First Published: Workers Viewpoint, Vol. 6, No. 30, August 5-11, 1981.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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The Iranian revolution is now well into its third year, and it is taking many new and unexpected twists and turns. The masses’ high hopes for freedom and a better life are fading away under a dictatorship of the Islamic Republican Party, a narrow sect composed of only 7,000 of the country’s 80,000 mullahs, or Islamic priests. The united front of militant Islam, progressive nationalism and the left that brought the revolution to power has been wrecked. After months of struggle – sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent – the IRP has established a political monopoly, controlling the Parliament, the courts and legal system and now the presidency.
The Islamic Republican Party’s sectarian activity has narrowed the support for the revolution and the Islamic revolutionary government. It has put the revolution at a crossroads. The IRP is seriously destabilizing Iran, threatening its independence and development.
“In understanding the situation in Iran today,” we wrote in the Sept. 1, 1979 issue of the Workers Viewpoint, “the starting point must be the concrete class analysis of world politics and economics as a whole, that is the four fundamental contradictions in the world today. And we must grasp tightly Lenin’s teaching as our framework – that we are still in the era of imperialism, the eve of proletarian revolution. Without this to ground us and guide our analysis, we can vacillate on principle – like opportunists who never grasped this from Kautsky and Trotsky, from Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng, to scum like the opportunist Revolutionary ’Communist’ Party, ’Communist’ Party Marxist-Leninist and the League of Revolutionary Struggle – side-tracking our fight from the main enemies of the people of the world....
“The main dividing line in Iran today is not what you say, but whether the various political groups actually in practice fight for Iranian independence from the two superpowers, and in that context continue the struggle for democracy and socialism, or serve as their agents. And for third world peoples and nations in the era of imperialism, that is the bottom line.”
The recent removal from office of President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the counter-revolutionary executions and purges in the army and other government institutions of leftists – mainly members and supporters of the Peoples Mojahedeen Organization of Iran – have brought out into the open the opportunist policy and actions of Iran’s leaders in the Islamic Republican Party. Since the revolution’s victory in February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeni, other, more farsighted clergy and secular elements in the revolution have waged consistent fight against the IRP’s interpretation of the revolution’s meaning and its definition of the tasks following the revolution’s victory.
The slogan “Death to the Shah!” was the slogan which guided the revolution to victory and united the masses and the three main forces mentioned above. Throughout the fight to overthrow the Shah and U.S. imperialism the left – the Fedayeen, the Mojahedeen and various Marxist-Leninist forces – remained steadfast. It fought heroically and produced many martyrs: The Shah’s SAVAK killed over 200 Fedayeen members alone. Many leftists spent years in prisons and torture chambers.
But for all this, its forces were scattered and it led a hounded existence in the underground. During the last few months of the Shah’s bloody rule, the left displayed tremendous heroism in the fight. Leftists were often in the front ranks of demonstrations, putting their lives on the line for the country’s liberation.
The national bourgeoisie joined the revolution early because of the Shah’s oppression against it. This class, mainly composed of the bazaar merchants and traders, was economically deprived by the Pahlevi family, which monopolized all the big industry, business and the lucrative foreign trade.
It struggled to get out from under the Shah’s thumb, and, partly because it is a deeply religious class, the national bourgeoisie threw its weight behind the clergy and the revolution. Toward the end of the Shah’s reign, it was very common for the merchants to go on strike in mourning for those martyrs killed by the Shah.
This class produced many of the early leaders of the revolution and provided an initial able core of experts. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the former foreign minister, and Bani Sadr both represent this class and were both close associates of Ayatollah Khomeini.
This class, of course, was never as firm as the workers and the left; it never was for the ending of exploitation of one class by another, only the ending of its exploitation by the Shah. This was shown politically in its vacillation. It was ambivalent toward the revolution’s progress and did not want to go very far, especially in the revolution’s early stage. Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic, said soon after the revolution, “We asked for a rain and got a flood.” In particular, he was fearful of the revolutionary justice that people were handing out to former officials of the Shah’s regime and SAVAK agents.
On the one hand, the national bourgeoisie hates the imperialists and the Shah for what they have done. On the other, it fears the revolutionary initiative of the masses, who take steps to implement revolutionary justice, decide their own laws and run their own affairs. We often had occasion to point this out and expose its vacillation.
