malenkov's speech, as well as that of other reporters and speakers at the Congress, was also devoted to the internal questions of the USSR, to its present economic strength, to the new five-year plan, to the situation in the party. All of this leads the Cominform organ to say in the article which it devoted to the Congress that:

"The most important result of the XIX Congress is the fact that it armed the working people of the Soviet Union with the grand Stalin programme of Communist construction outlined in the directives for the fifth Five-Year Plan for the development of the U.S.S.R. -- a plan for ensuring a further, powerful upsurge of the peace economy and culture of the Soviet country. Fulfilment and overfulfilment of this plan will be a further big stride forward by the Soviet people along the path to Communism."

The same paper estimates Stalin's article as follows:

"This brilliant work... provides the theoretical and practical solution to the vital problems confronting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the new historic conditions -- in the conditions of realizing the grand programme of building Communist society."

Molotov's opening speech defined the aims of the Congress in this way:

"This Party Congress will demonstrate the extent to which the forces of the Soviet Union, the homeland of victorious Socialism, have grown and gained strength. It will also fulfill its main task -- that of illuminating with the bright light of Marxism-Leninism the further pathways leading to new and even more glorious victories of Socialism in our country, to further, even wider and more powerful consolidation of the international democratic forces in the interests of defending world peace."

In reality it was Malenkov's speech which embodied the essence of the line put forward by the Congress in all spheres. We leave

aside for the moment the part of the speech devoted to the international situation and here will stress the part concerning the internal situation in the USSR. The part of the speech devoted to the economic situation in the USSR is of unquestionable interest.

It furnishes precious indices, some of them hitherto unavailable, on real production in the USSR, on the rate of its development, as well as on the misdeeds of bureaucratic management of the economy: waste, blackmarket, fraud and theft by the administration, discouragement of workers' initiative.

We have here, in connection with the report on the new five-year plan, material for a thorough study of the present situation of Soviet economy, its gains, its tendencies, as well as its vices and weaknesses.

The section of the speech devoted to the "continued reinforcement of the social regime and the Soviet state" attempts to justify the strengthening of the state and the national policy of the Soviet bureaucracy by "conditions of capitalist surrounding" (no longer by encirclement). For Malenkov as for Stalin the conditions of the withering away of the state will only be created with "victory in most of the capitalist countries." This in any case is an indication that the bureaucracy is now obliged to indicate a perspective of withering away.

The section of the speech devoted to the party itself reveals several important aspects of the internal situation in the USSR. The bonapartist tops of the bureaucracy permit themselves, indeed are obliged to, engage in a vigorous criticism of bureaucratic misdeeds in the lower ranks of the party and of the state, which are harmful to relations with the masses and to the interests of the bureaucratic caste as a whole (which ought not either to steal or to deceive its own state, which ought to discipline itself and not to so brazenly reveal its weaknesses and its vices to the masses.)

That is how the bureaucratic tops of the bureaucracy are attempting to refurbish themselves before the masses, to appear concerned about criticism and democracy, to also call to order the bureaucratic leaders who are "betraying" their caste.

But at the same time the tops are not relaxing their strict control over the masses and are drawing attention to a "reappearance" of opinions and conceptions which are "hostile" to it. The entire section on party and state discipline as well as on ideological work is devoted to this.

"Wherever there is relaxation of attention to questions of ideology, favourable soil is created for reviving views and concepts hostile to us. People alien to us, all types of elements from the dregs of anti-Leninist groups smashed by the Party, seek to lay their hands on those sectors of ideological work which for one reason or other are neglected by Party organizations and where Party leadership and influence have weakened, in order to utilise these sectors for dragging in their line and reviving and spreading various kinds of non-Marxist 'viewpoints' and 'conceptions'."

That is an indication of the first water on the survival of former opposition elements who have not ceased to worry the bureaucracy.

"To continue to guard as the apple of the eye the Leninist unity of the Party ranks which is the foundation of the strength and invincibility of our Party."

This kind of concern with guarding "the Leninist unity" of the party must appear completely superfluous in a "socialist society in the process of going over to communism."

But in reality it all goes together and is intermeshed in the same logic: in a society where there remains commodity production as well as money, the law of value and the state (the latter being stronger than ever), the class struggle continues in other forms even in the party, and vigilance is necessary. (The question of who is watching whom is something else again.) The only illogical thing in all this is to call this society "socialist in the process of going over to communism."

But in effect this is another matter, and one should not expect the bureaucracy to be more logical.

The contradictions in its actions, its proposals, its lines are inherent in its contradictory nature and in its ever more contradictory environment. All these will remain until the bureaucracy disappears.

Can the analysis of the international situation and the line put forward in this connection by the Congress be considered as signifying an important new turn in Stalinist policy, and if so, in what direction? Was the Congress lined up on the point in Stalin's article that there is a greater probability of an inter-imperialist war than of a counter-revolutionary war on the part of coalesced imperialism? Does it consequently call for a new coalition of the Communist parties with the European bourgeoisie and the revival of new Popular Fronts?

These questions require clarification, all the more because there have appeared hasty conclusions and erroneous estimations of the real balance sheet of the Congress of the Russian CP on this point in the organs of some of our sections. First of all, an attentive reading of all the documents of the Congress of the Russian CP shows irrefutably that this Congress was not lined up on the above-mentioned passage from Stalin's article, but on the contrary Stalin by aligning himself in his final speech on the different general tone of the Congress put the emphasis on ideas contrary to those contained in his own article.

