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Supplement to Sociological Abstracts

Newsletter

International Society for the Sociology of Knowledge

DECEMBER 1979 VOL.5/NO.2

5985

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THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (ISSK) was founded in 1972 to promote the development of theory and method in the study of the relation between social structure and consciousness, to encourage and sponsor research in the sociology of knowledge, to stimulate scholarly publications, and to foster cooperative relations among persons and organizations engaged in the study of the sociology of knowledge and related studies, on a national and international basis. Officers of the Society are:

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INSIDE THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979)

The purpose of this *Newsletter* is to promote discussion among disciplines as well as within sociology, to encourage an international exchange among scholars who very often work in the isolation of their own traditions, to help define more clearly the analytical problems associated with the sociology of knowledge, and to sharpen the methodological tools necessary for their solution.

The approach of the *Newsletter* is informal, allowing for the exchange of ideas and for the discussion of research projects during the early stages of formulation. It will contain short articles, critical reviews, abstracts of papers, reports on current research contributed by readers, reports on teaching, and news of meetings. News of research, contributions, and suggestions should be sent to:

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PREFACE

The most superficial reason for dedicating this issue of our Newsletter to Herbert Marcuse is that he was a member of our Advisory Board. The far more serious reason is that he can be argued to have been a very important contributor to the sociology of knowledge. For he, like his friends and associates of the so-called Frankfurt School -- men like Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, or Erich Fromm, to mention the best-known among them -- have provided us with an analysis of our society which includes and implies an analysis of its intellectual life and its products.

The early and spontaneous appreciations which were presented on August 30, 1979, at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Boston, can also be read in this direction; like Marcuse's works -- which, of course, are an incomparably richer storehouse -- these recollections and assessments, too, invite their use as sources from which to glean insights into the 'mind' of our society.

We publish them as a modest memorial to Herbert Marcuse. From conversations with him on the sociology of knowledge, I know that he would be pleased and interested in a reading of his work from its perspective. It would be a fine result of the present issue of the Newsletter if it stimulated some individual or individuals to embark on such a task.

Kurt H. Wolff, Guest Editor

KURT H. WOLFF

My name is K. Wolff. We are here to commemorate Herbert Marcuse, that is to say, to draw comfort from concentrating on his memory. Although the need we have of him and the need he has of us obviously are incomparable, ours is greater: incomparably greater, precisely. So great: I, for one, cannot even believe that Herbert Marcuse is dead. He so lives.

I wish to thank Russell Dynes and Alice Myers of the American Sociological Association for providing the time and place of our gathering. This gathering, of course, can be nothing but a most preliminary way of coming to terms with Herbert Marcuse. There have been and there will be a great many more meetings in his honor, and none can be anything but preliminary. Tonight, some friends, students, colleagues of Herbert Marcuse will say whatever it is that presses them most on this occasion. That is, we'll have a number of brief personal statements that are distinguished by their genuineness and variousness, thus reflecting two features of the many that characterized the man they recall.

I have been asked by two persons to read their messages because, unfortunately, they cannot be here. One is LEO LOWENTHAL:

"It is with profound regret that I am unable to be present at the occasion of paying tribute to the memory of Herbert Marcuse by members and associates of the sociological community.

Herbert was my dearest and oldest friend and for many decades my intellectual and scholarly comrade-in-arms. We have known each other for almost half a century and shared a life -- often at close physical proximity -- in many dimensions: theory, politics, the arts, the Hegelian-Marxian tradition, intimate family relations. Of all who mourn him I consider myself as one of the principal mourners, the only survivor (certainly without meritorious claim) of a philosophical, cultural, and moral perspective which had found its institutional frame in the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, Geneva, New York, Los Angeles and again Frankfurt.

I send my warmest collegial and personal greetings to all of Herbert's friends present at this meeting to honor one of the most significant social and sociological philosophers of this era."

The other is JEREMY J. SHAPIRO,* a much younger friend, as well as a translator, of Herbert Marcuse's:

> "Men can die without anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves to die -- at a moment of their choosing." (Eros and Civilization)

What men and women love has probably never been less protected from misery and oblivion than during the time when Herbert Marcuse, who wrote those words, lived and died. Part of his greatness, in which he took after his own culture hero, Orpheus the liberator, who (with genuine philosophy) "responds to the fact of death with the Great Refusal," is to have affirmed this possibility of both life and death without anxiety at a time when even life with anxiety has been rendered problematic by the technology of domination. I do not know whether Marcuse died without anxiety at a moment of his own choosing. But I know that he did live a fulfilled life, in which he was able to relate to what he loved -- the earth, its people, their creations of beauty and intellect -- as though they were protected from misery and oblivion, seeing them in the light of the Orphic and Narcissistic Eros [that] awakens and liberates potentialities that are real in things animate and inanimate, in organic and inorganic nature -- real but in the un-erotic reality suppressed. These potentialities circumscribe the telos inherent in them as: "Just to be what they are," "being-there," existing (Eros and Civilization). Marcuse's contributions as a liberator, as a critical theorist concerned with understanding and transforming our society in the light of its historically specific emancipatory (and repressive) potential, were nourished from a deep core of humanity, dignity, imagination, tenderness, and humor that also characterized his life and personality. Humanity's dream of a non-repressive civilization, which Marcuse attempted to interpret, to ground materialistically, and to help realize, was also his personal dream. It informed his character and the direction of his thought. The image of joy and fulfillment; the voice which does not command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and ends the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with god, man with nature (Eros and Civilization). The power of Marcuse's concepts and the uncompromising nature of his commitment to freedom, happiness, rationality, truth, and justice are intimately linked to his Orphic and Narcissistic inspiration. To understand the real in the light of the possible that inheres in it and defines it is at the same time an intellectual, a moral, and an erotic achievement.

For those who grew up or lived within Marcuse's sphere of influence and activity, the manifestation of these characteristics in daily life were part of the "meaning" of Marcuse. People told Marcuse stories the way Hasidim told tales of their wunderrebbes: not so much because of hero worship as because, just as with Hasidic rabbis and pre-Socratic philosophers, everyday life, conversation, and, especially, humor were the place where wisdom, reflection, and critique took life, the original locus of the unity of theory and practice. Everyone who had much contact with Marcuse knows dozens of such stories. All of them bespeak an attitude of irreverent, critical, and sometimes almost obstreperous humor that was not merely a personal idiosyncrasy but rather linked Marcuse's spirit with that joyful transcendence, beyond all ressentiment, of surrealist pranks, Nietzsche's gay science, and Marx's question and answer: "Why this course of history? In order that humanity cheerfully take leave of its past." Marcuse's humor was an everyday manifestation of his thinking everything in the light of its determinate negation and in the interest of what he called the "logos of gratification."

Shortly before Kant's death in 1804 he was visited by a doctor. Kant, who was very weak and could scarcely talk, would not sit down before his guest, who could not understand his behavior. Kant mustered all his strength and declared, "The feeling for humanity has not yet left me." These words of Kant hold, I believe, for Marcuse. The feeling for humanity never left him, and is embodied in his works and what we know of him as a person."

* Abridged with the author's permission.

Just now came a telephone message from Angela Davis: she expressed her regret not to have been able to come to this meeting, but having been out of town received the invitation too late.

The sequence of the contributions which follow was agreed on just before this meeting by the contributors. (It was slightly altered by the editor.)

MAURICE R. STEIN

Toward the end of the summer, Herbert Marcuse died. As the press noted in passing, apart from his many other accomplishments, he was a member of the Brandeis faculty from 1954 to 1965. During that period he published several important books and articles, but perhaps of greatest interest to this group, he was a major educative presence on this campus for students and faculty alike. He helped found and maintain an innovative interdisciplinary program -- the History of Ideas. He also taught courses and seminars in a broad range of subjects while holding appointments in both the Departments of Philosophy and of Politics. His course on Advanced Industrial Society where he introduced many of the key concepts in One-Dimensional Man, a book that became a key text for groups in the Sixties, was taken by thousands of interested undergraduates. He also was a major influence on graduate students, and one can point to dissertations in several fields including both sociology and psychology, as well as politics and philosophy, that reflect the impact of his teaching.

