GENERAL GAIDA, after breaking with the Kolchak leaders, came east, arriving in Vladivostok August 8, 1919. He not only announced publicly that the Kolchak Government could not stand, but took other provocative measures, and why some steps were not taken by Kolchak adherents in the Far East to check Gaida's moves I am unable to say. He had submitted a long report to Kolchak, and had permitted the contents of his report to become public. After calling attention to the defects, he said in part:
" The acuteness of the situation demands special precautions. It is imperative to trace a clear and democratic course of state policy, follow it with unswerving strictness, in the assurance that you can then count upon the majority of the people and on the Army. The Government must clear away doubts as to its democracy and its desire to establish civil law and order. The Government must cut away from its own agents who do not hesitate to profit by their own position. The Government must declare that its final aim is to call a Constituent Assembly, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. A meeting of the representatives of the Government and district Zemstvos and municipal Dumas, as well as representatives of social organizations. It is necessary to take steps to prevent such defects as shooting without trial in all Russian territory. It is necessary, also to work out a system of freedom of assembly as in European countries.
" Measures should be taken to restore the authority of Zemstvos and municipal Dumas, and start investigation as to administrative punishments inflicted upon members.
" Steps must be taken to arouse the sympathy of the peasant masses, and the development of agriculture."
These might have been excellent suggestions for helping the situation in Siberia, but the unfortunate fact was that General Gaida did not follow these principles of government when he had command of the Kolchak forces; he then announced his belief in the use of the whip and bayonet on recalcitrant Russians, and his statements were belated and not entirely free from revenge.
The Russian military situation was becoming worse very fast. The Military Intelligence officer, Colonel Eichelberger, reported as early as August 22, that:
" Reliable information from many sources indicate that there is practically no front maintained by the Siberian Army."
This report of Colonel Eichelberger was made in Vladivostok while I was in Omsk, and just one week after I had been looking along the Ishim River for the one hundred thousand Kolchak troops which I had been led to believe I would find if I went along that river. The farther one was from Omsk, Kolchak's Headquarters, the more freely information was given as to the disintegration of the Kolchak forces. To get the United States to recognize Kolchak and give him financial aid was the last hope of the Russian Monarchists and their Allied supporters.
At this time Gaida's probable coup d'etat was a live subject of discussion in the east, and the general opinion was held that the Czechs would support Gaida.
Gaida's preparation for his coup d'etat was being built around the Social Revolutionists. The Czechs, including Gaida, at this time were neither Monarchists nor Bolsheviks. They believed in a parliamentary government and could see no hope of getting it from either of the extreme classes in Russia.
The Czechs announced their feeling and policy on November 16, 1919, as follows:
" The intolerable position in which our Army is placed, forces us to address ourselves to the Allied powers to ask them for counsel as to how the Czech Army can be assured of its own security and of a free return to its own Country, which was decided with the assent of all the Allied Powers.
" The Army was ready to protect the railway in the sector which was assigned to it and it has fulfilled its task conscientiously. But now the presence of our Army on the railway to protect it has become impossible be-cause the activities of the Army are contrary to its aspirations in the cause of humanity and justice.
" In protecting the railway and maintaining order in the country, our Army is forced to act contrary to its convictions when it supports and maintains an arbitrary, absolute power which at present rules.
" The burning of villages, the murder of peaceable Russian inhabitants by the hundreds, and the shooting without reason, of democratic men solely because they are suspected of holding political views are daily facts; and the responsibility for them, before the Courts of Nations of the entire world, will fall upon us because being an armed force, we have not prevented these in-justices. This passiveness is the direct result of our neutrality and non-intervention in Russian internal affairs, and, thanks to our being loyal to this idea, we have become, in spite of ourselves, accomplices to a crime.
" In communicating this fact to the representatives of the Allied Powers to whom the Czech Nation has been and will be a faithful Ally, we deem it necessary to take every measure to inform the nations-of the whole world in what a moral and tragic position the Czech Army is placed and what are the causes of it.
" As to ourselves, we see no other way out of this situation than to evacuate immediately the sector which was given us to guard, or else to obtain the right to prevent the injustices and crimes cited above.
" V. Girsa."
This was as accurate a portrayal of the real conditions as could be made by words. I had often stressed, in my reports, the fact that the United States could not escape responsibility for the conditions, because the atrocities committed against the people would not have been possible if Allied troops had not been in Siberia. Everyone who had know edge of the facts, and had no prejudices one way or the other, knew that Girsa reported the true conditions.
Gaida was not working with the Czechs during the preparation for his revolution. I could see no evidence of great enthusiasm for him exhibited by members of the Zemstvo, nor did he show evidence of making any great attem to secure the support of the Zemstvo.
Early in September, when Semeonoff was in Vladivostok, he tried to make friends with Gaida, claiming that he, too, was a democrat, but Gaida did not take kindly to the offer of Semeonoff's support.
After General Rozanoff was overthrown, January 31, 1920, among his papers was found a report of the Gaida revolution. In this report Rozanoff stated:
" During the first month of Gaida's residence in Vladivostok, the result of his work showed complete unification with the local right wing of the Social Revolutionists and the Zemstvos, and was headed by the former President of the Siberian Provisional Duma, Mr Yakusheff. The 18th, of September, was set for the coup d'etat."
General Rozanoff was the responsible Kolchak representative in Eastern Siberia and, according to his own statement, he knew the plans of Gaida being formulated in a train located not more than three hundred yards from his Headquarters, and still he made no move to check or to prevent these plans. How can such a failure to act be accounted for? It was an open secret in Vladivostok that Gaida was going to try to drive Rozanoff from power. Some reports I received said that Rozanoff was afraid to act, and hoped something would happen to prevent Gaida from taking his apparent intended step. Other reports were to the effect that an effort was being made to force some combination, to take effect when Kolchak was overthrown.
Rozanoff further states in his report: " Gaida's convoy, numbering fifty men, had increased to three hundred. The fall of Omsk, on the night of the 15th, of November, seems to inspire hope."
