

KAZIMIERZ MIJAL -- DOGMATIC DIEHARD OR POLITICAL ADVENTURER?

First Published: **RADIO FREE EUROPE Research, June 26th 1967**

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DOC 004 | *Summary*

Kazimierz MIJAL, former member of the PUWP CC and chief, consecutively of several central offices, failed to realize that the political changes which ensued in 1956 were limited in character. This misunderstanding strengthened his dogmatic position. Guided by a particularly strong desire to exert influence on political events, he disseminated his view in Poland through illegal treatises. With time, he approached the ideological concepts of the CCP. Compromised in Poland, he proclaimed himself the chief of an illegal Communist Party of Poland (KPP) and left, with a false passport, for Albania, where he took charge of anti-Gomulka Communist propaganda. Despite the dogmatic character of the main theses of his political program and his lack of popularity in any stratum of the population in Poland, Mijal may exert some influence over the hardening ideological course of the PUWP.

Introduction

The person of Kazimierz Mijal [1] was, until recently, completely unknown outside the narrow circle of people studying the political careers of personalities in the East European Communist parties. Even in this specialized circle, few people attached any importance to Mijal, treating him rather as a politically defunct remnant of the Stalinist era. If it were not for the periodical appearance in Poland of some pamphlets [2] of which he was believed to be the author, Mijal would soon have been totally forgotten.

However, in February 1966, Mijal became the subject of more general interest. The reason was his "escape" from Poland to Albania, where he was given political asylum. The circumstances of his departure and the country where he "chose freedom" gave a sensational flavour to the affair [3]. Mijal named himself Secretary General of the "Temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland" and started an open propaganda campaign against the so-called "Gomulkovsehina." Despite the bizarre nature of

Mijal's "schism," it should be worthwhile to take a closer look at the circumstances preceding Mijal's present career, for they shed some light on the general political situation in Poland.

Mijal's Career to 1956

Mijal became active in pro-Communist organizations before the war, while still a student [4]. It was only during the war that he became a formal member of the Communist Party (Polish Workers' Party, PPR). At that time, he took active part in the underground Communist resistance movement. Among other activities, he is believed to have carried out the reconnaissance preceding the attack on the KKO (Communal Savings Bank) in Warsaw, where he was employed. He also helped publish the illegal paper, Proletariusz (The Proletarian).

After Bierut arrived in Poland from Moscow, Mijal became his right-hand man, working as a secretary, messenger, and bodyguard. He was in charge of the technical arrangements for organizing the first session of the National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa) and was later a secretary of its presidium, as well as the editor of the Biuletyn Sprawozdawczy Prezydium KRN (Information Bulletin of the Presidium of the National Council). It was probably at that time that he became one of the most trusted and best informed men in Bierut's entourage.

After the war, he became mayor of the city of Lodz [5]. His friendly relations with Mieczyslaw Moczar [6] date back to that time, when the latter was chief of Public Security in Lodz. Mijal became most influential, however, when he was appointed chief of the Civil Chancellery of the President (Bierut), a post he held until 1950. At that time, he was also extremely active in the Party; he made one of the most virulent speeches at the November 1949 CC Plenum, where Gomulka's group was being finally purged.

For a brief time thereafter, Mijal was Minister of Communal Economy. In 1952 he also became the chief of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers. In this capacity, he revealed himself to be one of the most eager Party officials. He also displayed certain characteristics: an inclination to extend influence beyond formal prerogatives, suspicion of subordinate personnel, a taste for all kinds of personal intrigues.

Undoubtedly, Mijal reached the peak of his influence, as chief of the Bureau of Ministers. Through, various machinations, he exerted an influence on the work of, and decrees issued by, the Council of Ministers [7]. People who at that time collaborated with Mijal knew of instances where he would question the decisions of deputy premiers and the premier himself, reserving his personal decision on suggestions submitted to the decision of the Council of Ministers. In reality, he became the second most important person after the premier, and public opinion regarded him. As one of the "grey eminences" of the regime, He was also known, at that time, for his close collaboration with the Committee for Public Security, It was no wonder, then, that one of the first results of a political thaw in Poland was Mijal's dismissal from the office of the Council of Ministers [8] This move certainly met with widespread approval, not excluding approval of members of the Council of Ministers, who were constantly threatened by Mijal's political ambitions.

Reduced to his position of Minister of Communal Economy, Mijal could concentrate on charting an important role for himself in the rapid political changes then taking place in Poland. At that time, the general division of the Party leadership into supporters of the old forms of rule and supporters of far-reaching changes was generally established. From the very beginning of the emergence of factional groups, Mijal joined the supporters of the old forms of rule [9]. His motivation seems clear. First, he was generally hated among the most influential members of the Party and state leadership and he knew that, as such, he risked becoming a scapegoat. Persons who had offered him political support were deprived of influence. [10] Most important, with the death of Bierut, he lost his most powerful protector and sponsor. Second, his direct and extreme involvement in the previous forms of wielding power did not allow him to switch to a more flexible approach -- even if for only tactical reasons. One might suggest that, had he not been so strongly engaged in the defense of the existing state of affairs at the beginning of the October period, he could have -- like so many others of his kind -- seen that a reformed edition of Polish Communism was necessary for tactical reasons. But he missed that opportunity, if he ever noticed it existed. Third, one must consider that, in his case, the will to power was particularly intense. This ambition was incompatible with political calculation and a more flexible approach. In contrast, a number of other Stalin jets who were removed from power in 1956 managed, within a few years, to regain at least their previous positions in political life [11].

