Written: 9 April 1933.
Source: The Militant, Vol. VI No. 25, 6 May 1933, pp. 1 & 2.
Transcription/HTML Markup: Einde O’Callaghan for the Trotsky Internet Archive.
Copyleft: Leon Trotsky Internet Archive (www.marxists.org) 2015. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0.
The question or the fate or German Communism stands now at the centre of attention of all our sections. So far as can be judged, the majority of comrades are inclined to the belief that in Germany the question of Communism is a question of a new party. There are others, however, who consider such a formulation of the question as incorrect and maintain that the old slogan of a “reform” of the party along Leninist lines should be retained. This is the position, for instance, of two Spanish comrades, of two German comrades, who speak in the name of whole groups and of one Russian comrade. I do not doubt that their objections reflect the mood of quite a considerable part of the Opposition. It would be unnatural if the need for such a serious turn did not produce in our midst different shadings and disagreements. It would be unworthy of the Opposition if we were incapable of discussing in a comradely, yet matter of fact, fashion the disagreements which have arisen. Such a discussion can result only in the further growth of the Opposition and in the strengthening of inner democracy. In what concerns the essence of the objections themselves, I cannot agree with them, although psychologically I can understand them. The mistake of the above-mentioned comrades consists in that they proceed from the formulas of yesterday and not from the facts of today. We must learn how to correct and replace the formulas in the light of new events.
During the last three years our calculations have been based on the ability of the German Communist Party to make a timely change in policy under the pressure of the masses. If our prognosis of yesterday were defined more sharply, it would be expressed as follows:
“We cannot know as yet to what degree the German working class is weakened by past mistakes, zigzags and defeats and to what degree the sabotage of the Stalinist bureaucracy in combination with the capitulation of the social-democracy, have paralyzed the energies of the proletariat.”
We have frequently expressed the hope that the very approach of the Fascist danger would close the ranks of the proletariat and give rise to a power of resistance which would not allow Hitler to capture all positions at once. And every delay in the advance of Hitler, even though he be already in power, would inevitably release a greater flow of confidence among the workers. The beginning of Civil War in its turn should have engendered a decomposition in the government camp and in the Fascist army itself. Vacillations in the camp of the enemy, should have again, in their turn, heightened the offensive force of the proletariat, etc., etc. Such was the dialectic perspective which we considered probable; at any rate, not excluded. And because of that, we had to, it was our duty to, exhaust all possibilities contained in the situation of yesterday.
However, now it would be insane to be ruled by an old perspective which has been cast aside by events. The Spanish comrades ask: “Is it possible that these few weeks can replace the perspective or long months or civil war?” Of course, they have replaced it. A few weeks, even days have destroyed completely the possibility of that more favorable variant on which we counted. Hitler seized the material apparatus of power. He routed without the least resistance the apparatus of the Communist party, deprived the German workers of the press, forced the reformists to break with the Second International and to submit to the Fascist regime.
The sharp change in the situation is clearly revealed in the question of the united front. To propose a united front in Germany between the two parties now would be doctrinaire stupidity. There was a period when the social democratic apparatus found itself under the yoke of advancing Fascism on one side and the pressure of its own masses on the other – that time should have been utilized. Now, after the defeat, the social democracy licks the boots of Hitler and sees in that the only means for its salvation. If two years ago Breitsheid considered it necessary to scare the bourgeoisie by a bloc with Communists, now Wels and Co. are interested in recoiling demonstratively not only from the Communists but from the Second International itself.
The proposal of a united front now would only place the Communist C.E.C. in a ridiculous position and would be of service to the social democratic party administration. Politics knows no absolute formulas. Its slogans are concrete, that is, timed to definite circumstances. (What has been said above does not, of course, exclude, even today, agreements between the Communist and the social democratic organizations in the enterprises, in the districts, etc., as well as agreements with other Left wing groups which will inevitably break off from the official social democracy).
The average German worker as well as the average Communist feels like a traveller who has suffered shipwreck. His organizations, press, his hopes for a better future – all are drowned in the waves of Fascism. The thoughts of the shipwrecked are directed not toward building a new ship but toward getting shelter and a piece of bread. A depressed spirit and political indifference are the inevitable consequences of such gigantic catastrophes. But the political awakening of the more enduring, of the firm and courageous will inevitably be tied up. with the thought of a new ship.
