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SOCIALIST LABOUR LEAGUE
DRAFT RESOLUTION

THE USSR SINCE THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS

1. Since the October Revolution of 1917, the capitalist system has been confronted by a rival system of production which rejects the private ownership of the means of production and the anarchy of market relations. Since the second world war the economic achievements of the Soviet Union, together with the success of revolutions in new countries, particularly in China, have sharpened the contradictions between capitalism and socialism. A large proportion of the world's population and productive resources are now outside the sphere of capitalist exploitation or expansion. This heightened conflict between capitalism and socialism will not simply fade away in an atmosphere of "peaceful coexistence." As interpreted by the Soviet bureaucracy, peaceful coexistence is only an ideological cloak for their policy of compromise with imperialism, their opposition to decisive clashes between capitalism and the revolutionary working class. The conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems cannot be solved except on the arena of international class struggle. It is false and contrary to Marxism to pose as the alternatives "either peaceful coexistence or a third world war." Above all, it is a question of the international consciousness, organization and action of the proletariat. Khrushchev envisages rather a growing number of existing states or governments committed to friendly relations with the USSR. Consequently the working-class movements in the capitalist and ex-colonial countries are channeled into "pressure" politics rather than the overthrow of the capitalist state. This is the fundamental meaning of the theories of "peaceful roads to socialism," "antimonopoly coalitions" and "broad peace alliances."

2. The economic advances of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe result from nationalized and planned economy. Their more rapid and even growth, compared with the capitalist countries, testifies to the advantages of planned economy over private enterprise. But this does not mean that the claims of Stalin and his successors about the construction of socialism or even communism in the USSR can be accepted. Such a claim is dangerous and in contrast to the facts; to accept it would mean accepting all the excesses of Stalinism, its political repressions and social and economic distortions, as inevitable features of a socialist society. Although the repression has become less ruthless and obvious, there remain all the contradictions flowing from the betrayal of the revolution which was cloaked by the theory of "Socialism in one country." The inequality of incomes and the social privileges of the bureaucracy, the absence of effective control from below in the formulation and carrying through of the state plans, all result in disharmonies which drag upon the economy and prevent its full development of the productive forces in a planned way. In this way individualist tendencies are encouraged, not only in the bureaucracy but also among the workers and peasants. So long as the working class is rigorously excluded from political power by the bureaucratically controlled state and party machine, this contradiction cannot be resolved. The state property in the means of production remains a fundamental basis for the building of socialism, but is by no means socialist property, any more than are the

collective farms. Socialist society implies the disappearance of the state, since the abolition of classes makes any apparatus of repression or enforcement of law unnecessary. Even without the usurpation of workers' power in the USSR by the bureaucracy, there could be no question of the victory of socialism until imperialism was defeated and a much higher level of material production reached. The USSR, China and the Eastern European countries are workers' states: i.e., they are based on property forms established by the October revolution, directly or indirectly, property forms which are the basis for socialist society. However, the working class in these countries does not wield political power, does not control production, and does not decide the policy of these countries to the world outside.

The confinement of the first stage of the world revolution to the USSR alone, a backward country, resulted in the victory of a bureaucratic caste in politically expropriating the proletariat. This bureaucracy stands above and outside the working class and is parasitic upon the economic forms created by the October revolution. This is not an inevitable feature of the transition to socialism, but arises from the special conditions of isolation of the Russian revolution and will be replaced historically by a political revolution by the Soviet working class. The preparation of this revolution depends upon the strategy of the revolutionary working-class forces on a world scale.

3. Thus we see the USSR, China and Eastern Europe as workers' states which have become deformed or degenerated. Their present form can only be temporary, and it is wrong to interpret these temporary distorted forms as a new or inevitable stage in the development of society. We stand for the defense of these states as of every conquest of the working class: their return to the sphere of exploitation of imperialism would be a shattering blow to the prospects of socialism, whereas their continued existence constitutes a permanent challenge and threat of instability to imperialism. But such defense of the USSR, Eastern Europe and China does not mean giving up the right of criticism. Revolutionaries have a duty to criticize ruthlessly the counterrevolutionary role of the bureaucracy, which in fact works against the defense of the revolution. Both in their own countries and in the class struggle all over the world through their influence on the Communist parties, they hamper the growth of socialism. In calling for a political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy we are not supporting the "liberation" propaganda of the imperialists and their agents in the labor movement. We advocate such a revolution to preserve and not to overturn the nationalized property relations, to ensure their protection from the restoration of capitalism either from within or without, as a part of the world revolution.