Since August there have been commemorative meetings designed to celebrate Marcuse's influence on intellectual and political life. Kurt Wolff organized one such discussion at the recent meetings of the American Sociological Association, and one can assume that similar events will take place elsewhere. Marcuse was a central member of a group of social theorists called the Frankfurt School who developed a critical version of Marxism aimed at interpreting several main anomalies within classical Marxism, especially the rise of Nazism, the absence of proletarian revolutions in advanced industrial societies and the special system of social control based on mass consumption of commodities, entertainment and information which such societies evolve.

This is hardly the time or the place to specify Marcuse's many contributions to critical theory but it is worth noting that he was one of but a few Marxist writers to have any sort of significant audience -- even when he disagreed with them -- among the dissenting young people of the Sixties.

Stephen Spender tells the story about his own surprise when during a huge mass meeting at the Sorbonne in June 1968, he was suddenly swept with great ceremony to the podium, only to find that he had been mistaken for Marcuse.

I will share two memories of Herbert. The first goes back 25 years to 1955 when I was myself a new faculty member at a very different Brandeis. In fact, it goes back even further, to my interview for a faculty appointment. At that time, the university being in its fifth year, was quite small having approximately 60 faculty, 600 students, and, if you can believe it, 13 buildings. There was no separate sociology department and the whole School of Social Science had no more than 20 members. The committee interviewing me had several impressive persons, including Abe Maslow, Frank Manuel, and Max Lerner. The one who awed me the most was Marcuse. The middle section of his book on Hegel, Reason and Revolution, contains a brilliant critique of reification of social categories, including indications how Marxism itself could become a form of obscurantism. This book had moved me deeply, and I placed its author on a very high pedestal. It was a delightful surprise to find Marcuse to be a most generous and indeed humorous interviewer, whose passion for social justice was matched with great compassion toward individuals, even aspirant assistant professors.

I will pass over eleven years of colleagueship and friendship and end by mentioning a side of Marcuse that probably is little known. In 1969, when I went on leave from Brandeis for two years to live and teach in Los Angeles, my wife, young son Paul, and I used to visit the Marcuses in San Diego as often as we could. On some visits we would all travel to the San Diego Zoo where Herbert would share his delight in the animals with Paul and with the rest of us. He loved this zoo and despite his Prussian patina of paternal dignity, one could see clearly that he loved children.

It was a great privilege to have been his colleague, and Brandeis can be proud to have been his academic home for the years that he spent here.

E. V. WALTER

For me, Herbert Marcuse remains a man of great courage and integrity. The courage is obvious. He never yielded to intimidation. He never said or wrote less than he thought. As a thinker and writer his integrity also urged the integrity of social thought. He never approved of the countless specializations in academic life, sometimes exposing them as manouvers to make jobs. His work reached over the boundaries of philosophy, sociology, psychology, and politics -- but there was a political message in this range. He showed us that the traditional borderlines between the separate disciplines and political life "have been made obsolete by the condition of man in the present era." Formerly autonomous areas of private existence, he argued, were being absorbed by public existence.

When Marcuse died this year, someone told me that the New York Times printed a biographical sketch carrying the title, "The Power of Negative Thinking." It stayed with me -- but not in the way the New York Times intended -- because reflecting on my own relationship with Herbert, which goes back over twenty years, I wanted to understand not only the power that established him as one of the most important social philosophers of our time, not only his authority as the guru of the New Left, not only his influence on devoted students, but also his impact on us, the friends who loved him. I wanted to know how we might use the power of his thinking, now that he no longer exercises it himself. How can it enable us to live with the terrible knowledge that critical inquiry yields?

In the epilogue to Reason and Revolution, Marcuse wrote, "Hegel saw in the 'power of negativity' the life element of the Spirit and thereby of Reason. This power of Negativity was in the last analysis the power to comprehend and alter the given facts in accordance with the developing potentialities by rejecting the 'positive' once it had become a barrier to progress in freedom. Reason is in its very essence contra-diction, opposition, negation as long as freedom is not yet real."

Herbert was never seduced by the positive claims of social institutions or political leaders. He exposed the ways they contradicted the claims of reason and freedom. Some of his critics, then, condemned his negative thinking as a journey to nihilism, as an irresponsible exposure of limitations and abuses, as a sour pessimism that looked at the established world without finding anything any good. How could anyone live with such a jaundiced view of the world?

But Herbert was one of the most exuberant people I have ever known. He enjoyed life thoroughly. He was a cheerful pessimist. The power of his personality warns us against drawing depressive implications from the neg-

5988

ative qualities of life in the present world. Nihilism, cynicism, and depressive conduct work as contradictions to reason and freedom. Herbert's joyful spirit negated the dreadful knowledge revealed by critical inquiry.

My favorite memory of Herbert goes back to one evening some time around 1959 or 1960. We were invited to a student party at Brandeis and had dinner together first, then took a long walk. It was a memorable conversation, but we shredded every political person, event, and expectation, and by the lamp of critical reason the present looked very bleak and the future even worse. Then we proceeded to the building known as The Castle where we had a wonderful time, and everyone danced. We remained in high spirits and the party lasted into the wee hours. It was a delight to see Herbert in the circle dancing along with everyone else.

In the long run, Herbert believed, the historical process would not fail us. The worst is yet to come -- but its inevitable contradiction, I think he continued to believe, would yield something better than what we have known.

Along with exposing the obstructions to reason and freedom in the present, Herbert believed in the importance of utopian thinking. The cunning of reason weaves pipe dreams into the contradictions of reality.

My wife, Ruth, once asked him if he thought it were important to work toward revolution and to continue political education even if the prospect seemed insane, and he answered yes, because it is important to prepare the people about what is going to happen. And ever since Three Mile Island, I have appreciated the wisdom of his remark, recorded by the editors of The Critical Spirit, that "for a rational human being, the right to be frightened is the most important one left today."

Herbert's life and work and personality answer the shallow claim that things are so bad and the future looks so hopeless that there is no point in writing or thinking or acting. The power of negative thinking transcends that inertia. The critical spirit is a high spirit.

IRENE L. GENDZIER

I offer these notes as tentative statements, signs of a friendship recalled. What follows is in no sense an assessment of Marcuse's intellectual or political impact on my work, let alone a position on the value of his overall contribution to our thought. I leave this to others for the moment, as I do the task of reconstructing the personal nature of his quality as friend, instructor, colleague. There is still, somehow, the foolish uncertainty that Marcuse is only late in his annual stopover and that this exercise will, in the end, amuse him, so contradictory does it appear in the light of his almost severe reserve.

In June, Marcuse was on my mind. I recall telling a common friend of the elation, a strange term here perhaps, that I felt on rereading some of his earlier essays. I was, at the time, reading his essay on Weber in connection with some work I was doing. "Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber," was such a contrast with the uncritical litany of Weber which appeared in the writings of political scientists engaged in the production of theories of Political Development. There is no sense, that one can discern, in that literature, of the limitations of rationality or of its double-edged quality in relation to capitalism and particularly to the world of advanced industrial capitalism. There is no awareness of the contradiction that "in the unfolding of capitalist rationality, irrationality becomes reason: reason as frantic development of productivity, conquest of nature, enlargement of the mass of goods (and their accessibility for broad strata of the population); irrational because higher productivity, domination of nature, and social wealth become destructive forces."

This is not the place to lecture on the failings of what is known as "Modernization" or "Development Theory," though the ubiquity of these concepts would almost justify such a turn. But it was against a background of this literature and its wooden concepts that Marcuse's essay fell on receptive ears. What in Marcuse's text is the expose and exposition of the political nature of 'technical reason', is, in this material, understood to be the impersonal, value-free quality that distinguishes both technology and rationality and the nature of modernity with which they are seen to be allied. So persistent is this insistence, and so blatantly does it contradict another reality that one is left with a sense of estrangement toward such conceptualization, or toward history and contemporary actuality.