It would seem that, while in the past dogmatic and conservative inclinations dominated in determining Mijal's behaviour, with his first major political defeat (removal from the Council of Ministers) his ambition to "get back his own" in politics and his extreme desire for power began to dominate. His political program then became subordinate to these ambitions.

In the months preceding the October events [12], Mijal put his money on the victory of the conservative elements. This did not demand any change of political conception, and it further guaranteed him full power in case of the victory of this faction -- which grouped together men of similar moral and political qualifications and was thus for good reason dubbed "the boors" [13].

In the beginning, like his like-minded companions, he did not openly enter into factional struggle. He still acted under so-called Party democracy, though giving full rein to virulent attacks on more liberal groups. A few weeks after the Poznan uprising [14], the Seventh CC Plenum met, in the course of which the Natolin faction violently attacked the "thaw" tendencies in the Party [15] and tried to push through the view that the Poznan tragedy proved that the liberalization of rule had led the Party into danger and demanded that a strong-arm policy be restored. For the first time, clearly demagogical methods were employed, such as anti-Semitic allusions, mention of purposely fanned anti-Soviet feelings, etc. The plenum did issue a compromise resolution, but it was known that it failed to solve the main problem -- the deep rift between the Party factions. After the plenum, the final act in the struggle for power began.

There is no doubt that -- barring outside interference this struggle was as good as won in July 1956 by the Pulawy group. This was the result of a certain moral and political breakthrough within the Party leadership. Most factional divisions notwithstanding, the majority of the CC, not to mention the Party as a whole, did not desire a return to the forms of rule so compromised by the 20th Congress of the CPSU. To a large extent, this attitude stemmed from the belief that only with a certain curtailing of the security apparatus could the personal safety of the members of the CC itself be increased; many of the CC members, despite their high positions, had lived under constant threat. But one should not underestimate the influence of public opinion, particularly intense at that time, which unanimously demanded the rapid liberalization of political life.

All in all, the so-called Pulavian faction was the only group within the Party leadership which could claim -- at least potentially -- public support. Numerically, this group, together with its sympathizers, was in the majority, both in the CC and in the Politburo. Feeling itself politically isolated, the Natolin group decided on the most propitious move, in its estimation: a coup d'etat with the help of the Soviets [16]. The masterly countermove by the Pulavians nipped the attempt in the bud [17].

The plenum, which met on 19 October 1956, began its debates in an atmosphere of overwhelming support for Gomulka and the Pulavian group and complete isolation of the Natolinians.

The defeat of the Natolinians was complete, since the leadership of the CPSU, faced with a *fait accompli*, proclaimed its support for Gomulka and halted Soviet intervention. In the course of the Eighth Plenum debate, members of the faction were reduced to criticizing anti-Soviet attitudes, questioning the candidacy of Roman Zambrowski, and suggesting the candidacy of Konstanty Rokossowski (the Soviet general who had commanded the Polish Armed Forces) as a member of the Politburo. One may deduce from the number of votes cast for the candidates to the Politburo that the balance of forces at the Plenum was 59 to 19 to the advantage of the Pulawy group [18].

Mijal was directly involved in all these events; he was in the inner sanctum of the Natolin group. He could not make a speech at the Eighth Plenum, [19] but he added his prepared text to be published later with the reports from the debates. This speech does not differ much from the speeches of other Natolinians; perhaps the attack on the press is particularly strong, with such charges as: misinformation, anti-Soviet bias, "quite shameless struggle against the political system," etc. The speech also contained statements which he was to expand on later, in his illegal publications, particularly with reference to the character of the changes taking place in Poland. At that time, however, he was not yet bold enough to call these changes "counter-revolutionary."

"Dogmatic" Opposition

Following the Eighth Plenum, a new stage in Mijal's political career began -- on the one hand, he still held state posts and participated in Party activity, but on the other hand, he

began publishing illegally distributed treatises attacking the Party for its retreat from socialism. At the beginning of 1957, Mijal was removed from the Ministry of Communal Economy and named the director of the Investment Bank [20]. His degradation seems to have been the result, not so much of his earlier factional activities, as of the dissemination, in January 1957, of an illegal Letter to the Peasants in Tomaszewski County and various other regions of the country. In this letter, he accused the new Party leaders of "agrarian" tendencies and made demagogical use of the Hungarian revolution. At about the same time, The People's Daily published an article by a certain Pawlak with similar statements. The authorship of that article is generally attributed to Mijal [21] During that time, various other leaflets ascribed to Mijal were circulated in Poland.

The decisive stand taken by the new Party leadership at that time arose from the fact that the electoral campaign was then being conducted, and the elections were to be a kind of a plebiscite voicing support for the recent changes. Any attempt at factional activity was then particularly dangerous, hence the rapid reaction and demotion. At another moment, similar behavior by Mijal would probably have drawn much milder sanctions The strong measures against Mijal, including the Party's effort to compromise him openly in the press, also showed the role of public opinion, always ready at that time to support the new Gomulka leadership against Stalinist elements.

However, Mijal did not give up. He prepared more extensive underground opposition, without abandoning open forms of criticism of the new leaders. Moreover, while in the past he had been only one of many Natolinians, now -- after the political neutralization, for all practical purposes, of the faction he became its leading representative. Around him there gathered the "Party of the unjustly treated," later called the "dogmatic faction."