Then Rozanoff speaks of the feverish and hurried preparations, for the attack which was to begin on the night of November 17, and which were in sight of his Headquarters and well known to him. At this time he began preparing to resist.
Gaida apparently let Rozanoff get ready and then began his attack, at 12 o'clock the night of November 16-17. This attack commenced at Okeanskaya, twenty-two miles from Vladivostok. Rozanoff says that at 8 o'clock in the morning of the 17th, Gaida was issuing arms to all who came to his train, and still Rozanoff remained passive.
In the afternoon of the 17th, the Allied Commanders held a meeting with a view to formulating some plans to prevent murder and pillage, as well as damage to the Allies who were in town. They concluded it was a political fight, and decided to remain neutral. The city was divided into sections and the Allies were to give protection in the section allotted to them by the Allied Commanders. General Rozanoff states that after the Allied Commanders decided to remain neutral, the Japanese sent him a message wishing him " a speedy and successful elimination of the rebellion before the morning of November the 18th." I do not know whether this report has any truth in it or not.
There were many rumours that the Japanese posted their troops so that no one was permitted to go to the assistance of Gaida, and that they would not permit his troops to leave the railroad station where they were trapped like rats. I never obtained any information, worthy of credence, to justify me in charging that Japanese troops were not neutral.
Rozanoff could not resist the charge that the Americans were not neutral and he says:
" Twice during the night the Americans opened machine-gun fire on the government troops."
That part of his statement I know was untrue.
By 1 or 2 A.M., on the morning of the 18th, it was known that Rozanoff was successful and that Gaida had been defeated, although he and his supporters remained in the railroad station which Rozanoff bombarded with his small destroyers and field artillery.
During this fight I witnessed a remarkable exhibition of courage by some Russian soldiers. The Russians had placed a machine-gun at an intersection of two streets without any protection whatever. The enemy evidently had the range and very soon after a man would take his place to operate the gun, he was killed. Without any effort to remove the machine-gun or to protect it, man after man was killed at that one place. I could see this from my bedroom window and, as far as I could see, the men, without any excitement, willingly went to what was almost certain death.
About 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning, General Cecek, a Czech, came to my Headquarters and told me the Rozanoff forces had Gaida and his men cornered in the railroad station, and asked me to join him in demanding that Gaida be turned over to the Czechs. I felt sorry for Gaida, but told Cecek that I could take no part in the fight except to protect life and property, in accordance with the agreement of the Allied Commanders at the conference the afternoon before.
In the early morning Gaida and his troops at the station surrendered, Gaida being slightly wounded. The presence of the Czechs undoubtedly had a re-straining influence on Rozanoff in the disposition of Gaida, as they would not have permitted Gaida and the few Czechs with him, to be brutally murdered as were the Russians, or many of them that fell into Rozanoff's hands. There were eighteen or twenty young Russians captured at the station who had belonged to some organization in Vladivostok. The Rozanoff troops took these particular young men out in front of the station and offered them an opportunity to join the Rozanoff forces. All of them replied they would die a thousand deaths before they would join such a band of robbers. They were then marched into the station and ordered to descend the circular stone stairs leading to the basement where, as they were going down the steps, they were all shot and killed. This was in the presence of several people, among whom were some Americans.
I cabled to Washington on November 21:
" I have evidence of American Railway Service Corps which establishes the fact that Rozanoff's troops refused to handle anti-Rozanoff wounded, but left them for several hours in the cold snow and rain, and that they went into a warehouse where there were wounded and killed the wounded. There are other re-ports of killings but I cannot verify the accuracy of these latter reports. I have been assured by Rozanoff's representative that women and children will not be molested.
" This movement was inaugurated by the Social Revolutionists under the title of Siberian National Di-rectorate with the ultimate object of the establishment of a Constituent Assembly; with Mr. Yahusheff as President, General Gaida as Commander of Troops, and Mr. Morovsky and Colonel Krakovetsky, Members of the Directorate. None of these men were classed as Bolsheviks and it cannot be called a Bolshevik movement."
During the fight, Colonel Krakovetsky and four other Gaida supporters escaped to American Head-quarters, rushed by the sentinel at the door, and asked for protection. This placed me in a very embarrassing position, as we all knew that to put them out of Head-quarters would have been equivalent to a sentence of death. I felt confident my Headquarters could not be considered as American territory and, therefore, I was not justified in protecting them.
Admiral Rodgers, who was in command of the Asiatic Fleet, was in Vladivostok at the time, and said he would consider them as being entitled to asylum and suggested that I cable to Washington. I gladly adopted the Admiral's suggestion and turned the men over to Colonel F. W. Bugbee, 31st Infantry, for safekeeping, until I could receive a reply from Washington. I sent my cablegram on the 18th, and it was answered on the 19th, as follows :
" Secretaries of State and War agree, not possible constitute your headquarters American territory."
I sent a second cable to Washington, before I received the reply to the first, saying:
" Rozanoff is having prisoners shot. The prisoners in my headquarters or some of them, will be shot if turned over to Rozanoff. If it can legally be done it is very desirable for American prestige to constitute-my headquarters as American territory."
I felt if I turned these prisoners over to Rozanoff, I would be almost committing murder as Kolchak Russians were not following the practice of civilized nations and I knew these men would not be accorded the rights of prisoners, according to, the laws of War. I was seizing any opportunity for delay and convinced myself I was justified in waiting for a reply to my second cable, which I knew would not come.
Colonel Bugbee, to whom I had turned these prisoners over for safekeeping, was a very earnest, conscientious officer, with high ideals, and a world of common sense. I was in my office one evening worrying about the prisoners, when he entered, saluted, and said:
" General, the prisoners have escaped."
I could not say to him that I was glad, as a matter of fact, I could not say anything, but I know of nothing in my whole life that removed such a load from my conscience as did that report of Colonel Bugbee, and I decided I would not report this to Washington, as nothing could be done about it. I was very much amused to receive on December 10, twenty days after I had been told I could not legally hold these prisoners, the following cable from Washington:
" State Department advises that you cause refugees to leave your headquarters as soon as consistent with general principles of humanity and before question of surrender arises."