The essay on "Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrialized Society," was another part of that June reading. And again it resounded on several levels. In the context of the same literature to which I have referred above, there appears the pluralist-consensus view of American experience. It is prescriptive and normative at the same time. What it chooses to overlook is not the value of moderation and multiple interests, but the roots of social conflict and the bases of social immoderation. It is not only violence and power that are in the shadows, but the aggressiveness which a certain kind of social structure promotes and finds offense at. There was no determinism in Marcuse's approach, since here as in Eros and Civilization there was the promise of a less destructive pattern which the enormous wealth and capability of advanced industrial society, in this country at least, could produce. And there was the poetic undertone, to be sure. As in Eros, the relentless reminder of the possibility of a tenderness in human relations; at once a dream and an assertion of a potential transformation.

Conversations with Marcuse were occasions to discuss work and the relevant and irrelevant that passes in a common discourse among friends without question and with a silent comprehension. But there were areas of significant disagreement in our exchanges, particularly insofar as they involved the Third World and the Middle East. In time I came to feel that Marcuse's own criterion of the essential part of the truth, namely, that it involves a "recognition of the frightening extent to which history was made and recorded by and for the victors, that is, the extent to which history was the development of oppression"(from the essay on "Repressive Tolerance"), was a position which he applied selectively. To the extent that he allowed himself to speak on the Middle East -- he did so in private rather than in public -- this double standard emerged. It had its reasons, which history, the heart and the mind collaborated to strengthen. It was out of his own and European experience that Marcuse argued. The non-Western world in general, and certainly that of the Arab Middle East remained profoundly "other" to him; not on an immediate and personal level, but on a more pervasive and deeper level of being. But then the political consequences of the discussion of the Arab-Israeli crisis, were more than personal matters of private deliberation. And the imperatives of that crisis precluded a europocentrism which masked the contemporary nature of that struggle. For whatever reason, this was a subject which interested Marcuse, to which he returned in conversation, but about which he was not overly preoccupied, or well informed. It was simultaneously too personal and too distant, a dichotomous position which he seemed to impose on the conflict itself. In a larger sense, however, it was not merely the particularities of the Arab-Israeli conflict that were involved but the larger dimension of the nature of political transformations occurring in the Third World.

And yet, Marcuse's work had not only spoken to some of the problems involved in these transformations, but to some of those intellectuals of the Third World who found an echo of their longings for liberation in his thought.

DAVID KETTLER

In the academic year 1952-53, the second year after his departure from the State Department, Herbert Marcuse offered a course in the Sociology Department at Columbia, and he called it "the theory of social change" (in contrast to a course by Kingsley Davis on theories of social change). In some important respects, the course resembled lectures on historical sociology given some twenty years earlier by Franz Oppenheim and then Karl Mannheim at Frankfurt, and I believe that Marcuse subsequently turned away from this sort of offering. Yet I would like to make my contribution to our memorial for Marcuse by saying something about this course. First, because I was an eager and impressionable member of that class, and want to share some reflections on that extended encounter with an audacious and energetic Marcuse, in order to suggest something about his importance to me and perhaps to others of my generation. Second, because I think that the story of the course tells important things about Marcuse and may help us to decide how we should remember him. I begin with a brief summary of the course.

During the first term, Marcuse periodized the histories of ancient Greece (especially Athens) and Rome into parallel sequences and he characterized the social structure of medieval Europe. He sought to establish objective criteria for progress and decline and weighed alternate explanations for the decline of the classical societies of antiquity. Progress, he maintained, can be measured by the development of means to satisfy human needs and faculties, which are themselves undergoing transformation. Decline is indicated by a diminution of such means. The civilization of antiquity declined, he concluded, because it is not possible for a slave society to sustain development and because the struggle for power within these hierarchical orders nevertheless pressed the societies into overextending themselves. Medieval Christian society, he argued, represents an adjustment in the structure of ancient society, but not a fundamental social change. Marcuse denied that there were any fundamental changes in social system during the whole span of Western European history until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Ancient and medieval social history, it seemed, was cyclical, marked by the rise and fall of social units sharing basic characteristics which Marcuse found adequately outlined in Sombart's and Weber's accounts of preindustrial societies and epitomized in the notion of "traditionalism."

The emergence of modern civilization in the form of industrial society, then, was the only historical happening which has as yet merited the designation social change, according to Marcuse, in the full sense of a change in the principle governing the system by which society develops needs and faculties and the means of satisfying them. Marcuse expressly denied that changing class relations constitutes social change in his sense, and he stressed that his conception rendered the distinction between capitalist and socialist industrial societies relatively unimportant. There is cumulative progress in industrial society in contrast to the cyclical histories of the earlier type, but this progress is not itself social change, and may not directly bring it about.

The distinguishing feature of industrial society is acquisitiveness, an unceasing extension of the productive mastery over nature accompanied and made possible by an internalized social injunction against enjoying what is produced. Marcuse went on to contrast liberal and Marxist accounts of this society in its capitalist form and concluded with a survey of current tendencies very similar to his pessimistic projections in his Afterword to the 1954 edition of <u>Reason and Revolution</u>: although industrial civilization depended on the cruel paradox of unending deprivation amid progressive plenty, there is little prospect of the next social change which would harmonize wants, faculties, and means for satisfaction. Marcuse's theory of social change was more an interpretative characterization than an explanation. He did review a number of theories purporting to account for the revolutionary change from medieval to modern civilization, but failed to make a strong or clear case for an explanation of his own. There was a suggestion that the change came about because many experienced the old order as oppressive and were enabled to liberate themselves when it declined toward failure, presumably in the cyclical pattern, but this suggestion was not elaborated. In the end, then, Marcuse offered a contrast between two historical types of society, one approximating to an ideal type of society which permits gratification of needs and exercise of faculties but fatally flawed by conditions which prevent the development of adequate means, and the other inherently progressive in means but systematically denying human fulfillment. Criticism would seem to demand social change to an order utilizing the newly developed means for human ends, but social interpretation gave little encouragement that such change can be brought about.

The students I knew didn't accept this pessimism, and we debated urgently among ourselves whether Marcuse's passive conclusions were simply prudent accommodations to McCarthyist America. And we didn't accept (or fully grasp) the very restrictive sense Marcuse gave to the concept of social change. But we were exhilarated and energized by the course. He offered us a comprehensive and ethically charged context within which we could locate and further the knowledge we had begun to accumulate. It was an alternative to disciplinary contexts which many experienced as narrow and technical. Marcuse rendered relevant much that we had been learning from others, although he also encouraged us to be dangerously impatient with objections and difficulties. We were being initiated into a vital debate involving the major voices of the cultural tradition.

The character of the debate Marcuse chose to have us join indicates something about him that I want to memorialize. The course on social change, with its radical simplification of two types of society, renewed contact with the debates between ancients and moderns which were constitutive of modern social theory. I do not mean to suggest that Marcuse can be understood as reincarnation of those early generations, but simply to call attention to Marcuse as continuator of the humanism of Shaftesbury and Ferguson, of Montesquieu and Rousseau.

1952-53 was a time of profound reconsideration for Marcuse. It is touching and characteristically humanist that he should have dealt with this intellectual crisis by returning to origins, to the confrontation between the culture of virtue and the civilization of progress. And so, since memorials are quintessentially humanist institutions, it seems right to me to recall on this occasion not Marcuse the revolutionary or dialectical philosopher, but Marcuse the humanist teacher and sage.

THOMAS McCARTHY

Before arriving at the University of California, San Diego, in the fall of 1967, I knew Herbert Marcuse as the author of one book that had brought home to me the critical potential of Hegel's thought as none had before, and of another book on Freud which had, I must confess, struck me as somewhat fantastic. I knew him also as the participant in a conference on "Marx and the Western World" who had responded to the remark that "no serious intellectual could be a Marxist today" with a peculiarly charming and passionate: "But I am a Marxist!" And I knew him more recently as a philosopher of the New Left to whom protesting students appealed with increasing frequency.