Why did Mijal become one central figure among the dogmatic elements in the Early after October? Many factors seem to have combined here. First -- Gomulka's skillful cadre policy, which left several outstanding representatives of the Natolin faction in positions of influence, confused the group and undermined its unity. Perhaps the most influential among the Stalinists, Aleksander Zawadzki, as well as Edward Ochab, joined forces with Gomulka supporters even before the Eighth Plenum. The leader of the Natolinians, Zenon Nowak, on the other hand, was given the prestigious position of deputy premier. Second -- Hilary Mine and Franciszek Jozwiak retired from political life, and, in practice, played little part in the intra-Party struggles. Konstanty Rokossowski, after a brief vacation, was recalled to the USSR and ceased to play any role in Poland. Third -- the most important among the remaining Natolinians, Franciszek Mazur, was retained in Moscow, [22] and after his return he officially supported Gomulka at the Ninth Plenum.

Others, [23] despite their reservations about Gomulka's policies, were motivated by the possibility of obtaining new and profitable positions.

Thus, three extremists, namely Mijal, Stanislaw Lapot, and Wiktor Klosiewicz [24], remained on the battlefield. It would seem that the total disintegration of the Natolin group was helped by the desperate attempts of the latter to keep his post. Apparently, Gomulka wanted to fill the position of the chairman of the Trade Unions with a man he trusted, namely Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, at present a Politburo member. Hence a persistent campaign

against Klosiewicz. Although it should have been obvious that, with his popularity and political power, Gomulka would achieve his aim.

Klosiewicz decided not to give in. He paid for his lack of political skill with a complete personal disgrace, resulting from a violent press campaign, and he compromised, by the same token, most of the Natolinians who supported him. United in supporting Klosiewicz, they became involved in public discussions in a sphere where any basic criticism of the "Gomulkovschina" was no longer permissible. Finally, in November 1957, Klosiewicz was deprived of his post. A few months later, at the Eleventh CC Plenum in March 1958, he was removed from the CC. This was the end of the active, official opposition of the dogmatists within the Party.

At the following, 12th Plenum, attacks on Gomulka were anaemic, the majority of "unjustly treated" concentrating on securing new positions.

Thus, the three extremists mentioned above (generally known as the "hard-headed" ones) were isolated from even their close ideological friends. Of the three, only Mijal -- though with the approval of the other two -- was bold enough to enter into open intra-Party subversion.

It would seem, from the events which followed, that this boldness was mainly the result of Mijal's particular virulence, and ambitions, which prevailed over his reason. The opportunism, which made him accept the Chinese Communist views, appeared only later. Resentful of the Party leadership, Mijal wrote, in the second half of 1957 [25], under the pen name of Jan Kosa, a longer pamphlet entitled *To the Comrade Communists* [26]. This pamphlet was illegally distributed in Party circles; its particularly simplistic style suggests that it was addressed to the lower, provincial, professional Party apparatus. Mijal (whose authorship, while not proved, seems certain) undertook in this pamphlet to defend the old Stalinist system, treating the 20th CPSU Congress as a "disaster." His main attack, however, was directed against the then most recent liberalization moves, seeing in them signs of capitulation before capitalism. Although, compared to later pamphlets, the author does show some circumspection as far as full rehabilitation of *Trybuna Ludu*, polemicizing with the pamphlet, called it "a peculiar encyclopedia of current Polish dogmatism" and announced the pending liquidation of activities undermining Party unity. One could deduce that Mijal was to be thrown out of the Party in the immediate future. But a long time was to pass before this actually took place.

Despite the failure of the promised sanctions to materialize, Mijal suspended his illegal activities for some time (at least, there is no indication that he continued them).

Perhaps the violent reaction of *Trybuna Ludu*, which so successfully disgraced him, had some effect. Nevertheless, he did demonstratively abstain from voting when Klosiewicz was removed from the CC at the 11th Plenum, and he attacked Gomulka's agrarian policy at the 12th CC Plenum [27].

At the Third Party Congress, in March 1959, Mijal was not re-elected to the CC. In practice, this meant that the Gomulka leadership had given up trying to "re-educate" the enfant terrible of the Party at a moment, when it was attempting to rationalize its dictatorship. Although there is no evidence that Mijal was at that time continuing illegal activity, it is not impossible that -- as before -- he kept in close touch with the remaining elements of the

"unjustly treated" group. It does seem certain that he concentrated on preparing more fully documented treatises against the leadership. His job as director of the Investment Bank could have been of great help to him in this work, since he could easily collect data to use against the Party's economic policy [28]

Nineteen fifty nine seems to have been a particularly difficult year for Mijal. In that year, two other outstanding Stalinists, Julian Tokarski and Eugeniusz Szyr, received important government posts as deputy premiers. It was widely known that advancements of other Stalinists, previously removed from positions of authority, were being prepared. This increased the isolation of the group, even among sympathetic Party members. Naturally, the fact that former Stalinists were taking over important posts could have constituted a fortunate development for the extreme dogmatists -- provided they had stuck together. But this was not so; appointments were in fact given to men who had abandoned their opposition to Gomulka, and the fact they were close to the extremists could only be harmful to the latter.