This looked like preparation for an alibi in case embarrassing questions should be propounded later. If it had not been for Colonel Bugbee's good sense, and if I had turned these prisoners over to Rozanoff, and I really don't know what I would have done, they would have been dead at least twenty days before I got this cable.
Several years later after I was retired, Colonel Bugbee told me the story of the escape of these men. He had an officer whom he felt he could trust " not to talk," so about dusk he instructed him to take these prisoners from where they were confined to a safer place, and if they escaped it would be too bad. I never told Washington what became of the prisoners.
I later found out how fortunate I was in declining to join General Cecek in demanding that the Russians turn Gaida over to the Czechs. The Kolchak sup-porters had to charge everyone who was not helping Kolchak as being a party to Gaida's futile efforts to overthrow Rozanoff. I first was charged with organizing the movement and in a few days I was charged with financing the movement. How little they knew about the accounting system of the United States Government! As an indication of the extent such a foolish report will go, on December 20, 1920, my interpreter in Siberia wrote me in part as follows:
" During my service with the Naval Intelligence Department, under Captain Larimer, Lieutenant Martinek confronted me with the question ` if it was true that you had promised the Vladivostok government assistance and recognition? ' I told Martinek that this was a pure fabrication and I would swear, on oath, that you had never promised any Russian either singly or collectively, either support or recognition."
The, downfall of Gaida had no appreciable effect on the political situation in Siberia. Kolchak was on his way east, and everyone except the American Consul General, seemed to know that he was almost a negligible factor. On November 25, I cabled to Washington :
" Three Japanese transports arrived with troops and more expected. Supply of food stuffs very low and no relief in sight. Following from British sources: ` Bolshevik radio interceed reported caure ten generals, one hundred and ten guns and thirty thou-sand prisoners at Omsk. Council of Ministers poorly received Irkutsk, Zemstvo and city council refused to meet them."
On November 22, Soukine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Kolchak was issuing a manifesto expressing contrition for faults of the past and giving assurance of good conduct in the future. Kolchak was, at this late date, promising to abolish the reign of military terror. This indicates that Kolchak not only knew of the terrible atrocities being committed by his Military but, by promising to stop these atrocities at this late date, he implies he could have stopped them at any time while in power, although no evidence came to me in Siberia that Kolchak turned his hand to relieve these terrible conditions in the Far East.
Ivanoff-Rinoff's troops were beating women as well as men and torturing and killing men, because their sons were not at home and yet Kolchak took Ivanoff-Rinoff to Omsk and promoted him to Lieutenant-General, and personally gave him a gold sword. This did not look like disapproval of Ivanoff-Rinoff's acts. The last act of Kolchak was to designate Semeonoff as his successor and, as stated, in the whole of Siberia, there was only one worse criminal than Semeonoff and that was Kalmikoff. This last act did not look as though Kolchak had much contrition because of the " treatment inflicted upon his fellow-Russians " during his regime.
On the 25th of March, 1919, Mr. Harris, the American Consul General, who Kolchak said had shown him the greatest feeling of friendship and extraordinary sympathy, cabled to the United States, as coming from the Omsk Government :
" The Military, the Political and particularly the international situation in the Far East are such that the Russian Government, although having administration in that region is practically unable to exercise power and authority over this part of the country."
Kolchak not only asked that this be kept confidential, but " extremely confidential as no similar statement has been given to other Allies." Why couldn't Kolchak tell this to his mentor, General Knox? If they were all friends, working together for a common purpose, why should only one friend be told this secret? At this very time, Ivanoff-Rinoff was in command in the Far East, and in the hey-day of his atrocities.
This statement of Kolchak was undoubtedly not entirely disconnected from the suggestion of Mr. Ughet, Fnancial Agent of the former Russian Government in Washington, that the Supreme Ruler make a declaration of liberal policies in order to win the United States public opinion. Kolchak was in an embarrassing position; he could not appear liberal enough to win public opinion in the United States without running great risk of alienating his Russian and Allied sup-port. Hence the extreme secrecy. frequently confronted with statements designed to deceive, and the facts are unimportant when such efforts are undertaken. Falsehoods can often be detected by the people on the ground, but could not be by those seven or eight thousand miles away; especially when such statements have attached to them a tag calling for " extreme secrecy."
There is no doubt in my mind that the so-called Russian Embassy in Washington suggested to Kolchak that some statement be given to Bakmatieff so that he could satisfy the State Department concerning the atrocities being committed in Siberia, but I personally doubt if Kolchak lost one moment's sleep over the conditions in the Far East, and his subsequent treatment of Semeonoff and Ivanoff-Rinoff clearly shows his conscience was not disturbed by their acts. One of the most difficult tasks confronting me was to determine when words and acts were sincere, or were designed to deceive.
As illustrating the Far Eastern psychology, while in Siberia I saw an article in the Kokumin, a Japanese newspaper, with the heading, " Observations of Marquis Okuma on International Relations." The observation was as follows:
" International relations are quite unlike relations subsisting between individuals. Morality and sincerity do not govern a country's diplomacy, which is guided by selfishness, pure and simple. It is considered the secret of diplomacy to forstall rivals by every crafty means available."
This statement can at least be approved for its frankness and apparent sincerity if not for its moral philosophy.
Early in November, there was a change in the attitude of some of the Allied representatives in Vladivostok. Some appeared to be looking for a new orientation when Kolchak fell, and his fall was then imminent. On November 7, Colonel Eichelberger, my Intelligence officer, stated in a report that " probably 97% of the people of Siberia to-day are anti-Kolchak."
On November 13, I was informed by General Semenoff-Merlin, who was Rozanoff's principal assist-ant, that " the Cossacks desired to let the past die in so far as Americans were concerned and establish friendly relations with the Americans." He said Semeonoff was sending a man to me if I would see him with the idea of conferring with me in the hope that I could be induced to consider them with reference to their future action, rather than with reference to their past. I told him I would see Semeonoff's representative, but they might just as well know that I would have nothing to do with murderers.