Molotov's opening address emphasized the threat of the counter-revolutionary war of imperialism and his sole reference to this passage in Stalin's article concerned only the aspect of sharpened inter-imperialist contradictions, and was made for the purpose of drawing the conclusion not especially of the probability of an inter-imperialist war, but of the weakness of the imperialist camp, objectively emphasizing the superiority of the opposite camp.

"It goes without saying that we are not unmindful that the Soviet Union lives 'in a system of states,' that there exists the imperialist camp which entertains venturesome aggressive designs, which is building more and more armaments, whipping up war hysteria in every way and conducting preparations for unleashing a new world war."

"Nothing, however, can hide the serious weakening which has taken place in the world capitalist system in recent years, particularly in the postwar when a number of states with an overall population of 600,000,000 dropped out of this system. Nor can anything screen the inability of the capitalist countries to cope with the growing danger of a new economic crisis and another rise of mass unemployment, leading simultaneously to growing contradictions and friction between these states and to inevitable sharpening of class struggle in these countries...The more there is unfolded the precariousness and hopelessness of the prospect for and the inner weakness of contemporary capitalism now in the stage of general crisis and heading more and more towards a fascist regime -- the more aggressive become the main Powers of the imperialist camp and their predatory propaganda for a new war."

In Malenkov's speech, where he speaks of the "increased menace" of the counter-revolutionary war of imperialism, he refers in passing to the inter-imperialist contradictions in a similar vein.

"It would be incorrect to consider that war could be directed only against the Soviet state. The first world war, as we know, was unleashed by the imperialists long before the U.S.S.R. came into being. The second world war began as a war among capitalist states, and the capitalist countries themselves suffered heavily from it. The contradictions which today rend the imperialist camp may lead to war between one capitalist state and another. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, the Soviet Union is working to prevent any war among states and is acting for a peaceful settlement of international conflicts and disagreements."

In Beria's and Boulganin's speeches the emphasis is frankly put on this same threat and the quoted passage from Stalin's article is not referred to. On the contrary, the remainder of Stalin's article dealing with the economic and social problems of the present and future of the USSR occupied an important place in all the speeches made at the Congress.

The theme of inter-imperialist contradictions was treated by the Congress in the following sense: It was particularly emphasized, as we have already pointed out, in order to reveal the weakness of the imperialist camp, and consequently the superiority of the relationship of forces of the opposing camp.

It was also done to allow a better, a more tempting presentation of the solution of compromise proposed to the European bourgeoisie by the bureaucracy in exchange for "neutrality."

The bureaucracy offered them barter instead of the "Atlantic" policy which is leading to their accentuated subjugation to American

imperialism, to the atrophy and the crisis of their economy: it offered trade with the East and the reduction of armament expenditures, but at the same time it warned them, pointing to the growth of the economic strength of the USSR, that it does not fear the war which is being prepared and that such a war would precipitate the "end of capitalism."

The bureaucracy at the Congress appeared before the European bourgeoisie holding out an olive branch and dangling the sword of Damocles over them.

"We are confident that in peaceful competition with capitalism, the socialist system of economy will prove its superiority over the capitalist system more and more vividly year by year. We have no intention, however, of forcing our ideology or our economic system on anybody. 'Export of revolution is nonsense,' says Comrade Stalin. 'Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not want to there will be no revolution.'

"While it steadfastly pursues its policy of peaceful co-operation with all countries, the Soviet Union takes into account the existence of the threat of new aggression on the part of the warmongers who have lost all restraint. Hence, it is strengthening its defence capacity and will continue to strengthen it.

"The Soviet Union is not frightened by the threats of warmongers. Our people have experience in fighting aggressors and are not novices at giving them a drubbing. They gave the aggressors a drubbing way back at the time of the civil war, when the Soviet state was young and comparatively weak; they gave them a drubbing in the second world war, and they will give future aggressors a drubbing too if they dare to attack our homeland.

"The facts of history cannot be ignored. And the facts show that as a result of the first world war Russia dropped out of the system of capitalism, while as a result of the second world war a whole series of countries in Europe and Asia dropped out of the system of capitalism. There is every reason to assume that a third world war would bring about the collapse of the world capitalist system.

"That, so to speak, is the prospect of a war and its consequences if war is forced on the peoples by the warmongers, by the aggressors.

"But there is another prospect, the prospect of preserving peace, the prospect of peace among nations. That prospect calls for prohibition of war propaganda in accordance with the resolution adopted by the United Nations, a ban on atomic and germ weapons, consistent reduction of the armed forces of the Great Powers, conclusion of a Peace Pact among the powers, extension of trade among countries, restoration of the single international market, and other analogous measures in the spirit of strengthening peace."

This is not simply an oratorical stance, it corresponds to the bureaucratic nature and especially to the contradictory policy which

in any case is imposed on it by the contradictory situation in which it has been now objectively placed, between the threat of imperialist war or of revolution.

In practice this attitude is necessarily manifested by actions, one of whose aspects could be interpreted as offering collaboration to the bourgeoisie (the formula of national united front, for example) also connote a real struggle against no less real war preparations of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the unquestionable desire of the bureaucracy for compromise is not enough now for the practical realization of compromise and class collaboration, which require the consent of the other party -- in this case of the bourgeoisie. However, the bourgeoisie, is rejecting compromise; the objective basis for compromise no longer exists; this fact imposes in practice on the bureaucracy, and the communist parties under its influence, a line which cannot be likened to that of the peoples fronts and of class collaboration, such as we knew between 1934-1938 or between 1941-1947.