At that time, Stanislaw Lapot -- least likely of the three to play an important political role -- ceased to support Mijal's undertakings actively. Thus, apart from Klosiewicz, a couple of retired Stalinists and a group of provincial Party functionaries which was practically meaningless politically -- no one seemed ready to become involved in active opposition with the Party leadership. The stabilization of Gomulka-ist apparatus was clear.

The only horse on which Mijal could bet was inter-Party struggles. This required time, however, since -- first of all -- the Sino-Soviet conflict had not yet entered a phase offering any hope of profit from engagement on either side and since -- second -- the views of Mijal himself still had to evolve in the direction of the more primitive Chinese Communist arguments.

This process continued through 1963. At the beginning of 1964, in the atmosphere of discussion preceding the 4th Party Congress, a new, 90-page illegal pamphlet by Mijal, entitled, *The Struggle for Victory! Silence and Passivity Mean Disaster!*, was distributed. The contents of the pamphlet clearly showed the evolution in Mijal's thinking; in the pamphlet, the first attempt is made to adapt Chinese dogmatism to the Polish situation. While in previous pamphlets the virulent tone, the violence of arguments hung in a void, as it were, in this pamphlet the individual arguments were brought together into one critical ideological concept. Compared with previous works, the author was faced with a much more difficult task. Obviously, many parts of the treatise repeated the criticisms of the economic achievements current among the population. Here, Mijal took advantage of the data available to him through the Investment Bank. He questioned, for instance, the evaluation of the results of the five-year plan in terms of the standard of living; he ridiculed unpopular investment decisions; etc. In this part of the pamphlet, he certainly satisfied an intelligent reader, although only repeating wide-spread complaints.

In other parts of the treatise, however, devoted to an assessment of the earlier activities of the Party, of Stalin and Bierut, and suggesting the trend ideological and political change should take, he offers to the reader statements which are nothing but adjusted copies of the main theses of Sino-Albanian "dogmatism."

He lacks consistency in one thing only, the pamphlet does not once mention the source of its ideological inspiration. This silence is understandable, however, in the light of the general lack of popularity enjoyed by the Chinese Communists among Polish Communists as well as the wide-spread jocular approach to the various phases of the Sino-Soviet conflict. [29]

Mijal's treatise was dismissed by the Party as a backstage scandal on the eve of the Party congress. Because of the publication date and several parts devoted to polemics with Party policy or to the presentation of alternative programs, the pamphlet was dubbed the Anti-Theses.

Against this background, a telling incident took place in Katowice. In the office of Ryszard Nieszporek -- chairman of the Katowice Voivodship National Council a number of copies of the Anti-Theses were found in April 1964. As a result, Nieszporek was suspended from duty and, a few months later, sent as ambassador to Bulgaria [30].

Mijal himself was recalled from his bank directorship and kept under house arrest for a few weeks (until the end of the Fourth Party Congress). [31]

Mijal's pamphlet apparently had no influence whatsoever on the political atmosphere of the Fourth Congress; there is no evidence that any attempt was made publicly to present its point of view during the debates. But this did not discourage him, as is explained by his motives. Mijal wanted to gain an outstanding position; since he could not get it in the Party, he attempted it outside the Party.

The sanctions against Mijal in mid-1964 only hastened the process of the crystallization of his action program, as well as connections with Foreign Communist opponents of the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy of Khrushchev and his followers." Thus in December 1965, a new Mijal pamphlet appeared, entitled, Under the Marxist-Leninist Banner, into Battle for Socialism: Two characteristics distinguish this pamphlet from the earlier ones. First, it is the political program of a new political group, called the "Communist Party of Poland." [32] Second, it is an example of the full adoption by Mijal of Sino-Albanian views. [33]

While the second characteristic came as no surprise (it was obvious from the earlier publications what political forces Mijal intended to woo), the announcement of the creation of the "KPP" certainly startled public opinion. What was important was not actually the question of the creation of an illegal party -- which seemed to be largely or entirely fictitious [34] -- but the attempt to subvert and disorganize the existing system in Poland and the fact that this might attract ever more numerous anti-Gomulka elements in the country.

A few months later, the reason "behind Mijal's creation on a "Communist Party in Poland" became obvious: in the middle of February, with the aid of the Albanian Embassy, he left Poland under an assumed name and obtained political asylum in Albania. In this way, he sought to become an emigre, not as a political bankrupt, but as the chief of a "revolutionary," illegal Party of Polish Communists.

The fact that the Party was non-existent hardly seemed to matter.

Mijal in Exile

The first signs of Mijal's activity after his departure from Poland came from an unexpected direction, namely from Belgium.

Analysis of the text of the pamphlet suggests that the idea of creating a party arose in Mijal's mind as he wrote. In the final pages of the pamphlet, he writes about the need of creating "a new Communist Party"; further on, he mentions the creation in the provinces of "illegal organizations of the KPP," and at the end, he ascribes the authorship of the pamphlet to a Temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland.

The publication of the pro-Chinese Belgian Communists, *La Voix du Peupls*, printed the text of the latest Mijal pamphlet (with the significant omissions of its most demagogic passages, including anti-Semitic attacks), with an editorial note hailing the creation of a "KPP." A new partner had emerged among the pro-Chinese Communists.

At the same time, illegal leaflets continued to circulate in Poland, probably brought in from Albania on ships visiting Polish harbors.