Semeonoff's representative came and stated that the men around Semeonoff had committed acts of which Semeonoff did not approve and, in fact, was not aware until recently that his officers had been guilty of such terrible murders. He, in the next breath, said Semeonoff had recently killed some of his officers because of their crimes, that Semeonoff would like my advice as to his course of procedure in the future, and that he would follow my advice. I replied as follows :
" My only advice to Semeonoff was to follow the well known moral laws as to right and wrong. Semeonoff and all his people knew that acts had been committed by Semeonoff and his troops of which the United States would not approve, and while we did not care to say what Russians should do, we did claim the right to have no dealings with Russians who committed acts op-posed to all moral laws."
In addition to this man, General Romanofsky and other reactionaries came to tell me that Semeonoff was a much bigger man than they thought and, after a personal investigation, they found he was not such a bad character. My reaction to these reports was that the reactionaries, the Cossacks, and the Japanese had decided to join and declare Semeonoff Dictator of the portion of Siberia east of Lake Baikal, as I knew that such action, to have any chance of success, would re-quire the support of Japan.
In a day or two I went to see General Oi, the Japanese Commander, and had a long and very pleasant talk with him about conditions. I knew that General Oi typified Marquis Okuma's philosophy of " forestalling rivals by any crafty means available," yet I was impressed by the sincerity of what he told me. He said:
" I know the people of Japan are not in favor of the Japanese supporting any monarchistic government in Siberia. My policy in future will be to guard the rail-way, and get economic help to all the people. I feel sure economic help could not be gotten to the people by using Russian officials."
Mr. Matsudaira, Japanese representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee and later Ambassador to the United States, had spoken to Mr. Smith, American representative on the Committee along the same lines General Oi had talked to me. Mr. Matsudaira had impressed me as not being favourable to all the acts of the Japanese Military in Siberia. He had approached me previously and expressed his regret at some act of the Military and said he hoped Americans would not think such acts were approved by the Japanese people, but he said if foreigners made a public criticism of the Japanese Military, the people would resent it, and it would work out to the benefit of the Military.
There was no question but that the Military was the controlling factor in Siberia so far as the Japanese were concerned.
On the 13th of November, Mr. Zumoto, a Member of Parliament, and owner of the Herald of Asia, an influential Japanese magazine, came to see me. He brought me two articles he had written, which had been published in the Shimbun a Tokyo newspaper - these articles were very liberal and openly opposed the policy of the Japanese in Siberia.
In my report to Ambassador Morris at Tokyo, of the interview I said:
" He said he had not talked with General Oi about the matter but some of the Army were beginning to change their views and state that they believed the Japanese had made a mistake in supporting the reactionary and ruthless leaders of the East and it was necessary to change their plans and now support representative bodies as typified by the Zemstvos and Co-operatives. He stated many Japanese opposed this pro-posed plan because it would give America a great advantage in Siberia, as we had consistently followed that course since we arrived here. Mr. Zumoto said this was true but he had no reason to believe that Americans would be unfair and that he felt it was right and, therefore, Japan must follow that course."
He expressed the hope that Japan and the United States could work together in Siberia. Mr. Zumoto also visited Mr. Smith, and talked to him along the same lines as to me, and further stated that since speaking to me he had seen General Oi, who felt as he did.
Mr. Smith and I got together and discussed these statements made by the three most influential Japanese in Siberia, to see if we could come to any conclusion as to their significance, but there were so many contingencies to be considered that we could come to no conclusion as to what was contemplated. It soon developed, in so far as the Military was concerned, no change in their policy and practice was contemplated, and the statements meant absolutely nothing.
The United States seemed to be the last country to lose hope in Admiral Kolchak, as the Secretary of State of the United States on December 7, 1919, ex-pressed the desire that Admiral Kolchak should continue as the head of any Government in Siberia. The Secretary of State also said this would maintain the validity and force of democratic assurances which had been given by Admiral Kolchak.
Democratic assurances, as has been previously noted, were freely given; but democratic actions by Kolchak were never observed by me, or reported to me by military observers. Evidently Japan had been talking to the State Department about her democratic ideas in the Far East along the same lines the Japanese representatives had approached me, as the Secretary of State was happy to respond to Japan's ideas that local self-government should rest " upon the consent of the bulk of the people." Another application of Marquis Okuma's philosophy.
This statement, coupled with the support of Kolchak by the State Department, implies that the State Department considered that Kolchak's power rested upon the consent of the bulk of the people. My observation, taken in connection with reports I received, led me to the conclusion that at no time of Kolchak's power did he have more than 7 percent of the Russian people back of him. From the time Kolchak assumed power, November 18, 1918, until his mobilization order was issued, and Ivanoff-Rinoff began to put this into execution, the peasants were non-committal as to Kolchak.
After Ivanoff-Rinoff began his unconscionable acts upon the people in his efforts to mobilize them for military service, at no period from that date could Kolchak have lasted one month without the support he received from foreign troops in Siberia. This is not a judgement arrived at after the fact, and my reports when in Siberia repeatedly called attention to this situation.
The Secretary of State of the United States, on December 7, 1919, cabled the American Ambassador in Tokyo, in part:
" This Government does not propose to depart in any way from its principles of non-interference in Russian internal affairs."
I was not able when in Siberia, nor have I been able since, to understand the system of reasoning used by the State Department in concluding that the Government of the United States could send arms and ammunition to Kolchak; could suggest to the War Department that my attention be called to the support given by the United States to Kolchak; could, on two occasions through a representative of the State Department, call attention to representatives of the War Department as to my lapses by failure to support Kolchak, and still claim " non-interference in Russian internal affairs."
I know as a reply to at least one of these representations made to the War Department, the representative of the State Department was informed that the War Department construed my orders as I did, and suggested that if the State Department did not so construe my orders the question should be taken up by the Secretary of State with the Secretary of War and have the difference in the interpretation definitely settled. I do not know, and my informant did not know, if any further steps were taken.