The year spent in San Diego is now only a series of images and fragments of images — of Herbert Marcuse as a man of great personal charm, generous and warm beyond expectation to a new colleague several decades his junior; as a dignified and distinguished individual, who

yet often wore an impish grin as he contemplated or delighted in some verbal mischief; as a man of integrity and courage who resisted both the blandishments of the popular media and the threats of right-wing groups in Southern California; images of Herbert Marcuse walking the cliffs of La Jolla or joyously embracing the members of a political repertory group after a stirring performance; of his rather German-professorial manner in the classroom, which did not however prevent him from introducing with a grin each new undercover agent assigned to monitor his classes; of him joining with students in a march through La Jolla after the assassination of Martin Luther King, uneasily ignoring the screams: "They're too young to know any better, but you're just an old fool"; of Herbert Marcuse explaining to students his gut-reaction to Huxley's Brave New World: that he could never be content in his own life as long as others were prevented from realizing their humanity; of Herbert Marcuse admitting, when cornered, to a preference for Robert Kennedy over Eugene McCarthy, because he missed in the latter the moral passion he glimpsed in the former.

"A morally passionate advocate for humanity" -- this would have to be included in Marcuse's epitaph. In those days, the days of 1968, this advocacy had propelled him to the center of attention. In fact, the San Diego Union -- a paper then distinguished by the number of retired admirals encouraged to propound their views on its editorial pages -- placed Herbert Marcuse at the heart of a worldwide conspiracy to overthrow all that was good and holy. I recall one brief period during which he first visited his son at Columbia -- only to arrive as the University was under siege by students who welcomed him with open arms; he then traveled to Paris for a prearranged conference -- only to find the streets of the city occupied by workers and students who hailed him as a revolutionary hero and escorted him into the occupied zone; and finally, on to the University of Rome -- which had been shut down by students waving banners with the infamous: "Marx, Mao, Marcuse." The San Diego Union saw in all this the proof positive of its allegations. But Marcuse was no less condemned in other, more august journals -- in Pravda, for instance, and in the New York Times. What could the professor have done to merit such high honor!

He was not being celebrated for his early recognition of the importance of Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, or for his efforts to develop the philosophical side of Historical Materialism, as well as the historical and materialist sides of philosophy. He was not being singled out for having essentially anticipated the phenomenologically oriented Marxism later developed by the French Existentialist-Marxists and the Jugoslav Praxis Group. Few of his detractors or supporters were familiar with his work in the Institute for Social Research, first at Frankfurt University, then in Geneva and finally in New York. They did not know that many of his central themes were developed in collaboration with Horkheimer, Adorno and other members of the Institute: the one-dimensionality of instrumental reason and the destructiveness of an exclusively scientific-technological rationalization of society; the interweaving of sociological and psychological concepts with their interdependent ideals of an emancipated society and an autonomous ego; the growing obsolescence of an individualistic psychoanalysis in the totally administered society of the present with its totally socialized and integrated individuals. Nor could they, consequently, appreciate what distinguished his thought from theirs: his intrepid efforts to develop a systematic, theoretical analysis of advanced industrial society, both capitalist and socialist; the directness of his communication, whether theoretical or practical, critical or utopian; his willingness to risk projecting, in however broad strokes, the basic features of an emancipated society and a liberated form of life; or his hope, even in the midst of what he regarded as a total society, that critical insight and spontaneous protest might join together and align themselves with the disenfranchised and the impoverished in challenging an unnecessarily repressive social order.

Perhaps Marcuse overestimated the stability of advanced capitalism, the extent to which its members are seamlessly integrated into its structures of domination. Perhaps this was in part the overreaction of a sensitivity formed in another world in other times. And perhaps it was this overestimation of the power of the objective that led him to stress the subjective side of praxis, that prompted him to turn from history to anthropology for a justification of the potential for a new society, to advance a conception of science and technology as a particular historical project that might be replaced by a new science with a different political content. Be that as it may, it was not simply his position on the political spectrum that accounted for Marcuse's unequalled influence on the student movement, that enabled him to speak as did no other to the generation that came of age in the sixties, that made his analysis of capitalist society ring so true to them that he would be celebrated by the youth of Rome, Paris, and Berlin as well as those of his adopted country. More than any other member of the Frankfurt school, Herbert Marcuse strove constantly to relate his critical theory of society to incipient forces of opposition and change, however weak, however fragmented, however desperate. He never gave up the attempt to articulate the dumb dissatisfaction that pervades life in contemporary industrial society, to reorient its distorted expressions, joining insight to attitude in a great refusal. Herbert Marcuse never stopped caring, he never stopped hoping, he never stopped thinking, and he never stopped fighting.

JEFFREY HERF

Herbert Marcuse's last public address was delivered in Frankfurt, in May 1979. He spoke at the Römergespräche, an annual symposium sponsored by the city of Frankfurt. This year the theme of the Römergespräche was the social and political implications of scientific and technological progress. The vigor with which he spoke, the absence of the slightest hint of political resignation, and his openness to the political andcultural currents of the last decade-and-a-half made it apparent that we were listening to a great old man whose critical spirit remained young. The talk was quintessential Marcuse: a distillation of themes he had developed since the 1930's combined with a spirited defense of the New Left, feminism and ecological concerns.

Just as Marcuse insisted that the oft-pronounced "collapse" of the New Left was a case of conservative wishful thinking, so it should be said tonight that the oft-mentioned obsolescence of the philosopher of one-dimensional society and of its oppositional forces is nonsense. The greatest tribute we can render to Marcuse is to read him again, to develop his thought further, and to remember how very important "Marcusian" ideas are for us today. In the following remarks, I want to touch on some of the themes Marcuse mentioned in his last public address and in his speeches and interviews of the last several years. In particular, I will refer to his comments on the historical significance of the New Left, and on technology and the domination of nature.

Ten years ago large segments of the New Left abandoned their utopian, cultural critical, anti-authoritarian, that is, Marcusian components, for the certainties of sectarian Marxism. As Paul Breines said at that time, "The weight of its [the New Left's] own originality was too great to bear." In the same year, 1969, Marcuse published An Essay on Liberation, in which he defended precisely those ideas that had become an embarrassment within the young left. Whatever our generation may think of its own past, Marcuse remained loyal to it. He said that the New Left had "redefined the concept of revolution" so that it would be appropriate to the possibilities presented by advanced industrial society. It had pointed to "new dimensions" of social change that could no longer be grasped in political and economic categories alone. Instead, this redefinition in theory and practice was "above all a revolution of the dominant

system of needs," as well as of the modes of satisfaction of these needs. The New Left, he claimed, rediscovered a "suppressed dimension" of Marxist theory and practice: the dream of a qualitatively different society, one in which the relations between individuals and between human beings and nature, were completely transformed. This dimension, suppressed by the productivism of both existing capitalist and socialist theory and practice must be operative now, he argued, in the means chosen to achieve the good society. In being the first movement of the left to transcend Marxism's fetishism of the productive forces, the New Left was a "cultural revolution" which "totalized" the opposition by connecting domination anchored in the individual unconscious to conscious social domination.

He spoke of the "emancipation of sense and sensuality," of a new morality, of the fusion of aesthetics and politics that left far behind the Puritan ethic of capitalism and orthodox Marxism. Yes, anti-intellectualism, political repression, the authoritarian ritualization of dogma, and cults of violence had taken their toll. But "in spite of all that," Marcuse insisted that the New Left "marked a turning point in the history of capitalism and socialism." It was, in embryonic form, the prefiguring of a revolution whose impulse would derive less from material suffering than from the revolt against inhuman forms of labor and free time, against enforced needs and their pseudo-satisfaction. It concretized a notion that had remained abstract for far too long, namely, that Marx's impulse to change and not only interprot the world did not mean replacing one system of domination with another. Rather, it entailed making the leap to "a qualitatively new level of civilization in which individuals are able to develop their own needs in solidarity with one another."

As he had for the last decade, Marcuse stressed the importance of feminism. The organization of production on the basis of Eros would "take the ground out from under masculine aggressiveness in its most repressive, productivist form — namely, the form of capitalism." What had appeared as the feminine antithesis to masculine qualities would "emerge as the suppressed historical alternative, the socialist alternative" to contemporary self-destructive productivity.

But when the New Left did turn against its own originality and toward terrorism, Marcuse's response was clear: a pragmatic rejection of terrorist violence was insufficient. "Socialist morality," the idea that the goal of a liberated society must be apparent in the means chosen to achieve it, was equally necessary. If he rejected Max Weber's notion of a value-free social science, he was equally adamant in rejecting a value free concept of instrumentalized radical political opposition.