It appeared from the leaflets that the revolutionary spirit of their author had greatly increased in the Albanian climate, from sources whose credibility was hard to ascertain came reports that attempts had been made to organize strikes in factories.

In the fall of 1966, the pamphlet *Under the Marxist-Leninist Banner into Battle for Socialism!* was again distributed in Poland, this time most assiduously. This edition of the pamphlet was reportedly printed in Belgium and brought to Poland on Chinese ships.

Part of the shipment was allegedly intercepted by the Polish militia and destroyed.

As far as Mijal himself is concerned, after his arrival in Tirana, he reportedly started working in the Sino-Albanian Joint Stock Shipping Company -- probably only a formal pretext for supporting him. At the same time, there were rumours that he had visited Peking and later Italy. In September 1966, Mijal was reported to have taken over as chief of the newly-established Polish Section of Radio Tirana. Indeed, shortly after their inception, the programs of that radio in Polish began mentioning the Communist Party of Poland. [35]

In the fall of 1965, Albanian Party media, too, began to mention the "KPP!" The report on the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Communists, published in November 1956, included a fragment about secret organizations of KPP being active in Poland. At that meeting, the head of the pro-Chinese Belgian Communists, Jacques Grippa, read a proclamation addressed by the KPP to the congress. But there was no mention of Mijal, and no indication that he addressed the congress

This reserve suggests that, despite the unity of political aims and despite Albania's role in Mijal's escape from Poland, the Albanian Party wanted to give the impression that he was

still in Poland. Thus, it delayed two months in answering the servile telegram which Mijal sent Enver Hoxha on the 22nd anniversary of the proclamation of Communist rule. The delayed reply was addressed to Mijal as Secretary-General of the KPP, which could be taken as official recognition of his Party. Mijal's presence in Albania has still never been admitted. Nor, curiously enough, have the Chinese Communists ever referred publicly to the KPP, although they have reported alleged sympathy from individual Poles. [36]

Even before, factual support for Mijal was shown by the placing of Radio Tirana at his disposal.

He has taken full advantage of this opportunity. The analysis of the texts suggests that he is most probably the sole author of the programs. The texts are studded with bad grammar and the Tirana announcers can hardly speak Polish -- but this must seem insignificant to Mijal, compared with the fact that he can present himself to the world as the leader of a group of "revolutionary" Communists. [37]

The Thought of Kazimierz Mijal

Quoted below are Mijal's opinions on current events and leading personalities, as expressed in his pamphlets, leaflets, and radio broadcasts.

The PUWP -- "A Social-Democratic party of the bourgeois type...."

Wladyslaw Gomulka [38] -- "Betrayer of socialism," "marches into capitalism like a sheep into a slaughterhouse," "he is not, and never was, a Communist," "lackey of capitalists."

Gonuilka's clique -- "Red bourgeoisie." suggesting a different author, and contain detailed analysis of topical problems broadcast with a delay, suggesting collaborators in Poland.

Description of some members of the PUWP -- "Millionaires with a Party card. They steal now and they will steal more, because the socialist system is degenerating into a thieves' system, a capitalist system whose foundation and whose moving spirit is the daily robbing of the working man."

Description of the socio-economic situation in Poland -- The outflow of the national income from the pockets of the workers into the pockets of the bourgeoisie is constant and increasing. The bourgeoisie increases in economic power, as well as in political importance.

The daily practice of every citizen of our country at every step shrieks against the betrayal of socialism, against the approach of destitution and rebirth of capitalism, against fascist ways of ruling over the proletariat, of the biological destruction of the nation conducted by the Zionist-bourgeois, rightist-nationalist clique."

The Polish worker -- "Is supposed to work his fingers to the bone, for measly pay, which in the majority of cases does not even provide for a subsistence-level existence for the worker's family."

"Earnings suffice for a few days of existence."

The October changes in Poland in 1936 -- "The greatest betrayal within the bosom of brotherly Communist Parties," "Counter-revolutionary upheaval."

Reasons behind the political defeat of the Natolinians in 1956 -- "We were unable to use our forces in an organized fashion against this gang of renegades and plotters, simply because we were not organized."

Communist Party of Poland (KPP) -- "The only rightful headquarters of the struggle."

Loyalty of Party members to the PUWP -- "The creation of the KPP permits all real revolutionaries to separate illegally from the Gomulkovschina, from the traitors to socialism... removing the internal obstacles from the point of view of revolutionary morality."

Class struggle -- "Knows no boundaries, and despite Gomulkovschina drivel, is also being waged in Poland."

The "paper tiger" theory in Mijal's version -- "When the masses are politically aware and appropriately prepared, then even without tanks and guns, but with paving stones, they can wipe off the face of the earth the hated revisionist clique."

The influence of the US on political evolution in Poland -- "During the last 10 years, at the insignificant cost of about half a milliard dollars in grain and in lard, the revolutionary party known as the PUWP has been transformed into a Social-Democratic Party. Tito is selling himself dearer."

Appeal to the workers -- "Keep on studying Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung."

Boleslaw Bierut -- "Great son of the Polish nation, outstanding politician and unforgettable revolutionary."

Threats -- "One should take down the names and note the activities of agents-provocateur as well as of people who are servile to Gromulkovschina."

Prospects -- "The defeat of revisionism in the international arena and in Poland is inevitable," "The hour of victory is near."