I know that not one word in my original instructions was changed during my entire stay in Siberia.
On December 12, an American Army officer arrived in Vladivostok with orders to report to Consul General Harris. This was not only unusual but was almost unprecedented under conditions as they existed in Siberia, and I could not help feeling it was a reflection upon me. I did not believe General March knew this order had been issued and, as this officer belonged to the Military Intelligence Division, I came to the conclusion that the State Department, through General Churchill, head of the Military Intelligence Division, had gotten the order issued. I, of course, knew there was some object in asking that an Army officer with the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel, I do not remember which, report to the Consul General. I had been informed that my reports differed materially from the reports made by the Consul General and I came to the conclusion that the object of the move was to get an Army officer in Siberia who would make reports that differed from mine. This officer had in his possession a monograph, pre-pared in the Military Intelligence Division, which he unwittingly showed to Colonel Eichelberger, my Intelligence officer. In this monograph appeared the following:
" The American troops are in Siberia primarily to support Kolchak against Bolsheviks by keeping his line of communications open along the Trans-Siberian rail-road."
This was an official document from the War Department that discredited my repeated statements in Siberia that I was to keep my hands off the internal conflicts of the Russian people. This document was of such importance to me that I cabled to General March and asked that this officer be directed to report to me, tear out this part of the monograph and burn it in my presence. My request was approved and the objection-able sentence was torn out and disposed of as I suggested.
Where did General Churchill get the information to base such a statement? I do not believe General Churchill ever saw my orders and I do not believe he would manufacture such a statement and try to discredit my well-known construction of my orders. If he had gone to the proper authority in the War Department, where he should have gone for information, before making a statement not in accordance with facts, he would have been told that my construction of my orders was the same as that of the War Department. I am of the opinion that General Churchill went to Mr. De Witt C. Poole, State Department, for an interpretation of my orders.
In a few days after the officer had left Vladivostok for Chita, to report to Consul General Harris, I received a cable from General March saying this officer needed discipline and he would not send anything out of Siberia except through me. That made it plain to me that my surmise as to the origin of this officer's order was correct.
As the ostensible reason for keeping United States troops in Siberia was to keep the railroads open for the benefit of the Russian people, I consider the following letter received from Colonel G. H. Emerson, Mr. Stevens' First Assistant, as the best evidence obtainable as to the working of the Inter-Allied Railroad Agreement. Colonel Emerson was travelling along the railroads practically all the time, and had a better opportunity to observe the working of the agreement than any other man in Siberia. The letter, dated December 13, was as follows :
" My resignation has been acceed. In severing my connection with the Russian Railway Service Corps, I wish to thank you for the many courtesies that you have extended to me personally and the officers of the corps.
" The Russian Railways Service Corps, assigned as technical inspectors under the terms of the Inter-Allied Agreement, have made every effort to assist in connection with the operation of the railroad. We have been opposed in every way by the Russian Military faction and the Russian technical railroad officials, regardless of the fact that we have made every effort to assist in an advisory capacity after I was officially informed that the Omsk Government was unable to carry out the terms of the agreement, and all suggestions made by the technical inspectors were ignored.
" In every case where there has been any interference in that portion of the line guarded by troops under your command that conflicted with the agreement, prom action has been taken by your officers assigned to the various sectors, as a result, the railroad employees have made an honest effort to cooperate with the technical inspectors, so, what little has been accomplished in the way of improving railroad transportation has been con-fined entirely to that sector under the protection of the American and Chinese troops.
" Our officers assigned to the district, Manchuria to Verkhne-Udinsk, that is supposed to be under Japanese protection, have been subjected to insult, and on two different occasions have been ejected from cars by the troops under command of Semeonoff, and were it not for the firm stand taken by Colonel Morrow to protect our officers assigned in that district, I am satisfied they would have been annihilated by the renegade bands operating under Semeonoff.
" In conclusion, I firmly believe, had the Commanders of the other Allied forces, assigned to guarding the railroad, taken as strong a stand as you have, the Inter-Allied Agreement would have been successfully carried out."
Kolchak was no longer of any consequence in considering the Siberian situation. The British Mission reported Evacuation of Novo-Nikolaevsk at midnight, the 13th and 14th of December, and Kolchak was as far east as Marinsk on the 14th. The congestion on the railroad was great and embarrassing and was causing charges and counter-charges as to unfairness in the assignment of locomotives where the worst shortage occurred.
On December 23, Colonel Eichelberger gave me the following information, as coming from the Polish Mission:
" At Tartarskaya, Admiral Kolchak appealed to Poles for protection from arrest by his own soldiers and was escorted out of the district by Polish armored car.
" Kolchak has protested to Russian and Allied officials against the Czechs taking precedence in their Eastward movement. Also claims he has been subjected to threats and insults by Czechs.
" Semeonoff has sent a telegram to Czechs, demanding that the train carrying High Russian Command, the sick, wounded and their families, as well as the last remnant of the National wealth, be allowed to pass to Irkutsk."
The last demand was by no means least important in Semeonoff's mind.
On the 24th of December, General Knox informed me the Czechs were going to escort Kolchak from Krasnoyarsk to Irkutsk.
On January 18, Dr. Girsa, Czech civilian representative in the Far East, said he had talked with the Czech Chief of Staff, by direct wire, in Irkutsk, and was informed that Kolchak was a prisoner in the hands of Social Revolutionists.
It was very difficult to get any direct news from Irkutsk.
We were later informed that the Allied representatives, including Consul General Harris, left Irkutsk for Chita four or five days before Kolchak arrived, under Czech protection in that City.
The Social Revolutionists demanded Kolchak and notified the Czechs in case of refusal, they would try to take him by force. Considering the abuse heaped upon the Czechs by Kolchak and his supporters, one could not reasonably expect them to fight for him. The Social Revolutionists in Irkutsk were very much incensed at the action of one of Semeonoff's generals who, when he was driven out of Irkutsk before Kolchak's arrival, had taken about twenty of the most prominent men in Irkutsk with him, on the plea that they would stir up trouble if left there. This General assured the people of Irkutsk that he was going to send them east, but led the people to believe that he did not intend to injure them. He took them to Lake Baikal, had them killed, and their bodies thrown into the lake.