Especially dangerous is the petty-bourgeois tendency which characterizes the Soviet Union as a system of "state capitalism." By using an impressionistic method of superficial comparisons, the theories of "state capitalism" claim that the Soviet bureaucracy, through its control of the state apparatus, has become a new capitalist class and has destroyed all the gains of the October revolution. On this basis all responsibility for the defense of the USSR

from imperialist attack is avoided, and the necessity for constructing a Leninist party is denied. Formally embracing Marxism, such tendencies in fact provide a left cover for the bourgeois theories of "totalitarianism" and the impossibility of working-class power; in times of political crisis, such as the Korean war, they provide support for the imperialists. They are a direct agency through which certain elements in the movement capitulate to petty-bourgeois democratic opinion at a time when sharp class struggle arises and the need for proletarian discipline and principled program becomes vital. The discussion of the character of the USSR from the point of view of abstract political criteria like "democracy" and "freedom" rather than from the basis of production relations is clear evidence of the class character of this tendency. In theory as in practice they are a direct line of transmission to right-wing social democracy.

4. Stalin's excesses, justified by the theory of "Socialism in one country," expressed in the sharpest form the reactionary role of the bureaucracy. In the period following Stalin's death, the bureaucracy itself was able to curb the power of the security forces in its own interests. In this way the power of the bureaucracy was not ended but placed on a different basis. Khrushchev's speech to the closed session of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was an attempt to respond to the growing strength of the Soviet working class and to the questionings following Stalin's death, by rationalizing the bureaucracy's internal relations and attempting to give the impression of a clean break with the brutal repressions of the Stalin era. Khrushchev has succeeded in surviving the various crises within the Communist party leadership and in the Eastern European countries, finally emerging as the undisputed successor of Stalin. Although Khrushchev's regime appears less rigid and brutal than that of Stalin, still the area of debate and democracy remains severely limited. The promises of collective leadership in state and party, a necessary response to the rise of a mass educated working class with growing consciousness, have not been fulfilled. The cult of personality remains, even if muted in comparison with Stalin's day. The rule of the bureaucracy is concentrated in the rule of one man, a supreme arbiter who staffs the top posts with his own nominees and takes all the major decisions both on domestic and foreign affairs. This one-man rule befits a bureaucratic type of planning based on commands from the center rather than democratic decisions and checks. A series of policy changes and ideological modifications, combined in an empiricist way that often amounts to demagogy, have enabled Khrushchev to maintain a certain stability in the relations between the bureaucracy and the people. Concessions have been made to the peasants, and the discontent of the working class has been stemmed by some improvement of living standards and the promise of more to come. By applying his own personal energy to these practical problems and by skillfully routing his own opponents within the bureaucracy, Khrushchev has confirmed his own position as boss. The stability thus brought about is necessarily only temporary, for the personal power involved, centralized in a single personality, is in contradiction with the continued expansion of the economy and the growth of the working class. Thus Khrushchev's personal rule prepares for even deeper contradictions in the future. The whole course

since the Twentieth Congress, where Khrushchev made his "secret speech" in emergency conditions, has amounted to a bottling up rather than a solution of the fundamental conflicts.

In Hungary and Poland, the risings of 1956 were unable to overthrow the rule of the bureaucracy. Here too, modification of the old police rule has taken place. But in Hungary, leading workers and intellectuals remain imprisoned, and the workers' councils set up in 1956 were ruthlessly suppressed. In Poland, Gomulka's leadership of a left centrist group in the bureaucracy tided the bureaucracy over the storms arising from Poznan and Warsaw in 1956. Since the Eighth Plenum of that year, however, the legislation on workers' councils and the suppression of dissident opinions have been used to stifle the initiative of the youth and the working class. Following concessions to the Stalinist or Natolin group in 1958, with the return to office to many of the members of the repressive machine, there came a restriction of the workers' councils to advisory committees in the factories. This reimposition of bureaucratic power and the checks on working-class activity have encouraged the open political campaigning of elements like the Roman Catholic Church.

5. Khrushchev now claims that the capitalist encirclement is ended and that communism is now being constructed in the USSR. Neither assertion bears any relation to the objective situation. The continual drain on the economy of a necessarily high armaments production and scientific research geared to military requirements, and the continued emphasis on heavy industry rather than consumer goods, due to the fact that the advanced industrial countries remain in the capitalist sphere, all reflect the capitalist encirclement. In many ways the USSR is far from having the lineaments of an advanced economy, despite the claims that communism is being introduced. The relative backwardness of consumer goods production, of housing and roads and motor transport, are all inevitable disproportions in an economy surrounded by hostile capitalist states and unable to profit from the international division of labor. But they make a mockery of the claims to have reached the threshold of communism.