Relations with the USSR -- "Nothing separates our peoples. All that had been controversial in the past was settled through mutual, good-neighbourly agreements under Bierut and Stalin."

Jews -- "Long experience has shown that it is in that milieu that most traitors and agents are recruited." "We must carry through to the end the decisive struggle against Zionist agents in Poland."

The Church -- "There is no reason why there should not be regulated relations between the Church and the state, mutually profitable ones."

The Vatican -- "The greatest of enemies."

The prospect for Polish agriculture -- "There is no point in pulling wool over the peasants eyes and leaving them open to exploitation by the capitalist market economy. The question must be put clearly: the rural road to socialism lies in production cooperatives."

Jozef Stalin -- "A great Marxist." "He helped the creation of the socialist camp, strengthened the dictatorship of the proletariat, applied the principles of proletarian internationalism, of the international solidarity of working people. This historic role and the merits of Stalin ... cannot be effaced by the lies and slanders of the revisionists." "A famous leader, a great Marxist-Leninist."

Nikita Khrushchev -- "Directing the main line of the attack against the person of Stalin, Khrushchev, in fact, attacked the Leninist principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat." "A drunkard, a story-teller, renegade and political deviate." "Following the best example of Goebbels, he slandered the whole achievement of the CPSU and of the socialist camp." "He was ready to trade our Western territories."

Changes in the Communist movement -- "The center of the revolution has shifted East." "Marxist positions are maintained by Parties such as those of China, Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam, Albania, and New Zealand."

An assessment of Albanian Communists -- "The stand of the Albanian Workers' Party in defense of the principles of the revolutionary theory of socialism offers an example for all true revolutionaries."

Radio Free Europe -- "The heart of the ideology of the 'Polish October' (is to be found) in the Free Europe studios in Munich."

A sample of Mijal's style -- "The garbage heap of the red bourgeoisie, created by the Gomulka-ist revisionists, will flow away like the waters of a crystal-clear mountain stream which has been polluted by gutter dirt."

* * *

Although the above quotations are authentic, still, as with any anthology, they might give the reader an oversimplified image of Mijal. In fact, he uses even the most incredible statements with a certain demagogic skill, [39] The purpose of this section was to present the scale of arguments Mijal exploits in his attempt to build an "original" political platform for himself and to gain as large a number as possible of the "displeased" as his followers. [40]

Mijal's Influence

Who in Poland could be a potential ally of Mijal? How extensive is his influence?

The influence of his slogans and appeals must in general be extremely limited, since the language he employs, as well as the political program behind the language, is hateful to most Poles. Moreover, the public is rendered immune by a generally jocular attitude to the various ideological principles at issue in the Sino-Soviet conflict. When looking at the matter from the point of view of various social strata, the rural population, spontaneously hostile to any suggestion of collectivization, can be eliminated first. One can also eliminate the youth (taken as a whole), which is generally not interested in political problems. The groups of ideologically-motivated Communists in student circles, representing either naive, "romantic" or "humanistic" viewpoints are a small minority. The vulgarity and inconsistency of Mijal's propaganda would suggest that he also cannot hope for any success among the intelligentsia. His influence among workers, and especially the least well-paid groups, would seem to be limited solely to cases of immediate grievances (a strike against living conditions or lack of social services). This is an influence that is purely organizational in character, since the workers are, at present, probably immune to any ideological appeal.

Mijal has an equally small chance of finding support among Party members, taken as a whole. The main problem of the PUWP leadership at the present time is counteracting ideological passivity and the influence of "liberalizing" ideas within the Party ranks. [41] But as far as the leaders are concerned, as mentioned before, despite certain political inclinations, no one can officially support Mijal's views, since they would lead to complete discredit. The only element which constitutes potential support for Mijal are those Stalinists who still consider themselves "unjustly treated" as a result of the October 1956 changes, small-time, provincial apparatchiks.

But few of them remain, and, second, they are people who are in the main incapable of political action and have been disgraced in their local areas. There is a possibility, however, that Mijal's theses might find support among such dogmatists at a politically opportune moment.

But there is no evidence of such support at present, if one disregards Mijal's own boasts about strikes and an organized network of Communist Party of Poland (KPP) cells throughout the country. [42] Thus, one may assume that the destructive influence of Mijal on present-day political life in Poland is small. Although it sounds like a paradox, one can suggest that he makes the present Gromulka leadership more popular, since, compared with the alternative Mijal offers, they appear as worthy "liberals."

This does not mean, however, that Mijal has no influence whatsoever on political life in Poland. On the contrary, it could be that his influence is growing. The regressive measures lately adopted by the Party are some of those recommended by Mijal. The stiffening of the Party's course could be hastened by the impact of Mijal's propaganda on the leadership reacting to his accusation of loss of revolutionary spirit. Having "disarmed" the dogmatic opposition, the leadership, in fact, is becoming more similar to it.

