(This is the third article in a five-part UNITY series on U.S. foreign policy. It looks at the relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe. It examines why differences between the U.S. and Europe have sharpened and the dilemma U.S. foreign policy planners face in developing a coherent European policy. The next two articles will look at the relationship between the U.S. and the third world; and what approach the American working class should take to U.S. foreign policy.)
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Looking at the current state of Atlantic relations it is evident that attitudes and perspectives on either side of the (U.S.-West European) alliance are badly out of phase; our objectives and interests no longer run parallel, we no longer see the world in the same way. The phrase that “what unites us is greater than what divides us” has an increasingly hollow ring. – Pieter Dunkert, President of the European Parliament, before the Mid-Atlantic Club, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1982.
During the 1950’s and 1960’s a cornerstone of U.S. world domination was the alliance between the U.S. and the secondary capitalist powers of Western Europe. This bloc was based on common imperialist interests – trade, exploitation of the third world, opposition to national liberation and socialism – but it was also a product of U.S. domination of much of the economies of these countries. U.S. imperialism after World War II erected a world monetary and trade system that favored the U.S. dollar and helped U.S. business investment. This enabled the U.S. to control, to a certain degree, less powerful capitalist countries.
As a consequence, European defense and foreign policies were heavily influenced by U.S. interests. The U.S. and its allies had serious disputes at times, like during the Suez crisis of 1956 when the U.S., for its own advantages, did not support the British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt after it nationalized the Suez Canal. But overall there was close cooperation among the powers on most major issues.
The U.S. publicly portrayed its relationship with its capitalist allies as an altruistic one. According to Washington, the U.S., as the most powerful capitalist country in the world, had the responsibility to rebuild the war-torn economies of Europe and Japan, and defend them under a U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” Washington, according to its spokesmen, fulfilled these duties reluctantly and only because it recognized the special role the U.S. had to play in the protection of the “free world.”
In fact, there was little that was altruistic about these policies. U.S. imperialism profited immensely from the unequal relationship with Europe. Over 75% of all U.S. foreign investment went into Europe, helping to capture vital financial and industrial sectors. The U.S. flooded the markets of its allies with manufactured and agricultural goods. The U.S. war industry sold billions of dollars of weapons to its imperialist allies. And the U.S. used the European nations as a cushion for U.S. economic problems. U.S. capitalism could shift some inflation or currency instability onto other capitalist countries. It was said that when there was a slight cough in the U.S. economy, the European countries came down with a severe cold.
By the mid-1970’s, however, this situation began to rapidly and profoundly change. As a result of declining U.S. economic strength and rising European power, the traditional political relationships began to undergo a major shift. This created problems for U.S. foreign policy-makers.
Economically, the original Common Market (now known as the European Community, or EC, and today composed of Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) had in 1958 a combined gross national product (GNP) which was just 25% that of the U.S. Today the European Community’s GNP exceeds that of the U.S. U.S. corporations once dominated the world in a number of areas, but today they are being eclipsed by European and Japanese companies. The international monetary system has changed and the U.S. has had to devalue the dollar and place it on a more equal footing with other currencies.
The rate of U.S. investments in Europe is also declining. (In 1981 it was up just 3.5%, compared to 14% in 1979.) In contrast, European investments in the U.S. are up dramatically. There was a 28% increase in 1981 (Wall Street Journal, Aug. 12, 1982). U.S. businesses are not investing in Europe as in the past because they are having a more difficult time competing with European corporations. The overall U.S. share of international markets is declining, while the U.S. itself is becoming a lucrative market for European and Japanese cars, steel, and consumer goods. The tremendous trade challenges from its European allies will increase and not diminish in the future, despite current talk about making U.S. goods more competitive in the world market.
The EC today is a powerful economic unit, and becoming more cohesive politically. Agreements among its member countries have brought substantial tariff and marketing coordination which are advantageous to the capitalists of these countries. U.S. capital is excluded from these agreements. Greater economic coordination, in turn, is encouraging coordinated approaches to broader foreign affairs.
A couple of years ago, the EC deliberately began to devote more attention to working out a common foreign policy standpoint independent of the U.S. The contrasting positions of the EC and the U.S. over the Middle East and trade with the Soviet Union are indicative of this.
The EC today is conscious of its differing interests with the U.S. as well as its actual ability to pursue its own goals. While serious conflicts are still usually downplayed, there is significant tension beneath the surface of the relations. The magazine of the EC, Europe, openly declared in early 1982 that Western Europe is “less willing than in the past to toe the U.S. policy line.” And by the end of 1982, the EC felt that during the summer of 1982 U.S.-West European relations perhaps had been at their lowest point in recent memory.
Another factor that has altered the situation is the rise of Soviet military and economic might. The massive Soviet military establishment and its growing aggressive behavior has become a genuine threat to the national sovereignty of Western Europe. In response, some in the European governments emphasize the need to strengthen NATO and ties with the U.S. to counter the Soviet threat. Others, perceiving the decline of U.S. strength and the development of independent European interests, believe that Europe needs its own policy towards the Soviet Union.
A number of political leaders in Europe also fear the continent could become a pawn in the superpower rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union. They believe that close ties with the U.S. encourage Soviet hostility or that the U.S. might even sacrifice Europe to the Soviets to avoid a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers. This too has pushed European leaders to define a policy distinct from the U.S.