Objective conditions are essentially different now and, despite what other desires the bureaucracy might have, in practice they bring about a different line.

Then let us return to the Moscow Congress. The leaderships of the Communist parties seem to consider that its principal directive which concerns them is not the alignment with their respective bourgeoisies against the United States but on the contrary the ideas contained in Stalin's closing speech, namely that the bourgeoisie has become definitively and totally "reactionary" and "anti-national" that they should consider themselves as "the new shock brigades" having as their task and perspective the seizure of power in their respective countries following the example of the Russian CP. This was the way that the editorial in the Cominform organ devoted to the Congress concluded:

"For the Communist and democratic Parties in the countries still under the capitalist yoke the conditions for becoming the leading force of their nation and leader of the people in their struggle for liberation and preservation of peace are far more favourable than were the conditions of the Russian Communists under tsarism. The work of the revolutionary and democratic parties is made easier today by the fact that the main enemy of the liberation movement -- the bourgeoisie -- has become more reactionary, has lost contact with the people and, by doing so, has weakened itself. Their work is facilitated particularly by the fact that they have before them such examples of struggle and success as those provided by the Soviet Union and the people's democratic countries, examples from which they can learn.

"'Consequently,' Comrade Stalin says, 'there is every reason to count on success and victory for the fraternal Parties in the countries dominated by capital'."

This was also how the French Stalinist leader, A. Lecoeur, spoke on his return from Moscow:

"Like powerful beacon lights, the reports and documents of the 19th Congress will provide a much better illumination of the road which leads to peace and to democracy, to socialism...

"Dear comrades these perspectives are today close.

"It was not so long ago that worker militants with their courage and faith in socialism, were going from city to city and speaking with hope and certainty of a better future which they depicted, they thought, only for future generations. This future is today within our range. Not only our children will enjoy socialism, but we ourselves will." (L'Humanite, October 30, 1952.)

A formula like United National Front issued in France is filled with a content which can be termed not right wing but rather "sectarian," squarely turning its back to any other front which is not "constituted around a working class and the Communist Party," and especially to any united front with the Social Democracy:

"The national front must be realized around the working class, around its Communist Party. Those who today are aware of the catastrophe threatening the country should recognize that only an anti-imperialist policy, with the working class, can avoid this catastrophe. There is no other choice. Comrade Billoux was correct when he wrote in the Cahiers du Communisme of May 1952:

"A reversal of the political situation can only be the result of the united action of the masses. Only the Communist Party at the head of the working class united with the poor and middle peasantry and with the middle classes of the cities is capable of organizing and leading this action." (Ibid)

All that naturally does not mean to say that the new oscillation to the left marked by the closing of the work of the Moscow Congress excludes right wing interpretations in this or that country, at this or that moment. On the contrary, it can be predicted that difficulties within the Atlantic alliance (which the more hardened attitude and the risky initiatives of the new Republican administration in the United States threatens to aggravate), the hesitations and the discontent of various European bourgeoisies or of important sections of them will incline the Kremlin and the leaderships of the CPs to accentuate the "national" side of the front proposed at this or that moment and to put the damper on the idea of realizing it "around the working class and its Communist Parties." But fundamentally, regardless of this or that desire of the Soviet bureaucracy, because of the inexorable development of the objective situation which excludes the possibility of a compromise, the Stalinist line will remain what it has been for sometime: a contradictory melange of an opportunist attitude directed toward the whole "nation" and militant action based more especially on the mobilization of the working class against the war preparations of the bourgeoisie.

In accordance with circumstances, the Stalinist leaders will put special emphasis on one or the other element, without abandoning the idea of "united action of the masses" against the war and of the leading role of "the working class and its Communist Party."

This line will remain valid for all capitalist countries in the Atlantic alliance. On the other hand, in countries such as Latin America, and even in India, in Ceylon, in Indonesia, where the bourgeoisie is hinting at opposition to American imperialism, the Communist parties can be led to support these attempts fundamentally and to try to conclude real popular fronts of the 1934-1938 type, i.e., common fronts which would be led politically by bourgeois or petty bourgeois parties.

This possible attitude of the Communist parties which will greatly contrast with the real needs and aspirations of the masses in these countries can only still further facilitate the task of our organizations which should from now on orient themselves to play the role of revolutionary parties leading the masses.

So much regarding the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and the CP leaderships. But at the same time under the pressure of events and of the perspectives of war and revolution on the mass CPs is so great that left currents, going much further and in an incomparably more consistent manner than their leaderships, become possible and even inevitable. This phenomena is the counterpart of the phenomena of Bevanism, of the radicalization which we observe in the mass socialist parties of England, Belgium and Germany. The Marty-Tillon affair which broke out openly recently in the French Communist Party demonstrates this process which we had predicted and on which in part we based the need of the entrust tactic sui generis to be followed in France and Italy especially.

In effect it becomes obvious that if for example in France we had already been integrated for a year in the movement influenced by the French CP, and in the CP itself, we would be in an infinitely better position today to exploit this Marty-Tillon affair, to exploit the atmosphere of a certain discussion which is now taking place in the ranks of the French Communist movement around questions very close to our policy, to know how to link ourselves with a certain number of "Martyites" or with critical elements in this movement which has in its ranks the most revolutionary elements of the French working class.

The French comrades present will speak more extensively on the importance of this Marty-Tillon affair.