Because its own rule is bound up in every way with the economic problems confronting the USSR, the bureaucracy is unable to perceive clearly or to remedy these problems. Khrushchev continues to make strenuous efforts to cope with problems which have worried the administration for decades: but there is no attempt to go to the root of the matter, viz., the emphasis in the planning system of a caste of administrators separated off from the producers and relying on a chain of command from an uncontrolled center. This center and the caste around it are immune to democratic discussion of the economic plans and are independent of any control from below, which is an essential part of socialism. Khrushchev's own repeated complaints make it clear that the system of incentives and individual responsibility for norms encourages systematic dishonesty and cheating of the state and its enterprises. Corruption, inefficiency, plundering of public resources, bribery, fixing, unfulfilled promises -- all these are not the inevitable results of economic planning and "human nature" but of

the bureaucratic methods of the Soviet ruling caste. There must be no one-sided evaluation of the USSR on the basis of such examples, but at the same time such developments must impede the economy, and it is ridiculous to continue to attribute them to "survivals of capitalism." The backward individualistic attitudes to which this latter characterization refers are in fact bred every day by the system of material incentives which continues to dominate the life of the working class itself, despite the official lip-service to "workers' participation" and nonmaterial incentives. Such attitudes are encouraged by the visible signs of privileged consumption by the members and families of the bureaucracy.

6. Khrushchev has been particularly concerned with the recurrent crises in Soviet agriculture and associated problems. The main production lags have in fact been in agriculture. Despite the "virgin lands" projects and various agrarian reforms the peasantry clearly remains little affected by the exhortations of the official spokesmen; the agrarian sector appears to offer particularly wide scope for the corruptions and evils of bureaucracy. In industry the problem is less one of continued growth than of harmonious proportions between the different branches of production. But in agriculture it is not possible in the same degree to ensure continued growth in output by continuous increase in the amount of capital investment in new means of production. This can only be brought about on the same scale by bringing new lands into cultivation. The other necessary conditions are improved livestock husbandry, improved crop yield, the spread of technical knowledge among the peasantry, and their active cooperation in meeting the economic plan. Clearly results in these fields have been very uneven, have required many concessions to the peasants and the constant attention of Khrushchev himself. At the same time the system of procuring and distributing agricultural produce has been criticized severely by the bureaucracy itself as a weak link in the economy, allowing as it does enormous opportunities for fraud and speculation. The relation between the workers' state and the peasantry remains one which is endangered by the character of the bureaucracy; the agrarian problem remains unsolved. The future of property forms is no more certain than it was in the 1930s. Measures like the sale of the machine tractor stations to the large collectives leave in serious doubt the relation between collective farms and state farms.

7. The bureaucracy seeks peace and disarmament agreements with the imperialists, not only because it wants to ensure its own continued privileged existence but also because the arms program is a great drag on the economy. But the existence of great imperialist powers who see the need to oppose any spread of the revolution makes such disarmament a dangerous illusion. The theory of peaceful coexistence seeks to get round this basic dilemma.

The theory of peaceful coexistence serves to sum up the current ideology of the bureaucracy in the USSR. It rests upon a number of major assumptions concerning the character of the class forces in the modern world. The statements of Soviet statesmen and the writings of Soviet economists reveal an oversimplified concep-

tion of the general crisis of capitalism as a steady growth of inevitable contradictions, involving growing unemployment and declining living standards. In fact this picture grossly underestimates the recuperative powers of capitalism after the second world war, powers which required direct collaboration from the Social-Democratic and Stalinist leadership of the working class in Europe. Thus the Soviet economy suffers from distortions resulting from the political betrayals of the ruling caste internationally; the same bureaucracy now advocates an intensification of the same policy of illusions and betrayal. Similarly in the colonial revolution: it is all very well to talk about the colonial system having come to the end of its history, but this ignores the extent to which the imperialists have been able to come to terms with the national bourgeoisie of these ex-colonial countries, preserving the imperialist stake in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Once again, this has only been possible because of the failure to build alternative revolutionary leaderships in the working class in the colonial countries, a failure which can be laid right at the door of the Stalinist bureaucracy, with its uncritical support of national bourgeois leaders in the anti-imperialist movements.