Closely related to this political vacillation is the national bourgeoisie’s political flabbiness. So far it has been unable to produce any significant nationwide political party. Bani Sadr had only a newspaper – which he founded – to back him, and he relied heavily on the support from Khomeini.
Despite the extreme vacillation of this class and its inability to carry out the revolution by itself, it has given the Islamic Republic necessary important technical, educational and cultural skills to build an independent country. It is correct to wage struggle against this class when it compromises, but it must be united with; it is wrong and will lead to disastrous results if one makes a principle of attacking it, as the IRP has done.
The revolution did not attain proportions capable of reaching even the backward elements until the clergy joined. For years there had been struggle against the Shah, including the short-lived National Front government headed by Mossadegh, a representative of the national bourgeoisie. So why did the revolution succeed this time around?
The difference was the Islamic church. Previously, it had been bought off by the Shah and given special privileges. But when, in the late 1970s, he began confiscating church land and halting church subsidies, he alienated the clergy. Its whole network of mosques and Friday prayer services came over to the revolution.
Even more than the national bourgeoisie, who had the bazaars where information was exchanged, the clergy had a legitimate form to reach the masses. Because the Iranian people organized their lives around the mosques and Islamic rituals, the clergy was best able to take their pulse and deeply understand their revolutionary temperment.
In particular, Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the symbol of the revolution. He had been exiled for criticizing the Shah at a time when the clergy was not revolutionary. If anybody had moral authority, it was Khomeini. A leader in whom the broad masses have confidence is essential for mobilizing a truly mass movement. This leader makes the revolution’s goals concrete – whether the masses agree with all the leader’s views or not.
It was “natural” that someone would step forward to lead the Iranian people, but the fact it was Khomeini is accidental. So while the Islamic clergy did play the major role in the leadership of the revolution, the revolution was not made for Islam. Rather it was made out of necessity. The masses demanded a change from life under U.S. domination and the Shah.
“It is exactly these conditions;” wrote the Confederation of Iranian Students, in December 1978, “the economic chaos and inequity; the lack of social welfare; the non-existence of any form of political expression; the denial of basic human rights; and the continuous selling out of the Iranian people’s sovereignty, and political and economic interests, that have created such an explosive situation in Iran today. The burden of repression, poverty, exploitation, and national betrayal has become too heavy for the backs of the Iranian people. They have stood up and stated their demands in clear and determined voices. They have taken their future in their own hands.”
Ayatollah Khomeini, too, recognized this and saw that not only would the revolution have to fulfill the masses’ spiritual needs, it would have to solve their material needs. “The Shah,” he said, “has destroyed the economy and the industry and the agriculture. You call this modernization and transformation to an industrial society. Our objective is to start a real modernization based upon the fundamental needs of the vast majority of the people who are poor.”
Khomeini, an Islamic cleric, recognizes the spiritual value of Islam and the positive role it played in mobilizing the people. But being a sober, practical revolutionary, he knew that ideology and the mobilization of the masses around it was not enough.
That is why, aside from getting support from other clerics, he also surrounded himself with experienced revolutionaries who were also experts and representatives of the national bourgeoisie. Khomeini’s broadmindedness extended further, to welcoming communists to the fight against the Shah and inviting Iranian students studying abroad to come home and use their skills to the country’s benefit.
The clerics and others who later formed the Islamic Republican Party, like the late Ayatollah Beheshti, are not nearly as farsighted as Khomeini. They take the victory of the revolution as a victory and a mandate for them. They want to impose their ideology on the revolution against the will of the people.
Prime Minister Rajai made this clear in an interview with The Middle East magazine in July 1980. “It is natural,” he said, “that the unity which brought the Shah down should disappear.” This is because, “During the revolution, ’Death to the Shah’ was a slogan welcomed by all, but ’Long live Islam’ is not a slogan which is welcome to holders of all ideologies. When a government is established on an ideology, then the other ideologies are bound to be in a state of discomfiture.
“Had our revolution been different, and like that of Algeria’s nationalist movement, then things would have been different. Their aim was to expel France but not to establish Islam. So for them their task was finished. We would be unhappy if we gave up our ideology. I am happy even if I am getting 7,000 tumans a month, but would not be happy if I got 20,000 tumans and did not have my ideology.”