Before concluding with the policy of the Communist parties, one word more on the recent Congress of the Yugoslav CP. Tito's speech as well as in his proposals which tend in fact toward the liquidation of the Yugoslav CP as an organization of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat of that country; the removal of Neskovitch from the Political Bureau on the eve of the Congress; Djilas' declaration on the existence of differences within this bureau; some scandalous incidents which marked the Congress and its atmosphere in general -- all of these are evidence of a profound crisis.

In effect no organization could survive the turn executed by the Yugoslav leaders, since the Korean war especially, nor such frenzied opportunism, nor the incoherence of the present line which

these leaders are trying to justify by literally hairsplitting arguments.

The most vulgar, the crassest, the most outrageous empiricism and opportunism, painted up as "Marxist orthodoxy," cannot but shock and revolt the most educated, the most critical elements.

Even this party educated in Stalinism but animated by a revolutionary spirit, becomes both an obstacle and a channel of ferment, which is undesirable and even dangerous for the leadership. It is significant, however, of the profound discontent which prevails among the masses of the most conscious elements in the country, that Tito is obliged to maintain a bonapartist position between "the West and the East," and to avoid lining up completely not only in words but even in acts with the imperialist West.

Unfortunately, the Yugoslav Congress confirmed in general the most pessimistic fears which the International had expressed since the Yugoslav turn and confirmed the great need of a Leninist opposition in Yugoslavia to overthrow the present leaders who are leading the Yugoslav revolution to its certain doom.

#

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY BY REPORTER

In the discussion that followed, several comrades took the floor to speak on the present economic conjuncture, its consequences on the class struggle and its further development; on the work of the Congress of the Russian CP and Stalin's article; on the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and of the leaderships of the Communist parties subsequent to the Congress of the Russian CP.

Various speakers took the opportunity in the course of the discussion to analyze the situation in their own countries and to provide the Plenum with very interesting information. The speech on the situation in Indonesia, especially, held the attention of all the members of the IEC.

Comrade Germain, speaking on the economic situation of the USSR, as it has been better clarified in the light of the documents provided by the Russian CP Congress, illustrated both the progress of Soviet economy and its defects resulting from bureaucratic management. The documents of the 19th Congress of the Russian CP strikingly confirm the method by which the International has approached and analyzed Soviet economy up to now.

Comrade Burns, while recognizing the absence of an objective base for a collaborationist policy on the part of the Stalinists with the Western bourgeoisie, stressed the possibility of seeing a new and more marked Stalinist turn to the right after the Vienna (peace) Congress, and CP attempts at collaboration with the "anti-American" sectors of the Western bourgeoisie.

It appeared to him that the Congress of Vienna had that meaning and that he would like the report to accord it such importance.

* * *

In his summary, the reporter, Comrade Pablo, again dwelt on the question of the economic conjuncture and its perspectives: on the significance of Eisenhower's victory in the United States; on the timetable for war, and on the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and the leaderships of the CP resulting from the 19th Congress of the Russian CP.

When we say war will become possible beginning with the middle or the end of next year, the reporter emphasized, we mean to say that despite the imperialist will to war which has always existed, that up to now the war has not been materially possible because of the extreme lack of preparation on the part of the imperialists. But as of the middle or the end of next year the imperialists, while not having succeeded in decisively reversing the relationship of forces in the social sphere in their favor, will have a material base, due to the progress of their rearmament program and to the reactionary political conjuncture in the United States, to contemplate reacting by war against all new progress of the revolution or against any serious threat of a still further deterioration of the capitalist system.

This is especially valid for the American bourgeoisie. On the other hand, beginning with this time, the evolution of the economic conjuncture threatens to move in the direction of regression and crisis, and that naturally will weigh in the scales in the political decisions of the bourgeoisie.

In any case a critical period will open, as of this time (the second half of 1953), in which the counter-revolutionary war of the imperialists will become possible.

Up to now, the reporter repeats, this was not the case, despite the will to war of the imperialists, which does not suffice for the purpose of unleashing it (i.e., of unleashing it with some reasonable chances of winning).

So far as the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy and the leaderships of the CP after the 19th Congress of the Russian CP are concerned, the reporter again emphasizes that neither on the basis of the documents of the Congress nor on how its results have thus far been interpreted by the different CPs, can we conclude that it has inaugurated a decisive new rightward orientation and the resurrection of a policy of class collaboration on the part of the CPs like that of the Popular Fronts of 1934-1938 or in the 1941-1947 period.

We should guard against judging Stalinist policy uniformly on the basis of some of its aspects of this or that moment and in this or that country.

The policy of each Communist Party now has its own peculiarities which should be taken into account. On the other hand, the objective base is now lacking for collaboration of the CPs with the Western bourgeoisie.

The only exception that can be envisaged is the possibility of a somewhat more consistent and lasting opposition to Washington of

important sectors of the Western bourgeoisie (the English, French, German, Italian) and of the bourgeois governments in these countries.

Naturally in that case the Kremlin, in order to isolate the United States, will impose upon the Communist parties a policy of collaboration with the bourgeois parties who would be opposed to the United States.

A development of such scope is practically excluded. Stalinist policy in all the Western countries will fundamentally continue on the course as defined by the report: "a contradictory melange of an opportunist attitude directed toward the entire 'nation' and militant action especially based on the mobilization of the working class against the war preparations of the bourgeoisie. The Stalinists, in keeping with the circumstances, will place a special emphasis on one or the other element, without abandoning the idea of 'united action of the masses' against the war, and of the 'leading' role of the working class and its Communist Party."