The automatic and non-Marxist conception of the nature of capitalism's decline, in which socialism will gradually "prove" itself superior to capitalism in peaceful competition, as expressed in the declaration of the 81 parties in 1960, lead at the same time to an overestimation of the strength and potentialities of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries. The actual possibilities of independent revolutionary action by the working class are negated by this automatic identification of the working class with the Communist parties and with the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy itself. Such a conception is geared to alliances with the "peace-loving" sections of the bourgeoisie in the colonial and even in the advanced countries, in order to install coalition governments friendly to the USSR or regimes dominated by the CP, as in Eastern Europe.

The Chinese Communist party leaders have recently called into question all the basic theoretical presuppositions of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese saw in peaceful coexistence an implicit willingness to accept the status quo, thus abandoning the struggle against Chiang for the recovery of Formosa, and also to trade support for the colonial revolutions in return for disarmament agreements. The Chinese leadership also arises from a bureaucratic caste, no less wedded to its power and privileges than its Russian counterpart. But, being nearer to the sources of revolutionary energies, facing difficult problems at home and resenting the imposition on the world communist movement of policies which were against its own interest it readily found theoretical ammunition in Leninism with which to oppose the "revisionists." The concentration of this fire on the Titoists deceived no one as to the real target. The fact that, in the course of this controversy, the Chinese made many correct points, that their estimation of the division of world forces was more realistic and their ideology "purer," should not lead to the acceptance of their case as a whole. It was equally arrived at on an empiricist and not a principled basis and it includes some points which were

adventurist and dangerous, such as the claim that in an H-bomb war socialism would be victorious.

The Chinese position, emanating from a powerful member of the bloc with high prestige, especially in the less developed countries, opened up a theoretical discussion inside the Communist parties, which has not yet shown its full results. The declaration of the 81 Communist parties as well as subsequent Soviet statements show a verbal adaptation to some of the objections raised by the Chinese without any major change on tactics or policy. This suggests that, taking advantage of the Chinese domestic embarrassments, the Soviet leaders were mainly interested in preserving their dominance within a unified Communist movement, and they have in fact succeeded in this aim. As a result the declaration, and other statements are even more eclectic than such statements have customarily been: they contain something for all the different trends and made it possible to cover in advance almost any course upon which Khrushchev decides -- thus leaving the Communist parties no choice but to follow.

9. The fundamental causes of the crisis within Stalinism were no more dealt with in 1960 than in 1956: once again their solution was put off by methods of equivocation, suppression and the production of eclectic "declarations" which papered over differences. The crisis is bound to intensify in the great class struggles which are now beginning. The "monolithic unity" of the Communist parties, both internally and internationally, is only appearance. The new phase of the world revolution will produce further breaks from the Communist parties as the dangers of Khrushchev's opportunist line are revealed and the rank and file comes to seek a policy nearer to the interests of the working class. At first these trends will necessarily be sporadic and uncoordinated. There is no automatic process by which the bureaucracy will be unseated or the policy of the old leaders in the capitalist countries transformed. A great responsibility rests upon the Marxist movement to construct new mass revolutionary parties and to further this process by winning militants from the Communist parties and sections of the working classes under their influence. In the Soviet Union and other workers' states the party is first and foremost an instrument of the bureaucracy. It is possible that the movement of 1956 for a return to Lenin may be repeated, either within the framework of the party or outside it. Whatever the case, the question is not one of reforming the Communist parties of these countries, but of building new revolutionary parties with the strategy of political revolution. For this there is necessary a return to the traditions and methods of the Left Opposition and the Bolshevik party, and it is particularly important to educate the youth in this spirit. No opportunity must be lost, however small and insignificant the beginnings, in the furthering of this task. The 1956 events in Poland and Hungary showed the tragic results of the absence of a revolutionary leadership of the working class in the workers' states; they point to the urgent need to construct such parties if needless sacrifices are to be avoided in the future. Only when confronted by genuine revolutionary forces, organized as a Marxist party with deep roots in the masses, will the bureaucracy face its historic fate of destruction. Such a

perspective in the USSR, Eastern Europe and China, together with our unconditional defense of these states against the capitalist countries, along with the building of a new revolutionary International, constitutes the essence of our policy towards the USSR, China and the countries of Eastern Europe.

10. The present world situation, thirty-six years after Stalin's introduction of the theory of "Socialism in one country" emphasizes the fact that the future of socialism is a question of world revolution. The second world war and the arming of the great powers with nuclear weapons give the sharpest answer to the theories of an isolated socialist society. Only a new relationship between the working class of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the working class of the advanced countries on the other, can guarantee the victory of socialism. Even within the sphere of the workers' states there has not developed a planned division of labor and resources on the basis of equality. With revolutions in the advanced countries, socialism will be able to develop on its true objective basis, the material foundation of high productivity and the international division of labor developed by capitalism itself.