The ability to think in terms of a unity of opposites was embedded in Marcuse's every utterance. "Does not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which could wipe out the human race also serve to protect the very forces which perpetuate this danger?" This was the opening sentence of <u>One-Dimensional Man</u>. Progress <u>and</u> destruction, liberation from manual labor <u>along with</u> growing domination over men and nature, a growing possibility of an end to unnecessary instinctual repression <u>together with</u> the growth of repressive forms of instictual release to ward off the specter of happiness -- these conceptual opposites continued to confound his critics, who simultaneously labeled him a technological determinist, on the one hand, and a backward-looking romantic, on the other. He was neither. He simply took the word "dialectic" very seriously, as the following anecdote illustrates: in the course of a recent conversation it was suggested to Marcuse that, obscene as it may sound, the introduction of the guillotine during the French Revolution was "progress" because it was more humane than methods of execution practiced by the monarchy. He responded by saying, "Of course, in bourgeois society that is what progress looks like."

"Progress?" was the title and theme of his Frankfurt talk. It was not a world-weary sight of the conservative cultural critic he had often been accused of being. Rather, it was an urgent insistence that capitalism's "ever more threatening spiral of progress and destruction, domination and subjection" can be halted only if the radical left succeeds in keeping open the new dimensions of theory and practice it had initiated in the 1960's. The alternative was still that of "socialism or barbarism" -- and so soon after the Three Mile Island near-catastrophe he meant this very literally.

Of the many controversial ideas Marcuse put forward, few met with more criticism from sympathetic and hostile critics than his views of modern technology. This is not the occasion to give them an adequate recapitulation. Suffice it to say that his remarks in Frankfurt were fully in the spirit of the following sentences from <u>One-Dimensional Man</u> (pp. 157-158, 168-169):

> It is my purpose to demonstrate the <u>internal</u> instrumentalist character of this scientific rationality by virtue of which it is <u>a priori</u> technology, and the <u>a priori</u> of a <u>specific</u> technology -- namely, technology as form of social control and domination ... technology has become the great vehicle of <u>reification</u> -- reification in its most mature and effective form.

For putting forth such notions, for questioning the "neutrality" of technological rationality, for calling for a "new science and technology" and for a new and "pacified" relation between human beings and nature, Marcuse had been repeatedly criticized for committing the sin of indulgence in romantic, backward-looking irrationalism. In Frankfurt he once again committed this "offense" against common sense, obviously convinced that he'd been fundamentally right all along. He stressed his loyalty to the hopes of the 1960's and to his fundamental theoretical positions developed over half a century. But he recalled terror as well as hope. He concluded his speech in Frankfurt by referring to the terror of Auschwitz.

In the last decade, as the political struggle shifted from one for revolution to one for tenure, a more or less pervasive mood in our generation has implied that Herbert Marcuse and his analysis of advanced capitalism and communism was a sign of the times; and with the fracturing of our "affluent society," the entry of a decade of double-digit inflation and high unemployment, of the job and energy shortage, the philosopher of the rebellion against the one-dimensional society had become a museum piece -- as had our own political past. As I listened to him in Frankfurt so soon after Three Mile Island, after the China-Vietnam war, after a decade of "scientific Marxism" in American sociology -- during which time it should be said that American sociology has proved itself to be remarkably immune to Marcuse's influence -- I reflected that Marcuse's thought was as timely today as it was when he first articulated it. The legacy he has bequeathed to us means that Marcuse's critical spirit -- if such a sad occasion as this allows a hopeful note -- is very much alive. Marcuse was the last of a great generation of Western Marxist philosophers, but we must hope for all of our sakes, not the last of an endangered species: the politically engaged and deeply cultured intellectual. In his last speech Marcuse displayed the pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will, the instinctual impulse to a reasoned Great Refusal or more simply the effort to fuse social theory and emancipatory political practice that informed his whole life and work.

MARGARET CERULLO

Not the least of the ironies and interesting paradoxes that constitute the significance of Marcuse for us is the fact that an 81-year-old man and product of one of the most deeply patriarchal and authoritarian of

modern cultures, he turned and returned consistently in his writings of the last decade to the subject of feminism. He explained his reasons in one of the last public lectures he gave in this country at Stanford in 1974. Simply:

> I believe the Women's Liberation Movement is perhaps the most important and potentially the most radical political movement that we have -- even if the consciousness of this fact has not yet penetrated the Movement as a whole.

I take Marcuse's serious engagement with the feminist project both as a testament to his enormous historical openness, his refusal of political resignation, and also -- speaking as a woman and a feminist -- as a moving gesture of respect and solidarity, which may turn out to be the most important part of his legacy to the male left in the United States today.

I want first to explore why Marcuse thought that the Women's Liberation Movement was "the most radical" political movement we have; and then, in a Marcusean spirit -- evident always in his dialogue with Marxism -- interrogate the tradition of critical theory itself, confronting it with the development of feminist theory and practice, in the hope of its emancipation from its own patriarchal bias and male-modeled assumptions.

What Russell Jacoby wrote in relation to the New Left may be even more apt here: with the emergence of the Women's Liberation Movement, the gap closed between Marcuse's texts and the writing on the wall. So many recurrent Marcusean dreams and themes found their embodiment in the movement for women's liberation that came to be called socialist feminism: his vision in Eros and Civilization of love as revolution; his insistence on the possibility of a new reality principle, as the promise of a socialism which could no longer be understood as a change in social institutions but had to be deepened to include a vision of a change in consciousness and the very instinctual structures of human beings deformed by exploitation and domination; his understanding of socialism as a qualitative leap to a new system of needs which are sensuous, ethical, and rational in one. The movement of our recent history revealed the power of eros, of love, which Marcuse invoked against a repressive civilization to be the power of women at work and in the community,[1] a power which found its most concerted and political expression in the women's liberation movement.

Marcuse saw the women's movement at its most radical as announcing precisely a rupture with the Performance Principle, the Reality Principle of industrial capitalism and of a socialism which continued and even extended the Performance Principle and its values. Underlining the demand for the liberation of women thrown up by the Movement itself, Marcuse insisted that equality with men is not yet freedom. He understood women's liberation as a subversion of the Performance Principle, not an invitation to participate. Marcuse saw finally that what was at stake was a new morality, a feminist morality, a reversal of the values of profitable productivity, repression, efficiency, aggression, competitiveness, of an instrumental rationality severed from emotion -- in the name of receptivity, tenderness, nonviolence. It seems to me that remembering our own dream, our own vision, our own morality, whose terms Marcuse had so eloquently anticipated, is of critical importance to our Movement today -- in a period in which instrumentality, competitiveness, self-assertion, aggressiveness, individualism are starkly revealed and even cynically embraced as the name of the game, particularly the academic game. To challenge any and all of these, to stand against the instrumentality which has come to infect the Movement that once stood on the basis of another morality; to propose, to think, let alone to envision and establish the alternative structures and modes of intellectual activity that would concretize a different vision of intellectual engagement -- sounds as romantic, as naive and utopian as anything Marcuse ever proposed.

Marcuse himself stood outside -- irritating, critical, romantic, utopian, outrageous: a model of a critical politically engaged intellectual, against the grain, the trend, the fashion. The political, intellectual, and cultural position he claimed for himself is one known to few men and fewer women. Even to put together the words, critical, politically engaged, intellectual -- woman breaks the sequence and reminds us that we are dealing with a phenomenon virtually unknown in this country. For a few minutes, I would like to begin to explore why. What kind of life are we talking about and for whom is it possible? What kinds of assumptions, decisions, struggles, sacrifices constitute, enable, paralyze, or deny the life of a political intellectual? Where do family, sexuality, parenting, love fit within it (all issues which in other contexts Marcuse insisted had to be taken into political account)? When Marcuse proposes as the terms of such a life the fusion of eros and reason, what I must conclude is that he is implicitly -- if importantly -- talking about the feminization of male intellectuals. The identification of the feminine, of woman, with eros, with pleasure, with sensuality must seem more ambiguous to us, the eroticization of our intellects a possibility with which we are all too familiar. As women, our project must be to create the space of study and solitude, of intellectual intensity and assertion, of confidence and challenge -- and still to think, to act, and to be like women. To begin to salvage and to renew a critical intellectual tradition too long deformed and distorted by our absence. And that would be a radical and subversive project in the Marcusean spirit.