The Stalinists, especially after the 19th Congress of the Russian CP, have been interpreting the formulas of "United National Front," "national government" or "people's government" etc., as meaning the mobilization of the masses including the "middle classes," "around the working class and its Communist Party."

During the Peoples Fronts period the problem was one of broadening the united fronts to bourgeois parties, which politically led the entire front. The present formulas of the Stalinists are primarily sectarian and should be attacked as such. They sabotage the only possible and necessary front, the one with the Socialist parties, and in reality practice a united front from below under Stalinist leadership. They are doomed to complete defeat.

The terms "left" or "right" turn apply only relatively to Stalinist policy -- which is contradictory and bureaucratic by nature -- in reference to its previous course and not in an absolute sense.

Relative to the policy carried on from 1941 to 1947 there has been a "left emphasis" of Stalinist policy beginning with and especially after the Korean war, and this has basically continued despite inevitable conjunctural oscillations.*

*The Political Resolution of the Third World Congress correctly foresaw and characterized the problem in these terms:

"The limits of this leftist course are now quite clear. Given the fact that an extended compromise with imperialism is more or less excluded, and given the fact that the war preparations of the bourgeoisie will continue at its accelerated pace, this course will persist in its basic form. Nevertheless, it will undergo oscillations from left to right and vice versa, always on the basis of this fundamental line and in keeping with the possibilities of limited and ephemeral compromises and in conformity with the 'peace' offensives the Soviet bureaucracy will continue to launch up to the outbreak of the conflict..."

The reporter then stressed the lessons of the Marty-Tillon affair in France and especially as it relates to our tactic of entrism sui generis in France and in Italy.

This case confirms the rise and the development at the present stage of left-centrist currents in all mass working class organizations having a mass influence, including the CP. It fully justifies the considerations regarding this question contained in the documents of the Third World Congress and in subsequent documents of the International. It demonstrates the possibilities which already exists for political work within the movement influenced by Stalinist leaderships, this movement being neither absolutely monolithic nor absolutely impervious to the correctness of some of our ideas. It constitutes an important encouragement for the rapid and determined application of our tactic of entrism sui generis.

In reply to a suggestion by Comrade Manuel, which was seconded by Comrade Jacques, the reporter concludes that a document of a preventive nature, warning the members of our movement against erroneous interpretation of our tactical line in relation to the CP's on one side or the other, might soon be written on the basis of more advanced experiences of our sections in this sphere. Up to now there have not been important erroneous interpretations in one sense or the other. At the most, all that has been seen are tendencies. Some of our members still have the tendency to reason along the lines of old, out-dated schemas (because conditions have changed) and do not sufficiently keep in mind the new international situation in which all, including the Soviet bureaucracy and the leaderships of the Communist parties, are placed.

Other members have the tendency to schematize our present position and to accord to the CP's and to our relations with them an importance that the latter do not have.

The best way of expressing our interest for the category of workers who follow the CP, where they are only minority parties with a restricted base of influence, is to draw them behind us either by the dynamism of our independent action (for example, Ceylon, Bolivia) or by the dynamism and success of our work toward the principal mass of the organized proletariat within the big reformist organizations (for example, England, Germany, Austria).

#

Vote: For the general line of the report, 12; against, 0; abstentions, 3 (Edward, Peng, Jacques).

Comrades Edward and Peng did not have the time to study the written text of the report.

Comrade Jacques reserves his vote in favor until the writing of the document mentioned by the reporter in the conclusion of his summary.

#

BOLIVIA

Draft Resolution submitted for the approval of the 12th Plenum of the International Executive Committee (November 1952).

The way the POR (Revolutionary Workers Party) has acted up to now is generally correct and corresponds to objective realities as well as to the real forces of the party.

Ideologically prepared in advance for the events of April 9, the POR was not surprised by them and above all did not fail to interpret them correctly and to adequately adjust its own policy.

The POR participated thoroughly in the April insurrection and avoided isolating itself from the broad masses polarized in action by the MNR. Its policy was then aimed to continue not being isolated from the masses over whom the MNR still has a strong influence, especially not to isolate itself from the ranks of the left wing of the MNR while giving an impulse to revolutionary action and the independent organization of the masses.

This two-fold preoccupation is concretized in the critical support granted the MNR government, accompanied by direct revolutionary activity among the masses, for the purpose of exercising and reinforcing their pressure and developing their independent organizations in the trade unions and in the militias.

The organization and the strengthening of the Bolivian Workers Center (COB -- Centro Obrero Boliviana) has assumed the significance and the dynamism of a distinct proletarian power objectively constituting a counter-weight to the MNR government. This achievement constitutes by far the most important conquest thus far of the Bolivian revolution, as well as the greatest achievement of the fruitful activity of the POR which has in large part been able to determine the ideological orientation and the dynamism of the Workers' Center.

The principal political task which is now posed to the POR is to find the bridge (a) between its present slogans and transitional slogans concretizing for the broad masses their own forms of political power toward which the revolution must be more firmly oriented; (b) the concrete organizational forms which will make this political power possible and will aid the consciousness of broad masses in its necessity.

In every revolution, and the Bolivian revolution as well, it is necessary to start from what has been achieved up to now, however limited the gains of this proletarian revolutionary activity of the masses may be, and to develop them to their final conclusions, to avoid attempting to force the revolutionary process by the application on slogans of organizational forms of an essentially doctrinaire or programmatic nature.