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE SOCIALIST LABOUR LEAGUE

April, 1961.

RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST LATIN-AMERICAN
TROTSKYIST CONGRESS
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Towards the World Revolution and the
Latin-American Revolution

Santiago, Chile, 1960.

RESOLUTION ON THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Its First Objectives

According to Lenin a revolution is characterized by the class which leads it and the objectives that class sets itself. We find that the Cuban revolution in its first stages has a petty-bourgeois leadership. That is to say it is led by a class of capitalist society which is neither fundamental nor decisive and which oscillates between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

This fact alone places the Cuban revolution outside the traditional category of social revolutions. This does not mean that it contradicts the Leninist concept as to the essential features which enable us to characterize a revolution. On the contrary, as we shall show later it is enriched by extracting from this new experience the necessary conclusions which will enable us to decide how to act in other countries where movements of the same kind may occur; it will also help to decide on our own participation in these movements.

The program of the Castro movement shows that it originated as a bourgeois movement with a petty-bourgeois leadership which orientated itself towards the reestablishment of bourgeois democracy and freedom, without interfering in any way with the interests of the capitalists and imperialism. It was a "democratizing" movement which made use of guerrilla warfare to attain its objectives.

We must also establish the fact that in its first phase this movement did not have the support of the masses, nor even that of the petty bourgeoisie. But it could count on the help of sections of American imperialism which supplied arms from Florida. There can be no doubt that imperialism was playing its own game attempting to make use of Castro and his movement, as a substitute team to replace the Batista regime. The latter had already shown itself to be completely useless; it had lost all regard in Cuban politics and was being repudiated progressively by the masses.

The absence of mass support is confirmed by the fact that Castro's appeals to the workers and peasants to support him by declaring general strikes were ignored.

The First Stage

Having characterized Castro's movement let us now examine what was the process of its development, its quantitative and qualitative leaps, and its stages.

The method of struggle adopted by Castro, guerrilla warfare; the area in which he established his headquarters, the Sierra Maestra (it lent itself to this purpose, because he could already count on the support of the big sugar planters); and the need to recruit new elements for his attacks and for his defense action; all of these were the determining causes which conditioned the basis for the qualitative leap which occurred later.

At first only peasants could be recruited to swell the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra. But so that they would be prepared to take this step it was necessary to offer them something in the way of improving their living and working conditions. This was the origin of Castro's first concessions to the peasants.

It was the participation of peasants in the Castro movement, in the guerrilla bands and in the fighting itself which changed the appearance of the movement independently of the thinking of Castro and of his petty-bourgeois leadership.

By establishing relationships with the peasantry Castro's movement acquired a new basis for its support. It was no longer made up of the dozen or so petty bourgeois, mainly students; from then on the movement was tied to the poor peasants, and in linking itself to them in this way a contradictory factor was introduced -- that is, the peasants themselves. They were fighting not only to bring down Batista, and to restore freedom and democracy, but also for their own demands.

This contradictory factor was highly positive in so much that it brought about a huge qualitative leap in the process of the revolution, this was shown later when the peasants took over the land without waiting for Castro's decisions.

From the time of this union with the peasantry, Castro's bourgeois democratic movement underwent a change not in its leadership but in its content. It now contained within itself the germs of the nationalist revolution and the social revolution which would manifest themselves later when connections were established with the urban proletariat.

As we have seen the revolutionary process in Cuba began and developed among the peasantry in the first place.

In this sense it has a certain similarity with the Chinese revolution, this also began from the countryside, with this difference, however, that the latter was led by the Communist party.

Traditionally we expect the revolution to be started by the proletariat in its role as the vanguard of the oppressed classes; nevertheless, facts show that in certain objective conditions, it is possible for the revolution to begin in the countryside. This in no way contradicts the vanguard role of the proletariat nor does it deny in any way the fact that the proletariat is the only revolutionary class.

An examination of this first stage of the Cuban revolution shows that the original limitations of the movement begun by Castro

were being overcome by the development of the struggle itself and in the same degree to which new elements were integrated into it, the peasants and the agricultural workers. Let us now examine the evolution of the revolution.

Second Stage

This was characterized by the opening of new guerrilla fronts, which came into existence independently of Castro's leadership.

These new guerrilla fronts opened up as the expression of Castro's own struggle and linked up with his movement ideologically.