[1]For a magnificent historical development of this point, see Elizabeth Ewen, Immigrant Women in the Land of Dollars, 1890-1920, forthcoming from Pantheon.

MARYANN LASH

Beacon Press is privileged to have had a long, challenging and fruitful relationship with Herbert Marcuse, as his publishers. A remark by one of Beacon's editors in 1955, when Beacon published the first of nine books written or co-authored by Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, set the tone for the rest of the 24-year relationship. She wrote to Marcuse of a "special sense of excitement" at Beacon over the upcoming publication of that trail-blazing work. Our records indicate that it began when Philip Rieff, a colleague at Brandeis, fortuitously brought author and publisher together.

Of course, Marcuse wasn't as well known in the mid-50's as he would be 10 or 15 years later, as a copy of a letter he wrote to Look magazine indicates. Marcuse noted: "The February 7 issue of your magazine lists on page 67 'For Women Only' (with 13 cute little red hearts) under the caption 'Current Books on Love' my book Eros and Civilization together with Three Loves of Dostoevsky by Mark Slonim and Fabulous Foods for People You Love by Carolyn Coggins. While I feel deeply honored to be mentioned together with Dostoevsky and fabulous foods, I am apprehensive lest your readers (if anyone of them should buy my book) are disappointed if they don't get what they expected." After a brief discussion of the book, Marcuse closed the letter thusly: "I feel I should warn your readers and protect myself against any accusation for not delivering the goods."

He may not have delivered the goods for Look's "Current Books on Love," but he certainly "delivered the goods" for the generation of the late sixties and seventies.

The early sixties were different. It's now hard to believe that when Marcuse wrote One-Dimensional Man a reader advised against publishing it, saying he did not believe there was an audience for the book. Since then "one-dimensional man" has become, it's fair to say, part of our cultural fabric. And for the academic world, his contributing to our understanding of critical theory has been, I believe, even more important.

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From Eros and Civilization through One-Dimensional Man to last year's Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse kept working -- and kept us at Beacon working. For if anything characterized Beacon's involvement with Herbert Marcuse, it was his interest and involvement with every facet of the publishing process -- an involvement that Beacon welcomed and delighted in. Our files are bulging with correspondence from Marcuse: asking for copies of his books; inquiring over the possibility of an edition in French, Italian, Japanese -- or even Serbo-Croatian. Partnership became friendship and there grew a special sense of working together for common goals. In many ways Marcuse and Beacon together became more like a European publishing venture -- where ideas and intellectual search are the pivot, where theory and practice are joined.

Marcuse carried this with him -- his largeness of spirit and mind, his charming sense of fun, his challenging vision.

His keen interest in everything we did was an indication of the man and his work: he never lost his sense of excitement, of inquiry. Perhaps what made working with him so challenging was the fact that he was so alive, so intensely human -- a brilliant and warm person.

This is not to say his was an easy mind to fathom. As one reader wrote to him, "Your style is easy; it's the thought that's difficult." (Perhaps that says more about the reader than about Marcuse.) But we knew his argument is well worth following. The richness of his writing is truly remarkable -- the interplay of theory and practice truly unique.

We at Beacon relied on him more than we realized. We constantly communicated with him regarding works by other authors. And he always was generous with his opinions and suggestions.

Marcuse knew he was regarded with suspicion by the establishment press. He had written an essay in the summer of 1972 excoriating the United States for its Vietnam policies, an essay that strongly endorsed George McGovern. Marcuse wanted it to appear in lieu of a preface to Counterrevolution and Revolt but unfortunately it was too late to include it in that volume. He explained that he wanted it published that way, because "These pages are so outspoken that I see no other chance of getting them published (except in some small leftist paper or periodical)."

But if there was a hint of despair, it didn't last very long. Soon his spirits were rising again, for he remained a man of hope.

Quite simply, Beacon exists to publish writers like Marcuse. Several large commercial houses held out blandishments to him after he gained eminence and success. But he understood what our commitments are. We share with him, as Erica Marcuse and Peter Marcuse have put it, "in the struggle for justice in this life, in this world -- to use life to help bring about a better life." And Marcuse continued to honor us with his new works. It was an important partnership for both author and publisher.

JOHN DAVID OBER

Circumstances having at last set me free from the groves of academe, I come here tonight not as a member of some illusory fifth column but as a poor working member of the fourth estate. Before I read the brief tribute to Herbert Marcuse which I composed for the Boston Phoenix, I would like to make two observations:

Just days before he died, Marcuse told a French reporter that it was fitting and proper that he end his life in Germany. Ironic. Bittersweet to the last. For the Germany that molded Marcuse and that he loved -- his first published work was a limited edition of Schiller -- was also the Germany that drove him out. There is justice in the fact that the Old Jew, as he sometimes called himself, was able finally to pique the conscience and to make a little trouble for the land that had rejected him and had devoured its own best progeny and impulses.

Second, a word on Marcuse the scholar. He knew Hegel, Marx, Freud and could do textual analysis with the best of them. But his purpose was not to produce scholarly tracts illuminating the ideas of seminal minds. He did not write books on Freud; he used Freud -- ruthlessly even -- to expose a later historical situation characterized and dominated by the unique psychic and economic concatenations confronting post-Freudian man. Marcuse was not, then, an Hegelian, a Marxist, a Freudian. Like the best social theorists of the past, he borrowed from, altered, and "re-collected" -- in Gabriel Marcel's term -- the ideas of the past in order to explain, to challenge, and to oppose the monstrosities of our beleaguered century.*

The last two decades of Herbert Marcuse's life were in some ways an ironic and empirical recapitulation of his critique of modern society. "That which is not yet a commodity will become one," he used to say. Those who knew him before the meteoric ascendancy to public prominence and the equally steep plunge from the heights of media favor gazed on the spectacle with bemused amazement, as photographers and reporters enshrined his visage and trivialized his most serious ideas. That he was as entertained as we was typical of Marcuse: through it all, he remained unscathed by his own rise and decline.

"We live in the first society ever in which reality surpasses and obliterates the imagination," Detractors of all political persuasions made facile use of cryptic statements like this one to accuse Marcuse of rank utopianism. He seldom bothered to answer the charge, because he thought that the imagination was the source and preserve of freedom against a predatory and wasteful society. Such Hegelian remnants earned for him the undying enmity of the doctrinaire left.

Long after his acuity as a social critic was recognized abroad, he was "discovered" in his adopted country shortly after the publication of One-Dimensional Man, in 1964. Marcuse was transformed in the popular mind into something he was not by people who usually failed to understand him and who often had not even read him.

In many ways he was the opposite of those who acted in his name. He neither invited nor caused a cult following to emerge, although he no doubt felt vindicated by it in specific and understandable ways. He offered erudite encouragement to the rational forces of rebellion, and condemned -- not loudly enough for some -- the mindless ploys and anti-intellectualism.

Marcuse the man had been molded by a classical German education; he possessed a Bildung and intellectual discipline that had all but died in the trenches of WWI. Husserl himself sat on the examination board when Marcuse took his doctorate; he studied with (and later repudiated) Heidegger; and the scope of Marcuse's knowledge was a constant reminder that a part of him belonged to the century of Kant and Goethe. He had a passion for late Beethoven quartets, Mahler, Berg; he knew more about so-called literature -- German, French, English -- than many a contemporary academic specialist; he liked food prepared according to the methods of Escoffier, and fine clarets and Cuban cigars.

Yet unlike that of many of his less erudite colleagues, Marcuse's wisdom was not fixed in the past but was brought resolutely to bear on the present and prob-

* The text beginning with the fourth paragraph was first printed in The Boston Phoenix, August 7, 1979. Copyright John David Ober.

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able future course of events. Marcuse transcended his own scholarship to create a breathtaking and devastating critique of advanced capitalist societies and their attendant ideologies. For him, Watergate and Vietnam did show that the system works: unfairly and to the advantage of those who have the most to lose if it fails.