Rajai’s statement is an opportunist justification for purging leftists and secular leaders and establishing the political monopoly of the IRP. There is no question at all of his being denied his ideology; no genuine political force – neither Bani Sadr nor the Mojahedeen – ever threatened him with this. What is at issue here is whether it is correct to dismiss those revolutionaries and patriots who disagree with the IRP’s sectarian politics.
A revolution’s success depends on the mobilization of the masses. But it needs more, much more, as we have shown above. In the history of revolutions it is not at all unusual that a certain class or a certain political force does not have necessary skills to run a country.
In the Soviet Union, for example, while the working class and its leadership, the Bolsheviks, displayed tremendous heroism and revolutionary consistency in the fight to overthrow Tsarism and capitalism, it had not produced experts for the peaceful construction of the country. The first state bank was a sack of gold in Lenin’s office closet.
The question which confronted Lenin and the Soviet working class was where to get experts to help run the country. The answer was the New Economic Policy, which, in exchange for getting the country functioning again and relieving the workers’ and peasants’ state of exhaustion, gave intellectuals and officials from the old regime and even some members of the bourgeoisie concessions.
To be sure, Lenin encountered opposition to his NEP from revolutionary workers; they opposed giving any concessions to their former enemies. Lenin struggled with them, finally getting them to see that this was the only way to keep the country from collapsing.
He finally won them over, but not before Trotsky, an opportunist who always fought the revolution, took advantage of the workers’ narrow scope and, using demagogy, manipulated their revolutionary stand by accusing the Bolsheviks of selling out. Lenin’s broadminedness pulled the revolution through a difficult time and defeated those who made a career out of twisting the people’s revolutionary temperment.
One cannot fault the Islamic Republican Party for lacking the necessary skills to run a country. But the question then arises: if a Party does not have these skills, where and how is it to get them? The IRP has no plan for this. In fact, by its attacks on the national bourgeoisie, western educated intellectuals – including the Iranian student movement in the U.S. and Europe (which played such a crucial role in building world public opinion against the Shah) – the left and the university system (which has been closed for a year), the IRP seems to make a principle of having no skills.
It has taken a correct principle of vigilance against the national bourgeoisie’s vacillation and perverted it to mean that anyone with skills, or anyone not closely aligned with it, will sell out. The IRP twists the people’s temperment and hypes them up to cover their own inability to run the country.
The IRP, with its narrow sectarian outlook and insistence on its version of Islamic ideological purity, produces disastrous results wherever it gains the upper hand. It attacks all who disagree with or oppose it, and it has been unable to solve any of the country’s problems.
Some of Iran’s problems, like the poor economy, were inherited from imperialism. Solving them requires close cooperation and concessions from all sides. In September 1979, we indicated the correct approach to solving some of Iran’s economic ills.
“So in terms of the relations between the workers and the capitalists in Iran, the united front is both unity and struggle on the one hand, each has to subordinate their immediate class interests to the larger question of protecting Iran from superpower subversion.
“For instance, at the point right after the revolution it would have been incorrect for the workers to strike for better conditions, given the fact that a crucial part of putting Iran in a position to fight superpower subversion was restoring production...
“On the other hand, the standard of living must be improved for the people to be unleashed to support the revolution. That’s why concessions of the workers must be reciprocated by the capitalists. If the capitalists are getting fat while the workers are starving, they will ask ’why should we support this?’
Any capitalist who opportunistically used the united front to take advantage of the proletariat’s restraint and fatten himself is carrying out a reactionary policy that weakens the united front. Thus, in that situation, not only is a strike justified, but it is necessary to protect the proletariat’s independence and initiative in the united front and the united front itself. United front unity means struggle to build the united front against those incorrect policies and actions that threaten to break it.”
The working class has kept up its end of the bargain, exercising tremendous patience and restraint in the struggle for an independent Iran. In the beginning stages of the revolution the oil workers refused to be provoked by the Shah’s agents into striking, instead, keeping oil production up.