Of course Kolchak had nothing to do with this, but the resentment of the people extended to him and in such cases, outraged humanity reaches for the top. Kolchak was tried by a military court, convicted, and shot on the morning of February 7, 1920.
One hundred thousand men clothed, armed, and equipped by the British had joined the anti-Kolchak forces by December, 1919, and the Bolsheviks wired General Knox thanking him for supplying clothing and equipment for the Soviet forces. These people now had sufficient force to demand fair treatment by the foreigners in Siberia, and they did not propose to longer submit to the railroads being operated, under the protection of foreign troops, for the sole benefit of their enemies.
The Americans were doing the best they could to protect the railroad sectors assigned to them to guard, and it had always been necessary to divide the organizations into small detachments in order to guard the extensive sectors. This was becoming very dangerous as these small detachments would have no chance against the overwhelming numbers that were threatening to attack us.
In December, one of the anti-Kolchak leaders came to see Major Melaski, 31st Infantry, who was on duty guarding the Suchan line, and told him they did not desire any conflict with Americans, but by guarding the railroad, we were helping the reactionary crowd and delaying the final settlement of their difficulties, and as it was his duty to prevent coal and military supplies from going to Kolchak, he would have to engage in conflict with us to accomplish his object. He said they would not disturb the movement of any other class of trains.
Who could blame these people? The Kolchak Government was only a shell, with practically no Russian military support, except a few former Czarist officers.
On December 27, I cabled the War Department, in part:
" Safety of American troops demands concentration which results in abandoning parts of our sector. We are fast arriving at the place where we join Kalmikoff, Semeonoff and Rozanoff in fighting the Russians who claim they are trying to establish a representative government in the East. These men are not Bolsheviks as that word is understood in the United States."
On December 29, I received the following cable-gram :
" You are informed very confidentially that it is expected that within a few days you will receive orders for the withdrawal of your entire command. Keep matter very secret until orders are received by you."
I was told to concentrate my command but to assign some reason, other than the real one, until the time came to announce our withdrawal. Undoubtedly the great secrecy was due to an effort to get Japan to consider her mission over, and to carry out the following part of Japan's assurance to the Russian people when she entered Siberia, viz :
" They (Japan) further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian Territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.'
The object, Japan refers to, was to relieve the Czechs who were reported as being opposed by German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners. As the Czechs in Eastern Siberia, where Japan operated, never needed any military assistance, it would seem reason-able to expect Japan to withdraw.
The Japanese Government issued a statement on March 31, 1920, the day before I left Siberia, al-though I did not see this statement while there. It was as follows:
" The Imperial Government hereby takes occasion to declare its intention that, when political conditions in the countries, contiguous to, or neighboring on Japan, have been established on the stable, assuring status and all menace to Manchuria and Korea has been removed; when the life and property of the Imperial subjects in Siberia have been secured, and when the freedom of traffic and communication has been guaranteed, it will withdraw its Military forces, from all parts of Siberia, at the earliest opportune moment after the conclusion of the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak army."
Japan did not intend to permit any other nation to determine when " political conditions in countries contiguous to Japan have become stable," nor to determine when all menace, " to Manchuria and Korea has been removed," and it is not unfair to say that the statement of Japan, above quoted, means that Japan would not get out of Siberia until she was ready to leave, or until she was forced out.
This statement of Japan, on March 31, 1920, was tantamount to a repudiation of her statement on Au-gust 3, 1918, just before sending troops to Siberia. I arrived in Vladivostok September 2, 1918, just one month after the statement was made, and was still there when the second one was made. I never saw, or had reported to me, a single aggressive act of the Russians towards the Japanese.
The order to concentrate American troops relieved me of considerable embarrassment, and was received by all soldiers with great joy.
It soon became evident that the Japanese were planning to stay in Siberia, and were giving as a reason that they had an obligation to see that the Czechs were all evacuated before they left. At the same time their puppet, Semeonoff, began trying to prevent the evacuation. This is shown by resolutions of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, and the Technical Board. On April 14, 1920, this Resolution of the Technical Board was passed:
" Whereas two Russian railway employees at Imyanop, Manchuria, were suddenly arrested and summarily shot on April 6th, by some Japanese soldiers, without trial." " Whereas on the evening of April 8th, two Russians were refused passage over the Sungari bridge at Harbin, by Japanese soldiers in spite of their passes entitling them to such passage, one of them was thrown over the bridge and the other had his head badly cut by Japanese soldiers. Both were badly injured." " Whereas on April 8th, railway employees were suddenly arrested at Harbin, by some Japanese soldiers, and were locked in a Japanese Military car to be transported to some unknown destination." " Whereas, three Russian railway men were arrested at Manchuria railway station, April loth, by Japanese soldiers." " Whereas, these violent acts have created a widespread excitement and indignation among the railway employees and are most liable to precipitate grave trouble leading to the interruion of communication and the disturbance of the whole region, and the delay to the Czech evacuation, all of which tend to de-feat the purpose and function of the Technical Board." " 'Whereas, these acts are regarded as bringing direct contravention to the Inter-Allied Agreement covering the guarding of the Chinese-Eastern Railway which duty was assigned to the Chinese Government, by the Inter-Allied Powers, and that the Military forces of no other Nation have any authority in the guarding of the railway." " Whereas, the Technical Board protests, in the strongest possible manner, against the interference and the high handed actions of the Japanese 'troops, in these and similar instances, and ask them for an assurance, from the Japanese authorities, that such acts will not be repeated."
It should be remembered that the Japanese announced, at the time the Americans were withdrawn from Siberia, that their obligations to the Czechs had not been fulfilled and that they could not leave until they had been evacuated.