The activities on these new guerrilla fronts give greater strength to Castro's movement, both in fighting capacity and also in its basis of support. But the most important aspect was that quantitatively the greatest weight was now being supplied by the workers and peasants who formed the guerrilla fronts.

Combined action on the three fronts, that of Castro, that of the Revolutionary Committee and that of Escambray, brought about the fall of Batista. In this battle something decisive was achieved: the liquidation of the Regular Army (as in the Bolivian revolution).

Third Stage

When Castro assumed power he had at once to face a difficult situation. Very soon he found himself under pressure from three directions simultaneously. On one side there was the pressure of the worker and peasant masses who had been mobilized in support of his government and were fighting Batista's tyranny in its last strongholds. On their own initiative they executed well-known representatives of the former regime. The peasants began to occupy the land and to liquidate the former owners and the workers presented their own demands.

In the independent activities of the peasant guerrillas who occupied the land and liquidated the former owners, there were concrete manifestations of dual power. This was damped down later by the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law, but it did not liquidate its core: the peasant militia.

On the other hand there was the pressure of imperialism which attempted to channelize for its own purposes the mass movement which had developed around the Castro government. Finally there was the pressure of the bourgeoisie who showed their fear at the measures taken by the workers and peasants on their own initiative, and which neither the government nor Castro could prevent.

Private firms both foreign and native offered to make a loan of millions of dollars to the State. The Revolutionary Committee, the 26th of July Movement and the militia units of Raul Castro and Che Guevara had to give way on certain principles and Fidel succeeded in carrying through a deal imposing Urrutia as president. But very soon the workers and peasants (who began to reorganize) as well as the militias and the People's Revolutionary Army, insisted

on the carrying out of the revolutionary program. This was being openly sabotaged by the pro-imperialist Urrutia and the latter's resignation was not long in coming.

Once in power Castro chose to continue making concessions to the masses and to legalize what they had already done. From this policy followed the Agrarian Reform Law, the cut in rents, electricity rates, and the prices of some articles of popular consumption, the prohibition of dismissals, the building of thousands of houses and schools, the denunciation of pacts with imperialism and later the expropriation of imperialist firms. All of this was accompanied by the legalization and the development of worker and peasant militias.

Another qualitative leap of outstanding importance had occurred. With it the Cuban revolution had acquired, as it were, its birth certificate.

The original movement which had begun with certain limited bourgeois objectives had undergone a whole process of dialectical transformation, accompanied by quantitative and qualitative leaps of such importance that although the movement still retained its petty-bourgeois leadership, nevertheless we are faced today by a revolutionary process of the greatest importance.

Various concrete objective factors determined the outlines of the new situation in Cuba. Among them we can distinguish the following: the active participation of the working masses, the founding and growth of the armed militias, their presentation of immediate minimum demands, the international solidarity of the working class with the measures taken by the Cuban revolution, the pressure of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism upon Castro and his government, and the balance of forces on a world scale which was unfavorable to imperialism and which so far has prevented armed intervention against Cuba.

All of this determined the pendulum-like swing of Castro's petty-bourgeois government's policy towards the masses; he sought their support as the only means by which he could maintain the government in power.

The Present Stage and the Tasks

Judging from the present characteristics of the Cuban revolution we may say that we are confronted with a nationalist type of revolution with a petty-bourgeois leadership, which is undertaking and developing bourgeois democratic tasks (agrarian reforms and anti-imperialist struggles). In order to avoid its being halted and eventually retreating it is an absolutely essential condition to transform the present processes into those of the permanent revolution.

The absence of a strong working-class revolutionary party in Cuba retards and makes this task more difficult. This also represents the main danger for the future development of the revolution in Cuba.

The Cuban revolution presents many specific aspects. In the first place there is the dynamism of the anti-imperialist struggle. U.S. attacks and the continual danger of invasion (either directly or through a declaration of war against Cuba by other Latin-American countries) have meant that the Castro government has been compelled to hand over modern arms to the peasant militias as a means of self-defense. (In the frontier zone where it is expected that the counterrevolutionary attack may occur Czech machine guns and automatic weapons have just been handed over to 2,000 peasants.) These measures of self-defense will no doubt deepen the revolution as happened in China as a result of the war in North Korea.

The militias, especially those of the workers, are in permanent training, but so far the government has not handed over arms to them. The arms depots are controlled solely by the Rebel Army. The fact that the workers and peasants have not got arms in their possession is a weakness and represents the most important danger which threatens the future of the revolution. The workers are conscious of this as is proved by a resolution passed at a recent Congress in the Eastern Zone in which a demand was made that:

"The CTC (Federation of Cuban Workers) form an organization able to help the Rebel Army and able also to unite workers with the armed forces; they should know where arms can be obtained quickly and they should organize militias."