For well over two years, the working class has endured 25-30 percent unemployment and well over 25 percent annual inflation. It has endured shortages and rationing. All this was for the good of the country. Although conditions were hard, the government, on Khomeini’s instructions, made concessions, too. Early in the revolution he put aside one day’s oil revenues to improve the lot of the country’s oil workers.
But now the workers are receiving nothing in return for their patience. The Tehran bus drivers are a case in point. After fruitless negotiations, they went out on strike – against the wishes of the mullah-dominated committee – for the traditional New Year’s bonus which was denied them. Far from being sympathetic to their plight, the IRP blasted the workers, charging them with sabotage of the revolution.
Bezhad Nabavi, chief government spokesman, said, “Aims that could not be achieved through Saddam’s war [the Iraqi invasion] – they could not bring down the government of the Islamic Republic – are now being pursued through the creation of internal crises, strikes and chaos in the society. Actions are being taken to achieve the aims that the United States has against our revolution.”
The government, after slandering the workers as agents of U.S. imperialism, broke the strike by threatening to bring in troops from the front to scab. With this attitude, the IRP is losing the workers’ support, and an open, nationwide struggle is breaking out in the workers’ committees between the mullahs and the workers. How this concludes remains to be seen.
It is the wish and desire of the Iranian people to free themselves from imperialist domination, and a fundamental part of this is an independent economy. No country can maintain its political independence for long without building its economic independence.
Iran welcomed the cut in trade ties with the U.S., and has expanded trade relations with some socialist countries and lesser European countries. Iran has also drastically cut back on imports of non-essential products and even many production goods. There is nothing wrong with this, per se. But without a plan for building the economy, gut desire to break ties with imperialism can turn and has turned Iran’s economy into chaos.
The economy is in shambles. According to the Ministry of Industry and Mines, only 59 percent of the enterprises in operation before the revolution are operating today. Even these factories were operating at only 80 percent capacity. Big assembly plants, such as auto, are being shut down. So far the only plan that the IRP has advanced for putting workers back to work and the economy back on its feet is for the workers to have patience because, “our revolution was aimed at cleansing society and not for wages.”
The IRP’s economic policy is losing the support of the working class, but it is also losing the support of the national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie, the bazaari, as we pointed out before, joined the revolution because the Shah monopolized the economy. When the revolution took over, concessions were granted to the bazaari, and they took over the foreign trade. At the same time, the government also pursued a correct policy of restricting profiteering and other black market activities.
But the IRP appears to be reversing policy, apparently without a sober assessment of the state of the economy. Eric Rouleau, the Mideast correspondent for the French paper Le Monde, describes the process of the national bourgeoisie’s alienation. “We are being stifled, we cannot go on!” After the taghutis, the big industrialists, the former imperial regime’s big businessmen, here we have a bazaari, a fairly wealthy trader – formerly an unqualified supporter of the Imam Khomeini and the clergy – in turn attacking the ’“mullahs’ dictatorship.” His house has been searched for hours about the “suspect relations” he allegedly had with “liberals” – that new category of counterrevolutionaries. The pasdaran who invaded his house, he explained indignantly, did not “even have a search warrant.”
Almost 2 years after the fall of the monarchy, the rule of law has still not been established. Goods are still being seized and confiscated, usually at the initiative of cleric or a local committee which does not bother about legal procedure. Of course, it is possible to appeal to the revolutionary courts, but they declare themselves incompetent or, in most cases, find against the plaintiffs. To do that they merely have to refer to the Islamic doctrine embodied in the constitution and the Raja’i government’s program which states that property belongs to God alone. God only “delegates” this privilege “partially and on a temporary basis” and on the express condition that the beneficiaries use it “for the community’s benefit.”
Joint commissions comprising officials and clerics have recently been touring the rural districts to carry out the umpteenth land distribution, confiscating as they go land lying fallow or farms requiring the help of paid workers. “Big” landowners of all kinds, described as “parasites” are eliminated in favor of a distribution and marketing network now being set up.
Foreign trade, formerly a source of wealth for the barzaaris, is also being nationalized. The Gulf war is being used as a justification for speeding up the process.