Growing economic relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union are only furthering this trend of independence from U.S. policy. The lucrative trade agreements some European capitalists have worked out with the Soviets make them reluctant to take too strong a stand with the U.S. against the Soviets. Western European trade with Eastern Europe and Russia is greater than that of the U.S. U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe constitute 1.7% of its total, whereas the corresponding percentage is 2.4% for Britain; 4.5% for France; and 1.9% for Germany. Most of the $80 billion of outstanding foreign loans held by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries are from West European countries. Some West European capitalists actually connive with the Soviets’ aggressive behavior – they acknowledge the legitimacy of Soviet influence over other countries, such as Poland, in the hope that Moscow will do more business with the West.
Manifestations of the different outlooks of the U.S. and Europe have surfaced a number of times already in the past couple of years:
• European governments, due primarily to popular sentiment, have been reluctant to endorse the deployment of a new round of U.S. nuclear missiles on the continent. The scheduled deployment of new U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles is already one of the hottest international political issues in 1983. The Danish Parliament has blocked a previous government decision to contribute $6 million towards these new U.S missiles in Europe.
• West German Chancellor Kohl, one of the European rulers closest to the U.S., and other West European leaders have called for the U.S. to demonstrate greater flexibility in the arms control talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva.
• The European capitalists are also upset at the U.S. role in the Middle East. They are pressing for a basic resolution of the Palestinian question (with several countries supporting the right of the Palestinians to form their own state) and do not support the obstinate backing by the U.S. of the Zionists. In part this is a product of greater European reliance upon oil resources from the Arab countries, but generally the European countries have been more cooperative with the third world on its demands on trade and political issues. This is attributable in part to the greater dependency of Europe on the resources and markets of the third world.
• The European governments angrily rejected Reagan’s attempt to block the construction of the natural gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Europe. This conflict created deep fissures in the alliance.
• The European governments generally did not go along with the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics which was initiated by the U.S. to protest the invasion of Afghanistan.
There is considerable concern in Washington that U.S.-European relations will continue on a rocky path and even may deteriorate further. A top official of the EC stated last year that there was a real danger of a new trade war over tariffs, markets, and the “dumping” of goods, between the U.S. and Europe as in the 1930’s. Europe magazine in late 1982 observed a “growing incapacity – or unwillingness” for understanding between Europe and the U.S.
There are plenty of indications of this in the controversies over European imports to the U.S. (such as steel) and what the U.S. currently believes are unfair European trade barriers to U.S. agricultural products. The cry of “protectionism” is heard more and more these days from U.S. business interests, and is becoming a top political issue in the U.S., even though the overall U.S. balance of trade with Europe has been dramatically in the U.S.’s favor.
The economic situations are not good in both Western Europe and the U.S. Unemployment in West Germany has hit its highest point in 30 years and the economic prospects of the entire capitalist world are not bright. It is estimated European unemployment will rise to 15 to 20 million by 1985. Both sides of the Atlantic are acutely concerned about trade since it is so critical to the recovery of their economies. Economic conflicts therefore are bound to expand and create political differences. Many European leaders believe U.S. economic policies, especially the high interest rates of the Reagan Administration that are attracting capital out of Europe, are especially hurting their economies. Reaganomics, which the U.S. ruling class currently favors as the path for economic recovery, is attacked by European powers as being a key “divisive element” in U.S.-European relations.
U.S. foreign policy makers also will have a very difficult time developing a common policy towards the Soviets. The Europeans are reluctant to see their continent made a chessboard in the superpowers’ rivalry. They have already adamantly opposed Reagan’s confrontational approach of using trade and business as political weapons, and have also expressed concern over the military buildup.
The desire for “detente” with the Soviet Union is still quite strong in Europe, and currents of appeasement are still much in evidence. There are voices in the U.S. calling for a return to “detente” with the Soviet Union, but there is little indication that there can be a return to this approach in the near future. Military parity, Soviet economic strength, Soviet aggressiveness, a new arms race, and the erosion of U.S. imperialist control over areas of the world will prevent any U.S. president from returning to the detente form of rivalry seen in the early 1970’s.
There is another factor U.S. policy makers must consider, and that is the mass sentiment in Europe for disarmament and peace. Millions of Europeans have demonstrated against the superpowers’ arms race. Generally speaking the protest has been against both Washington and Moscow, but because U.S. missiles and military installations abound in Europe, the U.S. draws particular attention. Some top European leaders even have expressed support for the U.S. nuclear freeze movement. The U.S. has little control over this sentiment and is concerned about its influence on general U.S.-European relations.
In the U.S. ruling circles are two broad tendencies towards dealing with Europe. There is “unilateralism,” which means that the U.S. should act as it sees fit. It should give first priority to its particular interests and less attention towards building a consensus with the Western European countries. Reagan has leaned in this direction on some issues, but the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy has not been in this direction. It remains, though, a strong undercurrent.
The other trend is to try to strengthen cooperation between the U.S. and Western Europe. This was former Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s intention and also seems to be what Secretary of State Schultz is trying to do. There are, however, major obstacles to this as noted above.
In reality, there are few options for the U.S. Unilateralism would only isolate the U.S. further from its critical allies. There is too much U.S. investment in Europe to allow any radical changes. U.S. investment in Europe amounts to $95.65 billion. More than one-half of the entire defense budget is devoted to the NATO commitment. Despite the sharp conflicts, Washington will have to seek ways to accommodate the growing economic and political power of Western Europe and accept it as an equal in world affairs. It will not be easy for U.S. imperialism to accept its reduced role in the Atlantic alliance, but it has little choice in the long run.