On the other hand, in the countryside there has begun a vast experiment in agricultural cooperatives with the participation of the peasants organized in INRA (National Institution for Agrarian Reform). There now exist about 1,000 cooperatives in which about 200,000 people are working. As Marx and Engels pointed out it is necessary for these experiences to be deepened in order to make it possible for the peasantry to become conscious of the collective exploitation of the land. In this connection it would be very interesting to study the way in which some aspects of the Yugoslav cooperative system could be applied in Cuba, making due allowances for the differences between Yugoslavia which is a workers state, and that of Cuba which is still capitalist. It would be especially interesting to examine the way in which control and administration is carried out by basic organizations such as the Peasant Councils. It is necessary to take into account the fact that according to the Cuban Agricultural Reform Law, the lands of the cooperatives are: "indivisible properties, in that all those who are members of the cooperatives shall be the proprietors of a given area of land and the land shall not be divided in any way or for any reason."

With reference to the extent of the Agrarian Reform (and the revolution) even though we cannot yet come to any definite conclusions, we are already in a position to state that -- apart from Bolivia -- no other Agrarian Reforms in Latin America have brought about a change in the structure of agriculture as great as that in Cuba. In the first place, the sharecropping system has been abolished; this was payment in kind, which in nearly all cases amounted to half of the crop, to the owner who lived in comfort in Havana or abroad. Secondly, a huge system of cooperatives has been established, as noted above. In the third place, small proprietor-

ship is being abolished (in 1946 there were 62,500 peasants who had three-fourths of a caballeria each -- a caballeria is equal to approximately 13 square hectares). They have been regrouped in properties with a minimum extent of two caballerias, with the possibility of rising to five caballerias (65 square hectares). In the fourth place, the break-up of the big estates has begun.

Another important aspect is the direct expropriations carried out by the proletariat (in many cases without the intervention of the state). For example, the workers and employees in hotels have taken over the administration of these enterprises; the printing workers have assumed responsibility for the old reactionary newspapers such as "El Diario de la Marina" and others, after the owners left. In Pinar del Rio there were 3,000 shoemakers of whom 2,000 decided to combine and establish a large firm (a cooperative) which they managed themselves; they did so well that after a few months the other shoemakers closed down. It is of interest to note that in this case it is not only a question of workers' control. This experiment has certain socialist aspects, but it is necessary to clarify its content in order to avoid false interpretations. Above all this experiment has taken place in a State where capitalist private property still prevails. In the second place, such cooperatives do not belong to the State and they operate on a profit-sharing basis. In the case of the shoemakers the workers have combined their small workshops and with them have been able to establish a fairly considerable amount of capital. Up to the present time they have themselves been working, extracting surplus value from themselves, but tomorrow they might employ other workers from whom they would extract more surplus value. Production in this case is socialist, but the appropriation is not and continues to be individualist, with the safeguard that instead of there being two or three owners, there are 2,000. In any case the development of the spirit of cooperation prepares the way for a conscious participation in the future of collective production and distribution.

Finally (it is difficult to end here because the study of the Cuban experiment is still continuing), the confidence in their own strength which the workers and peasants have acquired, results in their openly defying their employers every day, demanding the dismissal of overbearing managers, etc.

The whole of this revolutionary process has brought about in Cuba the rise of Dual Power. This Dual Power (in Cuba) still does not have the characteristics of that which was established in the Russia of 1917 between the Soviets and the bourgeois government. Nor does it have the characteristics established in the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, of dual power between the COB (Bolivian Workers Federation) and the government. In Russia and in Bolivia -- to cite only these two cases -- dual power was shared between the organizations and institutions of the classes; (Soviets, COB, on the one hand and bourgeois governments on the other) and in all the daily events of concealed and open struggle of the classes. In the absence of more precise terms we may speak of Dual Power being exercised here "from above" and "from below." In contrast in Cuba the Dual Power does not yet operate "from above," neither the CTC nor the peasant organizations are represented in the government.

For the time being dual power operates "from below" only, it is expressed in the actions of the masses, in their conflicts with their employers and managers, and in the executions of counterrevolutionaries either directly or through Popular Courts, in the taking over of land and in the setting up of militias. This is permanent dual power "from below" operated by workers and peasants in a regime of capitalist private property.