On the Kurdish question, too, the IRP has reversed verdicts isolating an important ally and further narrowing support for the revolution. The Kurds, a minority nationality living in the border areas of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, have historically been used by imperialism. They have fought for centuries against national oppression against the rulers of all three countries. The CIA attempted to use them to stir up trouble, especially in Iraq, but then Henry Kissinger made a deal, and the Kurds were slaughtered in the early 1970s. The Shah also mercilessly oppressed them and the Kurds in Iran were one of the forces who fought to overthrow the Shah and kick the U.S. out of Iran.
Most recently, the Kurds have been incited against the Iranian government. Reactionaries from the Shah’s bloody regime like Shapur Bakhtiar and General Oveisi each have radio stations inside Iraq from which they broadcast counterrevolutionary and anti-government propaganda. The Kurdish Democratic Party, whose leadership for years had been outside the country, in the Soviet Union, is also trying to take advantage of the friction between the central government and the Kurdish people.
There was initially a correct policy toward the Kurds, which was formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini over the heads of other Islamic clergy. He sent his son-in-law and some other religious leaders close to him to negotiate with the Kurds after local leaders got nowhere. The outcome, after much struggle, was an agreement for regional autonomy. Furthermore, the central government recognized a Kurdish revolutionary committee and, again on Khomeini’s instructions, $75 million was given to develop the Kurdish areas.
Settling the Kurdish question in this fashion was in the interests of both the Kurds and the government. Tensions were lessened in the border areas, contributing to Iran’s security. It also gave less room for SAVAK agents, old generals and other remnants from the Shah’s reign to maneuver, and deprived them of material with which to incite the Kurds against the revolution. Nevertheless, the opportunist Kurdish Democratic Party refused to accept the settlement and revolted, and the central government had no choice but to put down the uprising.
But the IRP has reneged on the correct solution of regional autonomy to the Kurdish question. They no longer recognize the Kurd’s right to self-determination. Here, too, the IRP’s ideology – Islamic ideology – has taken precedence over politics and the well-being of the revolution.
“Islam believes in one nation,” said Prime Minister Rajai. “We are internationalists and believe in one Muslim nation. “There are no Arab Muslims or Kurdish Muslims [both minorities in Iran]. They are just one entity... .We do not believe in national or international divisions or for that matter geographic or racial divisions.”
This is no abstract question of rights, but one of life and death for the whole country. The Kurdish masses will never accept forcible merger with the rest of Iran. As long as the IRP oppresses the Kurds, they will fight, and Iran will be in turmoil. This will further drain the economy and waste valuable resources, including people. Iran is also more vulnerable to invasion and meddling by the U.S. imperialists.
The IRP’s attack on former President Bani Sadr and the subsequent slaughter of the left plunged the country deeper into chaos.
This fight had actually been going on for a long time, but surfaced at the beginning of the year, when the hostages were released. Bani Sadr recognized that, while it was absolutely necessary to take the hostages and support the militants holding them, they could not be held forever.
After a while, and especially without a trial, the propaganda value was used up. Holding them became a drag on implementing other important tasks. Beside, the masses could be mobilized only so long without a change in their conditions. Based on this principled view, he tried to negotiate a settlement including reparations and a self-criticism from the U.S. government.
But the Islamic Republican Party blocked him time and again. Its line of “no talks with Satan” was bogus. It had no hard assessment of the situation and how the hostages fit in with the other tasks. It thought it sufficient to chant “Death to Carter!” and bring the masses out to daily demonstrations. It did not recognize the great leverage it had over the U.S. imperialists because of the presidential elections.
In fact, the IRP rejected a settlement which Bani Sadr negotiated in April 1980 – that is, almost one year earlier than the hostages were released. His settlement included return of all frozen Iranian assets and return of all the Shah’s wealth.
What did the IRP accomplish? It dragged the hostage crisis out for well over a year. When it lost the leverage after the elections were over, it became scared of Reagan and eventually capitulated to the imperialists. After holding the hostages 444 days, it got but a small part of the frozen assets. But for almost a year after the issue could have been settled, the IRP distracted the masses, delayed the urgent tasks of reconstruction and destroyed the unity between the Islamic forces and progressive nationalists.