One example is the latest, Eighth CC Plenum, devoted to" restrictive policies in culture, education, and propaganda. The view has also been expressed that the recent more energetic and successful moves to reduce unemployment in Poland are a result of Mijal's violent attacks on the Party leaders, accusing them of purposely creating limited unemployment. One can find other cases where the Party leadership seems to be collaborating with Mijal. Thus, when Migal opposes sending diplomats of Jewish origin abroad -- the PUWP leadership is indeed trying to limit this. Mijal attacks young "Trotskyites" -- the PUWP leadership has imprisoned them. But this should not come as a surprise -- although opponents, the Gomulka leadership and Mijal still have much in common. Only against this background can one understand why Mijal's "rebelliousness" was tolerated for so long, although he openly called for the overthrow of the ruling elite through revolutionary upheaval. At that same time, after all, people were being imprisoned for expressing much milder views. This is an aspect of "Party" solidarity: Mijal shall always be one of "us," while Prof. Leszek Kolakowski, for instance, will be an "ideologically-alien" element. Still today, anti-regime invective matches that of Mijal over Radio Tirana, nevertheless, the propaganda campaign in Poland is directed solely against Western influences without a mention of Mijal. [43]

A sign of the tolerance of Mijal is the circumstances of the publication and distribution of his tracts. [44] The security aparat would seem to be able to uncover the sources of distribution and to stop more effectively at least a repetition of such activity.

Similarly, the circumstances of Mijal's departure suggest the complicity of the Ministry of the Interior. Thanks ultimately only to the tolerance shown him by the PUWP leadership and -- all things considered -- certain similar attitudes, can Mijal today lead the least realistic political movement in the whole history of Poland.

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NOTES

(1) Kazimierz Mijal, 56, was born near Warsaw to a peasant family. He graduated from the Tradesmen's Association Commercial School in Warsaw. Before the war, he was connected with pro-Communist organizations, but was not politically active until the war, when he became the secretary of Boleslaw Bierut (later the First Secretary of the PUWP CC in the Stalinist era). After the war, he was in turn mayor of Lodz, chief of the Presidential Chancellery, chief of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Communal Economy, and director of the Investment Bank. He was a long-time member of the CC of the Polish Workers' Party and then the PUWP.

At the time of October he was one of the chief organizers of the Natolin (Stalinist) faction. Since 1957, he has organized various factional moves against Gomulka, publishing a number

of clearly dogmatic pamphlets. At the Third Party Congress in 1959, he was not re-elected to the CC. In 1966, he left for Albania with a false passport, proclaiming himself the chief of the Temporary Central Committee of the (pro-Chinese) Communist Party of Poland and apparently taking over the Polish section of Radio Tirana.

(2) There is no doubt that he was the author of three lengthy pamphlets and he was probably the author of several other anti-Gomulka publications distributed illegally in Poland. Some of them were printed abroad.

(3) In February 1966, he left Poland, using the passport of an Albanian citizen, "Serwet Mehmetko." After his departure, the Albanian ambassador to Poland was declared persona non grata.

(4) It is hard to establish the school from which Mijal graduated. According to some, he studied at the Higher Trade School in Warsaw and graduated with a diploma. Other sources claim he finished the Tradesmen's Association Commercial School (secondary level) where bookkeepers were trained. His publications and speeches give the impression that he is not a college graduate. His arguments are primitive and he makes frequent mistakes in economic matters.

(5) The second largest Polish city, of particular importance after the war since the majority of state offices were located there, before being transferred back to Warsaw.

(6) Mieczyslaw Moczar -- present Minister of Internal Affairs and head of the veterans' organization, Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (ZBoWiD).

(7) As the chief of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, he was in charge of assisting the government in its undertakings according to the instructions of the premier. He was a member of the Council of Ministers had a special file, where political and other complaints directed against state officials were collected.) This could explain the tolerant manner in which the security authorities later dealt with the dissident Mijal

(8) In February, 1956.

(9) This was the so-called Natolin group -- openly pro-Soviet --opposed to the Pulawy group (later supported by Gomulka).

(10) Such as Jakub Berman, member of the Politburo, in charge of security; Hilary Mine, member of the Politburo, in charge of economic affairs; Stanislaw Radkiewicz, chief of the Committee for Public Security; and a few others.

(11) For example: Eugeniusz Syzr, Elazimierz Witaszewski, Julian Tokarski.

(12) The Eighth Plenum of the CC in October 1956, when the Party's previous activity was comprehensively criticized and Gomulka was elected First Party Secretary.

(13) The representatives of the "liberal, Jewish" faction later supported by Gomulka were dubbed the "Yids."

(14) In June, 1956, during the International Trade Fair, a spontaneous demonstration by the population took place, in protest against Party administrative practices. It turned into an uprising which was put down by the army at the cost of many lives.

(15) Despite requests by many members of the Party leadership and the pressure of public opinion, the debates at the Seventh CC Plenum, where the views of the two factions clashed for the first time, were views made public. The trend of the differences and the important subject matters discussed at that plenum could be deduced from references at the Eighth CC Plenum.

(16) It seems that there were two projects for the take-over of power:

1) a coup was to be carried out while a delegation of the Politburo was in Moscow, at the summons of the Soviet leadership, on the eve of the Eighth Plenum of the CC;
2) when the delegation refused to go to the USSR, about 700 Party and government leaders were to be arrested just before the plenum and the meeting faced with a fait accompli. In both variations of their plan, the Natolinians counted on the support of the armed forces under the command of Marshal Rokossowski and on intervention by the Soviet armed forces.

(17) This was made possible chiefly by the active support of the population of Warsaw. On the eve of the plenum, organized groups of workers intercepted the list of persons to be arrested and paralyzed action by the Natolin group. The Polish Army, still smarting from the shameful intervention in Poznan, was openly on the side of the population (see, inter alia Z. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge, 1960), Chapter II).