I have before me now, ten pages of letter paper of closely typewritten matter, all of which refer to the actions of the Japanese, or their puppet, Semeonoff, in interfering with the operation of the railroads according to the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement. No sincere person could come to any conclusion other than that the Japanese and Semeonoff were trying to block the Technical Board in the operation of the railway, and thereby delay the evacuation of the Czechs, which would give an excuse for Japanese troops to remain in Siberia.
On April 24, 1920, a cable signed by the representatives on the Inter-Allied Committee of China, France, and the United States, Czecho-Slovakia and Great Britain was sent to interested Allied Governments, in part as follows :
" The Japanese Military authorities have acquiesced in Colonel Medy's attitude, have themselves usurped functions, by right belonging to the Technical and Transportation Boards and have used them in such a manner as to add to the confusion on the railway, and actually to delay the progress of the Czecho-Slovaks."
Mr. Smith was sent to the Trans-Baikal section by the Inter-Allied Committee to represent it in the evacuation of the Czechs, and it was his conclusion, in which the Committee agreed, that there was deliberate interference with the railroad to delay Czech evacuation. Dr. Girsa also stated officially to the Inter-Allied Committee that the Japanese were not needed to help the Czechs in their evacuation.
The Japanese Foreign Office represented to Mr. Morris, the American Ambassador to Japan, that the announcement of the United States that we were going to withdraw our troops from Siberia before Japan was ready to make a similar announcement, was an act which showed a lack of proper cooperation with Japan and tried to create the impression that, if it had not been for this announcement, Japan possibly would have withdrawn her troops. Mr. Morris was induced to put at least some reliance in this suggestion.
In a book written by K. K. Kawakami, a Japanese newspaper man, entitled " Japan's Pacific Policy," on page 250, appears this statement with reference to the withdrawal of American troops:
" Had the Washington Government taken Japan into confidence, and conferred with her frankly and earnestly, as it did in the Summer of 1918, a complete and simultaneous evacuation, in the Spring of 1920, might have been possible."
To my mind, these suggestions constitute a strong indictment of Japan as to her sincerity of purpose in Siberia, and I do not believe the manner of withdrawal of American troops had any influence in shaping the determination of Japan to remain in Siberia. The suggestion that Japan might have withdrawn her troops, if the United States had consulted her, was undoubtedly referred to in Tokyo by some Japanese authority, as both Mr. Morris and Mr. Kawakami referred to the question, and Mr. Morris spoke to a member of my Staff about the time the Americans were withdrawn, and seemed to blame me for hasty announcement. This attitude of Japan was undoubtedly taken with the idea of lessening the criticism that she expected from other nations for her continued occupation of Siberia, contrary to her announced purpose August 3, 1918.
Baron Shidehara, in his statement made at the Limitation of Arms Conference in Washington in 1921-22, said that Japanese troops remained in Siberia because, " in the first place, there is a considerable number Japanese residents, who had lawfully, and under guarantees of treaty, established themselves in Siberia, long before the Bolshevik eruion and were there entirely welcome . . . and that those residents can hardly be expected to look for protection of their lives and property, to any other authorities than Japanese troops."
Baron Shidehara also said, at the same time:
" There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to recall her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to the geographical propinquity, the general situation around Vladivostok and Nikolsk is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier."
Neither of these reasons was mentioned by Japan in her statement of August 3, 1918, announcing her reasons for, and objectives to be attained by, intervention in Siberia.(Russian-American Relations, 191 7-1920, page 239.) What caused the Japanese Government to believe the lives and property of the Japanese residents in Siberia, and on the Korean frontiers, required protection in 1920, when American troops left, and did not require protection in August, 1918 ? There was more resentment against the Japanese in 1920 than in 1918, but this resentment was against the Japanese Military because of their actions during intervention. In my judgement, the real objectives of Japan in Siberia; have never been made public.
When the American soldiers began returning to the United States, or as soon as it was known that they would soon return, it was brought to my attention that some of them were getting married to Russian women. Entirely too many of these women would not, under the law, be permitted to enter the United States, and I felt that some steps should be taken to keep them out. I felt that it was un-American and exceeded my authority to tell a soldier he may not get married so, to meet the situation, I issued orders stating that if any soldier married, without the consent of his immediate Commanding Officer, I would not give his wife transportation to the United States. At the same time I instructed all Commanding Officers to have an investigation made, with a view of determining whether the woman the soldier wanted to marry would be permitted to enter the United States, under the laws, if she were not married. If she proved of good moral character, to grant permission to marry but if not of good character to refuse permission. This step was in the interest of the soldier as well as of the United States. Evidently my order did not meet the hearty approval of the authorities in Washington, where the real situation could not be realized and, at the instigation of someone in the Red Cross, I was ordered to give transportation to a most dissolute woman, who had married a soldier. I protested at this order, and was finally told to let the soldier's wife come to the United States, if I was convinced the soldier married her with the idea of rehabilitating her in society. I had to admit my inability to determine the real intent of the soldier, so I turned the matter over to my Chief of Staff, class-mate and room-mate at West Point, Colonel J. D. Leitch, to handle according to his best judgement. I asked the head of the Y. W. C. A. to assist in looking up the character of these women who lived in Vladivostok. I felt that my order accomplished something, but fell far short of my expectations.
It seems very difficult to keep off the subject of Semeonoff and Kalmikoff in writing of occurrences that happened in Eastern Siberia, and I must ask the indulgence of the reader, while I once more turn to Semeonoff.
On January 9, 1920, Semeonoff's armoured car came to Verkhne-Udinsk, which was in the sector of the rail-road guarded by Americans, and arrested the station-master. The armoured car was in command of General Bogomoletz, one of Semeonoff's generals. Colonel Morrow went to General Bogomoletz and asked him if he knew he, Colonel Morrow, had charge of that sector, and he would not permit him or anyone else to come into his sector and arrest railroad employees. General Bogomoletz said:
" I am not supposed to give any account to you of our actions. I will not converse with you any more in regard to such."
Colonel Morrow replied :
" Let me tell you this, I do not want to cause any trouble for you, however, I have twenty-five hundred men here to carry out my orders. I must know why this man was arrested, he is under my protection."