It follows that the most important task is precisely the development and consolidation of dual power, concentrating power "from below" in the organizations of the workers and the peasants through correct slogans, and actually taking over power "from below," while at the same time dual power is generalized "from above" also. We believe that the slogan about power which the Peasant-Working Class Government could express at present is a demand for the entry of Worker and Peasant Ministers into Castro's government. These should be nominated and subject to recall from below through permanent trade-union congresses -- these congresses would in their turn serve as a true Parliament of the workers, peasants and militia-men. This would also give the direct lie to the counterrevolutionaries who are demanding elections in order to elect a new bourgeois parliament. As far as INRA is concerned, the most important point is its peasant base, for this reason it is necessary to develop control over INRA by the peasant masses through peasant committees controlling the cooperatives which would encourage the development of socialist tendencies in the countryside. A demand must be made for the extension to all the sugar-planting companies of Chapter (f) of the law which states: "The lands of the State and the lands subject to expropriation by the application of this law shall be handed over as areas of communal property to the cooperatives." We say extension, because the same law exempts from the provisions of the agricultural reform law, "areas sown with sugar cane or rice or used for stock rearing which do not exceed 100 caballerias" (which means that estates of 1,300 square hectares will still remain). These are precisely the lands which must be expropriated and exploited socially through the medium of the cooperative system, because they are the areas of most efficient capitalist development. In the same way the workers of Cuba must see that Chapter (i) is applied, too, this states that: "private land of whatever extent which is not in production on the 31 June 1961 shall be expropriated by INRA."

With reference to the militias, it is necessary to direct their organization nationally through the CTC and peasant organizations with control from below. The creation of a paid Rebel Army is not conducive to the aim of deepening the revolution until a Worker-Peasant Government has been set up. This does not mean either that the militias should be disbanded or that they should not maintain close contact with the Popular Rebel Army. It is essential that the militias should become independent. This is the only way in which effective support can be counted on for an independent class policy. The militias should begin at once to put into operation the resolution passed in the Congress mentioned above. They should know where they can obtain arms and begin to demand that the government should hand over arms to them at once.

On the other hand, the workers should struggle to obtain control in their own hands of the government of the municipalities and of the provinces, particularly those in frontier areas and in the mountains, so as to forestall any counterrevolutionary attacks. All power in the municipalities to the CTC, militias and the peasant organizations of the region.

In the factories and sugar refineries workers' control over production must be established (access to the employers' accounts, of running expenses and profits, particularly of those employers who put up most resistance to the revolution), and the expropriation by the State of the factories which did not want to provide more work, pleading unprofitability. This and a sliding scale of working hours is imperative for the solution of the serious problem of unemployment, particularly since we know that the unemployed have often been used by the counterrevolution.

Of all the Latin-American revolutions the Cuban revolution has carried out the most expropriations of imperialist firms (and it is one of the few nationalist revolutions in the world to do so), with the important addendum that the imperialist firms have received practically no compensation. Of the one thousand million dollars which Yankee imperialism had invested, practically the whole has been expropriated. The struggle for the NATIONALIZATION OF ALL THE BANKS must, nevertheless, still be waged. With this slogan there must go another: Workers' Control of the expropriated firms, until that time.

We believe that the best grounds for the development of the class and revolutionary tendencies do not lie within the 26th of July Movement but within the CTC, the militias and the INRA (cooperatives).

These revolutionary plans and slogans will certainly bring down on us accusations from the CP, the reformists and the nationalists; they will charge us with being provocateurs and adventurers. But to stupid words we turn deaf ears (we did this before at the time of Guatemala and Bolivia). As Trotskyists we support vigorously every anti-imperialist measure taken by Castro; but this does not mean that we should not speak the truth and that we should blindfold our eyes publicly, simply shouting "Long live the revolution." We must continue putting forward means to help the Cuban workers to set up a Worker-Peasant Government. All the slogans and tasks we have advanced will tend to sharpen the revolution, to accelerate the processes of differentiation within the 26th of July Movement, and to separate the wheat from the chaff. They will serve to distinguish between those who are for a worker-peasant government in Cuba and those who stand for the maintenance of capitalist private property. In fact the future of the Cuban revolution lies between these two alternatives: either a Worker-Peasant Government is set up in Cuba, or bourgeois reaction is left secure until it can carry out a counterrevolution. The intermediate phase -- the maintenance of the petty-bourgeois leadership -- may last for some time, until the masses have acquired experience, but it can provide no guarantee of the decisive victory of the great Cuban revolution which would plant the flag of a Workers' State in Latin America for the first time.