(18) According to the votes cast for Zambrowski. The candidacy of Rokossowski got 23 voices (thus, the ratio was 52 to 23), but one must consider that a couple of undecided CC members may have voted for him, while surely not a single Natolinian voted for Zambrowski.

(19) For tactical reasons, the list of speakers at the plenum was limited, and it was proposed that those who had been excluded could later add their speeches to the public record in written form.

(20) A position of incomparably lesser importance. As Minister of Communal Economy, he was a member of the Government. As a director of the Investment Bank, he was subordinate to the Minister of Finance.

(21) *Dziennik Ludowy*, 31 January 1957.

(22) Mazur's stay in Moscow at the turn of the years 1956-1957 was interpreted as an attempt to blackmail Gomulka with the possibility of creating a new leadership (somewhat analogous to the Janos Kadar regime in Hungary). After the USSR gave up any idea of opposing Gomulka, Mazur returned to Poland as a humiliated political bankrupt; as a reward, he was sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia a few months later.

(23) For instance: Boleslaw Ruminski, Julian Tokarski, Kazimierz Witaszewski.

(24) Stanislaw Lapot was deputy premier before October, and Wiktor Klosiewicz was the chairman of the Central Board of the Trade Unions even after the October changes.

(25) After the Ninth CC Plenum, at which he again accused Gomulka of restoring capitalism and giving in to the Church, and at which he made anti-Semitic demands.

(26) Trybuna Ludu, 13 November 1957, "Once again about Dogmatism --Precious Avowals." Stalinism and accusations against Gromulka are concerned, still, the pamphlet essentially contained, all the arguments which he would later invariably use. He called for resistance against the "capitulatory" Gomulka leadership "Can, under these circumstances, the comrade Communists keep on observing -- cowed by the October coup -- this work of liquidation?" He also clearly called for conspiratorial factional activity in preparation for the Party Congress, which was to take place within two years.

(27) The 11th and 12th Plenums of the CC took place in 1958.

(28) Because of its financing of investments, the bank had at its disposal a large department of research and analysis of many economic problems, not just investments.

(29) The Chinese press failed to mention the appearance of the pamphlet. This could be explained by a realistic evaluation of the situation by the Chinese, realizing that any suggestion as to the source of inspiration would be the last nail in Mijal's coffin. But even later, the CCP failed to mention Mijal's KPP.

(30) At the same time, a certain Wlodzimierz Zawadzki, a friend of Mijal's, was dismissed from his job as director of a foreign trade enterprise and charged with spreading information discrediting the Party leadership. His case concerned the meat scandal, which Mijal had mentioned in his pamphlet.

(31) In judging the severity of the punishment, one must consider that, barely two years later, two young scholars from Warsaw University Kuron and Modzelewski, who wrote and distributed an oppositional pamphlet -- written from a position of intellectual honesty and no more rebellious than Mijal's treatises -- were brought to trial and sentenced to several years imprisonment. A double standard seemed to apply: gentle measures against a dogmatic former leader, but harsh measures against "revolutionary" critics who were not connected with the ruling elite.

(32) The pre-war name of the Polish Communist organization. Its use, resulted in many jokes, because it was almost devoid of popular following in pre-war Poland and because its leaders were almost all killed by Stalin, the man whom Mijal would like to restore to full glory.

(33) One might suggest that the only difference between the views of Mijal and of the Chinese Communists lies in the lesser emphasis among the latter on anti-Semitic elements.

One can hardly expect, however, that the Chinese, even considering the demagogic character of their propaganda, should engage in criticizing events so unknown to them.

(34) In practice, there was no evidence of an illegal party, if we dismiss timid attempts at exchanging critical views (usually in friendly gatherings) by embittered, but not very numerous, Stalinist apparatchiks.

(35) For example, the report of 3 November 1965, that the KPP had its "men" in the security services and the armed forces. Addressing the High Party School of the CC, CPC in spring 1960, Albanian leader Hysni Kapo had referred to "Marxist-Leninist groups and Parties" in East Europe, explicitly mentioning Poland, (Zeri i Popullit, 10 May 1966).

(36) See CAA report, "Peking's Inter-Party Relations, I," 11 May 1967, by jck.

(37) Some of the most recent programs are well-written,

(38) Most frequently, Mijal calls Gomulka "Wladyslaw the Liar."

(39) With some exceptions: e.g., the call for an uncompromising struggle against revisionism, since "the Albanians stand ready to defend us."

(40) Mijal's authorship of a map circulated in Poland which shows Poland with boundaries extending East beyond Kiev remains unproven. This map was captioned: "Such a Poland is guaranteed to you by -- " and a stamp "The Temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland." If this was truly Mijal's work, he must be clutching at any straw in his desperate attempts to win some measure of popularity.

(41) The latest, Eighth Plenum of the CC PUWP (16-17 May 1967) was devoted, in part, to these matters.

(42) There is undoubtedly another aspect to this question. Similarly absurd slogans were expressed in 1948, during the anti-Gomulka campaign in the Party, and -- despite their lack of logic -- they actually prevailed. At that time, however, these views were backed by the group in power and by pressure from the USSR. At present, the possibility of serious pressure from China or Albania does not exist.

(43) Only three attacks against his activities have been published in the last 10 years.

(44) The majority have been printed in Poland, formerly on the printing plant of the Investment Bank. The remainder seem to have been printed in Belgium, Albania, or other countries.