General Bogomoletz replied:
" I was told he was a Bolshevik and I wanted to kill him tonight, but if you insist, I shall release him. It is immaterial, if the station-master is guilty we will get him sooner or later."
The station-master was released. The armoured car continued west, and about midnight arrived at Posolskaya, where American soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Paul Kendall were on duty guarding the railroad. At I A.M., when the American detachment was asleep, the armoured car fired into the car in which the American troops were quartered. Colonel Morrow telegraphed as follows :
" Semeonoff armored car attacked detachment thirty-eight men in their cars at Posolskaya at one A.M. January loth. Detachment fought and captured armored car. One general, six officers and forty-eight men held here. American casualties; one died of wounds, one seriously wounded. Detailed reports of casualties follows; Russian casualties; - five killed and several wounded."
I was sorry that Lieutenant Kendall, who first got hold of Bogomoletz, did not hang him to a telegraph pole, but he acted within the law and really exhibited better soldierly qualities in doing as he did. This young officer is entitled to great credit for his leadership in resisting this unwarranted attack, and in cauring a force with vastly superior armament.
There were no courts for the trial of these people and Semeonoff began clamoring for his armoured car, and assured Colonel Morrow that if he would turn the prisoners over to him they would all be punished. Colonel Morrow was to leave Verkhne-Udinsk on January 23, and he kept his prisoners until he left, when he had to turn them over to Semeonoff's representatives. He took the evidence of all these men, separately, and their statements as to what had happened, on this one armoured car, were remarkably uniform. It was established, beyond any doubt, that this one car had, between January I and 1o, " robbed and brutally murdered over forty men and three women were raped and brutally killed."
This is the same Semeonoff who, in 1919, had robbed a New York company of a train load of furs, reported as being worth one-half a million dollars; this is the same Semeonoff who took three Americans, who had taken their discharge from the Army, and remained in Siberia, and brutally murdered them for no reason except that they were wearing the uniform of the American Army. This murder was after I left Siberia, but I was informed of this by Mr. John F. Stevens, and I sent a report of the same to the War Department. This is the same Semeonoff who later came to the United States through the port of Vancouver, B. C., and went direct to Washington and I know conferred with one American official, and I imagine he conferred with others.
Colonel Morrow found, as he was coming out of Siberia, that the officer who had been sent to Siberia to report to Consul General Harris, previously referred to, had, according to the officer's own statement, attached himself to Semeonoff's headquarters. Colonel Morrow said to this officer, when he told him that he was with Semeonoff:
" Do you know what a murderer he is? Do you know he has killed some of my men? "
The officer replied :
" Semeonoff is the only thing standing between civilization and Bolshevism, and I do not intend to listen to anything against Semeonoff."
The idea that Semeonoff could add to the benefits of present day civilization was carrying absurdity to the extreme.
Why was an American Army officer directed, or permitted by the American Consul General, to join the headquarters of this notorious scoundrel and murderer? It is not even possible that Semeonoff's record and reputation were unknown to Mr. Harris and if Semeonoff had committed, in the United States, one one hundredth of the offenses that he committed in Siberia, he would have been legally or illegally killed, for such a character could not exist in this country.
Colonel Morrow wished to show this officer the testimony taken after the firing into the train, and killing two American soldiers, but he replied:
" You have nothing to do with me, and General Graves has nothing to do with me."
Colonel Morrow then told him he was going to take him to Vladivostok to report to General Graves. He protested at this, but was told if he caused any trouble he would be taken by force. Consul General Harris protested to me that this officer was under his control and Colonel Morrow had nothing to do with him, and he demanded that I order Colonel Morrow to release him. This I refused to do and Consul General Harris took the question up with the State Department. I got a telegram from General March saying:
" Some row between Morrow and , settle it."
When Colonel Morrow arrived at Vladivostok, about two weeks later, he turned in a report of a medical officer, whom he had directed to stay with this officer on the trip to Vladivostok, and to make a report on him. This report was to the effect that the officer was not mentally balanced.
I was not satisfied that an injustice had not been done this officer, and I ordered a board composed of three senior medical officers in Vladivostok to examine him in connection with the report turned in by Colonel Morrow. This board reported to the effect that they could not agree with the report of the doctor made to Colonel Morrow, but it was their opinion that the officer was of a very nervous temperament and they thought it unwise and unsafe to leave him in Siberia. I approved the report and kept the officer in Vladivostok until I had an opportunity to send him to the United States.
As to the arrival of Semeonoff in the United States in 1922, I have reason for thinking his trip was not unexpected by the Immigration Officials of the United States, notwithstanding the fact that he had brutally murdered Americans.
I was informed by Mr. C. H. Smith, the United States representative on the Inter-Allied Railroad Committee, that, prior to the arrival of Semeonoff, he, Mr. Smith, went to the telegraph office in the McAlpin Hotel in New York City, to send a telegram to his wife in California, and in this telegram said something about Siberia. The telegraph operator, a woman, said to Mr. Smith, that a very influential man was coming to the United States from Siberia. Mr. Smith asked who it was, and the operator told him it was Semeonoff. Mr. Smith asked how she knew; and she said that she had sent a message saying if he would come through the Port of Vancouver, B. C., about such a time, there would be no objection to his entry into the United States. Semeonoff came through Vancouver, at approximately the time the operator had told Mr. Smith he would come.
While Colonel Morrow was in Chita, Semeonoff's headquarters, he saw an American Red Cross train, with the doors of the cars open and Semeonoff's soldiers helping themselves to the Red Cross supplies. Colonel Morrow made an official report of this to American Headquarters in Vladivostok, signed by him-self and four other officers. This report said the officers were unable to find any Red Cross representatives superintending the issue of these supplies. I sent the report to Dr. Teusler, requesting comment. He said a representative of the Red Cross was present, and watching the issue. He did not deny that this vile murderer of Russians and of American soldiers, whose actions had placed him,beyond the pale of civilization, was being given American Red Cross supplies, for the use of his troops, such supplies having been purchased by money contributed by the generous people of the United States.