Those of us whom Marcuse taught and befriended were made especially aware of the power inherent in "the laughter of deadly seriousness." There was more than a little of Till Eulenspiegel in his vision and in his defiance. Nothing triggered his scatological wit faster than a man or woman who blatantly espoused the view that the way we (and things) are now is pretty much the way we (and they) have always been. Marcuse's laughter always made a point, was unobtrusively didactic -- and sometimes concealed his great warmth.

"Marcuse is like Rousseau -- with less guilt and more gallows humor." An undergraduate's remark, strange at first glance but in the end close to the mark. Just as Fousseau became a very sharp thorn in the flesh of the French Enlighteners of the 18th century, so Marcuse, in his immense integrity and fiery opposition to ideology, ruffled more than feathers across the political spectrum. He was subjected to an unending litany of epithets: Stalinist, anti-working class, CIA agent, elitist, pessimist, utopian, to list a few of the more polite labels.

If his enemies have yet to discover the areas where Marcuse's social analysis is most vulnerable, it is not for lack of trying. And for all the spilled ink, few if any, critics have satisfactorily met the haunting challenge or adequately refuted his threatening theory of repressive tolerance, his concept of repressive desublimation, or his conclusion that modern societies are unfree and demented precisely because of their apparent rationality.

Marcuse's own truculence greatly impeded the efforts to classify, package, and sell him -- and ultimately to pretend he did not exist: true, when he cut too close to the bone, he was quickly taken off the market. But historically, reports of his death as a power to be reckoned with are probably greatly exaggerated.

Herbert Marcuse: the Philosopher as Perpetual Scandal *

by

RUSSELL JACOBY

Herbert Marcuse is dead. Last Sunday night, at the age of 81, he succumbed to a world he always resisted. His list of credits or crimes is long, and it includes inciting the student revolts of the 1960s. For those who collect evidence that the '60s are over, another scrap can be pasted in the album. But those who were too young to remember those years and those who never cared should be told: A piece of the living past has been dislodged.

Before the flood of bathos commences, let it be said: Herbert Marcuse was a perpetual scandal. He belonged to a species on the endangered list everywhere: the politically engaged intellectual. The world of the big buck and the fast deal was not his; neither was he one of those academics who clamber up the ladder of government posts and consulting fees, nor was he the front man or fall guy for any political group. His commitment to critical and independent thought belonged to a fading tradition.

Marcuse shared obsolescence with others from his generation; it was the source of their intellectual force. What he said on the occasion of the death of his friend, T. W. Adorno, can be said of himself: He preserved past forms of culture in the uncompromising opposition to the present culture. This generation indicted the present with its own past. Here was the root of Marcuse's unfashionable integrity. That Marcuse was attacked not only by defenders of the security of the Republic, but also by Moscow's Pravada: not only by the Pope, but also by the French Communist Party; not only by the American Legion, but also by left sectarians suggests that he threatened authorities of every stripe. Marcuse was not only a subversive; he was subversive to the subverrives.

Marcuse a subversive? He never tired of affirming that he was only a "poor" philosopher. He threw no rocks and set no bombs. He offered only unexpurgated thought: thinking without censorship and fear. But this provoked censorship and fear. Academics were unnerved by his intellectual audacity, and the ease with which he walked between the departments of the university. He wrote on Marx as well as Freud, on the Soviet Union as well as the United States, on philosophy as well as art. His academic critics were convinced that because he had so much to say he lacked rigor. Defenders of law and order mailed him death threats.

Marcuse was a man of the 20th century, and also its victim. Along with a generation of Jews, Marcuse made the trek from Germany to the United States as Hitler came to power. His 81 years began in Berlin and, with intermediate stops in Geneva, New York, Washington and Boston, ended in Southern California, where he joined the faculty of UC San Diego in 1965. Others were not so lucky. Many never began or finished the flight from fascism. Marcuse did not forget, and his remembering was not an afterthought or a weekend testimonial. The critical function of memory infused and largely defined his work. The wounds that heal in time, he wrote, were also the wounds that contain the poison. In the cloudless skies of Southern California, Marcuse never forgot the darkness that haunts civilization.

Marcuse drank deeply from Freud, as well as from Marx and Hegel. The titles of some of his books suggest his unfashionable scope: Eros and Civilization and Reason and Revolution. These four words encompass everything he wrote. The Freud who pondered whether aggression and self-destruction would drown civilization was familiar to Marcuse; and he turned not to the Marx of state production goals, but to the Marx of human liberation. He shared the sentiments of his friend Max Horkheimer, who had denounced those revolutionaries who were already drawing up lists for the executions of the future. Marcuse was no pacifist, but neither was he a friend to the cultists of violence. In his vocabulary, pornography was not so much four-letter words, as the hardware of military destruction. He found obscene a society that indicted the pornographers while parading bemedaled generals to be gawked at by Little Leaguers and Boy Scouts.

The improbable happened. For a historical instant this uncompromising intellectual from the past, who never lost his German accent and never learned to drive, was lionized -- and cursed -- as instigating the student upheavals of the '60s. A student of Marcuse's, Angela Davis, made headlines as a black revolutionary, and added to the din around her teacher. His best-known work, One-Dimensional Man, had appeared in 1964, and anticipated that future social revolts would be triggered not by a working class but by those "outside" the

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5995

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working class: blacks, minorities, students and peoples of the Third World. In the United States, and even more in Germany, France and Italy, Marcuse emerged as one of the most visible spokesmen of a new left. The "new" of the New Left expressed a hope and, partly, a reality. It was new after the dissipation and repression of the older left of the 1950s, and it turned away from the traditional arenas of elections and trade unions to challenge society in its gut: the streets, the bureaucracies, the forms of life and loving. Yet did the youth of Jerry Rubin's Do It! -- the Yippies, hippies and rebelling students -- actually read Marcuse's books? No matter. For a moment there was a convergence of sensibilities. The inchoate protest against the war in Vietnam and racism, which spilled into a wider and deeper protest, found its reason and mind in an aging German-Jewish philosopher. For a moment the gap between the texts of Marcuse and the writing on the wall was closed. At the same time that he was writing "the fight for Eros is a political fight" the streets resounded with the scuffles of a counter-culture. If Marcuse was fashionable, however, it was despite himself; he wrote no blank checks, and was sometimes a sharp critic of the New Left. And when the world went on to other things, Marcuse continued writing and lecturing.

A society traumatized by the exhaustion of its energy and fuel should take note. Fascism packed off to these shores a sliver from the wreckage of European culture. It included a Thomas Mann, a Bertolt Brecht and a Herbert Marcuse, as well as thousands of others. To risk a generalization, one quality many of this generation shared was an inexhaustible intellectual energy to write, teach and live. Marcuse was active and committed, interested and interesting to the very end of his life. He was born before the age of the automobile and he died in the nuclear era. Today, corrosion and erosion have damaged the ability and energy to think critically and boldly; the pay is poor, and few are applying. Marcuse's example of critical reflection and political commitment must be protected and nurtured. All the solar power in the universe will not light a world that has lost its ability to illuminate itself.

Marcuse, the pessimist, once wrote that "Not those who die, but those who die before they must and want to die, those who die in agony and pain, are the great indictment against civilization." Neither Marcuse's life nor death add to that indictment; the carnage of daily life and the destruction of wars more than suffice. Marcuse led a full and graceful life. What does darken the future prospects, however, is that the force and subversion which belong to the engaged but independent intellectual will fade into oblivion, and that with Marcuse we are burying a piece of ourselves which we are unable to retrieve.

Herbert Marcuse, Marxist Philosopher*

by

RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA

The death of Herbert Marcuse on July 29 marks a sad day on the historic calendar of young revolutionaries as well as old Marxists. How great is the void death has created can be gauged from his mature life-span which covered the 1919 German Revolution, the U.S. New Left in the mid-1960s, to the very month of his death in Germany -- the country of his birth, the land of both Hegel and Marx -- where he was preparing a paper on "The Holocaust" to be delivered both there and in Spain. Marcuse's life-span was by no means one upward spiral. But the fact that the mass media, in their obituaries, choose to dwell on his One-Dimensional Man, as if that were the focal point of his life, tells a great deal more about decadent capitalism than it does about Herbert Marcuse.