As characterizing the present situation in which the deepest layers of the German proletariat find themselves, I consider most important the report that in the majority of enterprises the old shop committees have been ousted and replaced by cells of Nazis. This “reform” passed so quietly that the foreign press did not even reflect it. But this is not a matter of the editorial board of a newspaper, or of the Liebknecht House, or even of a parliamentary faction, that is, it is not a matter of distant heights, but of the very base in production of the proletariat – the shop. The lack of resistance against the ousting of shop committees denotes an acute paralysis of the will of the masses under the influence of treachery and sabotage at the top.
The Communist party has gathered during the last years up to six million votes. Into the struggle it did not draw even one hundred thousand. Even the members of the party did not respond to the appeals of the C.E.C. This fact alone indicates the frightful isolation of the apparatus. With each day this isolation will grow. The masses are not interested in shadings and trifles. They take events in toto. The masses will inevitably turn their back to the party which quieted their anxiety with empty formulas, with boasts of the victories of tomorrow and led headlong to a catastrophe.
The situation of the German Communist Party changed so radically within the two or three weeks of March as in “normal”, “peaceful” times it could not have changed in two decades. The imperialist epoch in general, is an epoch of sharp turns. One must learn to follow them attentively so as not to trip and crack one’s head. We must not delude ourselves, we must give ourselves a full account of the extent of the catastrophe – of course, not to become tearfully downcast, but to start according to a new plan, the long and stubborn work required, on a new historic base.
Nearly all those opposing, object to the comparison of August 4th, 1914, with March 5th, 1933: the social democrats, you see, betrayed the proletariat consciously and by that came nearer to the seats of power; the Stalinists, however, “did not know” how to defend the proletariat and landed in jails. This difference is, of course, very essential and not accidental. But we don’t have to exaggerate its political significance. In the first place, the majority of the social democracy even in 1914 wanted, not to carve out a career, but to “save” the proletarian organizations, just as the leaders of the German Communist Party, blindly obedient to the commands of the Moscow bureaucracy, think first of all of their apparatus. Secondly, if in 1914 the social democracy came nearer to the seats of power, yet in 1933, despite all its baseness and degradation, it came nearer to jails. We need not doubt that in the end it will be crushed and will yet have its Matteotis; but does this change our general estimate of reformist policy?
We condemn the apparatus of the German Communist Party not for “stupidity,” or “inability” (as certain comrades express themselves absolutely incorrectly) but for bureaucratic centrism. It is a matter of a certain political current, which bases itself on a definite social strata, first of all in the USSR, and adopts its policy to the needs of this strata. Until the latest events, the question of what factor would win out in the German Communist Party: the interests of the Stalinist bureaucracy, or the logic of the class struggle, remained open. Now the question is completely answered. If events of such gigantic import could not correct the policy of the German Communist Party, it means that bureaucratic centrism is absolutely hopeless. And from this follows the need of a new party.
But the question is solved on an international scale!, object the opponents who turn a correct historic thought into a super historic abstraction. The question of the victory of the proletariat – and not only of its defeat – is also solved on an international scale. This does not prevent the proletariat of Russia, which attained its victory in 1917 from still waiting for the victory in other countries. And the opposite process can also develop unevenly: while the official German Communist Party is liquidated politically, in other countries, and primarily in the USSR, the party has not yet been subjected to a decisive test. Historic events unfold themselves, irrespective of the chess board of the Comintern.
But the Comintern bears the responsibility for the German defeat? Absolutely true In the court of history, however, just as in an ordinary bourgeois court, not the one who bears the principal responsibility is found liable, but the one who has been caught. Now, alas, the apparatus of the German Communist Party has been caught between the tongs of history. The distribution of punishment is really “unjust”. But justice in general is not an attribute of the historic process. And there is no appeal from it.
However, let us not slander the court of history: it is much more serious than the bourgeois court. The liquidation of the German Communist Party is only a stage. It will not stop there. If other sections of the Comintern will learn the German lesson, they may rightfully deserve leniency of history. Otherwise they are doomed. In this way, the march of history gives to the other sections still some additional time to reconsider. We, the Left Opposition, are only the historic interpreters of the march of development. That is why we do not break with the Third International.
Last updated on: 3 September 2015