Mojahed, the publication of the People’s Mojahedeen Organization of Iran (PMOI), contends that, “Until recent times, the seizure and trial of the hostages and the decline of any form of dealings and/or negotiations with U.S. imperialism were considered the purest criteria for being anti-imperialist in essence and in action. But in an urgent and brief session of the Majlis, the same people turned around recently and ’reasoned’ that the struggle against U.S. imperialism cannot be measured by the seizure or release of the hostages. Today we can clearly see that the hostage captors exploited the genuine anti-imperialist feelings of the masses in Iran in order to achieve their own aims. After they achieved their aims, these people gave in to the imperialist pressure and capitulated to the enemy.”
Bani Sadr blasted the IRP for its capitulation and the battle was on. From then on the IRP hemmed him in – first threatening to try him for treason, then refusing to let him appoint his government aides and finally dismissing him as the army’s commander and as president.
Bani Sadr relied on Ayatollah Khomeini’s interventions to save him. But Khomeini did not save him. Rather, he alternately defended and chastised him and ultimately banished him. Toward the end he gave Bani Sadr one more chance: do self-criticism and repudiate your followers, he said, and then return to the fold. If you don’t, he continued, “I’ll cut your hand off.” This was a reference to an Islamic proverb which means he would destroy him.
Why Khomeini’s inconsistency? Why did he shun his “adopted son”? Did he finally turn his back on modernization, as some have asserted? The answer does not lie in Khomeini’s individual personality but in the political realignment that took place in the wake of the hostages’ release.
Around the first of the year the Mojahedeen allied itself with Bani Sadr against the IRP. The Mojahedeen correctly saw that the IRP was wrecking the country. Bani Sadr, too, must have seen that the only hope he had for staying in power and developing the country was to ally with the Mojahedeen against the IRP. Khomeini, as revolutionary and progressive as he is, fears the left’s coming to power. The fact is, the Mojahedeen represents the major challenge to the IRP-dominated government.
Khomeini was caught in a bind. On the one hand, he feared the left’s backing of Bani Sadr. On the other hand, he knew he needed the popular president’s and the national bourgeoisie’s expertise to build the country. That is why he struggled to cut Bani Sadr from the Mojahedeen and at the same time fought with the IRP sectarians to allow Bani Sadr and other experts to continue their patriotic duty without harassment.
As it turned out, Khomeini, prestigious as he is, could not have both. His fear of the left won the day, and he finally, but reluctantly, dumped the president and approved a purge. But once he gave his consent, the IRP opportunist leaders went wild. The united front, which it had been destroying for the past year, was drowned in blood. Over 200 leftists have been slaughtered since the last week in June.
But having done this, the IRP is sealing its doom. It is becoming more isolated, as the demonstrations against Bani Sadr’s dismissal in over a dozen cities shows. And the left is armed and has growing support among the people. These are two favorable conditions for the overthrow of the IRP.
Said the Confederation of Iranian Students about the prospects of their revolution: “The overthrow of the ruling despots will not be possible without the unity of the masses and the patriotic and independent groups. On this basis we fully support the great national unity and for our part are trying to make it possible.
“The history of conversion of the hard-line sectarians to a despotic gang which has surrendered to the superpowers, once again proves that any force which denies the great national unity will not be able to resist the superpowers. In fact, a firm anti-imperialist, must be a firm unity lover. Uniting does not mean becoming one but means unification of all strata and classes of people with different ideas around the fundamental principles of the revolution, namely independence, freedom and social justice. Today the Great National Unity means the unity of the three genuine, historical and political trends in our society, namely independent Islamic, Nationalist and socialist forces.
“Experience has also proved that any real anti-imperialist force must be in favor of freedom. Because without freedom, without the freedom of speech and without the struggle between right and wrong, it is neither possible to reach a correct analysis nor to unite. Betraying freedom means destroying unity which results in compromise and surrender. Independence and unity, unity and freedom will not be achieved without social justice which is the main purpose of revolution. Independence and freedom serve the people’s welfare and social justice.
“The situation of the patriotic forces is getting better, by day, whereas that of the autocrats and capitulationists is becoming worse. Despots and traitors are a small force. They are doomed to failure and extinction. Let’s roll up our sleeves, hold hands, rid ourselves of sectarianism, fight against any words or deeds which hurt the unity in action of the pro-independence and freedom forces, to dethrone the capitulationist autocrats and establish the government of Great National Unity. The future belongs to the peoples of Iran.”