The worth of a revolutionary leadership is manifested among other things by its capacity to discern and then to adequately utilize every slogan and every organizational form indicated or even

suggested by the revolutionary activity of the masses of the country themselves, in a word to seize upon the characteristics and the peculiar national processes of the revolution.

From this point of view, it appears to us that the principal point of departure from which the POR should operate to lead the revolution to a higher level is precisely the COB and its congress, which is scheduled for January 1953.

The COB is already established in the revolutionary movement of the Bolivian masses as the embryonic representative of their own power. In fact, it constitutes the proletarian element of the dual power which has been developing in the country since April. It is not only a trade union federation concerning itself with economic and elementary democratic demands of the masses, but much more, a particular form of Soviet organization of the masses, a kind of workers' counter-parliament and a distinct political power. These characteristics are expressed in the scope of the program and the ideological orientation of the COB as well as in its practical revolutionary activity: organization of militias, demonstrations, agitation and organization of the peasant masses.

Obviously the COB must be taken as the point of departure, in what it already represents for the workers, and in its dynamism, in order to generalize a Soviet organization of the worker, peasant and urban petty-bourgeois masses, and in order for such an organization then to give rise to the need of a Workers and Peasants Government which will appear as the almost automatic emanation of such an organization, on which finally this government will base itself.

That is to say, the COB should serve to polarize the working masses around itself and to keep them under its own influence, distinct from that of the MNR government, to initiate a propaganda and agitation campaign directed toward peasant and urban petty-bourgeois strata which will aim to draw the latter into a Soviet form of organization. This campaign can only be based on the slogan of a National Congress of the workers and peasants. This slogan, already contained in the program of political orientation of the COB, could include in this form the content of a Constituent Assembly, mobilizing and organizing both the worker, peasant and urban petty-bourgeois masses.

The Congress of the COB by issuing this slogan, rounded out by the slogan of committees in which workers, peasants and urban petty-bourgeois participate for the convening of such a Congress, will signify in reality the mobilization and the organization of the masses allied to the proletariat for Soviet power.

The success of the campaign for the National Congress of Workers and Peasants will determine the possibility of going over from the present stage of the revolution to the stage of a Workers and Peasants Government emerging from the committees of workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie and from their National Assembly, and basing itself upon them. This will be the government of the political majority of the committees and of their National Assembly.

The slogan of the National Congress should now be placed within this perspective.

The mobilization and organization of the Bolivian working masses is the work of the COB itself. The COB is already engaged in this work, and its Congress, which is now scheduled, constitutes the most powerful lever for this purpose. But after the Congress of the COB, mobilization for the National Congress of Workers and Peasants will succeed only if it is successful in adapting its concrete program to the most profound needs and aspirations of the peasant and urban petty-bourgeois strata.

So far as the peasant masses are concerned, the concretization of the meaning of the agrarian revolution is evidently the most powerful lever toward this end. This concretization should keep in mind political imperatives and not strictly economic or doctrinaire considerations.

It should aim to promise an immediate solution to the peasants corresponding to their needs and to their immediate desires so as to arouse their enthusiasm and to solidify their alliance with the worker masses.

So far as the urban petty-bourgeois masses are concerned, the emphasis, outside of their own economic demands, should probably be put on a program of genuine democratization of the regime and on concrete perspectives of proletarian power in Bolivia.

This latter point, which is also very important for all other social strata, should be treated along the lines of the idea set forth in the international report presented to the recent Congress of the POR: trade agreements and commerce primarily with neighboring countries, Argentina, Chile, Peru, eventually with Brazil and Uruguay; trade agreements and commerce with all other countries of Latin America and of the world including the nations of the Soviet bloc and China; planning and rational development of the resources of the country itself.

A commission of the POR should now occupy itself with the aim of arriving at conclusions and concrete proposals on the agrarian question as well as on the above-mentioned question after a thorough-going examination of the realities of Bolivia and of the neighboring Latin American countries.

The POR should seek to concretize its present policy in the sense indicated above for the purpose of raising of the revolutionary movement of the masses to a higher level.

Such an orientation will permit it to find the road toward a Soviet organization, not only of the worker masses but also of the peasant and urban petty-bourgeois masses, as well as to pose the question of power in a concrete, transitional form which is presented neither as a POR government, nor as a Workers and Peasants Government suspended in mid-air which the masses are unable to understand or to support.

Another alternative which may arise, and whose entire importance should naturally be understood and basically exploited, is the possibility of consummating the split between the right and the left of

the MNR, the latter succeeding in winning the majority of the MNR or of separating itself from the party and constituting a separate party. In both cases, the POR could envisage the possibility of a Worker and Peasant Government formed by the coalition of the two parties on the basis of a common minimum program -- a brief stage on the road toward a genuine government of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In any case, if this eventuality arises, it should naturally not prevent the POR from continuing its propaganda and its agitation for a Soviet organization of the masses through an identical road that we have already indicated above.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

October 1952

#

RESOLUTIONS

I. BOLIVIA

The draft resolution will serve as a recommendation rather than a directive to the POR. (Unanimously adopted.)

The Plenum decides that all continental European sections will carry on a campaign to collect funds among their members and sympathizers to aid the Bolivian section.

II. CEYLON

The IEC approves the letter of the International Secretariat to the Conference of the LSSP. Vote: For, 9; against, 0; abstentions, 4 (who have not had time to read the document).