The truth is that, as a young man completing his military service in Germany, he was active in the revolutionary Soldiers' Council in Berlin. Marx's philosophy of liberation and the revolutionaries, Rosa Luxemburg-Karl Liebknecht, were the real determinants of Marcuse's life. It is true that when the Social Democracy beheaded that 1919 revolution and Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were murdered, Marcuse left political activism for the study of philosophy. It is not true that he wavered in his commitment to Marxism.

In the very period when he wrote his first major work, Hegel's Ontology and the Foundation of a Theory of History, which still bore the traces of his teacher, Heidegger, he penned what remains to this day one of the most profound analyses(1) of Marx's Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which had just then (1932) been published in Germany. Not only does Marcuse there call Marx's early essays the "philosophical foundation of a theory of revolution," but he adds presciently for our times:

> All attempts to dismiss the philosophical content of Marx's theory or to gloss over it in embarrassment reveal a complete failure to recognize the historical origin of the theory: they set out from an essential separation of philosophy, economics and revolutionary praxis, which is a product of the reification against which Marx fought and which he had already overcome at the beginning of his critique (p. 10).

Just as the bourgeois press is trying to reduce the historic legacy of Marcuse to the writing of One-Dimensional Man (to which I'll return later), so the Stalinists and Maoists did everything to slander Marcuse in the 1960s when, by no means a youth, he nevertheless identified with the New Left in the anti-Vietnam War movement, in the Black revolution, in the student movement which rose to a climax in May, 1968, in Paris.

What those state-capitalist practitioners, calling themselves Communists, don't explain is why they chose the mid-1960s to pre-occupy themselves with "exposing Marcuse's role" of working for the U.S. Government two decades earlier, in World War II. What they hide is that while Marcuse, even then, did not compromise with Marxism as theory, they have totally revised Marxism both as theory and in practice. The reason is twofold: First, by the 1960s, for different reasons, both Russia and China refused to approve any but their own method of opposing U.S. imperialism -- that is to say, actually carrying out secret negotiations with it to make sure there would be no successful social revolution in their own lands. Second, Stalinists and Maoists alike hoped to make the "exposé" of Marcuse so slanderous that none would want to look at what Marcuse had published in that crucial year of 1941.

That was the year Reason and Revolution appeared. In that seminal work, Marcuse established the Humanism

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5996

of Marxism, and re-established the revolutionary dialectic of Hegel-Marx, for the first time for the American public.(2) It is impossible to forget the indebtedness we felt for Marcuse when that breath of fresh air and vision of a truly classless society was published -- and we were actively opposing that imperialist war. It was the year I embarked on the study of the nature of the Russian economy and the role of labor in that state-planned economy, and came upon Marx's Humanist Essays and the famous Frankfurt School. While I deeply disagreed with these German refugees who were under the illusion that one way of fighting Nazism was to work for the U.S. Government, I felt a kinship to these opponents of Nazism. One thing that distinguished Herbert Marcuse, a theoretician in that famous Frankfurt School (officially Institute for Social Research), was that he did not hold himself apart from the people in the country in which he now lived; and his friends were not the rulers, but the revolutionaries.

Thus at the height of McCarthyism, when the Humanism of Marxism about which I was writing in Marxism and Freedom -- its American roots as well as its world dimension -- was hardly the most popular theory to propound in these United States, Marcuse volunteered, when I sent him the manuscript, to write the Preface to it.(3) He also tried to find a publisher for it. Neither in private nor in public did we ever hide the sharp differences that divided us. But that did not keep him from practicing his strong belief in a continuous, open, serious battle of ideas as more than mere bourgeois democracy. As he was to put it in that Preface:

> The Marxian insistence on democracy as the preparatory stage of socialism, far from being a cloak, or "Aesopian language" pertains to the basic conception and is not minimized by the equally strong insistence on the difference between "bourgeois" and socialist democracy (p. 11).

Fairly recently (Nov. 1, 1976), the differences surfaced in a new form as Marcuse had not only moved away from any belief that the proletariat was the revolutionary force, but bestowed that revolutionary role on art. Here is what he wrote would be my attitude: "You will laugh, when you hear I am working on Marxist aesthetics: 'Doesn't he have other worries?' But perhaps we will meet again sometime, somewhere, for a good discussion and disagreement."

The determining division between us, of course, came in 1961 with the publication of One-Dimensional Man. As against the Marxian concept of labor as the revolutionary force and reason for transforming society, which Marcuse had held not only in his 1932 essay on Marx but also in his 1941 Reason and Revolution, and as a departure (or development if you wish) of the 1957 Preface to Marxism and Freedom, when Marcuse began questioning the role of the proletariat, he now pronounced nothing short of capitalism's "integration" of the working class in mind as well as body -- and even, à la Sartre's analysis of automation, in sexuality. I held, instead, that, far from the proletariat having become one-dimensional, what the intellectual proves when he does not see proletarian revolt, is that his thought is one-dimensional. I sent him my review, and when next we met, what happened discloses how great is the philosophic void that his death brings and how hard it will be to fill that void.

He laughed at my review(4) and called me a "romantic." Those gentle eyes of his had a way of smiling even when he was theoretically shouting at you -- as if he were saying: "It really is good to have one who still believes; for, without revolution, what is there?"

This was the attitude I sensed again as he suddenly engaged me in a discussion of a phrase Marx used in his Critique of the Gotha Programme: "labor, from a mere means of life, has become the prime necessity of life." When he asked what I thought that meant, it need hardly be stressed that Marcuse knew very well what Marx meant. He wasn't asking for any sort of definition about how different from alienated labor under capitalism would be labor as self-activity and self-development when, with the abolition of "the antithesis between mental and physical labor," the new society could write on its banner: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

No, what he was saying was: since we "cannot know" when labor will become creative as united mental-physical, any more than we can know when the state will "wither away" -- and we are surely living in a "repressive monolith," be it the U.S. or Russia -- what can we, "a very tiny minority," do? If you think it is more than the Great Refusal -- well!

Marcuse always had a strong streak of pessimism in him. I don't mean pessimism in any "psychological" sense -- he enjoyed life too much for that. I mean this constant veering between loving utopias and not believing in them; some sort of cloud was always appearing at the very moment when he thought he saw farthest. Ah, there goes that smile in those gentle eyes. Oh, no, he is dead!

One final, personal word. Last year when I saw him in California, where I was on a lecture tour, we of course disagreed again; and again it was on the nearness or distance of revolution. Suddenly he asked me why I didn't stop "running around," (that is, being active), and concentrate instead on finishing the manuscript on Rosa Luxemburg and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution.

When the news of Marcuse's death came this July 29, just 10 days after his 81st birthday, and I remembered the last discussion, I thought: the 1919 German Revolution and Marx's philosophy of liberation were precisely the points of the birth of Herbert Marcuse as Marxist philosopher. How sad that he is gone! How great that the revolutionary legacy lives on!

Detroit
Aug. 2, 1979

NOTES

(1) In English this essay, "The Foundation of Historical Materialism," was not published until 1972, when it was included in a collection of his essays, Studies in Critical Philosophy, New Left Books, London.

(2) It is true that Marx's Essays themselves were not published in English until I included them as Appendices to Marxism and Freedom in 1957. But analysis of them, as well as the attitude to the Hegel-Marx dialectic as revolutionary, set forth in Reason and Revolution, sent many students who knew other languages to seek them out.

(3) It was also the period when he had just finished Eros and Civilization and, while I had kept my distance on the whole question of trying to combine Freud with Marx, I did turn the book over for review to a Marxist-Humanist physician who held that "It is to the great credit of Marcuse that he clearly and persistently points out the dynamic revolutionary core of Freudian psychoanalysis: that the life instincts . . . required not compromise but rejection of the present society, not sublimation but confronting the sickness that is disturbing modern life." ("A Doctor Speaks," News & Letters, Feb. 5, 1957.)

(4) See "Reason and Revolution vs. Conformism and Technology" in The Activist, Fall, 1964.

EDITORIAL DEADLINE
Submission of materials for the Volume 6, No 1, NEWSLETTER is:
15 January 1980