III. CHINA

1. All documents sent to the International Secretariat will be translated for the information of the members of the IS and of the IEC.

2. To request the leadership of the Chinese section to send a detailed and responsible report on the situation and particularly everything concerning the repressions directed against the members of our movement.

3. That the Chinese section and Comrade Peng personally takes the responsibility for active political defense of our members against every act of repression on the part of the Chinese CP, publicly denouncing these actions before the Chinese masses and the international proletariat, in documents which will at the same time make known our clear and unequivocal political position with regard to the Third Chinese Revolution and to the regime.

Vote: For, 13; against, 0; abstentions, 0.

GREETINGS TO THE INDONESIAN COMRADES

The 12th Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International greets the work of the Indonesian comrades who in recent months have begun the constitution of revolutionary Marxist study groups studying the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky.

It hopes that this work will lead to the solution of the tasks which these comrades have posed on the building of a revolutionary Marxist cadre, the first stage toward the formation of a revolutionary party of Indonesia which will be capable of leading the oppressed masses toward the destruction of feudal imperialist and other exploitation and toward a socialist Indonesia and a socialist world.

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LETTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH PCI SUSPENDED IN JULY 1952

Comrades,

At its 12th Plenum the International Executive Committee once again took up the French question. It did this again with the desire of retaining the maximum number of members in the International and in its French section. Once again it was ready to overlook numerous incidents and even not to draw extreme conclusions from your refusal to apply the decision of the 11th Plenum, from your public attacks against the leaders of our movement, and from your harmful use of the name of our organization, provided only you were ready to loyally submit to the discipline of the International.

After a first declaration made along these lines by Bleibtreu on November 15 before the entire IEC, we appointed a commission composed of Comrades Livio, Pablo, Germain, Frank, to explore together with Bleibtreu, the modalities of a possible reunification. On Bleibtreu's request, three other members of your tendencies (Lambert, Renard, Berne) participated in most of the meetings of the commission. The commission worked extensively and arrived at four points of agreement. There is disagreement on the fifth point (relating to the election in the first sector of Paris). Comrades Livio, Pablo, Germain, Frank then raised this question in a distinct resolution. Bleibtreu demanded that a meeting of your leadership be held to examine this question of the candidacy. The next day before the entire IEC after Comrade Germain had reported on the work of the commission, Bleibtreu pretended that these things did not happen at the commission and presented a false version of its deliberations. Bleibtreu's attitude was in contradiction not only with what it had been at the commission but also with the one that he had taken to the whole IEC on the eve of the commission meeting. This attitude aroused vehement indignation on the part of all of the members of the IEC without exception.

Under these conditions, the 12th Plenum adopted the following resolutions (which were addressed to your leadership on November 20). The International Executive Committee also decided to send you the present letter to set forth the most important points of these resolutions.

Resolution III

Point 1 sets forth the modalities of the discussion. We discuss in order to act. The discussion with you cannot have as its aim the elaboration of a new line, nor the application of the line of the Third World Congress to France -- that has already been done by the 10th Plenum. The 11th Plenum already approved the orientation now being applied by the French section. The acceptance of this principle by Bleibtreu signifies that you were ready to apply this line in the unified section. The discussion in our opinion could not be held between you and the comrades who are already applying this line and who cannot be sidetracked from their work. The discussion with you should, in our opinion, assist you to better prepare for the application of the line. Such a discussion can be profitably carried on with you by a delegation of the IEC and a delegation of the leadership of the French section. You have the right to express yourself as you wish. But it goes without saying that this discussion cannot alter the line of the International and its application in France. For us the purpose of the discussion is to make you understand and apply the line of the International.

You invoke new facts. There are always new facts, which does not mean that the orientation can constantly be called into question. The periods of discussion in the International and its sections are defined, and the discussions are organized by the IEC. The 12th Plenum has not found any need of opening a discussion on the line of the International at the present stage. The line of the International cannot be changed until a Plenum decides to do so. In the meantime, if you accept the conditions of reunification, we will recognize you as a tendency, and on important questions, you will be able to take a position in the documents which will be published in the International bulletin without thereby opening a discussion.

Point 2 recognizes that in case of reunification, you will have your representation as a tendency in the organisms of leadership of the French section. Under the condition of the reunification the leadership could not properly be designated by the parties to the unification. Only the IEC or a commission appointed by it could do so.

This is moreover confirmed in Point 3 which refers again to the statutes and the discipline of the International. Besides, it is not an innovation in our movement. Even more than at the preceding Plenum, the IEC had the conviction that your tendency, by the hostility it has shown to the policy of the International, is incapable of being the pivot of a leadership capable of applying this very difficult orientation for the entire party.

Point 4 demonstrates that the International does not request anything from you so far as your activity is concerned during the months of discussion; it limits itself to declaring that it bears no responsibility for your public activity and that you should carry on without using the name of the International and its French section. Thus the International has not requested the slightest guarantee from you except that at the end of the three months you will not have reneged on the conditions set forth in the three preceding points. The IEC was taking a risk, because the leaders of

your tendency several times have broken their promises to the International. Nevertheless, the IEC took this risk because it felt it was worthwhile doing so if it could prove helpful to reunification.

Resolution IV

During the three months envisaged for discussion various circumstances may arise such as the Paris election of December 7. If there is a sincere desire for unification on your part, it should express itself in a desire to find an area of agreement. Our resolution -- as you can notice -- is not a condition, but it is a serious test for us. (It is not true that your leaders propose Renard's withdrawal. They put forth the idea of the withdrawal of both candidates. They were ferociously hostile to Pierre Frank's candidacy.)

What do we ask of your group? To accept as candidate Comrade Pierre Frank, the oldest Trotskyist in France, who was designated as secretary of the party by the 10th Plenum and who would have been designated for that post by the International in the event of reunification -- which is for us much more important than being the party's candidate in the elections.

To refuse to accept his candidacy can only raise doubts on your desire for unification and cause us to believe that at the end of three months' discussion you would call into question the decisions of the 12th Plenum just as you have violated the decisions of the preceding Plenum, that you will refuse to accept the leadership designated by the International, and that you will continue your public activity outside the ranks of the International.

Unification can only take place on the line of the International, within the framework of its discipline. There can be no question of reopening the debate within the unified organization the day after unification. You have complete right to your ideas in our movement only on one condition: that you accept the right of the majority to apply its policy and to accept the leadership of those who, because of the conditions which the French section has gone through, appear the most qualified to lead the organization. If you are ready to unify in this spirit, there would really be no reason for you to oppose the candidacy of P. Frank.

Resolution II

The Plenum addresses itself to every comrade, and the members of the IEC regret that they did not have time to say these things orally to each of the comrades of the Bleibtreu-Lambert tendency.

The matter cannot be dragged out indefinitely. Our international gatherings have accorded your section more time than they have granted other sections, many of whom are engaged in extremely important activities. We are well aware of what has happened in the French section. It was your leaders especially who have informed us about this situation. We reproach your leaders not for their opinions, but for their irresponsible conduct, unworthy of leaders, of carrying on a game dictated by political opposition which has

successively placed them in organizational conflicts with the French members loyal to the International, International Secretariat and finally with the International Executive Committee, which has led them to pretend that in this International, which they say is healthy, the most responsible members of the leading body are liars, subjected to a "personal government." In reality they wanted to trick the International, to gain time so as not to apply the policy fixed by it. Our patience has limits. We have given the members of your leadership eight days to individually or collectively accept the conditions defined by the commission.

For the first time in this crisis, and we bring it now to its final conclusion, we address ourselves to you not merely as a tendency but to each one of you individually. You have up to January 1, 1953 to make a weighty decision for your future as active revolutionists. You know that no group has survived outside the International. Only the International has the intrinsically sufficient forces to overcome the formidable pressures of the world in which we live. If it turns out to be wrong, it also possesses the strength to correct its errors. No national group is in a position to cope with the forces of disintegration which are brought to bear on it. The four months you have existed as a national group should already have made you understand that.

Faction discipline cannot go contrary to International discipline, except if the faction is mortally hostile to the International. There are those among you who during these months have lost all attachment to the International. Do not permit yourself to be led by them.

You have before you a few weeks for consideration. Once again we say to everyone of you: Do not commit the irreparable. The International, its French section, are continuing on their way as they have done every time groups have abandoned them. They ask you to understand that to leave them means in a more or less brief period to leave your place as a militant in the international struggle.

INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

October 22, 1952

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE 12TH PLENUM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REGARDING THE FRENCH SECTION

I.

The 12th Plenum of the IEC approves the measures and decisions adopted by the IS in applying the decisions of the 11th Plenum to the French section.

It notes that members of the group suspended from the IS placed themselves outside of the International by the violation of the decisions of the 10th Plenum and have no right to claim membership in the Fourth International. (Unanimously adopted with one abstention: Switzerland.)

II.

Because of the erroneous presentation made by Comrade Bleibtreu of the work of the French commission, the IEC decides to give all members of the Political Bureau of the suspended group eight days to accept the following resolution elaborated by the French commission, failing which the suspension announced by the IS will be transformed into expulsion pronounced by the IEC.

The period for other members of the group -- under the same conditions -- is set until January 1, 1953. (Unanimously adopted.)

III.

Resolution on the Solution of the Crisis of the French Section

1. There will be a three months' discussion between the group of comrades suspended by the International and a commission of members of the IEC, as well as a delegation of the PCI recognized by the International. Discussion will be carried on in writing in bulletins, which will be made available to members of the IEC and to the members of the recognized PCI for information purposes.

2. At the end of this period, the IEC commission will designate, in conformity with the decisions of the 11th Plenum, the leadership of the unified PCI, in which, in any event there will be representatives of both tendencies. This leadership will fix the practical modalities of the unification.

3. The unified party will naturally apply the line of the International, will recognize its statutes and its discipline including the dispositions made in paragraph 13.

4. During the discussion period, the group of members of the PCI suspended from the International will carry on their activity according to their own decisions, for which the Fourth International will bear no responsibility (which means to cease using the title, "Section of the Fourth International," in all activities and publications). (Unanimously adopted.)

IV.

The 12th Plenum of the IEC,

Noting that a resolution has just been adopted opening the road to the unification of the French section --

Considers that the electoral campaign in the first district of the Seine will in any event be a test of the seriousness with which this latter effort has been undertaken to maintain the unity of the PCI --

Decides that in any event the candidacy of Comrade Pierre Frank, secretary of the International, representing the policy of the International in France, will hold --

Calls upon the comrades of the suspended group to withdraw their candidate as a sign of their willingness to regularize their situation in the International as it is today, with its present policy and its present leadership --

Proposes that in the event that this withdrawal of candidacy actually occurs, a joint commission of both tendencies will draw up the leaflets and posters and will try to unite all the members of the PCI in the campaign. (Unanimously adopted.)

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